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Preface to the English Edition
According to current usage, the geographical name "Transylvania" refers 
to the Romanian province lying west and north of the Carpathians and bor­
dering on Hungary. Originally, only the territory between the Carpathians 
and the Bihar Mountains constituted historic Transylvania, which in medi­
aeval times used to be an organic part of the Hungarian state. In the six­
teenth and seventeenth centuries the so-called Partium (the areas lying west 
and north of the mediaeval Transylvania), and even the Banat, belonged to 
the Principality of Transylvania, then under the suzerainty of the Ottoman 
Empire. (Before 1526 these regions belonged to different administrative units 
of the Kingdom of Hungary.) Historic Transylvania was a Habsburg princi­
pality from the late seventeenth century until 1867, except for a brief inter­
val from 1848 until 1849 when it was reunited with Hungary. From 1867 
until 1918 Transylvania belonged to Hungary, with both being included in 
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The modem definition of Transylvania 
was formulated after 1920 to include areas outside historic Transylvania. 
This new Transylvania was split into two by the so-called Second Vienna 
Award (30 August, 1940), which gave the northern and eastern parts back 
to Hungary. Then, in late 1944, these same areas were given back to Roma­
nia and this arrangement was sanctioned by the Paris Peace Treaty of 1947.
From the previous paragraph it must already be apparent that the his­
tory of Transylvania right up until the twentieth century, has been charac­
terized by a series of annexations predominantly determined by considera­
tions of power politics. In Transylvania, Romanians, Hungarians and Saxons 
have been living side by side for centuries, together with other, smaller, 
ethnic groups. Ever since the nationality issue came to the fore, ethnic fac­
tors have played an increasingly important part in the changes. Since the 
early eighteenth century, Romanians have constituted the greater part of 
Transylvania's population. By the end of that century the idea of uniting all 
Romanian-populated regions had already achieved a prominent place in 
the thinking of the intelligentsia, and in the nineteenth century incorpo­
rated into the concept of a unitary Romanian nation-state. At the same time, 
the Hungarian population of Transylvania was bound to Hungary in nu­
merous ways, politically as well as culturally, and wanted Transylvania's 
XIII reunion with Hungary. The third major nationality in Transylvania, the
Saxons, wished to secure their own autonomy under any prevailing regime. 
Transylvania was twice united with Romania: once in 1920, and then again 
in 1947. On both occasions the ethnic majority principle formed the basis of 
the decision and the Hungarian minority was not consulted in the matter.
As a result, areas predominantly populated by Hungarians were also handed 
over to Romania. This fact became a source of friction, since there existed 
neither bilateral nor multilateral agreements to settle the minorities' prob­
lems in any acceptable form, and at a time when the practice of forced as­
similation was continuing.
As a result, Transylvanian history has long been subject to dispute not 
only among politicians, but also among scholars. The truth of this assertion 
was indicated by the reception given to Erdely tortenete (A History of Transyl­
vania), the three-volume work published in cooperation with the Hungar­
ian Academy of Sciences' Institute of History in 1986. Although the authors 
attempted to avoid the pitfalls of a nationalist approach, to write the his­
tory of Transylvania with the greatest possible objectivity, and to apply the 
criteria indispensable to a scholarly work, Romanian politicians, together 
with certain historians, accused them of having nationalist prejudices, of 
advocating territorial revision and even of falsifying history. We rejected 
these accusations, but welcomed those critical comments which, while ap­
preciating the concept, methodology, and novel approach of the work, called 
attention to its unevenness and to the omissions and mistakes it contained.
With these criticisms in mind, we decided to publish an abridged version in 
English to help inform and orientate the foreign reader.
Sadly, not all the original authors and editors could participate in this 
work. The deaths of Andres M6csy and Zsolt Tr6cs3nyi were a great loss.
To revise the sections written by them, we had to call on G&bor Vekony and 
Ambrus Miskolczy: the resulting chapters should be seen as the joint work 
of the authors of both the original and the abridged version. Istv^n B6na 
took over the editorial work of Andras M6csy. L3szIo Makkai died shortly 
after the completion of the abridged manuscript.
The criticism and the arguments put forward confirmed the authors and 
the editors in their earlier conviction that writing a history of Transylvania 
is a task which touches on the fundamental questions of scholarly research, 
and places a great responsibility on historians both in the eyes of their col­
leagues and of the public. We all share the belief that in the interest of learn­
ing about our past we have to consider facts which need to be presented, 
analyzed, and interpreted with respect to circumstances prevailing at the 
time. Our authors and editors reject the traditional argument of nationalist 
romanticism, which invokes so-called "historic rights" to support a politi­
cal ideology or a national identity, and all those reductionist explanations 
which attempt to derive historical processes form a single factor — i.e. eth­
nicity. They are unable to accept the finalist approach of certain historians, 
who attempt to project the ethnic and state structures of the twentieth cen­
tury into the past. Although our authors assign great significance to the 
independence movements and the efforts to form nation-states, they do not 
regard them as the sole driving forces of history. They are convinced that, 
partly independently of the ethnic composition and partly embedded in it, 
economic and social conditions were crucial right up until the formation of XIV
the m odem  nation-states, and continued to be relevant even later on. Last, 
but not least, historical experience taught our authors that co-operation be­
tween the various nations is in the interests of each nation. They believe 
that only the observation of collective and individual human rights and 
mutual respect for the language, the culture and the history of each nation 
can form the basis for such co-operation.
In writing a history of Transylvania, the authors addressed themselves 
to the economic, social, political and cultural history of all three major na­
tionalities, knowing full well that in the current state of research a certain 
disproportion was unavoidable. The authors were careful to base their work 
on the analysis of facts and to avoid value judgments as much as possible — 
realizing that there is always a great temptation simply to replace old val­
ues with new ones when one writes a history of such controversial subject. 
For this reason, they paid much attention to the economic, social, and cul­
tural trends of the "long period", trying to fit it into the framework of the 
region's history.
W e have listed in the annotated bibliography the works written by histo­
rians of other nations, calling attention to views that are at variance with 
our own. We take the opportunity to express our hope that the time will 
come when historians will discuss their differences according to the norms 
of scholarly research and that their work will serve not only scholarship 
itself, but also better understanding between nations.
W ith regard to the period after 1918, we had to content ourselves with a 
brief summary of events up to 1945, since there are neither reliable source 
documents, nor sufficient research work to facilitate an authoritative ap­
praisal of the last decades. We hope that within a few years there will be 
enough material available to permit the writing of respectable and schol­
arly works.
Transylvania is a special part of Europe, where different nationalities, 
religions and cultures meet — sometimes competing, but mostly co-operat­
ing with each other. The events of the last years prove that such co-opera­
tion between the various ethnic groups of Transylvania is in the interests of 
the whole of Europe.




TRANSYLVANIA IN PREHISTORIC 
AND ANCIENT TIMES

I. Prehistory and Antiquity
1. The Prehistory of Dacia
From the Beginnings to the End of the Stone Age
The variable pre- and protohistory of the Transylvanian Basin, ringed by 
high mountains, can in no way be separated from the history of the neigh­
bouring areas. The valleys of the Szamos, Maros and Olt rivers have always 
been a favourite route of traders and populations in search of a new home­
land. Groups casting an eye on the mineral wealth of this area were not 
deterred by the seemingly impenetrable mountain ranges, while what ap­
pear to be insignificant hills often acted as borderlines.
As a consequence of the geographic features of Transylvania and fre­
quent immigrations, few periods have been characterized by a cultural and 
ethnic unity.
Even though the first human groups had probably colonized this area by 
the Lower Paleolithic, the first certain races of human settlement in Transyl­
vania date to the Middle Paleolithic. At the beginning of the last glaciation, 
archaic Homo sapiens groups settled the caves of the Middle Maros region. 
Some of these sites show strong affinities with the slightly earlier or con­
temporaneous cave dwellings in the western part of the Balkan Peninsula. 
Their flakestone tools were manufactured exclusively from quartzite. It is 
noteworthy that while a group of the so-called Charentean culture that oc­
cupied an open-air site in Hungary specialized in the exploitation of young 
cave bears, wild horse was the main quarry of another community of this 
culture in the Hatszeg area somewhat later.
The Charentean industry was distributed not only in the Hatszeg but 
also over the entire southern Carpathian Range as shown by the sites of 
Pestera in the Toresvar Pass and Baia de Fier in the southern Carpathians.
At the close of the Middle Paleolithic, groups manufacturing bifacial tools 
retouched over their entire surface made their appearance in Transylvania. 
These groups are generally linked to the Szeletien technocomplex in a wider 
sense. There is no evidence of development from earlier, local industries 
and thus the presence of bifacially worked points in the Late Charentean 
can be traced to Szeletien influence.
Only the developed phase of the Aurignacian industry appeared in the 
second cold stage of the last glaciation. The Aurignacian groups replacing 
the cave bear hunters of the Wiirm 1/2 interstadial have been identified 
only from seasonal cave campsites. Interestingly enough, it is precisely the
short-lived innovation of the Aurignacians, the projectile point carved from 
bone, which is lacking from the known tool kits, with the only notable ex­
ception being the Late Aurignacian point from Baia de Fier. Worked points 
of bear hunters have been reported from Csoklovina. The neuro-cranium 
found on that site suggests that these hunters can be assigned to the proto- 
Nordic anthropomorphic group (Predmost race).
Beginning with the Wiirm 2/3 period, the mammoth and reindeer hunt­
ers of the eastern Gravettien seem to have bypassed the area encompassed 
by the eastern Carpathians. Only two sites in the source region of the Dim- 
bovifa suggest that these plains hunters had seasonal cave settlements. The 
tools recovered from Szitabodza too lie on the boundary of Transylvania.
After the retreat of the icesheet from the Carpathians the Transylvanian 
Basin was again slowly populated. Epigravettien-Tardenoisien sites are only 
known in southeastern Transylvania, along the upper reaches of the Bodza 
River. In addition to a variety of tiny blades, points, blade scrapers and 
small lunate scraper flints these sites have also yielded the characteristic 
trapezoidal tools of the Tardenoisian culture. At the same time the proto- 
Europid Romanello-Azilien groups of the southwestern Carpathians and 
the Iron Gates region domesticated the dog and may also have tried their 
hand at the cultivation of wheat and at pig breeding.
This process came to a halt with the arrival of the Kflros-Starcevo popula­
tion, an immigrant group from the southern Balkans. They had learned the 
cultivation of wheat and barley and adopted an animal husbandry based 
on sheep and goats from Anatolian newcomers in their original homeland. 
However, the domestication of millet and of cattle may perhaps be regarded 
as their own innovation.
Their sites all lie beside watercourses and occasionally on low river ter­
races. They built timber-framed houses with wattling subsequently daubed 
with clay. In addition to ground level houses, semi-subterranean huts have 
also been uncovered. Their dead were laid to rest within the village. Whereas 
the Epi-Paleolithic archaic Homo sapiens population buried their dead in 
an extended, supine position, the predominantly proto-M editerranean 
Koros-Starcevo population interred their dead in a contracted position, with­
out grave goods.
The finds recovered from the Karos settlements reflect an increased de­
pendence on food production, but with a wide range of variation between 
individual sites. The ratio of hunted and domestic animals is roughly equal 
on some sites, while on others, domestic animals outnumber hunted spe­
cies sixfold. Stockbreeding based on cattle appears to have been predomi­
nant compared to the previously domesticated sheep and goats. While pig 
breeding was of importance on some sites, other sites are devoid of any 
evidence of pigs.
A similarly wide range of variation has been noted in the ratio of culti­
vated and gathered cereals. The quemstones found on a number of Transyl­
vanian sites must undoubtedly have been used for grinding seeds, but not 
necessarily cereal grains. The lithic assemblages from these sites rarely fea­
ture the short blades that could have functioned as inserts in a sickle. The 
KorOs-Starcevo population nonetheless lived in food-producing communi­
ties even if hunting and gathering were not always secondary activities. At
the same time, some groups appeared to have specialized in the processing 
of minerals, which would explain traces of human settlement in caves that 
had been uninhabited since the Late Pleistocene.
The KorOs-Starcevo population penetrated Transylvania from the Banat. 
Their earliest settlements have been reported from Kolozsv&r. Some groups, 
however, migrated as far as eastern Hungary. These groups then intermixed 
with the local Epi-Paleolithic population which is why burials of both Al­
pine and archaic Homo sapiens type individuals were found at BScstorok. 
In accordance with the general practice of that period, the graves were found 
inside and between the houses of the settlement.
Around 5000 B.C., new groups from this population came to Transylva­
nia, advancing slowly along the Maros River. Certain aspects of their mate­
rial culture have also been observed in the southern part of the Great Hun­
garian Plain. One of their earliest settlements is that uncovered at Sz&sz- 
herm^ny. The assemblages from this site include coarse vessels of chaff- 
tempered clay and fine red-slipped bowls, some of which are painted with 
the white spots of the preceding period. Pottery painting in general, as on 
the Great Hungarian Plain, was rare in Transylvania. The only other excep­
tion is the site of L6cfalu, where polychrome painting also occurred. The 
early finds share numerous affinities with assemblages from the eastern 
Balkans, while the final settlement phase has been correlated with the final 
phase of the Koros-Starcevo sequence.
After a brief transitional period, the arrival of new populations from all 
directions at the onset of the Middle Neolithic brought an end to the uni­
formity characterizing the Early Neolithic. Groups of the Vinca-Tordos cul­
ture advanced along the middle reaches of the Maros and settled the area 
between the southern Carpathians and the Erchegyseg (Ore Mountains), 
with some groups migrating as far east as the Fogaras Mountains. South­
eastern Transylvania was occupied by Linear Pottery groups from Moldavia 
who penetrated as far as the Mez<5seg in the northwest. Sporadic traces of 
the Szak£lh&t group — distributed over the southeast of the Great Hungar­
ian Plain — have been identified along the Szamos River, whilst further to 
the north we find groups making painted pottery related to that made in 
the northeastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain.
The ethnic character of the Middle Neolithic defined the course of Transyl­
vanian prehistory for a long time, until the close of the Copper Age. The 
population of the Vinca-Tordos culture, one of the most thoroughly inves­
tigated archaeological cultures of this period, after a time abandoned the 
majority of their settlements. The settlement of these peoples in the firc- 
hegyseg region from the central areas of the Balkan Peninsula is hardly a 
coincidence: copper artifacts made their appearance at a fairly early date in 
this region and the gold deposits of nearby Zalatna were among the earliest 
to be exploited.
The pictographic tablets brought to light at Als6tatarlaka in 1961 which 
bear a striking resemblance to similar clay tablets from proto-Elamite and 
proto-Sumerian contexts must be mentioned here. The possibility of direct 
contact between the two regions, however, is rather problematic since apart 
from the geographical distance the finds are separated by a gap of about a 
thousand years from their Mesopotamian counterparts. Early linear-geo-
metric writing systems tend, in any case, independently to resemble each 
other. At the same time, the Als6tatarlaka tablets, which are undeniably 
composed of some sort of writing, have permitted the positive identifica­
tion of some of the marks (previously suspected to be writing) incised on 
various clay items of the Vinca-Tordos culture. It would appear that an 
attempt to introduce writing was, thus, made around 4000 B.C. in the Maros 
region which is in itself a remarkable achievement. We can at the same time 
also assume that a proto-state formation based on some sort of simple cen­
tral ceremonial centre developed in this region. Such a political formation 
in turn could hardly have come about had some groups not begun to ex­
ploit the mineral resources of the region and become dependent on the grain 
and cattle raised by other groups.
Fig. 1. Terracotta tablets from Als6tat3rlaka
The attempts in Transylvania at creating a production economy based 
on the central redistribution of surplus failed over the long run. The process 
was interrupted by new population movements. In Moldavia, the areas for­
merly settled by Linear Pottery population groups practising a primitive 
agriculture and animal husbandry (with the ratio of hunted animals as high 
as 50 per cent) were occupied by groups of the Boian culture from eastern 
Muntenia whose economy was based on cattle and sheep breeding. Some 
groups even penetrated the Middle Maros region from the Olt Valley. Their 
large pots and bowls ornamented with excised triangles and incised bun­
dles of lines make an appearance among the settlement finds of the Vinca- 
Tordos group.
The real break, however, was caused by the migration of the Szamos 
Painted Pottery population from northern Transylvania along the Maros 
River. Their vessels, ornamented with red and occasionally black painted 
motifs against a white or orange background, crop up from time to time 
among the finds from the upper layers of Vinca-Tordos settlements, sug­
gesting a partial mingling of the local population and the newcomers. How­
ever, few traces of this integration survived in the later archaeological record 
and therefore it would appear that the greater part of the Vinca-Tordos 
population abandoned its settlements and withdrew along the Maros. 6
The Copper Age
Thus, for a short period at the turn of the Middle and Late Neolithic, the 
greater part of Transylvania was occupied by the same population. Only 
the highlands of southeast Transylvania were still controlled by peoples of 
the Boian culture. The communities of the Petresti culture long occupied 
the territory of southern, and partly central, Transylvania. Their control of 
ore mines enabled them to establish contact with groups in faraway regions 
such as Muntenia and Dobrudja and almost certainly with communities in 
more southerly areas. Their vessels are fired so that they ring in an almost 
metallic way. They are ornamented with elaborate black, red and brown 
painted meander and spiral patterns. The technical execution of these bowls, 
shouldered vessels and cylindrical fruitstands testify to a flourishing metal­
lurgy that is corroborated by a wide variety of copper finds. The various 
articles fashioned from sheet gold and their imitations which reached dis­
tant areas in Bulgaria and Greece to the south, and the Kassa Basin to the 
north bear witness to the intensive exploitation of gold deposits.
The Petresti sequence lasted until the end of the Copper Age but only in 
the areas formerly occupied by the Vinca-Tordos population. The painted 
pottery groups of the Kis-Szamos region were replaced by horse breeding 
proto-Europid peoples from the Pontic steppeland who entered Transylva­
nia through the eastern Carpathians. They occupied the settlements of the 
painted pottery groups and, in marked contrast to the earlier Neolithic prac­
tice, buried their dead in larger cemeteries separate from the settlements as, 
for example, at Marosdecse. Their dead were laid to rest on their back with 
the feet drawn up slightly. Various grave goods such as large Pontic stone 
knives, knobbed stone maceheads and simple cups were found next to the 
bodies in the graves. The custom of depositing lumps of red paint, ochre, 
beside the deceased can also be traced to the east.
Roughly at the same time as the arrival of these new groups, the popula­
tion of the Cucuteni-Tripolye-Erosd culture settled in the former Boian ter­
ritory. These successive waves of migration in the eastern half of the 
Carpathian Basin resulted in continuous population changes. Due to the 
local population's intermingling with the newcomers, their lifeways and 
their material culture underwent various developments.
The Tiszapolg^r culture which evolved as a result of this process settled 
the Tisza region, northern Transylvania and the Banat, with some groups 
from the Banat advancing as far as southern Transylvania and the Middle 
Maros region. The villages of simple huts inhabited by the Tiszapolg&r 
groups — whose economy was based on large-scale animal husbandry and 
cultivation — and the settlements of the Cucuteni-Tripolye-Erdsd popula­
tion encircled the settlement area of the Petresti culture, whose population 
continued its existence in peace even in these troubled times — perhaps 
because the former populations were dependent on the products of their 
metallurgy.
The Cucuteni-Tripolye-Er<5sd population learned the art of pottery paint­
ing from its new neighbour, the Petresti culture. The Er6sd-Tyiszkhegy set­
tlement, whose layer sequence is over four metres thick, yielded an abun­
dance of bichrome and polychrome pottery that was painted with motifs in
black, white and red prior to firing. The settlement consisted of houses, 
with walls made of upright posts connected with a twig wattling subse­
quently thickly daubed with clay on both sides. Their internal furnishings 
featured rimmed hearths plastered with clay. The occupants of the ErSsd 
settlement were agriculturalists who cultivated einkom wheat. Their live­
stock was dominated by cattle, although, at the same time, the greater part 
of the meat consumed came from hunting. Most of their tools and imple­
ments were carved or polished from stone and bone (axes and antler hoes), 
while copper was reserved for awls and various ornaments. The small clay 
statuettes and clay stamp seals used for body painting preserve the memory 
of elaborate rites and rituals, as well as of a tribal organization.
The Cucuteni-Tripolye population penetrated as far as the Upper Maros 
region in the north where they became neighbours of the Tiszapolgar peo­
ples. The settlement territory of the latter was subsequently occupied by 
groups of the Bodrogkeresztur culture, who occasionally also occupied 
former Tiszapolgar villages. Transylvania marked the periphery of their dis­
tribution. Their presence in this area can hardly be explained otherwise 
than that they were attracted by the rich ore deposits of this region, since 
conditions for intensive agriculture and large-scale animal husbandry were 
undeniably more favourable in the Banat and on the Great Hungarian Plain. 
It is characteristic that, viewed from Transylvania, the proportions of cop­
per artifacts increases dramatically towards the heartland of their settle­
ment territory. The shaft-holed axes, adzes and so-called hammer-axes 
reached the Great Hungarian Plain from these Transylvanian copper mines. 
The graves of the Tisza region have also yielded an abundance of small 
gold ornaments. It is not accidental, then, that similar gold items rarely 
occur in Transylvania itself — the only well documented specimen was 
recovered from Marosv&s&rhely where a site of the Bodrogkeresztur cul­
ture has been identified.
The Bodrogkeresztur find assemblages from Transylvania are practically 
identical to those from the Great Hungarian Plain. The deceased were laid 
on their side with their feet drawn up and were equipped with two-han­
dled vessels — so-called milk jugs —, flowerpot shaped vessels and a vari­
ety of cups. Their settlements probably consisted of ground level houses. 
One Bodrogkeresztur site lying in the Cucuteni-Tripolye territory featured 
a small house with a floor constructed of wooden planks that was subse­
quently plastered with clay.
At roughly the same time as the Bodrogkeresztur population moved into 
the H&romszek Basin, the beginning of an integration process seems to have 
taken place in Transylvania. Assemblages reflecting the mingling of Bod­
rogkeresztur, Petresti and Cucuteni-Tripolye traits can be observed on the 
eastern periphery of the Mezdseg, whilst the finds from the Middle Maros 
region reflect the integration of Bodrogkeresztur and Petresti groups. The 
end of this process saw the emergence of a material culture that can be 
considered the heritage of the southwestern Transylvanian and Oltenian 
populations.
A few groups from these mixed Transylvanian populations migrated as 
far as the Great Hungarian Plain, whilst other groups — probably advanc­
ing along the Szamos River — penetrated the sub-Carpathian region and 
eastern Slovakia.
The population of the Baile Herculane-Cheile Turzi group often settled 
in caves. These agriculturalists and stockbreeders, whose ranks also included 
ore miners and traders, did not settle in these barren and remote caves of 
their own free will, but because pastoralists from the eastern steppe had 
begun to graze their herds on the pastures of Wallachia and Moldavia at 
this time. These pastoralists stormed into this area through the Carpathians 
and disrupted local communities. The local population managed to work 
out some sort of modus vivendi with the first wave of newcomers, however, 
successive waves forced them to flee from their mountain homes.
This event marks, not for the first time, the start of a new chapter in the 
history of Transylvania (and, also, of east-central Europe). These eastern 
newcomers and the local population assimilated in the Lower Danube re­
gion, where they were soon joined by southern Balkanic and perhaps also 
Anatolian groups. The emerging new population, the Cernavoda III cul­
ture, penetrated as far as the Maros region. Their livestock keeping was 
based on sheep, goat, pig and horse, as well as cattle. The cattle bones are 
generally dominated by the remains of old male individuals reflecting a 
high number of oxen which, in turn, suggests plough agriculture and the 
use of wooden or perhaps antler hoes and shares.
This incipient development soon came to an abrupt end. Around 2000B.C., 
new population movements again led to changes in Transylvania with the 
arrival of Kolozskorp&d-Cojofeni groups, pastoralists from Macedonia and 
the Balkans in the southwestern Carpathians. The settlements are to be found 
everywhere both in the uplands and on floodplains. They often settled in 
mountain caves as well. They cremated their dead — the first instance of 
this in Transylvania — although inhumation burials, often sprinkled with 
ochre, also occur, especially in the burial mounds from the early period. 
They may have adopted this custom from their eastern neighbours. Con­
versely, this practice may have been part of the cultural tradition of this 
eastern European population. Their frequently found settlements are lo­
cated in environments favouring the semi-nomadic lifeways of this pas- 
toralist group.
Even though these pastoralists and the Cernavoda III population came 
from roughly similar backgrounds, their pottery shows marked differences. 
Scoops with high-drawn handles, globular cups, urns and askoi were at 
first decorated with simple incised lines and hatched bands (matching or­
namental motifs and a few corresponding vessel forms have also been un­
covered in Cernavoda III contexts), which were later combined with lentil­
shaped ornaments. Short dashes filled with lime also appear in this period, 
mostly on Transylvania sites.
Pastoralist tribes from the trans-Carpathian territory migrated into south­
east Transylvania during the Cojofeni II-KoIozskorpad period. The popu­
lation groups of the Foltesti III-Zabala culture penetrated as far as the Mid­
dle Maros region from the Haromszek Basin and the Brass6 area. Little is 
known about their settlements. Their dead were laid to rest on their side 
with the feet drawn up in simple pit graves or in stone cists over which a 
burial mound was erected. Cojofeni elements can occasionally be singled 
out among their finds suggesting scattered local m ingling of the two 
populations.
The Bronze Age
Around the middle of the Early Bronze Age the Foltesti III-Zabala groups 
were ousted by newcomers to southeast Transylvania (and Wallachia): the 
Glina III-Schneckenberg population. The new arrivals founded their vil­
lages on hilltops and elevations. Their livestock was dominated by sheep, 
and their antler hoes and shares suggest a primitive plough cultivation.
The clay wagon model from KucsuMta perhaps reflects experimentation 
with animal traction. The abundance of curved stone knives and polished 
stone axes contrasts sharply with the scarcity of copper implements, mostly 
awls and chisels, with the occasional adze, axe or dagger. Household pot­
tery is invariably tempered with sand and crushed shells. The one and two- 
handled mugs as well as the small handled cups are carefully polished. 
Their dead were laid to rest in a contracted position within a stone cist and 
were only rarely accompanied by their worldly possessions.
Whilst the Olt region was settled by the Glina III-Schneckenberg popu­
lation, the rest of Transylvania was still controlled by Cofofeni groups. In 
this later phase of their existence the former lentil-shaped ornaments are 
gradually replaced by deeply incised and stroked decoration in short mul­
tiple designs. The excavations at the site of Kelnek uncovered bipartite houses 
with walls erected around a framework of wooden posts interconnected 
with wattling and subsequently daubed with clay. Hearths and ovens were 
found inside the houses. These features are probably the result of changes 
in style of life. It would appear that a direct link can be traced between their 
sedentary way of life and the fact that the settlements of the Cilnic popula­
tion are concentrated in the Erchegys6g region. So-called eastern copper 
axes, whose antecedents go back to the Cemavoda III period, abound in 
this area. The manufacture of this weapon type, widely distributed through­
out eastern and central Europe, was obviously not restricted to the Clinic 
territory. Nevertheless, it cannot be mere coincidence that an imposing hoard 
of over forty axes, dating to a somewhat earlier period, came to light in this 
area at Banyabiikk.
The turn of the Early and Middle Bronze Age saw the arrival of Moldavian 
groups in the H&romszek Basin in eastern Transylvania: population groups 
of the Ciomortan culture who were related to Monteoru and Costisa groups. 
The settlement at Csikcsomortany-Vcirdomb was fortified with a ditch. A 
few of their two-handled jugs, globular bowls and cups were deposited 
beside their dead who were also buried in a contracted position.
They did not enjoy life for long in their few fortified settlements. They 
were unable to check the advance of newer groups of the Monteoru culture 
and were forced to migrate to more westerly parts of Transylvania. The 
characteristic ornamental motif of their pottery, triangles of parallel lines 
filled with punctates later reappears on the widemouthed cups of the 
Wietenberg culture.
The earliest Wietenberg finds were brought to light in the north (outside 
Transylvania). The early assemblages and finds from this area share nu­
merous similarities with the Early Bronze Age Ottom^ny culture of the Tisza 
region, with influences from the Ciomortan and Tei cultures only discern­
ible at a later date. In contrast to its neighbours in and beyond the Carpathian 
Basin who practised inhumation, the Ottom^ny population cremated its 
dead similarly to the other Middle Bronze Age groups of Transylvania. It 
would appear that at the beginning of the Middle Bronze Age, population 
groups from the trans-Tisza area migrated into Transylvania (finds associ­
ated with this population have been uncovered at Des, and B&gyon beside 
the Aranyos), where they mingled with the Ciomortan population and, in 
the south, with Tei groups.
The Wietenberg population occupied the whole of Transylvania with the 
exception of the territory beyond the Hargita, whilst the Haromszek Basin 
came under the control of the Monteoru culture.
Wietenberg settlements have been identified on low river terraces, high 
plateaus and well-defendable elevations. Most houses were log-built, but 
sem i-subterranean dw ellings have also been uncovered. Surprisingly 
enough, few traces of agricultural activities have survived in the archaeo­
logical record, with hunting and animal husbandry appearing to have played 
a prominent role in their economy. Since they enjoyed exclusive access to 
the Transylvanian ore resources, the Wietenberg population probably traded 
gold and bronze for grain with their neighbours.
The entire range of bronze artifacts and gold ornaments then current in 
east-central Europe has come to light on the Wietenberg territory. At the 
same time, few hoards are known in spite of the fact that hoard finds prac­
tically encircle their settlement area. This phenomenon and the demonstra­
ble presence of "acropoleis" suggest a strong military aristocracy. In addi­
tion to eastern type and disc-butted bronze axes their weapons also include 
the sort of daggers wielded by the Mycenaean Archaeans. Warfare with 
long daggers was unusual in east-central Europe at that time; and, in con­
trast to neighbouring areas, there is hardly any evidence for horse riding in 
Transylvania.
Since the Wietenberg culture shares a number of other links with the 
Mycenaean civilization, it is not entirely impossible that the local Transyl­
vanian population was ruled by a group of warriors from the south during 
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries B.C. This military aristocracy in­
creased its wealth through the intensive exploitation of ores and the trade 
of metal artifacts manufactured from these ores. The products of this metal­
lurgy are, as a general rule, distributed outside the Wietenberg territory 
and it would appear that their traders could easily fall victim to strangers 
bent on seizing their riches. The hoard of gold axes, discs and other orna­
ments discovered at Cofalva in the Monteoru territory, the hoard of gold 
swords and daggers found at Persinari in Muntenia, which at the time was 
occupied by the Tei population, as well as several other hoards on the fringes 
of the Wietenberg territory were probably concealed for such reasons.
The prosperity brought by gold left its imprints on every aspect of life. 
The womenfolk, freed from the burdens of agricultural work, busied them­
selves with homecrafts of which, sadly, only the lavishly ornamented earth­
enware vessels have survived. The globular jars and one-handled cups were 
covered with incisions and channelling so arranged as to produce flamboy­
ant spiralform and meander patterns. Askoi, vases with multiple mouths
and wagon models were manufactured for elaborate rites and rituals. Richly 
ornamented sacred hearths were placed inside cult buildings similar to the 
one uncovered on the eponymous site of Wietenberg near Segesvar.
At the close of the fourteenth century B.C., central European pastoral 
tribes invaded the Carpathian Basin. The migrations triggered by this inva­
sion shook the very foundations of the prosperous society built by these 
Transylvanian smiths, traders and warriors. The familiar roads on which 
they transported their goods were now roamed by hitherto unknown peo­
ples. Groups of refugees poured into Transylvania and the locals had no 
choice but to conceal their valuables.
The "Tum ulus" groups advancing along the Maros Valley in the wake of 
these displaced and fleeing groups occupied southern Transylvania. Their 
heritage has also been uncovered in the Szeben area, in the Mez<5s6g and 
beyond the Hargita. Together with the former inhabitants of the Great Hun­
garian Plain, they penetrated southwest Transylvania as well. One part of 
the Wietenberg population fled to the mountains (their cave settlements 
date back to this period), but the majority withdrew northwards. Together 
with the Gyulavars&nd population they attempted a last stand in the Szamos 
Valley, the Maramaros and the sub-Carpathian region against the advance 
of the Tumulus culture and its allies (the Felsoszocs group) from the south 
and the west.
The lack of consolidated circumstances and broader regional unity made 
Transylvania the easy prey of yet newer waves of pastoralists from the east­
ern steppes in the early phase of the Late Bronze Age. This new population 
movement is not reflected in hidden hoards since the local population had 
hardly anything left worth concealing. Their new overlords, the population 
of the Noua culture, who poured into Transylvania through the Carpathian 
passes, also extended their rule to the Middle Szamos region in the north 
and the Erchegyseg in the west.
Very few settlements of this cattle and sheep breeding people have yet 
been investigated. The few Moldavian sites that have been excavated fea­
tured light wooden dwellings suggesting that their Transylvanian houses 
must have had similar constructions. They buried their dead in a contracted 
position with their feet drawn up although in some cases cremation ap­
pears to have been the practice. Their tw o-handled cups and vessels 
ornamented with simple raised bands appear to have been adopted from 
the assimilated Monteoru groups. The three-edged bone arrowheads, the 
bone cheekpieces from horse harnesses, the knot-headed and roll-top pins, 
as well as the curved sickle-knives find parallels far to the east among the 
artifacts of the Sabatinovka population who lived between the Dniester and 
the Dnieper rivers. This proto-Europid population — which included Al­
pine and Mediterranean anthropological groups in Transylvania — prob­
ably spoke an Old Iranian tongue and thus the arrival of the Noua popula­
tion marks the first appearance of Iranians in the Carpathian Basin.
Sometime at the beginning of the first millennium B.C. the inhabitants of 
Transylvania and the Szamos-Tisza region were again compelled to con­
ceal their accumulated riches. The greater part of the Noua population fled 
eastward so as to escape the fate of being reduced from master to servant 
overnight.
The newcomers, population groups of the Gava culture, gradually occu­
pied the Kuktill<3 and the Olt valleys, the Mez<5seg and the Szamos region. 
Their settlements include fortified sites; their houses are mostly log-built 
oval or rectangular semi-subterranean huts with central plastered fireplaces. 
They raised cattle but could also boast of considerable horse herds. In spite 
of the high number of bronze sickles, agriculture appears to have played a 
less prominent role in their economy and the better part of their meat was 
procured through hunting.
Following their settlement, bronze metallurgy again began to flourish in 
the Erchegyseg region. Practically all known tools, implements, weapons 
and ornament types were manufactured from bronze. These axes, sickles, 
swords, spears, belts, pins and cauldrons were, to all appearances, buried 
in uncounted quantities as shown by the hoards discovered at Isp^nlak, 
Fels6marosujv&r, Nagysink and Marosfelfalu.
The GSva population — who cremated their dead and laid their ashes 
to rest in urns — and other allied groups gradually extended their sway 
over larger territories at the close of the Late Bronze Age. Their settlements 
and cemeteries have also been identified outside Transylvania, in the Banat 
and the trans-Tisza territory, as well as in Galicia and Bessarabia to the east 
of the Carpathians. Some groups even penetrated as far as the Dnieper re­
gion.
The area south of the Carpathians, Wallachia and northern Bulgaria was 
also settled by a population which, judging from its material culture, may 
have spoken a tongue related to the one used by the G&va groups. This area 
roughly coincides with the territory later inhabited by the Dacians, the Getae 
and the Mysoi.
There is little evidence for major migrations that would have led to popu­
lation changes in this extensive area during the period that elapsed between 
the close of the Late Bronze Age and the first mention of its peoples in 
classical sources. This favours an identification of the Gava culture and al­
lied groups with the ancestors of the Dacians, the Getae and the Mysoi. 
Their origins are clear. The emergence of a population sharing the same 
language or speaking related tongues at the close of the Late Bronze Age 
was the result of the gradual mingling of remaining local Middle Bronze 
Age groups with the conquering Tumulus population.
The Iron Age and the First Historical Nations
The peaceful existence of the Transylvanian miners and traders came to an 
abrupt end at the close of the Late Bronze Age. Asian equestrian groups 
swarmed into the Carpathian Basin and the Danube region and caused con­
siderable upheaval in the quiet life of the agrarian communities. The new­
comers — a mixture of various population groups who also often warred 
among themselves — resettled entire villages and turned extensive areas 
into wasteland. After the subsidence of these successive waves of people, 
various communities, often quite small, with mixed ethnic components ap­
pear along the Danube. Population changes can be noted in the areas set-
tied by the Gava culture and related groups, with most of the Late Bronze 
Age population of Transylvania probably migrating to the trans-Carpathian 
region. Their abandoned villages were occupied by the newcomers and other 
groups from the Lower Danube and, to a lesser extent, from southern 
Transdanubia.
Finds of the Basarabi culture make their first appearance in the Middle 
Maros region, whence this population spread out to occupy the whole of 
the Transylvanian Basin. Their settlements, in contrast to those in Wallachia, 
are often fortified and inhabited for longer periods of time. Light surface 
buildings were scattered among their wattle and daub houses. Their economy 
was predominantly based on animal husbandry. Most of the Basarabi popu­
lation appears to have earned a living by metallurgy. It is striking that a 
number of assemblages unearthed on the fringes of their settlement terri­
tory contained artifacts that were unknown or very rare in Transylvania, 
but which were made up of bronze objects used among their neighbours.
This period witnessed a flourishing iron metallurgy. Not only are weap­
ons, tools and implements as well as parts of horse harness manufactured 
from iron, but also personal jewellery and costume ornaments, in ever- 
increasing proportions. The newcomers gradually discarded their old 
bronze goods and, for example, began to cast cheekpieces of iron instead of 
bronze which, at the same time, resemble the old ones down to the tiniest 
details. Their weapons — swords and akinakes — often resemble the Late 
Bronze Age swords with open-ringed hilts. Single-edged curved daggers 
with T-shaped hilts, similar in form to the weapons wielded by the neigh­
bouring Balta Verde group have also come to light.
Little is known about their gold metallurgy but there is evidence sug­
gesting that a number of gold items from the Carpathian region were fash­
ioned in this area: the early finds from Mih^lyfalva, for example, include 
armrings and winged beads with analogies to be found in the Dalj (Croatia) 
and Michalkowo (Poland) hoards. Gold items occur but sporadically in later 
periods, again suggesting that these craftsmen traded their products.
A uniform burial rite can be observed over all Transylvania at this time. 
The dead were interred in a supine position with the head oriented west or 
east. In addition to their personal ornaments, their weapons and everyday 
tools were also laid in the grave. The vessels deposited in the graves con­
tained beef whilst most of the cups probably held some sort of drink. The 
fact that only three vessel types — urns, one-handled cups and bowls with 
inverted rims — were placed in the grave pit reflects a rather strict burial 
rite. Even though evidence for horse burials with a mound erected over the 
grave is known from the early phase immediately succeeding the Late Bronze 
Age, the vessels deposited in these graves foreshadowed the practice of 
later times. At the time when wheel-turned pottery became widespread in 
the Lower Danube region and in the Great Hungarian Plain, only vessels 
reflecting an earlier style were laid in the Transylvanian graves.
This Early Iron Age population with its strict rites was undoubtedly re­
lated to the Scythians of eastern Europe. Herodotus, who wrote his Histo­
ries in the late fifth century B.C. and who drew exhaustively from Hecataeus' 
late sixth century works, states that the Maros spilled into the Danube "from
the country of the Agathyrsi".1 In another passage, however, he mentions 
that the Agathyrsi were neighbours of the Neuri,2 who dwelt in the Bug 
region near the source of the Tyras (Dniester) River.3 Obviously, these scat­
tered bits of information can be related not only to Transylvania, but to the 
entire eastern half of the Carpathian Basin or to the Carpathian Basin in 
general.
At the close of the sixth century B.C., Darius conducted his European 
campaign against the Scythians with the Agathyrsi also turning against them. 
This can be interpreted as some sort of potential Persian-Agathyrsian alli­
ance. Set against this background, the recovery of one of Darius' inscrip­
tions from Transylvania, namely from Szamosujvar, is indeed noteworthy.
According to Herodotus (or rather Hecataeus), the Agathyrsi "live in 
luxury and wear gold on their persons. They have their women in com­
m on."4 This latter remark can perhaps be taken to suggest group marriage 
or, what is more likely, polyandry. In any case, the evidence from the cem­
eteries dated to the later, Csombord period can hardly be reconciled with 
Hecataeus' description, and thus his data probably reflect earlier condi­
tions.
Around 500 B.C., the Agathyrsi of Transylvania occupied further terri­
tories and their characteristic artifacts reached the eastern areas of the Great 
Hungarian Plain. When at the beginning of the fifth century B.C. this area 
was occupied by groups from Wallachia and the central Balkans, they aban­
doned their plains settlements but continued their peaceful existence unin­
terrupted in Transylvania. The metalwork distributed in and beyond the 
Carpathians — mirrors, akinakes, and quivers with applied metal crosses — 
clearly imply that it was they who supplied the neighbouring and, often, 
more faraway regions with popular "Scythian" items.
They soon disappeared from the horizons of the Greek world. Herodotus 
mentions one of their kings, a certain Spargapithes, who lived in the mid­
fifth century,5 and the last reference to the Agathyrsi is to be found in a work 
written by Alexander's teacher, Aristotle, according to whom they were a 
law-abiding people who chant their laws.6 In the mid-fourth century B.C., 
they still lived in Transylvania, but not much later — according to the testi­
mony of the archaeological material — the Agathyrsian cemeteries abruptly 
ceased to be used. They abandoned their dead and moved to other areas 
without a trace. The reason for their sudden departure was the arrival of 
the Celts who appeared in the eastern Balkans at the close of the fourth 
century B.C. In 335, they sent a peace delegation to Alexander the Great. 
Their attack against the Balkans was repelled by Cassander.
Transylvania abandoned as it were by its former inhabitants, came into 
the possession of homeless Celtic tribes. Archaeological traces of settlement
1. H erodotus, IV , 48 .
2. H erodotus, IV , 125.
3. H erodotus, IV , 1 7 , 51.
4 . H erodotus, IV, 104.
5. H erodotus, IV , 78.
6. A r is to t le ,  Problemata 1 9 , 28.
on a larger scale only date from the beginning of the third century B.C. 
Prior to that, only a few isolated graves of warriors who had participated in 
the raids on the Balkans are known. The early Celtic-style finds which, in 
contrast to the majority of the Transylvanian finds labelled "La T£ne", can 
undoubtedly be considered an inheritance from the Celts have been un­
earthed in the Erchegys6g region and the Saj6 and Nagy-Szamos valleys. Of 
the Transylvanian inhabitants of what was later to become Dacia, only a 
single population group can be singled out as being of Celtic stock: the Cotini- 
Cotensi.7 In his description of another group of this population inhabiting 
the westerly parts of the Northern Mountain Range, Tacitus writes that — 
to their own shame — they mine iron.8 These scattered bits of information 
would suggest that the Cotini of Dacia were the descendants of the third 
century B.C. Celtic settlers. They formed a small, but important minority of 
the Transylvanian population in Celtic times.
The majority of the population groups who now settled Transylvania 
were Dacians from the Tisza region of the Great Hungarian Plain. They 
preserved various elements of their traditional culture in the face of the all- 
pervading Celtic "fashion" which also crop up among the uniform com­
modities of long-distance trade and include large pots, one-handled cups 
and small curved knives. The Late Iron Age cemeteries of Transylvania 
contained burials of this population. The burial rite is as varied as it is on 
the Great Hungarian Plain, ranging from inhumation burials to scattered 
cremation burials and urn graves.
The spread of wheel-turned pottery and a flourishing iron metallurgy 
specializing in the manufacture of agricultural implements and the tools 
used in homecrafts suggest the emergence of a separate class of craftsmen. 
In some cases these craftsmen can be linked to a distinct ethnic group, such 
as the Cotini. Finds of weapons, horse harness and war chariots as well as 
the presence of unarmed agrarian communities on the opposite end of the 
scale reflect a ruling warrior class. This social structure suggests a consider­
able surplus which in turn led to the necessity of introducing a means of 
measuring value instead of the traditional barter trade in Transylvania and 
in the neighbouring territories.
The so-called "eastern Celtic" and "Dacian" coins were modelled on the 
tetradrachms issued by Philip II and Alexander the Great. At first, the Mac­
edonian kings circulated the originals together with their imitations. The 
story of minting follows the events of political history: with the appearance 
of Burebista on the scene the imitations of Macedonian coins were no longer 
minted. However, the links between Transylvania and the "Celtic koine" 
had been severed much earlier, for beginning in 150 B.C., the coins minted 
in Transylvania did not serve (or only very rarely served) as a measure of 
value beyond the Carpathians, for instance, on the Great Hungarian Plain.
7. P tolemy, III, 8. 3; ILS 8965.
8. T acitus, Germania 43.
2. The Dacian Kingdom
The Dacian People
The exact dating of the first reports concerning the Dacians is a matter of 
considerable controversy. No less controversial is the question of their au­
thenticity. The usefulness of the available evidence is restricted by the fact 
that it is only some extracts of more detailed accounts that have come down 
to us, and these extracts, in discussing a given people, often present as con­
temporaneous events which, in fact, occurred historical periods apart. The 
other difficulty stems from the fact that two different names were used for 
the Dacians. Greek and Roman writers employed various ethnonyms for 
the tribes inhabiting the eastern half of the Balkan Peninsula, the Lower 
Danube and Transylvania. The territory to the south of the Balkan Moun­
tains — which was bordered by Macedonia in the east — was occupied by 
the Thracians, a population which had come into contact with Greek cul­
ture at a relatively early date, whilst the Getae settled the area to the north 
of the Balkan Mountains, and the Lower Danube region. Greek sources in­
variably refer to the Dacians of Transylvania as Getae, an ethnonym which 
Roman historians often arbitrarily translated as "D acii" even when the peo­
ple in question actually were Getae. Consequently, the scattered bits of in­
formation relating the participation of Dacians in the wars fought by Rome 
against various Thracian, Getic and Celtic tribes on the northern frontiers 
of Macedonia during the second and first centuries B.C. must be treated 
with extreme caution.
The archaeological record contributes little towards the clarification of 
this problem. An assortment of population groups which — one might call 
them "G etae" in the south, "Bastam ae" in the east, and "Celts" in the Car­
pathian Basin — lived on the territory of Burebista's later Dacian kingdom, 
which stretched from the Dniester to the Danube and from the Balkan Moun­
tains to the northern Carpathians. In Transylvania the traditions of Celtic 
iron metallurgy survived uninterrupted even though other aspects of mate­
rial culture underwent significant changes. Coarse hand-made vessels domi­
nate the pottery inventory, and the potters manufacturing wheel-turned 
wares were not the descendants of Celtic masters, but newcomers from the 
Balkans and the Lower Danube. The imposing remains from the first cen­
tury B.C. and later Dacian monumental architecture uncovered at Kosztezsd, 
Blidaru, tJjvarhely and elsewhere reflect formative influences from the Greek 
cities of Pontus, rather than a survival of Celtic traditions. Stone walls, whose 
outer and inner faces were built of squared blocks of hewn limestone that 
were held together by wooden ties, were still current at the time of the 
decline of the Dacian Kingdom; in fact, the majority of the buildings con­
structed using this technique were, apparently, erected at this time. Neither 
do the relics of Dacian silverwork — which are so obviously items manu­
factured on the fringes of the classical world that their counterparts are to 
be found on the Iberian Peninsula — predate the time of Burebista. The 
silver vessels from Szorcse and Csi'kszentkir^ly were, the works of Greek 
craftsmen active in Roman times, whilst the masked fibulae and the mul-
tipally twisted armrings were fashioned by "barbarian" goldsmiths who 
drew their inspiration from Greek art. Since in the area bordered by the 
Ruszka, Szoreny and Kudzsir mountains (the Szdszv&ros Mountains), and 
in the Maros Valley these finds occur together with hand-made pottery 
whose origins can be traced to Moldavia and the Lower Danube region, it 
would appear that Dacian culture was secondary and that its emergence 
can be linked to Burebista's efforts at creating a state.
During the course of the first century B.C., a number of hillforts sprang 
up over the territory that was bordered by impenetrable mountains to the 
south, but which maintained vital links with the Danube through the wa­
terways of the Maros, Jil and Olt whose heartland lay in the valley of the 
Varosvlz that flowed into the Maros. The number of open-air — unfortified
— settlements increased spectacularly during the second and first centuries 
B.C., suggesting major transformations in the fabric of Dacian society. How­
ever, the exact nature of these transformations is less easily defined. Tech­
nological progress was undoubtedly stimulated by strong Celtic influences 
from northern Transylvania. The widespread use of iron tools and imple­
ments, the adoption of the potter's wheel as well as the introduction of a 
series of other innovations, and the emergence of these hillforts can like­
wise be traced to influences from the Celtic oppidum culture. The use of 
currency and the appearance of local mints indicate that silver began to 
function as an economic adjunct in the case of various commodities, as well 
as a practical and measurable means of wealth accumulation. But, as in the 
case of the Danubian Celts, this by no means implies that money became 
widespread as a universal standard Value. Nor did it lead to the emergence 
of a market economy. The Dacian economy appears to have remained on a 
preponderantly subsistence level, to the extent that even the pots and pans 
used in individual households were made individually or, at most, within 
the local community. There is no evidence whatsoever that pottery was 
manufactured as a market commodity. In this respect, the economy of the 
Dacian Kingdom lagged far behind that of the Danubian Celts.
The Reign of Burebista
What remains to be explained then are the internal reasons underlying the 
erection of hillforts — reflecting a clearly differentiated social structure —, 
the accumulation of wealth — mainly in the form of silver — and the obvi­
ous and sudden growth of Dacian power. The often laconic data on Dacian 
social structure describe two distinct, almost caste-like layers: the tarabostes 
or "cap-wearers", and the commoners or "long-haired" people. Later de­
pictions indeed show that members of the Dacian nobility wore felt caps. 
The separation of a small elite minority from a subjugated majority offers a 
plausible explanation for the duality of the Dacian archaeological heritage, 
a unique phenomenon among the other Late Iron Age cultures in the Lower 
Danube region. Greek import pottery, Greek mirrors, a high standard of 
local silverworking and carefully executed wheel-turned wares ornamented 
with painted patterns from the Dacian hillforts are in sharp contrast to the
humble and coarse handmade pottery and poor quality iron artifacts which 
maintain Early Iron Age traditions in the open settlements.
That one tribe or a smaller group of tribes conquered extensive territo­
ries within a relatively short period of time, and either subdued and ex­
ploited the local population — one not necessarily related to it linguistically
— or forced it into an uneasy alliance is by no means an unusual phenom­
enon in these centuries. Before the Dacians gained control in the Lower and 
Middle Danube region, Roman Macedonia was first harassed by the Celtic 
Scordisci from the north and later, from the beginning of the first century B.C., 
by the Dardanians of southern Serbia and Macedonia. At the time when the 
Scordisci are designated as the archenemies of Rome in the Balkans, the 
Dardanians either pass without comment or are lumped together with other 
Thracian tribes as the allies of the Scordisci in their wars against Rome. The 
power of the Scordisci was broken around the turn of the second and first 
centuries B.C., and they are rarely mentioned among the Balkanic enemies 
of Rome thereafter. At the same time, increasingly more is written about 
the Dardanians and various other Thracian tribes who accompanied them 
to the battlefields and who had previously only been "grudgingly" listed 
among the allies of the Scordisci. The political history of the Carpathian 
Basin during the last few centuries B.C. was characterized by the reign of a 
tribe or a smaller group of tribes. The northern and western areas of the 
Carpathian Basin were, at the close of the second century B.C., controlled 
by a Celtic tribal alliance led by the Boii. The Sava Valley was dominated by 
the Scordisci who until the beginning of the first century B.C. were the over­
lords of the Pannon tribes living between the Drava and the Sava. The he­
gemony of the Scordisci in this area was probably broken after the crushing 
defeats inflicted on them by Rome. The independence of the Pannon tribes 
in the 60s is suggested by the fact that when Mithridates, king of the Pontus 
region, set out to attack Italy via the Balkan Peninsula and the Alps, it was 
the Pannons and not the Scordisci who were said to control the area.
In the mid-first century B.C., the peoples of the Carpathian Basin and the 
Balkans found themselves confronted by the Dacian king, Burebista, who 
had embarked on a series of swift and unexpected campaigns. Our sources 
offer little conclusive evidence as to whether Burebista had actually been 
the first significant ruler to unite the Dacian tribes, or whether he was fol­
lowing up on the achievements of his predecessors. His reign is correlated 
with major events of Roman history: the arrival of Burebista's right-hand 
man and chief counsellor to the Dacian court is synchronized with Sulla's 
ascension to power (82 B.C.), while Burebista's murder is set alongside Cae­
sar's assassination (44 B.C.). These ill-constructed parallels serve only to 
enable us to date Burebista's reign before the mid-first century B.C. Ac­
cording to Strabo — our most important source — Burebista carried out his 
major conquests within a matter of a few years. An inscription found in 
Dionysopolis9 (Balchik, Bulgaria) dating to around 48 B.C. flatly states that 
Burebista was "the first and greatest of all the kings of Thracia". The same 
inscription mentions a Getan ruler to whose father the town of Dionysopolis
9. G. M ih a il o v , Inscriptions Graecae in Bulgaria repertae. I. (2nd edition, Sofia 1970).
No. 13 = DobO, Inscriptions ... 837.
sent a delegation. The delegation was received by the Getan king in Arge- 
dava. Owing to the fragmentary state of the inscription it is not entirely 
clear whether this king of Argedava was Burebista's father, or whether 
Argedava itself may perhaps be identified with Arcidava (Varadia) on the 
eastern fringes of the Banat. If so, the king receiving the Greek delegation 
may plausibly be identified with Burebista's father. This possibility is, how­
ever, somewhat contradicted by the fact that in the first half of his reign, 
every sign suggests that Burebista did not have any influence over the Greek 
towns of the Pontic littoral. In the audacious plans drawn up in the 60s by 
Mithridates, king of the Pontus region, the Dacians are ignored — they ap­
pear neither as potential allies nor as foes — suggesting that Dacian rule 
did not at that time extend to the Lower Danube or to the Black Sea littoral. 
Consequently, Burebista's conquests can be assigned to a brief period in the 
50s of the first century B.C. During the first, and longer, half of his region, 
Burebista was undoubtedly preoccupied with the unification of the Dacian 
tribes and with the creation and consolidation of the Dacian Kingdom. His 
chief counsellor and aide in this protracted and undoubtedly bloody proc­
ess was Decaineus, the high priest, who was invested with "an almost royal 
power".
The chronological order of Burebista's conquests is uncertain because 
our sources mention little more than the fact itself. Burebista extended Dacian 
rule in three directions. He broke through to the southeast as far as the 
Pontic littoral and vanquished the Greek towns lying on the seacoast be­
tween the Danube delta and the Balkan Mountains. Before he could achieve 
this, the Getan tribes inhabiting the! Lower Danube region had to be sub­
jected in parallel with crushing the power of the Bastarnae occupying the 
territory to the north of the Getae beyond the Carpathians. This population 
of Celtic or Germanic stock had by the second century B.C. frequently put 
their troops at the disposal of the Macedonian kings and appeared time and 
time again as mercenaries serving various powers. After Burebista's death 
they were either the allies of, or mercenaries in the service of, the Dacians in 
the wars against Rome.
The other thrust, deemed dangerous in Roman eyes, was directed against 
Macedonia. Burebista crossed the Danube, and after ravaging the better 
part of the Balkan Peninsula he came to the Roman province of Macedonia 
and the Dalmatian coast, also in Roman hands. In Julius Caesar's last years, 
the removal of the Dacian threat was high on the agenda of Roman foreign 
policy. However, the only established result of these Balkanic conquests 
was that the Scordisci fought alongside the Dacians in Burebista's later wars, 
and that the Dacians had gained a lasting foothold to the south of the Dan­
ube, in the northern part of present-day Serbia.
The third direction of Dacian expansion affected their western neigh­
bours, the Celts. The Boian tribal confederacy embraced, in the first half of 
the fir§t century B.C., the Celtic tribes of western Transylvania. Burebista 
first probably tried to break the hegemony of these tribes, the Taurisci and 
the Anartii, and then found himself facing the Celtic (Boian) tribal confed­
eracy controlling the northern areas of the Carpathian Basin. The conflict 
was sparked off by the Dacian advance towards the settlement territory of 
the Boii that lay in Transdanubia and western Slovakia. Burebista's victory
over the Celts led to the dissolution not only of the Boian tribal confed­
eracy, but also to the settlement of Dacians in what is today southern Slo­
vakia. Besides the widespread distribution of the characteristic hand-made 
Dacian pottery, this fact is also reflected in the marked "Dacianization" of 
Celtic personal names during the second century A.D. in southern Slovakia.
The changes in the balance of power in the Middle and Lower Danube 
region caused consternation in Rome if for no other reason than that a hith­
erto unknown population — furthermore one living far beyond the Roman 
sphere of influence — had with alarming swiftness grown into a major po­
litical force in Illyricum (the Dalmatian coastline) and Macedonia. The ne­
cessity of breaking Dacian power was justifiably a major point in Julius 
Caesar's political programme. He planned an expedition against them that 
was to have been launched from Macedonia and would have taken place by 
44 or 43 B.C. had his assassination not thwarted these plans. Around the 
same time, Burebista too became the victim of political murder. This con­
spiracy (or rather revolt, in our sources) appears to have reflected the inter­
ests of a particularist group (or groups) of the Dacian nobility: the Dacian 
tribes could have been united only after the elimination of their independ­
ent tribal leaders. Obviously, the possibility that Roman foreign policy also 
had a role in Burebista's death cannot be entirely ruled out. Som e of 
Burebista's successors are known to have made contact with Octavian and 
Anthony.
The Transition Period
At the height of his power, Burebista would have been able to mobilize an 
army of 200,000 men, while not much later Dacian military power is esti­
mated at one-fifth this number. Burebista's kingdom broke up into four, 
and later, five principalities. In the heartland, Decaineus managed to main­
tain his control over Burebista's own tribe for some time. His successor, 
Comosicus, probably in his person united the final form of royal and high 
priestly power. The list of kings recording the names of the kings from 
Burebista to Decebal obviously relates to this central territory, to the king­
dom controlling southwestern Transylvania, whilst the other Dacian and 
Getan kings mentioned in various Augustan sources probably ruled over 
tribes of the Lower Danubian Getae. The list of kings poses problems of its 
own. Cotiso of the Dacians, mentioned by several sources as controlling the 
mountainous Iron Gate section of the Danube, is omitted from the list nam­
ing Burebista, Decaineus and Comosicus. Since the list contains other mis­
spellings too, Comosicus can perhaps be identified with Cotiso.
Of Burebista's fragmented kingdom only the intra-Carpathian Transyl­
vanian principality can be regarded as strictly speaking Dacian, since the 
other kingdom s ruled over Getan tribes. One of their kings, a certain 
Dicomes, is said to have established contact with Anthony at the time of the 
civil war which raged after Caesar's death and to have offered his help 
before Actium. At the same time, Cotiso made overtures to Octavian and, if 
Anthony's accusations are to be believed, Octavian even toyed with the
idea of establishing family relations. Other Getan and Dacian kings, by navi­
gating skilfully between the squabbling Roman parties, also hoped to achieve 
material and financial gains with promises of alliance. These extraordinar­
ily far-reaching diplomatic ties, unusual among the barbarian peoples of 
this period, can be explained by the fact that each king of Burebista's frag­
mented domain regarded himself as Burebista's political heir and tried to 
enlist powerful allies to further his political ambitions. Under these circum­
stances, the Dacian threat retained its priority in Roman public opinion even 
after Julius Caesar's death. Octavian, as Caesar's heir, declared war on the 
Dacians as the executor of Caesar's political legacy, in spite of the fact that 
the timeliness and possibilities of Rome's actually going to war had practi­
cally passed. Even the Iapodic war fought between 35-33 B.C. was, ostensi­
bly, launched as a preliminary to the campaign against the Dacians, though 
its real objective was the occupation of the hinterland of the Adriatic 
coastland connecting Italy with the Balkans. One undisputable result of this 
campaign was the capture of Siscia (Sisak, Yugoslavia) in the Sava Valley, a 
victory Octavian hailed as providing Rome with a highly advantageous start­
ing point and a base for military operations against the Dacians.
The Dacian war, of course, never took place. For one thing, the years that 
followed saw the decisive phase of the struggle for autocratic power in Rome; 
for another, the Dacian threat was by that time not so great as to be a prime 
concern of Roman foreign policy. Rome was satisfied to have Cotiso's con­
trol broken south of the Danube. This happened in 29 B.C., not long after 
Octavian's victory at Actium. M. Licinius Crassus scored a major victory 
against Cotiso in the first phase of a protracted Balkan war. Cotiso, how­
ever, retained his power over the left bank of the Danube, and probably 
remained in power for some time in the heartland of Burebista's former 
kingdom.
The conquest of the territories that were to become Noricum and Pannonia 
to the south of the Danube, and the organization of a Moesian army subor­
dinated to Macedonia again led to hostilities between the Roman Empire 
and the Dacians. In the last phase of this large-scale operation, Rome took 
the first steps towards ensuring its influence on the left bank of the Danube. 
During the war that eventually led to the conquest of Pannonia (10 B.C.), 
the Dacians crossed the Danube. The Romans repelled this attack and 
Augustus sent a punitive expedition against them which "forced the Dacians 
to acknowledge the supremacy of the Romans".10 This campaign was prob­
ably directed by M. Vinicius, of whom we know that in the course of one of 
his campaigns he first defeated the army of the Bastamae, and later forced 
Dacians and Celts into an "alliance".11 Lentulus's expedition, which drove 
the Dacians, "a people inaccessible" in their mountainous lands, to the north 
of the Danube and established a Roman guardpost on that side of the river, 
was perhaps synchronous with this campaign. One of our sources com­
ments on this event to the effect that "Dacia, although not wholly vanquished,
10. Res gestae Divi Augusti (Monumentum Ancyranum) 30. = DobO, lnscriptiones 
... 769.
11. DobO, lnscriptiones ... 769a.
was kept at arm's length".12 Only a few details of some later Roman cam­
paigns in the area are known: a Roman army sailed up the Tisza and the 
Maros and approached the Dacians; and there must be some factual back­
ground to the remark in a poetic work that the Dacian tribe of the Appuli — 
probably the inhabitants of the region around Apulum (Gyulafeherv^r) — 
could easily reach the Black Sea. This casual remark is the only indication of 
the fact that after Burebista's death the Dacians might have tried to estab­
lish contact with the Lower Danube region. The shortest route between 
Apulum and the Black Sea lies by way of the Olt Valley. It cannot be mere 
chance that Augustus, who did not attach much importance to the military 
occupation of the Danubian frontier, established one of the earliest Danubian 
legionary camps not far from the mouth of the Olt (Oescus=Gigen, Bul­
garia). The other early Augustan legionary fortress on the Danube (Camun- 
tum=Deutschaltenburg, Austria) was founded on territory neighbouring 
Rome's other Danubian foe, the Germanic kingdom of Maroboduus. This 
would suggest that in spite of the disintegration and territorial losses of the 
Dacian Kingdom after Burebista's death, it nonetheless remained an almost 
inaccessible political formation of superior organization.
In this barely stabilized situation the Romans probably breathed a sigh 
of relief when two tribes of the equestrian Sarmatian people began their 
gradual westward migration along the Lower Danube. The Jazyges and the 
Roxolani advancing behind them were sandwiched not only between the 
Getae and the Dacians, but also between the Roman Empire and the Dacians, 
and eventually formed a buffer zone between the Dacians and Pannonia. 
The Sarmatian migration — which was welcomed and even in some cases 
supported by Rome — could have been the occasion of the series of large 
and small Dacian incursions, which could well have included joint Dacian- 
Sarmatian action. In order to ease the tensions north of the Danube, the Ro­
mans had worked out a settlement policy under Augustus. A large number 
of Getae (Dacians?) were settled in Moesia in order to provide a homeland 
for the Sarmatians. The disturbances stirred up by these events subsided 
but gradually. Even in the final years of Tiberius's reign the Dacians and 
the Sarmatians frequently raided Moesia. Afterwards, however, there fol­
lowed long decades of peace which, according to the afore-mentioned Dacian 
list of kings, roughly coincided with Coryllus's forty year long reign.
Coryllus occurs nowhere else in our sources, and is probably a misspell­
ing of Scorilo, a highly popular Dacian name. A typical anecdote about a 
Dacian king called Scorilo has come down to us. To discourage his people 
from taking sides in Rome's domestic quarrels, he pitted two dogs against 
each other; when he then threw a wolf in front of the dogs, both dogs imme­
diately turned on the wolf.13 This kind of caution must have been a hall­
mark of Coryllus-Scorilo's long reign, and the anecdote about the dogs was 
especially apt at the time of the first real crisis in the history of the Roman 
Empire (68-69 A.D.), when the Danubian frontier was left unprotected by 
the legions who marched off to participate in the civil war. The Sarmatians 
exploited this situation successfully on several occasions, inflicting fatal
12. F l o r u s ,  Epitome II, 28 (= IV, 12).
13. F rontinus, Strategemata 1 ,10, 4.
blows on a number of Roman armies and governors. Scorilo's cautionary 
parable can, in fact, be linked to a specific event. During the crisis of 68-69 
(probably during the winter of 69-70), the Dacians crossed the Moesian 
section of the Danube and occupied a couple of frontier camps. If the par­
able about the bickering dogs can indeed be attributed to the Dacian king 
mistakenly called Coryllus, it seems probable that the Danubian frontier 
was attacked by an independent Dacian group from Wallachia, making 
Coryllus-Scorilo's admonition to his own people necessary.
Tacitus described the Dacians as an "ever unreliable nation" in connec­
tion with this attack.14 Though this opinion reflects the experiences of later 
D acian-Rom an conflicts as well, the Dacians had always been accorded 
special attention since Burebista. It proved infinitely more difficult to steer 
them into a relationship conveniently called an "alliance", but which practi­
cally meant an incorporation into the dependent clientale system. When, at 
the close of Augustus's reign, the Dacians are described as not being as 
dangerous as they had formerly been and as being on the verge of recogniz­
ing Roman overlordship, this can be taken to reflect the more peaceful con­
ditions of the Scorilo period. It would nonetheless appear that the Dacian- 
Roman alliance (foedus) rested on very shaky grounds indeed. The Dacian 
Kingdom differed in several respects from the Germanic and Sarmatian 
client kingdoms lying along the Danubian frontier which had entered into 
alliance with the Roman Empire. It enjoyed a singularly favourable geo­
graphic position in that the heartland of the kingdom was cut off from the 
Danube by an impenetrable mountain chain. A Roman attack from the west 
through the Temes or Maros valleys, or from the east through the Zsil or 
Olt Valley would have definitely involved long deployment of the troops 
with a considerable detour, as well as the penetration of well defended moun­
tain passes. The Dacians were undoubtedly at a tactical advantage in no 
less a place than in the most important section of the empire's Danubian 
frontier, where the Danube cuts the southern Carpathians in a series of steep, 
narrow gorges. So that the Roman ships might be towed, a cliff road had to 
be hewn into the rockface. This amazing feat of ancient technology was 
completed towards the end of Tiberius's reign. It cannot be mere coinci­
dence that a more peaceful phase of Dacian-Roman relations commenced 
at this time. Rome certainly would not have shirked even considerable fi­
nancial sacrifice to make shipping safe through concessions to the Dacians.
The Kingdom of Decebal
Beside its obvious geographic advantage, Roman foreign policy also had 
to consider the high level of organization of the Dacian Kingdom and the 
strength of the central power. The hillfort of "royal" Sarmizegethusa on the 
western slopes of the Kudzsir Alps was surrounded by a chain of similarly 
fortified hilltop settlements which made the royal seat almost inaccessible 
and defended it against the outlying territories of the kingdom. These forts,
14. Tacitu s, Historiae III, 46, 2.
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covering areas of several hectares and fortified by ditches, thick walls and 
also often with watchtowers, could not only house an impressive number 
of armed men, but also served as the kingdom's industrial centres and stores, 
and, naturally, its treasuries and sanctuaries. That the royal power could 
mobilize an enormous labour force is reflected by the thick walls faced with 
regularly cut limestone blocks reinforced by wooden crossbeams, as well as 
the paved courts, roads, stone staircases and water channels hewn from 
large blocks of stone all of which also served to underscore royal power. 
The impression made by "monarchic representations" of this kind on the 
commoners living under far more primitive conditions should not be under­
estimated; the enormous social gulf dividing the "cap-wearers" from the 
"long-haired" Dacians undoubtedly required these royal accoutrements.
This centralized power was also strengthened by a religion whose cult 
places have been identified near the hillforts by recent Romanian research. 
The round sanctuaries framed by regularly placed stone slabs and the quad­
rangular ones with four rows of columns were most probably the scenes of 
cults interwoven with astrological beliefs. These cults are said to have been 
introduced by the Thracian Zalmoxis (or in other sources Zamolxis) who 
was supposed to have been a disciple of Pythagoras. The teachings of this 
25 mythical Zalmoxis — who was later admitted to the ranks of the gods —
included exhortations to an ascetic way of life. This belief system of Thraco- 
Getan origin probably was spread among the Dacians by Decaineus who 
came to the Dacian Kingdom at Burebista's invitation. Burebista had prob­
ably perceived the possibilities inherent in this belief system and used it in 
the development of central power. The practice of the cult was a privilege, 
and the belief system was a jealously guarded priestly secret. The high priest 
mediated between the supernatural and the king. It could well be that priestly 
privileges included the art of healing. Greek medical texts mention a large 
variety of Dacian medicinal herbs together with their Dacian names, re­
flecting the high level of the medical and botanical knowledge of the Dacians.
The excavations conducted on Dacian forts have brought to light a number 
of Roman imports in addition to the local implements and artifacts. Some 
of these belong to the group of luxury items that can be found among the 
personal possessions of the barbarian nobility in all parts of Europe. What 
is conspicuous, however, is that the Roman imports found in this area in­
clude not only items that enhanced the luxury of the tribal aristocracy, but 
also good quality iron implements which undoubtedly contributed to the 
high level of the crafts practised in the forts. It is also highly probable that 
Greek and Roman specialists were sought out and employed to direct the 
fortification work of the Dacian hillforts. A number of ashlars, and espe­
cially the stone blocks from the sanctuaries, bear Greek letter signs which 
were probably mason's marks facilitating the joining of pre-carved archi­
tectural elements, whilst another group of these signs is associated with the 
calendrical function of the sanctuaries. A huge truncated conical vessel — 
perhaps serving a cultic function — bears stamps with Latin lettering iden­
tical to those on Roman stamped tiles in every detail. One of these stamps 
reads DECEBALVS, the other PER SCORILO.
Romanian scholars generally translate these two stamps as "Decebal, 
Scorillo's son". The difficulty of this translation and interpretation lies in 
the fact that the two names were impressed by two different stamps (even 
though both occur on the same vessel), as if one name were that of the 
customer (the one who ordered the vessel), and the other that of the potter. 
The link with King Decebal is plausible, but even so, the lack of the title rex 
("king") is highly conspicuous. Assuming that the translation "Decebal, 
Scorilo's son" is correct, one is led to conclude that Decebal was King Scorilo's 
son. However, the Dacian king list records another ruler between father 
and son: King Diurpaneus, who charted the political course which, despite 
the brief grandeur of Decebal's reign, eventually led to the downfall of the 
Dacian Kingdom.
As we have seen, Scorilo basically accepted the alliance system created 
by Rome along the European frontier of the empire. He may have been 
favourably disposed towards this system because Tiberius granted him an 
exceptionally high annual stipendium after building the cliff road along the 
Danube. According to a later historian, Jordanes, King Diurpaneus launched 
an attack against the empire after the Dacians "in  the reign of the Emperor 
Domitian ... for fear of his avarice, broke the truce they had long observed 
under other emperors".15 It could be that Domitian had indeed planned to
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reduce the exceptionally high stipendium, but it is hardly plausible that he 
would have done so in a politically unfavourable climate when the Danubian 
Germanic tribes were making preparations for war. It is more likely that the 
Dacians timed their unexpected and surprise attack — causing serious losses 
to the empire — in concert with the tensions on the Germanic front.
The Dacians attacked at the latest in the winter of 85-86 and as so often 
before, they probably poured over the frozen Danube. The surprise attack 
claimed the life of Oppius Sabinus, the governor of Moesia. The seriousness 
of the situation is shown by the fact that Domitian himself hastened to Moesia 
where he devoted several months to the organization of an effective coun­
ter-attack. The direction of the counter-offensive was entrusted to Cornelius 
Fuscus, the praetorian prefect, who crossed the Danube and advanced suc­
cessfully on Dacian soil. At this critical moment Diurpaneus gave up his 
throne to Decebal, who began his reign with a glorious victory over Fuscus's 
army. Fuscus fell in battle and his defeat was so disastrous that his army 
was declared lost. Only a third Roman army commander, Tettius Julianus, 
managed to secure a decisive victory in 88, in the Battle of Tapae, a pass en 
route to the royal seat.
Owing to the fragmentary nature of the sources, it is difficult to single 
out the new elements in Dacian-Roman relations introduced by the treaty 
that was shortly concluded and by the new alliance. Historiography with 
an anti-Domitian bias has considered this peace treaty as a victory for De­
cebal, since he was granted not only a high stipendium, but was also sup­
plied with skilled craftsmen and engineers from Rome on whose knowl­
edge he could rely in matters "pertaining to both peace and w ar". At the 
same time, following the victory, but still prior to the peace treaty, it was 
possible to dispatch Roman troops safely to the Germanic front over the 
Great Hungarian Plain, "through the kingdom of Decebal".16 Decebal him­
self repeatedly suggested a peace treaty even before his defeat at Tapae.
Decebal did not exploit the Romans' plight in the ensuing years when 
Domitian was forced to wage a long Germanic-Sarmatian war in Pannonia. 
It would appear that he had achieved his aim with the high stipendium  
granted him by the peace treaty and the Roman artisans placed at his dis­
posal. He did not attend the peace negotiations of 88, but was represented 
by an envoy called Diegis (perhaps his brother), and it was the latter who 
received the diadem — symbolizing his confirmation as a client king — 
from the hands of Domitian.
The clarification of the building periods of the Dacian forts awaits fur­
ther research. It is possible that the erection of stone walls and watchtowers 
around the hilltop settlements can in part be attributed to Decebal who 
asked the specialists sent to him to supervise these and similar operations. 
The stamp bearing the name of Decebal was probably made by a Roman 
military engineer, since it is an exact copy of the stamps used in Roman 
military brick making. The tiles used in the forts similarly suggest the activ­
ity of Roman artisans.
Decebal significantly enlarged his kingdom's territory during the dec­
ade of his client relationship with Rome. These expansions were tolerated
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by Rome as long as they remained within the framework of the alliance 
system and did not endanger treaties concluded with other kings' and would 
not foreseeably lead to the collapse of the carefully established and precari­
ous clientale network. Decebal's expansion can be reconstructed from Pto­
lemy's descriptions, for in his geographic handbook — written well after 
the conquest of Dacia — the boundaries of Dacia do not correspond to the 
frontiers of the Roman province. Nor does he mention which legions were 
stationed in Dacia, even though he never failed to note this detail in his 
descriptions of other provinces. Sarmizegethusa is still described as "royal", 
suggesting that it cannot have been the Roman colonia founded at Varhely, 
but only the royal seat near Ujvarhely. The frontiers of Decebal's Dacia were 
marked by the Tisza River to the west, by the Carpathians to the north and 
by the Dniester River to the east. He had subdued this vast territory, which 
was inhabited not only by Dacians, but also by Celts, Sarmatians and other 
population groups, step by step and not without the occasional war. Ptolemy 
also lists the populations that came under Decebal's rule — unfortunately, 
in a manner that does not allow their precise geographic localization. The 
northernmost among these peoples we know from other sources as well: 
the Celtic Anartii and Taurisci, members of the former Boian tribal confed­
eracy inhabiting northern Transylvania, and the Costoboci who lived be­
yond the Carpathians and spoke Dacian. The other ethnonyms Ptolemy 
mentions do not occur elsewhere; however, they include a conspicuously 
high number of ethnic names derived from place names (Predavenses, 
Ratakenses, Kaukoenses, Buridavenses, etc.). Since these peoples are allo­
cated a central position on Ptolemy's map the assumption may perhaps be 
risked that Decebal settled his Dacians on territories that were adminis­
tered from a specific centre, and thereby disrupting the traditional tribal 
framework. For the other striking feature of Ptolemy's record is that the 
only previously known Dacian tribe, the Appuli, does not occur even in the 
form "Apulenses", i.e. derived from the place name Apulum.
3. The Roman Province of Dacia 
Conquest and Organization of the Province
By the second half of the first century A.D., the continental European fron­
tier of the Roman Empire had been established at the Rhine and Danube 
rivers. The linear military defence along the river banks had become final. 
These waterway frontiers not only separated the empire clearly from its 
neighbours, but the rivers also checked potential enemies and acted as a 
barrier to minor raids. At the same time, these waterways offered a conven­
ient means of communication and acted as a means of transporting various 
trade commodities and supplies, as well as building materials between the 
chain of camps and forts built at fords and at suitable strategic points. The 
various peoples living on the fringes of the imperial frontier were drawn or 
forced into alliance with the empire. However, one strong military power
on the other side of the frontier could not be fitted into this system. Conse­
quently, the peace concluded between the empire and Decebal in 89 — though 
in fact adhered to by both sides for quite some time — was not regarded as 
final by Rome on the experiences of the previous 150 years. The Dacian 
state, a strong political, economic and military power, became a constant 
source of tension.
The internal and external political situation of the Roman Empire did 
not permit any kind of action against the Dacians for some two decades. In 
89, Antonius Satuminus rebelled in Germania and a Suebian-Sarmatian war 
was raging on the Pannonian frontier (89-92). The execution of dissident 
senators, beginning in 93, and the acute political crisis led to the murder of 
Domitian in 96. Following Nerva's brief reign, Trajan soon began making 
preparations for a Dacian war. The emperor took far more comprehensive 
measures than ever before to ensure his victory. He assembled a vast mili­
tary force: the legions, auxiliary troops and other military units stationed 
along the Middle and the Lower Danube numbered some 200,000 men. Most 
took part in the battles of the military campaign that began in 102.
The army began its march after three years of preparation. Only frag­
ments of the contemporary accounts of this campaign have survived. The 
precise chronology of events can best be reconstructed from the historical 
narrative written by Dion Cassius in the third century, from the 200 metres 
long spiral band of reliefs on the memorial column erected in Rome after 
the final victory, and from the results of archaeological investigations. The 
army was commanded by the emperor and his close friend and colleague, 
Licinius Sura. The troops were concentrated in Moesia Superior, around the 
legionary camp of Viminacium. The main objective was undoubtedly the 
storming of Decebal's seat at Sarmizegethusa Regia which was surrounded 
by a chain of forts and which could be approached from several directions.
The main thrusts of the military advance were determined by the Dan­
ube fords that were defended by the fleet. The largest deployment of troops 
began from Lederata. These troops then marched towards the HAtszeg 
Mountains through the eastern Banat where a military base was established. 
A few surviving fragments from the emperor's campaign journal suggest 
that he also advanced along this route towards the Dacian heartland. The 
other attack route was initiated from Drobeta, whilst still other units crossed 
the Danube at Dierna.
The Romans scored a decisive victory at the very beginning of their cam­
paign and the Dacians sued for peace. However, Decebal did not appear in 
person at the peace negotiations and fighting was resumed. The Roman 
troops advanced along the northern frontiers of Moesia Inferior from the 
Danube to the southern Carpathians. When the Sz3szv3ros Mountains were 
encircled, Decebal was forced to surrender and the harsh terms of the armi­
stice, in practice, signalled the end of the Dacian Kingdom. The Dacians 
were compelled to surrender their weapons, their siege engines, and their 
military engineers — as well as to extradite all Roman refugees. Their forts, 
and fortresses were pulled down, and the territory occupied by the Roman 
troops was formally annexed to the empire. The Dacians became the sub­
jects of Rome. The occupied western part of the Dacian Kingdom was in­
corporated into Moesia Superior, whilst the eastern areas were absorbed
into Moesia Inferior. After the war, a stone bridge designed by Trajan's 
engineer, Apollodorus, was constructed at Drobeta making communica­
tion possible and insuring continuous supply at all times.
Decebal, nevertheless, made a last attempt to reorganize his army and 
resist. He occupied some territories and established contacts with a few 
neighbouring peoples. He captured a high-ranking Roman officer, Longinus, 
and tried first to blackmail the emperor, and then later to have him poi­
soned. These events left Rome with no alternatives and the empire com­
menced preparations for a final showdown. The second Dacian war broke 
out in 105. The aim was to capture the central areas of the Dacian Kingdom: 
Trajan led his troops towards Sarmizegethusa Regia. By 106 the Romans 
had captured and destroyed the Dacian forts and strongholds. Before the 
last fortress fell, the defenders poisoned themselves. Decebal fled and com­
mitted suicide in order to avoid capture. His head was cut off and brought 
before Trajan at his military headquarters by a soldier called Claudius Max­
imus.
Following the triumph in Rome, Decebal's head was exhibited on the 
Gemonia steps. Plays were held in the circus to celebrate the death of this 
despised enemy, while coins bearing the legend DACIA CAPTA were struck. 
The former Dacian heartland was now occupied by the Roman army.
The Dacian wars marked the first conscious decision of the empire to 
send a Roman army across the European frontier of the Imperium  — marked 
by major waterways — with the express aim of protecting this frontier 
through conquest, the annihilation of the enemy, and the incorporation of 
the enemy territory into the empire -> though at times it seemed as if Rome 
was of two minds about the annexation and retention of the Dacian terri­
tories.
The organization of the province began at a fast pace during the term of 
office of the first governor, Terentius Scaurianus between 106 and 110. Coins 
bearing the legend DACIA AUGUSTI PROVINCIA were struck in 112. 
Scaurianus took the necessary measures to transform the conquered terri­
tory into a province. He took a population census and then ordered a sur­
vey of the area. The first and most important task was the clear demarca­
tion of the frontiers of the new province and the organization of its defence. 
In the European provinces of the empire, the legions and the auxiliary troops 
were generally stationed along the river frontiers of the Rhine and the Dan­
ube. In areas where this did not prove possible, as in the southern parts of 
Germania and Raetia, an arrow-straight defensive line with earthworks and 
ditches was created, even across open hilly countryside. However, the rough 
terrain of Dacia did not favour either kind of defence system. It took Rome 
about ten years to build a chain of strong, military forts. The military camps 
standing on the boundaries of the province served at the same time to mark 
the frontiers of the empire.
The core of the military defence of the new province was at first formed 
by two legions and their auxiliary troops. The legio I1II Flavia was stationed 
in Bersovia until 118-119. The other legion was the legio XIII Gemina whose 
camp was established in the centre of Transylvania, at Apulum.
In addition to the legions, a high number of auxiliary troops — cavalry 
and infantry troops totalling 500 men and cavalry units numbering 1000
men — were stationed in the province. The province was permanently gar­
risoned with troops by the 120s. The all-important road network was con­
structed in parallel with the forts. The building of roads by the military 
began at roughly the same time as the organization of the province since 
supply lines were essential and of strategic importance, especially in a prov­
ince which thrust so deeply into hostile territory.
Trajan settled the veterans of the legions who had fought in the Dacian 
wars in Colonia Dacica, the first settlement in the province. In order to popu­
late the territory which had emptied as a result of the wars, Trajan settled 
large populations in Dacia. These settlements were symbolized by children 
playing in the lap of a female figure personifying the province of Dacia on 
coins struck to commemorate the constitutional foundation of the province.
At the beginning of Dacia's existence, in 107-108, a war broke out on the 
western frontier of the province.17 All that is known of this war is that the 
governor of Lower Pannonia, who later became the emperor Hadrian, fought 
against the Sarmatian Jazyges — who were settled in the Danube-Tisza 
interfluve and had previously been allies of Rome in its war against the 
Dacians. The unrest among the Sarmatians was, in part, caused by the fact 
that the territory (the eastern part of the Banat) that had been wrested from 
them by Decebal had not been returned to them by Trajan, in spite of their 
repeated demands.18 At the same time, the Jazyges living in the Transdanube- 
Tisza region, were now bordered by the Roman Empire not only on the west 
and south, but also on the east as a consequence of the newly-founded prov­
ince, a circumstance which, understandably, became a source of tension.
Rome's problems in this region appeared to have been resolved after 
these wars, and the safety of the new province appeared to be secure as 
well. This period of respite proved to be very fleeting, however. When Trajan 
died in 117, the first real showdown between Rome and its neighbours took 
place. The Jazyges and the Roxolani attacked the two Moesias. The situa­
tion was aggravated by the death of Quadratus Bassus, Dacia's excellent 
and experienced governor. The outbreak of hostilities was caused by the 
reduction of the annual stipendium paid by Rome to the Roxolani and by the 
above-mentioned territorial demands of the Jazyges, as well as by the fact 
that the newly created province acted as a barrier between these two re­
lated peoples. The emperor hastened to Moesia and also visited Dacia en 
route. At Drobeta, he had the superstructure of the bridge removed "for 
Hadrian was afraid that it might also make it easy for the barbarians, once 
they had neutralized the fortifications at the bridges, to cross into M oesia".19 
After assuring the Sarmatians that they would again receive their previous 
stipendium, the emperor soon came to an agreement with the Roxolani also. 
A rather unusual method was chosen for dealing with the Jazyges. An ex­
perienced soldier, Q. Marcius Turbo of the equestrian order was appointed 
governor of Pannonia Inferior and Dacia. Thus, he was able to crush Jazygian 
resistance from both directions.
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The Sarmatian wars in 116-118 clearly showed that Dacia played but a 
minor role in the defence of the provinces lying to the south of the Danube 
River and in staving off possible attacks. Though Rome had eliminated a 
major source of danger with the overthrow of Decebal, a former buffer zone 
which had checked the Sarmatian tribes was also eliminated in the process. 
The danger of a unified Dacian power had indeed disappeared, but the 
growing strength of the Sarmatians threatened not only the Danubian fron­
tier of the empire, but also sections of the Dacian frontier in Oltenia and the 
TemeskOz. The equestrian battle tactics employed by the Sarmatians were 
less of a threat in the mountainous parts of Transylvania, but an alliance 
with the "free Dacian" Celtic and Germanic tribes on the northern fringes 
of Dacia was able to bring concentrated attacks along the entire Lower 
Danubian limes section and the frontiers of Dacia. Consequently, the de­
fence of the frontier of the empire — now augmented by Dacia — called for 
a larger garrison than the shorter Danubian limes section prior to the con­
quest had. Thus at the beginning of his reign Hadrian, whose ideas on im­
perial strategy were basically defensive in nature, contemplated the possi­
bility of relinquishing Dacia.20
This possibility must in any case be considered as having been realistic 
in view of the military situation. It was not alien too Hadrian to relinquish 
conquests secured by his predecessors in the course of costly expeditions. 
For example, he did withdraw the Roman troops from the territories be­
yond the Euphrates and the Tigris. But, in the end, he abandoned this idea 
and reorganized the defence of the province. The legio IIII Flavia was with­
drawn to its earlier base beyond the' Danube, to Singidunum. Hadrian an­
ticipated a potential Jazygian attack and he hoped to strengthen the Danubian 
limes with this measure. The military role that fell to Dacia was — besides 
the defence of its own territory — participation in the battles to ward off an 
enemy attack. Incapable of independent military manoeuvres, on numer­
ous occasions the Dacian army could be successfully deployed only together 
with troops from other provinces.
The Roman Empire was determined to establish in the European border 
provinces a defensive line which would clearly demarcate the imperial fron­
tier for the peoples of the Barbaricum, and which would, at the same time, 
offer a relatively easy and rapid means of overland and water communica­
tion between the chain of forts built along this frontier. What remain to be 
researched are Rome's interests in retaining —along with the shorter Danu­
bian frontier which corresponded better to the traditional ideas of defence
— a province the control of which posed considerable difficulties. Why did 
Rome decide, after some hesitation, to maintain a province whose defence 
called for a larger and certainly more costly army than the defence of its 
other provinces? Having failed to immediately withdraw its troops from 
this territory after the Dacian wars, Rome could have done so later only at 
the cost of considerable prestige. The gold resources of Transylvania un­
doubtedly influenced the decision to retain the province.





























































































The organization that began under Marcius Turbo and probably lasted well 
into the term of office of the next governor, Julius Severus (120-126) af­
fected the frontiers and the garrison of Dacia, as well as the neighbouring 
territories of the Barbaricum: the Temeskoz, Oltenia and Wallachia. The 
troops of the Lower Moesian army stationed in Wallachia were withdrawn 
at the latest by this time; this, in effect, meant the abandonment of a terri­
tory that had been occupied during the course of the Dacian wars. A prov­
ince called Dacia Inferior (Lower Dacia) was carved out from the Dacian 
territory beyond the Olt River. No legions were stationed in this province. 
It was governed by a procurator of the equestrian order. The province en­
joyed a certain measure of independence in its internal administration. Its 
boundaries were marked by the Danube to the south and by the other Dacian 
province, Dacia Superior, to the northwest. The eastern boundary is uncer­
tain: it either lay along the chain of forts on the Olt River or along the so- 
called Limes Transalutanus, a fortified line lying some twenty-five to thirty- 
five kilometres farther on and roughly parallel with the Olt.
Prior to its division, the central territory of Dacia was called Dacia Supe­
rior (Upper Dacia); it comprised the heartland of Transylvania and the east­
ern Banat up as far as the Eastern Carpathians. Following the transfer of the 
legio IIII Flavia, only one legion remained in Dacia, the legio XIII Gemina 
stationed in Apulum. The governor of the province, who at the same time 
acted as the legion commander, also resided here.
Simultaneously with the reorgariization of 118 or some years later (but 
definitely before 124), a new province was created in the northern part of 
the province, in northern Transylvania, under the name of Dacia Porolis- 
sensis. The province received its name from the military fort at Porolissum. 
There was no legion stationed here either and, thus similarly to Dacia Infe­
rior, the province was governed by a procurator of the equestrian order. The 
governor of Dacia Superior was entrusted with supervising military mat­
ters in the other two provinces as well. The formerly united province of 
Dacia was, in this way, divided into three distinct parts.
There were about eighty forts in Dacia. Unfortunately, very little is known 
about the date of their construction or the sequence in which they were 
built owing to the lack of archaeological investigation on these sites. It is 
possible that some of these forts only operated for short periods of time. 
The large number of forts can also be attributed to the fact that there were 
few military camps of the size usual elsewhere. Also, a number of smaller 
forts were constructed along the limes section on the Olt and the Limes 
Transalutanus. Several of these forts could be garrisoned by a single mili­
tary unit. In 164, the garrison troops stationed in fifteen Dacian forts were 
drawn from three equestrian and twelve infantry units. Disregarding the 
legionary detachments, these troops numbered about 11,500 soldiers. To­
gether with the legion, the armed forces in Dacia can be estimated at about 
45,000-50,000 men.
The earliest, earth-and-timber period of these forts has been observed on 
fifteen of the fort sites. These forts were later partially or totally rebuilt with 
stone walls and defence works. This work began by the time of Hadrian,
while the reconstructions continued under Antoninus Pius. Conversely, a 
number of forts were only built at the beginning of the third century.
According to a milestone erected in 109-110 in Ajtony, the construction 
of the main military roads began immediately after the occupation of the 
province and finished with its reorganization in 118. The routes can be re­
constructed from the Tabula Peutingeriana. This rough map of the road net­
work connecting the settlements — mostly forts — and of the distances 
between them was drawn in the mid-third century. The Tabula begins its 
description with the roads from the two Danubian bridges at Lederata and 
Drobeta connecting Dacia with the empire, and those from Dierna which 
led to Apulum, and thence to the northern frontier. The roads linked these 
strategically important fords with the capital of the province and with the 
northern frontier. The roads of eastern Dacia are not marked on the map, 
the reason being that this territory had been evacuated by the army by the 
middle of the third century. The map, drawn at a later date, does not depict 
the abandoned forts in that area.
The road connecting Dacia with Pannonia Inferior led through the Bar- 
baricum, and is also well known: it branched off from the Tibiscum-Apulum 
road at the confluence of the Sztrigy River and then turned westwards into 
the valley of the Maros River. It also led beyond the Dacian frontier. The 
road followed the Maros Valley until its confluence and then entered Pan­
nonia Inferior through the Danube-Tisza interfluve. Its course along the 
valley of the Maros is not known. The stamped tiles and building remains 
uncovered at Bulcs, in the environs of Arad, at Nagyszentmiklos and at 
Nemetcsanad definitely suggest that this road was under military control. 
Fill from it has been found along a fifty kilometres long section in the Dan­
ube-Tisza interfluve. This road enabled rapid communication between 
Pannonia and Dacia. The tomb statue of a sailor from Micia and the inscrip­
tion erected by the shipping society active in Apulum21 indicates that there 
was shipping on the Maros River. The safety of the section of road that 
passed through Jazygian territory had to be ensured at all cost, which is 
why it was placed under military protection.
The interpretation of the finds that have been unearthed on either side of 
this road also has a bearing on the definition of the status of the Temeskoz. 
It has been suggested that the road leading through the Maros Valley should 
be considered an imperial frontier — a section of the limes — in spite of the 
fact that no camps have yet been identified next to it and that the western 
boundary of this territory, the line of the Tisza River, is similarly unfortified. 
The presence of a Sarmatian-Jazygian population as well as the lack of for­
tifications and Roman finds definitely suggest that the area lying to the east 
and south of the Tisza-Maros line cannot have belonged to Dacia in terms 
of administration.
The peaceful decades following the reorganization in 118 created favour­
able conditions for subsequent development in Dacia. For over two dec­
ades there were no major wars in or beyond the province. The Dacian threat 
is mentioned in general terms only during the reign of Antoninus Pius. These 
Dacians lived beyond the northern and eastern frontiers of the province
21. Collegium nautarum: CIL III, 1209.
and also included groups of Carpi and Costoboci, as well as free Dacians 
(daci liberi) who had either been unwilling to surrender or who had fled 
from their homeland because of the wars. The details of this war are not 
known, but the war threat appears to have been insignificant at this time. 
According to a brief remark in the biography of Antoninus Pius22 the em­
peror "crushed the Germans and the Dacians and many other tribes and 
also the Jews, who were in revolt". The Dacian war can be dated by the 
appearance of the epithet Dacicus among the honorary titles taken by the 
emperor in 157. Indeed, the governors of Dacia Superior and Porolissensis 
were all first-rate soldiers (Statius Priscus and Macrinius Vindex). The armed 
forces of the two provinces proved unable to prevent the attack and 
Mauritanians troops had to be called in from Africa. Even though actual 
battles can only be assumed in Dacia Superior, the enemy movements were 
the first signs of unrest and a portent of the long war along the entire sec­
tion of the Danubian frontier.
Economy and Trade
The economic importance of the central European frontier provinces of the 
imperiutn was negligible. Neither were their exports of much consequence. 
At the same time, the upkeep of the garrison troops consumed considerable 
funds. The mineral wealth of Transylvania undoubtedly enhanced the im­
portance of Dacia for Rome. Aside from stone quarries as well as iron and 
salt mines, what really attracted the Romans were the gold deposits. Even 
though an exceptionally abundant source material has survived concerning 
these gold mines, next to nothing is known about their exploitation in Dacian 
times (the Dacians apparently preferred silver jewellery, at least this is what 
is suggested by presently-known finds), or about the yield of these mines in 
Roman times. The fame of the Transylvanian gold mines was spread by the 
wax tablets that came to light at Verespatak in 1786, in 1790, and on several 
other occasions during the course of the nineteenth century. These tablets 
comprise, in fact, various economic writings, contracts of purchase and sale, 
and accounts from between 131 and 167.
The exploitation of the Transylvanian gold mines (aurariae Dacicae) ap­
pears to have begun shortly after the organization of the province. The fo­
cus of mining activity lay in the Erchegyseg where the miners lived in small 
villages next to the larger settlements of Ampelum and Alburnus Maior.
The mine territory (territorium metalli) was considered imperial property 
and the settlements here were not granted urban autonomy (it is uncertain 
whether Ampelum ever received the status of tnunicipium). The adminis­
trative organization and the gold mines were directed by the mine procura­
tors (procurator aurarium) who were generally freedmen of the emperor. 
Mining was well under way by Hadrian's reign as indicated by a wax tablet 
dated to 131. The staff of the administrative organs of the mines (vilici, 
tabularii, dispensatores) to whom the administration and professional control
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of the mines were entrusted were mostly imperial slaves and freedmen. 
The librarii, who were clerks in the office of the procurator, were occasion­
ally chosen from among the soldiers of the legio XIII Gemina. They were not 
the only soldiers who were active in the territory of the mines. The protec­
tion of the regions that lay near the frontier against external attacks and 
bandit raids was the task of the numerus Maurorurn Hispanorum, soldiers 
who had been recruited from North Africa.
The wax tablets and the other inscriptions from this area contain a wealth 
of information about the population living in the mining territories. The 
mines were worked by Illyrians from Dalmatia as well as by Pirustae, 
Sardeates and Buridustae. The Illyrian names from the mining territories 
account for the greater part (64 per cent) of the Illyrian names in Dacia. It 
would appear that there was a constant shortage of miners in spite of re­
peated recruiting. The high wages paid to these miners also suggest that the 
labour force was insufficient. The text from one wax tablet clearly shows 
that the population of this area had declined by the sixties of the second 
century. On 9 February, 167, the officials of the Jupiter Cemenus collegium  
of Apulum dissolved the organization because only seventeen of the origi­
nal fifty-four members remained in Alburnus.
Little is known about the economy of Dacia aside from mining. Handi­
crafts appear to have been self-supplying, as in the other provinces. The 
implements and tools necessary for agricultural work and mining were 
manufactured from iron ore extracted from local mines. The handicraft best 
preserved in the archaeological record is that of the potters since ceramics 
were used in every household. So far, however, very few workshops and 
pottery kilns have been excavated. Neither can traces of a local, uniform 
pottery style distributed over the entire province be detected. Influences 
from the area to the south of the Danube have been noted in the vessel 
forms and the surface finish of pottery from southern Dacia. In contrast, the 
pottery from the north shows influences from Noricum and Pannonia (as 
reflected, for example, in three-footed bowls). However, one specific vessel 
type with a characteristic ornamentation can be distinguished in northern 
Transylvania. The exact distribution of this pottery ware is not precisely 
known. These large hemispherical bowls were decorated with stamped pat­
terns. The grey and pink bowls manufactured in Porolissum reveal influ­
ences from southern Pannonian workshops. The figural relief ornamenta­
tion of terra sigillata wares can be recognized in the stylized geometric pat­
terns that were stamped on the vessels.
Overland and water routes favoured the development of long-distance 
trade, while the many soldiers stationed in the province guaranteed a se­
cure market with substantial purchasing power. At the same time the high 
proportion of oriental settlers ensured links with the major trade arteries of 
the Roman world operated by Syrians. A number of merchants are known 
from the inscriptions. Little is known about their actual business for they 
left hardly a trace of their activities in the archaeological record. They prob­
ably traded in perishable commodities such as foodstuffs and textiles which 
have not survived. The main export commodities of the province were salt, 
iron and, obviously, gold; some of the wild beasts (such as bear and wolf) 
used in circus games were perhaps also caught in and exported from Dacia.
The Long W ar and Recovery in the Severan Age
The northwest to southeast migration of the Gothic tribes, beginning in the 
middle of the second century, initially caused unrest among the peoples 
living beyond the frontiers of the em pire in the northern half of the 
Carpathian Basin, and then led to a bitter war one and a half decades long. 
The Germanic tribes (Goths, Langobards and Vandals), who were on the 
move in search of a new homeland, threatened the settlement territory and 
the hitherto peaceful existence of the border populations. The path of their 
flight was blocked by the Roman Empire which forced them into a depend­
ent, client relationship, but which at the same time also proved to be a wealthy 
neighbour.
The safety of the region was undermined by the fact that in 162, Emperor 
Marcus Aurelius withdrew a number of troops from the European frontier 
provinces — including Dacia — for deployment in the Parthian war that 
had broken out in the previous year. However, the skilful policy charted by 
the governors of these provinces postponed for some time the outbreak of 
hostilities in this region. The first armed conflicts in Dacia can be roughly 
dated to after 167 on the evidence of the coin hoard from Tib6d — the latest 
coin from which was minted in that year — and the latest date on a series of 
wax tablets (29 May, 167). These wax tablets had been carefully concealed 
by their owners probably on their receiving news of the war; they were 
never able to retrieve them. Simultaneously with the onset of armed con­
flict, a number of administrative and military changes came into force. Un­
fortunately, the exact sequence of these changes within the brief three year 
period cannot be reconstructed from the sparse information contained in 
the sources. These measures were probably adopted in the face of the crisis 
brought on by the war so that it is hardly probable that the best solution 
was found already by the first years of the war. In the second half of 167, the 
legio V Macedonica which had returned from the eastern campaign to Troes- 
mis in Dobrudja, was transferred to northern Dacia, to the military camp of 
Potaissa, perhaps in anticipation of an attack against Transylvania. The ad­
ministrative subdivision of Dacia was also modified, with the three parts of 
the province becoming more strongly linked to each other between 167 and 
170. They were placed under the leadership of a single governor whose 
official title became "legatus Augusti pro praetore Daciarum trium" (governor 
of the three Dacias). The names of the provinces also changed: Superior 
became Apulensis and Inferior was hereafter called Malvensis (probably 
after a settlement that has not yet been identified). These changes follow the 
well-known pattern established by naming Dacia Porolissensis: the prov­
inces were named after a major settlement or town. The legionary fortress 
of Potaissa was linked to Dacia Apulensis.
Military activity culminated between 167 and 170. Dacia's situation was 
especially critical because its long frontiers had to be protected from three 
sides. The high military command in Rome appointed capable and experi­
enced soldiers as governors and procurators in the Danubian provinces; 
some of them, such as M. Claudius Fronto, who in 167 had been the gover­
nor of Moesia Superior, fell in battle. The defence of the western frontier of
Dacia and Moesia Superior was eventually pulled together under one com­
mand in order to check the Jazyges who mounted attacks through the 
TemeskOz. In 168, Fronto was entrusted with the joint governorship of both 
provinces and subsequently was placed at the head of the Tres Daciae. When 
the army of Moesia Superior was defeated and the new Moesian governor 
also fell on the battlefield, the province was joined to Dacia. The concen­
trated Sarmatian and Germanic attacks led to a critical situation at the front: 
"... After waging successful battles against the Germans and the Jazyges, 
and while fighting valiantly for the state, he fell in battle", states the inscrip­
tion on Fronto's statue erected in Trajan's forum.23 An inscription in his 
honour was also erected in Sarmizegethusa.24 The danger threatening the 
town is described in another inscription set up in honour of Marcus Aurelius, 
whose troops relieved the town when it was in grave danger.25
Little is known about the eastern front in Dacia. It is assumed that only 
minor skirmishes took place in this area since the main enemy thrust was 
directed towards the south. The Costoboci and the Sarmatians bypassed 
Dacia and plundered Moesia Inferior before advancing into Achaia. They 
ransacked the Eleusinian sanctuary. Finally, the governor Cornelius Clemens 
defeated them with the help of a Vandal group, the Asdingi Qiasdingi) in 
171 and 172.26 This event marked a decisive turn in events. Rome now at­
tempted to realize her aims by diplomatic means. In a somewhat similar 
way, "Tarbus, a neighbouring chieftain, who had come into Dacia and was 
demanding money and threatening to make war if he should fail to get it"27 
was also checked by Rome's allies. Certain populations were admitted into 
the empire who later settled in Pannonia, Moesia and Germania. This course 
of events reflects the ultimate wish of the belligerent barbarians to be ad­
mitted behind the frontiers of the empire. The events of the ensuing year 
were determined by military actions initiated by Rome. The enemy was 
defeated on its own territory. The Jazyges were later granted permission by 
Marcus Aurelius to communicate with their kindred in the east, the Roxolani, 
by way of Dacia under the supervision of the governor of the province.28
The legio I Italica from Moesia Inferior was also deployed in the battles 
on the northern frontier of Dacia. Around 180 Marcus Aurelius' son, the 
emperor Commodus, led his army against the peoples, primarily the Buri 
(buri), living in this area. The campaign proved successful because "now 
that they were exhausted he [Commodus] made peace with them, receiving 
hostages and getting many captives from the Buri themselves, as well as 
fifteen thousand from the others, he compelled the others to take an oath 
that they would never dwell in nor use for pasture a forty-stade (five-mile) 
strip of their territory bordering Dacia. The same Sabinianus also, when 
twelve thousand of the neighbouring Dacians had been driven out of their 
own country and were on the point of aiding the others, dissuaded them
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from their purpose, promising them that some land in our Dacia should be 
given them ".29
At the end of the long war, Rome restored the former system of alliances 
on the frontiers of the empire. The appearance and settlement of various 
Germanic tribes along Dacia's northern front, however, cast a shadow over 
the province.
The one and a half decade long war and the plague following in its wake, 
as well as the weakness of the military defence and the slower pace of the 
granting of urban autonomy compared to other provinces, again caused 
unrest among the provincial population under Commodus's control. The 
emperor's biography mentions these events briefly. In the mid-180s, "the 
provincials in Britain, Dacia and Germany attempted to cast off his yoke".30 
The minor details are unknown but there is nothing to show that the native 
Dacian population participated in these movements. Similar stirrings were 
reported in Germania. It is possible that the Dacian legions received the 
epithet "pia fidelis, pia constans" at this time for their fidelity to Commodus. 
The legion stationed in Apulum erected a statue to Commodus.31
In 192, Commodus was murdered and in March 193, the governor, Sep- 
timius Severus, was acclaimed emperor by the Pannonian legions in Car- 
nuntum. Together with the other Danubian provinces, the Dacian army, 
too, immediately recognized him as their overlord. The new emperor en­
trusted the governorship of Dacia to his brother. From this point, the mili­
tary detachments of the Dacian army fought on the side of Septimius against 
the pretenders. Under the reign of Septimius Severus the fate of the Danubian 
provinces which had supported him from the outset took a turn for the 
better. The peaceful political situation also favoured economic prosperity. 
The reconstruction of Dacia is reflected in broad grants of urban autonomy. 
Severus granted autonomy to three settlements while one settlement was 
promoted to the rank of colonia. It would appear that grants of ius Italicum  
to several Dacian towns can also be dated to his reign. The territorium of 
towns that had received the ius Italicum were exempted from land tax.
The paucity of archaeological finds — those that do exist are, moreover, 
largely unpublished — does not allow a detailed reconstruction of this Seve- 
ran prosperity. It is nonetheless conspicuous that this prosperity appears to 
have been restricted to Transylvania rather than extending to the whole of 
Dacia. The chief beneficiaries of this prosperity were the soldiers of the two 
legions and of the auxiliary troops stationed in the province. The rebuilding 
and enlargement of various towns following the ravages of the Marcomann 
wars can also be attributed to this new policy of urbanization.
Dacia suffered no enemy attacks under Septimius Severus. Following 
the devastation of the long war, reconstruction work in the military for­
tresses also began. Wherever necessary, the fortifications were rebuilt in 
stone. It has been suggested that the Limes Transalutanus was also built at 
this time. Armed hostilities broke out again in 212-213 in the northern part
2 9 . D ion C assius, LXXII, 3. Vettius Sabinianus was governor of Dacia.
30. SHA, vita Commodi 13. 6-6.
31. C1L III. 1172.
of Transylvania when the province was attacked by the free Dacians, the 
Vandals and the Carpi. After the fighting, Caracalla visited the province 
before setting out with his army to fight in the war raging in the eastern part 
of the empire.
In 218, following Caracalla's murder, the free Dacians "... after ravaging 
Dacia and showing an eagerness for further war, now desisted when they 
got back the hostages that Caracalla, under the terms of the alliance, had 
taken from them".32 Few inscriptions have survived from the reign of the 
last Severan emperor, Alexander, although soldiers, in the spirit of the em­
peror cult, erected inscriptions to the emperor and his mother, Julia Mam- 
maea, as a token of their loyalty.
Settlement and Urbanization
After the Roman conquest, Dacia became imperial property and, as such, 
its territory was assigned to different administrative categories (military 
territorium, municipal territorium, imperial property). Trajan granted Dacia 
provincial status soon after the conquest. This region would hardly have 
attracted settlers if the newly conquered territory had remained under mili­
tary administration, which always suggested a lack of security. The intro­
duction of civilian administration and the management of the affairs of the 
population called for the founding of a civilian settlement, a town. This 
took place in 110-112, at the latest. The veterans of the legions that had 
fought in the Dacian wars were settled in Colonia Ulpia Traiana Augusta — 
later known as Sarmizegethusa — founded by Trajan. The native Dacian 
population of this area who had not fled with their brethren do not appear 
to have enjoyed preferential treatment over the legionary veterans at the 
time of the foundation. Since large tracts of arable land were scarce in the 
mountainous region, the resettlement of the local population somewhere 
else was a more pressing problem than in other colonies. This colonia re­
mained the only one of its kind in the province until the reign of Hadrian. 
The new town adopted the name of Decebal's seat, Sarmizegethusa Regia, 
in spite of the fact that it lay some thirty-seven kilometres to the west of the 
former Dacian capital and that it had no Dacian antecedents.
The adoption of the geographic names used by the native population 
corresponds to general Roman practice. The survival of earlier place-names 
was made possible by the fact that when the Roman army conquered this 
territory during the course of the first Dacian war, these settlements were 
still inhabited; thus, their names could be passed on. That this had indeed 
been the case was revealed by the emperor himself. In his campaign journal 
of the Dacian wars, Trajan recorded the route of his advance. According to 
the single surviving fragment of this journal "... from here we advanced to 
Bersobis, and then to Aisisis".
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The survival of the place names used by the native population, however, 
does not necessarily imply the actual survival of earlier settlements, espe­
cially if the Roman town was founded on the site or in the immediate vicin­
ity of an abandoned military camp, as was the normal practice in Dacia. 
The building of a military camp generally entailed the annihilation of what­
ever Dacian settlement there might have been there. The native name was 
retained even if the camp was sited in the broader environs of the native 
settlement as, for example, Aquincum and Brigetio in Pannonia, as well as 
Singidunum in Moesia. Sarmizegethusa Regia and Colonia Dacica in Dacia 
are a case in point. They demonstrate that the Roman conquerors used Dacian 
place names quite liberally when naming their settlements. Consequently, 
it is impossible to identify Dacian settlements on the basis of the Dacian 
names given to Roman camps and forts. Neither do these names demon­
strate the continuity of the Dacian settlements.
When Hadrian organized the three Dacian provinces, he also founded 
two new towns for the administration of civil matters. The municipium of 
Dacia Inferior was created from the vicus beside the military camp of Drobeta 
lying on the Danube River. The reasons for choosing this particular settle­
ment were obvious. The importance of the settlement guarding the north­
ern bridgehead of the stone bridge increased considerably owing to a large 
traffic while the rapid growth of its population also called for a grant of 
urban autonomy. Napoca in Dacia Porolissensis was promoted to the rank 
of municipium in the northern province.
Municipal development and urbanization was extremely slow compared 
with other provinces. The foundation of the first colonia was necessitated by 
the introduction of civil administration, whilst the next two were brought 
into being following the creation of new provinces. Little is known of the 
circumstances and the foundation date of later towns. The vicus of the camp 
of Romula was made a municipium after the transfer of its troops, perhaps 
under the rule of Antoninus Pius or Marcus Aurelius. The civic settlement 
next to the legionary fortress of Apulum (Apulum I) was granted urban 
rights by Marcus Aurelius. Some time later it was already being mentioned 
as a colonia, a rank granted, at the latest, under Commodus. Urbanization 
proceeded on a larger scale under Septimius Severus. The canabae of the 
legionary fortresses of Apulum (Apulum II) and Potaissa became municipia 
at this time. The fort vicus of Dierna and Tibiscum received the status of 
municipium in the third century, perhaps under the Severi, whilst Drobeta 
became a colonia. Potaissa and Apulum II were raised to the rank of colonia 
by Caracalla. The town of Malva has not yet been identified. Some scholars 
equate it with Romula, while according to others, its location should be 
sought for elsewhere. What is certain is that it became a colonia in 230.
There were only about eleven or twelve towns in Dacia including three 
or four municipia and eight coloniae (the status of Ampelum is uncertain, 
and the identification of Romula with Malva, as we have noted, is still moot). 
Moesia Superior, considerably smaller than Dacia, boasted thirteen towns, 
while Pannonia had about twenty to twenty-three. In contrast to other prov­
inces where the towns of the urban network were dispersed more or less 
evenly over the entire province, the urban settlements of Dacia were con­
centrated in the western half of the province.
Civitates, which normally played a decisive role in the "civilization" of 
the native population were entirely lacking in this province. It would ap­
pear that the fact that municipal rights were only conferred on most of the 
settlements (certainly five of six of them) at a relatively late date, under 
Septimius Severus, was directly linked to the lack of such civitates. In Dacia, 
towns could evolve only from military settlements that grew up around the 
camps because there alone were communities with large enough populations 
to be found. In the second century A.D., however, this possible course of 
urban development was still blocked. The territoria that lay under military 
administration were inhabited by the families of the soldiers as well as dis­
charged veterans, merchants and various craftsmen. The municipalization 
of these settlements would necessarily have called for the loss of a part of 
the territoria, i.e., for joining this land to the new town, in spite of the fact 
that it was needed for provisioning the military. The abolition of the mili­
tary territoria only began under Septimius Severus, and this delay proved 
an obstacle to urbanization in Dacia. Owing to the great number of camps, 
the areas attached as military territoria were rather extensive. At the same 
time, the emergence of larger civilian settlements was hindered by the rela­
tively late date of the conquest on the one hand, and by the smallness of the 
civilian population on the other. Owing to their low numbers, the towns, 
concentrated as they were in western Dacia, could not become disseminators 
of Roman culture throughout the province.
The settlement of various peoples after the conquest did not yield spec­
tacular results while, from the 160s, a gradual emigration from the prov­
ince can even be noted. Long drawn out wars and plagues decimated the 
population. The lack of civilian population also hindered urban develop­
ment. The disastrous economic situation following the Marcomann wars 
and the lack of urban autonomy led to unrests and, later, to revolts. This 
situation, in turn, called for radical measures to ensure some sort of im­
provement and the repopulation of the area. The grants of ius ltalicum  were 
meant to remedy this situation. Sarmizegethusa, Napoca, Apulum and, 
perhaps, Diema were granted the rare privilege of exemption from land tax 
under Septimius Severus at the latest, a measure that was designed to at­
tract and encourage settlers from outside Dacia. These measures proved 
successful as the ranks of the provincial population were swelled by Syr­
ians and other orientals. The organs of the provincial emperor's cult and 
the provincial assembly also sprang into life — after a long hiatus — in the 
Severan period. The lack of such organs for expressing civic loyalty in the 
preceding period is highly conspicuous. The provincial assembly was the 
main body uniting the towns and the civitates of the native population and 
also fulfilled another important corporate function in addition to perform­
ing the public rites of the emperor's cult. This assembly could instigate pros­
ecutions against an unjust governor after he had finished his time in office 
and it could request the investigation of alleged grievances. The existence 
of this organization is not attested to in the pre-Severan period in Dacia, but 
is documented in a number of inscriptions from later times. The title of 
"m etropolis" as definitely linked to the location of the provincial assembly, 
appears next to the name of Sarmizegethusa only under the reign of Alex­
ander Severus.
The relatively late appearance of the provincial assembly can be traced 
back to two causes. On the one hand, the low number of second-century 
towns did not call for the introduction or for the zealous practice of the 
emperor's cult. These rites were, in any case performed regularly in the 
military camps and by the augustales in the towns. On the other hand, the 
government in Rome considered the local population too small; the civitas 
organization was also lacking. Under the Severi, however, the urban popu­
lation increased along with the number of towns which in turn eventually 
necessitated a provincial assembly and the organization of the emperor's 
cult on a provincial level. The high priest of the imperial cult was called 
coronatus, "wreath-wearer", a word borrowed from the eastern provinces.
By the time the towns and their leading organizations were called into 
being under the Severi, Dacia looked back on a hundred years of existence. 
As it happened, it could look forward to less than three decades of peaceful 
developm ent, which obviously restricted the extent and intensity of 
romanization in the towns and elsewhere.
Little is known about the rural settlements. It would appear that the ur­
banized areas also influenced the occurrence of villa economies. Estate cen­
tres and their buildings have mostly been excavated in the western part of 
the province, in Transylvania, and generally in the vicinity of towns. The 
main buildings are small, rarely covering more than 400 square yards or so. 
They are simple and unpretentious without a trace of luxury, such as mosa­
ics, wall paintings or ornamental marble slabs in their internal furnishings, 
which suggests that these villae belonged to small- or middle-sized estates. 
And hardly any villa estates are known from the Oltenian plains even though 
this region was better suited to agricultural activities.
The Population: Dacians and Settlers
In his description of the population of the new province, Eutropius men­
tions that after the conquest "Trajan ... had transferred there infinite masses 
from the entire Roman world to settle the fields and cities. Dacia lost all its 
men in the long war of Decebal".33 The historian's words clearly imply that 
the native population of Dacia suffered considerable losses during the course 
of the long wars and that Trajan had, in essence, to repopulate the territory. 
A conscious settlement policy was usually adopted for the "provincializa- 
tion" of freshly conquered territories in the course of which discharged sol­
diers received land grants. The veterans were soon joined by their families 
and a number of tradesmen. If this is what had happened in the case of 
Dacia as well, Eutropius would not have stressed the fact so emphatically. 
The real reason for the settlement is fairly evident. The area had become 
depopulated owing to the heavy losses suffered by the native population.
The fate of the native population of any newly conquered territory de­
pended largely on how and after what preliminaries it came into the hands 
of Rome. If the province had been acquired peacefully and without resist-
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a nee, the population suffered few losses. In Dacia, however, the situation 
was different. Trajan annexed the territory to the imperium after two bitter 
and protracted wars, at the end of a one and a half century long process. 
These struggles and the occasional Roman defeats made the Dacians a hated 
and much-despised enemy.34 This impression was only aggravated by 
Decebal's treacherous actions after the first Dacian war. For Rome, he was 
the man who broke his oaths, a man to be mistrusted at all times, for he had 
not observed the peace treaty. His actions subsequent to the outbreak of the 
new war won him no more credit. He first tried to persuade Longinus, a 
captured commander in the Roman army, to defect to his side, and when 
this attempt failed "he asked that he might receive back his territory as far 
as the Ister and be indemnified for all the money he had spent on the war, in 
return for restoring Longinus". Longinus committed suicide and Trajan was 
then able to reject these unacceptable terms.35 Decebal then made an abor­
tive attempt to have Trajan murdered by assassins at his Moesian head­
quarters.36
The deeds of Decebal for centuries determined the Roman attitude to­
wards the Dacians. Little wonder, then, that after the preliminaries to the 
second Dacian war "the emperor wished to exterminate them utterly". We 
might recall here that the physical annihilation of barbarians who dared to 
attack the Imperium Romanum in no way posed a moral problem to Rome. 
This sentiment, first voiced by the Emperor Augustus37 was later put into 
practice. Marcus Aurelius had, for example, contemplated the extermina­
tion of the Jazyges.38 Extermination, in the Roman sense of the word, meant 
not only the execution of all rebels, but also that the native population was 
sold off as slaves, with the men drafted into the army and sent to faraway 
provinces. Those Dacians who had been thrown in their lot with Decebal 
could expect no mercy. This bleak perspective undoubtedly influenced their 
last desperate act — which is also depicted on Trajan's memorial column. 
The Dacian ruling elite committed mass suicide. When Trajan returned to 
Rome "he gave spectacles on one hundred and twenty-three days, in the 
course of which ... ten thousand gladiators fought"39 — most of them prob­
ably Dacian prisoners of war. According to Criton, who was a physician in 
the imperial court, and who participated in the wars and later wrote their 
history, the number of prisoners from the Dacian wars was extremely high. 
Trajan, however, spared the lives of only some forty men after his final, all- 
decisive victory. Even if these numbers are somewhat exaggerated, they 
nonetheless reflect one aspect of the Dacian-Roman relationship, as well as 
the high toll on Dacian life.
The surviving Dacian men were drafted as auxiliary troops and were 
sent to Britannia and the east. Their later fate is not known. There is no 
evidence that after their discharge they returned to their former homeland.
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In any evaluation of the extent of the depopulation it should be borne in 
mind that the new province was centered on the heartland of Decebal's 
kingdom, the area which had suffered the greatest losses in human life, not 
only because of the long wars, but also because it was these people who had 
remained loyal to Decebal — to the point of draining the poison cup. It was 
the inhabitants of this region who were massacred by the Romans. It was 
they who were sold into slavery, and who fled to unoccupied territories in 
face of the Roman conquest.
The incorporation of the native population into an administrative and 
territorial organization (civitas peregrina) convenient to Rome was an essen­
tial point in the establishing of any new province. These civitates were at 
first placed under military control, although the leaders of the native popu­
lation were also drafted into the administration. The administration of the 
civitates later passed into the hands of the tribal elite (principes) who enjoyed 
various privileges. The civitas system in part provided the institutional frame­
work for romanization and in part formed the nucleus of later urban com­
munities. However, in contrast with other provinces, no traces of this sys­
tem can be detected in Dacia. One reason is the lack of a tribal aristocracy: 
this had either been eliminated by Decebal or had perished with the rest of 
the Dacian "nobility" during the wars. Characteristically enough, only a 
single tribal or ethnic name survived into the provincial period in Dacia: 
the vicus Anar(torum), the village of the Anartii in northern Transylvania.40 
This village, however, was inhabited not by Dacians, but by Celts who had 
been subdued by them. Only a single princeps is known by name: T. Aurelius 
Aper, who was not a Dacian but a tribal leader from Dalmatia.41 The small 
native population would, perhaps, explain why Rome considered the intro­
duction of an administrative system designed for the dissemination of Ro­
man civilization — the civitates — unnecessary for the surviving Dacians. 
This situation would imply that the surviving native population took no 
part in the urban life that eventually led to romanization. The inscriptions 
from the province suggest that persons with "Thraco-Dacian" names were 
not represented in urban bodies and institutions.
The written sources and the archaeological evidence offer an insight into 
the process of the settlement ex toto orbe Romano (from the entire Roman 
world), to quote Eutropius. The first group of immigrants were the legion­
ary veterans who already enjoyed full Roman citizenship and who arrived 
after the founding of Sarmizegethusa. Another group can be traced back to 
the legions stationed in the Rhineland, western Pannonia and Moesia; their 
names betray an Italian ancestry. A western Pannonian or Norican origin is 
rarely indicated on the inscriptions. However, the distribution of character­
istic proper names clearly reveal Pannonian and Norican origins, judging 
by the occurrence in northern Dacia of burial rites formerly restricted to the 
area of Noricum and Pannonia, and by the distribution of various artifact 
types, the number of arrivals from those regions was fairly high.
The other group of settlers from the Middle Danubian region came to 
Dacia from Dalmatia. Various inscriptions clearly show that they arrived as
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close-knit communities and that they were essentially resettled along tribal 
lines, mainly in the territorium metalli (ore territory). A segment of this group 
did not yet enjoy Roman citizenship but wereperegrini. They settled in closed 
communities (vicus Pirustarum) in the Erchegyseg, and mining on a larger 
scale only began with their arrival. A few descendants of these Dalmatian, 
Norican and Pannonian settlers later became municipal leaders. Besides 
Roman citizens, the colonists from Pannonia and Noricum included also a 
number of Celts, as indicated by their names (Bonio, Bucco, Cotu, Veponius).
The military, too, contributed to the ethnic heterogeneity of the prov­
ince. The auxiliary troops stationed in Dacia included a number of units 
organized along ethnic lines. Surprisingly enough, the proportion of Thracian 
names is conspicuously low in spite of the many soldiers of Thracian origin 
and the large mass of Balkanic immigrants. This can perhaps be attributed 
to the fact that the soldiers who had been recruited from nearby areas did 
not settle in Dacia after their discharge but returned to their former homes.
There was a large influx of people from the oriental provinces and from 
the southern Balkans, the Greek-speaking territories of the empire. The Ro­
mans often deployed special units, such as Palmyrian archers, in regions 
with varied topography that could only be defended with difficulty. Three 
units of archers were stationed in Dacia. There were other Syrian troops as 
well, generally archers and other Commagenian units. The proportion of 
immigrants from the east, from Anatolia, rose perceptibly after the Marco- 
mann wars.
The proper names which can be evaluated from the province total about 
three thousand. Seventy-five per cent (about two thousand) are Roman, 
one hundred and twenty are Illyrian, seventy are Celtic and sixty are Se­
mitic (Syrian). Thracian-Dacian names number about sixty, that is, about 
two per cent of the entire onomastic material. These are mostly true Thracian 
names held by persons who had arrived from areas lying south of the Dan­
ube River. Since no throughgoing attempt to distinguish Dacian names from 
Thracian has yet been carried out — the relatedness of the two ethnic groups 
is still subject to debate — these names are lumped together. It is nonethe­
less conspicuous that expressly Dacian names (Bitus, Butus, Decebalus, 
Diurpaneus, Sassa, Scorilo) occur not in Dacia, but in other parts of the imperium 
where Dacians were taken as slaves. Names from the native population 
comprise about 24 per cent of the total in Noricum, where romanization 
began a full century earlier than in Dacia. This would suggest that Dacian 
participation in the romanization of Dacia was minimal.
The settlement of populations from Noricum-Pannonia and Illyria is re­
flected by the occurrence of tumulus graves in Dacia, mainly in Transylva­
nia. Either a large or small mound was constructed over the ashes of the 
dead who were cremated on a funeral pyre. This custom was widespread 
in western Pannonia and in neighbouring eastern Noricum. The close ties 
between the two areas are reflected not only by these tumulus burials but 
also by characteristic Norican-Pannonian clay vessels, such as three-footed 
bowls, bowl-shaped lids and large straight-walled bowls deposited in these 
Dacian graves. A large (perhaps the largest) cemetery of these N orican- 
Pannonian settlers with over three hundred tumulus burials has been un­
earthed at Hermany. Other cemeteries have been identified at Kalbor and
Magyarigen. In addition to earthen tumuli, burial mounds encircled by a 
stone wall or a "parapet" have also been found. A most impressive, early 
burial of this type has been uncovered at Sarmizegethusa: the huge tumulus 
(whose diameter was twenty-one metres) erected by the Aurelius family 
over the burial of a twelve year old girl. The graves in the small cemetery at 
Csolnakos were encircled by a stone wall. Parallels to it have been noted in 
western Pannonia (Camuntum, Austria).
We know little about religious belief in the Norican-Pannonian territory 
aside from these burial customs. The cult of Suleviae, Epona and Hercules 
Magusanus was probably introduced by settlers from Celtic and Germanic 
territories. The spread of the cult of Silvanus in Dacia perhaps reflects the 
closer relations with Pannonia. The altar dedicated to Jupiter Depulsor sug­
gests the presence of settlers from Poetovio in southwestern Pannonia where 
a number of altars erected to the "averting" Jupiter have been found; the 
Dacian altar was dedicated by a person with an Illyrian name.
Little is known about the tools and implements of everyday life, or about 
the personal ornaments and costume of the southern and eastern, mainly 
Syrian immigrants. Considerably more is known, however, about their be­
liefs. One type of tombstone, which depicts the deceased in the midst of a 
funerary feast, can be traced to southern, Greek iconography. The wide­
spread distribution of marble cult images of Danubian rider gods can like­
wise be traced to southern influences. Finds of this type have mostly come 
to light in the southern part of the province. The pottery industry of south­
ern Dacia also shares numerous similarities with that of Moesia.
The number of altars and temples dedicated by the settlers of eastern 
origin to their local gods (diis patriis) is considerable. First among the re­
vered deities was the supreme god of Doliche who was identified with Ju­
piter. Altars and cult images dedicated to this particular god have come to 
light all over Dacia. The Palmyrians had their own temples in Sarmizege­
thusa, Micia and Porolissum. The numerous eastern deities mentioned in 
inscriptions also testify to the diversity and heterogeneous origins of the 
gods venerated by the provincial population (Jupiter Tavianus, Erusenus, Mater 
Troclimene, Jupiter Heliopolitanus, Azizus, Bonus Puer, Balmarcades, Nabarazes, 
Malagbel, Bellahamon, Benefal, Jarobolas).
Dacia was a Latin province in the sense that the language of administra­
tion and public life was Latin and that most inscriptions were worded in 
this language. The use and spread of Latin was promoted by the legionaries 
stationed in Dacia who had been recruited from Latin territories and by 
western settlers insofar as they were descended from Italian immigrants 
and still spoke Latin. Bilingualism, that is, a higher level of romanization, 
can hardly be assumed among the Illyrians and the Celts in view of their 
early settlement. They perhaps spoke Latin, but the language had by no 
means become their native tongue around the first half of the second cen­
tury: they had barely embarked on the romanization which awaited them 
in Dacia. The same is true of the Pirustae from Dalmatia. Other settlers had 
arrived from territories where the administrative language was Greek. Simi­
larly to the native western colonists, some groups came from areas whose 
population had not been entirely hellenized. They still spoke their native
1. Gold jewellery finds from the Bronz Age, Somogyom
2. Scythian finds: 1. "Bronze bell", Gemyeszeg; 2. Bronze mirror, Makfalva
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3. Dacian silver jewellery:
1. Torock6szentgy0rgy, the 
vicinity of Nagyenyed and 
Nagyv£rad; 2-3. Nagyk'igya 
Darlac and Cserbel
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4. Coins from Dacia: 2. Coin minted at the time of the foundation of the province of Dacia; 
2-3. Denarii minted at the end of the Dacian wars with personalized representations of Dacia 
subjugated and the Danube River; 4. Coin minted in Viminacium during the reign of Philip- 
pus showing Dacia and the insignia of the emperor's legions
5. Wax tablets found at Verespatak
6. Gothic pottery in Transylvania: ornate dish found at Bereck; side and bottom
7. Gepid jewellery: 1. Gold earring set with precious stones, B&nffyhunyad; 2. Gold pendant set 
with precious stones, NagyvSrad; 3. Ornate sword pommel, Transylvania; 4. Gold bracelet, 
Transylvania; 5. Gold ring, Nagyszentmikl6s; 6-7. A pair of gilt silver fibulae; 8. Gold pearls;
9. Gilt bronze fibula, NagyvArad
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8. Relics from early Avar graves: 1-2. A pair of stirrups from the remains of a funeral pyre, Dics6- 
szentm&rton; 3. Gold earring, Transylvania; 4-6. Bridle-bit and a pair of stirrups, N6metpereg; 7. A pair 
of gold earrings from the grave of a high-ranking lady, Torda
tongue (e.g., the Galatae). The Palmyrian archers and their families were 
numerically strong and comprised a considerable portion of the popula­
tion. They had their own writing system which they sometimes employed 
in their Dacian inscriptions. These inscriptions are extremely important in 
spite of their scarcity since they are lacking in other Syrian communities in 
Europe. Several Greek, as well as Syrian, inscriptions have been recovered 
from not one, but several Dacian towns. Pottery vessels and tiles inscribed 
in Greek or some other oriental language are also quite common. This would 
suggest that both languages were spoken throughout the province. Note­
worthy as well is the fact that Apulum was called Chrysopolis, "gold city" 
not in Latin, but in Greek, as well as the fact that the high priest of the 
emperor's cult was designated using Greek terminology.
The southern settlers came from Thrace, where the official language was 
Greek, and from Moesia where the official language was Latin. (The latter 
area was in fact bilingual, a Greek-Latin territory.) The Thracians from the 
south did not contribute to the dissemination of the Latin language. They 
were mostly soldiers who were compelled to speak Latin during their serv­
ice in the army but whose original homeland was part of the Greek speak­
ing world. They continued to use their native tongue over a long time and 
maintained the use of their typical names until the early Byzantine period. 
Consequently, these soldiers of Thracian origin, who in the early second 
century had only been under Roman administration for about sixty years, 
would not have spoken Latin as their native tongue in Dacia. If we accept 
the relatedness of the Thracians and the Dacians, the exam ple of the 
Thracians, who stubbornly remained one of the most un-romanized popu­
lation of the imperium, most emphatically suggests that the process of 
romanization was long and drawn out for the Dacians as well. The adop­
tion of Latin by the native population cannot be documented in the prov­
ince of Dacia which existed for a mere 165 years, the shortest-lived of all the 
provinces of the Roman Empire.
Dacia was, thus, rather heterogeneous linguistically. A linguistically uni­
form community never evolved. The language most suited to this role would 
undoubtedly have been Latin, the official language of the province. How­
ever, this was only spoken as a native tongue by the leading officials in the 
administration, army officers and the majority of soldiers serving first in 
the one, and later — after 167 — in the two legions stationed in the prov­
ince. In the absence of strong Latin communities among the new settlers, 
there was lacking the precondition for the linguistic transformation of the 
native population.
The extent to which the native population could have been romanized 
was, thus, quite restricted and, in contrast to the native populations of other 
provinces, the government did not deem the romanization of the Dacians 
to be particularly important. What was the nature of this native popula­
tion? The archaeological record definitely suggests that a few Dacian groups 
stayed behind in the province after the conquest. A few of their settlements 
and cemeteries have been unearthed and investigated. Their number is low, 
however, nor is the chronology of these sites secure. It is still open to debate 
whether these partially excavated settlements were also occupied after the
Roman conquest. Graves that can be linked to the native population have 
been unearthed at Orb&zsa, Maroslekence, Mez6szopor, Radnot and Seges- 
v&r, although the tombstones from the latter site are inscribed with Illyrian 
names. The cemeteries of the native population were no longer used after 
the evacuation of the province. These cemeteries generally contained cre­
mation burials where the dead were commonly cremated in one place and 
then their ashes were strewn into an oval pit, or deposited in an urn. These 
latter have usually been considered to be Dacian burials even though this 
rite is globally linked to the Roman population in other provinces. Burials 
where the deceased were cremated on the site of the burial are less fre­
quently found. This practice has mostly been observed in tumulus graves. 
At the same time, these diverse funerary rites often occur within the same 
cemetery. Inhumation burials make their appearance in the municipal cem­
eteries (Apulum, Napoca) from the late second century A.D.
The settling of two free Dacian tribes in the province at the close of the 
second century A.D. must also be considered in the analysis of the ethnic 
composition of these cemeteries. Some of these burial grounds have yielded 
silver jewellery with parallels in the ornaments of the Carpi of Dacian cul­
ture, who lived beyond the eastern frontier of the province. Silver jewellery 
of this kind has come to light in the Mez<5szopor cemetery.
The material culture of the surviving Dacian population is rather colour­
less and undifferentiated. Aside from the already mentioned settlement fea­
tures and burial finds, only the pottery vessels found in the course of exca­
vations can be studied in this respect. No inscriptions, stone sculptures, 
costume depictions or jewellery has survived. Their material culture is more 
or less restricted to pottery. However, only a few vessel types continued to 
be manufactured in the provincial period from the diverse pottery industry 
of the former pre-conquest period. These wares were handmade. Wheel- 
thrown Dacian vessels are rare in the imperial period. These vessels are 
ornamented with finger impressions or applique decoration imitating cords. 
One characteristic vessel type is the so-called Dacian cup, a shallow, thick- 
walled, wide mouthed cup with one or two handles. This would suggest a 
rather simple way of life linked to the lower strata of pre-conquest Dacian 
society.
The provincial Dacian pottery industry is very instructive in terms of the 
romanization of the native population. The handmade pottery of Pannonian 
potters did not survive into the third century A.D., which saw the appear­
ance of mass-produced, wheel-thrown provincial pottery. In Dacia, how­
ever, hardly any interaction or exchange of ideas can be noted between the 
pottery of the native population and the pottery wares used by the new 
settlers. The stubborn persistence of earlier pottery forms probably reflects 
the resistance of the native population to romanization.
Romanization was a complicated process that took place in the conquered 
territory which had been transformed into a province. By the end of the 
process, the local population had adopted Roman customs and various ele­
ments of Roman culture. The first changes were in the material culture, 
which was modified and transformed by the adoption of Roman techniques
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and by the influence of Roman forms and design. The life-styles of a part of 
the native population also underwent changes. Romanization was a more 
or less spontaneous process whose framework was provided by the admin­
istrative organization, the civitates, and which was greatly promoted by ur­
banization and military service in the Roman army. The tribal groupings 
gradually disintegrated; the long military service, participation in urban 
life and in trade brought great social changes. This process, which lasted for 
several generations, first led to bilingualism and later to a complete change 
in language. This cultural progress generally lasted for some four hundred 
years or even longer in the various provinces of the empire. Romanization 
was encouraged and promoted by well-defined external measures so that 
this gradual integration and assimilation can be easily traced in the archaeo­
logical record of the province. No similar process has been noted in Dacia.
The multi-lingualism of the people who settled in Dacia did not favour 
the linguistic transformation of the surviving Dacian native population. How 
could the groups living in the vicinity of military camps in which Syrian or 
Thracian troops were stationed ever hope to learn Latin? There was no civi- 
tas organization for the native population which might have triggered this 
transformation. The possible reasons for the paucity of civitates, so very 
conspicuous in Dacia, have been already dealt with at length. But since the 
native population did not participate in urban life, it was denied the most 
plausible path to romanization.
In contrast with other provinces, there is no evidence whatsoever for the 
drafting of the native population into linguistic units a few years or even 
decades after the conquest. The beliefs of the Dacians had no impact on the 
religious remains from the province. Nor do we know the name of a single 
Dacian deity. In spite of various attempts in this regard it remains to be 
demonstrated whether behind the ostensible dedications to some Roman 
god lie native divinities identified with the classical pantheon according to 
the patterns of interpretatio Romana. Inscriptions, such a characteristic fea­
ture of Roman culture and everyday life, were not made by the Dacians.
The province, as we have already noted, existed for a mere 165 years. 
Assimilation and a complete change of language would have been impossi­
ble in such a short time. Neither in Pannonia which bordered on Italy, nor 
in other provinces of the empire did the romanization of the material cul­
ture of the native population take place during the first two centuries of 
Roman rule. The tools and implements of everyday life as well as dress 
only underwent significant changes after the crises brought on by the 
Marcomann wars, while another 200 years elapsed before romanization can 
be considered complete. In Dacia, the Marcomann wars were followed by 
the settlement of orientals. The brief, generation-long prosperity of the prov­
ince under the Severi was followed by a series of wars after which the prov­
ince was abandoned and evacuated. There is nothing to show that the sur­
viving Dacian groups were romanized. The highest stage of romanization, 
the change of language and the adoption of Latin as a native tongue, is not 
only not demonstrable in Dacia, but the historical and social evidence ar­
gues strongly against it.
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Collapse and Evacuation
The 220s mark the last peaceful decade in the history of Dacia. In the same 
year that the emperor Alexander Severus set off for the abortive Persian 
campaign with detachments from the Illyrian army (231), the Gothic migra­
tion towards the Black Sea littoral form the northwest, which had previ­
ously provoked migrations in the Carpathian Basin, also came to an end. 
The Goths, whose path was blocked by the Black Sea, settled in the south­
ern Ukraine and the northern Pontic littoral. However, this by no means 
brought peace to the empire or to Dacia. The fleeting decades of peace, in 
fact, mark the years when the Goths mustered their forces. From the mid- 
230s they wreaked their fury on the provinces of the Balkans and Dacia, 
bringing devastation on a scale never experienced before. The first attack 
against Dacia was mounted during the reign of Maximinus (235-238). In 
236, the emperor took the title Dacicus Maximus, indicating military victory 
and suggesting that by this time war was raging in the vicinity of Dacia. 
The province was primarily attacked by the free Dacians and the Carpi who 
had been pushed westwards by the Goths. The hostilities continued under 
the reign of Gordianus III (238-244) when the Carpi stormed the Limes 
Transalutanus. Their attack is marked by a number of hoards hidden at that 
time in Dacia, Dobrudja and Moesia. The peril is reflected as well by a dozen 
or more coin hoards that were concealed during his and his successor's 
reigns. The Dacian provincial assembly still expressed its gratitude on an 
inscription dedicated to Gordianus.42 Then in 245-247, the Carpi mounted 
a devastating attack on the eastern frontier and the Limes Transalutanus sim­
ply collapsed. Pannonian troops were also deployed to help Dacia. In spite 
of temporary successes, the Limes Transalutanus had to be abandoned. Given 
the lack of archaeological data, however, the exact date of its abandonment 
remains unknown, although it must have occurred before 248, when the 
internal line of defence, the Olt-Alutanus became the new frontier. Romula, 
lying along the Olt River, was surrounded with stone walls by legionary 
detachments from Moesia Superior and Germania.43
In 246-247, after the local mints of Moesia had ceased to operate, a mint 
was set up in Viminacium in order to ensure continuous military pay in the 
Lower Danubian area. This mint supplied Dacia with coins for eleven years, 
but the province was later granted the right to mint coins itself.
The hostilities and wars continued. Trajan Decius is honoured as "resti- 
tutor Daciarum" (restorer of the Dacian provinces), in an inscription from 
Apulum. A bronze statue of him was erected in Sarmizegethusa. In 250 he, 
too, took the title of Dacicus Maximus, which suggests repelled enemy at­
tacks. By the middle of the third century, coin circulation had come to a halt 
in the military camps of eastern Transylvania, a phenomenon that probably 
reflects the departure of the troops stationed in these forts. The evacuation 
of the northeastern territories is also indicated as we have already note, by 
the mid-third-century Tabula Peutingeriana, which does not show either the
42. C7L III, 1454.
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Limes Transalutanus or the Roman roads through eastern Transylvania. The 
attacks of the Carpi demonstrably triggered the emigration of the popula­
tion to Moesia, south of the Danube. The mother of Galerius, the future 
emperor, fled from Dacia during the reign of Philippus owing to repeated 
Carpic attacks.44 She was hardly the only one to have hit upon this obvious 
solution at this early date.
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Fig. 2. Altars erected to Mithras at Poetovio, western Pannonia, by the legions with­
drawn from Dacia in the 260s
The attacks against Dacia are poorly reported in the sources since the 
area most badly affected lay in the Balkans, and not in Dacia which had, in 
any case, lost its strategic and military importance. In 257, Gallienus took 
the title Dacicus Maximus, which indicates some sort of action against the 
Carpi. This period marks the last phase of building activity in the forts of 
the province. The wide gates of the forts at Enlaka, Barcarozsny6, Sebesvar- 
alja and Porolissum were walled up in order to leave as few penetrable 
surfaces as possible. Under Gallienus, that is before 260, the custom of erect­
ing inscription stones was also abandoned. The disappearance of coinage in 
western Dacia is reflected by the fact that with the exception of Apulum,
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Map 3. The abandonment of Dacia
1. Singidunum ; 2. V im inacium ; 3. Ratiaria;4. O escus;5. Novae; 6. Durostorum ; 7. Coin hoards concealed in the 
m iddle o f the third century, indicating the decay o f old Dacia
the military headquarters, hardly any coins have come to light in the forts 
and towns. The chronic lack of money — an ongoing attendant to the crises 
of the middle of the third century — was aggravated by the closing of the 
Viminacium mint in 257-258 when it was dismantled and transported away. 
The conclusive wars, conducted on several frontiers for three decades, the 
catastrophic economic situation, the chronic shortage of money and the in­
ternal power struggles eventually led to anarchy within the imperium. At 
the close of the 250s, however, after the rockbottom depression brought on 
by the terrible sufferings of the earlier incursions, Gallienus devoted his 
energies to reorganizing the empire. He created a mobile central army from 
detachments drawn from the legions, and in 260, he succeeded in expelling 
the Alamanni, who had penetrated as far as Italy. He then consolidated and 
restored the Rhineland frontier.
Gallienus established his military headquarters for the defence of Italy 
and Illyria at Poetovio. In the 260s, the Dacian legions, the legio V Macedonica 
and the legio XIII Gemina were both transferred to this base under the lead­
ership of Flavius Aper praepositus. The soldiers took up quarters in the town. 
Their presence is attested to by marble inscriptions and reliefs that have
come to light in the third Mithras sanctuary of the town which was rebuilt 
and richly furnished by them. The presence of staff officers and their ad­
ministrative rank in Poetovio indicates that numerous detachments from 
the two legions were stationed there. This in turn suggests that these troops 
had been transferred from Dacia because the province had lost its strategic 
and military importance and because Dacia was now surrounded by hos­
tile and belligerent barbarians. This transfer was a continuation of the former 
partial relinquishing of territories and a prelude to later events.
The reorganization of the Danubian provinces was facilitated by the fact 
that after a series of attacks, the Gothic thrust lost its strength. In 269, Em­
peror Claudius II inflicted a crushing defeat on the Gothic army at Naissus. 
The title Gothicus taken by the emperor marked a real military victory and 
became a constant epithet connected to his name. His successor, Aurelian, 
cleared Illyria and Thracia of the plundering barbarian hordes and defeated 
the Goths on their own territory before leaving for the eastern front. The 
Goth king, Cannabaudes, also fell in battle. The war on the Lower Danube 
came to an end at this point. The victories brought relief to the people of the 
area, but they could not save Dacia. The coins minted in 270, at the begin­
ning of Aurelian's reign, bear the legend GENIUS ILLYRICI and PAN­
NONIA or DACIA FELIX reflecting the importance of Illyria, and proclaim­
ing the luck of Dacia, which had been salvaged for the Imperium. It is possi­
ble that the legend indeed refers to the salvation of Trajan's Dacia, but it 
appears more probable that it commemorates the deliverance of the pro­
vincial population, and celebrates the new province of Dacia that had been 
founded south of the Danube. Aurelian, who gained personal experience of 
the situation in the province, probably saw no reason to maintain a prov­
ince plagued by constant raids, and, to boot, one with a much diminished 
population. The remaining garrison troops were withdrawn and the sur­
viving population was resettled in Moesia. To keep up appearances, a new 
province called Dacia (later Dacia Ripensis and Dacia Mediterranea) was 
created between the two Moesia with Serdica (Sofia, Bulgaria) as its capital.
The final forty years of Dacian history repeatedly demonstrated what 
had already been apparent in Hadrian's time, namely, that the province did 
not play a significant role in the defence of the Balkan provinces and the 
central areas of the empire. The Sarmatians and the Goths had been able to 
plunder the two Moesias and Thracia unhindered. The long frontier section 
of the empire in this region could not be effectively defended even by tens 
of thousands of soldiers. By withdrawing the Romans from Dacia, Aurelian 
considerably reduced the length of the imperial frontier. What remained 
could then be better protected, similarly to the frontier in Germania and 
Raetia, in the triangle between the Rhine and Danube rivers. He strength­
ened the Danubian limes in its late first-century form. The legio XIII Gemina 
occupied the castrum at Ratiaria, whilst the legio V Macedonica returned to 
Oescus, its garrison of 170 years before. After shortening the frontier sec­
tion, Aurelian was able to lead a segment of the Illyrian army east in the 
knowledge that the Balkan provinces were now secure.
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The Fate of the Provincial Population after Evacuation
The surrender and evacuation of Dacia is described rather uniformly in the 
sources. Eutropius45 recounts the event as follows: "On seeing that Illyricum 
was devastated and Moesia was in a ruinous state, he abandoned the prov­
ince of Dacia which had been founded by Trajan and led away both soldiers 
and provincials, giving up hope that it could be retained. The Romans who 
were evacuated from the towns and fields of Dacia he resettled in the cen­
tre of Moesia which he named Dacia. It now divides Moesia ... and lies on 
the right bank of the Danube, as it had previously lain on the left". What 
remains to be established is whether in spite of everything, we can assume 
the presence of masses of Latin-speaking Roman citizens in the territory of 
the former province, who, after weathering the storms of the Migration 
period, could have become the ancestors of a neo-Latin population. Eutro- 
pius's statement could be challenged only if the late third century ethnic 
conditions and the historic circumstances did not confirm or downright 
refute this resettlement, or, if the presence of a mass of Latin-speaking peo­
ple who had attained the highest level of romanization were to be demon­
strated in Dacia after 271. The word "m ass" is crucial in this respect, for 
after the disintegration of the Roman administration and provincial organi­
zation and the collapse of military defence in the Middle Danubian prov­
inces, Roman civilization in the region was sooner (in northeastern Pannonia) 
or later (in western and southern Pannonia, Raetia and certain parts of 
Noricum) swept away by the successive invading waves of the Migration 
period some 130-150 years later. Surviving population groups who stayed 
behind in the province because they had no place to flee — emigration to 
the south was pointless — were either assimilated by the continuously chang­
ing newcomers or perished. They were not to become the ancestors of a 
neo-Latin population in spite of the fact that the situation, circumstances (a 
uniform population that had evolved over the course of 400 years of roma­
nization) and geographic position were infinitely more favourable there than 
in a Transylvania surrounded by hostile barbarians where the restless pe­
riod brought on by the incursions of the Carpi, the Goths, the Sarmatians, 
the Vandals and the Gepids was prolonged after the early Roman with­
drawal.
When investigating possible continuity in Dacia, one must also consider 
what set of circumstances contributed to the survival of the provincial popu­
lation in more westerly provinces and made the emergence of neo-Latin 
peoples possible. The ethnogenesis of the neo-Latin peoples took place some 
130-150 years after the evacuation of Dacia on the territory of the former 
Imperium. At the same time, considerable divergences are noticeable in the 
survival of Roman culture in these territories. In the western and southern 
European parts of the empire, a continuity in ways of life may be observed 
even after the appearance and settlement of new barbarian conquerors. In 
contrast, the peoples occupying the Carpathian Basin, who later founded 
kingdoms in the west or in Africa, succeeded each other with alarming ra­
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pidity and perpetuated decades of misery and insecurity. This process had 
begun some 130-150 years earlier in Dacia than in the other Danubian prov­
inces.
An important point is that the evacuation of the province was a well- 
organized action which was carried out after Rome had managed to check 
for some time the raids ravaging the northern Balkans. In other words, places 
of refuge still existed at this time. Even if the improvement in the situation 
at the close of the third century was not that spectacular for the average 
Roman citizen, the cessation of the Gothic incursions into Moesia made the 
changes perceptible and showed that the empire was still capable of de­
fending itself. The wars to the south of the Danube reduced the population 
there to such an extent that there was no obstacle to resettlement on a larger 
scale. Indeed, Eutropius links the evacuation of Dacia not so much to the 
vulnerability of the province, but rather to the devastations in Illyria and 
Moesia. However, the losses to the Illyrian population may be attributed 
not only to constant warfare, but also to plagues that raged throughout the 
province from the 250s: "Such a great plague broke out in the towns as had 
never been experienced before; the devastations of the barbarians appeared 
small in comparison so that the occupied, almost desolate towns could con­
sider themselves luckier than the ones contaminated by the plague".46 The 
loss of population was so great that Thrace — which bordered on Moesia — 
still required resettlement in the fourth century. It is, thus, fairly obvious 
that not only were there no obstacles to the evacuation of the provincial 
population of Dacia but that the depopulation of the Balkans practically 
called for a new influx of population. Rome undoubtedly congratulated 
itself that in the place of barbarians it could populate these territories with 
its own subjects.
The evacuation of Dacia was by no means an emergency measure. Why 
would the provincial population, especially the Latin-speaking Roman citi­
zens, have remained in an undefended area that could expect a series of 
barbarian strikes that would eventually lead to occupation, and which would, 
in the foreseeable future, slip back into its former barbarous state? In the 
other provinces, escape to the south began spontaneously in the early fifth 
century A.D., with the decline of the empire, even though the refugees could 
in no way hope for effective protection by then. The Latin, Greek and per­
haps Syrian-speaking Roman citizens could see no future in staying behind 
in the areas to the north of the Danube, especially if they could continue 
their earlier life-style not far from their former homes and among the infi­
nitely more civilized and cultured conditions of the empire. Neither can it 
be assumed that the less romanized, fragmented Dacian population, who 
did not even speak Latin, would have been more attached to the former 
province. The contrary was to have been the case if the sources are to be 
believed. At the close of the second century A.D., the free Dacians requested 
their receptio into the empire: at the end of the Marcomann wars a contin­
gent of unknown numbers and a group of 12,000 people were admitted into 
the Imperium. Now, in the face of dangerous Gothic incursions, they would 
have wished to remain in the province even less, but it was hardly because
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they had become romanized in the intervening fifty to sixty years. It was 
more that since the second century, the peoples living beyond its frontiers 
saw the Imperium as a haven of prosperity and security, an area protected 
by walls and defended by a strong army, where they repeatedly requested 
admission. The attraction of the empire continued in spite of the anarchy 
and wars raging in the middle of the third century. The Marcomanni were 
resettled in the empire under Gallienus, while the Carpi, who had previ­
ously ravaged Dacia,47 were resettled in 295.
A sudden decrease in the number of inscription stones erected by the 
civil population may be observed from the middle of the third century 
throughout the empire. The process of resettlement can, nonetheless, be 
traced using epigraphic evidence. Prior to the evacuation, the number of 
Latin inscriptions from the fourth century increased perceptibly in Serdica, 
the new capital of Dacia that lay in a Greek-speaking area. This phenom­
enon can certainly be linked to the Latin-speaking population evacuated 
from Dacia.
The written sources give uniform descriptions of the surrender of Dacia. 
Evacuation and resettlement to a neighbouring area could not have proved 
too difficult a task for the well-organized and efficient administration of the 
Roman Empire. Obviously, the transfer of population did not take place 
overnight, even if a considerable part of the civilian population had already 
fled earlier. It is possible that they had not all left the province, even though 
there is little to support this hypothesis. It is, nonetheless, obvious that the 
number of people who might have opted to stay behind was minimal.
The fate of a population, whether their settlements continued on or were 
abandoned, can be established by a look at their cemeteries. If a settlement 
is no longer inhabited (because its occupants perished or fled elsewhere) its 
cemetery also falls into disuse. The dress accessories, tools and implements 
of everyday life, various grave goods and coins placed in the burials give a 
fairly good indication of when a settlement is abandoned and when a cem­
etery is no longer used. If it were assumed, in spite of the contradictory 
testimony of the written sources, that the better part of the provincial popu­
lation stayed on in Dacia after the surrender of the province, this could only 
be confirmed through the excavation of Roman towns and rural settlements, 
and the cemeteries of the military forts. Such excavations would demon­
strate, beyond the shadow of a doubt, whether or not burials continued 
after the 270s. Apart from a few excavated sections of cemeteries too small 
for an analysis of this kind, only one completely excavated cemetery is 
known, the burial grounds at Romula which were no longer in use after the 
second third of the third century. The cemeteries of Napoca, Apulum, Potais- 
sa and the military forts await investigation.
Roman coins and Christian finds, or relics interpreted as such, are often 
mentioned as proof that the provincial population survived. True enough, 
Roman coins, even if in insignificant number, were still in circulation in 
Dacia for some fifty years after the middle of the third century. Their number 
only begin to rise again from the fourth century. Coins, however, were aux­
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iliary to the economy and were, thus, also in circulation beyond the impe­
rial frontier in the Barbaricum in various amounts depending on historical 
circumstances. Circulation of money in Sarmatian territory on the Great 
Hungarian Plain and in the Banat — areas never under Roman rule — defi­
nitely shows that this particular type of find does not confirm the survival 
of the descendants of the provincial population of Dacia, nor does it indi­
cate that the Temeskoz was ever a part of the empire (as a remnant of former 
Dacia).
The only cohesive force among the provincial population after the disin­
tegration of the Roman administration and provincial organizations was 
Christianity. From the middle of the fifth century, the church played a cru­
cial role in enabling the population to weather the crises of the fifth to sev­
enth centuries with promises of salvation and a happier afterlife. The church 
hierarchy already evolved by the fourth century had begun to be integrated 
within the state apparatus and played a vital role. From the very moment 
that the state bodies showed themselves unable to fulfil their functions and 
incapable of organizing the defence of the centres of Roman civilization, 
that of the towns, the ecclesiastic communities became increasingly impor­
tant. Of especial importance were the bishoprics which operated on the 
same principles as the territorial organizations of towns and which were 
bound by a sense of the universality of the Christian church. This church 
hierarchy gradually organized the defence of the community, and negoti­
ated with the conquerors whenever necessary.
Since the bishoprics were only organized during the course of the fourth 
century throughout the lmperium, this factor, which could have promoted 
romanization, simply did not exist in a Dacia which had been evacuated in 
271. Indeed, there are no traces whatsoever of the existence of bishoprics 
there. The majority of the finds from Dacia (fifteen in all) which have — 
sometimes incorrectly — been identified as Christian are of unknown prov­
enance and their find circumstances are unclear. Thus, they are unsuitable 
for demonstrating the presence of ecclesiastic communities or bishoprics. 
At most, these finds confirm the presence of individuals who professed 
Christianity. These objects could have reached Transylvania either through 
trade conducted by the Christian (Arian) Goths who settled in this area in 
the fourth century, or as booty from various raids, or as a result of the 
collection of antiques — as in our own times. With the exception of the 
Berethalom assemblage, unambiguously linked to the Goths, these finds 
were not liturgical requisites. Similarly to the early Byzantine bronze lamps 
from T3pi6gyorgye in the vicinity of Pest or from Luciu in Moldavia, in the 
Barbaricum, neither can these finds be cited as proof of the Christianity of 
their owners. In the same way, the hand of a bronze statue of Jupiter Doliche- 
nus from Dacia found in the Ukraine does not suggest a Roman citizen ini­
tiated into the rites of that cult, while the bronze statue of Victoria unearthed 
at Akasztd, in southern Hungary, does not attest to the Roman beliefs of its 
barbarian owner.
Aside from written sources and archaeological evidence, place-names 
also offer an insight into the nature of ethnic change. The names given to 
settlements, mountains and rivers help to orient peoples living in a particu­
lar region. Changes according to a set pattern in place-names, which are a
part of the civilization of human groups, reflect the changes or transforma­
tions affecting the population or even its disappearance. Changes in place- 
names and changes of population rarely take place at the same time since 
local populations rarely disappear without trace. Furthermore, the partial 
coexistence of old and new groups involves the adoption of place-names, to 
some extent. Consequently, these names are preserved to some degree even 
after the original (eponymous) population has disappeared or has been as­
similated. This process is irreversible: insofar as a given people remained in 
its homeland, the place-names did not disappear without trace even if new 
groups had settled in their midst. Changes in place-names are generally 
indicative of the appearance and settlement of new peoples. The survival of 
place-names is influenced by the nature and actual process of ethnic change, 
cultural heritage, and social organization. The total disappearance and 
change in place-names is rare over wider areas. Various sections of major 
rivers were always inhabited at one time or another and river names were 
transmitted over several millennia as in the case of the river Elbe, the Rhine, 
the Danube, the Tisza and the Maros rivers.
The study of place-names is especially important after the disintegration 
of the Roman Empire. They have proved instrumental in tracing the fate of 
the provincial population at a time for which other sources are practically 
non-existent or mute. In the parts of the empire where great masses of the 
Roman population stayed behind, that is, in the later neo-Latin countries, 
an abundance of Roman toponyms and river names may be found which 
were affected only by regular patterned linguistic change. In other areas 
where the provincial population retaihed only part of their former home­
land which was resettled by new peoples, place-names were changed to a 
certain extent. Where population change came after a period of an area's 
depopulation — absolute or with only small remnants surviving — the 
change in place-names is more complete. Repeated linguistic changes in­
volved more rapid modifications of place-names as well as the disappear­
ance of earlier ones. In Raetia, Noricum and Pannonia, the Roman popula­
tion survived into the fifth century only for some time after the disintegra­
tion of the empire. Afterwards, they disappeared so that only a small per­
centage of their place-names have come down to us. The names used in 
Roman times, however, have been preserved to the present day even in 
areas where the descendants of the one-time provincial population have 
long since disappeared. No antique place-names have been preserved in 
the northeastern part of Pannonia, since population change was swift and 
complete there. In the Drava-Sava interfluve and western Pannonia, how­
ever, in addition to the water names (Raba — Arrabo, Marcal — Mursella, 
Zala — Salla, Zobernbach — Sevira — Savaria, Mura — Muria), town names 
have also survived: Wien — Vindobona, Ptuj, Pettau — Poetovio, Sisak (Szi- 
szek) — Siscia. Szeremseg (Srem) incapsulates the memory of Sirmium. The 
name Scarbantia (Sopron) is documented until the late sixth century A.D. 
The name of Savaria did not change: it may be found in the ninth century 
and it was used officially alongside the name Szombathely until the nine­
teenth century in spite of the fact that this part of Pannonia had not been 
settled by neo-Latin population groups in the ninth century. The initial co­
existence and later assimilation, however, permitted the transmission and
use of old place-names by the new population. The survival of certain 
Pannonian place-names definitely shows that they were adopted by the 
Hungarian tribes. If the ethnogenesis of the neo-Latin speaking Romanian 
people had indeed even partially taken place in Trajan's Dacia or in Transyl­
vania, the majority of Roman place-names would have survived as in other 
neo-Latin countries.
As it is, only the names of a few rivers have been preserved: the Szamos 
(the form Samum is known from the Roman period) and the Maros (Maris- 
sus, Marisia). However, as only a section of these rivers flowed through 
Dacia, the survival of their name cannot be entirely attributed to the Dacian 
population. The survival of the river names of the Olt (Alutus) and the Csema 
(is sometimes derived from its Slavic name Dierna) can be ascribed to the 
Romans and Byzantines who controlled the northern bank of the Danube 
and the narrow shoreline from counter forts for centuries after the evacua­
tion of Dacia. In addition to a few controversial water names in the Dacian 
heartland, not a single place-name has survived. The extensive disappear­
ance of Roman names, much greater by far than in the other European prov­
inces of the Imperium, also confirms the evacuation and surrender of the 
province and is harmonic with its history, demonstrating as it does a com­
plete and total change in population. (Present-day place-names which have 
an antique ring in the territory of former Dacia are artificial denominations 
from the more recent past.)
Historical records, archaeological evidence and place-names all demon­
strate that after 270, the territory of Dacia became isolated from the Roman 
Empire and was, thus irrevocably lost to Roman civilization.
II. From Dacia to Transylvania. 
The Period of the Great Migrations 
(271- 895)
1. The "Men of the Forest".
The Goths in Transylvania (271-380)
The Decline of Dacia
The Carpic, Gothic and Gepid attacks which afflicted the Roman provinces 
to the north and the south of the Lower Danube are well known from the 
history of antiquity and had been described in the previous chapter of the 
history of Roman Dacia. As a result of these attacks, the position of Dacia 
Superior became critical. The soldiers manning the Roman frontier forts in 
Transylvania received their pay until the end of the joint reign of Philip I 
and Philip II; a few garrisons are known to have existed under Decius (249- 
251).
The Roman limes in Transylvania was the military installation of a strong, 
self-confident militant superpower given to taking the offensive. The Impe- 
rium did not close the passes — with the exception of the Vorostorony Pass
— but controlled them with a chain of advanced turrets, visible from the 
military forts. The Ldpos Mountains in the north, the Kelemen and GOrgenyi 
Mountains and the Hargita in the east, the Bereck Alps in the south were a 
kind of no man's land — Transylvanian Dacia can be best likened to an 
enormous classical theatre whose gates and seats Rome ceded to the bar­
barian audience, reserving the stage for itself.
The camps, and later forts, of the auxiliary troops were established on 
the plateaus usually beside or near a major waterway in order to facilitate 
transport and communication, and were located on low hills or terraces 
which offered an excellent overview of the lowland encircled by the moun­
tains and their passes. In other words, Rome merely kept an eye on the 
great natural protective ring which — the myth that has persisted into mod­
ern historiography notwithstanding — never, for one single moment, really 
protected Transylvanian Dacia.
This system had collapsed by 160-170, and could no longer be effec­
tively held by the Roman Empire under the thrust of the barbarian attacks 
in the middle of the third century. The successive raids and incursions from 
248 onwards ravaged and destroyed the stone-walled forts and towns of 
Scythia Minor, Moesia and Thracia. The military prowess of the barbarian 
armies clearly indicates that none of the border forts in Dacia could resist or 
seriously impede their onslaught. The undefensible eastern Transylvanian 
limes was relinquished in the 250s without even an attempt at its defence.
About three or four towns and the single legionary castrum of the prov­
ince held out for some time in the western half of the province, but only 
along the main road leading southwards: the garrison of Micia protecting 
the western exit of the Maros Valley was withdrawn under Valerian (260). 
On the evidence of hoarded coins, the last bastion in the heartland of Transyl­
vania, the castrum of Apulum, was under attack from 268 onwards, when 
the main road leading through Krasso-Szoreny was also abandoned (the 
Galacs coin hoard).
Contemporary literary sources and the archaeological evidence both 
demonstrate that the Roman army, the soldiers' families and all other civil­
ians whose livelihood was strongly linked to the military were evacuated 
from the province at the beginning of Aurelian's reign (271) at the latest. 
Life came to an abrupt end in the forty-eight Roman castella and the settle­
ments that depended on and lived off these forts (the so-called vici auxiliari) 
which formed an arc extending from the Temes region to the Vorostorony 
Pass. That this was indeed so is borne out by the castella themselves. Those 
which were not resettled and built in during the Hungarian Middle Ages 
(e.g. Bereck, Tih6, Kosdly, Varmezd, Magyarigen, and also Pozsesna on the 
Lower Danube) to this day offer the same desolate spectacle with their 
earthen ramparts and deep ditches as the agri decumates of Baden-Wiirttem- 
berg which were abandoned at roughly the same time, or the border forts of 
the Antonine Wall in Scotland that had been relinquished somewhat earlier. 
They are literally "em pty" both inside and out, for they had long fallen into 
disuse by the time of the large-scale building activity of the late Roman age.
It is probable in the case of the four municipia that held out the longest — 
Napoca, Potaissa, Apulum, and Ulpia Traiana — that the small and wretched 
population groups within or around their walls at first accepted Gothic 
overlordship. However, the traces of these groups in the archaeological 
records (a few burials) do not extend beyond the close of the third century 
A.D. At the same time, the buildings within the stone walls — some of 
which have survived into the Modern Age — decayed rapidly, and by the 
turn of the fourth and fifth centuries the principia (military headquarters) in 
Potaissa was being used as a burial ground by groups of eastern barbarians. 
The rural homes, the villae, and the farmsteads of the advocates of roman- 
ization had perished to such an extent that in the fourth century the Goths 
had already opened cemeteries on their sites (e.g. Palatka).
There is only one way a "romanized" population could possibly have 
survived: if they had resorted to active defence and had withdrawn into 
hastily erected hilltop forts and fortified sites, as indeed had the provincial 
population of some areas lying within the empire — the inhabitants of the 
Balkans and of southwest Pannonia, the population of the Eifel-Hunsriick 
hill country between the Rhine and the Mosel, and farther westwards, the 
population of the Ardennes. The terrain of Transylvanian Dacia was cer­
tainly extraordinarily well suited for this kind of defence. However, there 
are no traces of late Roman refugia or fortified places in Transylvania, and 
the lack of these contradicts the much-quoted "self-defence" theory.
Not one single late Roman or early mediaeval source mentions or knows 
of a "surviving" Roman population in Transylvanian Dacia: the one-time
Roman towns, settlements and forts perished without exception, not one 
single language or literary source retained their names into the Middle Ages. 
What has survived is of linguistically uncertain origin, the names of a few 
major waterways which the Romans themselves considered a prehistoric 
heritage: the names of the Temes, the Maros, the KorOs, the Szamos and the 
Olt. The river names "Ampelus-Ompoly" and "Tierna-Cserna" are sim i­
larly a legacy of the pre-Roman era. As for the name of the Aranyos River 
(documented in a charter from 1075: qui dicitur hungaricae aranas, latine autem  
aureus [which in Hungarian is called 'aranas' but in Latin 'aureus']), which 
in Hungarian was borrowed from the Iranian, it is "derived" from the Latin 
aureus only by those who go in for vulgar etymologizing. The name given to 
this particular river is rather obvious in view of its abundant gold content 
(Hungarian arany), a fact borne out also by its Slavic name (Zlatna-Zalatna 
from zlato, "gold").
The complete disappearance of antique place-names from Dacia proves 
the complete assimilation of the surviving population fragments, especially 
if one remembers that, although numerous place-names in Britannia, in the 
Rhineland and the Upper Danube region of yore are preserved in English, 
Dutch and German, the Roman population that continued to live there well 
over two hundred years after the surrender of Dacia was likewise com­
pletely assimilated. The funerary rite of the Transylvanian "late Roman" 
cemetery (Barathely I) is undoubtedly reminiscent of the so-called scattered 
cremation burials formerly practised in Dacia — and extensively docu­
mented in Pannonia until Probus (276-282) at the latest — but what must be 
recalled is that the grave goods (intact vessels, lamps, coins) characterizing 
genuine Roman burials do not occur in these graves. The Bar&thely graves 
all contained expressly "barbarian" meat offerings, whilst a few burials 
yielded fibulae and vessel sherds burnt in accordance with the barbarian 
rites practiced by the population of the Marosszentanna-Cherniakhov cul­
ture. Similar burial rites have been observed in the Carpic-Gothic cemeter­
ies of Moldavia (Danceny, Etulija, Baltzata, Hanska-Luterija II and Oselivka). 
Marosszentanna-Cherniakhov type finds (vessels, combs, jewellery) have 
also been found from the settlements belonging to these centuries, and thus 
the population group using the Barathely burial ground originated from 
the Barbaricum. It is, moreover, rather improbable that a closed commu­
nity of "surviving Romans" could have successfully lain low near one of the 
most bustling main roads leading through Dacia (between Medgyes and 
Segesvar).
Relics of the late Roman rites and costumes characteristic of the Tetrarchy 
and later do not occur on the left bank of the Danube. The so-called cruciform 
brooches — insignia bestowed by Rome on Roman subjects — only reached 
the Barbaricum as booty, with sporadic finds of such fibulae among the 
Germanic Quadi, the Sarmatians of the Great Hungarian Plain, the Gepids 
of the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain (Muszka), and the Transyl­
vanian Goths (Obrazsa, Lemheny and Vecel). These "crossbow" brooches 
do not confirm the presence of a Roman population in the Barbaricum, and 
this is doubly true of specimens that found their way into Transylvanian 
private collections and museums from Pannonia, Moesia and even Italy in
the course of the past century. Another absurd suggestion — and one that 
betrays considerable ignorance of human nature — is that the presence of 
Roman coins is evidence for the presence of "romanized" Roman persons. 
In fact, the Roman coin "circulation" of other regions of the Barbaricum 
such as the Great Hungarian Plain or the Polish Lowlands shows little, if 
any, divergence from the circulation of post-271 Roman coins in Transyl­
vania.
The Carpic Interlude
The first really dangerous attacks against Dacia were mounted by the bar­
barian Carpi from what is today Moldavia. Even though the classical sources 
claim that after their incursion in 244-247 the emperor Philip the Arabian 
cleared the empire of them, the fact is that the emperor barely managed to 
defend the Olt limes, the Limes Alutanus. The coin hoards from Transylvania 
that are closed by issues minted under Philip I and Decius in 247-249 
(Mezoviszolya and Mezdband, both lying in the region of Septer) suggest a 
successful attack against northeastern Dacia, though there is no record of 
this in our sources.
The urn burials of the cemetery recently unearthed in Septer on the north­
eastern fringes of the Mezc5s6g represent an archaeological culture that is 
new to Transylvania, but which has been linked to the Carpi in Moldavia 
(Poienesti culture). The Carpi had probably advanced into Transylvania 
through the Borg6 Pass. The amphora-shaped urns from BozOd and Medgyes 
which match the urns from Septer suggest that the Carpi penetrated as far 
as the Nagy-Kiikullo Valley in the southwest.
The Carpic settlement should not be overestimated, and especially should 
not be pictured as a mass influx of population. The twenty-seven burials 
that have been unearthed in the only known Carpic cemetery and the larg­
est one at Septer represent the majority of graves at that site; the grave finds 
are rather uniform and can be assigned to the span of a single generation, 
from between 250 and 290. The Carpic vessels and jewellery share numer­
ous similarities with those of the Marosszentanna-Cherniakhov culture, and 
"Carpic" amphorae have also been found in "Visigothic" contexts at Sepsi- 
szentgyorgy-Eprestetd and Barathely, whilst "G othic"-type bowls with 
smoothed-in decoration, pots, one-handled cups, combs and needle cases 
were also frequent in the Septer graves. These links are extremely impor­
tant for they indicate the earliest phase of the Gothic Marosszentanna-Cher­
niakhov culture in Transylvania, which has also been attested at the epony­
mous site of Marosszentanna.
There are no individual Carpic finds in Dacia after 290-300, but it is still 
uncertain whether the Carpi of Transylvania joined their brethren who were 
accepted into, and settled in the Roman Empire in 295, or whether they 
were assimilated by the Goths.
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The Goths in Transylvania
The history of the Gothic migration and the Gothic wars is known down to 
the level of detail, and their outcome is similarly quite clear: from 271, the 
area to the north of the Lower Danube (and to the west of Scythia Minor = 
Dobrudja) became the land of the Goths called Gutthiuda in Gothic and Gothia 
in Latin, and the left bank of the Danube was called ripa gothica or "Gothic 
bank". After the occupation of these areas beyond the Carpathians border­
ing on Roman Dacia, the hitherto uniform Gothic population split into two 
branches. The area to the east of the Dniester was settled by the greuthingi, 
"the Goths of the steppeland", who were also known as Ostrogoths (Gothic 
austro = "bright", "sparkling", "radiant", and also "eastern"), whilst the 
area to the west and southwest of the Dniester was occupied by the tervingi, 
"the Goths of the forest", who were called also Visigoths (Gothic vezufvizu 
= "valiant", "gallant"). The Gothic ethnonyms speak for themselves, for the 
Gothic groups who had previously inhabited the Pontic steppeland could 
only have acquired the name "people of the forest" after their occupation of 
mountainous Transylvania.
Only recently has it been suggested that Transylvanian Dacia had not 
belonged to the land of the Goths. Historic arguments, too, have been put 
forward for refuting claims that the Transylvanian Basin, called "Caucaland" 
in Gothic (= Hauhaland, i.e. "land of the mountains"), had ever been settled 
by the Goths, or that the Gothic occupation had ever been more than a 
fleeting, brief episode in Transylvanian history.
The fact is that not soon after their settlement a contemporary, official 
Roman source mentions the Goths in Transylvania: Tervingi, pars alia Gotho- 
rum, adiuncta manu Taifalorum adversum Vandalos Gepidesque concurrant}  In 
other words "the other Gothic groups, the men of the Forest (the tervingi), 
in alliance with the Taifali, clashed with the Vandals and the Gepids" (au­
tumn, 291). The Visigothic tradition preserved in the Origo Gothica2 clearly 
states the reason for these hostilities, and leaves no doubt that the warring 
parties clashed for the possession of the abandoned Roman province of Dacia. 
Fastida, the king of the Gepids who was "hemmed in by rugged mountains 
and dense forests",3 first made an offer for the peaceful division of Dacia. 
When his offer was rejected, he decided on a frontal attack, though only 
after some encouragement from Rome (my foe's foe is my friend), but with­
out success. After his defeat, Fastida retreated ad patria, "to his own abode"; 
and it must here be recalled that there is no area other than the Carpathians 
where the Gepids could have been "hemmed in by rugged mountains". The 
Vandalic allies could only have been the Hasding Vandals who, for the past 
120 years, had been living in the Upper Tisza region and in the valleys of its 
tributaries. The Siling Vandals of Silesia could have had no active role in 
these faraway events. The exact place of the battle recorded in the Origo 
Gothica will probably never be known (Auha, Gothic ahwa, "river", "w a­
1. Panegyrici Latini III, (XI) 17.1.
2. J o r d a n e s ,  Getica 99.
3. J o r d a n e s ,  Getica 98.
ter"), but Jordanes's remark that it had been fought near the oppidum Galtis 
suggests the environs of an old Roman town. The explicit purpose of this 
war was the division of Dacia, and it definitely took place in Dacia. Any 
attempt to degrade this war into an insignificant and inconsequential local 
skirmish somewhere near the Prut is nothing less than deliberate tamper­
ing with the substance of the literary evidence: the identity, the homeland 
and the aims of the actual participants.
After protecting Transylvanian Dacia from the incursions of the Eastern 
Germanic relatives, the Visigoths could proceed to occupy and settle the 
valleys of the Kukull6 rivers, the Kis-Szamos and the Maros as far as Micia/ 
Vecel. The historical proof of their settlement is their encroachment on 
Sarmatia, an ally of Rome. In response to an appeal of the Sarmatians for 
help, Constantine the Great's son, the future emperor Constantine II inter­
vened on their behalf and inflicted a disastrous defeat of Ariaric's Goths on 
18 February, 332 on the territory of the Temes region, the present-day Banat. 
The defeat did not quench their thirst for battle, and a few years later (around 
335) the Goths, led by their king Geberic, drove the army of Visumar, the 
Vandalic king, from the Maros Valley. The Goths could only have defended 
Dacian Gothia along the section of the Maros flowing through the Great 
Hungarian Plain. This is borne out by a contemporary Roman source from 
around 350: Daciam ... nunc Taifali, Victohali et Tervingi habent,4 in other words, 
"D acia is now  in the possession of the Taifali, the Victofali and the Tervingi".
The Gothic army led by King Athanaric first withdrew behind the Serrorum 
montes (the south-eastern Carpathians) after the campaign led by the em­
peror Valens in 364 and 369, and then retreated to the Caucaland in face of 
the Hunnish raids. The Gothic occupation of Dacia is a fact confirmed by 
contemporary Roman sources, and needs no proof. The geographical litera­
ture of the fifth and sixth centuries calls Dacia "Gothia" in their review of 
the third and fourth century history of the region. Suffice it here to quote 
Orosius from the fourth century: Dacia ubi est Gothiai5 — "Dacia, where Gothia 
now lies".
The archaeological evidence of the Visigoths was first identified around 
1906 on the basis of the finds from the Marosszentanna cemetery. Bela Posta, 
the then professor of archaeology at Kolozsvar, played a crucial role in this 
identification: in the course of a study trip to Russia he had acquired first­
hand personal knowledge of the finds — still unpublished at that time — 
from the cemeteries of Chemiakhov and Romashki excavated in the prov­
ince of Kiev and had noted their surprising similarity to the Transylvanian 
burial grounds. He was also the first to outline the historical background of 
this similarity. His identifications gained international recognition and ac­
ceptance through the publications of his student Istvan Kov&cs; the third 
and fourth century G othic-Eastern Germanic culture is still called the 
Cherniakhov-Marosszentanna (Sintana de Mures) culture.
Like the other Germanic peoples, the Goths, too, cremated their dead in 
the early imperial period. This rite — which serves as an indication of their 
ethnic origins — survived well into the third and fourth centuries. How-
4. E u tr o p iu s , Breviarium ... 8, 2.2.
5. O r o s iu s , Historiarum adversum paganos ... I, 54.
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Map 4. The Goths in Dacia, 270-376/380
ever, as a result of cultural influences from the Mediterranean world and 
with the spread of Christianity, inhumation burials gained ever wider cur­
rency and there is a perceptible decline in cremation burials. The few Gothic 
cremation burials from Transylvania can generally be assigned to the first
generation of Gothic settlers (for example, the burials in the decayed inner 
area of the Roman castellum at S6v3rad), but the practice of cremating the 
deceased is known from later periods, too, and has also been documented 
at the eponymous site of Marosszentanna.
Recent research had distinguished three successive waves of settlement 
on the basis of the finds in the Marosszentanna cemetery. These phases 
span at least three generations and give a clear indication of the period in 
which the occupants of the Gothic village established and used this burial 
ground (300-376). The first phase is characterized by an abundance of ves­
sels into which were deposited foodstuffs for use in the netherworld; simi­
lar graves have been brought to light at Csombord, Marosujv^r, Rugon- 
falva and Marosv&s&rhely in Transylvania. The second phase indicates a 
change of costume and jewellery (with the appearance of new fibula types, 
combs and buckles); the deceased were now equipped with only one or, at 
the most, two storage vessels; similar graves have been reported from 
Palatka, Mezoakna, Feheregyhaza and Kolozsvar. The third phase reflects 
the spread of Christianity: the burials are east-west oriented and they occa­
sionally overlie the burials of phase one which were no longer visible. The 
hands of the deceased are often clasped together and the pagan custom of 
food offerings disappears. Similar graves have been excavated at Uj6s, 
Medgyes and Kolozsv&r.
The so-called bow fibulae which fastened the garment at the shoulder or 
above the bosom and which continued to be worn by the Visigoths in their 
Hispanic home make their appearance during the second phase. This fibu­
lae apparently evolved from the fibulae "with returned foot". The distribu­
tion of Gothic silver and bronze fibulae covered with a semicircular plate at 
the head and a pentagonal plate at the foot reflects the centres of Visigothic 
settlement in Transylvania, but also the random choice of the areas investi­
gated (Kolozsvar, Magyar-Palatka, Vajdakamaras, Uj6s-Ret, Mez<3akna, Ma­
rosszentanna, Marosvcis^rhely, Teker<5patak, Maroslekence, between Bar&t- 
hely and Ecel, and Sz&szhermany, the latter being a settlement). Similar 
fibulae mark the wealthy female burials of the Ostrogoths in the steppeland, 
and the fibulae of Visigothic women living beyond the Carpathians are prac­
tically indistinguishable from the Transylvanian specimens (Independent, 
Spanjov, Izvorul, Alexandru Odobescu, Tirgsor, Lejcani, and more recently 
from Birlad and Mogosani). That these women really were Goths is indi­
cated by a spindle whorl unearthed at Lefcani bearing a well legible and 
intelligible Gothic runic inscription. Spindle whorls with incised runes have 
also been reported from Wallachia.
It is not only the female jewellery that is uniform. The female costume of 
the Marosszentanna-Chemiakhov culture features semicircular bone combs, 
various types of bone, silver and bronze pendants, whilst the male costume 
is characterized by belt and shoe buckles. Gothic pottery too, shows a uni­
form development, both continuing late Celtic traditions and adopting late 
antique techniques (such as the potter's wheel). Pottery wares practically 
identical in form, execution and ornamentation have been unearthed in the 
Dnieper, the Dniester, the Maros and the Lower Danube region. But while 
the pottery (and the material culture) of the Ostrogoths reflects influences 
and borrowings from the Graeco-Roman towns of the Pontus region, the
Visigothic wares reflect the cultural impact of the Roman provinces lying 
beyond the Lower Danube, especially of the handicrafts of the border towns. 
These influences (and Roman imports such as glass, amphorae and flagons) 
are more frequently documented in the lowland along the northern side of 
the Lower Danube than in the inland regions to the north. They are evident 
in the Barcasdg and in the Hciromszek Basin, while they hardly left a trace 
on the archaeological record from the Maros and the Kis-Szamos Valley. 
There is even less evidence of late impacts of the former (pre-Gothic) Ro­
man provincial handicrafts, and the technological know-how of firing ves­
sels to a bright red or yellow colour disappeared entirely.
'Ninety per cent of the archaeological finds of the Transylvanian Goths 
was identified, excavated and published by Hungarian and Saxon archae­
ologists prior to the outbreak of the First World War and shortly after the 
close of the Second World War. Systematic investigations came to a stand­
still after the excavation of some one hundred and twenty graves, while at 
the same time, the number of graves excavated and published from Moldavia 
and Wallachia rose from zero to two thousand; in other words, the ratio of 
Dacian to extra-Dacian burials is presently 1:20. This uneven ratio eventu­
ally clouded the vision of scholarly research and there has been a percepti­
ble increase in the theories calling the Gothic presence in Transylvania into 
question in the light of the "archaeological evidence", or restricting it to the 
Maros region on the evidence of a few "late" cemeteries (at Marosszentanna, 
Marosvasarhely and Mezoakna). Other scholars link these burial grounds 
to Athanaric's Goths who sought refuge in Transylvania after the Hunnish 
assault of 376, or to Radagaisus's people (?) around 400. Following the large- 
scale investigations on the Romanian lowland, even the few scholars who 
do acknowledge a Gothic presence in Transylvania from 271 or 300 on have 
tried to compress their settlement territory to a small or plainly insignifi­
cant area. One delightful theory would have the Visigoths using the cem­
eteries of the exclusively Roman settlements of Transylvania.
In reality, the Gothic settlements of Transylvania differ but little from 
the settlements of the Marosszentanna-Chemiakhov territory. The one-room 
huts — the likes of which were not to be found even in the remotest village 
of the Roman Empire in the third and fourth centuries — had sunken floors 
and their roof was supported by two or three pairs of posts; they contained 
hearths or ovens only rarely. However, timber-framed houses have also 
been uncovered. The combs, fibulae, jewellery and vessel fragments found 
in these houses match the grave goods of the burials found at Bozod-L6c, 
Bar&thely I, Segesvdr-Szdl<5k, Bogoz-Vizlok, SepsiszentgyOrgy-Eprestetd, 
Szaszhermany-Goldgrube, Szekelykeresztur, Rety-Telek, and Brass6, for in­
stance: the relatedness of the two is, thus, an archaeological truism. The 
number of settlement sites indicated by surface features and various finds 
is relatively high. These sites, along with the cemeteries, give a fairly accu­
rate outline of the boundaries of the Visigothic settlement territory. The 
distribution of the presently known eighty to ninety sites nevertheless sug­
gests a considerable compression of the inhabited and cultivated areas as 
compared to the Roman imperial period. Settlement traces indicative of the 
Gothic occupation of one-time Roman castella, villae and other settlements 
are few and far between (Micia/Vecel, and Bereck).
Fig. 4. The distribution of the plate-fibulp, the most characteristic item of Gothic 
women's jewellery in Transylvania
1. Kolozsveir; 2. M agyarpalatka; 3. Vajdakamar^s; 4. U jfls-Fdzkut; 5. Meztfakna; 6. M arosszentanna; 7. Ma- 
rosv^s^rhely; 8. Gyergy6teker<5patak; 9. M aroslekence; 20. Between BarAthely and Ecel; 11. SztiszhermAny
The composition of the food offerings that were deposited in the burials 
and the animal bone samples found in excavated settlements, as well as the 
settlement patterns clearly imply that — in contrast to their Ostrogothic 
kinsmen — the Visigoths occupying the Lower Danubian lowland and Tran­
sylvania were agriculturists, a fact supported also by Libanius's descrip­
tion from 348-349.6 The vocabulary of Ulfilas' Gothic Bible translation is 
well stocked with terms indicating a rather sophisticated knowledge of ag­
riculture, with words for ploughing, sowing, reaping and harvesting, and 
reflecting an animal husbandry based on stalling. The archaeological evi­
dence, the historical sources and the linguistic data refute a recently pro­
posed hypothesis according to which the Visigoths of Transylvania and 
beyond were migratory herdsman or "nom adic" pastoralists. A thriving 
and self-supplying peasant economy is suggested by the Gothic vocabulary 
with words for a wide array of village handicrafts. The surviving relics of 
Visigothic handicrafts (including pottery) are undeniably "barbarian", even
6 .  L ib a n iu s , Oratio 59. 89. 72
if they were visibly influenced by the neighbouring Roman civilization. But 
cultural impacts of this kind can be demonstrated for all peoples on the 
barbarian side of the limes. The Visigoths (as well as the other barbarians) 
were dependent on the empire for various luxury items such as metal and 
glassware, cloths and textiles, as well as certain foodstuffs like oil and wine 
to such an extent that when trade relations were broken off at, say, times of 
war, the Goths "w ere reduced to great hardship and distress owing to their 
extreme lack of the necessities of life".7 The Goths paid for these commodi­
ties with slaves; and when the emperor Aurelian evacuated the provincial 
population from Dacia, it was from this sorry fate that he was hoping to 
save them.
Visigothic society can best be reconstructed from the relevant expres­
sions in Ulfilas' translation of the Bible, from the Passio S. Sabae — the acts 
of the Gothic martyr, Saba — and from the information recorded by a few 
late classical authors, primarily by the fourth century contemporary, Am- 
mianus Marcellinus, as well as from the Gothic names and archaeological 
record of that time.
Following the occupation of Dacia, the Tervingi — the people of the for­
est — were not divided into tribes. (By the third and fourth centuries, the 
word thiuda, Gothic for "tribe", was used for denoting the Visigothic peo­
ple and their land.) The central power (thiudanassus) was in the fourth cen­
tury wielded by a single thiudans, a term that corresponds to Greek basileus. 
The Visigoths were divided into clans (kunja = phylai, pagi) who were led by 
a kindins (dux, archon). Extended families (sibja) inhabited the territorial units 
(garvi) corresponding to each kunja; these sibja, however, were linked by 
blood ties in exceptional cases only. Each village (haims) was generally in­
habited by a single sibi suggesting that the territorial, economic and cultic 
units of the period was the sibi. The patriarchal families (fadreins) grouped 
in each village were led by a village council, in which the elders (sinistans) 
called the tune. There were also some smaller, farmstead-like settlements 
(weihsa).
From the time of the large-scale campaigns and conquests, real power 
among the Visigoths passed into the hands of the military leaders and their 
retinue. Reiks (basiliskos, regulus) designated the military leader, and from 
the third and fourth centuries on, it occurs frequently as a part of proper 
names (Guntheric, Geberic, Aoric, Arianc, Mundenc, etc.) It is also to be 
found in the name of the greatest Visigothic leader of that century: Athanaric. 
The title of iudex borne by Athanaric is often rendered in Late Latin as "gov­
ernor" (or "ruler", "confederate leader") and it is fairly obvious that in terms 
of his real role, his activity and authority Athanaric was a iudex potentissimus
— a distinction that corresponds to the Gothic thiudans. The reiks owed their 
rule to the maistans (optimates-megistanes) layer, the all-powerful lords of the 
estates and rural manors (gards), and themselves belonged to this layer. 
Their power was ensured by a smaller or larger military retinue of profes­
sional warriors. The free (freis) Visigothic people had become strongly strati­
fied by the fourth century: besides the distinct layer of paupers, various 
classes of servants and slaves also made their appearance.
7. A m m ian u s M a r c e l l i n u s ,  Rerum gestarum. Liber 27. 5.
The archaeological record has preserved little of the maistans layer: a 
gold bracelet, probably a symbol of power and wealth from Szaszbuda, and 
a gold fibula set with garnets "ex Transilvania", a masterpiece of fourth- 
century Visigothic goldsmith's art. The social stratification of the villages, 
however, is more clearly reflected in the burials of the village cemeteries, 
for example at Marosszentanna. The graves and their grave goods reflect a 
social stratification comparable to that of the Gothic village described in the 
Passio S. Sabae. A community of fifty to one hundred villagers included four 
or five wealthier couples; it was they who, in their lifetime, must have had 
the main say in the village council. The majority of burials can be linked to 
peasant families of equal social standing (waurstwja), whilst poorer graves 
can be associated with the paupers (unleths). Few of the burials can be at­
tributed to slaves (skalks). The personal ornaments of the wife of a tribal 
leader standing above village society have come to light at Teker<3patak 
from a buried hoard. They resemble the jewellery of the wealthier village 
women, the only difference being that the former were fashioned from solid 
silver and that a small fortune in Roman coins was also part of this hoard.
Both the written sources and the archaeological finds offer a wealth of 
information about the ancestral religion of the Goths. The Gothic runic in­
scription on one of the items of the Pietroasa treasure that had been buried 
on the fringes of Transylvanian Dacia even includes the words: Gutani/d 
wih hailag.
The pre-376 Christianity of the Goths has, until recently, been judged as 
severely by most historians as by the Romans, who were appalled by the 
bizarre costumes of their pagan priests and priestesses, by their clan sanc­
tuaries bedecked with barbarian religious symbols, their rustic cult statue 
carted around on wagons and by their stag-drawn sacred carts. Christian 
missionary endeavours were thought to have been isolated events which 
could boast some — at best, temporary — success only among the Visigoth's 
Roman prisoners and captives, the one-time Roman population that had 
been subjugated by the Goths, and the lowliest of the lowly among the Goths 
themselves. Archaeology was even more exacting in what it required by 
way of evidence: it would have expected Gothic graves to yield tangible 
relics of Christianity of the kind that have hardly ever been found even in 
the frontier provinces of the empire before 376. The Visigothic cemeteries 
have yielded no tangible evidence of this kind, nor are they likely to. At the 
same time, from the middle of the fourth century, we can observe a percep­
tible decline in the pagan food offerings and beverages deposited in a number 
of these cemeteries, including the one at Marosszentanna, and a visible in­
crease of east-oriented burials (with elapsed hands). These traits are com­
parable to the fourth-century Christian funerary rites in the provinces.
Between 369 and 372, Athanaric tried to divert attention from the inept 
military leadership of the maistans and from the ignominious defeats suf­
fered from the Roman army in 367 and 369 with a spate of religious perse­
cutions. These persecutions, which gave an impressive number of Gothic 
martyrs to the Catholic and Gothic Arian church over the four years would 
hardly have made sense if the Christian congregations had indeed merely 
consisted of a few prisoners of war and a handful of miserable and wretched 
Goths.
The various — Catholic, sectarian, and Arian — Christian m issions 
flooded Gothia following the peace treaty concluded after the Roman vic­
tory of 332. Judging by Ulfilas' Bible, the Arians appear to have had the 
most success in establishing a Gothic Christian church. The number of Chris­
tians among the Goths appears to have been considerable already at the 
time of the first persecution in 347-348, and the history of Gothic Christian­
ity can be continuously traced up to the martyrdom of Saba (372), or up to 
378, when Fritigern, a convert to Christianity, sent a Christian presbyter as 
an envoy to the emperor Valens. Most scholars have at long last rejected the 
earlier thesis that the mass conversion of the Goths took place on Roman 
soil and only after 382, and now concede that "the majority of Goths had 
already embraced Arian Christianity when they poured into the em pire"8 
in 376.
In the light of the above, the few fourth to sixth century Old Christian oil 
lamps, and the donarium (votive tablet) with the inscription ZENOVIVS and 
a pendant bearing the monogram of Christ found at Berethalom in 1775 can 
no longer be cited as proof for some sort of "Rom an" presence. The fourth 
century donarium from Berethalom had been manufactured somewhere in 
Illyricum and had belonged to the paraphernalia of a missionary priest to­
gether with the bronze vessels found alongside it. The Christian gospel was 
for everyone. Neither in the fourth century, nor in our own times can it be 
regarded as the privilege of a population of a specific language, or ethnic 
origin.
Collapse
After the Huns smashed Ermanaric's Ostrogothic kingdom they turned 
against the Visigoths. Athanaric tried to ward off the enemy onslaught along 
the Dniester River, and he hastily consolidated advanced defensive posi­
tions against possible surprise attacks. The Hunnish military leadership, 
however, bypassed these line<using a brilliant nomadic manoeuvre: they 
forded the river by night, and routed Athanaric's army in a surprise attack 
at dawn. The outcome of this battle is well known: in the autumn of 376 the 
better part of the Visigothic population, led by Fritigern and Alavivus, peti­
tioned for, and was granted, admittance (receptio) into the empire by the 
overlord of the eastern part of the Imperium, the emperor Valens, whilst 
Athanaric and his retinue retreated to the Caucalandensis locus in Transylva­
nia. At the end of 380, Athanaric and his followers, too, sought refuge in the 
Eastern Roman Empire. This marked the end of Visigothic supremacy in 
Transylvania and in Gothia.
The catastrophe that befell the Goths and their subsequent withdrawal is 
reflected in numerous hoards, including two lavish gold treasures — the 
two weighing over seven kilograms — hoarded by members of the Gothic 
ruling elite: Roman gold ingots that can be dated to between 367-375 by the 
Roman state stamps on them have come to light at Kraszna; the gold ingots
8 .  H. W o lf r a m , Geschichte der Goten. Mtinchen 1979, 96-97.
found at FOldv&r can be assigned to between 376-380 on the testimony of 
the imperial stamps. The silver treasure from Teker6patak which is dated 
by a series of silver coins as well as by a gold solidus of Gratian from 376 
has already been mentioned in passing. What is remarkable is that none of 
the presently known Visigothic cemeteries have yielded jewellery types of a 
later date than the items in this hoard. Small and large fortunes in coin­
hoards were buried between 376 and 380 at Maroscsap6, Zernyest, Szamos- 
ujvSr and V&rhely. These coin-hoards definitely signal a general and wide­
spread catastrophe, and together with the TekerSpatak treasure they mark 
the end of Visigothic cemeteries and settlements in Transylvania. The Hun- 
nish pressure uprooted not only the German settlers of present-day Roma­
nia, but also triggered the depopulation of present-day Poland, an area that 
had for centuries been densely settled by various Germanic tribes. It was 
this depopulation which cleared the path for the large-scale Slavic migra­
tions that followed the Hunnish period.
The Visigoths had plundered and destroyed the forts, towns and vil­
lages of Roman Dacia. Even worse, their century-long dominion saw the 
decay of whatever may have survived the wars. The gold mining region 
was a deserted wasteland throughout the early Middle Ages. It would ap­
pear that the delights and comforts of Roman civilization had held no at­
traction for the Goths or, for that matter, for the Alamanni who had occu­
pied the agri decumates between the Rhine, the Danube and the Neckar riv­
ers, and western Raetia at roughly the same time. This territory, wedged in 
between the formerly prosperous Danubian provinces and the Rhineland, 
was about the size of the area of Transylvanian Dacia that had been settled 
by the Romans. Following the Alamannic conquest, the abandoned forts 
and rural settlements were gradually reclaimed by the forest; not even their 
names were considered worth preserving by the Germanic tribes, whose 
only interest in the area was the need for new pastures and new agricul­
tural lands. Surviving fragments of the earlier "Rom an" population were 
soon assimilated by the newcomers. This contemporary parallel sets the 
fate of Roman Dacia in its proper perspective.
The Gepids before the Hunnish Conquest (269-424)
Roman sources first mention the Gepids in their list of the barbarians who 
attacked Dacia in 269. Indirect proof of their arrival in the Carpathian Basin 
is the attack in the autumn of 270 at Aquincum, Pannonia launched by the 
Vandals, who had been set in motion by the Gepids. The Visigoths had 
occupied Roman Dacia under their very noses, and their campaign against 
the Dacian Goths before 291 — which had been encouraged by the emperor 
Maximian — turned out to be a defeat. They had no choice but to move 
beyond Dacia and settle on the fringes of the one-time Roman province in 
the northwest, primarily in the Meszes Mountains. Discoveries of their ar­
chaeological evidence (inhumation graves with elements of the Cherniakhov 
culture, but, in contrast to Gothic graves, abundantly equipped with weap­
ons) have become increasingly frequent in northeastern Hungary and north­
western Romania. This area corresponds neither to Roman Dacia nor to 
historical Transylvania, but rather to the northwestern fringes of the present- 
day Romanian "Transylvanian" lowlands. The Visigothic settlement ex­
tended only to the right bank of the Szamos River in Roman Dacia, and 
extended to the left bank of the river solely in the region of Kolozsvdr. The 
one-time Roman limes in Dacia lay some seventy kilometres to the west, 
along the inner side of the Meszes Mountains; the area in between was re­
garded as a kind of no man's land by the Goths.
The early abode of the Gepids lay in the valleys of the Sebes-Koros, the 
Beretty6, the Er, the Kraszna, the Tur and the lower Szamos rivers to the 
northwest of the Meszes Mountains; in other words, it did not extend to the 
borders of Roman Dacia and lay well beyond the boundaries of geographi­
cal Transylvania. However, archaeologists and historiographers abroad stub­
bornly insist on identifying the Principality of Transylvania with historic 
Transylvania and Roman Dacia, and locate the early Gepid kingdom in 
"Transylvania".
The dazzling treasures which the Gepid kings had amassed over a whole 
century and which were buried when the Huns penetrated the Carpathian 
Basin (424) at Szilagysomly6 in the foothills of the Keselyu Mountain — 
treasures I and II belong together, for they had come to light from the same 
small plot of land — can in no way be linked to the Visigoths whose settle­
ment territory lay well over one hundred kilometres away, beyond a moun­
tain range. It no more stands to reason to link them to some Roman or 
Dacian "local leader". The same holds true for a contemporary hoard of 
antique silver vessels found at T6ti in Bihar county. Both have come to light 
in early Gepidia, and together with the similar but smaller hoards from 
Gelenes in the Upper Tisza region and from Ormod/Brestov in the Car­
pathian Ukraine they signal a historical turning-point. The treasures from 
Szilagysomlyo and the other finds brought to light in this region — a heavy 
gold collar from Szilagyujlak, a gold pendant from Zilah, the grave of a 
Gepid warrior from around 400 likewise at Szilagysomlyo — suggest that 
the early centres of Gepid power should be sought somewhere in the broader 
environs of Szilagysomlyo, an area that was open towards the valleys of the 
rivers Kraszna, Er and Beretty6, but was protected by massive mountains 
from the east. The early Gepid dynasty had died out in this area, and it was 
here that King Ardaric, elevated to power by his Hun overlords, laid the 
foundations of later Gepid power.
2. The Huns (376/424-455)
The fate of Gothia was sealed by the Hunnish military advance. The former 
Gothic population that had known and, in a sense, had reached a modus 
vivendi with a still unified Imperium Romanum gradually disappeared from 
the scene under the repeated waves of Hunnish pressure. However, it is 
still unclear where and how the Huns established themselves in eastern 
Europe following their victory of 376. They first broke into the Eastern Ro­
man Empire in 395, by which time they were mounting their attacks from
Wallachia. In December 400, they did away with Gaina and his Goths flee­
ing back from the territory of the empire. The westward drive of various 
Hun troops caused the outbreak of the "second Hun panic": the Vandals 
and the Sueves hastily fled from their abodes in the Carpathian Basin, and 
the Visigothic army led by Alaric made its first attempt to penetrate Italy 
through Dalmatia (401). •
The next campaign that Uldin's Lower Danubian Hunnish army waged 
against the Eastern Empire (the occupation of Castra Martis in 409) ended 
in disaster. But by the time the government in Constantinople made truce 
with the Huns in 412, Uldin had already captured and burnt the Roman 
counterforts on the left bank of the Danube from Sucidava (near the mouth 
of the Olt River) to Lederata (west of the Iron Gates), and had, thus, annihi­
lated the Romans' advanced posts. In the following decades the whole of 
Wallachia was occupied by the Huns. No other region of Europe has yielded 
such an abundance of archaeological evidence for the early settlement of 
the Huns as this fertile lowland traversed by meandering rivers: the major­
ity of the Hun copper sacrificial cauldrons and graves with gold diadems 
have come to light in this region. It was from here that King Ruga led his 
armies against Thracia in 422, and though Ruga and the main Hunnish army 
moved into the Carpathian Basin following this campaign, soon new con­
tingents of eastern Hunnish warriors took their place. The significance of 
these troops is indicated by the fact that the camp (ordu) of the co-regent, 
Attila, lay somewhere in the Buzau Valley between 435-445. A number of 
princely graves have been discovered in this area, and a Hunnish gold buckle 
from Brass6 can probably also be liriked to this ordu. In summertime, a 
Hunnish noble probably marched into the (later) BarcasSg through the Bodza 
Pass. (The period in question is indicated by a gold solidus of Theodosius II 
issued around 430 and found in this region.)
By 424-425, King Ruga and the main Hunnish forces had pitched camps 
on the Great Hungarian Plain to the south of the Koros rivers. It was here 
that they began to build their new, principal ordu that was visited by Priscus 
in 449. The settlement territory of the Gepids who had submitted to the 
Huns was shifted to the north of the Koros-Sebes-KorOs line in the Great 
Hungarian Plain, and this shift apparently entailed a gradual Gepid infil­
tration into Transylvania as far as the Nagy-Szamos River. The land of the 
Huns lay to the south of this region.
Central and southern Transylvania, girded with rugged mountains and 
covered with dense forests, served as a highway to the east (through the 
Vorostorony, Bodza and Borg6 passes). It was a campsite in summer, and a 
hunting ground in the autumn. This period marks the nadir of human set­
tlement in Transylvania: only in the Maros, the Sebes-Koros, the Nagy- 
Kukiilld valleys and along the roads leading to the passes have traces of 
human settlement been identified, and even these are few and far between. 
No Hunnish finds are known from northern Transylvania.
Some sort of central residence, perhaps a temporary ordu (the likes of 
which are described by Priscus) can perhaps be postulated near Szaszsebes, 
where a gold solidus of Theodosius II minted in 429 or 430, and twelve gold 
coins of Varakhran V, the Kushan-Sassanian king (420-438) have come to 
light. The latter had probably been part of the booty brought back by a
Hunnish warrior who had fought in central Asia in the 420s. A series of 
other contemporary eastern and western Roman gold coins mark the extent 
of Hunnish power and the main routes leading through Transylvania (Gyula- 
feherv^r, Marosludas, and Vfzakna). The distribution of gold coins extorted 
from the two Roman empires accurately reflects the movements of the Huns 
and their allies.
One of the most significant Hunnish finds from Transylvania is the gold 
cicada — a religious symbol and an insignia of rank among the Huns — 
from S&romberke. It is possible that the Germanic gold fibulae inset with 
precious stones, ornaments comparable to the Szilagysom ly6 brooches, 
found at Vole in the Kis-Kuktill<5 Valley, were the jewels of a wealthy woman 
of the Hunnish period. The solitary grave of a nobleman buried with a gold 
coin of Theodosius II and an assortment of gold jewellery at Csepany near 
Beszterce can also be assigned to this period. Aside from these lavish finds 
only a handful of "commoners'" finds from the Hun period — which are 
nonetheless highly characteristic — are known from Transylvania. These 
include one-handled jugs with burnished, flattened decoration, and vessels 
and glass cups which are scattered across the entire Middle Danubian re­
gion that came under Hunnish occupation (Maroskama and Marosv3s&rhely, 
from graves or from settlements). Family burial grounds with a few graves 
typical of the Hunnish period from the Alps to Moldavia and the Pontus 
region have recently been unearthed at Uj<5s and Barathely: the graves con­
tained chip-carved fibulae (of the so-called Perse-L6va type) that resemble 
the ones worn by the Huns, the Alans and the Germanic peoples during the 
Hunnish period, as well as fibulae with a triangular plate above the catchplate 
(of the so-called Brigetio-Martely type). Similar plate-brooches have been 
reported from A rad-M ikelaka lying near the outlet of the Maros from 
Transylvania. The Alanic fibula of Caucasian type from Gyulafeherv&r- 
Partos is the last of this small group of Hunnish finds from Transylvania, 
which has been enlarged with the grave goods of Hunnish burials uncov­
ered at Nagyvarad-Szalkaterasz near the edge of the Great Hungarian Plain 
south of the Sebes-Koros. (The "Hunnish" items of the Mojgrad hoard that 
have played a prominent role in a number of earlier theories are modem 
forgeries.)
Southern Transylvania turned into a desolate and empty land during the 
fifty years of Hunnish occupation. The areas suitable for cultivation and 
human settlement had shrunk catastrophically. The river valleys functioned 
merely as routes of communication, and the areas bordering these valleys 
became the hunting grounds of the Hunnish kings and nobles.
3. The Gepid Kingdom (455-567)
Contemporary reports and the history of the Goths written by the Gothic 
Jordanes both highlight the importance of the role played by the "innum er­
able forces of the Gepids" in Attila's campaigns against Gaul (451). The 
Gepid troops were led by "the most famous king", Ardaric, who enjoyed a 
special privilege among all the vassal kings: he was allowed to participate
in Attila's council (445-453). This rare privilege of the Gepids can be as­
cribed to the fact that they were the only Eastern Germanic people who had 
not fled in panic on hearing of the Hunnish advance. In his campaigns against 
the towns of both Roman empires, Attila relied heavily on the mass of Gepid 
foot warriors. Their new king, Ardaric, who had been designated by the 
Huns, wielded the same measure of power over his own people as Attila 
over the Hunnish nobles and the common peoples of his empire. This kind 
of power was granted to Ardaric and a few other vassal kings by Attila and 
his Huns; and Ardaric, an astute and cunning man by nature, used this 
power for the benefit of his own people. No other area in the Carpathian 
Basin has yielded as many gold grave oboli as the settlement territory of the 
Gepids. Their Hunnish overlords supplied them with "home-minted" solidi 
of Theodosius II when the flow of eastern Roman gold dried up after the 
death of the emperor. When Attila died in 453, the Gepids were the best 
equipped and wealthiest of the Germanic tribes, and had the richest mili­
tary aristocracy. It was "the Gepids raging with the sword" and "Ardaric's 
sword" that led the coalition of the Danubian peoples to victory in the Bat­
tle of the Nedao River fought against Attila's son and successor, Ellak (455).
After their victory, "the Gepids occupied by force all of the Hunnish 
settlements and held sway over the borders of all of Dacia. Being valiant 
men, they asked only for a friendly alliance, peace and an annual subsidy 
from the [Eastern] Roman Empire".9 This contemporary report that has sur­
vived probably on the basis of Priscus's description strongly suggests that 
after their victory the Gepids annexed the Hunnish territory on the left bank 
of the Danube to their own settlement territory, which thus became multi­
plied in size. The boundaries of their kingdom in the first half of the sixth 
century can be reconstructed from a description by Cassiodorus, who drew 
his information from a Byzantine source. According to him, the Gepids lived 
to the west of Scythia Minor: the Danube bordered their land in the south, 
the Olt in the southeast, the Alpine mountain chain (i.e. the eastern and 
northern Carpathians) in the east and the north, and the Tisza in the west.10 
Right after 550, Jordanes remarked that the "present" country of the Gepids 
lay right across from Moesia on the far bank of the Danube, in a land for­
merly called Dacia and later Gothia, which was "now " called Gepidia and 
which was bordered by the Danube in the south.11 ,
The most significant war waged by the Gepids dates to the period be­
tween the above-quoted two descriptions of the location and size of Dacia. 
The war happened after the work of Cassiodorus was finished, and before 
Jordanes has finished his Getica, the Gepids had lost their newly-won terri­
tories. It must be noted here in passing that the Eastern Empire never ac­
knowledged the Gepid conquest. Jordanes, who lived in the territory of the 
Eastern Empire only alluded to these events in passing. The war that broke 
out in 539 was launched by the Gepids who had concluded an alliance with 
Theudepert, the Frankish king, against Byzantium. They routed the east 
Roman army led by General Calluc, and occupied the Danubian zone of
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Moesia Prima and Dacia Ripensis between Singidunum (Belgrad) and the 
region opposite the mouth of the Olt River. This area remained under Gepid 
control until the close of 551. The twelve year-long Gepid control of the 
Lower Danubian border can, in retrospect, be said to have shaped the later 
history of Europe: they opened the frontiers of the Eastern Empire to the 
permanent intrusions and attacks of various Slavic groups — and in 550, of 
the Kutrigurs. The romanized population of Dacia evacuated to the Lower 
Danubian region by Emperor Aurelian in 270 now fled to the inner regions 
of the Balkan Peninsula to avoid "slavery" under Gepid rule, and to escape 
recurrent Slavic-Kutriguric attacks. They took with them the memory of 
their Trajanic origins and their "Dacian" heritage, as well as their Latin 
dialects. And though Justinian I ordered the Gepids to evacuate the east 
Roman territory after the victory of his Langobard allies in 551, and again 
closed the Lower Danubian border, he could not resurrect its former inhab­
itants to populate the towns. After 552, only small forts were erected on the 
site of the former castella, counter forts and towns on both banks of the 
Lower Danube. For three decades, these were manned by soldiers of semi- 
or entirely barbarian descent, until the Avar and Slavic campaigns swept 
even these small forts away.
The Gepid finds from the Age of Migrations — the fifth and sixth cen­
tury — are exceptionally well documented. In fact, the very first Gepid 
grave find, jewels from the burial of a noblewoman, came to light in Transyl­
vania at Kisselyk, in the year 1856. J6zsef Hampel recognized as early as 
1880 on the basis of a grave find from Nagyv^rad that these and similar 
jewellery from the Carpathian Basin were ornamented in the "Merovingian 
style". By the end of the century he could confidently assert — on the basis 
of the finds rapidly growing in number and of his profound knowledge of 
historical sources — that the graves and burial grounds yielding compara­
ble finds to the east of the Tisza could be regarded as an evidence of the 
Gepids. In his publication of the first Gepid cemetery to be expertly exca­
vated at Mezdband in 1906-1907, Istvan KovScs proved beyond the shadow 
of a doubt that the cemetery should be assigned to the Gepids of the Age of 
Migrations (1913). And although the conceptual confusion pervading ar­
chaeological research after the First World War did not spare Gepid archaeo­
logy either, investigations and excavations have continued in the area that 
had formerly been Gepidia, but which now lies in three different countries: 
Hungary, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Although research in Transylvania was 
carried out between 1951-1956 within the framework of a "Slavic-Antes 
Programme", the 1960s brought a more professional approach. The claim 
that the settlements and cemeteries of the period in question do indeed 
belong to the Gepids has not been seriously challenged by any well-trained 
Hungarian, Yugoslavian or Romanian archaeologist to this day. It is, how­
ever, an infinitely more difficult task to reconcile their views with those of 
western scholars of the "Merovingian period", for there are quite a number 
of western historians and archaeologists who are loath to admit the very 
existence of the Gepids. The few who do, tend to associate with the Gepids 
only the simple commoners' finds. The contemporary Gothic and Langobard 
chronicles describing the Gepids as an abomination alas still influence schol­
arly attitudes, and it is still as fashionable to generously ascribe to the Goths
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their lavish treasures, their royal burials resplendent with dazzling jewel­
lery, and their military victories as to denigrate the people themselves. These 
attitudes occasionally influenced local research on Gepidia. One virulent 
example is the claim, borne out by no historical source, that the royal buri­
als of Apahida and the Szamosfalva treasure should be linked to an Ostro- 
gothic elite who possessed Transylvania until 474 or 490. And yet, the his­
toric victory of the Gepids over the Huns and their firm alliance — with the 
exception of the above-mentioned twelve years — with the Eastern Roman 
Empire provides a more than adequate explanation for the extraordinary 
wealth of the Gepid kings and nobles.
T,he distribution of the solidi issued under Theodosius II, Marcian and 
Valentinian III — gold coins that were lovingly deposited in the burials of 
Gepid nobles by their relatives so that they would be able to pay for their 
entrance to the netherworld — clearly shows that at the time of the Hun 
overlordship, Gepidia lay to the east of the Bodrog-Tisza line, to the north 
of the Koros-Sebes-Koros line, and north of the source area of the Nagy- 
Szamos in the east. International research generally tries to fit the solitary 
lavish burials from the Partium and northern Transylvania (e.g. Ermihaly- 
falva) into the chronological framework of "Merovingian civilization" es­
tablished on the basis of coin finds. The almost nouveau riche fashion worn 
by Gepid noblewomen, the dress ornamented with huge silver fibulae worn 
in pairs on each shoulder, the cast silver belt clasps, golden earrings and 
armrings, and an array of glittering beads evolved at around this time. 
Graves comparable to the noblewomen's burials uncovered in northeastern 
Hungary have also come to light in the Partium (at Erdengeleng and Genes), 
and a veritable noblemen's cemetery was set up at Nagyvarad at this time.
Since the weapons, male and female dress and various other products of 
the Gepid material culture of the Hun period are known from various cem­
eteries of Hungary and the Partium (Artand I—II, Ermihalyfalva, etc.) it is 
relatively easy to trace the settlement of Transylvania after the end of its 
Hun occupation. The first settlers obviously arrived still wearing the ear­
rings, fibulae and other ornaments manufactured in their former homeland. 
Their grave oboli were still picked from among the late issues of Theodosius
II which reached the Hun Empire in enormous quantities, or the late issues 
of Valentinian III but they were soon supplanted by the solidi of Leo I and 
Zeno. The distribution of these coins is concordant with the early Gepid 
grave finds that have come to light as far south as the valleys of southern 
Transylvania (Segesvar, Szekelyudvarhely, Brass6, Szelindek, and the Hat- 
szeg area). The majority of these finds come from small, family burial 
grounds established in the vicinity of newly founded manors or farmsteads, 
since larger villages had not yet been formed. Most of these early finds have 
been reported from Kolozsvar and its environs, suggesting the emergence 
of a major Gepid centre in that area.
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Gepid Kings in Transylvania
A chain of smaller settlements inhabited by high-ranking military retinues 
and their families evolved around the ruins of Napoca (Magyarvalk6, Kar- 
dosfalva, Szamosfalva, Apahida, etc.). It cannot be mere chance that the 
Gepid kings chose the site of the one-time Roman towns as their residence: 
the walls of Napoca, although crumbling, were still standing, and perhaps 
it was still possible to make a mouldering public building or so habitable to 
some degree. The same process of semi-restoration can be observed in the 
case of the abandoned fort of Castra Regina (Regensburg), which was used 
by the Alamanni, and later by the Bavarian princes. That the royal family in 
Transylvania enjoyed an even higher standing is reflected by the fact that 
they buried their dead in secret on the terrace of the Kis-Szamos, far from 
their residence, near the present-day village of Apahida. The first royal burial 
came to light, and was plundered, in 1889; even so, most of the grave finds 
were rescued. The bilingual (Hungarian and German) publication of these 
finds that appeared not much later practically contains all that can be, and 
is, known about this assemblage. Most important among these finds is a 
late antique-early Byzantine onion-headed gold crossbow fibula that is some­
what larger, more ornate and more delicately wrought than the brooch found 
in the grave of Childeric (d. 482), the Frankish king at Toumai, suggesting 
that this particular Gepid king had been held in higher esteem by the Ro­
mans than the other barbarian kings of that period. The magnificent silver 
jugs of the Apahida treasure were presents from Constantinople. The other 
grave goods were in part regalia (symbols of power and rank), and in part 
personalia (personal ornaments and jewellery). The solid gold armring with 
thickened terminals had been a symbol of rank among Germanic royal fami­
lies since the third and fourth centuries. The six gold pendants attached to a 
boar's head had perhaps ornamented a diadem-like crown fashioned from 
gold brocade. The king's belt was fastened with a large gold buckle inset 
with colourful garnets, and his insignia of rank included a gold-mounted 
glass or wooden cup. The religion of the deceased king laid to rest amidst 
his treasures is revealed by his gold finger-ring ornamented with crosses, 
and his name is preserved on another finger-ring bearing a Latin inscrip­
tion, OMHARIVS, as well as on a signet ring with a Greek monogram that 
can be read as (AUD-)OMARIUZ. The letter fc of the Latin inscription could 
be read as ri, giving the ending harius which corresponds to Old Germanic 
*harjaz and Gothic harjis  (nom inative and genitive) m eaning "arm y ". 
"Aud(om)lwrjis" can perhaps be translated as "arm y's salvation". If the liga­
ture is read as "ir", we get the Gothic word hairus meaning "sw ord". Om, 
however, defies interpretation in either case. In any case, on the evidence of 
other contemporary and related names, this compound name with its asso­
ciations of combat and weaponry had undoubtedly been borne by a Gepid 
king.
Some of the jewellery from the second royal grave at Apahida — for 
instance, a cloisonne buckle identical to the one in the first royal burial, the 
gold-mounted glass goblet and wooden cup — which was discovered and 
brought to light from a plundered grave in 1968 some five hundred metres 
away from the first assemblage — is on a par with the items of the first
burial. The other lavish finds, which include gold mounts that had deco­
rated the sword and its sheath, gold purse-lid inset with garnets, and sump­
tuous saddle and harness ornaments deposited together in a wooden cas­
ket, are items not found in the first burial. On the other hand, the insignia 
and personalia are missing from this second assemblage. Perhaps they were 
lost when the grave was discovered. Only a gold buckle that matches the 
former two, but is considerably heavier and more decorated, is known from 
the third Apahida find discovered in 1978.
The three royal grave finds are complemented by yet another buried 
gold treasure that came to light in 1963 at Szamosfalva. It contained mostly 
female jewellery (an ornate breast pendant suspended from a braided chain, 
belt buckles, beads and rings) with a few male ornaments such as a gold 
finger-ring and a massive gold collar.
The jewellery from Apahida and Szamosfalva can be confidently set be­
side the most splendid Germanic royal ornaments of the Hunnish period 
which have been left to us as mementos of the fabulous wealth of that era. 
There is every reason to regard them to be the grave goods and jewellery of 
the fifth-century Gepid kings, the Ardaricings. The regia of Napoca and the 
neighbouring manors and farmsteads of the royal retinue were abruptly 
abandoned at the beginning of the sixth century, an event which signals a 
particularly violent political change. The hoarding of the Szamosfalva treas­
ure can be linked to the ascension of Elemund; the hoard of family heir­
looms had probably been buried, never to be found again, by a fleeing Ar- 
daricing.
The Gepids at the Time of the Merovingian Civilization
At the turn of the fifth and sixth centuries, a new "civilization" made its 
appearance in the western and central regions of Europe from the Atlantic 
to Transylvania. Its cradle was northern Gaul, the area long occupied by the 
Franks, or, to be more precise, Austrasia, the "southern country" of the 
Rhine, Maas, Mosel and Maine valleys. The rise of the Merovingian dy­
nasty not only brought the consolidation of political power, but also re­
vived the economic prosperity of the one-time Roman towns. The country­
side saw the emergence of estates — and of villages and manors scattered 
over these estates — whose subsequent development was to lead to the 
birth of feudalism. Row grave cemeteries whose burials and grave goods 
have preserved the fashion, the weapons and other aspects of the material 
culture of that period, as well as certain tokens of the existing social order, 
grew up around these rural settlements, which had very little or nothing in 
common with the Roman villages of yore. To the east of the Frankish- 
Alamannic territory, in Thuringia, in present-day Bohemia, in Austria, 
Pannonia, the Tisza region and also in Transylvania we find the so-called 
"eastern Merovingian or eastern row grave culture" which can definitely 
be linked to the Germanic peoples living in these areas. No traces of this 
culture have yet been identified beyond the Carpathian Basin, either to the 
east or to the south. The distribution of this culture marked the frontiers of
contemporary Europe. And though the adjective "M erovingian" cannot, 
strictly speaking, be applied to the regions beyond Thuringia and Upper 
Austria — since the Merovingian dynasty never controlled this part of the 
world — the term "eastern Merovingian" can, nevertheless, be used to mean 
that the peoples inhabiting this region, first and foremost the Gepids and 
the Langobards, had entered into political and dynastic alliances with the 
Merovingians in the first half of the sixth century (the former is exemplified 
by the Gepids at the time of their campaigns against Byzantium in 539, the 
latter by the Langobardic kings). These relations frequently determined the 
course of history in this region.
The faraway Gepids appear to have been more receptive to Byzantine 
influences than to direct or indirect cultural impacts from the Merovingian 
world, and on the testimony of their jewellery, they also had contact with 
the Crimean Goths and with Scandinavia. After their second occupation of 
Sirmia in 536, their country was made up of three distinct units bound by 
loose ties. The Tisza region was receptive to influences from the west and 
the north, Sirmia was open towards the south and towards Italy, whilst 
Transylvania — for a while — was receptive to impacts from the east. When 
these eastern contacts were abruptly severed after the onset of the Slavic 
migration, Transylvania was soon transformed into a self-supporting prov­
ince within the Gepid Kingdom.
The fact that several permanent settlements are known from this period 
reflects economic and political stability. The fifth and sixth century Gepid 
settlements had no antecedents; traces of Gothic, Roman or prehistoric oc­
cupation have only been identified at major economic or strategic sites. The 
majority of the newly-founded settlements were villages or farmsteads that 
were established by the incoming Gepid rural population which earned its 
livelihood with agriculture and stockbreeding.
The most intensively investigated Gepid settlement lies at M alomfalva- 
Podej, where thirty-four huts with sunken floors, and gabled roofs sup­
ported by one, two or three pairs of upright posts have been uncovered. 
Like the houses of other contemporary Germanic peoples, these huts con­
tained no hearths or ovens. Looms have been identified in some of the huts, 
whilst others have yielded various tools and implements, lost combs, knives, 
cheap fibulae, and an abundance of pottery shred characteristic of the pe­
riod in which these huts were built and occupied. All objects are character­
istic products of Gepid iron and bronze metallurgy, or of Gepid bone carv­
ing, whilst the pottery testifies to the continuous use of the potter's wheel. 
Their parallels run into the thousands in the Gepid settlements and cem­
eteries of the Tisza region. There are no demonstrable "local" influences 
peculiar to this region and unknown elsewhere in Gepidia. The rural popu­
lation, engaged in crop raising and cattle breeding, had no notable outside 
contacts. The Malomfalva settlement was inhabited by the Gepids between 
500-567. The houses of the last period were utterly destroyed by the invad­
ing Avars. A few years or decades later, the site of the devastated Gepid 
village was already being used by the new Avar settlers.
Houses, and smaller and larger villages comparable to the Malomfalva 
settlement have been uncovered at several other sites in Transylvania (Csap6- 
szentgyorgy, Kutyfalva, Mez<5szopor, Vajdaszentivany, Betlenszentmikl6s,
Segesv&r-Szc516k, and Kezdipoly3n-K6h3t). Similar villages have been un­
covered outside Transylvania as well: in Bihar, where houses have been 
found with bone carving workshops; in CsanSd and P6cska in the Maros 
Valley; and in Szentl&szl6v5ra and 6-Pal^nk in the Lower Danube region. 
The sunken Gepid huts in the inner area of what had once been Apulum, 
that is, within the Gyulafeherv^r citadel, have yielded spouted vessels, char­
acteristic specimens of Gepid pottery, which date the period securely. 
Spouted vessels and other ceram ic wares decorated with stam ped or 
smoothed-in patterns have also been uncovered at settlements established 
on higher elevations, for example at Kisselyk-VSrhely and Kisgalambfalva- 
Galath-tetd These settlements also featured timber-framed houses besides 
the huts with sunken floors. However, there is no indication that these hill­
top settlements were fortified with earthen ramparts — some archaeolo­
gists have simply mistaken the prehistoric or medieval rampart for Gepid 
fortifications. Settlements in all of Gepidia were unfortified.
The extent of Gepid settlement in Transylvania is best reflected by the 
graves and by finds indicating cemetery sites. As elsewhere in Gepidia, 
these can be linked to two basic settlement types: to villages, and manors 
with their farmsteads. By the sixth century, the noblemen's mansions dis­
appeared throughout Transylvania; it is only at NagyvSrad (lying outside 
of Transylvania proper) that their continuous existence can be noted. Un­
fortunately, the family graveyard at Nagyv&rad had not been excavated by 
trained archaeologists, and quite a lot of the finds that came to light from 
about the ten graves in the course of several decades never got as far as the 
museum collections. The available finds, however, offer convincing proof 
that — whether these items had belonged to males or females — the graves 
contained the burials of some of the most distinguished people in the whole 
of Gepidia. The grave finds included Christian relics as well as genuine 
Frankish jewellery. Comparably splendid finds from the years after 536 are 
only known from Sirmia, which is hardly surprising, since around the mid­
dle of the century King Kunimund moved the Gepid royal court to the still 
thriving antique town of Sirmium. The heir apparent, as well as the bishop 
of the Gepid Arian church, also resided there.
Graves indicative of manors and farmsteads have been identified mostly 
in the Kis-Szamos and the Maros valleys (Magyarkapus, Nagyiklod, Mez6- 
ceked, Marosv&scirhely, and Maroscsapo) and in the Kis-Kukiill6 Valley 
(Betlenszentmikl6s). The burial rite is rather uniform and evidently Chris­
tian, with west to east oriented coffin burials. The grave goods, too, show 
surprising uniformity: Gepid-type fibulae, double-edged combs, arrowheads
— often an entire quiverful —, bronze and iron buckles current in that pe­
riod, pottery with stamped or smoothed-in patterns, and the occasional 
undecorated pot, all of them, without exception, Gepid wheel-turned wares. 
The quantity of pottery recovered from a given cemetery varied according 
to the religious beliefs of the community: some abounded in vessels, others 
hardly contained any.
Few village cemeteries are known from Transylvania. The cemetery of 
the Malomfalva settlement was plundered by grave robbers after the settle­
ment had perished. The few grave goods that were not considered worth 
taking — fibulae, beads, combs, weapons, and so on — are so characteristi­
cally Gepid that were the site of the cemetery unknown, it could be confi­
dently located as being in the neighbourhood of Szentes in Hungary. Vil­
lage cemeteries have also been uncovered at Beszterce and at Galacfalva.
The largest and most circumspectly excavated Gepid cemetery in Transyl­
vania is the burial ground at MezfiMnd. In contrast to Malomfalva, the 
deceased were provided with a wide array of vessels which, however, did 
not contain any pagan food offerings. This unique blend of Christian and 
pagan burial rites can also be observed elsewhere among the half-pagan, 
half-Christian Gepids. Like the cemeteries at Marosnagylak and Bar&thely 
III, the Mez6band cemetery is one of the few burial grounds that continued 
to be used even after the Avar conquest, and the few excavated graves at 
Marosveresmart suggest that this cemetery can also be classed among them.
The grave finds of known provenance and the number of sites with one 
or two graves come to about forty. The two "m ost Gepid" pieces of jewel­
lery found in Transylvania, two bird-headed buckles, also originate from 
such "solitary" burials at SzamosjenS and Maroscsap6-Csurret. Buckles of 
this sort had been the personal ornaments or "insignia" of high-ranking, 
wealthy women throughout sixth-century Gepidia.
Though the relics of the "Merovingian culture" of Transylvania are known 
from several sites and cemeteries — for this epoch can be considered one of 
the better-investigated periods of the early medieval history of Transylva-
Fig. 5. The settlement areas of Gepidia in the sixth century are indicated by the 
distribution of the most characteristic item of Gepid jewellery, the buckle decorated 
with an eagle's head
nia — their interpretation still poses numerous problems. What is certain is 
that this civilization is, by and large, identical with that of the Gepid popula­
tion of the Tisza region and of Sirmia, as well as with the culture of the Pan- 
nonian Langobards, and the Bavarians of the Upper Danube region. It is a 
culture securely dated by the Byzantine gold oboli deposited in the burials 
uncovered in the Tisza region and in Sirmia, as well as by other Byzan 
tine metal objects placed in these graves. The gold coins of Justin I and Justi­
nian I deposited as grave oboli are useful for dating the Gepid settlement, 
even if only a few of them were found in the actual sixth century graves.
,The political history of this period was not devoid of upheavals. The 
ascension of Elemund or of his father has already been alluded to. In the 
540s, this dynasty was overthrown by Thorisind. A great many villages (and 
their cemeteries) perished throughout Gepidia in the chaos following this 
coup. Signs of earlier unrest can also be noted in Transylvania. The single 
"internal" coin hoard of Gepidia was buried in the Nagy-Kukiillo Valley 
between Kisselyk and Mikesz&sza soon after the close of Justin I's reign. 
The hoard contained some fifty to eighty or one hundred coins that had 
been amassed from the 440s, but it did not contain any coins that flowed 
into Gepidia during the Justinianic boom. Still, the possibility that the hoard 
had been buried at the time of Thorisind's putsch cannot be ruled out.
In spite of numerous similarities, sixth century Gepid society in Transyl­
vania was but a pale reflection of that in the Great Hungarian Plain and, 
especially, of that in Sirmia. There are hardly any finds indicative of a nobil­
ity, or of a royal or princely retinue, and this, in the light of the diametri­
cally opposite testimony of the fifth century, can hardly be written off as 
due to some shortcoming of archaeological investigation. The southward 
movement of the Gepid nobles and military leaders in the sixth century is a 
historically documented fact. The few who chose to stay behind with their 
families had belonged to the ranks of the village warriors, and their number 
does not appear to have been particularly high. The majority of sixth-cen- 
tury Transylvanian Gepids were tolerably well-off or poor freemen, who 
were reduced to servitude and were burdened with a series of obligations
— a state of affairs that roughly corresponds to early feudal conditions. The 
grave of a smith uncovered at MezSband who was buried together with his 
tools and his helmet forged of iron plates can probably be ranked among 
the more highly positioned and wealthier members of his community.
It was in the Gepid period that the chain of villages engaged in agricul­
ture and animal husbandry began to stretch from the middle reaches of the 
Szamos, through the Maros and Kuktillo valleys, down to the Feketetigv 
River. The size and extent of the cultivated and inhabited area — though it 
fell short of what it had been in the Visigothic period — was again growing 
as compared to the absolute nadir of the Hunnish era.
Throughout the years of Gepidia's existence, the Gepids of Transylvania 
carefully closed and guarded the mountain passes into their land, and were 
spared the incursions of both the Slavs and the Avars. Thanks to their geo­
graphic isolation, the Gepids of Transylvania suffered relatively little in the 
course of the Avar campaigns against Gepidia in 567. Only twenty-five of 
the thirty cemeteries that can be confidently dated to the sixth century fell 
into disuse after 567, and their settlements had probably also been destroyed.
Any objective survey of the remaining four or five cemeteries belonging 
to various remote little villages that were still in use after 567 immediately 
reveals that they continued Gepid traditions both in terms of material cul­
ture and outlook. There is also the possibility that the Avars had resettled 
fleeing Bavarians, Alamani and Franks among the surviving Gepids. A few 
late sixth century and seventh century weapons, belt mounts and reliquar­
ies fashioned in a distinctively western style definitely support this possi­
bility. Similarly resettled population groups were to be found in other parts 
of the Avar Empire as well, and the policy is in itself expressly "steppean". 
Consequently, the archaeological theory according to which the few Gepid 
cemeteries that were still used after the Avar conquest in Transylvania con­
tain elements of an independent civilization or that there existed an archaeo­
logical "group" whose population "interm ixed with the autochthonous 
population" ("B6nd culture") lacks convincing proof. According to this 
theory, the "local Romans" are represented by a few Byzantine buckles and 
an array of cheap trinkets the likes of which were current all over the em­
pire and which also made their way beyond Byzantium.
What is an undisputable fact is that after the 670s, the Gepids left no 
traces in the archaeological record of Transylvania.
4. The Avar Period (567-827)
The archaeological legacy of the one-time Avar Empire that extended over 
eight present-day countries in the Middle Danube region includes over two 
thousand sites with tens of thousands of burials — some of the completely 
excavated cemeteries contained several hundred or even over one thou­
sand graves — as well as hundreds of house remains from Avar villages. 
Supra-national co-operation among archaeologists is admirable even if there 
is often a lack of consensus on minor details of chronology and ethnic attri­
bution. Co-operation of this sort, however, is sadly lacking in the case of the 
eastern part of the Avar Empire. Only thirteen graves of the Avar cemetery 
at Marosgombas in Transylvania — the first burial ground to be excavated 
by an expert — could be uncovered in the year preceding the outbreak of 
the First World War (M&rton Roska, 1913). (By that time, the number of 
excavated and published Avar graves was already in the thousands in Hun­
gary.) Roska was never to publish his findings. The same fate befell the 
excavation conducted at TOvis by S&ndor Ferenczi in 1938, on the eve of the 
Second World War: its only result was about fifty, still unpublished burials. 
Since then, Avar graves have at most been investigated as an unwanted 
"by-product" of excavations conducted on sites thought to belong to an­
other period, or in the course of unavoidable rescue excavations on a few 
other sites.
It is not difficult to account for why archaeological research on this pe­
riod was neglected and later, was outright discouraged. The twelve sites 
that have also yielded horse burials — five of which are described as "soli­
tary" horse burials the likes of which are unknown outside modern Transyl­
vania proper — and which are listed as Avar finds in a recent summary are
interpreted as the evidence of a gossamer "mounted nomadic" layer that 
ruled over the "autochtonous Roman" or, as other scholars would have it 
Slavic, population. It has been claimed that the archaeological finds in the 
Transylvanian Basin which can be associated with the Avars (finds which 
have been labelled as belonging to the "Mures group" or "Gimbas group") 
must be dated to after the internal upheavals and transformations within 
the Avar Empire, that is, to after 670. In the same vein, the distribution of 
the Avar finds is restricted to an area not exceeding roughly forty by fifty 
kilometres in size. These theories would have small Avar groups or com­
munities living out their lives in some sort of splendid isolation until the fall 
of the Avar Empire, after which their fate is shrouded in mystery. Accord­
ingly, the period until 670 is filled out by these theories with "surviving" 
groups of the above-mentioned B^nd-type Gepids and of the "rom anized" 
population. Scarce and sporadic though they be, this interpretation of the 
Avar finds in Transylvania is not only contrary to the historical evidence, 
but is also inconsistent with the archaeological evidence that has come to 
light for that period.
Interestingly enough, Transylvania played a crucial role in the European 
history of the Avars well before this population of inner and central Asian 
origin overran the Carpathian Basin. After their conquest of the windy 
steppes to the north of the Black Sea littoral, the Avars who had by that 
time concluded an alliance with Justinian I, arrived to the Lower Danube 
region in 562 where their kagan, Baian, "pitched his tents in great numbers 
over the wide plains".12 It is from this area that they asked to be admitted 
into the empire. Though the emperor refused to allow them to enter, he 
whetted their appetite with the possibility of seizing from the Gepids Pan­
nonia Secunda — a territory which would have made an excellent settle­
ment territory for the Avars. Baian, however, sensed that it would be futile 
to even attempt to penetrate into the fertile lowland through the narrow 
passes of the massive southern Carpathians, or along the Iron Gates. The 
young, energetic kagan, therefore, decided on a bold and bizarre course of 
action. Leaving their camp behind, he and his horsemen skirted the eastern 
slopes of the Carpathian massif in search of a pass. However, they could 
find no route through which a people of migratory herdsmen and their 
cattle could cross the 1,500-2,000 metre high mountains covered with dense 
forests several hundred kilometres wide on either side. The few passes they 
might perhaps have tried were heavily guarded by the Gepids. Winding 
their way along the mountains, they finally reached the eastern fringes of 
the M erovingian Empire (Galliae) where Sigebert I, King of Austrasia, 
checked their advance. The Avars were forced to turn back in 563. And 
since the new emperor of Byzantium, Justin II who ascended the throne at 
the end of 565, made no new promises and also stopped their supply of 
gold, the Avars made an abortive attempt to cross the Danube (winter of 
565-566). It was at this point that Baian decided to try his luck again, and to 
try to penetrate into the fertile lowland beyond the Carpathians along the 
already tested, longer route.
12. C o rip p u s, In laudem Iustini III.
This time, his efforts were crowned with success. He defeated the Frank­
ish army and even captured Sigebert himself, who was, however, set free in 
the hope of his acting as mediator in a desirable alliance. The alliance in 
question was to be forged with the Pannonian Langobards which, given the 
particular political constellation, did not appear to be an overly difficult 
task. For the queen of the Langobards, the wife of King Alboin, was none 
other than Sigebert's sister. This temporary alliance was as much desired 
by the Langobards as by the Avars, pursued as they were by the wrath of 
their Turkic overlords. For in the Langobardic-Gepid war that had broken 
out in the previous year, Justin II supported Kunimund, the king of the 
Gepids and this Byzantine-Gepid league posed a threat to the very exist­
ence of the Langobards. It was thus that the Avar-Langobardic alliance (in 
which King Alboin undertook to surrender the lands of the Gepids to the 
Avars) was concluded by the two panic-stricken parties at the beginning of 
the year 567.
The Avar cavalry that was escorted by the Langobards into the Carpathian 
Basin through the Moravian Gates and was then shown the way to the Great 
Hungarian Plain from the Danube Bend inflicted a devastating defeat on 
the Gepids. The contemporary Byzantine chroniclers were fully aware of 
the fact that "the state of the Gepids had been crushed by Baian"13 — and 
not by the Langobards, as their chroniclers were later fond of boasting. Af­
ter the first unsuccessful attack on Sirmium in the autumn of 567, Baian 
occupied the Gepid territories on the left bank of the Danube. The first Avar 
warriors penetrated Transylvania from the west, along the Maros, and they 
finally cleared the way into the Olt Valley through the Vorostorony Pass for 
their kindred who, for the past five years, had been patiently waiting on the 
other side of the mountains. The Avars devastated the country far and wide, 
and the majority of the Transylvanian Gepids probably perished at this time. 
This is not as far-fetched a statement as it might first seem: it only appears 
to be nonsense to modem, twentieth-century man who can only think in 
terms of countries with millions of inhabitants. The ruling elite of the na­
tions of that age rarely exceeded a few tens of thousands, and their 
populations rarely exceeded a few hundred thousand souls — which made 
the countries of that period very fragile indeed. At the close of the seventh 
century, the Geographer of Ravenna was pretty certain — for he mentions 
the fact twice — that the territory of one-time "Datia prima et secunda" or 
the older (magna) "Datia" which was also called "Gepidia ... is now popu­
lated by the Uns, also known as Avars''.14
Transylvania — but not the eastern parts of the Great Hungarian Plain, 
and the Temes region — practically lost its importance after the Avar con­
quest in 567-568, especially once the Langobards also ceded Pannonia to 
their formidable allies in the spring of 568. The pyre finds (burnt horse har­
ness, cheek bits, a pair of stirrups and a spearhead that were thrown onto 
the funeral pyre and later buried at a shallow depth) of inner Asian type 
which mark the earliest Avar occupation of the Carpathian Basin have only
13. M e n a n d e r  P r o t e c t o r ,  Excerpta ... 27-28,195-198, 456-458.
14. Ravennatis anonymi Cosmographia ... 1 ,11.; IV, 14.
been found at the lowland exit of the Maros-Aranka (Nemetszentpeter), 
and in the Kis-Kukull6 Valley (Dicsoszentmarton). These stirrups can be 
classed among the oldest in Europe, similarly to their counterparts from 
Hungary. A number of early Avar guardposts can be assumed on the 
Transylvanian side of the passes, especially in southern Transylvania, a fact 
suggested by a gold coin find of Khosrau I (531-579), the Persian king, which 
had obviously made its way to Brassb together with the Avars, as well as by 
the gold coins of Justin II (565-572) and of Mauritius Tiberius (582-602) 
found in the Sebes and Olt valleys. These Byzantine coins had in part been 
uspd as grave oboli by the Avars; the majority of these coins probably origi­
nates from looted graves whose find circumstances have not been adequately 
recorded. One proof for this is a solidus of Justin II found in a plundered 
burial of the small Avar cemetery at Isp^nlaka which is still unpublished, as 
are the other Avar graves that were uncovered there in 1970, and which 
contained also horse burials with gold or gilded grave goods. That an Avar 
centre had existed somewhere near the confluence of the Aranyos, Maros 
and Kukull6 rivers already before 600 is suggested by a splendid pair of 
gold earrings with a large gold bead pendant in a burial that was found at 
Torda; only fifteen similar pairs of comparable size and workmanship can 
be quoted from the entire Carpathian Basin.
The Avar commoners who occupied the windy plains and gently rolling 
hills of the Carpathian Basin could hardly have found the smallish Transyl­
vanian Basin hemmed in by mountains of dark woodland attractive. After 
the close of the first great wars against Byzantium (601-602), when the Avars 
finally realized that they had no choice but to make the Carpathian Basin 
their permanent home, traces of a new Avar centre in Transylvania have 
also been identified. The Szentendre and Deszk type gold earrings with 
pyramidal pendants "from Transylvania" — the exact findspot is not known
— suggest the appearance of nobles around and after 600. One centre can 
be located to Gyulafehervar, where silver harness ornaments and a contem­
poraneous Byzantine buckle have come to light. Equally important are the 
press moulds from the Kiikulld valleys (Erzsebetvaros and Korond) that 
had belonged to Avar goldsmiths and which definitely prove that ornate 
belt and harness mounts testifying to the rank of their owner were manu­
factured locally in Transylvania. Equestrian Avar groups who had buried 
their dead together with their horses settled in Nagyenyed and in the former 
Gepid village of Mezdband where the Avar community interred its dead at 
the edge of the Gepid cemetery. Their burial rites and their costumes match 
those of the Pannonian Avars and the Avars of the Great Hungarian Plain 
down to the smallest detail. Aside from the above-mentioned sites, pre-630 
Avar settlements are indicated by finds of Avar-type handmade pottery 
(Malomfalva, Marosnagylak, and Csap6szentgydrgy). However, not even 
the faintest traces of an early Avar habitation have been detected in the 
Szamos Valley. Obviously, this does not apply to the eastern part of the 
Great Hungarian Plain, the Er Valley, the Maros-Aranka triangle and the 
Temes region, areas that had been integrated into the Avar settlement terri­
tory at an early date and which yielded some highly informative assem­
blages. Example of these are the horse burials and the grave group from 
Ermihalyfalva; the burial of a goldsmith together with his horse from Fonlak;
the warrior and horse burial from Nemetszentpeter into which were placed 
a helmet, a coat of mail, and a sword as well as a gold coin of Heraclius 
minted before 625; and in the south, the burials of women wearing silver 
earrings with large globular pendants from Oravicab&nya and the early Avar 
burials from Orsova.
The defeat suffered at the siege of Constantinople in 626, and the ill- 
fated Italian expedition in 628 led to a prolonged crisis in the Avar Empire 
beginning with 630. In the west and the southwest, a number of Slavic tribes 
shook off the Avar rule and gained their independence by fighting, whilst 
in the east their former Bulgarian ally turned against them and founded a 
new steppean empire. The internal strifes did not spare Transylvania ei­
ther, and the events of between 630-638 can be traced in the archaeological 
record. The MezSb&nd cemetery fell into disuse and almost all graves — 
including the Avar burials — were plundered. The only large hoard of gold 
coins from the Avar period (Korond-Firtosvcir) which contained at least 
237 solidi, the last of which was minted in 625 in Byzantium and which 
gives the approximate date of the catastrophe, was hidden during these 
troubled times. Finally, there are those burials which came to light only in 
Transylvania within the Avar Empire, graves which yielded lance and spear­
heads with pierced blade of a form traceable to the Pontic steppeland, and 
graves of eastern Slavic women easily identified by their Slavic costume 
who had been the wives or relatives of the warriors alluded to above. East­
ern Avar and other, allied Turkic elements had probably fled beyond the 
mountains to Avaria when the new Bulgarian Kaganate was organized in 
635 (Marosgombds and Tovis).
Only a handful of seventh-century Avar settlements are known from 
Transylvania (Szdszsebes, M alom falva-Bors6fold, Radn6t-C sap6szent- 
gyorgy and Lapos, Segesvar-Sz<516k, and Bozod). The huts with sunken 
floors and their stone ovens hardly differ from the houses in the eastern 
part of the Great Hungarian Plain (Bihar), or the large Avar settlements else­
where in Hungary, nor are there substantial differences between the wheel- 
thrown and handmade pottery found in the fill of various settlements.
During the reign of Constantine IV, a little before the arrival to the Dan­
ube region of the Bulgarians, who had been pressed westwards by the emer­
gence and expansion of the Kazar Empire, the territory of the Avar Empire 
was flooded by eastern population groups. Among the new arrivals were 
Onogur-Bulgarians (Wangars), but mostly they were various Turkic groups
— including some Kazars — with whom the Avars shared a common an­
cestry, and who had been uprooted from their former abodes. In the north 
and the northwest the boundaries of the Avar settlement territory, as well 
as the political boundaries, shifted to beyond their former line. In the heart­
land of the empire, a number of settlements fell into disuse, and new ones, 
along with new cemeteries, were founded by the incoming population. From 
these it is evident that the new burial rite, the horse harnesses, the weapons 
and the styles of dress had no links whatsoever to the types current in the 
early Avar period. This new period is marked by grave finds dated with 
gold coins of Constans II and Constantine IV in the Temes region. No simi­
lar coins, however, have been reported from Transylvania.
Still, the newcomers to the Avar Empire did, eventually, make their way 
to Transylvania, brandishing their novel weapon, the sabre, and wearing a 
new type of stirrup for their flat-soled boots; the horses had distinctive bits 
and phalerae, and pendant-ornamented harnesses (01£hgorb6, Sz6kely- 
keresztur, Felenyed, Marosnagylak, and Csak6, where houses featuring a 
stone oven have also been uncovered). The cemetery at To vis was used by 
the newcomers and they also started a new cemetery at Aranyosgyeres. On 
the testimony of a gold finger-ring, one of their leaders, a prince, estab­
lished his residence and was buried at Gyulafeherv^r. All in all, not much is 
known about this transitional period of about a quarter century. There are 
only indirect references to it in the Byzantine and Frankish sources or none 
at all. It is only recently that its real significance has been recognized. In 
fact, the archaeological evidence of this period reflects the emergence of a 
new artistic style: a skilful blend of the traditions of earlier and later popu­
lation groups, a style that has aptly been termed "griffin-tendril" style after 
the motifs most frequently occurring on the cast bronze buckles and belt 
ornaments. It was at this time that permanent villages were established; 
under internal and external pressures, the peoples of the Avar Empire had 
turned to crop raising and animal husbandry, with semi-migratory pasto- 
ralism being the exception, rather than the rule. The majority of the known 
large Avar period cemeteries (about seventy to eighty per cent) contained 
the dead of four to five generations: village cemeteries with over one thou­
sand burials are by no means exceptional. This clearly reflects a change to a 
more stable way of life from the close of the seventh century onwards.
The presence of similar late seventh-century and eighth-century cem­
eteries in Transylvania is proven by horse burials described as "solitary 
graves" (Hari, Muzsnahaza, and Magyarlapad), as well as by griffin-tendril 
ornamented belt mounts, carved bone needle cases, and other contempora­
neous ornaments such as earrings with star-shaped or lunular pendants 
(Tovis, Aranyosgyeres, Lesnyek, and Szentgyorgyvalya). Equally scanty is 
the evidence from the eastern Temes region (Temesvar-Modosi Bridge), 
from the eastern fringes of the Koros-Maros interfluve (Szekudvar) and 
from the Er Valley. A settlement with huts featuring sunken floors and stone 
ovens, as well as timber-framed above-ground houses has been uncovered 
at Gyulafehervar-Stadion. The occupants of this settlement were mostly 
engaged in cattle raising; their vessels were partly handmade and partly 
wheel-turned, and bronze earrings with star-shaped or lunular pendants 
were also found. Late Avar huts with sunken floor and containing a stone 
oven have also been reported from Bihar. Unfortunately, only the mere ex­
istence of these settlements and cemeteries is known, but even these slen­
der facts verify an important point, namely that in the eighth century — but 
only then! — the Avars withdrew to the Maros Valley and to the surround­
ing fertile lowland. In other words, at a time when the Avar settlement 
territory was expanding throughout the Avar Empire, it drew back in 
Transylvania, and, judging by the numerous horse and weapon burials, 
became increasingly military in nature. The reason underlying this with­
drawal is to be sought in the westward expansion of the Slavs. Even so, the 
dominant element in Transylvania remained Avar. This is confirmed by the 
Slavic cemetery with urn burials unearthed at Barathely II, where Avar horse
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burial and inhumation burials containing Avars laid to rest in an Avar cos­
tume and according to Avar rites have also come to light. This cemetery 
and a few other comparable sites (including settlements) proved the earli­
est clues to why the Kiikull<3 River is known by two names. The theory — 
which remains controversial — is that Turkic kukalay (Hungarian kokenyes, 
"blackthorn thicket") was transmitted into Hungarian and then into Saxon- 
German (Kokel) from Avar, through Bulgarian. It was probably simultane­
ously that Slavic tmava (also meaning "blackthorn thicket") made its ap­
pearance, and was transmitted from Slavic into Romanian by the earliest 
Romanian settlers (Timava).
As far as can be judged from the few eighth-century Avar finds, neither 
the rites nor the material culture of the Avars had any specifically "Transyl­
vanian" elements: the cast belt mounts, phalerae, the jewellery, the weapons, 
and the horse harnesses could equally well have been found at any of the 
sites within the Avar Empire. In other words, the Transylvanian Avars kept 
pace with the overall internal development of Avar culture. Unfortunately, 
many details of this development are still unclear owing to the paucity of 
finds and accurate observations.
5. The Slavs up to the Hungarian Conquest 
(600-895)
The intensive Slavic migration that was to produce permanent changes in 
the ethnic and linguistic map of eastern Europe began in the sixth century. 
The earliest traces of the Slavic tribes' advance north of the Carpathians, to 
the region of the river Elbe to the Bohemian Basin, and even as far as the 
Maine-Weser riverhead are in the form of archaeological finds; no written 
sources deal with these events. Their presence and incursions in the Lower 
Danube region, however, are reported in the Byzantine sources from the 
reign of Justin I onwards. Slavic raids became increasingly frequent under 
Justinian I, and a number of Slavic groups gained a foothold on the area 
south of the Danube. For the time being, the Carpathian Basin, surrounded 
as it was by the Carpathian massif densely forested on both slopes, was 
spared a Slavic invasion; as long as Gepidia existed, the few passes leading 
into Transylvania remained heavily guarded. There is no evidence in the 
Gepid settlements and cemeteries of contact with the Slavic world before 
568, nor can one discover Gepid influences on the Slavic finds outside the 
Carpathians in the period before 568.
The collapse of Gepidia opened up new possibilities to the Slavs. The 
overlordship of the Avars extended to the distant eastern steppeland; it 
was not until 635 that the Carpathians came to mark a frontier. Neverthe­
less, there are no signs of Slavic settlement in Transylvania until around 
600, for even after 582, the main target of the Slavic incursions — which 
often had Avar support — was the Balkan Peninsula to the south of the 
Danube. The Slavs themselves had left behind vast regions of forest, and 
the dense Transylvanian woodland could hardly have held much attraction
for them. The situation changed drastically when the Byzantine troops at 
last managed to drive the Avars from the areas south of the Danube, and 
again closed the river frontier (601-602). From this point on, the slow Slavic 
migration temporarily came to a standstill, and those groups which had not 
yet secured a foothold had to look for a new home.
The Slavs are first documented in the archaeological record just outside 
Transylvania when they reached the outer foothills of the Carpathians at 
the turn of the sixth and seventh centuries. Their small villages of thatch- 
roofed huts with sunken floors form a sweeping arc (K odyn-Suceava- 
Botosana-Bucharest) from Bukovina to the valley of the Dimbovifa River, 
which is still known by its Old Slavic name. These lowly huts with stone 
ovens yielded the same sort of poor quality finds as have been uncovered in 
their former homeland between the Dniester and the Dnieper: simple hand­
made pots and round clay baking platters identified as being of the early 
Slavic Prague-Penkovka and Prague-Korcak culture. The pagan Slavs cre­
mated their dead and placed their ashes in urns or in small pits. The largest 
urn cemetery of the early Slavic world (which still awaits publication) has 
come to light at Monteoru, at the southeastern projection of the Carpathians, 
and indicates a mass settlement of Slavs in this region. The appearance and 
presence of the Slavs is clearly proven by their cremation burials, a funerary 
rite that had been abandoned by other contemporary populations much 
earlier.
The earliest archaeologically attested traces of Slavic settlement in Transyl­
vania make their appearance early in the second half of the seventh century 
in the Gepid villages and Avar cemeteries of the Avar period. These relics 
include distinctive masked fibulae cast from so-called "white metal" (Maros- 
gomb^s, Vecel, and Szekelyhid), "Romano-Byzantine" iron and bronze fibu­
lae from the outer Carpathians (Barathely and Malomfalva), Byzantine lock- 
rings and stylish pendants in the shape of stars and grape clusters braided 
into the hair, and inspired by Byzantine types (Marosgomb&s, Marosnagylak, 
and Marosveresmart). However, these finds prove nothing more than that 
the Gepids and Avars took Slavic wives. At the same time, the above-de­
scribed fibulae were also scattered beyond the Avar-Gepid settlement ter­
ritory, and have also been found on purely Slavic sites (Fiatfalva, Kezdi- 
polyan and V&rhely), which suggests that the Slavs whose daughters had 
married Gepids or Avars had, by that time, arrived in the Carpathian Ba­
sin. One Slavic bride even took her clay baking platter to Mezdband.
The Slavs who penetrated Transylvania through the eastern passes (B6k6s, 
Tolgyes and Ojtoz) settled the valleys and basins, and repopulated the east­
ern and southeastern Transylvanian fringes that had been empty and deso­
late for centuries. Many of the names given by the incoming Slavic popula­
tion to the rivers and the new settlements have survived to the present day 
(Cernavoda, Kvasena, Bystra/Bystrica and Lekenica are examples of such 
river names; of the settlement names, Cernaton and Pol'an are still in use). 
That the Carpathian-Lower Danubian region had, by the seventh century, 
become the land of the Slavs is even recorded by a faraway Armenian geog­
rapher, Pseudo-Movses Khorenatzi: "On the arctic (i.e. the northern) bank
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of the Danube lies the country of Dacia, which is inhabited by the Slavs, 
twenty-five clans."15
Although the majority of the finds unearthed during the quarter century 
after 1950 has only been published in part, these still constitute an impres­
sive and practically unmatched material. The earliest Slavic villages dating 
to the beginning of the seventh century have been identified in the Harom- 
szek Basin (Kezdipoly£n-K<5h£t, Fels6csemdton-R6bert-tag, and Sepsiszent- 
gyorgy-Bedeh^za). From here, the Slavs soon moved into the Barcas£g (Bras- 
s6-M agura) and the Olt Valley in the Fogaras region (Als6kom£na). By the 
middle of the seventh century, the string of Slavic settlements extended — 
via the Gyergy6 and the Hargita mountains — to the upper Kukull<3 region, 
from where a chain of villages has been reported (Bozod, showing Avar 
influences, Sz§kelysz£ll£s, Fiatfalva, and Szekelykeresztur). The occupants 
of these settlements consisting of a considerable number of huts with sunken 
floors (often twenty to thirty) used the Prague-type handmade pots charac­
terizing the earliest Slavic settlements. A mould carved from stone brought 
to light from a hut at Szekelykeresztur-Fenyoalja is comparable to the moulds 
from Slavic settlements beyond the Carpathians, and suggests the arrival of 
new settlers. Whether these new groups arrived through the Vorostorony 
Pass and migrated upwards, or whether they wound their way downwards 
along the Olt Valley is unknown, but it is a fact that from the middle of the 
seventh century, their settlements can be found at Kiscsur near Nagyszeben 
(whose name can be traced to Slavic Cibin), and at Vizakna. New settle­
ments make their appearance in the early Slavic settlement territory of 
Transylvania during the eighth century (Foldvar), and the renewal of some 
earlier villages can also be noted (Kezdipolyan, Simenfalva-Cserealja, and 
Sz^szhermany). The Slavic expansion continued toward the centre of the 
basin (Segesv3r-Sz616k, Sz6kelykeresztur-M elegpatak, N agym edeser- 
Bors6fold, Ocfalva, Szekelyszenterzsebet-Szendsvolgy) and also extended 
to the Upper Tisza region, and the Szamos and Lapos valleys.
Archaeological research was at first baffled by the relative poverty of 
early Slavic material culture. These early Slavs had lived in unpretentious, 
simple gabled-roofed huts with sunken floors rarely supported by any kind 
of post, which were small, smoke-filled, extremely dark and rather uncom­
fortable. They do not appear to have even used hand-driven potter's wheels. 
Their graves are, if possible, even poorer than their settlements. The most 
reasonable explanation for this apparent poverty is that — in spite of their 
seemingly central geographical position — the Transylvanian Slavs lived in 
isolation, on the fringes of the Slavic world, cut off from those neighbouring 
civilizations — Byzantium, Italy and the Merovingian Empire — in whose 
proximity or on whose territory their brethren showed a faster pace of de­
velopment. It is conspicuous that not even the faintest echoes of Gepid crafts­
manship can be felt in the Transylvanian Slavs' material culture. Their knowl­
edge of agriculture and animal husbandry, however, was in no way inferior 
to that of their kinsmen, and their smiths appear to have been better mas­
ters of their craft than, for example, their potters (as shown by a ploughshare
15. Geographie de Moise de Coretia d'apres Ptolemee. Ed. P. Arsfnf. Sukry, Venise 1881.
"Europa" X, 16.
and a turnable millstone from Simenfalva, and a ploughshare or counter 
from SepsiszentgyOrgy). The efficiency of their crop raising techniques is 
evidenced by the fact that some of their villages were occupied for centu­
ries, a number of them growing to a size of thirty or forty huts.
The Slavic settlers of Transylvania cremated their dead, as had their an­
cestors before them. The earliest urn graves have, quite fortuitously, been 
uncovered on the northern fringes and in the northern parts of Transylva­
nia (Piskolt, N&dasdar6c, Beszterce, and Doboka), whereas the cemeteries 
of the early Slavic settlements in southeastern Transylvania remain unknown 
for the time being for lack of archaeological research in that area. Slavic urn 
burials and cemeteries make their appearance in the Kiikull6 Valley from 
the middle of the seventh century (Ol^htordos, Nagyekemez<5, and Magyar- 
peterfalva) and soon extend into the Olt and Sebes valleys, too (Vizakna, 
Nagyszeben-Szenterzs6bet, and Mihalyfalva); the first burials at the latter 
site can be dated to after 670 on the testimony of an Avar-Byzantine bronze 
buckle.
Only a few traces of Avar-Slavic coexistence have been found, the most 
important among these being the urn cemetery uncovered at Bar&thely II. 
One sure sign of peaceful coexistence on this site is the occurrence of eighth- 
century Avar jewellery (the likes of which have been brought to light from 
Avar inhumation burials) in Slavic urns, as well as the presence of wheel- 
turned pottery. However, most of the cemeteries are even poorer in finds 
than the settlements: the majority of the urns contain only a few iron knives, 
an iron strike-a-light, or some beads. The archaic Slavic custom of sacrific­
ing the deceased's widow appears tb have been preserved and practised in 
a few communities (e.g. Vizakna).
The Slavic urn cemetery at Medgyes-Galgenberg which, from the 1960s, 
had turned the attention of archaeologists to the Slavic presence in Transyl­
vania had been only established in the ninth century. Under the influence of 
settlers from Bulgaria, some permanent, if modest, changes seem to have 
taken place in the material culture of the Slavic settlements that survived 
into the ninth century (Kezdipoly£n-K6h3t, Szekelykeresztur-Melegpatak, 
Feny<3alja, Simenfalva-Cserealja, and SztrigyszentgyOrgy). Changes of this 
sort are the use of the heavy, hand-driven potter's wheel in pottery manu­
facture, the appearance of potters' marks on the base of various vessels, as 
well as the use of ornamental motifs in pottery decoration. This type of 
decoration followed directly from the technique of using the potter's wheel, 
and is reminiscent of the ceramic wares produced by the Danubian Bulgar­
ians.
Parallel to these developments, the emergence of certain patterns, such 
as regular grave rows, can be noted in the cemeteries at Medgyes and other 
ninth and tenth century burial grounds (Mihalyfalva, Ol&hfalva, Barathely
II, the urn burials of Csongva, as well as the large, but still unpublished urn 
cemeteries excavated at Berve and Gyulafeherv^r). More than likely, this is 
a reflection of the Bulgarian military control in these areas. The Slavs who 
settled around the Bulgarian centres of power were reduced to servitude: it 
was they who cleared the forests and worked in the salt mines, and their 
heavy burden of services was ruthlessly exacted.
The People of the Szilagynagyfalu Kurgans
The first reliable traces of Slavic presence in the Carpathian Basin were un­
covered between 1878-1880.16 These excavations were conducted at Szilagy­
nagyfalu, where six of the forty-three tumuli were investigated. The excava­
tion of a further three burial mounds at the same site in 1958 has contrib­
uted greatly to a better understanding of the observations made in the last 
century. In 1957-58, six tumuli of a similar group of burial mounds were 
investigated at Szamosfalva, which is now part of Kolozsv&r, close to where 
another mound had been excavated at the beginning of the twentieth cen­
tury (Apahida). All these excavations furnished proof of the presence in 
northwestern Transylvania of an independent and distinct Slavic popula­
tion group.
These large, often three to six metre high tumuli had been erected over 
quadrangular or rectangular funerary buildings constructed of wooden 
beams; a few smaller mounds contained similarly constructed burial cham­
bers of the size of a large coffin. Only in the case of one mound is there no 
mention of any kind of wooden structure in the excavation report. These 
tumuli, or kurgans, apparently served as communal burial grounds, with 
the number of deposited vessels in each ranging from three to twenty-two. 
Some of these vessels served as burial urns, while others, together with the 
wooden buckets bound with iron bands, were storage jars. The ashes of the 
deceased were in some cases strewn over a clay plastered surface or over a 
woven mat, but all burials were provided with food, generally pig meat — 
a foodstuff alien to the Avar diet.
Well-datable Avar silver and bronze belt mounts were unearthed in some 
of the mounds both at Szilagynagyfalu and at Szamosfalva. These finds, 
and the horse burials uncovered at the eponymous site, suggest that the 
people of these kurgans had arrived at a time when the Avar Empire still 
existed. On the testimony of the Avar ornamental belts, this population 
can, with some confidence, be identified as the Avars' free Slavic allies who 
had settled in areas that had been desolate and empty since the decline of 
Gepidia, and even before that. The jewellery is similar to that found in other, 
less conscientiously excavated graves (e.g. Mojgr&d); the vessels decorated 
with bundles of wavy lines are closely matched by finds from various set­
tlements (e.g. Nagyiklbd, CsomaMja, Szilagynagyfalu, Kisnyires, Bihar, Er- 
szak&csi, L&zdri; one of the huts with sunken floors of the latter site also 
yielded an iron ploughshare). These finds from the Transylvanian Szil&gy 
region are closely allied to assemblages from the settlements (Karcs, Karos 
and Anarcs) and burial mounds (Kirdlyhelmec and Tarpa) of the Bodrog 
and the Upper Tisza region.
The origins and the original homeland of this population group requires 
further study. The custom of erecting a mound over the ashes of the de­
ceased, the distinctive pottery wares and some of the jewellery types point 
to an origin beyond the Carpathians. In any case, it is clear that this heritage 
can be linked to an incoming "eastern" Slavic population, where "eastern"
16. By F. R6mer, K. Tompa and J. Hampel professors of the Budapest university 
and F. Pulszky director-general of the Hungarian National Museum.
merely indicates their tribal and political origins, for the Slavic language 
was still uniform in the eighth century.
From the middle of the ninth century, the population groups occupying 
the Kis-Szamos Valley moved to the northwestern side of the Meszes Moun­
tains to escape the hostile Bulgarians who had arrived in the Maros Valley. 
They maintained but loose contact with the Maros Valley once it came un­
der Bulgarian control, and some of the finds from Szilagynagyfalu itself 
suggest that Slavic groups fleeing from the Bulgarian advance had also set­
tled in the neighbouring villages. The archaeological evidence indicates that 
the Szilagynagyfalu type Slavic population in the Szamos-Kraszna valleys 
lived to see the Hungarian Conquest, and survived well into the Conquest 
period, though their settlement territory became restricted to the hills and 
forest clearings. Their memory is preserved by a number of Slavic river 
names and place-names that were transmitted into Hungarian and, later, 
into Romanian. It would appear that this Slavic population, which inhab­
ited the areas that would later become Szatmar and Kraszna counties, was 
gradually absorbed by the conquering Hungarian tribes and had no signifi­
cant influence on the settlement patterns of the Hungarians in Transylva­
nia: the early Hungarian settlement territory lay to the south of the Szil&gy- 
nagyfalu Slavic population. Nor are there any indications that these Slavic 
communities had evolved a form of political organization that went be­
yond the tribal society, or that they had built forts.
6. Southern Transylvania under Bulgar Rule 
(8 2 7 -8 9 5 )
The internal strifes that erupted throughout Avaria in the aftermath of Char­
lemagne's campaign in 791 probably decimated the Avars of Transylvania, 
too. The civil wars of 795 saw the death of the kagan, the overlord of the 
Avar heartland, as well as of the jugurrus (juyrus), the commander of north­
ern and eastern Avaria. Since the Franks did not venture beyond the Tisza 
in their campaigns, eastern Avaria would have stood a chance of survival 
had not an even more dangerous enemy arisen in the person of Krum, the 
khan of all the Bulgarians, in 802-803. And while most western historians, 
ever under the spell of the Carolingian Empire, refuse to recognize that the 
Avar Empire had, in fact, been crushed by the Bulgarian army, most Hun­
garian and Bulgarian scholars are inclined to believe that eastern Avaria 
was incorporated into the Bulgarian Empire already in 804. This latter theory 
is contradicted by the fact that the Carolingian annals mention that between 
818 and 824, some Slavic groups — the Timocani who had inhabited the 
.Tim ok Valley, and the.renegade (predannici) Abodriti — fled to "D acia" 
north of the Danube to escape the wrath of their former Bulgarian over­
lords.17 Since the Franks readily supported these Slavic groups and showed 
no inclination whatsoever to waive their patronage, in 827 the Bulgarians
17. Annales regtii Francorum, ad A. 818; ibid. ad A. 819; ibid. ad A. 824. 102
mounted a general attack against the outposts of the Frankish Empire in the 
Drava-Sava interfluve. In the course of successive campaigns, they drove 
out the Franks and occupied the territory of the present-day Sirmia and 
eastern Slavonia. An inscription of Khan Omurtag (814-831) mentions a 
Bulgarian tarkhan who had drowned in the waters of the Tisza. This event 
and the Bulgarian name of an earth-and-timber fortress at Csongr£d/Cemi- 
grad in the Middle Tisza region suggests that the Bulgarians had indeed 
occupied some territories prior to the peace treaty of 832. A contemporary 
mid-ninth century source — the Bavarian Geographer — lists the eastern 
Abpdriti (Osterabtrezi) of Dacia among the subject peoples of the Bulgarian 
Empire,18 whilst the entries for the years 863 and 883 in contemporary west­
ern annals explicitly state that the armies of Bulgaria, in alliance with the 
Eastern Frankish Empire, had attacked Moravia, which lay on the western 
bank of the Garam River. In a description by the Persian Djaihani from 
around 870, the Bulgarians (w.n.n.d.r) and the Moravians (m.r.da) lived a 
ten day journey apart.19 Transylvania is only mentioned in the final years of 
the Bulgarian occupations in contemporary records: in 892, an embassy sent 
by Amulf, the king of the eastern Franks, requested that Laodimir (Vladimir), 
the Bulgarian khan, "should forbid the sale of salt to the M oravians''.20 This 
is the only indication that the Bulgarians had seized some of the salt mines 
in southern Transylvania (at Vizakna, Marosujv^r, and Kisakna), and that 
they traded salt to other lands. Though the Hungarian chroniclers make no 
mention of the Bulgarian occupation of Transylvania and have preserved 
the memory of Bulgarian overlordship only in the Tisza region, the fact that 
salt was mined and traded leaves no doubt that a considerable part of the 
Maros Valley had indeed come under Bulgarian control.21
The Bulgarian occupation of Transylvania is amply documented in the 
archaeological evidence. The inhumation burials brought to light on the left 
bank of the Maros near Als6tatarlaka, opposite Maroskarna, contained a 
series of vessels whose form, material and decoration was unlike any other 
earlier or contemporaneous Transylvanian pottery, but which is practically 
indistinguishable from the Bulgarian pottery of the time. Inhumation buri­
als with "M aroskam a-type" vessels, beads, knives and pagan food offer­
ings have been uncovered in Gyulafehervar and its environs (Kudzsir, Partos, 
Olahgorbo, Szdszsebes, and Sebesany). A pair of earrings was found in one 
of the Olahgorbo burials. Inhumation burials have also been found near 
Marosujv6r and Kisakna; some contained Maroskama-type pottery (Magyar- 
szentbenedek), some a series of female jewellery resembling the earrings 
from 01ahgorb6, which are of a type that has no known antecedents in Tran­
sylvania (found at Csombord). Bulgarian archaeologists soon proved that 
the only parallels to the jewellery from Csombord and Olahgorbo are the 
similar ornaments from ninth and tenth century cemeteries in Bulgaria. In 
other words, they can be considered the evidence of Bulgarian settlers.
18. G e o g r a p h u s  Bav a r u s , Descriptio pagorum Slavonum 2.
19. D ja ih a n i  =  G a r d iz i .  =  G o m bos, Catalogus ... III. 1006.
20. Annales Fuldenses, ad A. 892.
21. Meditations based on later place-names, for instance, Slankamen, dating from 
the ll-1 2 th  century, as regards never existing salt mines are untenable hypoth-
Since at the time of these finds similar earrings and pendants had been 
published only in reports of excavations of Moravian cemeteries, the Hun­
garian archaeologists of Transylvania who had excavated and published 
the Csombord cemetery were convinced that they had stumbled on a his­
torical curiosity: the graves of Moravian settlers in Transylvania engaged in 
salt mining and salt trading. As far as Csombord was concerned, this view 
was accepted by Romanian and Saxon scholars, too, who had been misled 
by a pair of simple iron spurs from Als6tatarlaka which they considered a 
sure indication of Moravian presence in the ninth century. Whereas the fact 
is that Carolingian spurs, and their imitations, were rather widespread in 
the eastern border zone of the Carolingian Eastern Frankish Empire during 
the eighth to tenth centuries — an impressive number of similar spurs has 
been found in Dalmatia for example — and they were also current in the 
Danubian Bulgarian Empire, as well as among the tenth-century Hungar­
ians.
Recent excavations of the Roman Apulum in Gyulafeh§rv&r have brought 
to light the remains of a ninth-century settlement (overlying partly the third- 
century Roman destruction layer and partly the sixth-century Gepid settle­
ment) which featured a number of huts with sunken floors containing pot­
tery shreds with smoothed-in decoration resembling the Marosakna ves­
sels. The cemetery of the settlement was identified to the west of the one­
time Roman castrum in Zalatna street; it contained inhumation burials with 
Maroskarna-type vessels, as well as a few Slavic-Bulgarian urn graves, char­
acteristic amphora-shaped flasks and pots bearing potter's marks. The ex­
planation for their presence is obviotis. There is reliable evidence that an­
tique Singidunum had been called "W hite castle" (Belegrad) by the Bulgar­
ians already in the ninth century after its white coloured Romano-Byzan- 
tine stone-walls. This name was also applicable to Apulum. The Bulgarian 
name of Belegrad was, in the tenth century, translated into Hungarian by 
the Hungarian settlers, and since it became the residence of the second most 
important leader, the gyula, the Hungarians called it Gyulafeherv&r, "the 
white castle of the gyula”. This name has survived to the present day in 
spite of the fact that in 1003, King Stephen broke the power of the mighty 
gyulas. The Saxon settlers of the twelfth century translated the Hungarian 
name into German (Weyssenpurg), whilst the name used by the Transylva­
nian Slavs (Bellegrad) was transmitted into the Romanian (Balgrad).22
The cemeteries of the Maroskama-Csombord population differ signifi­
cantly from the contemporaneous Slavic urn graves, from the Avar inhu­
mation burials of the preceding epoch, as well as from the tenth-century 
Hungarian graves. They are unique even in comparison to other Bulgarian 
cemeteries, for the latter were biritual by the ninth and tenth centuries, and 
reflected a mixture of Bulgarian-Turkic (Proto-Bulgarian) inhumation burials
— in which the dead were laid to rest with their costume, rich food offer­
ings and, often, their horse — and of the cremation graves of the Slavic
22. Recent Romanian historiography rejects the fact of Bulgarian rule in Transylva­
nia, nor does it acknowledge it even in Wallachia. Romanian archaeology calls 
these Bulgarian finds remnants of the "Dridu culture", a name reminding us of 
a Neolithic culture.
population. The small cemeteries unearthed at Maroskarna, Csombord and 
other Transylvanian sites resemble the Proto-Bulgarian burial grounds of 
Bulgaria. Considering the empire-building policy pursued by the Bulgarian 
khans, it is not in the least surprising that they should have sent Bulgar- 
Turkic warriors, rather than Bulgar-Slavs, to rule over the alien Slavic popu­
lation of Transylvania.
These small ruling strata of warriors lived a rather secluded life in Tran­
sylvania. The surrounding, subjugated Slavic population had little influ-
Fig. 6. Danubian Bulgar silver earrings from the Csombord-cemetery
ence on their material culture, their settlements and their cemeteries. The 
yellow flask of Lower Danubian type found at Marosnagylak, the northern­
most Bulgarian settlement, suggests that they probably received their sup­
plies from the mother country, to where the bulk of the mined salt was 
transported.
The main road to Transylvania from Bulgaria protected on both banks of 
the Danube by brick and stone forts led through the Olt Valley along the old 
Roman military road. A few Roman forts were restored in order to ensure 
its safety, and the Bulgarians' secure hold over southern Transylvania was 
ensured by the fort of Apulum-Belegrad. Another road that passed through 
the Bodza Pass from Constantia on the Danube was similarly protected by 
earth-and-timber fortresses which were later rebuilt in brick (Bucharest, 
Ploesti-Bucov and Slon-Prahova). Yet a third road wound its way from the 
Danube Bend in the Dobrudja to the brick fortress at Focsani, and from 
there (through the Ojtoz Pass| to the Transylvanian Slavs, who had settled 
in the Olt Valley and in the Cernavoda region, as confirmed by a Bulgar- 
Turkic vessel of Maroskarna-type found at Kezdipolyan.
Bulgarian finds have also been found along the Danube at Orsova, in the 
Tem es region, and up as far as Szentes along the Tisza, w hich makes 
Csongr£d the northernmost outpost of Bulgarian occupation.
The small group of Bulgarian conquerors and the single Bulgarian forti­
fication in Transylvania at Belegrad on the right (northern) bank of the Maros 
proved unable to withstand the onslaught of the Hungarians in 895. Their 
houses and settlements were set aflame, and Transylvanian Hungarian tra­
dition had not even preserved the memory of their rule. The people known 
to us from the Csombord cemetery apparently surrendered, and continued 
to live on in the area for some time into the tenth century.
PART TWO




I. The Hungarian-Slav Period 
(895- 1172)
The Magyars or Hungarians belonging to the Ugric branch of the Finno- 
Ugric family of languages first appeared in the written sources of European 
history in connection with a remarkable event. The kagan of the mighty 
Khazar Empire sent his envoy to the Byzantine emperor Theophilus asking 
him to build a fortification on the left bank of the Don River, the far side of 
which then marked the border with "Turkia". Indeed, in 833-834, Petronas 
Spatarios and his task force built Sharkel (white fortress), thus successfully 
sealing the Khazar-Hungarian border. The reason for building Sharkel anew 
from baked bricks was that sometime in the course of the decade following 
813, the earlier, original "W hite Fortress" on the site of today's Tzimlianskoe 
gorodishche, built of white stone not far away on the right side of the Don, 
had been sacked and destroyed by the Hungarians and some accompany­
ing Khazar insurgents, the Kabars.
W hile the Hungarian tribes living in the Don area still accepted the nomi­
nal suzerainty of the Khazars at the time of Prince Levedi, other Hungarian 
tribes and their Turkic allies appeared in the Lower Danube region, "sixty 
days' march" from Sharkel. Byzantine sources of around 838 refer to them 
as Turkoi, Hunnoi, and even Ungroi. The latter name comes from the appli­
cation of the folk name Onogur to the Hungarians. This word was originally 
used to describe the Turkic Bulgar peoples and is still preserved in the Eu­
ropean languages of today (Ungar, Hongrois, Hungarian, Venger, etc.). It 
was from the territory denoted by the compound Turkic-Old Hungarian 
word of "EtelkOz" (A telkiizii = between rivers; Constantine Porphyrogennetus 
gives its precise location as the area enclosed by the Seret, Prut, Dniester, 
Bug and Dnieper rivers,1 that the "enem y called U n gri"2 crossed the 
Carpathians in 862 to launch the first of their attacks on Carolingian Pannonia. 
It was in this manner that the Hungarians first visited their future home­
land. According to Arabic-Persian sources from around 870, the Hungar­
ians (m.dz.gh.r), with their "plentiful plough-lands" and an army of 20,000 
horsemen, were then ruled by a prince and a deputy military commander
1. DAI 38 = FBHH 45.
1  yJy 2. Annales Bertiniani ad A. 862. G om bos, Catalogus ... I, 111.
(k.nde  = ken de/k iin d ii; and dz.la = gyula). Since during the campaign against 
Venia (Vienna) in 881 the "rebellious" (= Kabar) troop of Khazars that had 
defected to the Hungarians still operated as a separate unit (Ungari and 
Cowari), their strength was probably not included in the 20,000 horsemen 
mentioned above.
The term "Hungarian Conquest" designated the series of events in the 
course of which the Hungarian tribes, yielding to pressure to leave the 
Etelkoz, sought refuge in the Carpathian Basin. The pressure came from the 
Bulgars who felt threatened by the alliance concluded in 894 in the Lower 
Danube region between Niketas Skleros, the envoy of the Byzantine em­
peror Leo the Wise, and the two leaders of the Hungarians, Arp&d and 
Ku(r)san. The Byzantines ferried a strong Hungarian army across the Dan­
ube, led by Arp&d's son Levente (Liunti[ka], using Greek phonetics). This 
army inflicted such a serious defeat on the Bulgar khan, Simeon I, that he 
was forced to seek refuge in his most secure strongholds (first in Mundraga 
= Madara, then in Dristra = Silistra). In his desperation, Simeon allied him­
self with the Turkic Pechenegs, who had earlier pushed the Hungarians 
westwards (893). The latter thus found themselves caught between two fires. 
The Conquest was the consequence of this double attack.
1. The Hungarian Conquest
Today, any historian or archaeologist'writing on the Hungarians' conquest 
of the Carpathian Basin, especially that of Transylvania and the lands lying 
east of the Tisza River, has to make a decision on whether or not to use the 
most extensive and detailed "source", the Gesta Hungarorum  (The Deeds of 
the Hungarians), written by an author calling himself Magister P. (P. dictus 
magister), or to use the name by which he is better known, Anonymus. If he 
does, the historian will find himself entangled in the contradiction which 
has been troubling historiography — both in Hungary and abroad — for 
over 200 years. The Gesta was originally written in the early thirteenth cen­
tury. The sole surviving copy, a fourteenth-century codex, was discovered 
in the mid-eighteenth century, and was taken as gospel practically from the 
moment of its first publication in 1746. Today, however, in the light of other 
extant written sources as well as of archaeological finds and observations, 
there is not doubt that the historical and geographical "facts" recorded in 
the Gesta must be treated with a great many reservations. The first step to a 
more critical approach was taken at the end of the nineteenth century, when 
the new scientific method of textual criticism was applied to historical 
sources. Since then it has been repeatedly pointed out that the content of the 
Gesta reflects the geographic and ethnographic character of Hungary of 
around 1200, as well as the political organization and aspirations of that 
time. For this period, the Gesta is an excellent source — but it is this early 
thirteenth-century world that it projected three hundred years back into the 
ancient past. The genre of the Gesta is the epic tale, a kind of narrative his­
tory which flourished after 1200. As such, the Gesta may, perhaps, serve as 
an authentic source for historians of literature, but not for historians. 110
Historical textual criticism of the Gesta, however, has not been consist­
ent. It has often been the case that, for the sake of supporting a new theory, 
persons and events mentioned in the Gesta are singled out and declared to 
reflect authentic clan traditions of the tribes conquering the country. For 
this reason, in present-day Hungarian historiography there are two, largely 
irreconcilable, Anonymus interpretations. According to one view, it is pos­
sible that in respect of folk names, of personal names and of place-names 
having to do with occupations, the author of the Gesta conveys something 
of the tribe traditions dating from the age of the Hungarian Conquest. His­
torians holding the opposite view, while they subscribe to what Anonymus 
says on the origin of place-names is applicable from the tenth century on­
wards, doubt very much that what he wrote reflected authentic late ninth- 
and early tenth-century historical and clan traditions. On matter of clan 
traditions, they consider what is said in the Gesta as applicable at best to 
conditions from the early eleventh century on.
Anonymus deliberately emphasizes that the property rights of the "con­
quering" nobility (it is here that the expression "de genere fam ilies" first ap­
pears) are just as secure and permanent as those of the House of Arpdd. 
According to Anonymus, these noble warriors fought relentlessly for ten 
years (!) shedding their blood for every square foot of land and all their 
privileges were granted by Arpad himself.
The truth is, however, that apart from Arp&d and some other command­
ers who lived and were active in diverse periods of the tenth century, the 
author of the Gesta has not the foggiest notion of the true events or charac­
ters of the time of the Conquest, nor of the contemporary sources, save for 
some misinterpreted statements by the early tenth-century chronicler Regino. 
He knew none of the names of the actual opponents of the Hungarians (such 
as Svatopluk I and II, Moimir II, the Frankish emperor Am ulf of Carinthia, 
the count of Pannonia Braslav, the Bulgar khan, Simeon and the Bavarian 
duke, Liutpold). He is ignorant of the decisive battle at Pozsony, and has no 
idea of the possible or actual foci of local defence, that is of Cemigrad/ 
Csongrdd, Mosaburg, Belgrade by the Danube as well as Belgrad in Transyl­
vania. With the exception of the Bulgarians, he is not familiar with any of 
the peoples who opposed the Hungarians (such as the Moravians, Slovenes, 
Carinthians, Franks and Bavarians). On the other hand, Anonymus creates 
two peoples (the Bisseni and the Picenati) out of the one eastern enemy, the 
Pechenegs. He is left with no alternative but to invent enemies and oppo­
nents, so that his no less fictitious Hungarian heroes might have the oppor­
tunity to triumph over them. Without much hesitation he devises the names 
of warriors and chiefs such as the Bulgar Laborcy, the Cuman Turzol, the 
Bohemian Zobur, the Vlach Gelou and the Bulgar Glad from the names of 
rivers (Laborc), hills (Tarcal and Zobor — the latter comes from the Sla­
vonic Sobor = "church mountain", after which the early eleventh-century 
Benedictine monastery of Zobor was named), and villages (Glad, Gyalu 
and Marot). The main antagonists, the Bulgar Salan and the Khazar Men- 
mar6t, are his own inventions. The supposed enemies — the Bohemians 
who in fact were still living in the Bohemian Basin at the time of the Con­
quest, the Cumans (Kipcaq or Polovci), who only appeared in Europe in the 
second half of the eleventh century (1055), and the Vlachs, who came to the
Carpathian Basin even later, in the thirteenth century — all reflect the cir­
cumstances of Hungary during the early thirteenth century. The majority of 
his conquering heroes are none other than the ancestors of wealthy early 
thirteenth-century landowners, whose lineage could be traced to the privi­
leged class of the new state apparatuses of the eleventh century.
Until this time, Anonymus's view has prevailed in all historical accounts 
of the Hungarian Conquest of Transylvania, irrespective of the nationality 
of the author. Coming through the "Verecke Pass", the conquerors came to 
the Tisza Valley and attempted the invasion of Transylvania along the Sza­
mos and Maros rivers. They immediately encountered a dangerous enemy 
in the person of the "Bulgar-hearted" Khazar Menmarot, lord of the for­
tresses of Szatmar and Bihar. Unable to defeat him, the Hungarians forged 
an alliance with him. From his fortress by the Szamos River "som e Vlach" 
(quidam Blacus) "leader" (dux) called Gelou organized the resistance of the 
local inhabitants (Blasii and Sclaui). In any case, no one has ever spoken 
more contemptuously of these two peoples throughout their history than 
Anonymus, the very same Anonymus who is extolled to the skies by mod­
ern Romanian researchers. They usually fail, however, to quote this half of 
his sentence: "uiliores homines essent tocius mundi” (they are the biggest ras­
cals in the whole world).
Neither Slavic nor Romanian scholars, as representatives of the nations 
living with the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin today, have applied the 
methods of textual criticism to the writings of Anonymus. If anything, they 
have even regressed a step in this century. When Anonymus pronounces in 
the Gesta on late ninth and early tenth-century matters, he is credited with 
the authenticity of a war reporter or war diarist. His "objectivity" being the 
royal notary of Hungary is never questioned. Today's Romanian and Saxon 
historiographers regard the persons and exploits of "G elu" (Gyalu), Men- 
mar6t (Mar6t), and Glad (Galad), fictitious characters whose names were 
derived from village names distorted both by Anonymus and his transcriber, 
as evidences of the "patriotic" war of the Romanian people and describe 
their supposed dominions as "feudal Romanian voivodates". There is no 
hope of bridging the gap between these views and reaching a compromise, 
as long as state and national interests dominate historiography.
The real history of the Hungarians during the ninth to the eleventh cen­
turies has been reliably recorded by Near Eastern and Spanish Arab, Per­
sian, Italian-, German-, and Franco-Latin, and Byzantine-Greek sources. 
None of these sources m ention the persons and events described by 
Anonymus, or, if they do, they date them to a period other than the time of 
the Hungarian Conquest. The history of the Conquest, as presented by 
Anonymus, is also at variance with the relevant section of the Gesta Hungaro- 
rum of the age of St. Ladislas. This chronicle, the oldest one known from 
Hungary, based its account on the lost Old Gesta set down in the 1060s.
Contemporary sources provide only a sketchy picture of the Hungarian 
Conquest. At present, there is no proof of that the Hungarians (and their 
allies, the Kabars) once in ally with the Carolingians, once with the Moravians 
were operating from within the Carpathian Basin during their early cam­
paigns against Moravia and Pannonia (862, 881, 892, 894). The situation 
changed dramatically in the course of the last in the series of campaigns 112
against Pannonia (894), which coincided with the death of Svatopluk I in 
late autumn of the same year, and with an other campaign that the Hungar­
ians, allied with Byzantium, had launched against Simeon I and Bulgaria. 
For this reason the Pechenegs, who had allied with the Bulgars, launched 
an all-out attack on the eastern territories of the Hungarians at the end of 
894 and by early 895, and the Bulgars, who had quickly made a truce with 
Byzantium, routed the Hungarian forces under Levente's command, which 
were plundering Bulgarian territory south of the Lower Danube. The 
Pechenegs' attack against their home territories effectively prevented 
Levente's forces from retreating to their former homeland. The Hungarian 
army was therefore obliged to retreat to Transylvania through the Southern 
Carpathians. There, it met up with the bulk of the Hungarian tribes who 
were fleeing the Pechenegs, and were pouring through every accessible pass 
in the Eastern Carpathians. The part of the Hungarian army that had at­
tacked Pannonia at the end of 894 likewise found itself prevented from re­
turning to the eastern steppes. By the end of 895, thus, all the Hungarian 
forces of any account had moved into the Carpathian Basin, and had taken 
over the lands up to the Danube and Garam rivers, and had put an end to 
Bulgarian domination in the southern zone.
There was no further military action in the Carpathian Basin in the fol­
lowing few years (896 to the summer of 900). This, in effect, marked the first 
phase of the Hungarian Conquest and settlement. Until the turn of the cen­
tury, the government of Carolingian Pannonia was firmly in the hands of 
the appointed Slavic count, Braslav. The Hungarians enjoyed amicable re­
lations with the Moravians, who lived on the other side of the Garam River.
The second phase of the Conquest began with the military alliance be­
tween the emperor Arnulf of Carinthia, and the Hungarians. By early 898, 
after having passed through Pannonia with Arnulf's permission, a smaller 
Hungarian army carried out an aggressive reconnaissance mission against 
the cities of Friaul and Marche, both hostile to the emperor. In the summer 
of 899 the Hungarians launched a massive campaign into northern Italy 
against Arnulf's adversary, King Berengar I. With their splendid victory at 
the Brenta River, on 24 September, 899 they burst onto the stage of Euro­
pean history and in the next thirty-three years did not loose a single major 
battle. Concurrently with the Hungarians' Italian campaign, civil war erupted 
in Moravia between the sons of Svatopluk (898-899); and Arnulf intervened 
on the side of Svatopluk II. Very likely, the Hungarians helped him in this 
venture as well. Arnulf's unexpected death on 8 December, 899 sparked off 
the next major turn of events. The Hungarians felt that the treaties they had 
made with both Arnulf and his ally, Svatopluk II, no longer bound them. 
Since neither the Carolingians (the government of Louis IV, the Child) nor 
the Moimirides renewed their alliances with the Hungarians, the latter took 
advantage of Moravia's near exhaustion from the ongoing civil war. In 900, 
in a single offensive launched against the country, they seized those of its 
territories lying between the Garam and Morva rivers. Simultaneously, the 
Hungarian army returning from Italy occupied Pannonia without encoun­
tering any significant resistance. By the summer of 900, therefore, the sec­
ond phase of the Hungarian Conquest was completed; and by autumn of 
1 1 3  the same year, the Bavarians had completed building Ernsburg in anticipa-
tion of Hungarian attacks. According to entries in the Annals o f  Fulda, when 
the Hungarians, after advancing as far as the Enns River on both sides of 
the Danube, turned back, they returned to Pannonia as to their "ow n" (ad 
sua) land.
The Hungarian destruction of the military strength of Moimir II's Moravia 
in 902 was meant to secure the outward defences of the newly-occupied 
Carpathian Basin. Then came the decisive victory over the attacking Bavar­
ian forces at the former stronghold of Count Braslav (Brezalauspurc = Press- 
burg) on 4 -5  July, 907. After this, there could be no doubt as to who were 
the masters of the new country.
The Hungarian raids on the west of between 862 and 955 have also been 
studied by German, French and Italian historians. Irrespective of how they 
evaluate their net effects, none of these accounts deny the military organi­
zation and success of the campaigns; any more than one can help but ac­
knowledge the mastery of the no less bloody and devastating raids of the 
Viking-Normans. The light cavalry of the Hungarians scored victories over 
the armies of Italy, Bavaria, Thuringia, Franconia, Saxony and Burgundy.
They took, looted and sent up in flames one Italian and western European 
town after the other. All the way to Denmark, to Bremen, to the English 
Channel, to the Atlantic Ocean at Aquitaine, to Andalusia in Spain and to 
Otranto in Italy the population rued the Hungarian visitations, and by the 
late 960s, so did Constantinople and Thessaloniki. Against the background 
of their real-life battles and cam paigns, they are reduced to batrach- 
myomachian fightings in the fantasy world of Anonymus against such fic­
titious characters as Laborcy, Zobur, Gelou and Glad. The warriors who, in 
real life, had sacked Beneventum, Narbonne and Bremen — to mention but 
a few cities — according to Anonymus's Gesta has stand utterly at a loss at 
the sight of the fancy-bred Bihar castle of "Menumorout" (spelled thus, as if 
the name would lose its Hungarian origin when the Old Hungarian spell­
ing is used: Menmar6t = Moravian stallion). It is likely that the same army 
which for fifty years terrorized the nations of Europe across the Alps and 
the Pyrenees, the Rhine and the Seine, the Danube and the Ebro, would — 
as the historians following Anonymus would have it — shrink from the 
Meszes Gate, from crossing the Maros and the V&g, or from the local strong 
men of county-sized territories?
2. Transylvania and the Eastern Great Hungarian 
Plain in the Century Following the Hungarian 
Conquest (895-1003)
The Hungarian Old Gesta written in the 1060s gives an account that is in 
agreement with what the various contemporary sources, too, suggest as the 
only viable route for the Conquest. By this account, for three months the 
hounded peopled of disturbed Hungarian habitations fled in disarray 
through all the traversable passes of the Eastern Carpathians, crossing for­
ests and snow-capped mountains (Alpes) to the safety of Transylvania (in 114
Erdelw), with the "eagles" (bessi) (in Old Hungarian besek = Pechenegs) at 
their backs all the while. The Hungarians were finally "able to rest here, 
and their surviving herds also managed to recover".3 There can be no doubt 
of the authenticity of the story preserved by the family tradition of the House 
of Arpdd which claims that the previous leader, Duke Almos, Arp&d's fa­
ther, was killed in Transylvania, "since he was not to enter Pannonia".4 It 
was probably the defeat suffered at the hands of the Pechenegs that called 
for this ritual human sacrifice in the Khazar manner. Transylvania was the 
only place that the Hungarian army routed in Bulgaria could retreat, since 
the pass south of the Lower Danube running parallel to the rivers was 
guarded by the strong Bulgar fortresses of Vidin and Belgrade. Further­
more, since no Bulgar army was stationed in the Carpathian Basin at the 
time of the Conquest, the Hungarians had no significant Bulgar forces to 
fight off for possession of the land. Between the fateful years of 894 and 899, 
these distant outposts of the Bulgars were unlikely to have had more than 
the regular 50-300 men guarding the fortified places, so that in Transylva­
nia, the Bulgar presence left not even a memory.
The concluding sentence of the chapter of the Old Gesta dealing with the 
Conquest makes the claim that in Transylvania the Hungarians had "built 
seven earthen castles (septem castra terrea) to protect their wives and live­
stock, and stayed there for some times". That the added comment "that is 
why the Germans call this country Simburg (Siebenburgen, the "Seven Cas­
tles") until the present day"5 is an insertion from later centuries, is obvious 
as the fact that the entire passage dealing with the "seven earthen castles" 
could not have been written before the construction of the first castles of 
Transylvania, that is, before the eleventh century. These supposed earthen 
castles are not likely to have been built for the protection of seven salt mines 
promptly seized by the seven tribes or chiefs either, as has been maintained. 
For one thing, initially, people barely had to mine for salt, since literally 
"m ountains" of salt were to be found on the surface in several places. In the 
early days, people probably continued to exploit the salt mines of the Bulgars 
in the Maros region. On the other hand, the conquering Hungarians simply 
did not have a population large enough to need all large salt mines of what 
was later in Mediaeval Transylvania.
Wooded ninth-century Transylvania could not possibly have fed all the 
people and livestock of the Hungarian tribes for even a few months. For 
this reason, the majority of the Hungarians were forced to move on into the 
Great Hungarian Plain by 895. True, in one place Constantine Porphyro- 
gennetos describes "the whole habitation area of Turkia" as the region whose 
greatest river is the Tisza (Titza), and which incorporates the Tem es 
(Timesis), Tutis (Bega?), Maros (Moresis), and K5r5s (Krlsos) rivers, with 
the Danube (Istros) marking the "eastern" border with Bulgaria.6 The con­
tradiction is usually dismissed by arguing that in this passage, the emperor 
was only speaking of the "land" of the Hungarian chief who had personally
3. SRH I, 28.
4. SRH I, 28.
5. SRH I, 286.
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visited Byzantium after 952. This explanation, while worth considering, is 
unlikely to be correct. The collection of the emperor's works was completed 
in 952, before the said visit, and it is common knowledge that it contained 
no information coming directly from the chief. The description of "Little 
Turkia" was derived from the reports of one of his envoys, the cleric Gabriel, 
written between 897 and 900, and incorporated into the emperor's far from 
consistent account, in which facts from various times are blurred. Thus, 
this work actually recorded the situation prior to 900. Aventinus, the six­
teen-century Bavarian humanist who used documents which are now lost, 
has,done the same, calling the Hungarians' pre-900 country "D acia" on sev­
eral occasions, and even distinguishing between the Dacia that was to the 
east and the one that lay to the west of the Tisza River. Elsewhere in his 
work, the emperor Constantine himself informs us accurately about the Hun­
garians' land as it was in his own lifetime: "Pannonia, which once belonged 
to the Langobards, is now the land of the Turks".7 To the west it borders on 
"Frangia" (Franconia).8 "The Turks live on Moravian land north of the Dan­
ube (= the south-west region of modern Slovakia), and on this side live 
between the Danube and the Sava".9 Even in the later passages of the above­
cited contradictory description of "little Turkia", the Franks are described 
as western neighbours and the Croats as its southern neighbours.10
What follows from all this is that, after having conquered "D acia", the 
majority of the Hungarians promptly left Transylvania. It can also be safely 
assumed that the Hungarian population of Transylvania further decreased 
after 900.
The eastern parts of the Great Hungarian Plain and of the Temes region, 
which now belong to Romania, do not readily lend themselves to compari­
sons with tenth-century Transylvania, while displaying striking similarities 
with the Tisza region of Hungary. The conquering Hungarians did not find 
significant Slavic populations here. The more populous Slavic communities 
lived at the edge of the mountains and on the wooded slopes, but on the 
plains (for instance along the middle section of the Beretty6 River and along 
the lower reaches of the Feher-KOros) they had only small dispersed settle­
ments. Hungarian cemeteries of various sizes from the period of the Con­
quest, almost invariably rich in finds, have been discovered in abundance 
in the area stretching from the Nyirseg and Ermell6k through Bihar, Zarand, 
Arad and Temes to Orsvar (Orsova) on the Lower Danube, and overlying 
these Conquest-period finds, the milites burials of the time of Grand Duke 
G6za towards the end of the century. The old Hungarian place-names, above 
all the ones preserving the names of the conquering tribes, also prove that 
the region was occupied mostly by Hungarians.
In addition, conquering tribes' names, of probably Kabar origin, tribal 
names — Varsdny and Tdrk^ny, and Bereny, meaning "A lan", a member of 
an Iranian people — are preserved in the names of villages even in the 
eastern Great Hungarian Plain. Seven of the eight names of tribes conquer-
7. DAI 27 = FBHH 38.
8. DAI 13 = FBHH 37.
9. DAI 42 = FBHH 50.
1 1 7  10. DAI 40 = FBHH 48.
ing the country, together with T&rk&ny, Vars&ny and Bereny, regularly turn 
up as place-names on the plains of Bihar and Zar&nd (all in all twenty-five 
villages). The exception is the tribal name Kurt, which is not to be found 
either in the eastern Great Hungarian Plain or in Transylvania. Although 
the Mongol invasion of 1241 had wiped out hundreds of villages in the 
Maros-Temes-Lower-Danube region (in certain places 30 to 70 per cent of 
all villages), and although by the end of the seventeenth century almost the 
entire Hungarian population had been eradicated in this area, about four to 
six place-names, tribal in origin, have survived in the flat areas of each county. 
In order of frequency of occurrence, these names are K6r, Jenc5, Tarj&n, Nyek, 
Megyer, Gyarmat, Keszi, as well as T&rk&ny and Vars&ny.
The habitat near Biharv&r of a tenth-century Hungarian commander, 
Salard dux — who in 924 had fought in northern Italy and had burned down 
Pavia — is called Szalard, while the fortress Zar£ndv£r received its name 
directly from Prince Zerind, the son of Arp&d's son Tevel. The origins of 
both of the above-mentioned fortifications probably go back to the tenth 
century as it was at that time that places were simply named after personal 
names. This, in the case of Biharv&r, has been demonstrated long ago by 
archaeologists. There are also some villages around Biharv^r which in the 
tenth century had serviced regional centres and which were named after 
the crafts practised by their inhabitants — blacksmiths: Kovcicsi, armourers: 
Csat^r; carpenters: Acsi; ploughmen: Szint6; hunters: Vad&sz. These names 
are all representatives of the type that turn up in eleventh-century docu­
ments as the names of permanent settlements.
The situation was fundamentally different in Transylvania. There are no 
villages with Hungarian tribal names in the territories of Bels<5-Szolnok, 
Torda, Kukull6, Feher and Hunyad counties. There is one Jenc5 and one Ker 
in Doboka, one Keszi in Kolozs county. The single Bereny in north Hunyad 
is not of much consequence. The reason behind this marked deficiency has 
long been a puzzle: the number of place-names with a tribal origin in Transyl­
vania falls short even of the low number of excavated Hungarian archaeo­
logical sites, and falls way short of the considerable number of waterways 
and other topographical features with names originating in Hungarian. What 
is clear is that in 942, the Hungarians were led by "seven emirs" or chief­
tains, as we have learned from a historical work only recently published, 
written by Ibn Hayan, a Spanish Moor. Even the actual names of some of 
the seven chiefs can be gleaned from this document which was based on a 
Hungarian source. Around 950, Constantine Porphyrogennetos, using a 
reputable Hungarian source, still lists the seven tribes (geneai) of the "Turks" 
correctly  and accurately. The fourth of these is the com pound nam e 
Kurtgyarmat.n These tribal names are authentic, since the names of the same 
eight tribes, found in varying forms from region to region, are preserved in 
the names of exactly 300, mostly still existing villages, in all those areas of 
the Carpathian Basin that were inhabited at one time or another by the 
Hungarians. While the frequency of their occurrence varies between twenty- 
three and fifty-eight, there are roughly all homogeneously dispersed over 
the territory of historic Hungary. The author of the Old Gesta, on the other
11. DAI 40. 118
hand, either no longer had any knowledge of the tribes or did not consider 
them worth mentioning. No reference is made to the tribes, tribal organiza­
tions or their remnants either in the legislation of Stephen I, nor in his 
Admonitiones. At the same time, tribal names (Vars^ny and Bereny included) 
appear as the names of permanent settlements in the same distribution as 
today in eleventh-century charters (from 1001, 1002, 1009, 1061, 1075 and 
1086). Therefore, the tribes — whatever is meant by the term — must still 
have existed at the beginning of the tenth century, although by the end of 
the tenth century their enforced disbandment had been completed. This is 
true even if tribal place-names continued to be given conceivably as late as 
the eleventh century. Such a systematic destruction of earlier formations 
could have taken place at the latest under the rule of Grand Duke Geza who 
is remembered, both by western contemporaries and in Hungarian tradi­
tion, as a strong ruler with blood on his hands — most of those tribal chief­
tains who thwarted him in his determination to control and subjugate the 
tribes. The forcible disbandment of the Hungarian, Kabar and other allied 
tribes meant the end of tribal system. "Duke G6za built up a regnum em­
bracing the whole country,"12 remarked a German contemporary. The dis­
persed tribal population was kept under control by the new army (militia, 
iobagiones). Grand Duke Geza created this army by significant expansion of 
his military escort, and guaranteed its success by its strategically-governed 
deployment — for example, in the triangle defined by Esztergom, Obuda 
and Sz6kesfeherv&r.
The above-outlined events of the last quarter of the tenth century did not 
affect the greater part of Transylvania — the only exception seems to have 
been the region around Kis-Szamos River. However, the dearth of tribal 
place-names in Transylvania in general does show that this part of the coun­
try followed its own distinct political path from the last third of the tenth 
century onwards.
This distinct direction had no perceptible preliminaries. There are known 
village names in Transylvania which seem to match the name of one of the 
commanders leading the Hungarian raids (Maros-Bog^t, Bugat rex being 
one of the leaders of the Hungarian army which penetrated as far as Verona 
in 923). But the four Transylvanian occurrences of the altogether twenty- 
five "Bog&t" villages in the Carpathian Basin are so scattered — from the 
Kis-Szamos River across the valleys of the Aranyos and Maros rivers right 
up to the bend of the Olt River — that they could hardly have corresponded 
to the habitats of a Transylvanian nobleman in the tenth century. Besides, 
this name of Slavic origin was evidently still in use in the eleventh century. 
It would be warranted to link one or the other Transylvanian villages going 
by the name of "Bogat" to the tenth-century commander only if some other 
archaeological, etymological or written information confirmed the partici­
pation of Transylvanian Hungarians in the Italian campaigns. Up to this 
point, however, evidence for relations between Transylvania and contem­
porary Europe come only from a single coin, a silver piece of the Bavarian 
duke Berthold found in Torda county in 1735. But since the coin was not
12. B. Q u e r f u r t e n s is ,  Vita Sancti Adalberti Pragensis. G o m b o s, Catalogus ... Ill, 4912,
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pierced following the Hungarian custom for the purpose of sewing it on the 
clothing, there is no indication of whether or not it might have come from 
the grave of a raiding Hungarian warrior. It must have passed into Hun­
garian hands sometime before the duke's victory by the Traun (943) and 
somehow found its way into Transylvania.
There are, on the other hand, two Transylvanian place-names which sug­
gest that this part of the country was under the rule of the Hungarian grand 
dukes until the middle of the tenth century. Jutotcha's (Jutas) son Falitchsi/ 
Falls (Fajsz),13 who was grand duke of the Hungarians around 950 accord­
ing to Constantine Porphyrogennetos, disappeared after the defeat at 
Augsburg in 955, and his unusual name was never to be assumed by any­
one else from the House of Arp£d. Obviously, neither of these two anoma­
lies was a coincidence. Fajsz's name appears as a place-name in only five 
instances over the whole of the Hungarian-speaking region. One of these 
five "Fajsz" villages is, however, located in the immediate vicinity of what 
was later to be Kukull5v£r, that is, on strategically important territory. 
Taksony (Toxun) — formerly and mistakenly, read as "Caxun" — the erst­
while village near Asszonynepe by the Kiikull<5 and Maros rivers received 
its, once again, unusual, name from Grand Duke Geza's father, Taksony (or 
"Taxin", in the works of Constantine Porphyrogennetos).14 Until about 970, 
the direct rule of the Hungarian dukes over the Transylvanian frontiers can 
be verified by these two rare place-names marking the princes' habitats and 
estates.
The Hungarian population then living under the rule of the leaders of 
the Hungarian tribal alliance consisted of the descendants of the generation 
who had stayed behind in Transylvania at the time of the Conquest. During 
the tenth century, this population inhabited the valleys of the Kis-Szamos 
and Aranyos rivers and the united Ktikull6-Maros river valleys, that is, the 
regions formerly inhabited by the Avars, and just before the Conquest, in 
part by the Bulgars. Only through archaeological research would it be pos­
sible to estimate the significance and size of this population. After the last 
third of the tenth century, the marches, known as the gyepu, ran along the 
inner rim of the Transylvanian Basin, as evidenced by archaeological exca­
vations and place-names. It was the same in other parts of the country with 
Zala, Vas, Sopron, Moson, Borsova and Ung counties.
The Byzantine Orientation and its Supporters
The alliance drawn up in 894 between the Byzantine emperor and the Hun­
garian leaders, ArpSd and Ku(r)san, proved enduring on both sides. It con­
tinued even when, around 897 or 898, the Byzantine authorities failed to 
persuade the "archons" of the Turks (that is the Hungarians) to undertake a 
military intervention against the Pechenegs. In the words of Emperor Leo 
the Wise, "now " (before 921) the Turks are "neither our neighbours nor our 
enem ies". Rather they appeared as friends, or, as the emperor put it, as
13. DAI 40. = FBHH 49.
14. DAI 40. 120
"subjects".15 Rumours of a Russian-Pecheneg-Hungarian alliance began cir­
culating around 924 or 925. At that time, this alliance would have been 
directed specifically against the arch-enemies of Byzantium, the Bulgars. 
However, by the time this campaign actually started almost a decade later, 
substantial changes had already taken place. The Hungarians' defeat at 
M erseburg in 933 and non-payment of German taxes which followed it 
turned the attention of the hawkish Hungarian leaders towards new — and 
more wealthy — prey. In April 934, the Hungarians, in alliance with the 
Pechenegs, did in fact launch their first attacks across the Danube against 
the,Bulgars but then they unexpectedly attacked the empire for the first 
time, as all the Byzantine sources point out. They advanced as far as Con­
stantinople and only turned back when a huge ransom was offered. This 
event was a watershed in Bulgar-Pecheneg relations as well: the Pechenegs 
went on to end Bulgar rule in Wallachia about this time by sacking the 
Bulgar frontier strongholds that had secured the passes of the Southern 
Carpathians. Around 948, the land of the Pechenegs "extended from the 
Lower Danube to across from the fortress of Dristra (Silistra)",16 at which 
point the Pecheneg province of Jazikapan lay only a half day's march from 
Bulgaria.17 The Pecheneg-Hungarian alliance turned out to be a lasting one: 
the two peoples did not fight one another for the rest of the tenth century.
In April 943, the Hungarians turned against Byzantium again. The cam­
paign ended with the signing of a five-year peace treaty. The Byzantines 
must have paid the Hungarians handsomely for these years of peace. In 
948, the third-highest ranking "archon" of Turkia, the "horka" (karkha), ar­
rived in Byzantium to renew the just-expired treaty. He was Bultchu, son of 
Kal(i), and he was accompanied by Termatchu (Torm&s), son of Tevel(i), a 
great-grandson of Arpdd. The treaty was extended and Constantine Por- 
phyrogennetos VII had raised Bultchu from the christening basin himself, 
and sent him home as a "patrikios" and the "m aster of a great fortune". 
"N ot much later Gyula (Gulasz), another Turkic prince, also came to the 
imperial city, converted to Christianity and received the same benefits and 
honours."18 However, this visit could only have taken place after 952, since 
it was not mentioned in Constantine Porphyrogennetos's work completed 
that year; on the other hand, it must have happened before 955, since Ioannes 
Skylitzes already mentions Bultchu's (Bulosudis's) death already in 955. 
Skylitzes goes on to say in the same place: "H e (that is Gyula) took along 
with him a monk by the name of Hierotheus, a man renowned for his piety, 
whom Theophylactus (patriarch of Constantinople between 2 February, 933 
and 27 February, 956) had anointed as the bishop of Turkia and who, upon 
his arrival, drew many away from their barbarous ways to Christianity. As 
for Gyula, he kept the faith, never again himself raiding the land of the 
Romans, and not forgetting about captured Christians. He paid their ran­
som, cared for them and freed them." A twelfth-century Greek polemical 
treatise — which has survived only in the form of a fifteenth-century Rus­
15. Tactics 18, 76 = FBHH 23.
16. DAI 42 = FBHH 41.
17. DAI 37 = FBHH 41.
18. Ioannes Skylitzes Synopsis 5. = FBHH 85-86.
sian manuscript — repeats, and fills out, this momentous report. The es­
sence of the addition runs as follows: "And the Greek high-priests had still 
not been able to plant their feet firmly on their land (on the land of the 
Paeons or Magers = Hungarians) or to teach them the words of the Scrip­
tures, when one of the two princes (knaza = the harka and the gyula), whose 
name was Stephen, died in the holy Christian faith and having had pleased 
the Almighty with many good deeds, entered the Kingdom of Heaven in 
peace." We also learn that no holy books had been written in the Paeons' (= 
Pannons') own language, and that "the heretic Latins from Rome ... bring­
ing along their books and writings''19 exploited this situation. Since the Latin 
mission only began in the autumn of 972, the above-mentioned must have 
occurred some time earlier.
In order to understand the above text, we must first recall that there 
were three leaders in the Hungarian tribal hierarchy: the kende (the chief 
duke) and the gyula (the military commander); the third was known as the 
harka (perhaps he was the chief justice). While the titles of kende and harka 
later disappeared into oblivion, gyula became a proper name after the mid­
dle of the eleventh century, and subsequent chroniclers projected it back 
into the past as such. Arab sources describing the Hungarians before the 
time of the Conquest, however, were aware of the fact that the di.la  or jila  
(gylas) was not a name but a rank, and so was Constantine Porphyrogennetos, 
who learned about the second leadership rank in Turkia from his Hungar­
ian visitors.
But to get back to the story: the Hungarian attacks on Byzantium were 
renewed in April 959, and the Hungkrians once again reached the gates of 
Constantinople under the leadership of a commander called Apor (Opour), 
whose memory and erstwhile habitat is what is probably preserved in the 
name of a now vanished village near Mindszent by the Tisza River. The 
Hungarian army plundered Thrace and Macedonia in 961, and after raid­
ing the environs of Constantinople and Thessaloniki in 968, returned home 
with a large number of captives. Two years later, in 970, the Hungarian 
raids came to a definite end following the defeat of the allied Hungarian- 
Russian-Bulgar army at Arcadiupolis.
The evidence that helps in the location of the base for these campaigns 
against Byzantium is quite spectacular. During the joint reign of Romanus I 
and his sons, Byzantine coins suddenly came pouring into Hungary. While 
only fifteen early tenth-century coins and one golden solidus have been found, 
there is a marked increase after 934: twenty-two coins, five of which are 
gold. The peak can be dated to a relatively short period: the rules of 
Constantine VII and Romanus II (948-959) — twenty-eight coins, of which 
twenty-four are gold! —, and it perfectly matches the events we have been 
describing. The archaeological finds show a small decline for the period 
between 963 and 970 (sixteen coins, eight of which are golden solidi), but 
this is misleading, since it was precisely in 965 that the astonished Ibrahim 
Ybn Yakub noted that the "Turk" merchants of Hungary were paying with
19. Facsimile in G. Fei ie r , A nagyszentmikl6si kincs-rejt61y megfejtesenek utja. (The
Way to Solving the Nagyszentmikl6s Treasure-Mystery.) Archeologiai trtesito
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gold coins at the market in Prague. The year 970, however, marks the last 
year for these coins.
Not counting the single solidus found in Sirmium, all these Byzantine 
coins, mostly gold pieces dating from the period between 934-969/970, have 
come to light in the Tisza region and east of the Tisza from Tokaj down to 
Orsova. More specifically, the authenticated graves containing golden coins 
(eleven sites) have all been found in the area stretching from the Beretty6 
and Koros rivers down to the Temes region by the Lower Danube. The 
distribution area of these Byzantine coins is precisely the same as the area 
from where Byzantine "lion-buckles" — five of the six occurrences —, gold 
and silver earrings, and a sword have been recovered. The latter was un­
earthed at Kunagota together with some Byzantine silver coins — hardly a 
coincidence. With the exception of Sirmia, tenth-century Byzantine gold and 
silver pieces and jewellery have not been found in the Carpathian Basin on 
the right side of the Danube. That absolutely none have been found in 
Transylvania is all the more striking considering that antique coins have 
been collected there regularly since the sixteenth century, and that in the 
last few decades all Byzantine coins from public and private collections 
have been published, and the search for such pieces has continued with 
social support — all with the aim of demonstrating continuous Byzantine 
presence within the "autochthonous Romanian" population.
It must, therefore, have been those Hungarian warriors residing in the 
Tisza region, the area between the Beretty6 and Koros rivers and the Lower 
Danube, who participated in the campaigns against Byzantium. This, of 
course, is not to say that the ransom Byzantium paid for non-aggression 
and the presents given to the horka and the grand duke did not find their 
way to other centres, though no traces of their having done so have been 
uncovered. All the finds have come from warrior graves in the Tisza re­
gion. Since the soldiers brought the booty back here with them, the prison­
ers freed by thegyu la  between 959 and 969 must also have been taken to this 
same area.
All these details add up to the following: the land of the "patrikios and 
gyula" Stephanos was probably located east of the Tisza, between the Koros 
and Maros rivers. It is probably the name of his headquarters that is pre­
served in the name of the town of Gyula (previously Julamonostora). Since 
Bishop Hierotheus did his missionary work among the people in the gyula's 
land, his permanent residence (assuming he had one) must also have been 
at the gyula's court.20
20. It is hard to imagine that his seat would have been in Sirmium (Sz&vaszent- 
demeter/Sremska Mitrovica), which counted as the border territory of Bulgaria, 
where, on the other side of the Sava in Sermon (Macvanska Mitrovica), by this 
time, a Bulgarian-Serbian bishop was active, whose cathedral, built on the ruins 
of an early Christian basilica, is well known from the middle of the tenth cen­
tury (D. Minic, Le site d'habitation medieval de Macvanska Mitrovica. Sirmium 
XI. Beograd 1980; cf. with the text written about early mediaeval cemeteries: 
Sirmium XII, Beograd 1980). This latter Sirmion/Sermon came under Byzan- 
tinian rule in 1018, and is not identical with the Hungarian Szer6mseg, as his­
torical literature thinks. Also, a diocese is unimaginable at the far away Gyula- 
feh6rv6r, which, before 950 could not have been the seat of the gyulas.
In 970, for the first time in 300 years, the Byzantine emperor Ioannes 
Tzimisces reached the Lower Danube with the Byzantine army in pursuit of 
the allied Russian-Pecheneg-Bulgar forces. In 971, he set up a Byzantine 
thema with Dorostolon (Silistra) at its centre. This event may have been be­
hind the gyula Stephanos's unexpected removal east to Transylvania. Since 
the defeated Pechenegs of Wallachia had temporarily disappeared from the 
historical stage in the tenth century, the gyula, in southern Transylvania in 
effect became Byzantium's neighbour in the Lower Danube region. In the 
Hungarian Old Gesta, the event is given the usual epic aura. W hile on a 
hunting trip "in Erdeel", the great and mighty commander, Gyula (Gula 
dux magnus et potens) is supposed to have discovered the fort of Alba 
(Civitatem Albam) that had been built in ancient times by the Romans. There 
is a seed of truth in the hunter-legend, insofar as the gyulas had, indeed, not 
resided in the Roman town for some time following the Conquest and only 
moved there from Hungary at a later date. Hierotheus could not very well 
have been alive by then, so it is more likely that the gyula was accompanied 
by his successors,21 if indeed the bishop had a successor. The twelfth-cen- 
tury polemical writing, however, vaguely supports this possibility. In any 
case, the Byzantine presence on Transylvania's borders was soon a thing of 
the past. The Bulgars had had a bad year in 971, so much so that they had 
been pushed back into Macedonia. Their envoys appeared in the court of 
Otto I in Quedlinburg in 973 together with Grand Duke G6za's Hungarian 
delegation in the hope of securing some western support. But the Bulgars 
soon recovered, probably with G6za's help. In 976, they succeeded in oust­
ing the Byzantines from the Lower Danube region for another quarter of a 
century. It is not very likely that the pious Stephanos lived long enough to 
see these events, although his putative death much earlier, in 956, is not 
supported by documents. But in the 970s at the latest, the aged gyula, a 
contemporary of Prince Fajsz and Taksony, was succeeded by the "second" 
gyula, who was a contemporary of Gaza's. His daughter, Sharolt, became 
Grand Duke Gaza's wife and, later, the mother of Vajk (afterwards King 
Stephen I).
The marriage of Grand Duke Geza and Sharolt was undoubtedly politi­
cally motivated. It was the gyula who needed this marriage in order to find 
favour with the prince. Although Sharolt, born east of the Tisza River in the 
second half of the 950s, must have been christened by Hierotheos on in­
structions from her pious grandfather, she was still given a Kabar/Khazar- 
type Turkic name: Sharaldy = White weasel, or Sharylty = Whiteness. Her 
name was later translated into Slavonic form as Bele-knegini, which has the 
same meaning: W hite princess/lady. [Her supposed sister "Caroldu" is
21. Inscription "Antonios bishop governor (proedros) of Turkia" on a lead stamp of 
unknown origin, dated to the 11th century and "Theophylaktos bishop (episkopos) 
of the Turks" on a similar one: FBHH 253. — It is not likely that these refer to 
Hungarians, they should be considered rather as alluding to high priests of the
Turks near Vardar. 124
again, an invention of Anonymus's or rather, one of his misreadings.)22 In 
the same way that he created a Bulgar commander called Shalan from the 
Hungarian name, Calan (Calan —» Chalan -> Shalan), he similarly, contrived 
the version "Carold" from the name Sharolt/d (Sharolt/d <-Charold—> 
Carold). Since the name Sharolt, spelled with an "Sh", was familiar from 
other sources, "Caroldu" became the "sister" for lack of a better alterna­
tive.]
The actual marriage ceremony took place in the 970s. If Vajk-Stephen 
really was bom  in 977 — the latest research indicated that he was definitely 
born after 975 — then his birth came at a time when the gyula was in serious 
trouble. It was exactly in 976 when the Bulgars cut off his direct links with 
Byzantium. Sharolt had been taken to Esztergom from Transylvania, as evi­
denced by the name of the village of Sarold, formerly her estate near Segesvar 
by the Nagy-Kuktilld River. (The villages featuring "D ecse" in their names, 
for instance Marosdecse, the salt port at Torda, and the village of Magyar- 
d6cse located in the salt mining region of the Szamos River, may all have 
belonged to Stephen's father G6za, but they are more likely to have been 
named after King Geza I.23 The original form of Geza was Gyecse.) There is 
not much more that we know about the rule of the gyula, Sharolt's father, 
although this much is certain: he tried to maintain his court in Feherv^r in a 
princely fashion. The court chapel, rotunda, was probably built during his 
rule, and the "gyepu" in the Kukiill6 Valley was pushed further east, be­
yond Segesvar.
Sharolt's brother — who must have been younger than Sharolt, since 
when his two sons, Boja and Bonyha, died a violent death at the time of the 
second plot against King Peter in 1046, they were both still in the prime of 
life — probably took over the rank of the "third" gyula of Transylvania at 
the beginning of the 980s, as the author of the Old Gesta could still vividly 
recall. His contemporary, the extraordinarily energetic Byzantine emperor, 
Basil II — later known as Bulgaroctonus = "Bulgar Slayer" — began his forty- 
year-long incessant and, in the end, successful fight to restore the Byzantine 
Empire to its former glory shortly afterwards, in 985. He launched his Eu­
ropean campaigns with an attack on Bulgaria.
The "third" gyula, therefore, had good reason to bank on direct Byzan­
tine support once more without even having to fear the retaliation of the 
House of Arpad. For in the 990s, it was the gyula's sister, Sharolt, rather 
than the aging Grand Duke Geza, who ruled the whole country: "totum 
regnum manu tenuit”.2i Geza's death, Stephen's elevation to the throne and 
the crushing defeat, in 997, of the pretender to the throne, Koppany, all
22. The written Hungarian sources from the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries 
spell the s (s), cs (c) and k sounds, sometimes the h, too with an ch. Cf. Chimon = 
Simon, Choma = Soma, Chanad = Csanad, Chatar = CsatSr, Chemey = kemej, 
Chemen = Kemeny, Chupa = Kupa. (K. F e h £ r t6 i ,  Arpadkori kis szemelyn6vtSr 
/Personal Names of the Arpad Period/, Budapest 1983.) Charold as the "wife 
of Doboka" was also mentioned in the history of Transylvania.
23. On his coins: Geuca, on his charter: Geisa, according to the Byzantine script on 
the Crown: Geovitza(s), which has to be pronounced as Gieitcha-Gievitcha; the 
harder Decse-Devicse version developed from this.
125 24. G o m b o s , Catalogus ... Ill, 2203-2204.
spelt trouble for the younger brother, whom the Slavs, for some obscure 
reason, nicknamed "Prokuj", meaning "the son of Prok". (Prok — "rem ain­
der", "successor" or possibly "descendant".) The quarter of Kopp&ny's 
drawn and quartered body sent to Transylvania must have gone to th e gyula 
in Feh6rv£r, which can be interpreted in many ways, except as a gesture of 
friendship.
The gyula's unexpected and rapid fall was initiated by Basil II's attack on 
Bulgaria in 1001. By the end of 1002, the emperor had occupied Vidin and 
restored the Byzantine thema Thrace south of the Lower Danube. Stephen 
could not afford to wait for the emperor to offer help to the power-hungry 
gyula, who was in any case already far too much under the influence of his 
Greek priests.
The Annals o f  Hildesheim an d Altaich note  briefly in 1003 that "King Stephen 
led an army against King Gyula, a maternal uncle of his, and took him to­
gether with his wife and two sons into captivity, forcibly converting his 
whole country (regnum) to the Christian faith".25 The sources make no men­
tion of there having been armed resistance or a clash of some sort, let alone 
a "Rom anian-Hungarian w ar", and the aftermath of the action certainly 
suggests nothing of the sort.
With this, the unbalanced "separate history" of Transylvania, covering a 
quarter of century came to an end. Stephen unprudently did not hold the 
prince in captivity who had assumed the role of a king. He escaped from 
Esztergom some years later and changed sides to join the Polish king Boles­
lav I the Mighty (992-1025). Stephen generously allowed his wife to follow 
him freely, without requiring a ransom. The best evidence how deeply the 
(senior) Lord "Prokuj" deplored his lost "kingdom" was that he had the face 
to take arms against Stephen and his country. Thus, Stephen felt obliged to 
expel him from the border fortress which was entrusted to him by King 
Boleslav. All these happened before 1018, when Bishop Thietmar of Merse­
burg, who related the late reports of Prokuj, died. The former prince must 
have finished his life somewhere on Polish soil. Boja and Bonyha, his sons, 
remained faithful to Istvan and their people.
The action which was over-estimated by both the Hungarian and the 
Romanian historiography, i.e., the defeat of "Leader" Ajtony, took place 
after the organization of Transylvania was established when the royal trans­
port of salt on the Maros River to the Tisza River had become already regu­
lar. The exact date of this event, possibly ranging from 1003 to 1028, has 
been extremely contested up to the present.
It is unlikely to ever be determined down to the year. At the time of 
Geza's rule and at the beginning of Stephen's reign, all aspects of life in the 
M aros-Tem es region followed the pattern being set in Hungary (see the cem­
eteries of the conquering Hungarian warriors and, later, the swords and the 
burial places of Gaza's militia). Graves from the second half of Stephen's 
rule, containing royal coins, have come to light from Hodony all the way 
down to Mehadia.
The incident itself had left no written trace in the contemporary histori­
cal sources. Of the close to ten written sources, only the greater Legend of
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Saint Gerald (Legenda maior S. Gherardi) and Anonymus' Gesta mention any­
thing, the two accounts providing two radically different versions. The leg­
end had it that Prince Achtum/Ohtum was baptized in Vidin according to 
the Greek rite. (His name originated from the Turkish word Altun, meaning 
"gold", and through regular patterned linguistic change, took the Hungar­
ian form "A jtony" in the same way as "Falis" was transformed into "Fajsz".) 
Later, on Greek (read: Byzantine) instruction (authority), he founded a 
monastery at Marosv&r, dedicated to Saint John the Baptist, and invited 
Greek monks as well as an abbot to settle there. This event could only have 
taken place after 1002, for by the end of 1002, Basil II had taken Vidin from 
the Bulgars and extended the frontiers of the Byzantine Empire up to the 
Lower Danube region, that is, to the borders of Ajtony's domain.
Ajtony's personal habits, in spite of his flirtation with Byzantium, re­
mained that of a heathen as he took "seven wives". Though this precise 
number sounds suspiciously like a folk-tale element in the legend, there can 
be no doubt that he had more than one wife. After Ajtony's defeat, one of 
these wives was given to comes Csandd, another to comes Bees. (On this, the 
two reports confirm one another, and the information is undoubtedly au­
thentic.) Vast herds of horses and cattle grazed on Ajtony's land "not count­
ing those which were put up by the herdsmen in stables".26 (Only a few 
years ago, this later information was still regarded as one of the later added 
elements of the legend, on a par with the descriptions of Ajtony's manors 
and mansions. Today, however, there is growing archaeological evidence 
indicating that the practice of stabling animals was known in the Hungary 
of the tenth and eleventh centuries.)
Ajtony probably had a sizeable army of the same type as Geza's militia, 
and was a man of overwhelming self-confidence. Originally this choleric, 
wealthy and braggart lord was probably the governor of the then recently 
built Marosvdr (urbs Morisena) who underestimated the balance of power, 
and switched his loyalty to his mighty southern neighbour. He succeeded 
in subjugating the heathen Hungarians living around Bekesv^r and as far 
as the KOrOs River, and made himself lord of the Temes region. With this, 
he began to pose a threat to communications between the royal seat and the 
recently acquired Transylvanian territories. Ajtony's unbridled covetous­
ness — he was insolent enough to raid the royal salt consignments —, his 
heathen practices and, above all, his flirtation with Byzantium infuriated 
King Stephen.
To vanquish the rebel, King Stephen sent his kinsman, Doboka's son, 
Csanad (Chanad, Sunad), and — according to the "Csanad Saga", an inser­
tion of dubious historic value in the Gerald Legend — the gyula, who hap­
pened to be in the royal court at the time. A tradition that does appear to be 
based on fact, on the other hand, places the battle between the armies of 
Csanad and Ajtony at the spot where Csanad raised a monastery dedicated 
to Saint George the Martyr in commemoration of the event. The place was 
later named Oroszlanos after the sculptured lions that decorated its gates 
(oroszlan means "lion"). Later on, Bishop Gerald found shelter for the Greek 
monks of Marosvar in the same monastery (called Wruzlanmunustura in
127 26. Vita S. Gerhardi 10 = G o m b o s, Catalogus ... Ill, 2424.
1247). Everything else (Ajtony's death included) remains obscure. Descend­
ants of Ajtony, bearing his name, continued to hold estates in the counties 
of Csan&d, Krass6 and Kolozs until the fifteenth century. King Stephen was 
not one to take revenge, and spared Ajtony's family in the same way as he 
had spared Koppdny's. (The principles are outlined in King Stephen's laws,
II. 2.)
The campaign against Ajtony — which, in fact, was more of a police 
action — cannot be dated to the establishment of the See of Maros, since 
that, together with the founding of the See of Bihar, was a part of the royal 
ecclesiastical policy of 1030. The jurisdiction of the Bishopric of Kalocsa had 
been extended previously to include the Temes region. The campaign must 
have taken place a good many years before 1015 or 1018 since in one or the 
other of these two years, more likely in the latter, King Stephen I fought 
alongside Basil II, destroying Bulgaria, and taking part in the first or second 
occupation of Cesaria, the "Imperial City" = Ohrid.
While the ancient Gerald Legend written in Csan&dvar had nothing to 
say about Ajtony's ancestry, Anonymus seems to know, and keeps repeat­
ing almost in the manner of an epithet, that Ajtony was the descendant of a 
"Cum an" commander called Glad who had lived at the time of the Con­
quest. While in the Gerald Legend it was Ajtony whose name was linked to 
Vidin, in Anonymus's Gesta it was Glad who had connections with the town. 
In keeping with his usual style, Anonymus added that extra authoritative 
touch, and made Glad a native of Vidin. Glad/Galad, probably a Turkish 
name, belonged to an actual person yyho lived in the tenth or the eleventh 
century. His memory is preserved in villages in the Temes region which 
bear the name GilSd/Gaiad. (These were some of the villages whose name 
Anonymus "borrowed" — a tried and true method he adopted — when he 
was creating "enem ies" for the conquering Hungarians.) By the early thir­
teenth century it was not, of course, known that the conquering Hungarians 
never assumed the name of anyone they found living in the conquered area. 
Therefore, we have no proof, other than Anonymus's narrative, that Glad 
might have been Ajtony's great-great-grandfather from 120 years before. 
The possibility, however, that he was Ajtony's father or grandfather, can­
not be excluded. It is also worth mentioning, however, that Oswald de Lasko, 
Franciscan friar, referring to unknown documents, claimed that Ajtony 
(Atthon) had been a native of the Nyirseg. He could not have been lord 
over either a Kabar or a Hungarian tribal land, nor over an independent 
"Romanian voivodate". Anonymus explicitly referred to Glad as a "Cum an", 
and spoke only of Cumans, Bulgars and Vlachs who had helped Glad from 
outside. That the latter were none other than Anonymus's contemporaries, 
people of the Asenid Bulgar-Romanian Empire (Asen's contemporary Latin 
title was: Rex Bulgarorum et Blachorum) established in 1186 with Cuman help, 
perhaps does not even need to be proved.
In the past few years it had become "fashionable" to connect the gold 
hoard unearthed at NagyszentmikI6s with the Hungarians of the gyula or 
of Ajtony (or even Glad's Romanians) obviously on the inspiration, among 
other things, of the proximity of Csan^dvar and Nagyszentmiklos. The ves­
sels of Avar princes made in the seventh and eighth centuries, however, 
cannot be linked to persons and events living centuries later. Ever since
very nearly identical parallels to the runes subsequently scratched on these 
vessels were found in Szarvas on an eight-century Avar bone needle case, 
even the burying of the vessels cannot be dated to after the fall of the Avar 
Empire.
The Conquering Hungarians in Transylvania
Identifying the artifacts of the Hungarians after their arrival in the Carpathian 
Basin has become a routine task for archaeologists. With the help of the 
tenth century western coins found in a grave in 1834, archaeologists had 
already succeeded in tying customs such as burying a warrior with his horse 
and other peculiarities of clothing and arms to the conquering Hungarians. 
Similar finds rapidly grew in number after archaeology first developed into 
a movement and then into a science. By around the turn of the century 
(1896,1907) publications of these finds filled huge volumes. In the past few 
decades, however, a new look at the excavations and research done in this 
century has led to the conclusion that the few hundred warriors found bur­
ied with their horse and arms and the graves of their female relatives do not 
fairly represent the entire Hungarian population of the tenth century. Even 
by the most generous estimates, these finds only reflect the middle strata of 
the population, about 20,000-30,000 people from one generation. The sur­
vival of the Hungarian language and nation was insured by the common 
people, likewise oriental in origin, who left behind less spectacular remains. 
It has also become apparent that though the armed strata, the equestrian 
"heathens" and their oriental metal craft, rich in pagan imagery, had disap­
peared from the scene by the early eleventh century, or rather, were trans­
formed into a new Christian ruling class and art, the villages and cemeter­
ies of the common people survived the shock of Hungary's joining the broth­
erhood of Christian states. From the late tenth or early eleventh century 
onwards, folk culture absorbed the local Slavic elements and, after being 
enriched by the symbols of Christianity, it became a culture of many peo­
ples, the "archaeological" culture of the Arpads' new state. For this reason 
after the eleventh century, it is exceptionally difficult to distinguish between 
Slavic and Hungarian villages and/or cemeteries in Transylvania, too, us­
ing archaeological methods. With the consolidation of the state and of the 
Roman Catholic church, these supra-national attire and rites lost their col­
our and became impoverished, though in essence they survived among the 
common people obliged to bury their dead around the Catholic churches 
up to the great catastrophe of the Mongol invasion of 1241-1242.
Thanks to archaeological excavations, this is all borne out today by evi­
dence from several thousand archaeological sites and burials. The cemeter­
ies of the military middle strata with symbolic or actual horse burials are 
known from 550 sites located all over the plains and the hilly regions of the 
Carpathian Basin. The culture of the common people is evidenced in more 
than 2,000 sites which include cemeteries of early villages holding from 600 
to 900 to 1,300 graves each. In the same way as the Old Hungarian place- 
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Fig. 7. Grave of a sabre-bearing Hungarian warrior from the time of the Conquest, 
with the remains of a stuffed horse on his left; and the plundered grave of a warrior 
of the same period with a horse-hide on his left. The former Zcipolya Street, Kolozsv&r
related to the villages and the artifacts of any people who had lived here 
previously.
To this day, the most spectacular finds have been those of the military 
middle strata. Their chief distinguishing feature is a characteristic equally 
absent from the customs of the Avars living here earlier and the equestrian 130
peoples who arrived in the plains of eastern Europe after the Hungarians. 
This custom is the partial (symbolic) horse burial. After the horse of the 
dead man had been butchered and eaten at the burial feast, the horseskin, 
together with the skull and the forelegs, was placed inside the grave, either 
rolled up, spread out, or occasionally even stuffed with straw. This practi­
cal custom derived from the Finno-Ugric belief that the soul of a horse — 
like the soul of a man — resides inside the skull. Therefore, the horse's 
afterlife could be assured by the burial only of its skull. Sometime only the 
harness or the saddle was placed inside the grave, or not even that in the 
case,of some families and/or groups. In these latter cases, it may be as­
sumed on the basis of oriental historical ethnographic parallels, that the 
skull, the harness, or perhaps the stuffed horse itself, was hung over the 
grave after the burial feast which was held at a later time in the same way as 
the spear of the deceased was often used to mark the owner's grave. There­
fore, a lack of horse-bones and harness equipment (e.g. in Maroskarna) only 
indicates that a particular community had different traditions and burial 
customs. It certainly by no means indicates that these people were not Hun­
garians.
The Hungarian burial grounds of the tenth and the eleventh centuries 
are, in general, characterized by shallow graves, even in the case of corpses 
buried in splendid costumes. The unprecedented shallowness of the Hun­
garian graves indicated that they saw the peace of their dead secure through­
out the land. These graves are, therefore, reflections both on a stable regime 
and on the character of a people who liked to make life as easy as possible. 
The same phenomenon is evidenced in the "partial" horse burials. In line 
with an ancient oriental tradition, the Hungarians liked to establish their 
burial grounds on hillsides and elevations. On the plains they preferred the 
sites of prehistoric settlements and tumuli (6beseny5-Bukova).
In the small cemeteries of the military middle strata, men and women 
were buried in one or two rows in a strictly predetermined order, even 
though some peculiar variations existed. Sometimes even women were bur­
ied together with their horses (Bihar, Kolozsvar, Temesvar). This arrange­
ment of graves within the cemetery has, in the past, been explained on the 
basis of kinship or clan relationship. Today, however, there are serious bio­
logical arguments against that view. It is becoming more and more appar­
ent that here we are witness to the military order of the tenth century. The 
details of this order are yet to be clarified in the course of archaeological 
excavations currently being carried out. The "standard equipment" found 
in the graves faithfully reflects the military order. (The inverted commas 
are only necessary to indicate that this equipment was never really "m ass 
produced". Rather, these objects were the products of many hundreds of 
independent blacksmiths and goldsmiths.) In spite of the varied workshops, 
all the harness equipment found in the graves such as the pear-shaped stir­
rups with circular bases and the bridle-bits are extremely characteristic of 
tenth-century Hungarian craftsmanship. Naturally, they vary in size and 
w hile some are made of simple wrought iron, others are also decorated 
with gold or silver inlay (Kolozsvar, Muszka, Perjamos). The decoration of 
the harness equipment is, again, characteristic of ninth- and tenth-century 
"steppe" nomads, although in their detail and combination of elements they
are uniquely Hungarian. The harness equipment found in women's graves 
can serve as an example: the reins and the breechings decorated with gold- 
plated silver and bronze rosette mounts have been found from sixty-five to 
seventy sites spread over the whole of the Hungarian territories (Bihar, Sikl6,
Muszka).
Since the internal order of the cemeteries of the warring middle strata 
shows a marked stratification, it is far from certain that the deceased could 
take all their worldly possessions with themselves into the beyond. The 
number of arrows placed in the iron mounted quivers varied from one to 
eight, clearly indicating that the deceased also were not equal beyond the 
grave. It does not really matter whether this was meant to reflect the view­
point of the other worldly or of the worldly hierarchy. Similarly, if the close- 
combat weapon of the Hungarians, the long sabre with a curved hilt is ex­
amined, it is found that this weapon was only placed in about twelve per 
cent of the graves of warriors buried with their horses. When all the graves 
of these middle strata are taken into account, the figure is reduced to five 
per cent. The exclusiveness exists in spite of the fact that the sabre was far 
from being a rare weapon. Practically every mounted soldier possessed one.
Naturally, these sabres, also display great variability, coming with or with­
out guards, in simple wooden or leather sheaths or in sheaths decorated 
with bronze, silver or gold mountings. One can no more picture a Hungar­
ian warrior without a sabre than assume that archers went to war with only 
from one to eight arrows in their capacious quivers. While it was the sabre 
which was best accommodated to the Hungarian style of fighting in the 
early days, there is authentic evidence that the first conquering Hungarians 
already possessed some "w estern" weapons. These w eapons include 
Norman-Viking double-edged swords (Gyulafehervar) and Byzantine ones 
(Sepsiszentgyorgy). The two different types of close-combat weapons un­
covered from graves of the conquering Hungarians, therefore, cannot be 
described in terms of conquerors' weapons versus the weapons of the de­
fenders (Arad-Cs&lya and Deva).
They carried rhomboid or "swallow-tail" shaped arrow-heads in ingen­
iously constructed iron-mounted quivers. These arrow-heads were of a type 
and size which, again, had previously been unknown in the Carpathian 
Basin (found at Kolozsv^r and Deva in Transylvania). The bows — the prod­
ucts of many many years of work —, and especially the bow-quivers, were 
very rarely placed in the grave. If such bows are found, the bone nocks of 
these reflex-bows, with their peculiar shape, stand out. The battle-axe and 
the spear-head featured less often in the Hungarian burial rituals (spear­
heads have been found at SepsiszentgyOrgy-EprestetS in Transylvania).
The metal — bronze and silver — hairrings, buttons and the lyre-shaped 
bronze (Temesv&r, Pecska, Maroskarna, Kolozsv&r) or iron belt-buckles are 
ubiquitous characteristics of Hungarian men's garb at that time. Naturally, 
every warrior had a leather belt and a sabretache. The distinctive bronze 
and silver-mounted ornamental belts decorated with oriental leaf-pattems 
were indicators of a specific rank (Sajteny and Kolozsvir), in the same way 
as were the ingeniously shaped and mounted rings set with precious stones 
and, above all, the metal sabretache plates. The commanders and distin­
guished warriors from the western campaigns often had silver coins sewn 132
Fig. 8. Grave finds of a Hungarian woman from the time of the Conquest buried in 
ornate costume, Marosgombds
to their garments by way of decoration (Sikl6, Orsova). These coins have 
proven to be of help in dating the burials up to the middle of the tenth 
century. According to a misconception that even has advocates in Hun- 
1 3 3  gary, the conquerors came to the Carpathian Basin without their women, ii
so, they would have forgotten their own language within a few decades. It 
is true that women's graves account for only about 30 to 40 per cent of all 
the graves in military cemeteries — this is what makes them military! In the 
civil cemeteries, however, this asymmetry is often reversed.
There are metal finds that help in the reconstruction of women's clothing 
such as buttons, circular or rhomboid adornments trimming the neck of the 
shirt or caftan, as well as mounted pendants of various sizes (Marosgombks). 
Mounted boots, caps and, of course, jewellery have frequently been found. 
Long oriental earrings decorated with pearl pendants first appeared in the 
Carpathian Basin with the Hungarians. They also brought along Byzantine 
earrings from the Black Sea region which has pendants resembling bunches 
of grapes. (These silver earrings come in solid and hollow versions and 
were also copied in bronze.) Still, the most important items are the lamellar 
disk-pendants, either beaten or engraved as well as the wide (often engraved) 
bracelets. After the Conquest the women began to wear western jewellery 
as well, including earrings and ornamental broaches with enamel inlay. 
Some of these objects found their way to the eastern part of the Great Hun­
garian Plain (Szalacs, Detta) and Transylvania (Gyulafeherv^r) either as part 
of the booty from raids or as goods purchased for money.
While the metal finds and the burial customs of the puritanical men of 
the middle strata are only rarely seen in the cemeteries of the common peo­
ple, the garments worn by women of the middle strata often resemble and 
display similarities with the clothing of common women. The gold and sil­
ver versions of the common women's bracelets, twisted torques and finger- 
rings bent from a single thick metal rod or bunched wire again represent a 
thoroughly new type of jewellery in the Carpathian Basin of the tenth cen­
tury. Such pieces often occur in the graves of the wealthier women. These 
women often wore a double-branched pendant for trimming the neck of 
their garments which was copied in several bronze versions by the com­
mon women up until the middle of the eleventh century. Clothing deco­
rated with small bronze buttons and bronze pendants to be braided in the 
hair were quite popular. The bronze and silver bracelets of unknown origin 
decorated with opposing animals' heads came to the Carpathian Basin only 
after the Conquest (Torda, Biharfelegyhaza, P6cska, Temesv&r). These brace­
lets were equally popular with women from both social groups. The only 
female jewellery worn exclusively by the common women were the simple 
bracelets and finger-rings of bunched wire, plain hair rings, crescent-shaped 
pendants of some religious significance and various glass necklaces, by this 
time sometimes of local origin.
The Hungarian archaeological culture appeared in Transylvania and the 
eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, simultaneously in both the val­
leys and on the plains as everywhere else in the country. In spite of this fact, 
even Hungarian researchers have subscribed to the view that the settle­
ment of the Hungarian conquerors in Transylvania had been less substan­
tial. It was, however, later research in the area that was spotty, not Hungar­
ian settlement. In the first place, archaeological research commenced half a 
century later in Transylvania than in the rest of Hungary: the first graves of 
the Hungarian conquerors in Transylvania were only found in 1895 at 
Marosgombas. The last systematic excavations of tenth-century Hungarian
sites, on the other hand, were carried out in 1911, at Z£polya Street in 
Kolozsvar and it was only possible to publish the results in 1942. Between 
the two world wars, only one grave of a single Hungarian conqueror horse­
man was reported (Szekelyderzs). After the Second World War, graves of 
the military middle strata were unearthed on many occasions, almost in­
variably as the "by-products" of excavations designed to look for some­
thing else. These sites were expertly excavated by conscientious archaeolo­
gists, but none of these cemeteries have ever been published (for example, 
those at D6va, Piski and Pata Street in Kolozsv&r, as well as a number of 
cemeteries in Gyulafehervar, and those at Korostarjan, Sajteny, Sikl6, A rad- 
Cs^lya and Cs6ka-erdo in Temesvar). A few graves were published (Ma- 
roskam a B. cemetery, Hodony, Szalacs and Galospetri), only because no 
horse-bones were found and hence the graves were thought to be those of 
non-Hungarian warriors. Compared with the results from excavations in 
Hungary and in southern Slovakia where admirable work is being done in 
research on the military middle strata, the number of Transylvanian finds 
falls steadily behind. This situation creates a great deal of confusion, since 
keeping such finds secret leads either to the underrating or overrating of 
their importance. The excavations themselves, however, can very seldom 
be kept secret. In this way, it leaked out that in the seat of the gyulas, 
Gyulafehervar, important cemeteries of both the middle strata and com­
mon people have been found in numbers that are comparable only to the 
cem eteries of the Arp&d dynasty in Szekesfeherv£r. In addition, it was 
learned that there had been a significant Hungarian military centre in the 
Carpathian Basin in Kolozsvar at the time of the Conquest.
Horse burials of "lone" warriors — a phenomenon known only among 
the elite — or of "groups" of just two or three graves have been found 
dating to the beginning of the tenth century in the Szekelyfold — region 
inhabited by Szekely — (Kezdiv&sarhely, Ereszteveny, Sepsiszentgyorgy, 
Csikzsogod, Kopec and Szekelyderzs). These men must have been mem­
bers of the military contingent settled along the inward edge of the south­
eastern Transylvanian passes to protect the borders against the Pechenegs 
and the Bulgars. It is the lack of such a force in this area that would be 
surprising, since significant military outposts of this same type have lately 
been found even on the outer ring of the northeastern Carpathians (Przemysl 
in southeastern Poland). Nor is it surprising, then, that around the turn of 
the ninth and tenth centuries, the Bulgars completely rebuilt the fortifica­
tions in Sion on the southern slopes of the Carpathians, placed precisely 
opposite to this southeastern Transylvanian border guard unit. These forti­
fications had originally been built from bricks to keep under surveillance 
the southern exit of the Bodza Pass, but only a few decades later they were 
rebuilt from stone. They provide tangible evidence of the appearance of a 
new, offensive power in the region against whom the Bulgars needed to set 
up a permanent defence system. What is surprising, however, is the trap- 
ezoid-shape stone fortress found at Slon-Prahova with towers on two cor­
ners and fortified with a peculiar gate tower, a unique construction north of 
the Lower Danube region. The technology of its construction — carved stone­
work and the use of mortar — links this fortress directly to the great Bulgar 
centres at Pliska, Preslav, Madara and Silistra/Dristra. The fortifications in
Sion on the southern slopes of the Carpathians must have served only de­
fensive purposes. These advanced positions were given up, first by the re­
peatedly defeated Bulgars, and later, also by the Hungarians.
The only partially excavated and almost wholly published Hungarian 
"m ilitary" cem etery (consisting of only twelve graves, including those 
brought to light in 1941-1942) in the interior of Transylvania is located in 
Kolozsvcir's former Zapolya Street (known today as Dostoievski Street, and 
also called Vishinski Street in some of the earlier literature). Its importance 
can only be compared to that of the most remarkable cemeteries of similar 
type in Hungary at Ken6zl6, Bezded, Eperjeske and Karos. That the cem­
etery contained everything with the exception of sabretache plates prob­
ably stems from the fact that the graves had been robbed sometime during 
the Middle Ages, and also that the cemetery has not been completely exca­
vated.
The fact that the graves of Hungarian warriors have turned up in the 
valley of the Kis-Szamos in no way enhances Anonymus's credibility as a 
"w ar reporter". The strategic importance of the location speaks for itself.
The relatively small cemetery in Zapolya Street serves as proof neither for 
the continued existence of "Rom an" Napoca into the tenth century, nor for 
the existence of Hungarian Kolozsv^r from the tenth century onwards, since 
the cemetery lies 1,275 metres to the east of the, by then, decayed ruins of 
the Roman city. Nothing could have justified this distance if the people 
buried in the graves had indeed lived inside the walls of the Roman city, 
and especially not if they had resided inside what was to be called the C)var 
(Old Castle), where, incidently, no sign of habitation between the ninth and 
the eleventh centuries has been found. In places where people did settle in 
what was still standing of the Roman cities, for instance in Apulum at 
Gyulafeherv£r, they did not hesitate to bury their dead within the city walls, 
inside the destroyed Bulgar settlement. The cemeteries outside the antique 
walls are a continuation of the Bulgar cemetery, or lie east, not far from the 
fortress.
The recent discovery of another cemetery located much closer to Napoca 
alters none of the above conclusions. About thirty graves, almost all with 
grave goods, were unearthed during the course of excavations at a second- 
and third-century Roman cemetery between the Gyorgyfalvi Street and Pata 
Street. Precisely how many graves contained horse bones is not known.
There may have been five or six, several of which contained sabres and a 
few of which were equipped with mounted belts. Almost all the men's graves 
contained arrow-heads, while a dozen more held the bone nocks from re­
flex bows. Hair-discs, bracelets, rings, some made of gold and silver, and 
"Saltovo-type" vessels were found in the women's graves. In other words, 
these finds are similar to those uncovered in Zapolya Street. The cemetery 
lies at a distance of about 600 metres to the southwest of the one in Zapolya 
Street, and therefore must have been a separate burial ground. There was a 
third cemetery from the same period at roughly the same distance to the 
northwest (Farkas Street), marked only by a single grave of a woman whose 
garment had been mounted with small metal buttons along the neck and 
who was wearing a pair of silver earrings with pendants resembling bunches 
of grapes. On the basis of these three early cemeteries in Kolozsv&r, it may 136
be assumed that some military settlement(s) from the time of the Conquest 
was located along the region of the Malompatak and Budai Nagy Antal 
Street (formerly Honved Street).
The horse burial of a Hungarian warrior, demolished in the eleventh 
century by builders, has been found inside the fortress in Gyulafeherv&r. 
No particulars are known of the graves from the middle warrior strata re­
ported found outside the walls (Zalatnai Street), except that they contained 
horse bones, ornamental belts, quivers, hair-discs and pendants, and silver 
earrings with pendants resembling bunches of grapes. The details of the 
military cemeteries of the middle warrior strata unearthed during the course 
of both earlier (at Marosgombis and Magyarlapad), which frequently con­
tained horse bones, and more recent excavations (at Maroskama B. cem­
etery) are comparatively well known. A similar, partially excavated and 
published cemetery from the Maros region in D6va has also been reported, 
and there has been news of unpublished horse burials from Maroskama 
and Piski.
Except for the ford on the Szamos River at Kolozsv&r, all the military 
cemeteries from the period of the Conquest have been unearthed in the 
Maros Valley. The cemeteries of the military posts appear along both sides 
of that section of the river which runs towards the open territory of the 
Great Hungarian Plain, along the valleys of the Maros and Aranka rivers 
(6pdlos, FOnlak, Nemetszentpeter, Arad-Cs&lya, Nagyszentmikl6s, Perjd- 
mos, Magyarpecska and Sajteny). Only one military settlement has been 
found in the valley of the Sebes-Koros at Krajnikfalva and none in the re­
gion of the gate of Meszes.
The cemeteries of the eastern Great Hungarian Plain belonged to the cen­
tral bulk of tenth-century Hungarian settlements. The totally military cem­
etery of Biharvcir was one of these, the only cemetery in the region that has 
been partially excavated and published still early in this century. Another 
central burial place was the military cemetery in nearby Korostarj^n, also 
including a number of horse burials, and the cemetery of Art£nd within the 
territory of today's Hungary. The Er region was inhabited by representa­
tives of the middle strata (Gilospetri and Szalacs), as was the vicinity of the 
presumed early habitat of the gyulas, south of the present-day town of Gyula 
(GyulavarsSnd, Muszka and Sikl6). In the Temes region, there is a long 
chain of fine military cemeteries of this middle strata, and cemeteries of 
their chiefs (Nagy6sz, Vizesd, Nagyteremia, Nagykoml6s, Hodony, Temes- 
v£r-Cs6ka-erd6 and Detta all the way down to Orsova). At Orsova on the 
Lower Danube, there was a military outpost from the period of the Con­
quest surprisingly rich in Hungarian finds, which have been dated with the 
help of western and Byzantine coins. In the last third of the tenth century, 
the military settlements of the Er region and the Sebes-Koros region likely 
served as border-guard posts against the Transylvanian "land" of thegyulas, 
while the forces of the Temes region were at the disposal of Ajtony in the 
eleventh century.
The smallish tenth-century cemeteries of the distinctly oriental common­
ers of Hungarian stock have been found almost exclusively in the valleys of 
the Maros River (Maroscsap6, Marosnagylak and Gyulafeh£rv3r — at least 
137  two cemeteries — Magyarlapad, Alvinc-Borberek and Maroskama). Even
the few exceptions are in the neighbourhood of the Maros region (Torda,
Zeykfalva and Kelnek). Only some of the more important cemeteries from 
the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain, the TemeskOz and the Lower 
Danube region are worth mentioning: those at NagykSroly, Hegykozkov£csi, 
N agyvirad, Gyulavars&nd, Pecska, Hidasliget, Temesliget and Meh&dia.
As in most places within the country, Hungarian settlements and their cem­
eteries in Transylvania, too, only rarely survived the internal struggles, tur­
moil and resettlements that accompanied the founding of the Hungarian 
state. There is evidence of a tenth-century period in the late (Medgyes-type) 
urn-cemeteries of the Slavs in Transylvania as well as in the Bulgar cem­
etery of Csombord and in the burial grounds shared by Bulgars, Slavs and 
Hungarians in Gyulafeherv^r. In the southern parts of the Temes region, 
some tenth-century archaeological material has been found in the cemeter­
ies of a few Bulgar-Slav settlements (Omoldova, Fels61upk6-Gomya).
3. Transylvania in the Early Kingdom 
of Hungary (1003-1172)
Igfon erdo (Egyfan = "holy woods") was the name given to the Bihar Moun­
tains in Old Hungarian. The country lying over the mountains was called 
"Across the woods" (Erdeelw  in the eleventh century Old Gesta) looking 
from the direction of the plain along the Duna-Tisza rivers; much the same 
as the land over the Havas ("Alpes" = the snow-capped Carpathians) was 
called Havaselve (today: Wallachia). In the pre-1190 sources from the Arp£d 
period, the former was referred to as Ultrasilvana (Ultra Silvas) in the Ital­
ian—Roman Latin dialect, while in the Latin dialect used in Germany the 
name Transilvana appeared sometime between 1190 and 1250, with the two 
forms being used concurrently. The use of the form "Transsilvania” is only 
confirmed after 1461. The thousand year old Hungarian name of Erdely is 
spelt Ardeal in Romanian. It was first written down in this form in 1444 in a 
Romanian charter worded in Slavic, and the same spelling is still used to­
day.
Compared to the rest of Hungary, very few charters have survived from 
the Arp&dian period in Transylvania. The Chapter of Gyulafehervar, to­
gether with its archives and registers, was destroyed, first by the Mongols 
in 1241, and then by the Saxons of Vizakna in 1277. The Mongol invasion 
brought a similar fate to the documents of the nearby See of Csan&d, to the 
archives of the See of V&rad — with the exception of a register containing 
some early thirteenth-century data — and to the archives of the Abbey of 
Kolozsmonostor. As a consequence of the widespread devastation, only a 
few official documents, mostly royal charters, have survived as records of 
Transylvania's early history, and these certainly do not go back to the earli­
est days (Gyulafeh6rv&r: 1111; Csan^d: 1111 and 1163; Belsc5-Szolnok: 1134 
and 1166; Arad and Aradv&r: 1156 and 1177; Dobokav^r: 1164; Krasznav&r:
1093 and 1164; Tordav&r: 1075 and 1177; Kolozsv&r, Kukullovar and Kras- 
s6var: 1177; Zar&nd: 1203 and 1214; Hunyadv&r: 1265 and 1276). Only four 
charters refer back to the eleventh century. To this day, the testimony of the 138
much earlier chronicles and legends is generally ignored and the archaeo­
logical data are re-interpreted in a determined effort to present these late 
references as primary, contemporaneous sources, especially when the ref­
erence is to the political institutions of the Kingdom of Hungary in Transyl­
vania. This approach fails to take cognizance of the fact that the arrival of 
the Saxons and the Romanians, as well as the resettlement of the Szekelys 
are also documented only in charters dated several decades after the events 
themselves. The unfortunate practice of deducing the history and economic 
history of eleventh-century Transylvania from development trends obtain- 
ing'throughout all of Hungary at the time as well as these late Transylvani­
an charters has only added to the chaos. It has resulted in a hopeless confu­
sion of the territorially organized counties (comitatus civitatis, mega, later 
also known as the "noble counties") with the border counties (marchia, comi- 
tati confiniorum), and the early units of government (centred around the 
royal castles (civitates, comitati castrorum, the "royal counties"), quite ignor­
ing the fact that in some places, the first of these really did develop quite 
late. The extent of the confusion is well illustrated by the circumstance that 
the existence of comitati centred around the royal castles, for example, is 
generally denied on the grounds that they lack the data and criteria charac­
teristic of the territorially organized counties. And yet, these castles are still 
there for everyone to see, and have been excavated and dated on the evi­
dence of the finds and occasionally, even of coins. People were continu­
ously buried in the cemeteries of these castles since the time of King Ste­
phen I and King Peter (6-Tordavar, 6-Kolozsv£r, O-Hunyadvar and O-Arad- 
var). Under these circumstances, therefore, toponymy checked against ety­
mology and archaeology plays a much larger role in the reconstruction of 
the real history of this region than of the rest of the Carpathian Basin.
There are many problems that cannot be resolved by archaeology. Ar­
chaeology can determine, however, whether or not a region was inhabited 
at any given time starting from the Neolithic, and can confirm with some 
degree of certainty whether or not the settlement was a lasting one. Archae­
ology also provides information on the type of population which lived in 
the region — its "culture" — on the degree of its social differentiation and, 
when it comes to historical times, on the form of government. Archaeology 
can establish, with a high degree of certainty, whether castles and fortifica­
tions existed in the period in question and if so, what type they were when 
they were built and rebuilt as well as when they were destroyed or de­
serted. With the help of the coins minted yearly or every other year, under 
the kings of the House of Arp&d and used by the people as oboli, archaeolo­
gists can date the eleventh- and twelfth-century cemeteries within a decade 
or so. They are also able to identify long-perished villages using the evi­
dence of charters and regional place-names surviving only in local history. 
In short, archaeology provides source material that today cannot be over­
looked. Unfortunately, however, the one-sidedly researched archaeological 
evidence from the region is even less adequate for shedding light on the 
economic history of this age than of the early stages of the Age of Migra­
tions.
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Map 8. Settlements in Transylvania and in the Eastern Great Plain between 1003 and 1172
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eleventh-tw elfth  centuries; 12. Slav D ar6c and A rd6 place-names; 13. Coins issued by Stephen 1, Peter, Sam uel and A ndrew  I; 
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com parison
The Eastern Part of the Great Hungarian Plain 
up to the Last Third of the Twelfth Century
Just as in the tenth century, it is necessary to distinguish in this period as 
well between the history of the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain 
(the eastern part of the region laying east of the Tisza and the Temes region) 
and the history of Transylvania. Biharvdr and Csanadvar, the two centres 
of this area played such major roles in Hungarian history that they rate in 
importance right after the two royal seats of Esztergom and Szekesfeherv^r, 
and sometimes even precede them.
From the second half of the 1020s, King Stephen I created a principality 
(ducatus) in the vast region of Bihar under the rule of his only surviving son, 
Prince Imre (Heinricus, Emericus). The establishment of the Diocese of Bihar 
in an area previously belonging to the Diocese of Eger, in 1030, and the 
concurrent founding of the See of Maros on territories formerly part of the 
Diocese of Kalocsa show the growing importance attached to the region. 
Prince Imre died in an accident in the Beretty6 Valley on 2 September, 1031 
while hunting wild boars. A monastery was founded on the probable scene 
of the accident at the end of the eleventh century (Hegykozszentimre).
Gerald (Gerhardt) of Venice, the great missionary saint of the Hungarian 
church was appointed bishop of Csan&d in 1030 (Annales Posoniensis), al­
though for a long time his bishopric would still be known as the Diocese of 
Maros (Moresenae aecclesia). After the death of King Stephen I, the bishop 
became the living conscience of the Christian kingdom. Even the atrocities 
committed by King Samuel Aba in Csanadvar in 1044 failed to intimidate 
him and he refused to place the crown on the king's head in the cathedral 
on 22 April, Easter Sunday. It was in Csanadvar that people opposing Pe­
ter's second reign gathered in 1046 and, with Gerald's support, set out from 
here to ask the heir to the throne, Prince Andr&s of the House of ArpSd, to 
return to Hungary. Gerald founded the episcopal Cathedral of Saint George 
(the burial place of Ladislas IV since 1290) using the 1000 silver marks do­
nated by King Stephen I and subsequently supervised its construction. King 
Stephen I had also given gold and silver worth 500 marks to Gerald to erect 
the Monastery of the Blessed Virgin Mary, where Gerald later wrote the 
first of his theological works completed in Hungary, the Deliberatio supra 
hymnum trium puerorum  (Deliberation on the Hymn of the Three Boys). He 
suffered martyrdom on 24 September, 1046, and by 1053 his body had been 
taken to Csan£dv&r to be buried in the Monastery of the Blessed Virgin 
Mary. The large piece of stone that had been the instrument of his martyr­
dom was placed on his sarcophagus. His remains were "elevated" on papal 
instruction in the presence of King Ladislas I and Prince Lampert on 25 
July, 1088. Thus, the first Hungarian bishop-martyr was canonized at Csa- 
n&dv&r.
Biharv&r had a stormier history. King Andrew I revived the principality 
between 1048 and 1050, initially putting Prince Bela, his younger brother 
and heir to the throne, in charge, and giving him the right to mint his own 
money. In 1060, Bela used the principality's military force to overthrow the 
rule of King Andrew and his son, Solomon. Nevertheless, after the death of 
King B61a I, King Solomon was forced to hand over the principality to Bela's
son, G6za (called "M agnus dux" on the principality's coins between 1064 
and 1074). During these decades, Biharv&r was practically the second capi­
tal of Hungary. It was hardly a coincidence, then, that such eminent person­
alities headed the Diocese of Bihar as the — presumably Italian — Baduil 
(Budli/Buldi, Budlu), who suffered martyrdom together with Bishop Gerald 
in 1046, or Baduil's successor and the future bishop of Eger, Leodvin of 
Lorraine (Namur) (mentioned before 1061 as Lieduinus episcopus Bichariensis 
between 1064 and 1074). Several princely mansion-houses were built in the 
area. It was from Bihar that Geza and Ladislas organized the revolt against 
King Solomon in 1073, and from here that Ladislas set out to get forcing 
help, while Geza's "Bihar army" was defeated on 26 February, 1074. Then, 
the same army, led by Prince Ladislas, thoroughly redeemed its honour at 
Mogyor6d less than two weeks later on 14 March, 1074. After G£za I as­
sumed power, Prince Ladislas became dux (1075-1077).
When B61a I seized power in the autumn of 1060, or when the pagans 
rose in revolt in SzekesfehervSr in 1061, the remains of King Stephen I were 
"raised" (Translatio S. Stephani regis, 11 October) and hidden under a huge 
stone slab in Szekesfeherv^r. It was at that time that his mummified right 
arm and hand were taken to Bihar. The thief hid them in a small wooden 
monastery until the third year after the second translatio occasioned by King 
Stephen I's canonization on 20 August, 1083, when the incident came to light 
(1086). King Saint Ladislas I and Prince Almos ordered the building of a mon­
astery for the Holy Dexter (Sanctissima Dextera, in Old Hungarian: Szent 
Jobb) on the spot. It was there that Hungary's national relic was kept until 
1433. Although King Coloman stripped the monastery of the lands and privi­
leges transferred to it by Prince Almos, including the salt tax of Szalacs, the 
lands were returned by G6za II. Later, considerable compensation was given 
to the monastery when it was made a locus credibilis, with authority to han­
dle legal business. Since almost all the estates of the abbey (also known later 
as Beretty6monostor) lay within the territory of modern Hungary (except, 
for example, Sfri near Vilagosvdr), no conclusions about the economy of 
Transylvania and the eastern part of the Great Hungarian Plain can be drawn 
from a survey of the sixteen different crafts professed by members of the 
roughly 90 households which rendered service to the abbey.
After founding Varad, Ladislas I first established a collegiate chapter in 
the newly built fortress and then moved the See of Bihar within the castle 
wall as well. His nephew and successor to the throne, Coloman, became the 
first bishop of V irad (between 1093 and 1095). Coloman's younger brother, 
Almos, earlier (1091-1095) king of Croatia which had been conquered by 
Ladislas I, became the last dux of Bihar (1095-1106), although without the 
right to mint his own coins. It was Almos who founded the Benedictine 
Monastery of Meszes in Transylvania around 1106. Following his pilgrim­
age to Jerusalem, he founded the Abbey of Domos (1108), donating about a 
hundred estates to it. They included several villages in the region between 
the Feher-Koros and the Fekete-Koros rivers and along the Maros River. 
The transferance of King Ladislas I's remains from Somogyvar to Varad 
perhaps also took place during Almos's reign (1098?). It was to have enor­
mous consequences when, a few decades later, the town was to become the 
second most important religious and cultural centre of the mediaeval King- 142
dom of Hungary, second only to Szekesfehervar. After the canonization of 
Ladislas I in Varad (1192), the area surrounding his grave became the burial 
place of kings and queens. (Among the first who found a resting place here 
were Andrew II [temporarily], Queen Beatrix of Luxemburg, Queen Mary 
of Anjou, and the king and emperor Sigismund of Luxemburg.) King Stephen
II founded Hungary's first Premonstrant abbey on the northern bank of the 
Sebeskoros on the Promontorium of V&rad, inviting monks from Premontre 
in the same decade as the order was established (1119). With authority over 
all the Premonstrant monasteries in Hungary, it was at this abbey that King 
Stephen II was buried in 1131. Since the first miracles around the tomb of 
Ladislas took place during Stephen's reign, it is entirely possible that the 
latter's remains were later taken to the Cathedral of V&rad. During the reign 
of Stephen II, there was a war of sorts on the southern borders. The Byzan­
tine emperor, Ioannes II Comnenus crossed the Danube at Haramvar and 
chased a Hungarian army as far as the Krass6 River. Otherwise these odd 
hostilities were confined to the destruction of each other's fortresses and 
the carrying off of the building material (1127-1129).27
The plains outside Aradv&r gained notoriety in connection with the gen­
eral assembly of 1031. It was here that sixty-eight noblemen supporting 
Coloman were massacred by the followers of Almos on orders from Helene, 
queen of Bela II. The confiscated wealth of the victims was later used to 
build the Abbey of Saint Martin on the spot by way of expiation. The build­
ing has already been completed by the reign of Stephen III, since people 
were buried around it in those years. The imposing ruins we see today are 
those of the rebuilt church consecrated in 1224. Its properties, donated by 
Bela III and registered in 1177, included besides villages in the counties of 
Arad, Zarand, Bihar and Temes, some Transylvanian estates: a piece of land 
in Torda county (whence the boats of the abbey stationed at Arad started 
out with their consignments of salt), and the previously mentioned village 
of Asszonynepe, to which we shall have occasion to return.
The history of the period came to a close with an attack by the Byzantines. 
Emperor Manuel I Comnenus marched to the Lower Danube in the autumn 
of 1150, and sent an army to the "land of Timises" (the Temes region). The 
army was led by Boris, a pretender to the Hungarian throne. The invaders, 
after plundering the wealthy market towns, fled in disgrace at the approach 
of the army of King Geza II, as we learn from the confirming reports of 
Ioannes Cinnamus,28 as well as Abu Hamid al-Gamati, from Granada who 
happened to be in Hungary at the time.
To complete the history of the period, the Cistercian Abbey of Egres, 
founded by Bela III on the left bank of the Maros River in 1179 must surely 
be mentioned. This was the second Cistercian abbey established in Hun­
gary after the one built at C ikidor in 1142. Built by French friars from Pon- 
tigny in the French style, it was to be the mother house of the Cistercian 
abbey to be built in Kerc in Transylvania in 1202. Queen Jolanta of Capet- 
Courtenay was buried in the Monastery of Egres in 1233 as was King And­
rew II in 1235.
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Transylvania after 1003 until the Last Quarter 
of the Twelfth Century
Although the Annals o f  Hildesheim  and Altaich leave no doubt about the en­
forced conversions that took place among the mostly pagan population of 
the region immediately after the gyula and his family were taken to Pannonia 
in 1003, there is also some earlier evidence on the organization of political 
power. Fortresses built with earth-and-timber ramparts were raised on this 
strip of land as soon as it was annexed to the kingdom. The work was car­
ried out under the command of people such as comes (ispan) Doboka (said 
to be related to the king) and the father of Csankd, the future comes of 
Marosv&r. At the time of the Pecheneg attack on Transylvania (an event 
which has been emphasized in all three legends of Saint Stephen and which 
took place sometime between 1015 and 1030), the village folk were herded 
within the walls of the castles until the Transylvanian army, commanded 
by the tribunus of Feherv^r, put the pillaging enemy to flight. The popula­
tion who "fled to safety within the walls" could not have been very numer­
ous, although the walls were already standing and, according to the Legenda 
minor, the castle of Feherv^r withstood the enemy attack.
It was in these years that the system of royal castles introduced by Stephen 
I were being built over the whole country. By the end of Stephen's rule, they 
numbered nearly forty. Alba civitas (Gyulafehervar), the most important of 
them in Transylvania, was protected by the stone walls left by the Romans.
Like Szekesfeherv^r, its sister castle in Pannonia, it was called "w hite" not 
only because of its walls but also to mark its position as the first among 
equals. The city that for a considerable time was only referred to as "Alba 
Ultrasilvana" or "Alba Transilvana" was called "(civitas) Alba Iule" in the 
Transylvanian sources. It was only later that the humanists' predilection 
for classical languages caused it to be changed to "Alba Julia" (the first 
documented occurrence of the term is in 1496).
Following practice current all over Hungary, the rest of the royal castles 
were named either after their first ispan, that is the official appointed by the 
king, who was responsible for administering the region and for the people 
belonging to the castle (e.g. Dobuka/Doboka, Turda/Torda, Colus/Kolozs, 
Hunod/Hunyad, Bihor/Bihar and Urod/Arad), or the river flowing by them 
(e.g. KiikullSv^r, Krasznav&r, Marosvar later called Csan&dv&r, Temesvar 
and Krassov^r). The direct adoption of personal names in nominative as 
place-names is a peculiarity of the Hungarian language. W henever it oc­
curs, we can be sure that we are dealing with Hungarian nomenclature, 
even in instances where the Hungarian origin of the name is doubtful or not 
verifiable (such as the presum ably Slavic Bihar, Doboka, Kolozs and 
Szatmdr). For example, the names given to the salt mines belonging to these 
castles had the Slavic word akna (pit) affixed to the names of the ruling 
ispans, and exemplify this use of personal names. (For Kolozsakna, Torda- 
akna, Desakna, read: Kolozs's akna, Torda's akna and Des's akna).
The early Transylvanian counties were all, without exception, border 
counties (marchiae, comitati confiniorum), each headed by an ispan. The cas­
tles serving as the ispans' seats of government were all built in the inner 144
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western half of the counties, for example Dobokav^r, Kolozsv&r, Tordavar 
and Gyulafehervar, as well as Hunyadv^r located at the point of entry to 
the H&tszeg Basin. The situation is somewhat different only in the case of 
the "easternm ost" castle, Kiikull6v^r. For a long period, the ill-defined 
marches marked the eastern, southeastern and southern boundaries of the 
early border counties. Approaching the Carpathians, regarded as the natu­
ral, theoretical border, the frontiers became increasingly blurred, until they 
disappeared in precisely the same manner as they did in the case of the 
other border counties of the early Arp&d period (Zala in the west, Borsova, 
Zemplen, Ujvar and GOmor in the north). The elongated (in the case of Feher 
county, undetermined) shape of the border counties stretching across the 
uninhabited or sparsely populated woodlands up to the peaks of the moun­
tains a priori exclude the possibility that they could ever have had any ear­
lier precedents, in the form of a voivodate or a kenezate. With the exception 
of Gyulafehervar, no precedents can be verified for the ispan's castles either. 
The composition of these counties was essentially similar to that of Szolnok 
county which was created for the overland transport of Transylvanian salt 
consignments. The county of "Ktilsd" (Outer)-Szolnok had been established 
along the Tisza River during the reign of Stephen I between 1018 and 1038. 
It was named after the comes Zounuk/Zounok/Zonuk/Zonok (pronounced 
like the Hungarian word szonok, meaning orator) who lost his life in the pa­
gan revolt of 1046. His old Hungarian name has nothing to do with the 
Slavic word "sol" meaning "salt", and used to mean "salt" in the Hungarian 
language of the Ugric Age. The present form, Szolnok developed in the Late 
Middle Ages. This county extended across the region east of the Tisza ("Ko- 
z6p" [Central] Szolnok) along the salt road of Szalacs (magna via Zoloch, 
which definitely existed previous to 1067) to include Desvar and Desakna in 
northern Transylvania under the name of "Bels<5" (Inner)-Szolnok either at 
the time of King Bela I or King Geza I. It is entirely possible that the later 
county name derives from Zounuk, who in 1073 was one of Prince Gaza's 
chief advisors.
Some Hungarian historians claim that the county system in Hungary 
was organized over the two-thirds appropriated from the lands of the con­
quering ancient clans. As far as the Transylvanian border counties were 
concerned, this is highly unlikely. Although the Gyula-Zsombor clan may 
have been present (though, more likely, it was not) in Doboka county the 
inhabitants were simply descendants of the clans of the gyulas. The gyula, 
who only moved to Transylvania in the last third of the tenth century, can­
not be regarded as a descendant of the Transylvanian conquerors. Also, the 
family of the "gyula" (Queen Mother Sharolt, Boja and Bony ha) remained 
loyal to the end to Stephen I, therefore, their estates were not confiscated.
It can be verified, however, that, in addition to the lands of the royal 
castles appropriated from the gyula's lands, the queen's estates had already 
come into being during the reign of Stephen I. The Hungarian word asszony 
originating in the Alan-Osset language means "lady, princess, queen" in 
Old Hungarian. The name of the village of Asszonynepe (Lady's people) in 
Feher county is the first occurrence, both in type and in time, of composite 
names containing the word asszony (1177: "Ascen nepe"). In or around 1030, 
Queen Gizella (Kesla), "with the consent of King Stephen", donated to the
5. Crucifixion. Detail from the high altar in the Lutheran church at Medgyes, Nagy-
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Abbey of Bakonybel the nearby village of Lopath (Magyar-LapM), situated 
along the same little stream, together with the now vanished Transylvanian 
village of Abony (Obon), according to the oldest charter making reference 
to "across the snow-capped mountains", that is Transylvania.
Although most of the first ispdns in Transylvania are known to us by 
name, precious little is known about the people they ruled. We have no 
information for this period about the landed families (seniores) of independ­
ent means (facultas) posing as rivals to the ispdns, with only two possible 
exceptions, the Kalan and Kajan families in Hunyad county. On the evi­
dence of identical place-names in the region east of the Tisza River, how­
ever, their ancestors, came to the Strigy and Maros valleys at the time of the 
gyulas. The Zsombor-clan (as the Zsombor-villages indicate their early es­
tates on the northern rim of the county of Doboka in the Alm&s Valley) 
played only a periferical role or was forced to do so in the eleventh century.
Once the region was integrated into the Kingdom of Hungary, there is 
no reason to assume that the social structure in Transylvania was any dif­
ferent from that mentioned in Stephen I's law books and Admonitiones. The 
castles, the swords and the spurs testify to the life-styles of the ispdns (comites), 
always described as the strongest supporters of the state, and of the sol­
diers (milites) who defended the castles. The latter were armed bondsmen 
(iobagiones) who lived in permanent residences (domus, edificia). Their ori­
gins must mostly have been Transylvanian: they were probably the descend­
ants of former border guards (speculatores) and the military escort of the 
gyulas. There is no indication that Stephen I ever moved significant forces 
from Hungary into the region. The ijiajority of those living inside the walls 
of the castles (cives) belonged to the social group of freemen (liberi) who also 
included the just emancipated, previously partially-free population (liberti). 
These are the people who were buried in the cemeteries of the castles with 
their jewellery and silver coins. Graves totally lacking in grave goods in the 
castle cemeteries tell of servant burials (servi, mancipii). As anywhere in 
Hungary, the common people and poor freemen (vulgares aut pauperes) in 
Transylvania, lived in villages (villae), houses (mansi), and semi-subterra- 
nean huts (mansinculae). Evidence from the cemeteries shows that the popu­
lation of these villages were also divided along family lines. Unlike the serv­
ants who came with the slave trade, these people almost certainly arrived 
at the time of the Conquest. In Transylvania, too, the villages were led by a 
village chief (villicus). Nowhere in the sources can we find any mention of 
organizations based on kinship or synthetic clans.
There is little sign of change in these social divisions in either the char­
ters of the middle third of the century or the so-called Third Law-book o f  
Ladislas compiled around 1077. There were poor people (ewnek = mek) both 
among the freemen and the semi-free servants, who nevertheless were fi­
nancially and legally in a far better position than the slaves. Considerable 
changes seem to have taken place, on the other hand, judging by late elev­
enth century legislation and charters dated from the turn of the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries including references to Transylvania. In short, there 
is no reason to believe that this region differed in its development from the 
rest of Hungary. The nobility (nobiles, optimates, proceres) and the military 
(milites) became the new ruling class. Members of the latter may even, by 
then, be described as knights. The population of the castles (cives, castrenses)
naturally consisted of freemen (liberi), but by then they had split demon­
strably into two groups: the professional soldiers (castellani, cives castrensis) 
and the bondsmen (iobagiones castri) of earlier times. As their contemporary 
Latin name indicates (ministri, ministeriales = people on duty), the latter were 
well on the way towards being swallowed up by the great new class of the 
common people (plebs, plebeia). The trend to growing differentiation is re­
flected in the various new designations for the free inhabitants of the castles 
(civiles, castrenses castri, populi castri, curtes-udvomici). These free and par­
tially free people were employed in service but nevertheless were still well 
above the great strata of slave-servants (servi, ancillae).
The Diocese of Transylvania was most probably established very early 
on, possibly in 1009, following the personal intervention of the papal legate, 
Azo, and concurrently with the founding of the dioceses of P£cs, Gy6r and 
Eger. Its seat was established in Gyulafeherv&r, where the Byzantine rite 
had yet to be completely suppressed. It is for this reason possible that the 
first episcopal church dedicated to Saint Michael (one which within dec­
ades would prove too small) was completed before 1009. The process of 
Christian conversion could hardly have encountered any serious opposi­
tion from the population. Its successes are soon evident from the cemeteries 
of the counties administered from the castles, although primarily only those 
with larger populations. It was only later that the Transylvanian bishops 
began to exert any real power over the counties of Kraszna, Szatmar and 
Ugocsa, which were sparsely populated, mostly by Slavs. The first bishop 
of Transylvania known to us by name was called Franco, according to a 
charter dated from 1075. Franco participated actively in the political life of 
the country. In Hungarian and foreign sources of between 1071 and 1081, 
he is referred to as "episcopus Bellegrad(i)ensis", using Gyulafeherv&r's Slavic 
name. The title of "bishop of Transylvania" (Ultra silvanus) was first used 
only in connection with his next known successor, Simon. Simon's succes­
sors, however, were all explicitly referred to as "ultrasilvani" (Baran 1138, 
Valter 1156, and Vilcina/Vulcina 1166). The change of title probably re­
flected the marked growth in the territory of the diocese during the twelfth 
century. By this period, the areas of the early deaneries set up in the first 
years of King Coloman's reign coincided with the areas of the counties that 
had since emerged. Probably Coloman was the one who founded the Chap­
ter of Gyulafeherv&r.
Not many major political and military events took place in Transylvania 
in this period. The only evidence of the opposition to the reign of King Peter 
in the region is the hoard of silver coins hidden sometime between 1041 and 
1046 in L^mkerek (between Sebes and Gyulafehervar).
The army of the Pecheneg tribe Jula29 led by Dux Osul, easily penetrated 
the marches from Moldavia when it raided Transylvania in 1068. The army
29. The description of the event can be found in the Chronica Hungarorum 102 
(SRH 1,367), where Osul was sent by "Gyule dux Cunorum" the late Hungarian 
personification of the Pecheneg Gula/Jula tribe, who settled west from the 
Dniester, not far from Turkia. By this time the Hungarian gyula, a name of rank, 
became an everyday personal name; cf. in the 1075 Charter of Garamszent- 
benedek: lula comes palatinus. Therefore, with the leadership of Osul, a hostile 
Pecheneg army attacked Hungary and Transylvania. The story of "Alba Iulia", 
14/ the Pecheneg lord of Gyulafehervar is an entire fabrication.
reached Biharvkr after burning down O-Kolozsv^r. Returning to Transyl­
vania through the valley of the Nyirs6g, the Szamos region and along the 
Lapos-Ilosva Valley, they hoped to escape with their booty through the Borg6 
Pass. The armies of the king and the prince gathered at Dobokav&r — first 
mentioned in an eleventh-century chronicle in connection with this event
— and cut off the enemy at the confluence of the Saj6 and Beszterce rivers. 
The Pechenegs fled to a hill but were completely wiped out by King Solo­
mon and his army in a daring frontal attack.
The hill where the battle took place was named after the battle cry of the 
Hungarians, "Kyrie eleis", from which the modem Hungarian place-name 
"Kerl6s" derives. In Romanian, "Kerles" was transformed into "Chirales", 
although it entered Hungarian poetry in the form of "Cserhalom " as the 
result of one of Bonfini's mistakes ("Cherhelem"). The memory of the battle 
itself was merged into the St. Ladislas Legend after going through substantial 
changes. As the commander of the Hungarians, King Solomon was replaced 
by Prince (and even King) Ladislas, and it was he who was described as 
having rescued the daughter of the bishop of Varad from the hands of the 
"Cum an" enemy.
These are very grave anachronisms, indeed, considering that the See of 
Bihar was only moved to V&rad a quarter of a century later and that the 
Cumans (Kipcak Turks) were still living east of the Dnieper in 1068, and so 
on. The mention in the legend of "the bishop's daughter", however, indi­
cates that the legend must have been created very soon after the death of 
Ladislas I, since in the book of his laws King Coloman prohibited the mar­
riage of bishops once and for all. After Ladislas I was canonized in 1192, 
this story — constructed of ancient eastern elements —, lived on along with 
his church legend. It became the most popular theme depicted in several 
episodes on cathedral frescoes (Nagyv&rad) and, following Sigism und's 
reign, in village churches, too. Neither is it a coincidence that it is the village 
churches of the Sz£kelyfold that most of these frescoes have been preserved.
According to the passage which relates the event in the eleventh-century 
Old Gesta it was a scout (speculator) from "Ujv&r” (de Novo Castro) who 
informed the Hungarian army stationed at Dobokavar about the escape 
route of the Pechenegs. It is possible, therefore, that the construction of 
"Ujv&r" (Marosujv&r), the fortress securing the salt mines and the salt roads 
in the vicinity of "U jakna", had been completed by 1068. There was a great 
need for it because, according to the charter of the Abbey of Garamszent- 
benedek, which had been given the right to collect salt taxes on the Aranyos 
River (Aranas in 1075), the castrum quod dicitur Turda ("the castle which is 
called Torda") (this is the first occasion that the fortress is mentioned) to the 
west of the already-working salt mine of Tordaakna could not protect the 
mine against enemy attacks coming from the Maros River. Nevertheless, 
everything seems to support the theory that the outer ring of fortresses pro­
tecting the Transylvanian Basin was built as a response to the incursion of 
1068 because the defence system, based on the marches and the uninhab­
ited strips of land along them, had proved ineffective against the light cav­
alry of the eastern invaders. It is not known exactly how many fortresses 
were involved. It would be as irresponsible to try and deduce a figure from 
later evidence as from the sheer existence of the earthworks surveyed with­
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out excavations. Only one thing is certain, namely, that in the last third of 
the eleventh century the populated area protected by fortresses grew sub­
stantially.
The new ring of fortresses was put to the test in the spring of 1091. The 
first real attack of the Cumans, led by Krul's son Kapoltch, probably came 
through the Ojtoz Pass. Again, passing through O-Tordav&r, 6-Kolozsv^r 
and Doboka they reached V&rad, Bihar and, after crossing even the Tisza 
River, they came to the Temes region where they finally encountered the 
army of Ladislas I. Ladislas had already recognized the failure of the bor­
der fortresses and had initiated the in-depth redistribution of his defences. 
He moved mounted archers from Bihar as well as from the western, south­
western and southern border counties behind the outer ring of fortresses 
(Second Statute of Ladislaus 17.1.: custodes confiniorum qui vulgo ewrii vocantur 
[border guards who are commonly called ewrii =ordk]). Archers were moved 
in smaller numbers to the Saj6 region, and in more significant numbers to 
the area south of the Maros River, along the Sebes River and the region of 
Nagy-Kukull6. These early border-guard settlers of Ladislas I would be­
come the creators, the most devoted disciples and propagators of the Saint 
Ladislas cult. The future Szekely administrative units, branches and clans 
were to be named after their habitats (Sebes, Orb6 and Kezd, later prefixed 
with the word Szdsz meaning Saxon), in the same way as their earlier Transyl­
vanian settlements (Telegd and Medgyes) had been. They built wooden and 
stone churches in their villages and had begun to bury their dead around 
these churches by the time of Coloman.
The names of most of their villages and settlements survived even after 
they were transferred to the east. Their early seats and lands were later 
recalled as "deserta", deserted (1224) only because they had to evacuate them 
for the immigrant Saxon colonists.
Hungarians and Slavs
German place-names have verified the presence of early Hungarian bor­
der-guard settlements since the twelfth century. According to Istvan Knie- 
zsa's now-classic research: "The Saxon place-names from northeastern and 
southern Transylvania yield very good evidence in the region. For in the 
northeast, along the Saj6 River which flows into the Nagy-Szamos not far 
from Bethlen, as well as in the area to the west, the German place-names of 
the Saxon population, with only one or two exceptions, all derive from the 
Hungarian" (e.g. Sarvar-Schueret-Sirioara; Kendtelek-Kindeln-Chintelecu; 
V erm es-W arm esch-V erm es; K£kes-K ikesch-Chiochis; Som kerek-Sim - 
krugen-^intereag, with the third version being Romanian). "Similarly, there 
is a remarkably large number of Saxon place-names, both in the area be­
tween the two Ktikullds and in the Kiralyfold between the Nagy-Kiikull6- 
Maros line and the Olt River which also came originally from the Hungar­
ian. These place-names convincingly prove that when the Saxons settled in 
the area they found permanent Hungarian settlements already in place. Since 
it is known that the Saxons moved to their present habitat area in the mid-
die of the twelfth century, the Hungarian settlements must be placed ear­
lier, at least to the beginning of the twelfth century or perhaps to the second 
half of the eleventh century. (E.g. Ormenyes-Irmesch-Ormenis; Holdvilag- 
Halwelagen-Hoghilag;Ludas-Lodges/Ludesch-Ludos; VesszSd-W assied- 
Vesaud; M edgyes-M ediasch-M edias; Barom lak-W urm loch-Vorum loc; 
S& rpatak-Scharpendorf-^arpotok; K 6zd-K eisd-C hizdu; E gerbegy-A r- 
begen-Agarbiciu; Bilrkos-Burkesch-Birgis; KOvesd-Kabisch-Coves; Ho- 
mor6d-Ham ruden-Hom orod; Halm&gy-Halmagen-Halmeag; A rp£s-Ar- 
pasch-Arpasu and Talmdcs-Talmesch-Talmaciu.) "In the Barcas&g, ... un­
like the Saxon regions mentioned so far, not a single Saxon place-name de­
rived from the Hungarian can be found... no Hungarian population to speak 
of could have lived here prior to the arrival of the Saxons ... It also follows 
from this reasoning that the SzSkely people could not have settled in the 
area known today as the counties of Csfk and Haromszek before the middle 
of the twelfth century."30
Already Kniezsa discovered significant eleventh- and twelfth-century 
surviving Slavic population groups in the region stretching from the Latorca 
River across the valleys of Tur-Kraszna to Beszterce. This finding can be 
complemented with results from later studies which show that the large 
majority of such eastern Slavic place-names from the Arp&d period as " Ard6" 
(forest guard/forester) and "D ar6c" (trapper/forest hunter) originated in 
this area. The results also demonstrate that the Szildgys^g, the M&ramaros 
and the Beszterce regions were once one huge woodland area where it was 
possible to find Slavic servants of the king holding the above names as per­
sonal names even as late as the thirteenth century. Igalja (Igyalja), the first 
village w ith a Hungarian name, appears in Doboka (northwest of the 
Kir&lyfCld of Beszterce and east of the Saj6 Valley) in a charter from the 
time of Bela III. This village later assumed the name of the Church of Saint 
Andrew which was already standing at the time of this first mention. Even 
a hundred years later, however, the estate consisted mostly of woods, bushes, 
groves and meadows.
The most important evidence for the continuing presence of the Slavic 
population in Transylvania has been provided by the names of the smaller 
rivers and streams. Of all the tributaries of the united Szamos, the Krasna, 
Tur, Tur6c, Pisterna, Lekence, Kapnik, Debrek and Debreke (Melsed = 
Melysed, in Arpadian Hungarian) rivers have Slavic names, as do the Lozdd, 
Lona, Gorb6 on the left side of the Kis-Szamos, and the Tiha, IloSva, Ilva, 
Salva, Rebra, Besterce and Lekence on both sides of the Nagy-Szamos. There 
are fewer rivers with Slavic names along the Maros River: the Kalodva, 
Orb6 and Lekence. Of the rivers flowing into the Aranyos, only the Tur and 
the Torock6 have Slavic names. On the other hand, there are more such 
rivers in Hunyad, and these include the LeSnek, Strig, Dobra, Cema and 
Bistra. The parallel Slavic name of Tirnava for the Kiikullc5s has already 
been mentioned in the chapter on the Avar-Bulgar period. The left-side 
tributaries of the FelsS-Olt also have Slavic names, including Toplica, Kis-
3 0 .1. K n ie z sa ,  Magyarorsz^g n£pei a Xl-dik sz&zadban. (The Peoples of Hungary in 
the Eleventh Century.) In: Szent Istvan Emlekkotryv. (Saint Stephen Memorial 
Volume.) II. Budapest 1938, 389, 447. 150
Besterce, Cemavoda, K^son, Kov£sna, and Debrenpatak, as do the streams 
of the Cema and Gerebenc in the region of the Olt bend and its tributaries, 
the Cibin, the Cemavoda and Cdd in Szeben. Most of the tributaries in the 
upper region of the Temes River have Slavic names such as Gladna, Bistra, 
Cema and Lank6.
There is an equally large, or perhaps even larger, number of streams and 
small rivers with Hungarian names in Transylvania, such as Szil£gy, Egregy, 
Alm£s, L3pos, Bereksz6, Hagym^s, N3das, Ludas, Kapus, Ftizes, Fej£rd, 
Gyekenyes, Melyes, Hodos, Saj6 and Fenes — all of which flow into the 
Szamos River; and the following tributaries of the Maros River: Tekerd, 
Bekdny, Kdves, Kigyds, Ezenes, Magyaros = Mogyor6s, Gdrgeny, Nyarad, 
Egregy (the Hungarian name given to the Cema), Farkad, Gydgy = Di6d, 
the other Gy6gy, Aranyos, with the Monyordspataka and Sdspataka brooks 
flowing into it; Koml6d, Ludas, Sebes, and the Ktikullds with Szekes, Szek^s, 
Buzgds^r, Segesd, Csergdd, Fenes, Kdrtvelyes, Szilas, Egres, Hagymas, and 
Sdsed/Sdspatak flowing into them. Of the tributaries of the Olt River, Fekete- 
iigy (Hungarian name for the Cemavoda), Vargyas, the two Homordds, 
Kozd (1206: Cwezfey), Kokdnyes, Kormos, Saros, Sebes, Arp£s, HortobSgy, 
another Sebes and Feketeviz all have Hungarian names. Into the Slavic- 
named Krasna flow the Slavic Zolina and Sereden as well as the Hungarian 
Eldpatak, Bikagytir, Egres, and Szekpataka. The same Slavic-Hungarian dual 
nomenclature is found around the headwaters of the Kdros rivers. The Slavic 
Bistra/Besterce and Derna and the Hungarian Almas, Gyiimdlcsenes, Gye- 
pes, Er and Jdn3s flow into the Hungarian Berettyd. At the river-head of the 
Sebes-Kdrds there is the Slavic (?) Kalota, but right after it the Hungarian 
Sebes, Mehsed, Hegyes, Kutas, Ny&rer, Koleser follow each other. In the 
Middle Ages the tributaries of the Fekete-Kdros had only Hungarian names: 
Belenyes, Fenes, Solymos, Holldd, Hodos, Gyepes. A big tributary of the 
Temes is the Hungarian Sebes.
Apart from the ancient names of the Maros, Kdros, Szamos, Olt, Ompoly 
and Berzava rivers (all of which came into the Romanian language after 
going through Slavic or Old Hungarian transmutations) only the three river 
names of suspected Turkic origin in the upper region of the Olt River, the 
Barot, Barca and the Brassd, should be mentioned. With that, all Transylva­
nian rivers worth the name have been accounted for.
Only one conclusion may be drawn from these river names, which usu­
ally prove much more lasting than other kinds of geographical names. 
Transylvania must have been inhabited by two different peoples up until 
the end of the twelfth century, the widely scattered Slavs who arrived ear­
lier and the Hungarians who have been continuously present in the region 
since the tenth century. The Slavs lived almost everywhere in Transylvania, 
although after the Hungarian Conquest larger groups of Slavic settlements 
were only in the Kraszna region, between the Szamos, Nagy-Szamos and 
Upper Tisza rivers, in the Haromszek Basin, in the area between the Sztrigy 
and the Szeben rivers, and in Krasso-Szoreny. There was also a smaller Slav 
population in the Aranyos region. By the twelfth century, these larger Slavic 
blocks became further diluted. In those times the Slavs and Hungarians 
lived mixed almost over the whole of Transylvania. The Slavic and Hun­
garian names of 143 rivers were adopted in still recognizable forms by the
German-speaking population except for the smallest streams and without 
exception by the Romanian speaking people of Transylvania. Not even a 
m ountain stream with Romanian name could be found in the whole of 
Transylvania up until the fifteenth century.
The question of place-names is only mentioned briefly here since Slavic 
place-names had also been adopted by the Hungarians, the Germans (Rudna, 
Bistritz, etc.) and the Romanians, the last mostly from the first two. The 
significance of the Slavic place-names, and consequently of Transylvania's 
autochthonous Slavic population, must not, however, be overestimated. Of 
the 1119 Transylvanian place-names known from various charters before 
1400, only 104 are Slavic in origin, that is, less than ten per cent. There are 
some place-names in central Transylvania, around the confluence of the 
Maros and Ktiktillfi rivers, which have definitely been borrowed from the 
Slavic language, such as the two Gerends, Domb6, Dombr6 and Gambuc. 
In these names, the Hungarian kept the nasal vowels that later disappeared 
from the Slavic language.
In reality, Hungarian place-names dominate the whole of Transylvania. 
In practice these place-names include nouns in the nominative case refer­
ring to a tribe, a people, a person or a trade, and from the twelfth century 
onward, the patron saint of a church. This way of denominating places is 
unknown in Slavic, German and Romanian. The following Slavic names for 
occupations appear everywhere over the entire Carpathian Basin: Bocsir = 
cup-bearer; Csatar = armourer; Hari = cook; Igric = entertainer. Similarly, 
the Hungarian nomenclature derived from certain trades of the so-called 
service-villages is not unique to Transylvania, either. Such names include 
Sz&nt6 = ploughman, Kovicsi = blacksmith, Fazekas = potter, Ebes = mas­
ter of hounds, Solymos = falconer and Sz61os = wine-grower.
Politics in the Twelfth Century
In 1105, King Coloman created the title of ban for the supervision of the 
ispans governing in newly-conquered Croatia. It is customary to place the 
origins of Transylvania's government as a discrete territory and the emer­
gence of the title of "vajda" (voivoda) in the same period. For various rea­
sons, however, both the Hungarian and the Romanian historiographers have 
tried to push the roots of its government as an "independent" territory cen­
turies further back. Romanian scholars regard the title of voivode as the 
direct continuation, or perhaps the revival, of the voivodeship (voievodatul) 
of Gyalu, the supposed ninth-century dux "blacus"ot Anonymus. Anonymus 
wrote down the name in the form "Gelou/Golou/Geleou" in the thirteenth 
century, although today's Romanian historiographers prefer the form "Gelu" 
used by Anonymus's fourteenth-century transcriber in the chapter titles 
(tituli). "G olou" can only be read as "Gyalu", which is a Hungarian name of 
Turkic origin (cf. the name of the village of Kun-Gyalu in the county of 
Szolnok, for example). His supposed castle mentioned by Anonymus obvi­
ously cannot be anything else but the curtis pontificalis, the summer resi­
dence of the Transylvanian bishops built next to a Roman castrum in Gyalu, 
referred to as "Golou" in a charter dated 1246. This is where Anonymus got 152
the name of the castle, and connected it with the title "gyula" (Geula), inter­
preted as a proper name. The only historically accurate piece of informa­
tion to be gleaned from this part of his account is that the fortified mansion- 
house of the Transylvanian bishops in Gyalu was, in fact, standing by around 
1200.
Hungarian scholars have looked for the origins of Transylvania's sepa­
rate government in various places: in the power of the gyulas; in the myste­
rious "Zolt^n of ErdSelve" (whom Stephen I supposedly appointed as gov­
ernor of Transylvania after the victory over the gyula); in the person of the 
"tribune" mentioned in the eleventh-century Minor Legend o f  St. Stephen; and 
in other "principes" which turn up in eleventh-century sources. But, in fact, 
it was only in 1526 that the chronicler known as the Anonymus Carthusian 
first called "the Gyula" a voivode. The vague fourteenth-century chronicle 
mentioned above calls Zoltan of Erdoelve the "forefather" ("proavus") of 
Stephen, which is clearly nonsense. The word "princeps", simply meaning 
"lord, or aristocrat", was used in connection with every prominent person 
in the eleventh century: the comes Zonok/Szolnok, after whom his county 
was named, was also referred to as "princeps". The title "Mercurius princeps 
Ultra silvanus" featuring in the often-quoted charter dating from 1111 is 
unlikely to have referred to a voivode, since only a few years previously — 
1097 — the same person had been referred to as "comes Bellegrat(a)e".
The voivodes sent to Transylvania as appointed royal functionaries rep­
resented the central power rather than some form of self-government. They 
only appeared after 1199, but then their presence here seems to have been 
continuous. By 1206, the office was rotated among five persons. The desig­
nation voievoda-voyvoda became permanently established beside the title comes 
Albe Transilvane, the latter being eventually dropped. The word voivode in 
the language of the Transylvanian Slavs and their relatives, had the mean­
ing of "seignior", "military commander" and "w ar lord". Referring to the 
Hungarian tribal chiefs, Constantine Porphyrogennetos used the same word, 
obviously as a result of having relied on Slavic interpreters. For the Transyl­
vanian Slavs, this word precisely fitted their notion of the gyulas' power, 
and later of the com es’ rank and office. It was hardly a coincidence that the 
comes of Doboka was referred to as the Voiouoda comes de Doboka in 1214. In 
any case, Gallus still bore the title comes Albensis Ultrasilvanus in 1177, with 
the charge or function of voivode appearing only later on.
This being so, it could not possibly have been the responsibility of the 
voivode to avert the biggest foreign attack on Transylvania that century. 
Continuing the hostilities that had taken place earlier in the Temeskoz, 
Manuel I launched a retaliatory campaign against King Stephen III from the 
direction of the Lower Danube region and the Black Sea. The attack in 1166 
was directed explicitly against Transylvania. Leon Vatatzes's army, con­
sisting mostly of Vlachs from the Balkan Mountains, probably invaded the 
"land of the Huns" via the Ojtoz Pass from the direction of the Euxinus 
(Black) Sea, where "he massacred everyone and trampled on everything 
that came his way without mercy".31 The carnage was immense and a great 
number of prisoners were taken. The report specifically mentions the horses
31. N. C h o n i a t e s ,  Epitome 16. = FBHH 238, 295.
seized by the enemy, thus providing the first evidence of the Transylvanian 
horse breeding that would become so famous later. The other Byzantine 
retaliatory cam paign was initiated from Vidin under the leadership of 
Ioannes Dukas. He raided the "land of the Huns" passing through some 
"difficult, uninhabitable terrain", which must refer either to the valleys of 
the Csema and Bisztra rivers through the Vaskapu (Iron Gate) of Hunyad 
or to the area along the valley of the Zsil River. He pillaged a number of 
larger villages and took rich booty, or at least that is what contemporary 
Byzantine chroniclers claimed.32
Economy and Population
Information concerning the economic history, geography and population of 
Transylvania has been preserved in documents from the last third of the 
eleventh century. While the passage in the Legenda Maior of Saint Gerald 
describing Saint Stephen's boats transporting salt on the Maros seems au­
thentic (cf. the story of Ajtony mentioned earlier), it was in 1075 that the salt 
tax (tributum salinarum) from a place near thecastrum oi Torda "ultra silvam", 
called Aranas in Hungarian, was mentioned in an authenticated charter for 
the first time. The occasion was King G6za I's waiving of half this salt tax in 
favour of the Abbey of Saint Benedict, situated by the Garam River. Shortly 
afterwards, we have reports of salt as a real form of endowment.
King Bela II's authenticated charter from around 1131,confirmed King La- 
dislas I's salt endowment of 1092 awarded to the Abbey of Saint Maurice in 
Bakonybel, which had been challenged during the reign of King Stephen II. 
Ladislas assigned twenty-four households (mansiones) to the Abbey, which 
were obliged to deliver 600 salt cubes (the number was later scratched out 
and "corrected" to 6,000) to the brothers four times a year (qui quattuor vicibus 
per annum sol deferrent scilicet, sexcentos lapides fratribus) ̂  There is little doubt 
about the salt coming from Transylvania, as can be seen from King B61a II's 
charter of 1138, which will be discussed later. At first reading, however, it 
is not clear whether the twenty-four heads of families listed by name were 
salt miners or only people who transported the salt, since their places of 
residence are not listed in the charter. The names of villages are also miss­
ing in that twelfth-century charter forged for the benefit of the Bakonybel 
abbey and dated to 1086, into which Ladislas's original deed of 1092 was 
inserted after the duties were generously increased. Still, it is more informa­
tive, insofar as it mentions a salt mine (salifodio), salt mining and three boats 
for transporting salt (navibus) in connection with the same twenty-four 
names. These names had come into Bela II's authentic charter of 1131 from 
Ladislas's lost charter of 1092. It is, therefore, precisely the late forgery which 
bears witness to Transylvania's salt revenues.33
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The members of the twenty-four households listed in the deed of 1092 in 
principle could have resided anywhere. However, their Transylvanian ori­
gin is supported by the very fact that the villages they lived in are not men­
tioned in the deed. In the same way, the villages of the surely Transylvani­
an salt transporters are not specified in the deed of 1138, either. This pecu­
liarity, while still needing further research, indicates that the miners and 
transporters of salt in early Transylvania were registered under the names 
of the heads of families and not by the names of their home villages.
The twenty-four names copied from the charter of 1092 support the Tran­
sylvanian origin of the salt transporters. It is in this charter that the word 
Scicul/Scichul, which is the oldest form of the designation "Szekely" (in 
Anonymus's Gesta: Sicul; in charters from 1213 and 1222: Sicul; in the 
Regestrum of Varad from 1217: Scecul) first appears and demonstrates the 
fact that those scholars of Turkic languages who earlier had tried to derive 
"Szekely" from the word sikil (recte: silik) or eskil/esekel were mistaken. Chris­
tian names — we find Paulus, Martinus and Michael — are still rare. There 
were many more unambiguous Hungarian servant names (San = Cs&ny; 
Nesinc = Nesincs; Nanasca = Nanasz/a/; Sacan = Cscikany; Zakan/Zachan 
= Z&k&ny; Bela; and Kasudi = Kasadi; Cuna = Csunya; Keta = Kot6; Rescadi 
= Reszedi). The Finno-Ugric suffix -di can also be found at the end of Slavic 
or other names (Zagordi, Bedladi), while the charter contains examples of 
purely Slavic names as well (Boguta and Walen). The remainder of the names, 
apart from a nickname (Negus), are hard to interpret (Lawa, Cunei, Zaut, 
Desce and Gnenu).
It was again King Bela II who, in a charter of 3 September, 1138,34 listed 
all those properties that in 1108 his father, Prince Almos, had donated to 
the Abbey of DSmOs and confirmed the ecclesiastics in their rights. Twenty- 
five transporters of salt were listed from the "salt village" of Sahtu/Sajti by 
the Maros River. Twice a year they were obliged to ferry the salt on the 
Maros from Transylvania to the market of Szombathely (forum Sumbuth) 
in the county of Arad. The salt transporters of Sajti had single-component 
Hungarian names, such as Aianduk = Aj^ndek, Bise = Bicse or Bese, Buken 
= Bokeny, Forcos = Farkas, Halaldi = Halaldi, Kewereg = Kevereg, Maradek 
= Maradek, Niundi =Nyundi, Numarek = Nyomorek, Silev = Stillo, Sima = 
Sima, Wendeg = Vendeg, Wosos = Vasas even their Christian names are 
Hungarian-sounding: Iwanus, Pedur, Michal, Niclous.
The 24,000 salt cubes — the number in the copy of 1329 was probably a 
later "correction" — transported to the Abbey of Domos by the people of 
Sajti (allatores salis = salt carriers) were carved out by members of those 
thirty Transylvanian households — In Ultrasilvanis partibus sunt mansiones 
cjue sal dare debent (In the Transylvanian Parts there are mansions which are 
obliged to give salt) — whose residence was so unclear in the 1138 copy of 
the same document. About three-fifths of the salt miners had single-compo­
nent Hungarian names: Wosas = Vasas, Besedi = Beszedi, Fuglidi = Fogolydi, 
Both = Bot, Vtos = Utas, Cima = Sima, Kosu = Kos, Halis = H&l&s/Hal£sz,
34. D. SzabO, A domosi prepostsag adom^nylevele. (The Deed of the Abbey of 
Domos.) Magyar Nyelv (Hungarian Language), 1936, 203ff.

Himudi = Himdi, Satadi = Csatadi (?), Sounik = Szonok, Orsci = Orrszi, 
Emis = Emes, Vza = Uza, Eulegen = Olegyen, Ellu = E116/E16, Wendi = 
Vendi. The remainder of the names were either Slavic — Kinis, Senin, Sokol, 
Lesin, Ginon and Viuscij (the Slavic Christian Wasil belongs to this group)
— or Christian: Martin, Simeon and Isaac. The origins of the names Vir and 
Ogsan are unknown, or rather, uncertain. The deeds of 1092 and 1138 pro­
vide the first chance to catch a glimpse of Transylvania's early ethnic com­
position. It is also worth noting that the forgeries and the transcriptions 
executed in the twelfth to the fourteenth centuries point to the dynamic 
growth of salt mining.
According to the deed of 1138, the people from the "Transylvanian areas" 
assigned to the Abbey of Domos were obliged to pay dues to the abbey in 
the form of the skins of twenty martens and one bear as well as one bison 
horn and one hundred leather belts. Unfortunately, names are not men­
tioned in the deed.
The perambulation of Asszonynepe, the estate donated to Abbey of Saint 
Maurice at Arad by King Bela II after 1131, were recorded in 1177.35 This is 
the oldest available information on Transylvanian village names. All the 
place-names specified are Hungarian: Feketefee = Feketefeje/f6; Hegeshol- 
m[ir]u = Hegyeshalom; Sossed = S6s-s6d; Husee Berke = Huseje/Huso/ 
Husi berke; Ret = Ret; Sciluas = Szilvas; Thow = T6; Feqet kopua = Fekete 
kapuja; Fequet = Fekete, later called Fugad/Fiigod. Similarly, nearby vil­
lages also bore the names of Hungarian or Turkic persons: Bodon; Lapad; 
Heren; Tordosi de Vyuuar = Tordos of Ujvdr; and Suqman = S/Szukman, 
the later Szokmand. The word "Caxun" occurs in this document, appearing 
as the name of a grove, probably the result of misspelling the name Taxun/ 
Taksony (only a stroke from the letter C is missing). The name "Parpurcum " 
(= Harpurtum) was also misspelled; in 1317, it was written as Haperton. 
The village is today known as Haporton. The Transylvanian Hungarian word 
"haportyan" roughly means "rush mat (basket) weaver".
At the same time the boundaries of the Torda estates of the Abbey of 
Arad was also registered in Hungarian: the Aranyos (Oronos) River, Fyzes- 
kuth = Fuzeskut, Monoros River, Sos River. The boundary description of 
the estate of the Cistercian Abbey of Kerc, donated between 1202 and 1208, 
and taken out of the territories of the Fogaras Vlachs (terra exempta de 
Blaccis) from 1223 is also of great importance. In this, except the names of 
the Olt (Alt) and the Kerc (Kerch) — which is of unknown origin — rivers, 
only early Hungarian (Hungarian-Slav) boundary names are mentioned: 
the marshy Egerpatak (Egvverpotac), the Nogebik (Nagybukk) and the Arpas 
River. These, probably, are remains from the times before the reign of 
Bela III and Geza II.
3 5 .1. B o r s a , III. Bela 1177. 6vi konyvalaku privil6giuma az aradi kgptalan szSm^ra 
(The 1177 Charter of B61a III for the Abbey of Arad). Leveltari Kozlemenyek, 1962,
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Archaeological Evidence from the Times 
of the Establishment of the State
W ith the exception of Gyulafeherv&r and perhaps Biharvar, little is known 
about tenth-century settlements either in the eastern part of the Great Hun­
garian Plain or in Transylvania; in the eleventh century, however, life con­
tinued in castles and other places of habitation whose names are preserved 
in place-names that are still in use to this day.
The most spectacular monuments of the new era are the fortifications, 
those large-scale defensive earth-and-timber castles which around 1200 
Anonymus saw as the unrivalled foci of all power. He claimed that some of 
these had already been in existence when the Hungarians arrived and took 
them by force (i.e. Szatm&rvkr, Biharv&r, Alp^rvar and Gyaluv&r) while 
others he explicitly says were built by the conquering Hungarian command­
ers (i.e. Szabolcsvkr and Csongr&dv&r). Of course, today it is clear that the 
problem with Anonymus is that he let his story run away with him; his 
sense for the essence of the matter, however, was quite keen. Fortresses 
were, indeed, indispensable to the "m odem " state in his time. Several tenth- 
and eleventh-century Hungarian fortresses had, in fact, antecedents. Some 
had been prehistoric (Bronze or Iron Age) earthworks of various sizes, usu­
ally placed at geographically and strategically important points, while a 
few others had been built upon the crumbling walls of Roman towns. The 
Hungarians, however, only rarely resorted to the rebuilding or the taking 
over of fortresses from potentates immediately preceding them in the re­
gion (Bresalauspurc = Pozsonyv&r; Mosapurc = Zalav&r, but only at the end 
of the eleventh century; of Belgrad = Gyulafehervar, and the Bulgar earth­
work of Cernigrad = Csongr&d). Of all these fortresses, Anonymus only 
mentioned the last one and even that as a newly-built Hungarian fortress. 
The Arpadian castles of Alpkrv&r, Zemplenvar and TitelvSr were all built 
directly on prehistoric foundations during the course of the eleventh cen­
tury or even later. Not one was standing as a fortification in the ninth cen­
tury, even though these were the supposed centres of Anonymus's local 
potentates. M odem excavations have demonstrated that the earth-and-tim­
ber fortresses of Szabolcsv&r, Abaujvkr, PatavSr, 6-Aradvkr, 6-Kolozsvkr 
(Kolozsmonostor), 6-Tordavkr (Virfalva), Dobokavar, Saj6s3rv5r and oth­
ers were built without antecedents either at the turn of the tenth and elev­
enth centuries, or in the course of the eleventh century.
A few decades ago even Hungarian historians could not imagine that 
the "nom adic" or "semi-nomadic" Hungarians were capable of building 
fortresses. The fortress-castles that served as the centres of local govern­
ment by ispans from the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, while men­
tioned in the written sources, were archaeologically unexplored, so that 
nothing was known of their size or structure. In this way, the old historical 
school brought up on Anonymus nonchalantly "attributed" to the local in­
habitants these supposedly insignificant fortifications.
By now, historians in general have accepted the view that no state or­
ganization could be maintained without castles, and especially not in the 
Middle Ages. Thus, a modem — costly and exhausting — "fight" for these 158
castles has begun. Outside Hungary's present borders, and depending on 
the country, searches have been initiated for Anonymus's Slavic, Vlach, 
Bulgar or "Rom an" (Frank) fortresses, respectively. The current upswing in 
these excavations is due, in no small measure, precisely to a "state archaeol­
ogy" of sorts. This prejudice has also brought about distortions in scientific 
methods, since the point of departure in dating the various layers is usually 
not archaeological stratigraphic evidence, but rather Anonymus's "facts", 
to which the finds are adjusted. The excavations at Dobokavdr, Kolozs- 
monostor and Gyaluv&r in Transylvania, and at O-Aradvdr by the Maros 
were inspired by Anonym us's Vlach commanders, Gelu and Glad, re­
spectively. Unfortunately, this same approach has also borne other fruit, 
namely, that the results from these excavations have not been published. 
For not only did these (and several other) excavations fail to produce a 
single find from the ninth century, but hardly any tenth-century material 
came to light either. The construction of the castles can be placed at the time 
of the establishing of the Hungarian state while the fifteenth- to seventeenth- 
century episcopal castle still standing in Gyalu was built directly on a layer 
of third-century Roman ruins, and not even on the territory of the Roman 
castellum.
The origins of the early Hungarian fort-building techniques are not clear. 
It is only in certain structural aspects that the Hungarian castles bear any 
resemblance to the tenth to thirteenth century earth-and-timber fortresses 
of central and eastern Europe. In size and function, they are thoroughly 
different. As to their purpose and role, they probably followed the Khazar 
model but this still remains to be verified by future study. Sunk panels and 
timbers were embedded in the high and extended ramparts comprising these 
fortresses. Hontvar, Sopronvar, MosonvSr, Abaujvar, Borsodv^r, and Sza- 
bolcsv£r are their representatives in present-day Hungary. Having once dried 
out, however, they became rather inflammable and burned down very 
quickly in sieges or even by accident. Because the ramparts turned red after 
such fires, these fortresses are often (and mistakenly) called "burned" or 
"sherd" forts. When people rebuilt them, they had to increase the height of 
the rampart out of structural considerations and sometimes this happened 
even twice in the lifetime of some of these fortifications. Nevertheless, it did 
not save them from the Mongols, who successfully sacked them in Russia, 
Poland and Hungary. It was mostly at that time that these fortifications 
were finally deserted for good. Only those fortresses did not bum  easily 
w here stone w alls had been raised to replace the wooden ones (e.g. 
Dobokav&r and Biharvar). In any case, by the thirteenth century this type of 
fortification was considered out of date on all counts.
Of the forty to fifty early castles, only a few (Sopronvar/Scarabantia, 
Gy6rv£r/Arrabona, the Slavic-named Visegrfd and Gyulafehervar/Apu­
lum) had Roman antecedents, and only the first two were constructed on 
Roman wall ruins. From this point of view, Gyulafehervar is quite unique 
in the Carpathian Basin. According to the oldest military maps (1687 and 
1711), its 474 metres by 474 metres layout preserved the regular square 
shape of the Roman legionary fortresses, with towers at two of its corners, 
on the axis of the Roman highway (cardo) and gates and gate-towers on 
159 both ends built on Roman foundations. The survival of some parts of the
walls, recognized as Roman already in 1574, was probably due, in addition 
to the excellent workmanship, to the fact that the Roman town, built under 
the mountain on a plateau that spread along the right-hand side of the Maros 
River, lost its importance after the Roman gold and iron m ines in the 
Erchegys6g were closed, and remained ignored until the conquest of the 
Danubian Bulgars. Of the other Roman forts of similar size and shape in 
Dacia (Ulpia Traiana, Potaissa, Napoca and Porolissum), three failed to be­
come the location of future settlements. These sites remained deserted, in 
spite of the fact that the walls of Potaissa outside Uj-Torda, together with 
one of its large, gate-towers decorated with reliefs, stood intact until mod­
ern times. During the Middle Ages, it was not even known that the city had 
formerly been Roman. The German inhabitants of 6-T ord a called it the 
"Saxoniaburg" (Fortress of Saxonia). It was the humanist Bonfini who first 
identified the city as Roman, but wrongly as "Salinum" (Salt City). In Kolozs- 
v&r, only parts of the northern and western walls of Napoca seem to have 
been made later use of. With the exception of the decumanus, the track of the 
highway running parallel with the Szamos River, the mediaeval town lay­
out owes nothing to that of the Roman city.
The earliest finds reflecting the settlement of the Hungarians in the cas- 
tle-forts and villages of Transylvania from the time of the Conquest are 
grooved rim vessels of eastern — Saltovo — origin and type found at Dobo- 
kavar, Gyulafeherv£r, O-Kolozsv&r, Betlenszentmikl6s, Malomfalva and Al- 
vinc; the early earthen cauldrons at Csanidvar, Biharvcir and V&rtelek re­
spectively; and the metal finds from the time of the last "phase" of the 
Conquest. The earliest finds uncovered within the castles and in the new 
cemeteries surrounding them all reflect the Hungarian rites and style of 
dressing implanted in the tenth century. The earliest burials reflect no defi­
nite Christian traits, except for the burial of the dead facing east. The hair 
rings, finger-rings, torques, bracelets, two-piece pendants and the buttons 
exhibited no or very few changes in fashion among these people, who have 
often been linked to their conquering forefathers through the specifically 
oriental Hungarian surgical method of true and false trepanation against 
various diseases.
M odem  scholarship assigns the late tenth and eleventh century cemeter­
ies to a half-pagan half-Christian population, although this is only true in 
connection with the nature of the cemeteries. The Legenda maior of Saint 
Gerald reveals that priests were sent out to consecrate the existing cemeter­
ies of all the communities that contributed to the building of churches — 
after 1030, statute II/ l of King Stephen obliged every ten villages to build 
one church — and this, temporarily, permitted the Christian to bury their 
dead on the old sites. This is the reason that the "pagan" cemeteries of the 
commoners are found to have been in use throughout the country even 
after the founding of the Christian state (e.g. Deva and Varfalva, both until 
the time of Ladislas I).
A significant change occurs after the eleventh century in that the graves 
become easy to date when the custom of placing an obolus in the dead 
man's spread to Transylvania and the Temes region. In this way, coins of 
Stephen I and other Hungarian kings up to the end of the twelfth century, 
the time of Bela III, have been uncovered, in just the same way as anywhere 160
else in the lands of the House of Arp£d. From the twelfth century on as the 
clothing became somewhat simpler it also became more uniform. Beside 
hair and finger-rings, metal veil pins appear in women's fashion (Gyulafe- 
herv&r, Kolozsv^r, Csittfalva, Marosv^sarhely).
As in other parts of the country, the miles, the new armed strata based 
largely on western models and derived largely from the former military 
escort, emerged in Transylvania, the eastern Great Hungarian Plain and in 
the Temes region in the early phase of the establishing of the new state, 
during the sixty-six years that Grand Duke Geza and King Stephen I reigned. 
Double-edged "Carolingian" swords have been found in the graves (Deva) 
and the fortresses (Des, Doboka, Nagyemye, Biharvdr, etc.) of this period 
in no smaller proportions than elsewhere. After the eleventh century, bronze 
and iron spurs came into common use, reflecting the spread of the new 
"knightly" way of fighting. It is in this period that pottery, one of the most 
important artifact of daily life became uniform in the land of the House of 
Arpad. So much so, that in the eleventh to the thirteenth centuries, there 
was no appreciable difference between the pottery of, for example, the 
Fehervar in Transylvania and the Fehervar in Transdanubia. Saltovo type 
vessels turned on potter's wheels and decorated with close-set horizontal 
grooves running in spirals predominated in both places. This technique had 
been carried in by the Hungarians from the east. Local pottery traditions 
rooted in the pre-Conquest era and still evident in the tenth century were 
either overwhelmed by the new style, or vanished. Present-day archaeolo­
gists trying to demonstrate the survival of these traditions in Transylvania 
have succeeded in coining terms such as Dridu culture or Csiiged/Ciugud 
ceramics, but have yet to come up with the finds to which the terms are 
supposed to apply.
The Emergence of Castles
The Bulgar Belgrad-Fehervar lying on the right side of the northwestern 
section of the Maros River was occupied by the Hungarians at the time of 
the Conquest. The grave of a Hungarian warrior buried with his horse in­
side the fortification, as well as other similar graves around it, verify this. 
The castle suddenly gained importance when, in the last third of the tenth 
century, the first Transylvanian gyula established his seat inside its walls. 
On the evidence of the mortar mixed with brick-dust, a Byzantine plaster 
technique, the earliest Christian church, a rotunda, must have been built 
during the time of the gyulas. There is no evidence of burials around the 
church in this early period. The commoners were buried in the "pagan" 
cemetery northwest of the castle up to the end of the tenth century. The 
Fehervar of the gyulas, most probably was not a very crowded town, be­
cause in its northwestern district, once the site of the Bulgar settlement, 
there still existed a tenth century "pagan" cemetery inside the walls.
The Fehervar of the gyulas grew further in importance after King Stephen 
put an end to his uncle's rule of the province in 1003. Its walls of white stone 
were restored at the beginning of the eleventh century, so that they did not
require further reconstruction until the Mongol invasion. Not long ago, the 
remains of the first single-nave episcopal church were discovered. It had 
been built on the site of the old "pagan" cemetery across from the present 
cathedral during the reign of Stephen: at the time, its length of 19 to 20 
meters would have been considered quite substantial. After the middle of 
the eleventh century the area east of the church from around the Monetaria 
(Mint) to the walls, became densely built up, with houses even lining the 
road leading to the castle. The fact that the number of cemeteries around 
the castle had risen to three by the middle of the eleventh century was obvi­
ously related to the increase in the population living around it. The most 
important of the three was the new cemetery lying to the northwest on top 
of an old Roman burial ground, one that was used from the time of Andrew 
I to that of Ladislas I. It was Ladislas I and Coloman who initiated the build­
ing of the new, thirty-eight metre long, triple-nave episcopal church at the 
end of the century. The present cathedral stands on the foundations of that 
building. The old church of the time of Saint Stephen had been demolished 
at the time the new one was being built. The earliest example of Transylva­
nian Romanesque sculpture, a Maiestas Domini relief on the semi-circular 
tympanum of the Ladislasean-Colomanean cathedral, has survived as an 
inside tympanum on the southern entrance of the present, early thirteenth 
century cathedral together with a few impressive capitals. The date and the 
Hungarian origin of the low relief is revealed by the figure of Christ sitting 
with his arms raised on a throne decorated with animals' heads. The com­
position follows the depiction of seated kings on the royal seals of Ladislas 
and Coloman. Inhabitants of the castle were obliged to bury their dead in 
the cemetery around the new cathedral from the twelfth century onward, 
even when that meant that the graves lay within the grounds of the old 
church! Other churches and cemeteries were built around the castle in the 
course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
Archaeological evidence suggests that the large fortification complex 
known as Dobokav£r came into existence at the beginning of the eleventh 
century at the earliest and during the course of the eleventh century gradu­
ally developed into a great ispan's castle. Repeated destruction and siege 
necessitated its renovation and enlargement on several occasions (during 
the reign of Stephen, before 1030, and then in 1068 [?], and again in 1091). 
Stone walls replaced the earth-and-timber elements by the beginning of 
thirteenth century. One of its churches was already standing by the first 
half of the eleventh century while the other was completed during the reign 
of Ladislas I. Both were rebuilt several times and had cemeteries around 
them. A church was also erected in the V&ralja (suburbium) in the twelfth 
century.
There is still no archaeological proof that Desv&r existed in the eleventh 
century, although the fragment of a western sword suggests that D6s and 
the surrounding area was occupied in the eleventh century. The early for­
tress and cemetery have yet to be found. Due to later reconstruction, only 
modest remnants from Kukiill6var are known on the left bank of the Kis- 
Kukiill<5. The earth-and-timber fortification has quite an ordinary structure 
with a double moat outside and stone pavement inside, similar to that found 
in O-Tordavar and Sajos3rv£r. An eleventh- or twelfth-century vessel re- 162
covered in the area of the fortress has been published. On 4 April, 1241 the 
castle was destroyed by the Mongols.
Much more instructive are the remaining three of Transylvania's "Seven 
Castles". All three are classic examples of the castle-to-city evolution pecu­
liar to eastern Europe in that the fortifications built in the early years of the 
consolidation of the Hungarian state were in different locations from the 
mediaeval towns which, for various economic reasons, grew up in their 
vicinity, some nearer, some farther away from the castle itself, towns which 
only subsequently inherited the names of the castle nearby.
O-Tordav&r was built on a flat plateau above today's village of V&rfalva. 
In size, shape and structure it is a typical early eleventh century ispdn’s 
castle. It has not been excavated inside, but the walls have been transected 
in several places. The cemetery in the suburbium used by the inhabitants of 
the castle at the turn of the tenth and the eleventh centuries, was excavated 
in 1912 and its finds published. The oldest sections of the cemetery still 
exhibit characteristics of commoners' burials, while younger parts reflect 
the burial rites of the castle's Christian population between the times of 
Stephen I and Ladislas I. The cemetery was discontinued during the reign 
of Ladislas and the population, was obliged to bury their dead around the 
new church after the castle was abandoned in the thirteenth century, as 
village dwellers. This new church was built below the castle during the rule 
of Ladislas I and is still used today by the Unitarian community. The town 
of 6-Torda was known to be the town of the salt miners who worked in the 
area of Tordaakna. Here, the earliest cemeteries were opened around the 
churches. (The eleventh- or twelfth-century cemetery of Tunderhegy inTorda 
had belonged to the neighbouring village of Szentmiklbs.) The northeastern 
neighbours of Torda are well known since 1176: the villages of Szind (Scinth) 
and Kopp^ny (Coppan).
The original Hunyadvar, was built on a promontory called Saint Peter 
Hill at the confluence of the Csema and Zalasd rivers, 300 metres from the 
late mediaeval castle of Vajdahunyad erected on rocks. The castle which 
was partly ruined during its history has been recently excavated. It was 200 
by 70 metres, oval, and a village belonged to it which was built below the 
hill. The cemetery below the castle, on the northern side of the road leading 
to Rakod, once used by its inhabitants, was partially excavated and pub­
lished in the 1910s. People were buried here from the time of Stephen I until 
the end of the eleventh century. No later cemeteries from the area are known 
at present.
Coluswar — castrum Clus — was built 2100 metres to the west of the 
Roman city and stood until 1241. It was originally established as an ispdn’s 
castle in this geographically ideal location: on a hill surrounded by branches 
of the Szamos River near to a ford and a cross-roads. The finds — for exam­
ple, coin of Stephen I and pendants from the late Conquest period — show 
that the earliest earth-and-timber fortification was built at the very begin­
ning of the eleventh century. The walls and houses containing the coins of 
Solomon were burnt down at the time of the Pecheneg (Uz?) attack in 1068, 
and a higher rampart was subsequently constructed. The size and the struc­
ture of the earthwork corresponds to that of the castles built for the ispans;
1 6 3  it is more than unlikely that it was just for the protection of some mansion

Fig. 10. Tenth to thirteenth century churches at Gyulafeh6rv£r
1. T he round church (rotunda) from the last third o f the tenth century; 2. T he first bishop's church, built cca 
1009; 3. T h e episcopal cathedral of Ladislas I and Colom an; 4. Today's cathedral built at the tim e o f Andrew  II
house or a legendary early monastery. The (unpublished) cemetery outside 
the fortress is the earliest. The cemetery inside the fortress suggests that 
there had been a small church, built perhaps after the middle of the elev­
enth century. The first Benedictine monastery in Transylvania, founded by 
Ladislas I and dedicated to the Blessed Virgin Mary, was built inside the 
castle before the end of the eleventh century. The population of the castle 
was buried around it until the end of the twelfth century (cf. Gyulafehervar). 
This triple-nave monastery church was destroyed or perhaps pulled down 
around 1190. With the stones of the monastery, a rotunda which had six 
apsis, was built around 1200 to meet religious needs temporarily. This ro­
tunda, partially demolished, was incorporated as a chapel within the new 
monastery at the time of its construction in the thirteenth century. This 6 -  
Kolozsvar fell to the Mongols with the last of its defenders. After the sec­
ond half of the thirteenth century, the site is only referred to as Colusmonustora 
(Monastery of Kolos, 1263). A rectangular stone wall was built around the 
monastery in the second half of the thirteenth century.
There is no sign of anyone having lived over the ruins of Roman Napoca 
in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Evidence from several excavations shows 
that by that time, a new surface layer had already formed on top of the 
ancient rubble inside the Roman city. The first evidence of life there in the 
Middle Ages is a twelfth-century cemetery around a village church dug 
into the Roman period rubble in today's Szabadsag Square. The late thir­
teenth-century 6vd r (Old Castle) was the earliest town centre located in the 
northwestern quarter of the old castellum, although not exactly following 
the line of the ancient walls. From the beginning, however, fourteenth-cen­
tury Kolozsv&r extended beyond the walls of the old Roman castellum  which 
could not, therefore, have played a part in the development of the city. The
M Fig. 9. Hillforts in Transylvania from the time of the establishment of the Hungar­
ian state
1. 6-KolozsvAr and its rotunda from the end of the twelfth century; 2 .6-T ord av3r; 3 .6-H un yad v 4r; 4. Biharv^r; 
5. D obokav ir; 6. KUkfllWv^r, border hillfort from  the end of the eleventh century; 7. Saj6s4rv4r
earliest finds so far, (vessels, etc.) come from the area of Ov&r and the town 
centre, and date back to the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
The Meszes Gate was guarded by Krasznav&r (1093: Krasson civitas). The 
large semi-circle formed by the outer belt of Transylvanian castles was 
brought into being after the 1068 Pecheneg incursion. In the north, at the 
confluence of the two branches of the Szamos, it begins with the red ram­
parts and the eleventh- to twelfth-century graves of Kozdrv&r. To the north­
east is the earth-and-timber fortress of S&rv£r, with its valuable finds of 
jewellery in the eleventh- to twelfth-century cemetery on the left bank of the 
Saj6 River. The Maros Valley was blocked by a small, now nameless, earth- 
and-timber fortification near Malomfalva on the right side of the river. An 
eleventh-century western sword and Hungarian pendants have been un­
covered from the site, together with fragments of vessels mostly from the 
eleventh to the thirteenth centuries. The sizeable earth-and-timber "kapuvar"
(gate fortress) of (Heviz-)Ugra was built to protect the important river ford 
on the Olt in the southeast at the end of the eleventh century or at the very 
beginning of the twelfth, at latest. A significant village community adjoined 
the fortress. The builder of Ugraver was probably the nobleman from Bihar 
who formed a part of King Coloman's escort in 1094 and who also founded 
Ugramonostor in Bihar. The fortress has been accurately dated on the basis 
of the excavated goods (cauldrons, vessels, hair-rings and coins). Around 
1200, a smaller stone castle was erected on the same spot. The bridge-head 
furthest east on the Olt River came into existence in the twelfth century at 
the latest, its name, Foldv^r (Earthwork), revealing the type of its construc­
tion. The earth-and-timber castle discovered underneath the present fortifi­
cation of Fogaras on the left bank of the Olt River could not have been built 
before the twelfth century, in contrast with the earth-and-timber fortress of 
Orlat on a flat hill top by the river ford of Cibin-Cemavoda (Black Water) 
in the south, which has been very accurately dated by fragments of vessels 
and clay cauldrons from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Its original name 
may have been Cibinv&r. Orlat (meaning "under the castle") was the name 
of the village that grew around a nearby thirteenth-century stone castle,
Salg6vdr. Finally, the earth-and-timber fortress of Szentl6szl6v£ra near 
Omoldova on the Lower Danube was also one of the early border castles as 
evidenced by clay sherds, and probably was built by Saint Ladislas. After 
the Mongol invasion, it was rebuilt in stone.
The castles of princes and ispans in the eastern part of the Great Hungar­
ian Plain can be linked to the history of Transylvania in the sense that they 
were all built along waterways leading out of Transylvania. Evidence from 
the tenth-century cemetery of the mighty fortress of Biharv&r (1075: civitas 
Bichor) built along the stream Kosmd shows that it was erected in the early 
Hungarian period. Not counting the Le^nyvSr (Maiden Castle), a small, 
squat earthwork from the Bronze Age extending beyond the later castle, 
the mediaeval fortification had no antecedent. Only prehistoric sherds have 
come to light from the earthwork rampart. The possibility of this very large 
and, in terms of its structure, characteristically Hungarian castle being 
erected by the scattered and sparse Slavic population of the eastern part of 
the Great Hungarian Plain can be safely dismissed. The earth-and-timber 
castle was twice renewed after two successive destructions (in 1068, and in 1 6 6
1091). Its walls were built higher, and, sometime in the twelfth century, 
were replaced by stone walls. Despite its thick stone walls, the fortification 
had lost its military significance even before the Mongol invasion. The com­
moners of the castle lived within the walls in rough semi-subterranean huts 
with earthen ovens inside, and buried their dead in the large burial grounds 
around the church south of the fortress from Andrew I until the time of 
Andrew II. The parochial, later episcopal, church is only known from de­
scriptions. Dated with the help of a Saint Stephen coin, it is to have been an 
early construction; only later were people buried around it. At the present 
time, the importance of Biharv^r is more clearly demonstrated by the densely 
distributed tenth- and eleventh-century villages and cemeteries in the area 
than by the finds of the poorly-excavated central castle site, most of which 
are, at any rate, unpublished.
On the southern bank of the Sebes-Koros, twelve kilometres south of 
Bihar, only Hungarian villages and commoners' cemeteries have been found 
from the tenth and eleventh centuries. Although these sites were found 
within the area of Nagyvarad, they cannot be linked directly to the present 
town. The circular, earth-and-timber castle of (Nagy-)V3rad was built only 
in 1091-1093 (1093: Vdradynum de Byhor) by Ladislas I around the monas­
tery also founded by him and soon rebuilt into the triple-nave episcopal 
cathedral of the Virgin Mary. The castle, built on the island between the 
main and the side branches of the Sebes-Koros did not have an antecedent. 
The earliest archaeological finds from this rich site date to the turn of the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries.
At present, no particulars are known about the castle of Szatmarvar, built 
on the northern side of the Szamos River overlooking the Szamos region. 
On the other hand, Marosv^r on the southern side of the Maros River, the 
"seat" of the rebel Ajtony in the eleventh century, had been definitely a 
centre by the tenth century. Its importance may chiefly be seen in the rich 
tenth-century graves and cemeteries found in the vicinity. The outline of 
the earliest earth-and-timber fortification, later renamed Csan^dvar, is just 
barely recognizable on Luigi Marsigli's map produced around 1696. The 
castle was blown up and demolished in 1699. At the time it was built, a 
branch of the Maros River still flowed by the fortress to the south. The stee­
ples of the Saint George Cathedral stood here as late as the end of the seven­
teenth century. The Benedictine Monastery of the Blessed Virgin, founded 
by Bishop Gerald and rebuilt in the thirteenth century, also stood on the 
northern periphery of the castle. It was renovated a second time in Gothic 
style in 1361. This monastery was also called the Abbey of Saint Gerald 
after the martyr was buried here. The precise geographical information given 
in the Legenda Maior of Saint Gerald indicates that the Monastery of Saint 
John the Baptist once stood in the vicinity as well. It vanished without a 
trace in 1241, and its precise location is not known today. The small church 
with its three apsides, not "seven" — an apse is not to be confused with a 
buttress —, which stood near the ruins of the cathedral at the end of the 
seventeenth century has been identified by Romanian and Hungarian ar­
chaeologists as the Byzantine church of Ajtony (or perhaps even Hierotheus). 
In fact, it was a typical sixteenth-seventeenth century Orthodox church.
167 The present cathedral of Nemetcsanad was built on the spot where the church
of the Monastery of the Blessed Virgin once stood. Renovated in 1741, the 
church was tom  down completely in 1868. It was at this time that the origi­
nal eleventh-century stone sarcophagus of Saint Gerald was discovered ly­
ing along the nave of the church. The latest, small test excavations have 
revealed a tenth- or eleventh-century settlement immediately above a sixth- 
century Gepid settlement. The original Aradvcir (Urod/Orod) on the north­
ern side of the Maros River was situated on an island surrounded by old 
branches of the same river, and has been better excavated. By now histori­
ans have established that this castle was located near Othalom-Glogov&c, 
twelve kilometres east of Arad. The evidence unequivocally shows that this 
is an earth-and-timber ispan's castle typical in the early eleventh century. It 
was rebuilt once and its height increased. People were buried around its as 
yet unexcavated church from the time of King Peter until the middle of the 
twelfth century, after which the cemetery around the chapter's huge Mon­
astery of Saint Martin was used. A charter from 1177 mentions people liv­
ing in houses inside the castle walls. O-Aradv^r was completely destroyed 
during the Mongol invasion.
Only the location of Temesv^r is known, but it must have been built in 
the tenth century, considering the presence of the Hungarian military cem­
eteries and the name of the castle. Only the eleventh-century graves of its 
inhabitants are known. The little researched fortification near Zimandujfalu 
known simply as Foldvar (Earthwork) from the Arp&d period was also built 
in the tenth century. Its extremely rich cemetery was in use from the tenth 
century to the time of Ladislas I, when the castle was probably deserted. 
For this reason it never received a new name. The future ispan's castle, Za- 
randv£r was, as its name suggests, probably founded in the tenth century 
by a prince. Only a very small part of it has survived, and even less has 
survived of the recently demolished Ors(ova)var (Orsova).
The Early Roman Catholic Church
Although Saint Stephen's statutes ordered the building of a specified number 
of churches (Decern villg gcclesiam edificent — that every ten villages build a 
church) all the eleventh-century churches known to us from their remains 
are in or around castles, the seats of local government by the ispans. How­
ever, there is also Statute I. 7 of Ladislas I in 1092 to consider, which or­
dered the restoration of churches destroyed or burned down during the 
civil war (meaning the pagan revolts) and Statute I. 8, which demanded 
that the bishops renovate those churches which were crumbling because of 
age. A considerable number of churches must, therefore have existed ear­
lier. Nevertheless, the situation changed fundamentally during the reign of 
King Coloman. What hitherto had been recommended, now became obliga­
tory, especially when it came to burial around churches. From the turn of 
the eleventh and the twelfth centuries, new parish churches and cathedrals 
were built one after the other (at Biharv&r, V5rad, O-Aradv^r, Dobokav^r, 
Gyulafeherv^r). Even more importantly from the viewpoint of the Catholic 
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up like mushrooms. Research into these churches and the cemeteries around 
them had been very much neglected in Transylvania. Still, the available 
information, mostly from graves dated with the help of twelfth-century coins, 
allows the construction of a coherent picture. Early village churches and 
their remains have survived over practically the whole of Transylvania: at 
Mojgrad, the remains of the twelfth-century church from a village of un­
known name near Almaszeg, at Csitfalva, at Szent&brahkm, at Sztrigyszent- 
gyorgy, at Fogaras, and at Illyed in Krass6. Those named after a patron 
saint (Saint James, Saint Nicholas, Saint Andrew, Saint Abraham, Saint 
George and the Saint-king, meaning Saint Stephen), are from the twelfth 
century. This has been demonstrated by the excavation of villages even 
where (e.g. at Mez<3szopor-Saint James), the churches themselves have not 
yet been found. Elsewhere, only the cemeteries around churches and the 
associated grave goods have come to light, for instance at Sigeth = M&ra- 
marossziget, Nagybanya = Asszonypataka, Varalmas, Jakabfalva, Gyorgy- 
falva, Marosvasarhely, Marosszentkiraly, Konop, Sajosarvar, Szekelyudvar- 
hely, Fogaras, Piski, and near Segesvar; at the last site dated by the coins of 
Stephen II and III.
Early Arpadian Villages, 
Houses and Other Architectural Monuments
The study of Arpkd-period settlements and houses is still at an early stage 
in Transylvania, too. In southeastern Transylvania several, formerly Slavic, 
villages continued on into the Arpkd period, like Sepsiszentgyorgy-Kulakert, 
the late houses on Simenfalva-Cserealja, the upper layer in Kezdipolyan, 
the middle layer of the Domonkos mansion in Alsocsernaton, the major 
part of the huts in Szekelyszenterzsebet-Szenasfold, Rety-Suvad£stet<5 and 
Segesvar-Szol<5k (the latter might be the same as the decayed village of 
Sharold). There was very little difference between the crude huts of the late 
Slavic and the early Hungarian period: both were semi-subterranean. The 
Hungarians of the Arp&d period seem to have preferred ovens carved into 
the earth (e.g. Szekelykeresztur-Gyarfkskert and Alsocsernaton-Domonkos 
mansion) to those of stone (e.g. Vermes, Malomfalva, Mez<5erked and 
Betlenszentmikl6s), and used frying balls, rather than frying platters. Early 
Hungarian settlements may be suspected where Hungarian metal objects 
such as arrow-heads, bridle-bits, sabre fragments, harness equipment, elev­
enth- and twelfth-century spurs, Hungarian coins (e.g. Cs£k6, Marosgombas, 
Maroslekence and Barathely II village), or typical Hungarian earthen and 
metal cauldrons have been found. The houses themselves were the usual 
gable roofed huts such as the common people of the Arpkd monarchy lived 
in everywhere (Sz£kelykeresztur-Gy£rfas-kert, Nagymedeser, Vermes, Bet- 
lenszentmiklos, Csap6szentgy5rgy, Mezoerked, Malomfalva, O-Kolozsv&r, 
Biharv&r and O-Aradvar). After the eleventh century, however, the huts 
occasionally had above-ground walls supported by timbering (Sz6kely- 
keresztur and Malomfalva). The same development is evidenced with the 
169 introduction of four to six posts in roof constructions (Csics6keresztur,
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Fig. 11. The princely palace of Bel6nyesszentmikl6s, eleventh-twelfth centuries
1. T he palace of princes B£la and G£za; 2. The palace reconstructed by Prince Almos, and subsequent addi­
tions
Malomfalva and Csikszentkir^ly). The family cooking cauldrons brought 
to the region from the east European "Saltovo culture" were important uten­
sils in Hungarian commoner households. These vessels were used over open 
fires in the villages and also acted as cooking cauldrons for herdsmen. The 
use of these cauldrons was widespread in all those parts of the Carpathian 
Basin where Hungarians lived. They were completely absent from the pre­
dominantly Slavic areas.
Cauldron sherds have also been found in Transylvania in great num­
bers. After comparing these to the earthen cauldrons of the Pechenegs in 
Moldavia and also to those of the Danubian Bulgars in Dobrudja and in the 
Lower Danube region, the latest Romanian and Saxon research, taking the 
view that the Danubian Bulgars were also Pechenegs, has attributed all such 
finds to the "Pechenegs". Using these earthen cauldrons as evidence, they 
hope to demonstrate a massive Pecheneg, and recently even a "Rom an", 
presence in Transylvania. There never was any large-scale Pecheneg immi­
gration to the Carpathian Basin, however, and especially not to Transylva­
nia, where there are only six or eight relatively recent (eleventh- and twelfth- 
century) villages containing the name "Beseny<5" (Pecheneg), all located in 
eastern and southern Transylvania. The remaining 95 or so 103 villages with 
similar names are found over the non-Transylvanian parts of the Arp£d 
kingdom. On the other hand, the shape and the ornamentation of the caul­
drons in the Carpathian Basin significantly differ from those of Moldavia 
regarded as their prototype and most of them were produced earlier. The 
suggestion that these cauldrons were copied from local, or even Roman 
bronze vessels, is untenable. The cauldrons were uncovered from houses 
and layers dated with the help of tenth- and eleventh-century Hungarian 
metal finds, or were found together with the wheel-turned Hungarian 
Saltovo-type clay vessels at Biharv&r, V£rad, O-Kolozsv^r, O-Tordav&r, 6 -  
Aradvdr, Gyulafeherv^r, Dobokavar, Maroslekence, Csap6szentgyorgy and 
Malomfalva. Cauldrons made from the eleventh century on may be dated 1 7 0
with the help of Hungarian coins, as were settlements and adjoining cem­
eteries containing oboli. Some cauldrons have been dated as tenth- or elev­
enth-century on the basis of their early wavy-lined ornam entation (O- 
Kolozsvar, Belenyesszentmikl6s, Segesvar-Sz61<3k and Bulcs-Kapolna). The 
numerous sites on the plains of Arad county where cauldrons have been 
found mark the locations of Hungarian villages destroyed during the Mon­
gol invasion. On the whole, these roughly 180 sites where such cauldrons 
have come to light so far in Transylvania and the eastern part of the Great 
Hungarian Plain have yielded important evidence on Hungarian settlements 
during the Arp£d period. They constitute an integral part of the 600 similar 
sites presently known over the entire area once occupied by Hungarians.
Hidden treasure finds shed important light on the study of eleventh- 
century settlements and their economy in addition to providing clues to the 
more major events which took place in this era. The silver bends from the 
Darufalva-Jurkovci type necklace were buried during the Pecheneg attack 
that occurred either before 1030 or sometime during the reign of Peter (1038- 
1044). This eastern type of jewellery is usually found accompanied by coins 
from the 1030, which makes dating easy. The magnificant treasure of silver 
jewellery also of eastern origin and found in the area subsequently known 
as the KirSlyfold was more likely to have been buried the Uz-Pecheneg in­
cursion of 1068. The Byzantine bronze coins collected since the tenth cen­
tury found in Als6csem£ton in H&romszek county had been hidden by the 
Slavic owner in a house burned down by the enemy. The silver jewellery 
sheds light on the relationship between Transylvania and the eastern Slavic 
world. The four coin hoards consisting of Ladislas I's coins clearly mark the 
line of attack of the first Cuman raid led by Kapoltch in 1091 across Transyl­
vania all the way to Biharvar (the finds were at Torda, Magyarfrata, Doboka- 
varalja and Biharszentandr&s). They also show that occasionally, large for­
tunes — 120-170 silver coins — were accumulated.
The discovery of the eleventh-century princely curtis and the accompa­
nying chapel near BelenyesszentmikI6s was the result of the most recent 
research. This sizeable palace, probably built during the rule of B61a I and 
G6za I as duces, is closely related to the royal mansion situated by the Dan­
ube River near Domos. The palace was damaged in the Cuman attack of 
1091, and probably was rebuilt while Prince Almos was dux. It was at that 
time that its church was enlarged. Its subsequent history and architectural 
development in the thirteenth century was associated with the gentilitial 
Borsa family.
Other new and professional excavations have verified that Transylva­
nia's central-lobed churches (at Szekelyudvarhely-Jesus Chapel, Kezdiszent- 
lelek-PerkS) previously thought, because of the uniqueness of their ground- 
plan, to have been built in the tenth or eleventh century — a view held most­
ly by Hungarian art historians and architects — are, in fact, late Arp&d-time 
buildings in archaic style. Other buildings of this sort are the four-lobed 
Orthodox church in Gurasz^da, which both archaeological and documen­
tary (a charter from 1292) evidence indicate to have been built around 1300; 
the rotunda of 6-Kolozsvar with six internal lobes built around the turn of 
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries (there were twelfth-century capitals and 
paired-columns with reliefs preserved in its foundation); and the rotunda
of Illyed in Krass6, lately held to be ninth- or tenth-century by Romanian 
researchers, but surrounded by twelfth- and thirteenth-century graves.
Research attuned to the romantic had disregarded the less specular of 
the truly early edifices. The small rotunda at Algy6gy with its semi-circular 
sanctuary was built using Roman bricks and, judging from its size, struc­
ture and formal characteristics (matching similar buildings in Veszprem, 
S&rospatak, Duc6 and Gyulafeherv&r), was definitely built in this period, 
that is in the eleventh or twelfth century. This circular church, assigned an 
unjustifiably late date and its significance overlooked, is probably the old­
est preserved church edifice in both historic and present-day Transylvania.
The First Frontier Guard Deployments to the East
At the turn of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, in most places it was the 
outer ring of border forts that marked the limits of the frontier-guard vil­
lages that were the settlements of the light archer cavalry (sagittarii). Some 
of these villages, however, may have belonged to the advance Pecheneg 
guards. One such village, named Talm&cs, is located by the Transylvanian 
exit to the Vorostorony Pass. The name referred to the Talmat/Talmac tribe 
of the Pechenegs who lived east of the Dnieper, and who enlisted as guards 
(talmatzoi) with the army of the Byzantine emperor sometime in the second 
half of the tenth century. The (uncertain) date of their enlistment with the 
Byzantines cannot be taken to indicate the time of their appearance in Hun­
gary. All the villages named TalmScs, and Kolpeny (after kulpingoi: another 
Pecheneg tribal name) have their origins in the time when the latter tribe 
joined the Byzantines, that is in the second half of the eleventh century. The 
greater part of these "Pecheneg" village names are scattered across Hunga­
ry's inner territory, and their presence underlines the historically verified 
arrival en mass of the Pechenegs in several waves during the eleventh cen­
tury. Their settlement and dispersion does not contradict their deployment 
as frontier and advanced guards, a role documented in several early Hun­
garian historical accounts, and demonstrated by the exceptionally advanced 
positions of their frontier settlements in Transylvania. The villages named 
"Beseny<5" located between the Maros and Olt rivers as well as Talm&cs in 
Szeben and Mez<5k5lp6ny in Marosszek, fit perfectly into the structure of 
the eleventh-century border defence system. As to the question of the 
Pechenegs' religion in the twelfth century, the contemporary German name 
for the village of Beseny6 in Beszterce, Heidendorf (Pagan village), leaves 
no doubt abut their still being pagan.
Of extraordinary significance for our understanding of Transylvania's 
settlement history are the eleventh- and twelfth-century stone and wood 
churches recently discovered beneath twelfth- and thirteenth-century Saxon 
churches in southern Transylvania, as well as the cemeteries around them.
No less important are the early Romanesque churches of the Hungarian 
border guard villages and their cemeteries used until the times of Geza II 
and Stephen III (Sz&szsebes, Sz&szkezd, Medgyes, Sz&szfeheregyh&za,
Kelnek, Nadpatak, Sz£szorb6 and Homor6ddar6c). These names also show 1 7 2
that by this time, the Catholic church had generally extended its influence 
over the valleys of the Sebes, the Nagy-Ktikull5 and the Homor6d rivers 
while to the south it held a way up to the Olt River (Fogaras). Concurrently 
with the settlement of Saxons along the country's borders after the middle 
of the twelfth century, the population of the Hungarian frontier-guard vil­
lage, the border guards of the eleventh century, were relocated in the terri­
tory of the present-day SzekelyfOld, most notably in the H^romszek Basin. 
Some villages disappeared completely. On the southern banks of the Nagy- 
Kiikulld, for instance, not far from Medgyes and just outside the old Paratej, 
the later Barathely, the life of a twelfth-century village dated with the help 
of coins and noted for the many cauldrons found there was interrupted for 
ever: its inhabitants had obviously been obliged to move on.
The two large cemeteries opened up just outside Zabola and Pet<3falva in 
the eastern part of the Szekelyfold have provided evidence for the Hungar­
ian arrival of the border guards in the area in the twelfth century. Both 
cemeteries were probably placed around wooden churches during the reign 
of G6za II. (That such churches existed is evident from the report of Otto of 
Freising in 1147.) Amply documented by oboli, these cemeteries continued 
to be used during the times of Stephen III and B61a III in Petdfalva until the 
Mongol invasion. The burial rites and the attire of the dead are typical of 
the Hungarians of the Arpad period. Their privileged status is revealed by 
the valuable grave goods. The women often wore small, medium or large 
hair-rings made of silver or electrum, as well as various embellished silver 
rings on their fingers; the men's occupation was reflected in the iron mounted 
quivers and iron and bone arrow-heads, while the occasional offering of 
cattle, lamb and (primarily) horse-meat testified to the frailty of their Chris­
tian faith. Relationships with the local Slavic population have left no visible 
traces. The people of Zabola and Petofalva belonged to the class of well-to- 
do free Hungarians, which accurately describes the legal and economic po­
sition of the newly resettled frontier guards. The appearance of the new 
settlers north of the Zabola region Kezdiszek (Als6csern&ton) at the end of 
the twelfth century is also shown by the east-facing graves and the associ­
ated grave goods.
New settlements emerged at the same time as these cemeteries. A house 
with its floor sunk below ground and a round earthen oven was found in 
the garden of the Apor manor house in Karatna (today part of Torja). It was 
accompanied by a circular open-air baking oven carved into the ground 
nearby. The settlement has been reliably dated by the sherds of cauldrons, 
characteristic arrow-heads similar to those found in Zabola, and twelfth- 
century fragments of vessels with potter-marks. The Zabola-type arrow­
heads and twelfth-century spurs of the settlement-finds at Karatna charac­
terize and accurately date the top settlement level with a circular oven dug 
into the earth, cauldrons, arrow-heads and spurs at Alsocsernaton-Domon- 
koskert which, as shown by coins found above a Slavic settlement level 
destroyed in 1068. Sepsiszentgyorgy-Bedehaza (cauldrons and spur), and 
Eprestet<5 (cauldrons, arrow-head, and hoe blade), Angyalos (arrow-head), 
and Rety (cauldron and spur) in the northeastern Szekelyfold are also of the 
twelfth century. After the end of the twelfth century, the early frontier guard 
settlements appeared north of this territory of what later was to be called
Csikszek: at Gyergyoszentmikl6s-L£z5rkastely (cauldrons), and especially 
within the area of Csikszentkir&ly, where a semi-subterranean house, but 
with roof posts at the four corners, was dated with the help of twelfth- 
century vessels, cauldrons and the coins of Isaac II Angelus. The latest exca­
vations and finds, thus, prove the fact that the frontier guards were moved 
eastwards in the twelfth century. They did not, on the other hand, confirm 
the earlier supposition based on wrongly-dated arrow-heads that these set­
tlements were associated with tenth- and eleventh-century Hungarians or 
even Pechenegs previously living in the area.
Conclusions Drawn from the Study of Hungarian 
and Slavic Settlements up to the Great Changes 
of the Late Twelfth Century
Fortuitous and irregular as the archaeological studies of the past century 
have been, they have yielded some irrefutable facts concerning settlements 
in the region.
The eastern rim of the Great Hungarian Plain from the Er region to the 
Lower Danube, together with the adjoining valleys, differed at most from 
the neighbouring western plains in that the centres of Hungarian settlement 
and early state administration were situated precisely along this rim, from 
Szatm£rv6r through Biharv&r, V5rad,Zar3ndv5r, Aradv^r, Temesv&r to Kras- 
s6v£r and Orsovav^r. Even denser and richer early Hungarian settlement 
may be anticipated here than in the central and southern parts of the region 
east of the Tisza. In the light of the archaeological study of these settle­
ments, it seems quite logical that the eleventh-century centres of political 
opposition to the power of the early Hungarian state as represented by Esz- 
tergom and Szekesfeh£rv£r formed around MarosvSr/Csan5dv3r and Bi- 
harv£r.
The situation was different in Transylvania proper. The study of the graves 
of the military middle strata suggests that the western half of the Mezds6g, 
the larger basins (i.e. H£romsz6k Basin) and both sides of the Maros Valley 
were occupied only for strategic reasons during the Conquest. When the 
Pecheneg-Bulgar threat ended in the middle of the tenth century, the early 
expansive defence system disappeared — to be changed to permanent oc­
cupation, in fact settling down in the western half of the Transylvanian Ba­
sin with a marchland round it. The first permanent Hungarian settlements 
formed around the salt mines along the Maros and Aranyos rivers, with 
Gyulafehervar being their political-military centre. Apart from Gyulafeher- 
v&r and some smaller villages in the Maros and Kiikiill6 river valleys, it 
would be hard to predict the location of significant settlements elsewhere 
during the second half of the last third of the tenth century without carry­
ing out excavations in the area.
After 1003, the valley of the Maros River continued to be the principal 
highway and the main artery of state administration in the eleventh cen­
tury. The campaign against Ajtony was partly prompted by the insolence of 
the lord of Marosv^r in taxing the boats carrying King Stephen I's salt con­ 174
signments on the Maros. This river remained the main transportation route 
for the Transylvanian salt being sent primarily to Arad and Szeged, and 
later to Szeged only, until the end of the sixteenth century. The archaeologi­
cal study of Transylvania's settlements suggests that the overland trans­
port of salt was only organized around the middle of the eleventh century: 
starting from Desvcir and built not long before in the northwest Transylva­
nia, the route led through the Gate of Meszes (already known and used at 
the time of the establishing of the Hungarian state — Virtelek) to Szolnok 
by the Tisza River. The salt route was given the telling name of kiralyuta — 
"The King's Highway" (via regis). Judging by the lack of archaeological evi­
dence, the rough terrain in the valley of the united Szamos from Des to 
Asszonypataka/Nagyb&nya did not play a significant role in the Hungar­
ians' settlement or in linking the two parts of the country until the end of 
the eleventh century.
Naturally, the absence of archaeological finds and all traces of human 
habitation also excludes the possibility of northern and northeastern Transyl­
vania having been densely populated in the Arpdd period. The possibility 
that these areas were populated by people other than Hungarians or Slavs 
is even less likely. Maramaros and the northeastern part of the Szil^gy re­
gion were described in twelfth- and thirteenth-century documents as vast 
royal forests. The supposed "autochthonous" Romanian population of 
Maramaros — in hiding from the time of Trajan until the coming of Dragos 
in the fourteenth century36 —, mentioned by the seventeenth and eighteenth- 
century Moldavian chroniclers Miron Costin and Dimitrie Cantemir, left 
behind no traces whatsoever.
Although the Sebes-Koros-Kiralyhag6 ("The King's Pass")-Kis-Szam os 
route had been known since the Conquest, practically up until the end of 
the Arpcid period it had less significance for the settlement history of Transyl­
vania than the main communication artery, the Maros Valley, as is borne 
out by the uneven distribution of earthen cauldrons.
The strategic defence of Transylvania to the last third of the eleventh 
century was secured by Dobokavar in the north, KukullSvdr in the east, 
and Hunyadvar in the south. The Hungarian settlements around these cas­
tles tended to be compact, and cover larger areas, and this was true of the 
settlements around 6-Kolozsvar and 6-Tordav^r as well. Gyulafeherv£r 
maintained its central role all the time. It is something of a triumph for ar­
chaeologists that the regions that were identified as centres of Slavic settle­
ment before the Conquest largely coincide with the areas that linguists study­
ing Slavic place-names have indicated as probable areas of the Transylvani­
an Slavic population's survival until the eleventh and twelfth centuries.
From about the last decades of the eleventh century, the central areas 
were defended by frontier guard communities moved from other regions 
of Hungary to the southern parts of Transylvania later inhabited by the 
Saxons. These communities were settled around and within smaller earth- 
and-timber forts. During the reign of Ladislas I and Coloman, the forma­
tion of a parish church system is evidenced within the whole area occupied
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to that time. Roman Catholic churches surrounded by cemeteries were es­
tablished in previously uninhabited regions and former woodlands, espe­
cially in the Kiikullo valleys. The castles of the ispans were everywhere the 
centres of Christianity. For example, two, later repeatedly rebuilt, early stone 
churches are known within the territory of Dobokav&r.
In the middle third of the twelfth century, at the time of the first Saxon 
immigration, the late eleventh century frontier-guard settlements were 
gradually moved into what was later to be called the Szekelyfold. Today, 
there is archaeological evidence that verifies the existence of these settle­
ments and cemeteries of the frontier guard communities. The frontier guards 
were Hungarians, cleaving to old Hungarian traditions which were already 
a little outdated in the rapidly developing new country. Their standing in 
society is shown in their clothing, which displays a wealth verging on that 
of the nobles.
The archaeological evidencies on the Hungarians' habitations in Transyl­
vania are confirmed by the most recent research on Transylvanian dialects.
The Hungarian dialect spoken in the Szatmar, Kraszna, Kozep-Szolnok, 
eastern Bihar, and western Kolozs (Kalotaszeg) regions is related to the dia­
lect of the Tiszantul and the Upper Tisza region. The archaeological study 
of settlements shows that the habitation areas of the Hungarians spread 
across this region, most of which lies outside Transylvania proper, from the 
west, that is from the Tisza region at the turn of the tenth and eleventh 
centuries.
There are at least three separate major dialects among the Szekelys. Its 
most ancient and sporadic remnants can be observed in the BelsS-Szolnok, 
northern Kolozs, eastern Fejer and western Kukiill<3 regions. People living 
in these areas seem to be the descendants of the early, eleventh-century 
frontier guards in the marches, while people in the western part of the later 
Udvarhelyszek certainly had their origins in Bihar. The three major dialects 
found in the Szekelyfold display striking similarities with the dialects of 
other former border regions of the country. The dialect around Marosszek 
is similar to that spoken in the Pozsony region (in today's Slovakia) and in 
the Moson region, and to that of the Orvidek (Burgenland). The dialect of 
Udvarhelyszek is similar to the one spoken in southern Baranya (Ormansdg).
The Szekely communities, therefore, must have formed through the reloca­
tion of various orsegs (guards) to the east during the course of the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries. Today it is impossible to say which was the largest, 
the eponymous, group. The autochthonous population throughout the whole 
of the Szekelyfold had been Slavic.
The Hungarian dialect of the Transylvanian Basin is distinctly Transyl­
vanian, different from all other Hungarian dialects. The only explanation 
for this is that this dialect has this roots in the Hungarians who settled here 
in the late-ninth century, of the time of the Conquest. Its early core, like the 
graves of the conquerors and the oldest earthworks, can be found in the 
area stretching from Dobokavar through Kolozsvar, Tordav^r, Kiikiilldvar 
and Deva to Hunyadvar. From here it extended in the eleventh and twelfth 
centuries to the eastern half of the Mezfiseg and the headwaters of the Feher- 
and the Fekete-Koros in the west. This area roughly corresponds to the ar­
chaic dialect of the folk songs found in the Mez6s6g, in Enyed and in 176
Marosludas, the fourth independent archaic dialect of Transylvania, the one 
defined by Bart6k. All this demonstrates that a significant group of the 
Hungarians have been continuously present in the western half of the 
Transylvanian Basin since 895. This group differs from the main body of the 
Hungarians — including even the Szekelys who were settled in their present 
location at a later date — in that their unique geographic isolation has re­
sulted in their preserving ethnic characteristics more archaic than those found 
in any other Hungarian region.
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II. The Emergence of the Estates 
(1172- 1526)
1. The Three People of Transylvania (1172-1241)
The Formation of the Szekely and Saxon Settlements
According to chronicles going back to the thirteenth century, the Szekely 
nation, living in a closed community on the southeastern border of Transyl­
vania, descended from the Huns who had found shelter in Transylvania 
after the death of Attila. This, however, cannot be proved; neither can the 
assumption that they are identical with a Turk people who migrated into 
the Carpathian Basin in about 670. Such an assumption, despite some ar­
chaeological evidence, is not verifiable linguistically. The Sz£kelys, or at 
least their eponymous core, are most likely to have descended from a tribe 
referred to as "kabars" by the Byzantine emperor, Constantine Porphyro- 
gennetos, the "rebels" who rose against their Khazar overlords and joined 
the Hungarian tribes before the conquest of the Carpathian Basin. In about 
950 they were still bilingual, speaking both their own Turk tongue and the 
Hungarians' Finno-Ugric language. Their name is generally derived from 
the name of the Bulgarian-Turk tribe "Eskil", although this is much dis­
puted.
However, the Szekelys' origin is likely to be Turkic. The runic alphabet 
which the Szekelys used in the Middle Age had initially been employed to 
set down Turkic texts; of its thirty-seven characters, twenty-one were Old 
Turkic, three Hellenic and three Gelgolitic. Four of the last two types of 
characters represent phonemes which do not occur in Turkic, but can be 
found in Finno-Ugric Hungarian. The Szekelys, for as far back as we have 
data concerning their language (including geographical names), have al­
ways spoken Hungarian, and their local dialect contains no more Turkic 
loan words than the vernacular Hungarian. Thus, even if their language 
had originally been Turkic, they very early on assimilated completely into 
the Hungarians. This could hardly have happened in their present area of 
habitation, on the southeast border of the territory where Hungarian was 
spoken.
The Szekelys preserved one element of their Turkic tribal organization 
even in modern times. The Szekely people was divided into six tribes, with 
four branches within each. Each branch was governed by a number of lead­
ing families which had the hereditary right to put forward judges (judices) 
and military leaders (capitanei) for the clan, and these offices were rotated 
annually among them in a specific order. This structure may have survived 178
from the time of the Conquest, or may have been formed as a pattern of 
military organization during the period when the frontier zone was estab­
lished. Be that as it may, it clearly existed by the time the Szekelys moved to 
their present location, since each one of the six clans is found by name in 
every Sz6kely community in whatever part of the country it settled later on. 
Some members of every one of the six tribes must, therefore, have been 
involved in each resettlement. The land on which they settled was in every 
case considered to be the common property of the Szekely people as a whole. 
Each new community was reorganized along the pattern of four branches 
for each of the six tribes; in cases where the new settlement was a branch 
short, the number was rounded out to four with a "new " branch. The of­
fice-holders' share of the common tribal land was a multiple of that of an 
ordinary person, and this, as well as the other benefits they received, made 
for considerable differentiation in wealth among the Szekelys, too. The feu­
dal system of personal subordination, however, could not evolve, since every 
Szekely was a free man, with the right to possess an equitable share of the 
common land and the duty to personal military service. Together with the 
tribal-military structure, the Szekelys preserved the longest, the transhumant 
way of life of the Hungarian herdsmen, seasonally rotating their use of high­
land and lowland pastures for optimal grazing. In the early days, they pre­
sented horses to the king by way of taxes, and even when they gradually 
took to agriculture, the Szekelys paid their tax in cattle. This means that 
they remained primarily stockbreeders. In the king's army, the Szekelys 
served as the light cavalry vanguard.
The uniquely structured Szekely communities and the Szekely way of 
life would never have survived within the framework of the royal counties 
where the commoners were assigned to various duties around the castles 
and only a certain proportion of them were called on to perform military 
service. Along with the military settlements bearing Hungarian tribal names, 
there are also settlements called Szekely throughout all of historical Hun­
gary, in Transdanubia as well as along the northwestern borders. From this 
we can conclude that the resettlement of the first Szekely (Kabar?) warriors 
must have started at the turn of the tenth and eleventh century.
The deanery established for the Szekelys which is first referred to in the 
sources as being in Transylvania was named after a settlement in Bihar 
county, and it even had a district called Erddhat (Forest Hill) after the hilly 
region near the village of Telegd. The Transylvanian Saxon nam e of 
HortoM gy for a river can be found at only one other place in Hungary 
outside the Szekelys' early Transylvanian habitat, and that is in Bihar county. 
The river-name of Homorbd which was given to two streams in the Dean­
ery of Telegd also has its parallel in Bihar. Bihar county was completely 
surrounded by Hungarian settlements in the course of the tenth century, 
which explains why the Szekelys were thoroughly magyarized by the elev­
enth century, and spoke only Hungarian by the time they moved to Transyl­
vania, although they kept their runic alphabet.
Toponomy also provides information about the area the Szekelys first 
inhabited in Transylvania, about the time of their movement further east­
wards to their present homeland, and about the route they took. It was 
1 7 9  around 1190 that King G6za II established a provostship in the valley of the
Hortob&gy River for the first German-speakers (Flandrenses or Theutonici) 
settled in Transylvania. This provostship was first under the authority of 
the bishop of Transylvania, but was later transferred to the archbishop of 
Esztergom. Its territory, called "Altland" both then and later, consisted of 
three judicial and administrative districts called szeks that is seats — the 
Szebensz6k, UjegyhSzasszek and Nagysinksz6k seats. The records refer to 
the Altland as desertum, meaning, however, not a desert, but something 
abandoned, the land left by the Szekelys of Telegd who moved on to a former 
royal domain — of which only its name, Udvarhely (Place of the Court) 
survived. This is primary proof that the Szekelys had already been in the 
Hortob&gy Valley before the arrival of the Germans, and also in the valleys 
of the rivers Sebes and Sz£d to the west, and in the S&ros Valley to the east, 
and had passed on some of their place-names before they moved on. After 
the departure of the Telegd Szekelys and still in the twelfth century, the 
Szekely community of the Sebes Valley (near today's Sz^szsebes) moved 
east of the Olt River bend to the territory afterwards called Sepsisz§k, this 
name being a variant of Sebesi, that is of the name of their former home. 
Later Szekelys from Orba in the Szerdahely district followed their example 
and migrated to the southeastern marches of Transylvania into the district 
afterwards Orbaiszek.
The move must have taken place before 1224, for in 1224, King Andrew II 
joined the seats of Sz6szv3ros, Sz&szsebes, Szerdahely and K<5halom to the 
three seats of Altland, decreeing that the Szekely communities, from "V&ros" 
(Sz£szv£ros) to Bar6t in Sepsisz6k beyond the Olt bends become one nation 
(unus sit populusj .1 He provided, furthermore, that the separate districts 
should unite under the sole authority of the ispan, or comes, of Szeben, who 
was appointed by the king and was independent of the voivode of Transyl­
vania. The first known ispan of Szeben appeared, by the way, in 1210 as the 
leader of the Saxons, Szekelys, Pechenegs, and Romanians in a war against 
Bulgaria. The Szekely's own separate ispan must have been appointed in 
about 1230, at about the time the settlers leaving the areas that had been 
allocated to the Germans were finally installed in Sepsiszek and Orbaiszek. 
For some time, however, there were some Szekelys living north of the Ger­
man settlements on the southern bank of the Nagykukiilld, who gave up 
their lands to the Germans only later. Nevertheless, the basis of the auto­
nomy these German settlers were to enjoy already existed in 1224. The other 
six seats joined to the "province" of Szeben (later Szebensz£k) were awarded 
the liberties of Szeben collectively. This meant that here the villages and 
seats had the authority to elect their own judges and priests, and that the 
population as a whole was subordinate to no private landowner. It was the 
king who appointed their administrative and military leader, the ispan of 
Szeben, who in these years was invariably a member of the Hungarian aris­
tocracy. The autonomous seats were obliged to pay a considerable amount 
of money in taxes, and to supply 500 armoured soldiers to the king.
This free peasant status, so different from the form of social organization 
in the counties, as it involved no obligation of rendering services even to
1. E. Ja k a b , Okleveltar Kolozsvar tortenete elso kotetehez. (Archives to Volume I of the
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elected officials, was not one that the German settlers had brought with 
them from their homeland near Luxemburg. In fact, the weight of their sei- 
gneurial burdens had been as much of a reason for their emigration as the 
over-population of that area. They won the liberties of Szeben in Transylva­
nia. Similar settlement programmes for foreign "guests" (hospites) who shared 
in the privileges of personal freedom and self-government were started in 
other parts of Transylvania as well: immigrants arrived in the northern part 
of the province around Radna and Beszterce, and in some villages of the 
Maros Valley in the district of Sz^szregen, probably about the same time as 
those, who settled in Szeben. Because they all shared in the Saxon-type privi­
leges, all German immigrants were referred to as "Saxons" (Saxones) by the 
royal chancellery and by the Hungarian population, though they had not 
come from Saxony. The liberties of Szeben thus became the "Saxon liber­
ties", and they applied only to those who settled on the royal domains trans­
ferred to them and called — despite the fact that the territories were geo­
graphically remote from each other — the Kiralyfold, German: Konigs- 
boden (Land of the King), and the Szaszfold (Land of the Saxons). Those 
Germans who established their new homes on ecclesiastical or other non­
royal land found themselves under the authority of their feudal lords. How­
ever, the freedom of the royal settlers, too, was in constant danger, from 
factors both external and internal to the system. In 1224, King Andrew II 
promised that he would not give grants of land to any lord in any of the 
seven seats which shared in the liberties of Szeben. Nevertheless, irrevers­
ible cases of his having done so had occurred before. For instance, Gosselin, 
the royal chaplin and one of the Walloon immigrants who had come with 
the Germans, owned an estate called Kisdiszn6d in Szebenszek. In 1223, 
one year before the ban on private ownership in the region, he gave the 
land, together with its church, to the Abbey of Kerc, probably because he 
himself wished to live in the royal court. The village could not revert to 
being under Saxon authority until a hundred years later, and even then 
only because the abbey was joined to Szebenszek.
The German immigrants were led by operators who held the title of Grave 
in German (gereb in Hungarian). Villages were often named after the gereb 
who established them. This is how Szeben, the Saxon centre, had initially 
acquired the name Villa Hermanni, and later, when it was a town, came to 
be called Hermannstadt. Thegerebs  laid claim to hereditary prerogatives (e.g. 
a bigger share of the land, milling and inkeeping rights), which gave them 
almost seignorial powers. It was to curtail this development that the com­
moners had the king declare in the charter of 1224 that "the people have the 
right to elect whomever they deem fit" for their magistrates.2 On the other 
hand, the gerebs tried to safeguard their independence by obtaining land 
grants from the king in areas to which the liberties of Szeben did not apply, 
and where they were able to exercise the rights of landowners over the 
population, even over the settlers of German descent. Some of them ended 
up moving out of Szebenszek, and ceding their villages to the Saxon com­
munities.
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W hile the Saxons succeeded in preventing the gerebs from accumulating 
land within the seats, they failed in their efforts to unite all the Saxon seats 
under the ecclesiastical authority of the Altland, the provost of Szeben com­
ing under the immediate authority of the archbishops of Esztergom, although 
that status involved significant material advantages when it came to the 
payment of tithes, for example. The priests belonging to the Archdiocese of 
Esztergom were allowed to keep two-thirds of the tithes collected for their 
own purposes, whereas the share of all the others was only a quarter. Time 
and again the priests of the other Saxon deaneries and chapters tried to 
wrest for themselves, too, the advantages which their Szeben colleagues 
enjoyed. This led to constant discord with their superiors, the bishops of 
Transylvania. The Saxon gerebs supported their priests in this struggle, and 
when the bishop of Transylvania had Al&rd, the defiant gereb of Vizakna 
executed in 1277, Saxon soldiers led by Al&rd's son Gy&n, ransacked Gyula- 
feherv&r, and set the cathedral on fire, with the members of the bishop's 
chapter and many Hungarians citizens who had fled there for safety inside.
By the beginning of the fourteenth century, Vizakna had finally been placed 
under the authority of the Provostship of Szeben, which also shared in the 
profits from the settlement's important salt-time. However, the dispute over 
tithes continued, and the bishops of Transylvania excommunicated the diso­
bedient Saxon priests on several occasions.
Before the 1224 charter securing the rights of the German settlers, there 
was an event which was to have a lasting effect on the history of the region: 
in 1211, the Teutonic knights who had been expelled from the Holy Land 
settled in the Barcas&g. The area wtes then deserted, because the king had 
resettled the Pecheneg frontier-guard community which had given the origi­
nally Turkic names of Barca, Brass6, TftmOs, Zajzon and Tatrang to the riv­
ers of the area. The Pechenegs' new home was probably near the castle of 
Talm£cs — named after one of their tribes —, where, according to records 
from 1224, they shared the use of the neighbouring forests with Saxons and 
Romanians. The knights were not under the authority of the voivodes, but 
enjoyed autonomy. They had the right to build wooden castles, and to set­
tle people on their land who became exempt from paying tithes and had the 
right to hold fairs. This, however, did not satisfy the knights. They started 
building stone castles and spread their influence beyond the mountains.
The last straw came when the knights insisted that they were subject to no 
authority but the pope's. King Andrew II would not tolerate this, and ex­
pelled them in 1225. Their German settlements, however, stayed on, and 
formed an independent Saxon district headed by a royal ispan who had his 
seat at Brass6.
The consolidation of both the Sz6kely and Saxon settlements took place 
only in the second half of the thirteenth century. Sz£kelys living near Medgyes 
moved to the Marosszek (west of the Seat of Udvarhely), which belonged to 
the Deanery of Telegd. Some of those living near Szciszkezd moved to es­
tablish Seat of Aranyos near Torda in 1288; others settled north of Seat of 
Sepsi and Seat of Orba of K6zdisz6k. The above three later united as the 
district of Haromszek (Three Seats), although as far as church organization 
was concerned, the seats of Orba and Kezd formed a separate deanery, the 
Deanery of Kezd. Sepsiszek was the only one of the Szekely seats to remain 1 8 2
part of the Deanery of Gyulafeherv&r. Finally, the inhabitants of the Seat of 
Udvarhely gave up their home and chose to live in the seats of Csik and 
Gyergy6, although they stayed within the jurisdiction of the Telegd dean­
ery. The two Saxon communities which took the place of the Medgyes and 
Sz&szk6zd Szekelys remained under the authority of the Sz6kely ispan until 
1402. Ecclesiastically, however, they belonged to the Gyulafeherv^r dean­
ery, as did the eighth Saxon seat, Segesv&r, which had grown up by the 
beginning of the fourteenth century. In the northeast, Beszterce — together 
with Radna and the "royal" district — obtained the liberties of Szeben only 
in 1366. The villages, however, south of Beszterce, which were adminis­
tered by the Teke, Regen and Kerles deaneries, now came under the author­
ity of Hungarian and Saxon landlords. Thus the geographical distribution 
of the Szekely and Saxon population took its final form.
The Peregrine Romanian Homeland
The settlement of the Saxons and resettlement of the Szekelys to the east 
was only an intermediate stage, not the final form, of frontier defence, which 
needed constant reorganization due to the changing nature of the external 
threats to the country. After the series of raids by nomadic peoples from the 
east, the most dangerous foe was Byzantium. In 1166, Emperor Manuel I 
led the first sudden surprise attack against Transylvania and his soldiers 
ravaged the area, taking many prisoners and a rich booty. According to a 
contemporary chronicler, "H is great army consisted of, among many oth­
ers, a great host of Vlachs, who are allegedly descendants of former settlers 
from Italy".3 The Slavonic word "Vlach" borrowed originally from the Ger­
man, was used by the Byzantines to describe the people in their empire 
who spoke a neo-Latin language and called themselves "Rum in".
The above is the first authentic historical source which speaks of the pres­
ence of Romanians in Transylvania. This was the first time they appeared 
north of the Danube River. In 1164, Manuel's rival, Andronikos, who had 
been imprisoned but escaped, was captured by Vlachs on the Galician bor­
der, that is, somewhere on the Moldavian side of the eastern Carpathians. It 
follows that Romanians must already have been living on the southern and 
eastern outer slopes of the Carpathians before 1200.
Linguistic evidence also suggests a similar conclusion. This derives from 
Bulgarian rule in the area between the Danube and the Southern Carpathians 
after 600: the Slavonic loan words in Romanian are of Bulgarian-Slavonic 
origin. Their phonetic features, however, suggest that intensive Bulgarian- 
Romanian ties were formed only after 900. Therefore, the phonetic change 
from a to o (e.g. bab to the Romanian bob) took place in the ninth century; 
and the disappearance of the weak vowel i (e.g. timinica to the Romanian 
temnifa) is conjecturally placed at about 900. Place-names of Romanian ori­
gin can be found only around today's Sofia and in the area to the west and 
south of it, indicating that linguistic relations developed only in those Byzan-
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tine territories which were occupied by the Bulgarian tsar Simeon who held 
Sofia and expanded his control as far as Thessaly. There are no signs of 
interaction in Old Bulgaria on the right bank of the Danube.
Further linguistic evidence points even further, as both main dialects of 
the Romanian language, the Daco-Romanian and the Megleno-Romanian, 
contain words which have either been borrowed from the Albanian or have 
originated from a Balkanic proto-language shared with the Albanians. (This 
Balkan proto-language may have had different dialects and may have been 
influenced by several satem type languages which fused during the period 
when the area was under Roman rule.) The Romanian dialects also have 
grammatical features identical to some in Albanian. The only place where 
the Romanian's ancestors could have had contact with the Albanians, how­
ever, was the central part of the Balkan Peninsula, for the Albanians have 
always lived there. The region where the Macedo-Romanians live, or rather, 
where they used to live, since the majority of them moved to present-day 
Romania earlier this century, cannot have been the Romanian people's origi­
nal homeland. For in the area concerned, that is, in the region south of Skoplje 
and Sofia, the vernacular was Greek during the generations of Roman rule, 
and the Romanian-speaking population could not, thus, have picked up its 
language there. They must have moved there from the north, probably af­
ter 600, fleeing from the Slavic tribes who were invading the Balkan Penin­
sula. Several tenth to twelfth century Byzantine sources provide data on the 
Macedonian and Thessalian Romanians.
That the Romanian people were spread over such a large area and ap­
peared in Transylvania at a relatively late date can only be attributed to the 
fact that they led a transhumant way of life. Words which can be found 
both in the Albanian language and in the northern and southern Romanian 
dialects provide linguistic evidence to support this view. The obvious pe­
culiarity of these words is that most of them, directly or indirectly, relate to 
pastoral life in the mountains. On the other hand, terms associated with 
land cultivation are clearly missing except for the words mazare (pea), pdstaie 
(pea-pod), grunz (clod of earth) and grapd (hoe), which indicates that the 
women must have cultivated the land using rude hoes, whereas the men 
tended the herds away from home. In Romanian, the technical terms of 
tillage, farming implements and cultivated crops are of Latin, Slavonic or 
Hungarian origin.
The vocabulary for the natural environment in Albanian, Macedo-Ro- 
manian and Daco-Romanian graphically depicts a mountainous area, par­
ticularly the region above 1200 metres, where primeval coniferous forests 
covered the slopes. It was in an environment of this kind that the Albanians 
and Romanians lived together before the Romanian dialects developed, as 
evidenced by words common in the Albanian and the Romanian dialects 
such as, for instance: brad (pine tree), bunget (dense forest), copac (tree), curpen 
(vine), druete (tree stump), ghionoaie (woodpecker), mal (slope), magura (hill), 
ndpirca (viper), pirdu (stream), sptnz (hellebore), and viezure (badger). To 
judge from the directions the peoples later took and the areas of their final 
settlement, the original common habitat must have been a mountainous 
area near Skoplje, a region rich in alpine pastures. This pastoral population 
had, at one time, lived as one people with a romanized population which 1 8 4
had fled from towns and villages north of the Albanian-Romanian area, 
and had settled south of it. This is proven by the Romanians' adoption of 
Macedonian place-names, for example Bitolja > Bitulea, Veria, Seres, Elasson 
> Lasun, Kastoria > Kostur, Saloniki > Sarun or Fiorina > Flarin. The close 
links that existed between the town-dwellers and the nomadic groups among 
the Macedo-Romanians are proven by a statement by the leader of the 1066 
Romanian uprising against the Byzantine government, who lived in the ur­
ban centre of Larissa: he was not able to get in touch with his men, because 
in the summer they and their families were all in the mountains of Bulgaria 
(today's Macedonia).
The above statement is, in fact, the first known mention of the practice of 
transhumance, that is summer-winter rotational grazing, among the Roma­
nians. Since the shepherds moved to the mountains with their families in 
the summer, and to the valleys and the seacost in the winter, Byzantine 
sources call them "nom ads". Real nomadism, however, involves the shep­
herds' constantly moving their herds to new pastures, and taking their fami­
lies with them. Although Romanian herdsmen did not, as a rule, follow this 
pattern, occasionally some of them had to seek new areas because of re­
peated attacks by other tribes, or poor pastures. In the Balkans, there were 
some Romanian shepherds even in the twentieth century who led a genu­
inely nomadic way of life and had no permanent habitat. Migration spread 
the pastoral, undoubtedly Romanian-speaking culture, whose language was 
from the Pindus to the northern Carpathians, leaving permanent traces on 
the languages of several other peoples.
From the sixty-six words in Albanian, Macedo-Romanian and Daco-Ro- 
manian (according to some dubious etymologies, a few more) which origi­
nate from the proto-language in the Balkan Peninsula, thirty have passed 
into Balkanic languages (Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian), including twenty- 
eight which have found their way into Hungarian and Ukrainian as well. 
Surprisingly, a further thirteen of them can be identified only in the Hun­
garian and the Ukrainian which means either that they never were adopted 
into the other languages of the Balkans, or that they have died out. Finally, 
thirteen of these words are still used by Polish, Slovakian and Moravian 
shepherds today. That these "peregrinating" words were originally in the 
vocabulary of peregrine shepherds is proved by their meaning. Out of those 
which reached the Balkanic languages together with Hungarian and Ukrain­
ian, twenty-one are fundamentally connected to pastoral life, and the oth­
ers are also related to it. (Some examples are: bacin (cheese-making shep­
herd), balega (manure), barz (grey animal colour), basca (wool), briu (belt), 
caciula (sheepskin hat), caputa (shepherd's socks), catun (shepherd's shel­
ter), flu ier  (flute), gard (manure-heap), galbeaza (flatworm), mmz (foal), murg 
(dun animal colour), rinzd (rennet), sarbad (sour-milk), sterp (barren), strunga 
(sheepfold), sut (hornless), fap (billy-goat), fare (pinfold), vatra (fireplace), 
vatui (lamb), and zgarda (dog-collar). The pastoral vocabulary of Daco-Ro- 
manian, and of all the other languages it influenced, became richer after the 
separation from the Albanians, and concerned with dairy farming particu­
larly. Some such words have survived in Macedo-Romanian too, lik e  straghe- 
ata (soft cheese), urda (sweet cottage cheese), zara (buttermilk), zar (whey), 
and ctrlig (shepherd's crook), but they also spread to other Balkan peoples,
as well as to the Hungarians, Ukrainians, and to some extent even to the 
Poles, Slovaks, and Moravians. Besides these, only the Daco-Romanian has 
preserved the words brmza (cottage cheese), bordei (shepherd's hut), butuc 
or butura (tree stump), capusa (tick), cafa (shepherd's crook), and cirlan (lamb).
It was from the Daco-Romanian that these terms have passed into the Bal­
kan languages, and into Hungarian and Ukrainian, and to some extent into 
Slovak, Polish and Moravian.
During the centuries when the Romanian pastoral communities were 
peregrinating across the alpine pastures of the Balkans and the Carpathians, 
their vocabulary was naturally enriched by other languages. For example, 
from the Slavic they borrowed sttna (cheese making hut), smintina (sour- 
cream), coliba (hut), jintifa  (sweet whey); from the Hungarian sala$ (shep­
herd's shelter), lacas (lodgings), ravas (accounting), and tar cat (dappled). It 
is striking, however, that of those Romanian words for animal husbandry 
which came from the Latin, only a few can be found in other languages, 
such as pacurar (shepherd), staur (stable), turmd (herd), curastra (yoghurt), 
probably because they did not belong specifically to Romanian pastoral 
culture, but were general terms of animal husbandry known to all nations.
It is apparent from the vocabulary listed above that the Romanian were 
a pastoral community engaged primarily in raising small animals, particu­
larly sheep, but they could not do without horses while migrating. Besides 
the making of cheese and cottage-cheese, weaving wool and breeding horses 
not only enabled them to be self-sufficient but also played an important 
part in the economic life of the whoje Balkan-Carpathian region. In the Mid­
dle Ages, and even in early modern times, one of the most importante aple 
foods in this huge area was preserved salted cottage cheese. Hand-w>_ ven 
woollens were sought after in both rural and town markets; and Romanian 
horses, apart from being considered very good, carried the greater part of 
the freight traffic in the Balkan peninsula. The documents mentic two cat­
egories among the Romanian shepherds attached to Serbian monasteries by 
royal decree in the twelfth to the fifteenth centuries: the vojniks or soldiers, 
and the kjelators who performed carrier socage-service. (The word kjelator is 
of Latin origin but derives directly from the Romanian calator which means 
traveller; the phrase Vlachoi hoditai used in a Byzantine source in 976 is prob­
ably a caique).
It would be a mistake, however, to regard the Romanians as solely a 
transhumant or even mainly a nomadic people — a mistake that has been 
made by a great many writers, from early medieval Byzantine chroniclers 
to modern Hungarian and even Romanian historians. The mountain shep­
herds who specialized in dairy farming had to rely on the town market 
where they could sell their surplus produce; they also needed to buy cere­
als either in the town markets or in the villages. However, in difficult times 
they had to cultivate the land themselves, within the limits of the geographi­
cal potential of the mountains. This is how the technical terms of tillage, 
which are of Latin origin, have survived in both the northern and southern 
dialects of Romanian, griu (wheat), orz (barley), secara (rye), meiu (millet), 
ara (to plough), semana (to sow), treera (to thresh), faina  (flour), and pnne 
(bread). In peaceful times the majority of the nomadic pastoral communi­
ties chose to stay in the same area for longer periods, changed over to farm- 1 8 6
ing and established permanent villages. This is proved by hundreds of place- 
names in the northern Romanian dialect, or by place-names that refer to a 
Romanian population (Vlasi, etc.) in the enormous area stretching between 
Sarajevo and Sofia from west to east, and between NiS and Skoplje from 
north to south, although the Romanians had left that region by the end of 
the Middle Ages, or had assimilated into the Serbian and Bulgarian envi­
ronment. While in Transylvania, the former Roman province of Dacia, there 
were no Roman town names preserved in the language of the inhabitants 
before the Hungarian Conquest, in the northern, romanized areas of the 
Balkan Peninsula the Roman names of towns and rivers adopted by the 
Slavonic population — for example: Ratiaria became Arcar, Naissus Nig, 
Scupi Skoplje, Serdica Srjedec, and Almus changed to Lom, Oescus to Iskar, 
and Augusta to Ogosta, and so on — imply that at the time of the Slavonic 
invasion only part of the romanized town-dwelling population had fled to 
the south, while the rest stayed on and assimilated into the Slavonic com­
munity only later. However, according to the above-mentioned evidence of 
mediaeval Romanian place-names, the inhabitants of the neighbouring Ro­
manian villages and pastoral communities maintained their language until 
their fourteenth-sixteenth century migration to the north, or until their local 
assimilation, and increasingly combined their pastoral way of life with ag­
riculture. The Romanian shepherds connected with the Bulgarians enriched 
their vocabulary with Slavonic words for agriculture sometime after 900, 
when the speakers of the northern and southern Romanian dialects were 
still living together. This is apparent in the fact that both dialects contain 
Bulgarian loan-words showing the same phonetic changes, for example, bob 
(bean), brazda (furrow), coaja (bark), coasa (scythe), cociasa (dry stalk), cucian 
(peduncle), gradina (garden), livada (orchard), lopata (shovel), plug (plough), 
snap (sheaf), stog (rick), and so on.
All in all, the Albanian loan-words of the northern Romanian dialect and 
the Bulgarian loan-words of the southern Romanian dialect lead to the con­
clusion that the evolution of the Vlach-Romanian language and people took 
place over a relatively large area in the course of migrating in different 
directions, and sometimes returning to previous places of habitation. This, 
if there is a continuity of the Roman province and, later, the Romanians, it 
cannot be regarded as attaching to some area, but to the people themselves, 
among whom were the descendants of the Roman and the romanized popu­
lation moved from Dacia to the southern banks of the Danube in 271, and 
pushed further to the south by the Slavs after 600. The Romanian popula­
tion, dispersed in various directions by the Bulgarians after 900, reassem­
bled in different places at different times as the changing political circum­
stances allowed. Between'900 and 1000, the Romanians must have been in 
every part of the Bulgarian Empire which spread from the southern Car­
pathians to Thessaly, including the region between the Carpathians and the 
Lower Danube, an area with a sizeable Bulgarian-Slavonic population at 
the time. Their presence in this area is shown by the names of such rivers as 
Zsil-Jil, Jijia, Ialomifa, Dimbovija, and by the name Vlaska region, near the 
lower section of the Arges River. This latter epithet implies the existence of 
a sporadic Romanian community in a Slavonic environment. It must have 
187 been here that the northern Romanian dialect picked up the Bulgarian-Sla-
vonic technical terms of agriculture which are unknown to the southern 
dialect, such as: ogor (fallow land), sadi (to plant), ovaz (oat), pleava (chaff, 
husks), and rarifd (hand plough), as well as brdzdar (ploughshare), grindei 
(plough beam), cormana (mouldboard), plaz (sole of a plough).
In 1014, the Byzantine expansion reached the Danube, and put an end to 
the independent existence of the Bulgarian state for the next two hundred 
years. The Bulgarian-Slavonic population was left isolated in the Lower 
Danubian plain. Hemmed in from the north by the Romanian pastoral com­
munities living on the slopes of the Carpathians, and by the Cumans invad­
ing the area from the south, this Bulgarian-Slavonic population gradually 
became romanized. The same thing happened to the Slavonic community 
living north of the Danube, on the territory of what later became Moldavia.
The former Bulgarian region between the Lower Danube and the Carpathi­
ans fell under Cuman rule, and was thereafter referred to as Cumania in the 
historical sources.
Between 1014 and 1185, the entire Romanian population of the Balkans 
lived within the Byzantine Empire, and, as mentioned above, was part of 
the Byzantine army. But they often rebelled against the Byzantine authori­
ties because of the heavy taxes. In 1094, the Cumans making forays into the 
empire were guided through the Balkan Mountains by Romanians. By that 
time the Romanian Christian church, whose language had originally been 
Latin, had already adopted the Bulgarian's Slavonic liturgy. They belonged 
to the Archdiocese of Ohrid, and in the eleventh century a separate diocese 
was established for them in Vranje in the Morava Valley. In 1185, the Bul­
garian malcontents rose against Byzantine oppression led by two Romani­
ans, Peter and Asen. With Cuman help, the area broke away from Byzan­
tium, and the Asenid, or Second Bulgarian Empire — also called the Bul­
garian-Vlach Empire — was founded. It eventually fell to the Turks at the 
end of the fourteenth century. The Romanian element ceased to play a role 
in this empire from the mid-thirteenth century on.
From the end of the twelfth century, large Romanian communities had 
been moving to the politically ascendant Serbia, only to disappear from 
there as well or to become assimilated into the local populations. By the 
fifteenth century, only the Macedo-Romanians and the secessionist Megleno- 
Romanians remained in the centre of the Balkans. A fragmentary Romanian 
population who spoke the northern dialect migrated to Istria and the ma­
jority of the Romanian people was concentrated north of the Danube.
After such a varied history, we cannot localize the ancient Romanian 
homeland to a small area, to the NiS-Skoplje-Sofia triangle, for instance, as 
some historians have previously believed possible. The Romanian linguist,
Sextil Puscariu, declared long ago: "Nothing prevents us from believing 
that during the early evolutionary period of our language, a relatively sparse 
population living over an extensive area was able to pass on linguistic inno­
vations through primitive channels across great distances". It was in the 
same spirit that Alexandru Nicolescu made the following highly apt obser­
vation: "The Romanians moved about both to the north and south of the 
Danube with characteristic versatility ... and therefore the Romanian nation 
did not have a single 'cradle' or 'ancient homeland', but several, stretching 
over a vast area had lying far from one another ... Through the repeated 188
merging and dispersing of their communities throughout the Carpathian- 
Danubian and Danubian-Balkan regions, the Romanians achieved a 'm o­
bile continuity'."4 The story of Transylvania's Romanians can be under­
stood only in the light of this "mobile continuity".
Romanians in Transylvania and Cumania 
until the Mongol Invasion
Some fifty years after the Romanians (Vlachoi) in the army of the emperor 
Manuel I had raided and looted Transylvania in 1166 a whole series of char­
ters dated to the first decades of the thirteenth century make reference to 
Romanians living peacefully under Hungarian authority in the southern 
Carpathians. They must have had some sort of autonomy. At least this is 
what is implied by a charter of 1202 issued by King Andrew II, in which he 
granted the narrow strip of land running up to the mountains between the 
Olt, Kerc and Arp£s rivers to the Cistercian monastery established in Kerc 
near the Olt River. This piece of land must have belonged to the Romanian 
community, for the charter removed it from their authority.5 According to a 
1223 charter issued to confirm the grant, the transfer of the property was 
carried out by Benedek, the voivode of Transylvania who held this office 
between 1202 and 1209. The approximate date of the next event referred to 
in connection with the Romanians in 1210. The document itself was written 
in 1250, and describes how Joachim, ispan of Szeben, led Saxon, Romanian, 
Szekely and Pecheneg soldiers (associatist sibi Saxonibus, Olacis, Siculis et 
Bissetiis) to aid the Bulgarian tsar Boril against the rebellious town of Vidin. 
Romanians shared a forest with the Pechenegs near — probably south of — 
an area settled by Saxons, for the use of which the Saxons, too, received a 
grant in 1224 (silvam Blacorum et Bissenorum cum aquis usus communes exercendo
— to use in common the forest of the Vlachs and the Pechenegs together 
with the waters). Historians have long held the earliest source of informa­
tion about Romanians in Transylvania to be King Andrew II's diploma of 
1222, in which the king granted the Teutonic knights who had settled in the 
Barcas&g various privileges, among them duty-free passage through lands 
owned by Szekelys or Romanians (cum transierint per terram Siculorum aut 
per terram Blacorum). Although it has been discovered that the knights, after 
being expelled from the Barcas£g, forged the document in Rome in 1231 in 
order to regain the land, there is no reason to doubt that at that time the 
Barcas^g indeed bordered on a region inhabited by Szekelys in the east, 
and on the area between the Olt River and the southern Carpathians inhab­
ited by the Vlach Romanian population in the west.
The word terra in the text cited above did not mean "country", or even a 
political administrative unit, as is often claimed by certain Romanian histo-
4. A. N ic o le sc u ,  Romania antiqua, Romania nova et la continuity "mobile" du Rou- 
main. Quaderni di Filologia Romanza ... Bologna, 6, 1987, 21-24. The above 
Puscariu citation can also be found there.
5 . Documenta historiam Valachorum in Hungaria illustrantia. Eds A. F e k e te  N a g y  and






































riographers. In some cases it simply meant "region" or "land", even the 
piece of land belonging to a village, as we can read in hundreds of docu­
ments. In other cases it referred to a larger area including several adminis­
trative units, as in the vernacular — though not official — names Szekelyfold 
(land of the Szekelys) or Szaszfold (Saxonland) both of which consisted of a 
number of seats. Finally, terra Blacorum could not have been the "successor 
state" to the domain of the "Gelu dux" invented by Anonymus, since he had 
placed Gelu's lands in the region of the Szamos River, whereas the terra 
Blacorum lay in the valley of the Olt.
The vicinity of the Barcasdg mentioned in the forged charter of 1231 sug­
gests that the terra Blacorum of the early thirteenth-century documents was 
located between the Olt River and the peaks of the southern Carpathians or 
even further to the south. If we assume that the forest shared by the Roma­
nians and the Pechenegs in 1224, lay south of Szeben, as many historians 
believe, then the "land of the Romanians" must have spread along the right 
bank of the Olt to the area where Talmacs castle guarded the entry to the 
Vorostorony Pass; since Talm&cs bears the name of a Pecheneg tribe, the 
forest in question must also have been here.
Like the German-Walloon settlers previously, the Romanians arriving 
in the Olt region also settled in an already inhabited area. Nineteen settle­
ments were recorded along the Olt River at various times in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries. Starting from the west, on the northern bank were 
Talm&cs (1265), Szakadat (1306), FOldv&r (1322), Fogaras (1291), Halm&gy 
(1211), Galt (on the site of today's Ugra 1211), Mikl6svar (1211), Hidveg 
(1332); on the southern bank Kolun (1332), Arp&s (in 1223, the name of a 
river, in 1390, the name of a village), Szombathely (1291), Betlen, Sarkiny, 
Debren (where P£r6 is today), Venice, Kormospatak (today's Kom&na), Heviz 
and Doboka (all 1235).
The name Talmacs as mentioned above, is of Pecheneg origin; Galt comes 
from the W alloon-French noiale gait (walnut forest); Venice from the Italian 
Venezia; Kolun from the German Koln meaning "colony". All these names 
were given by the foreign settlers; the rest of the village names are Hungarian. 
The names of 1235 were recorded in a papal tithe-roll, and indicate that 
they were Catholic settlements. There are no village names of Romanian ori­
gin among them, nor any suggesting a Greek-Orthodox population; the Ro­
manian forms of all these village names derive from the above-listed names.
The first document to mention a permanent Romanian settlement, Kerch 
Olacharum (Olahkerc) date from 1332. Although the name had already ap­
peared in a document in 1252, that text made only a general reference to the 
area inhabited by Romanians near Kerc (terra Olacorum de Kyrch). Place- 
names of undoubtedly Romanian origin in this region are Kucsulata and 
Mundra, both south of the Olt, which were recorded in 1372 and 1401. There 
is documentary evidence that in the fifteenth century about a dozen Roma­
nian villages came into existence in the hills further south of the Olt. These 
fairly new settlements were obviously established by the Romanian voivodes 
of Wallachia, as they, from 1366 on wards, often enjoyed fiefdom over this 
piece of land along the Olt, with Fogaras as an already developed centre. In 
1372 the voivode Vlaicu called the Fogaras area nova plantatio (new settle­
ment) when he gave grants of land to his Wallachian boyars, who appar-
ently brought along with them Romanian peasant settlers as well as Gipsy 
slaves. Thus the Romanian population, which had certainly been present in 
the area from the beginning of the thirteenth century, established permanent 
settlements only after a considerable time. Nor is it yet clear when they came 
to supplant some of the communities previously inhabiting the Olt Valley.
It is the name terra Blacorum that indicates the origin of the Romanian 
pastoral communities that settled in the Fogaras area, for the Romanian 
name of the later Wallachia has always been Jara  Romaneasca (Romanian 
Land). By the twelfth century, the Romanian population had absorbed most 
of the Slavonic peoples living in this region. The territory where Romanian 
was spoken spread to the steppes north of the Danube, an area inhabited by 
Cumans. (Several dozen rivers in the area have Cuman names.) These were 
people that the ancestors of the Romanian shepherds of the southern 
Carpathians moving their herds to winter pastures by the Danube had al­
ready come in regular contact with. It is not unlikely that the Romanians 
who took part in the campaign of Emperor Manuel against Transylvania in 
1166 had been recruited into the Byzantine army in this region. This deduc­
tion is supported by archaeological evidence: approximately 2700 Byzan­
tine bronze coins minted between 1081 and 1185 have been discovered in 
twelve treasure finds and thirty-three sporadic finds at forty-five locations. 
Far fewer Byzantine coin finds minted after 1185 have been found: only 322 
known items. The reason for this is clearly the previously-mentioned upris­
ing against Byzantium, in which Bulgarians and Romanians joined forces 
under Romanian leadership.
The Bulgarian-Vlach Asenid Erhpire continued the fight which Byzan­
tium had started against Hungary for the possession of Belgrade on the 
Danube and of Barancs. Although they sometimes made peace, and even 
formed an alliance — as in the cases of the Hungarian involvement in the 
Vidin uprising of 1210 — a clash over who should rule Cumania was inevi­
table. Since the 1166 Byzantine attack, Transylvania had been particularly 
vulnerable. Presumably it was in the last few decades of the twelfth century 
that the Kingdom of Hungary succeeded in persuading the Romanian shep­
herds grazing their flocks on the alpine pastures of the southern Carpathians 
but based at the lower reaches of the Arges River to undertake frontier 
guard duties. To win their support, the king handed over to them the area 
between the Olt and the mountains which was already settled by Hungar­
ian and Saxon communities. There is but one good answer to the question 
of why the establishment of permanent Romanian settlements in this area 
took place at such a late date, and that has been given by the Romanian 
historian, Petre P. Panaitescu: "In  Transylvania the northern and western 
slopes of the mountains do not have good pastures. No southern shepherd 
would dream of driving his herds to a country so poor in grazing land".6 
The transhumant Romanian communities which returned to the Danube 
annually established their first permanent settlements near the Arges River 
in the twelfth century; only later did they settle in the region around Fogaras.
The political affiliation of Cumania was finally decided when, after the 
Teutonic knights had been expelled from the Barcas&g, Prince Bela, the heir
6 . P . P . P a n a it e sc u , Introducere la istoria culturii romanesti, Bucharest 1969, 146. 192
to the crown, took over the government of Transylvania in 1226. The chief­
tains of the western Cuman tribes of the Lower Danube, in constant fear of 
a Mongol invasion and who had, indeed, been heavily defeated by the Mon­
gols near the Kalka River in 1223, took to the teachings of Hungarian Do­
minican missionaries to such an extent that they not only converted to Chris­
tianity in 1227, but also accepted the authority of the king of Hungary over 
their country and people. A Cuman diocese belonging to the Archdiocese 
of Esztergom was established in the southern part of today's Moldavia with 
Milko as its centre. The conversion did not extend to the Romanian popula­
tion of Cumania who were Orthodox Christians, had already adopted the 
Slavonic liturgy of the Bulgarian church, and were under the immediate 
authority of the patriarch of Constantinople. They probably had their own 
ecclesiastical organization belonging to the Greek Orthodox Diocese of 
Vicina, the diocese established in the Danube Delta at the beginning of the 
thirteenth century.
In 1234, Prince Bela received a papal order that the bishop of Cumania 
appoint a Roman Catholic bishop to care for the Romanians of Cumania 
living under the king's rule (populi sui Walaci vocantur), because they were 
receiving the Sacraments from some pseudo-bishops of the Greek rite (a 
quibusdam pseudoepiscopis Grecorum ritum tenentibus) and were even impel­
ling those Hungarians and Germans who had moved into their area to do 
so. This was the first attempt to unite the Romanians ecclesiastically, but in 
actual fact, nothing came of it. However, the data relating to the attempt 
prove that by that time, a significant part, or perhaps even the majority, of 
the population of Cumania was Romanian.
Integrating the newly-gained territories into the Kingdom of Hungary 
was primarily a political issue for Prince Bela; religion played only a sec­
ondary role. Cumania had previously belonged to Bulgaria and the new 
Bulgarian-Vlach Empire also laid claim to it. In anticipation of the likely 
Bulgarian attack, Prince Bela organized the western marches of Cumania 
into a military frontier zone as far as the Olt River. Patterned on the Croatian 
and Slavonian provinces, the area named the Banate of Szoreny, was to be 
governed by an official of the Crown, the ban. The first man appointed ban 
of Szoreny was the incumbent voivode of Transylvania, Posa de genere 
Cs&k. He was replaced in 1223 by Lukacs, the former master of the king's 
cupbearers, and returned to his previous office of voivode of Transylvania. 
In 1228, Prince Bela made an attempt to seize the castle of Vidin, a bridge­
head on the south bank of the Danube, from the Bulgarians. The Banate of 
Szoreny, however, survived, and the memory of the Hungarian settlers has 
been preserved in the names not only of several villages, but also of rivers 
(e.g. Amaradia from the Hungarian Homorod) and counties (e.g. M ehedinji 
from the Hungarian Mihkld). Corlard, the Walloon gereb of Talmacs, was 
granted the hunting area of Lovista in the valley of the Lator River. In 1238, 
Bela, who had by then already been crowned King Bela IV, asked the pope 
to send a bishop to minister to the Hungarian and Saxon inhabitants of the 
Banate of Szoreny. Only those parts of Cumania which were east of the Olt 
River continued to be governed by Cumanian chieftains, but even they ruled 
as royal commissioners from 1233 on, when Prince Bela took the title king 
of Cumania (rex Cumaniae).
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Map 11. Hungarian settlements in Transylvania in the middle of the thirteenth 
century, on the basis of place-names
The Mongol Invasion and its Consequences
The process of Cumania's integration into the Kingdom of Hungary was 
brutally interrupted by the Mongol, or Tatar, invasion, which brought dev­
astation to the whole of eastern Europe. In 1239, the eastern Cuman tribes 
fled to Hungary to escape the Mongols, and were accommodated between 
the Danube and Tisza rivers by King B61a IV. Their nomadic way of life, 
however, clashed with that of the settled Hungarian population, so they 
moved down to the Balkans in the spring of 1241, when the Mongols reached 
the Hungarian border. 194
The Mongol army poured into Transylvania along three routes. Entering 
through the Borg Pass, Kadan and his forces took the German mining town 
of Radna, sacked Beszterce, and marched on Kolozsvar, where, slaughtered 
"an innumerable multitude of Hungarians".7 Having massacred as many of 
the population of northern Transylvania as were unable to escape into the 
highland, and having burnt down the villages, they passed through the Gate 
of Meszes and joined the main body of the army led by Batu Khan, which 
had come through the Verecke Pass. Chieftain Budjek arrived in Transylva­
nia through the Ojtoz Pass, and clashed with the army of Voivode P6sa in a 
battle, near the Barcas&g, in which P6sa and most of his men fell. The Mon­
gol army proceeded along the Olt Valley without encountering resistance, 
devastated Kiikull<5v£r and Gyulafeherv&r, and then left Transylvania along 
the Maros River. In the meanwhile, the third army, the troops of Burundai, 
having wrought unspeakable carnage in Cumania, descended on Szeben 
through the Vorostorony Pass and laid waste the town and the surround­
ing area.
King Bela IV hastily rallied his troops, but they were not familiar with 
Mongol warfare, and the Hungarians suffered a major defeat from the main 
Mongol army near Muhi on the Saj6 River. The king had to flee; firstto Trans- 
danubia, and later, when the Mongols crossed the frozen Danube in the 
winter, to the island of Trau in Dalmatia. When in the spring of 1242 upon 
receiving news of the death of the khan of all Mongols the invaders with­
drew, they took thousands of prisoners with them — leaving behind a coun­
try of charred ruins and unburied corpses. Only a handful of castles in 
Transdanubia had been able to resist and still remained. Of the accounts, 
the most detailed is the one dealing with the devastation of Transylvania, 
for the memorists, Canon Rogerius of Varad, had escaped from Mongol 
captivity and had made his way up the Maros Valley all the way to Kolozsvar.
The primary effect of the Mongol devastation was demographic. Hun­
garian and Saxon immigration to Cumania and the Banate of Szoreny pe­
tered out, and Romanians started to migrate to Transylvania from the more 
exposed Lower Danube region to escape further Mongol attacks. The Cu- 
mans were scattered by the Mongol invasion: most of them became subjects 
(kipchak) of the Golden Horde established along the northern shore of the 
Black Sea. Of the rest, some settled in the Great Hungarian Plain, others in 
the Balkans. From that time on, the subjects of the king of Hungary in Cuma­
nia were Romanians who had assimilated what was left of the Slavs and the 
Cumans.
Romanian Kenezes and Voivodes
King Bela IV entrusted the Romanian battlerhardened nomadic equestrian 
people with the reorganizing of the provinces beyond the southern and east­
ern Carpathians. The first task was to restore the defensive potential of the
7. Gy. GyOrffy, A z Arpadkori Magyarorszag torteneti foldrajza. (Historical Geography 
of Hungary during the Arpid Era.) III. Budapest 1987, 356.
Banate of Szoreny: the keneziate or kenezseg (keneziatus) was the organiza­
tion structure adopted. The term derived from the Hungarian form of the 
word kniaz, originally meaning "ruler" in the Slavonic but used at this time 
to describe the leaders of Slavic villages in Transylvania. In Doboka county, 
for example, where, in the thirteenth century, no Romanians were yet liv­
ing, in a document of 1214 villani kenesii et omnes alii de provincia Doboka8 are 
mentioned. The keneziate was a hereditary office: it involved the leader­
ship of one or more settlements and the collection of the royal taxes, and 
involved certain privileges — for example the local administration of jus­
tice, a share in the tax income, and milling rights.
A role, analogous to that of the kenez was played by the leader of the 
German settlers, the soltesz — called "Schultheiss" in Upper Hungary and 
gereb in Transylvania. There is every indication that in the Banate of SzOreny 
and in Cumania, the institution of the keneziate was introduced by King 
Bela IV after the Mongol invasion. No evidence has survived concerning 
the previous organizational structure of the Romanian population of the 
area. In those Romanian communities living in the Balkans, particularly in 
mediaeval Serbia, the office of kneaz, the equivalent of the kenez, was occa­
sionally to be found, but the Romanians within the borders of the Kingdom 
of Hungary used only the term chinez taken from the Hungarian. The great­
est authority on the Romanian history of this period, Silviu Dragomir, also 
sees it in this light: "Kenezes or village leaders are known amongst the 
Transylvanian Romanians from the fourteenth century on. However, this 
particular institution is the product of the Hungarian feudal system, and 
has very little in common with what we find amongst the Vlachs living in 
the Balkan Peninsula. Had the Daco-Romanians borrowed the word from 
the Slavonic language during their frequent contacts with the Slavs, it would 
have become an integral part of the Romanian language. But this is not the 
case. The word has remained alien ..." ,9 Alien in one sense only, namely, 
that the institution was not a product of the internal development of Roma­
nian society, but was an organizational form typical in Hungary. It was 
Hungarian in the same way as the office of voivode — voievodat in its Ro­
manian form, was also essentially Hungarian. A voivodate incorporated, 
and its voivode was responsible for several keneziates. Here, the title of 
voivode, originally reserved for the voivode of Transylvania was used for a 
much lower office. There are also other examples of such devaluation of 
titles in the Hungary of the Middle Ages. For instance, the title of comes 
originally borne by the ispans who headed each royal county, was already 
being used by the gerebs in the thirteenth century, and by patricians in the 
fourteenth century; in modem times, an ispan was simply the administra­
tive head of an estate.
The earliest mention of the keneziates is in a charter of 1247 issued by 
King Bela IV, who had induced the Knights of St. John to help defend the 
country from the Mongols by granting them the "region of SzGr£ny" with
8. Ibid. II, 66.
9. S. D r a g o m ir , Vlahii din nordul Peninsulei Balcanice in evul mediu. Bucharest 1959, 
117.
the adjoining mountains as far as the Olt. The area included the keneziates 
of Janos and Farkas, who, judging by their names, could easily have been 
Hungarians. However, the king expressly denied the knights authority over 
"the keneziate of Voivode Litovoi, which is left to the Romanians". B61a 
granted the knights half the revenue of these lands, but kept the other half, 
and also maintained his right to the income from the Hatszeg area which 
formed part of Litovoi's land. The knights were also granted the territory of 
Cumania beyond the Olt, except for the land of the Romanians' voivode, 
Sanislau, which the king left to the Romanians "on terms similar to those 
for Litovoi's land". The Romanian voivodes were obliged to support the 
knights with military equipment. Later data have revealed that only the 
kenezes and voivodes were obliged to perform military service; the Roma­
nian commoners only paid taxes. The Romanians in the Banate of Sz5r£ny 
and in Cumania as in the whole Kingdom of Hungary paid their tax to the 
king in livestock — of which the king was bound to surrender a tenth to the 
archbishop of Esztergom, according to documents dating from 1250 and 
1252. A late thirteenth-century document reveals that this tax was the so- 
called "fiftieth" (quinquagesitna): one fertile ewe and one barren one for every 
hundred sheep, which was collected and handed over by the kenezes, who 
themselves gave thick woollen blankets and cheese. By the fourteenth cen­
tury, the Transylvanian kenezes paid the fiftieth in cash — which means 
there was already a market for Romanian dairy products. Incidentally, those 
Romanians who were the subjects of the Serbian kings in the Middle Ages 
also paid their taxes in the form of a fiftieth of their flocks, and this re­
mained the practice in the Kingdom of Hungary as well. However, Roma­
nians everywhere were exempt from paying church tithes, since they did 
not belong to the Roman Catholic church.
Besides the security considerations that loomed large after the Mongol 
invasions, there was also another reason for King Bela IV's choosing to set­
tle Romanian frontier communities in the Banate of Sz5r6ny on the inner 
slopes of the southern Carpathians. The area namely, that was situated 
around the new castles in the mountains was hardly suitable for tillage, 
whereas it stood to offer a good living to shepherd communities. This is 
how Romanian keneziates came into being near the castle of H&tszeg on the 
upper reaches of the Sztrigy River. The first evidence for this is from 1263 
when a Hungarian landowner was granted the former Slavic village of Fenes 
and the surrounding area, "except for the keneziates of Dragun and 
Kodoch".10 The Slavs must have fled during the Mongol attacks, and Dragun 
and Kodoch probably used the prerogatives that went with the title of kenez 
to settle their people there, and were under the authority of the above-men- 
tioned voivode Litovoi. After the Mongol invasion, new royal castles were 
built also along the upper reaches of the Temes and Karas rivers, which 
were later joined to the Banate of Szoreny. Of these, the earliest known was 
Krass6f6 (1247), but the royal castles of Zsid6, Mih^ld, Sebes and Illy6d, 
which are mentioned in sources dated between 1320 and 1333 must also
10. Gy . GyOrffy, Adatok a rom^nok XIII. szizadi tftrt6net6hez 6s a romSn 511am 
keletkez6sehez. (Data on the History of Romanians in the Thirteenth Century 
197 and the Origin of the Romanian State.) Sz 1964, 7.
have been built around the same time. Although these castles had Hungar­
ian names, in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries they were the centres of 
autonomous Romanian districts. Most of the records of this region were 
destroyed by the subsequent Turkish occupation. Thus, there is but one 
indirect evidence of Romanian settlement here, a deed dated 1350, in which 
Juga's son Lupchyn, or, as he was also called, Voivode Janos, successfully 
claimed the land which King Bela IV had granted to one of his unnamed 
ancestors in the Sebes district.11
We have no information about the local government of the Romanian 
voivodates and keneziates in the thirteenth century, and so we can only 
deduce how it may have functioned from fourteenth century evidence. The 
condition for obtaining the title of kenez, according to a document from the 
Hatszeg region of 1360, was bringing settlers into an area. In a lawsuit, a 
kenez family regained the prerogatives that went with the title of kenez (ius 
keneziatum) over two villages by proving that the villages had been newly 
established by their ancestors. The ruling — made by a group of jurors elected 
by the Romanians themselves: twelve kenezes, six priests and six Romanian 
commoners (Olachi populani) — was brought in at a meeting (congregatio 
generalis) where "all the kenezes and men of other status of the district of 
H&tszeg" (universitas) gathered under the presidency of the royal captain 
of Hatszeg castle. In the middle of the fourteenth century, voivodes were 
elected similarly by the Romanian universitas in the keneziates of M&ramaros 
and Bereg north of Transylvania. In 1364, Queen Elizabeth issued a decree 
in which she prohibited the ispdn of Bereg from employing his own officials 
to administer the affairs of the Romanian population: they were to elect 
collectively (de communi voluntate) to head their communities a Romanian 
voivode (woyvodam Wolacum), a man whom they find suitable and trust­
worthy as indeed the Romanians living in Maramaros and other parts of 
our country freely do... this voivode should administer justice in all matters 
arising among them, and should faithfully deliver the incomes due from 
the Romanians to us and the ispdn".
As long as the Romanians in the Kingdom of Hungary lived in settle­
ments which were directly subject to the king or his appointed officials, 
they enjoyed the privilege of having their own elected voivodes or groups 
of jurors elected by the people of each keneziate, administer their internal 
affairs according to their own legal customs (ius valachicum) and the only 
tax they paid was the fiftieth of their flocks. The change came when first 
King Ladislas IV between 1272 and 1290, and later other kings, allowed lay 
and clerical landowners to settle Romanians on their lands and to collect 
the fiftieth tax from them. Initially, there were certain attempts made to 
forestall this development. In 1293, King Andrew III ruled that Romanians 
who had been settled without royal permission should be returned, even 
forcibly, to the royal estate of Szekes. (In the area between the two Szekes 
rivers, both flowing into the Maros, there were thirty-four villages at the 
beginning of the fourteenth century. Five have since disappeared, but the 
rest still exist.) When, however, in the course of the great social transforma­
tions of the late thirteenth century, the majority of Hungarian royal estates
11. Ibid. 12. 198
were donated by the Crown to various landowners, the region of Szekes 
and the Romanians settled there, also came under seignorial authority. It 
was at this time that Romanian self-government began to disintegrate. In 
1291, King Andrew III called a Transylvanian assembly in Gyulafeherv&r, 
for the nobility, the Saxons, the Szekelys and the Romanians were all universis 
nobilibus, Saxonibus, Syculis et Olachis as autonomous self-governing com­
munities. This assembly was the last of its kind. After this, it was only the 
courts of the keneziates and voivodates in the privileged Romanian dis­
tricts which met, each separately to conduct its own affairs. By contrast 
with, the Saxons and Szekelys, no united self-government of Romanians 
evolved perhaps because the kenezes and voivodes did not represent any 
striving after Romanian autonomy.
2. Nobles and Serfs in Transylvania 
(1241-1360)
The Disintegration of the Royal Counties
The royal county as a form of social organization started to decline in Hun­
gary at the turn of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. By that time neither 
the royal court nor the ispdns were satisfied with the primitive goods pro­
duced in the villages surrounding the castles, as higher-quality articles were 
already available, both foreign import and goods made by the French and 
German settlers in the towns. Their acquisition, however, required money. 
The cultivation of land by slaves, who yielded the lord their dues in agricul­
tural produce but- no cash, was clearly obsolete. Free peasant settlers sup­
plying tax payments in money were encouraged on both secular and cleri­
cal estates. The families holding the highest offices of the realm wanted to 
emulate the Western European landowning nobility and possess their own 
demesnes instead of having only the poor returns from land worked by 
slaves and the income received as officials of the royal counties. At the other 
end of the scale, the commoners — some of them slaves on the royal, noble 
or church estates, others, though theoretically free, tied to the land by per­
petual servitude — longed for the privileges of the settlers newly arrived 
from the West. Better farming methods — the horse-drawn plough, the field 
rotation system, the quadrupling of the yield of cereal crops instead of the 
doubling of it — as well as the growing number of markets all confirmed 
the general feeling that the time had come for change. By the beginning of 
the thirteenth century, there were peasant movements in the western parts 
of the country even against manual services which in Hungary were called 
the robot.
By the late twelfth century, only a quarter of the royal revenue was com­
ing from the payments in kind made by the royal counties. The rest was in 
the form of money: the taxes paid by the foreign settlers, the hospites, and 
the profits on the minting of coins, and on the royal monopoly over the 
mining of salt and precious metals. This being so, the king could afford to
grant these lands along with the labour force living on it to aristocratic fami­
lies eager to have their own estates. These donations of the royal counties 
were highly prejudicial to the interests of various social groups living there, 
for after the relative freedom of being under direct royal authority, they 
now faced subordination to some private landowner. The solution was to 
adopt the western European model of late feudalism, a system in which 
peasants had the right to move freely, cultivated the land of their lord inde­
pendently, and paid him his dues in money or in kind. In most of Hungary, 
this change-over took place in the course of the thirteenth century. In 1298, 
a royal decree ruled that peasants living under the authority of a feudal 
lord were to be free to move. The word jobbagy, the Hungarian equivalent 
of iobagiones, the term once used to designate the group of armed retainers 
who had entered their lord's service of their own free will — was applied to 
these peasants to emphasize their freeman status. Recognition of the title to 
nobility of the small landowners (the former serviens class) and of the offi­
cials of the royal counties came even before that, in 1267. Previously, nobil­
ity had been granted only to the high-ranking officials of the king, who, 
from then on, enjoyed the title of "barons". At the same time, royal county 
as an administrative form gave way to the institution of the noble county. 
In the noble counties, the ispdn, who was appointed by the king, adminis­
tered justice jointly with judges called szolgabi'ros elected by the nobility. 
Later the ispdns of the counties were given the title foispdn.
In Transylvania the noble county and the rights of the nobility evolved 
only later and along different linqs. This is due to the fact that the royal 
counties, the administrative units centred around the royal castles, disinte­
grated at a slower pace in Transylvania. Things were still in a state of flux in 
the second half of the thirteenth century, and thus the iobagiones of yore, the 
soldiering small landowner and royal official class, received titles of nobil­
ity only at a later stage. But the main impediment to more rapid change was 
the oppressive authority of the voivodes. From the beginning of the thir­
teenth century, the ispdn of Gyulafehervar (who had the title voivode of 
Transylvania) appointed the ispdns of the other five Transylvanian counties
— Doboka, Kolozs, Torda, Kuktill<5 and Hunyad — from among his per­
sonal supporters. Between 1263 and 1441, the voivode of Transylvania was 
also the ispdn of Szolnok county which then spread from northern Transyl­
vania to the Tisza River, and thus the voivode was the chief administrator, 
chief justice and military leader of all of Transylvania, except for the Szekely, 
Saxon and Romanian autonomous territories. The voivode's income derived 
from the estates around the castles reserved for his benefit; the king's taxes, 
tolls and mining revenues, however, were collected by royal officials. Al­
though the voivodes were eager to obtain grants of land from the king, they 
hardly ever became big landowners in Transylvania, since the kings changed 
their voivodes often, and always appointed them from aristocratic families 
outside Transylvania.
The first voivode to obtain estates in Transylvania was Gyula K5n from 
Transdanubia at the beginning of the thirteenth century. He was granted a 
few villages, but lost them after he left office, and it was only in 1268 that 
one of his descendants who was also voivode was able to recover a part of 
his estate. Before that, at the very end of the twelfth century, the ancestors
14. Monastery of a clan at 
Harina, around 1200
15. Church built at Gurasz&- 
da for Romanian settlers, 
around 1300
16. Cistercian church and cloister at Kerc, first half of the thirteenth century
17. The sanctuary of the Saint Bartholomew church in Brass6, built by masons from Kerc, 
middle of the thirteenth century
18. The south aisle of the third cathedral in Gyulafeh6rv&r, first third of the thirteenth century
19. Greek Orthodox Romanian church built from Roman ruins at Demsus, middle of the 
thirteenth century
20. Greek Orthodox Romanian church at Zeykfalva, second half of the thirteenth century
21. The hall choir of the Lutheran church at SzAszsebes, second half of the fourteenth century
1. An outstanding example of mediaeval European sculpture, the statue of Saint George by M&rton 
nd GyOrgy Kolozsv&ri, 1373, Prague
t . 1 cWss R p t f ic n  liar/? /•>, 2|




A l t  r i u f i
•Vrpj.rVr (\o llir  Tfiiirn.. i D i r  5 c h a n ta  urn f e l %  cn . 1 ner"Wff^ a*oii l a l tnStsi 
Has a lte  ’Tal m a  s r k c r  SrK lofs. f. IVr I I in $ * n g  m  d m  ib  g r i u m n t r n  rieu.
ofTnrtrn C a r o li t i i fc k c n  \Wrrc .o>
23. Latorv&r, at the VOrOstorony Pass, one of the mediaeval border-fortifications in Transyl­
vania, fourteenth century (the cannon tower dates from the seventeenth century). In the back­
ground is the fourteenth-century fort of Talm&cs. Pen-and-ink drawing and watercolour, 
around 1735
of the Was family had been given grants of land. A bigger, but uninhabited 
area near the upper reaches of the Maros River was granted to MihSly K&csik 
of northern Hungary during his term as voivode (1209-1212), and to his 
brother, Ban Simon. However, because of the latter's rebellion, in 1228 the 
king confiscated the estate and gave it to Denes Losonci Tomaj. Tomaj, later 
voivode himself, established what was to become the wealthiest landown­
ing family in Transylvania, and which broke into three branches in 1319 
forming the Losonci, B&nffy and Dezsfifi clans. Smaragd Zsamboki, who 
was voivode for only a brief period (1206-1207), was able to obtain only a 
few villages in Hunyad county, which were later inherited by a poorer branch 
of his family, the Barcsais, who settled in Transylvania. A member of the 
Kokenyes-Radnot family was granted the sizeable domain of Teke near the 
Tomaj estates before 1228, but his family had died out by the end of the 
century. In the first half of the thirteenth century, the Becse-Gergely family, 
who were likewise not of local origin, had an estate in the north, near the 
Nagy-Szamos River; their descendants, the Transylvanian Bethlen, Apafi 
and Somkereki families, had a major part in the area's history right up to 
m odem  times.
Quite distinct from these big continuous latifundia consisting of several 
villages peripheral located at the foot of the mountains were those discon­
tinuous estates of two to ten villages lying on both sides of the Kis-Szamos 
and in the Mez5seg which were owned by different families of the same 
clan. At the end of the twelfth century, it became a nation-wide custom for 
these clans to call themselves the descendants (de genere) of their first known 
ancestor, someone regarded as one of the original conquerors. Five such 
clans are known in Transylvania from early thirteenth-century sources. Ano- 
nymus mentions the Zsombor clan — along with their village, EskullS — as 
the descendants of tenth-century conquerors; later, too, they were land­
owners in Doboka county. The other family he speaks of is the Agmand 
clan of Bels6-Szolnok county. In the early thirteenth-century Doomsday Book 
of Vcirad, we find the names of members of the Kalocsa (later called Szil, 
then Tyukod) clan who owned lands in the counties of Kolozs and Torda, 
together with those of a clan named "M ikola" after its first known ancestor. 
A similar pattern of discontinuous landowning is revealed by documents 
concerning the Borsa clan who were patrons of the monastery at Alm&s in 
the first half of the thirteenth century, and later acquired land in Bihar county. 
The five clans listed above, who lived in the four northern Transylvanian 
counties, held lands outside Transylvania only in neighbouring Bihar county, 
and even there only from the second half of the thirteenth century. They 
can, therefore, be regarded as "first settlers", that is, as Transylvanian land­
owners continuously from the time of the Hungarian Conquest. From all 
five clans there descended a number of families, most of which survived to 
the present day, and it was these families that produced the core of Transyl­
vania's Hungarian nobility.
In the second half of the thirteenth century, social changes not only 
speeded up, but involved more and more of Transylvanian society. The old 
castles (Des, Doboka, Kolozsv&r, Torda, Gyulafeherv£r, Kukiill<5v£r and per­
haps even Hunyad) were sacked by the Mongols. Although King Bela IV 
supplemented their surviving population with new elements and reorgan­
ized their administration, they lost their military significance. The role of 
defence was taken over by new castles built in the mountains on the initia­
tive of the king, and their captains were responsible for the administration 
of the area. The office of ispdn in each county was usually linked to the 
captainship of such a new castle. To the old centres — Des, Kolozsv&r, Gyula- 
fehervcir and Torda — the king brought settlers (hospites) engaged in both 
agriculture and trade. They were to have an exclusively economic role, and 
were granted the privilege of electing their own judges, and the right to 
hold markets and to engage in toll-free trade; they also enjoyed tax conces­
sions. The burghers of Transylvania's Hungarian towns were mixture of 
the Hungarian and German hospites population which had intermarried with 
the original people of the castles who had gained rights similar to theirs. In 
the thirteenth century, the king granted Gyulafeherv^r and Kolozsv&r to 
the bishop of Transylvania. While the latter became a royal free town in 
1316, Gyulafehervar remained in the hands of the bishops, a state of affairs 
which hindered its civic development in many respects. The castle of Doboka 
was presented to a branch of the Kokenyes-Radndt clan which had come to 
Transylvania from another part of the country shortly before. The castle 
itself lost its importance; the surrounding settlement declined into a village, 
and functioned as the seignorial centre of the Dobokai family's lands. Kti- 
k(iI16var and Hunyadvar, because of their more favourable location, con­
tinued to play a military role, although later, they, too, were alienated by 
the king, who disposed of them in the form of a royal grant. The villages 
which had been administered from the castles fell into the hands of land­
lords one after the other, and eventually the royal estates were confined to 
the mountainous regions around the new casties — which was, neverthe­
less, still a huge area.
The interior of the Transylvanian Basin and even some areas of the moun­
tainous region were, thus, transferred into the possession of the local nobil­
ity and of families recently moved to the area. The Kendi family, who had 
their estate along the Kukulld and later played an important role in Transyl­
vania, had sprung from the Transdanubian Szal6k clan. The Thoroczkai 
branch of the Akos clan, who were likewise not of Transylvanian descent, 
had their estates in Torda county, while the Illyei and Folti branches owned 
land in Hunyad county, on the northern bank of the Maros River. Near 
these estates, on the left bank of the Maros, grants of land were received by 
the Transdanubian Hermany clan, which later broke up into several families 
of small landowners. In the fourteenth century, the Lackfi de genere Her­
many family rose to become one of the highest-ranking families of the coun­
try. Six of the Lackfis': father, sons and grandsons, held the position of ei­
ther voivode of Transylvania or of ispdn of the Szekelys (comes Siculorum) 
between 1328 and 1376, and as such had major roles in determining the fate 
of Transylvania. Of the old families, the Losonci Banffys were the most 
prosperous, as they were granted the seigniories of Csics6 and L£pos, moun­
tainous areas comprising most of the northern part of Bels<3-Szolnok county, 
by King Ladislas IV and King Andrew III. The Cs3k clan hailing from Trans- 
danubia obtained the domain of Bonchida; however, in the fourteenth cen­
tury, this estate, too, passed to the Banffys, who were granted the domains 
of Sebesvar in Kolozs county and of Ujvar in KuktillS county at about the 202
same time. Thus the family came to rank among the most illustrious of 
Transylvania's aristocracy, and although they suffered setbacks both in in­
fluence and wealth during the fifteenth century, they continued to play a 
significant part in the life of Transylvania until recent time.
Anarchy and Consolidation
The spread of private landownership in the second half of the thirteenth 
century, had political causes. To satisfy the ambitions of his restless son 
Istvan, in 1257 King Bela IV divided the country, just as his father had done. 
The eastern part of Hungary including Transylvania passed to Istvan, who 
besides holding the title of junior king, also called himself duke of Transyl­
vania, maintaining his own court and conducting an independent foreign 
policy. He did a great deal to normalize life and to secure the defences of 
Transylvania after the devastation wreaked by the Mongols, and he rewarded 
those noblemen who supported him with generous grants of land. How­
ever, the rivalry which grew up between father and son soon had the coun­
try rent by internal strife. The troops of the king forced Istv&n to take refuge 
in the castle of Feketehalom in the Barcas^g, but he broke out, and won the 
support of enough of the besieging army to scatter his father's troops. Istv&n 
followed them to Pest, then, in the spring of 1265, won a major victory over 
Bela, forcing the king to acquiesce in Istv&n's possession of half of the coun­
try. This was the situation until Bela's death in 1270. The truce between 
father and son was a tense one, and both of them made every effort to 
strengthen their own party. The only way this could be done was to woo 
the aristocracy, who had already huge tracts of land, with further grants.
Istv&n, who reigned as Stephen V, died suddenly after only two years on 
the throne, and was succeeded by his son, Ladislas IV, who was still a mi­
nor. The great landowning families lost no time taking advantage of the 
situation: relying on troops recruited from their estates, and treating the 
royal lands, which they were supposed to govern as ispdns, as their own, 
they turned their territories into de facto autonomous princedoms. The first 
to refuse obedience openly was the Romanian voivode Litovoi who had 
governed the Banate of Szoreny since it was abandoned by the Knights of 
St. John in 1260. When in 1272 he fell fighting the royal troops sent to bring 
him into line, Barbat, his brother and successor, decided to try loyalty to the 
king and for a while paid the royal taxes. In the next few years, the king lost 
the Banate of Szoreny, and, more significantly, Cumania. The Romanian 
voivodes became independent, and Hungary broke up into princedoms, 
ruled for their own benefit by men who ostensibly governed in the name of 
the Crown. King Ladislas IV proved unable to regain his authority, and was 
eventually assassinated in 1290.
His successor, King Andrew III, inherited what was tantamount to anar­
chy, and was unable to restore order. His brief reign was further burdened 
by the need to fend off pretenders supported from abroad. Shortly after his 
accession to the throne he made a royal progress throughout the country, 
including Transylvania, in an attempt to contain the spirit of insubordina­
tion. The weakening of the central government left ample opportunity for 
the abuse of power, however, and not even the king's appearance helped. 
After he had left Transylvania, in 1294, the voivode Lor&nd de gen ere Borsa, 
who together with this brothers, held a significant part of eastern Hungary, 
attacked the bishop of V&rad with his troops, and even turned on the king's 
army which had been sent to stop him. After some desperate fighting the 
king's troops defeated the voivode's army, but his successor, L£szl6 K5n, 
who was appointed in 1297, did not prove to be any more loyal. While the 
king was busy dealing with the rebellious flaring up all over the country, 
the voivode laid hands on the Transylvanian royal revenues, added the 
titles of comes Saxonum and comes Siculorum, to his voivodeship and his of­
fice as ispan of Szolnok, and appropriated the revenues of the mining towns. 
In other words, he treated Transylvania as his personal property. Between 
1307 and 1309, he did not allow the vacant office of bishop to be filled until 
the chapter elected his candidate. In the castles he appointed his supporters 
as captains, and if someone was reluctant to enter his service, that person 
lost his land to the Crown.
Similar trends won out in other parts of the country as well and by 1301, 
when King Andrew III died, Hungary was in the hands of a dozen great 
landowning families, who ruled their territories independently. Hungary 
was on the brink of degenerating into a country of petty provinces. The 
struggle for the throne, which went on for several years, was also condu­
cive to the development of the oligarchy. The Arpad dynasty had died out 
with Andrew III, and a fierce struggle for power ensued among the rela­
tives of the female line. The pope supported Charles Robert of Sicily, a mem­
ber of the French Anjou dynasty, who was, however, initially unable to gain 
the sympathy of the whole of the aristocracy. The majority first invited 
Wenceslas of Bohemia, and later, after he had turned down the offer, Otto 
of Bavaria. Voivode L&szl6 K&n lured the new king to Transylvania reput­
edly with the promise of his daughter in marriage. But when Otto arrived, 
he had him taken prisoner and sent back to Bavaria. In 1308, L3szl6 K&n 
recognized Charles Robert as king, but refused to send him the royal crown 
which was in his possession.
Public recognition, however, of the legitimacy of Charles' reign was con­
ditional on his being crowned with the crown of Saint Stephen. Voivode 
L3szl6, however, did not even attend the Diet which elected Charles Robert 
king, but stayed in his mountain stronghold with the crown and awaited 
developments. The papal legate, Cardinal Gentile, started negotiations with 
him, and when these proved fruitless, the pope excommunicated him on 
the grounds of his daughter's marriage to the Orthodox king of Serbia, UroS
II. This finally achieved the desired effect. The voivode handed back the 
coronation regalia the following year, and even promised to return his ille­
gally acquired royal privileges and properties. Though Charles Robert was 
able to make a royal progress through Transylvania already in 1310, for 
over a decade he had to fight one battle after the other in the attempt to 
curtail the power that overmighty lords throughout the country had.usurped. 
During this time, Voivode Laszlo continued to rule Transylvania: he did 
not allow royal garrisons into his castles, and even managed to prevent his 
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over the voivodeship. Only after Voivode L£szl6's death in 1316 were the 
king's troops able to recover Transylvania from his sons in a battle near 
D6va. In 1318, the new voivode, D6zsa Debreceni had to fight the rebellious 
Borsas and their ally, the Transylvanian Mojs's son, Mojs. Even his succes­
sor, Tam£s Szecsenyi de genere K&csik, who assumed office in 1320, had to 
deal with the sons of LkszI6 Kdn: in 1321, he finally succeeded in occupying 
their last stronghold, the castle of Csics6.
Voivode Tam£s pacified the still rebellious Transylvanians with an iron 
hand. He forced the followers of L&szl6 K in  and a number of other turbu­
lent nobles to accept his authority, and finally turned on the Saxons. In the 
course of their endless dispute with the bishops, the Saxons had devastated 
Gyulafeherv^r again in 1308, and, when the title of ispan of the Saxons (comes 
Saxonum) remained tied to the voivodeship even after Voivode L^szlo's 
death, they rose, led by Henning, gereb of Peterfalva, against the new voivode. 
It was only with the help of Cuman forces brought in from the Great Hun­
garian Plain that the rebellion was put down in 1324. Tamds Szecsenyi, 
though obedient to the king, was as jealous of his power in Transylvania as 
his predecessor, Voivode L&szl6, had been. The bishop of Transylvania had 
cause enough to complain bitterly of the voivode's aggressiveness and in­
satiable greed, of his constant attempts to appropriate church lands for him­
self and his supporters.
Charles Robert's victory in Transylvania had serious consequences for 
the rebellious aristocracy. Great families who had settled in Transylvania 
either at the time of the Conquest or just a little later lost their properties, 
and although later the king pardoned most of them (for exam ple, the 
Zsombor and Borsa clans, and the Was family), the leadership of Transyl­
vania passed to Charles Robert's loyal adherents. Tam&s Szecsenyi held the 
title of voivode until the king's death (1342), and was generously rewarded 
for his services from the confiscated wealth of the rebels. In 1319 he was 
granted the enormous seigniory of S^romberke which lay between Beszterce 
and the Maros River, and then in 1324 the lands belonging to Salg6 castle in 
Szeben county. Like Voivode Laszlb, Tam&s Szecsenyi also married a Piast 
princess (Anne of Auschwitz), and with the interest of his family always at 
heart, he took his nephews with him to Transylvania. For one of them, Simon, 
who was to found the Kentelki Rad6 family, he acquired the seigniory of 
Nagysajo and the lucrative office of ispan of the Szekelys'. Another nephew, 
Peter Cseh, won — thanks to the position of his uncle — the hand of the 
Talm&csi heiress, a daughter of a fabulously wealthy Saxon gereb family, 
and with her, extensive properties. It was this alliance that gave rise to the 
Vingarti Gereb family, two members of which held Transylvania's highest 
offices in the fifteenth century: the bishop's and the voivode's. Other mem­
bers of the Kkcsik clan, to which the Szecsenyis belonged, also married into 
Transylvanian Saxon families. A descendant of Simon — the ispan of the 
Szekelys — acquired the estate of Kentelek, from which the Kentelki Rad6 
family had taken its name. Jknos, son of Peter Cseh, followed the example 
of his father and married a daughter of Mihaly Kelneki, an immensely rich 
Saxon gereb, who married six of his seven daughters to Hungarian noble­
men. The Hungarian Barcsais, who were small landowners, made their for- 
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ing part of their property when the family's male line died out. Naturally, 
the marrying of Hungarians into great Saxon families was not a one-way 
process: for example, the Brass6is, a Saxon gereb family, acquired the prop­
erties of a discontinued branch of the Zsombor clan by marriage.
The Noble Counties and the Nobility
In Transylvania, as already noted, the development of the noble counties 
followed the overall Hungarian trend, but the changeover had a slower 
pace. While in the rest of Hungary the noble counties were starting to take 
over the role of the royal counties by the time of the Mongol invasion, in 
Transylvania the thirteenth-century charters make frequent mention of the 
iobagiones castri of Bels<5-Szolnok, Doboka, Kolozs, Tor da and Gyulafeh£r- 
v&r. Perhaps because in Transylvania the major social change took place 
during critical years of political instability, their assimilation into the nobil­
ity was not as uniform as had been that of their peers further west. This 
social stratum which in Transylvania retained its status as a dependent of 
the Crown until quite late, was, to all intents, and purposes, swept away by 
the tide of events. Nearly every charter which mentions them does so in 
connection with the sale of their lands. The buyers were often descendants 
of the "conqueror" tribes (for instance, members of the Gerendi, Kecseti, or 
Szentmartoni families) or other nobles of uncertain origin, and sometimes 
ecclesiastics. It is not known what the fate of the impoverished soldiering 
small landowners and royal officials may have been thereafter; some of 
them perhaps salvaged enough of their property to be able to lead the life 
the nobility. It is impossible to prove with absolute certainty that any noble 
family in mediaeval Transylvania had descended from the iobagiones castri. 
The majority of them, however, must have entered the service of some 
wealthier noblemen, or found a living in the royal castles newly built in the 
mountains.
Thus, the mediaeval nobility of Bels6-Szolnok, Doboka, Kolozs and Torda 
counties in the Mez6s6g consisted mainly of families from the conqueror 
tribes, and was largely homogeneous. The differences between them were 
ones of financial status: the estates of the more prolific families were more 
often subdivided, and there were villages where several noble families lived 
and tilled their land themselves. But even less fruitful families were un­
likely to own more than ten villages. Only the wealthiest could claim twenty 
to thirty villages, but these lands were not contiguous, being broken up by 
other families' estates. The great latifundia incorporating twenty to fifty 
villages on a continuous tract of land developed on the edges of these small 
and medium-size estates.
Although the dietal act of 1290 which specified the system of noble coun­
ties, manorial court jurisdiction and the tax-free status and military service 
liability of nobles and "of Saxons of Transylvania possessing, like the nobil­
ity, freehold estates"12 applied to the whole country, the emancipation of
12. Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbiirgen. I. Hermannstadt
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the Transylvanian nobility came relatively late compared to other parts of 
Hungary. The Transylvanian nobles were still paying taxes to the voivode 
at the beginning of the fourteenth century, and were exempted from this 
obligation by Charles Robert only in 1324, in appreciation of their services 
in crushing the Saxon rebellion. It was in 1342 that they acquired full 
seignorial authority, that is won from the voivode the right of jurisdiction 
over the inhabitants of their lands, and were confirmed in this privilege by 
the king only in 1365. It was therefore all the more significant that the king 
remitted to the Transylvanian nobles in return for military service rendered 
the eighteen denarius tax — thelucrum cameraeintroduced by Charles Robert 
on each villain holding — in other words, he allowed the nobles to keep the 
tax themselves. Thus, the serfs of Transylvania paid tax to their lords only, 
except for the Romanian serfs, who continued to pay the fiftieth to the king.
The nobility's attempts to achieve autonomy for the counties were less 
successful. Although at the beginning of the fourteenth century, county courts 
with the nobles' judges (szolgabiros -  iudices nobilium), the symbols of au­
tonomy, appeared in Transylvania as everywhere in the country, and cer­
tain counties even held independent general assemblies, by the middle of 
the century, the voivodes had succeeded in their efforts at centralization. 
From then on, it was not the individual counties which held meetings pre­
sided over by their ispdns; rather, the voivode called joint assemblies of the 
seven Transylvanian counties, which usually took place in Torda. It was at 
these assemblies that they collectively elected the nobles' judges for the coun­
ties: two for each county (not four, as in other parts of the country). Thus, 
the voivodes governed the Transylvanian counties as though they comprised 
a single county, which greatly hindered the development of local self-gov- 
emment. This way, although the Transylvanian nobles as individuals ac­
quired those rights which distinguished the nobility from the commoners 
all over the country, as a group, as a social state, they were unable to set 
their collective will against the voivodes'.
The development of the nobility's political weight was hindered also by 
the institution of familiaritas, a peculiarity of the Hungarian feudal system 
which started to spread together with the formation of great estates. The 
poorer freemen began to enter voluntarily the service of the aristocrats, 
mostly as members of their military retinue or as managers of the seigniories. 
These people were admitted into the household of the lord (thence the term 
familiares), who undertook to support them and to provide them with legal 
protection, while the familiares swore an oath of allegiance. (However, the 
lord had nothing to do with his familiares's estates, since according to Hun­
garian law, land could be granted only by the king.) In Transylvania the 
voivode usually appointed his depute, the vice-voivode, from among fam i­
liares of his who had come from outside Transylvania; the vice-voivode was 
also the ispan of Feher county and presided over the voivode's court. This 
voivode also chose the ispan of each county from the ranks of his familiares, 
who, in their turn, chose their deputies, the alispans, from among their own 
supporters. In all the other parts of Hungary, ispdns were appointed by the 
king from among the most distinguished families. Since the office of the 
ispan was lucrative and involved considerable prestige, even members of 
2 0 7  the wealthier Transylvanian families were keen to fill it; and thus, a large
proportion of the landed nobility entered into a relationship of familiaritas 
with the voivode, which compounded the voivode's power considerably. It 
was for this reason that not even the wealthiest aristocratic families were 
able to compete with the authority of the voivode, although the voivodes 
usually came from families outside Transylvania, and had no estates there 
to speak of.
The motor of the social change that led to the formation of the nobility 
was the defence policy deliberately pursued by the kings. They supported 
not only the developing noble estate, but also the Szekely, Saxon and Roma­
nian communities, always favouring those who were most suited to under­
take the country's defence. There was the aura of the crusaders about the 
figure of the Hungarian soldier: "soldier" and "nobleman" became identi­
cal terms, and the nobility's way of life besides its enormous economic and 
political advantages had also a moral attraction for the Szekely, Saxon and 
Romanian communities. The change in these societies must be understood 
in terms of this attraction.
Szekelys and Saxons among the Nobility
The Szekely social order was, even in its original form, closest to the nobili­
ty's way of life, as the two major features which characterized Szekely soci­
ety, personal freedom and the obligation to undertake personal military 
service, were also typical of the rtobility. For this reason, as early as the 
fourteenth century, Szekelys were looked upon as noblemen even outside 
the borders of their own land. In 1346, a certain Pdl SenySi had to prove 
only that he was Szekely to be allowed to live as a freeman anywhere in the 
country. Within the Sz£kelyfold, however, the ancient custom of holding all 
land in common and the legal equality which existed proved obstacles to 
individual prosperity. The major advantages available to the nobility of the 
counties that is, the unlimited acquisition of land and dominion over the 
serf population of their estates, could not develop in the Szekely society.
The more enterprising Szekelys, therefore, had always tried to make their 
fortune by entering the personal service of the king, and, in recognition of 
their services they also received grants of land in the disintegrating royal 
counties. Since they were bent on keeping their share of the communal land 
in the Szekelyfold, they tried to obtain grants close by, but on the territory 
of the counties. It was mostly the estates of the old royal counties which 
were wedged into the Szekely territories that passed into the hands of this 
new nobility of Szekely origin. In 1252, the king gave the Sz£k estate, which 
lay on the border of the Barcas&g and H3romsz£k, to the Szekely ancestor of 
the Nemes, Mik6 and KMnoki aristocratic families. These families wanted 
to play the noble landowner even in villages whose inhabitants enjoyed 
Szekely rights and liberties and fought fierce battles with the Szekelys of 
Seps in an effort to bring them to heel. But in the end, the disputed area 
remained within the borders of the Szekelyfold. It was likewise in the thir­
teenth century that the king presented the castle of Bdlv&nyos with its Hun­
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the ancestor of the Sz6kely K6zdi and Apor families. The owners settled 
Hungarian and Russian serfs on this territory, and succeeded in bringing it 
under county authority. However, their claim on the region of Kdszon was 
successfully parried by the Szekelys in 1324. Near the Szekelyfold, on the 
eastern borders of Feher, Kuktill<5, Torda, Kolozs and Doboka counties, a 
whole group of families called "Sz£kely" acquired land, both through royal 
grants, and through marriage into the county nobility. In virtue of having 
kept their share of the common land in the Szekelyfold, these landowners 
played a role in the Szekely community, and in the public affairs of the 
counties, as well. The members of the same family often functioned simulta­
neously as a county's szolgabtros and as officials of the Szekely community.
Lack of economic wherewithal prevented the majority of the Szekelys 
from performing military service in the up-to-date armoured cavalry squad­
rons? Their branch of service was the light cavalry. In the parts of Hungary, 
further to the west, this type of soldier was disappearing, for the modem 
European warfare of the time called for armoured cavalry. As a result, after 
the Mongol invasion the Hungarian kings demanded a certain number of 
soldiers with good-quality armour from those social groups obliged origi­
nally to render military service. This necessarily led to a process in which 
those who had been ousted from effective military service were reduced to 
serfdom, since their role was restricted to providing only material backing 
for those of their fellows who actually did the fighting. This was the fate of 
the Cuman and Jazyg peoples who had been settled between the Danube 
and the Tisza in the thirteenth century. Though originally all bound to render 
personal military service, after a short period, they were able to provide the 
king only with 600 soldiers. The ensuing social differentiation marked the 
end of the Cuman and jazyg communities as societies of co-equals. Eventu­
ally, the soldiering class forced the commoners to serve them as serfs. The 
border regions of Transylvania, on the other hand, were, throughout the 
Middle Ages, under constant attack from enemies (Mongols, Lithuanians, 
Rom anians and later the Turks) whose military might, like that of the 
Szekelys, was based on light cavalry units; in battles with these enemies, 
the Szekelys' ancient equipment and methods of warfare was eminently 
suitable. Since the simpler kind of equipment required in the light cavalry 
was accessible even to those of modest means, every Szekely continued to 
possess the right and duty of personal military service, and consequently, 
also personal liberty.
Saxon society too, experienced a crisis no less grave than the Szekely, but 
developed in an entirely different direction. Unlike the Szekelys, the Saxons 
had never rendered personal military service, but were obliged to supply a 
certain number of troops. Therefore, the social advantages associated with 
being a soldier had always affected only a minor group of the whole com­
munity, primarily the gerebs. The gereb, who was judge, administrative of­
ficer and military leader in one person, held his office on a hereditary basis. 
The office was linked to the land owned, and could be sold or pledged. But 
the gereb was also bound to respect the interests of the community, was 
subject to Saxon law and had to pay his share of the taxes. Thus, if he really 
wanted to stand out from among his fellows, a gereb had to seek opportuni- 
2 0 9  ties in the counties, as did his Szekely counterparts. They acquired lands on
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Map 12. The sub-division of the diocese of Transylvania at the beginning of the 
fourteenth century
the edge of the Kir^lyftild and populated them with mostly German set­
tlers, who, however, were not treated as co-equal free members of the Saxon 
community, but as serfs. The "Saxon" serf class, thus, evolved outside the 
Kir^lyfOld in the second half of the thirteenth century.
The gerebs' title to the villages they held within the counties was one of 
noble right; in fact, many of them were even formally raised to the rank of 
nobility by the kings (the first known gereb to be ennobled was the Walloon 
Johannes Latinus of Voldorf in 1206). But public opinion regarded them as 
nobles independently of such formed recognition, distinguishing them, how­
ever, frcvm nobles with full rights (1358: nobiles et alii comites). The main 
reason for this distinction was that the gerebs — and here again their posi­
tion was analogous to that of the prominent Szekelys — did not give up 
their lands in the Szdszfold, and used the power and authority deriving 
from their estates in the counties to strengthen their leading role in the life 
of the Saxon communities. The history of the Saxons in the thirteenth and 
fourteenth centuries is one of the gerib families' continuing to consolidate 
their dominance and exclusive authority. They filled all the offices of the 
autonomous Saxon communities, it was they who represented Saxon m ili­
tary power and dominated Saxon economic life, and their aristocratic-mili- 
tary way of life, an attempt to imitate the Hungarian nobility's life style, 
effected the entire community. Intermarriage between Hungarian noble and 
Saxon gereb families became more and more common. Like the Hungarian 
nobility, they took for their family name the name of their estate, preferring 
the name of an estate owned by noble right in the counties over their lands 
in the Sz&szfold. It is sometimes only the German Christian names and the 
adjective “gereb" which reveals the Saxon origin of a noble family. Many of 
them held county offices; in the fifteenth century, a member of the Vizaknai 
Gereb family even became the vice-voivode of Transylvania, and later ispan 
of the Szekelys. Through-them, the noble society of Transylvania was en­
riched by valuable new elements, men with good leadership skills, but this 
did not change its character: the nobles who were of foreign origin were 
much smaller in number than the Hungarian nobles, and for all practical 
purposes, assimilated with the Hungarians.
Within the Saxon communities, gerebs in leading positions could be found 
even at the end of the fifteenth century, but their numbers gradually dimin­
ished. For in the meantime, Saxon society had started to develop in an en­
tirely different direction, one in which th e gerebs did not wish to share. Partly 
in response to the pressure of the Saxon middle class, which jealously 
guarded the Saxon traditions of equality before the law and the oneness of 
the people, and partly voluntarily, they gave up their share of the land to 
the communitas, renounced their titles, and moved to the counties where 
they could live as noblemen. In the fourteenth century, already, administra­
tion and the courts in the Saxon seats came to be headed by chief justices 
appointed by the king, the kiralybi'ros.
Ecclesiastical Organization and Education
In the Middle Ages, the nobility of the counties, the Szekelys and the Saxons 
belonged to the Roman Catholic church, the majority of them to the Diocese 
of Transylvania. The exceptions were the inhabitants in the area of the ear­
liest Saxon settlement, Altland, which from 1192 on, formed the Provostship 
of Szeben and was under the direct authority of the archbishop of Esztergom.
The rest of the territories inhabited by Saxons, both those forming free com­
munities and those living under landlords, formed separate deaneries and 
enjoyed a cerjtain degree of autonomy. The structure of the See of Transyl­
vania more or less coincided with the royal counties, except for the Dean­
ery of 6 z d  along the upper reaches of the Maros. There may, however, 
have been a royal county of 6 z d  at one time, which disappeared during the 
expansion of the Szekely territories and/or was amalgamated with the coun­
ties of Kolozs and Torda. Those parts of the Sz&szfold, which did not be­
long to the Provostship of Szeben, as well as the Szekely Sepsisz6k, stayed 
within the Deanery of Gyulafeherv&r. A separate archdeaconry of Kezd 
was set up for the Szekely areas of Kezd and Orba, and the Deanery of 
Telegd for the Szekelys of Udvarhely.
The bishops of Transylvania were initially of foreign origin (French, Ger­
man and Italian). Later, an increasing number of them came from within 
the country; there was only one though, who was of Transylvanian origin.
They were mostly from aristocratic families, sometimes from burgher fami­
lies, but they were all graduates of foreign universities. Some of them had 
previously been engaged as royal notaries; for example, Adorj£n at the end 
of the twelfth century, who had organized the working of the royal chancel­
lery and his successor, P3I who, in 1181, had drafted the decree making 
written records compulsory at the chancellery. In this period, the Transyl­
vanian bishops' annual income from tithes was 2,000 silver marks, which 
ranked them fourth among Hungary's fourteen bishops. Their being versed 
in the Scriptures proved to be compatible with a determined insistence on 
their exclusive right to tithes and to the income from their estates, and this 
even led to armed clashes with the voivode, the Saxons and the abbot of 
Kolozsmonostor in the course of the thirteenth and fourteenth century.
The monastic orders were mainly represented in Transylvania by the 
Benedictine Abbey of Kolozsmonostor established by King Ladislas I to­
wards the end of the eleventh century. After 1231, it became one of the 
credible places. In the province of Transylvania, the Chapter of Gyula- 
fehervSr had the same right. Their archives were burnt during the Mongol 
invasion; the first known document issued in Kolozsmonostor is from 1288, 
whereas the incomplete records of Gyulafeherv&r start with the year 1278.
A Benedictine monastery was founded by Duke Almos near the Transylva­
nian exit of the Meszes Gate in 1120, but this disappeared without trace 
from documents after 1288. Monasteries were also built to house family 
crypts: in Almas for the Borsa clan in the thirteenth century; in Harina, 
probably for the Kdcsik clan, and in Gyer<5monostor for the Mikola clan.
They were all basilica-type buildings with a nave and two aisles, and semi­
circular clerestories. Only the one at Harina has preserved its original form 212
to the present day. The Cistercian monastery of Kerc already mentioned 
was built in 1202; its late Romanesque-early Gothic style, reproduced by its 
builders in later years, was a major influence on Hungarian and Saxon church 
architecture in Transylvania. The monastery itself was deserted in the thir­
teenth century, and today only its ruins remain.
The mendicant orders had a much more significant impact on Transyl­
vania, though not as much on architecture as on public thinking. As early as 
the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Dominicans of Transylvania 
started their campaign to convert the Cumans, whose first bishop was to be 
a Hungarian Dominican. In the thirteenth century, they established alto­
gether five monasteries in Gyulafeh£rv5r and in the Saxon towns, and also 
had convents at the same locations. It was in the fourteenth century that the 
Franciscans became popular in Transylvania with the Hungarian, Szekely 
and Saxon communities particularly because of their sermons preached in 
the vernacular. In a Franciscan collection of Latin sermons assembled around 
1310, there are brief summaries in Hungarians, the so-called " gyulafehervdri 
glosszak" (Gyulafehervar Glosses). The most flourishing period for the Fran­
ciscans in Transylvania was the fifteenth century.
The town and village priests received their education in parish and chap­
ter schools in the towns. However, village schools were also founded rela­
tively early; the first record of such a school is from 1332, and concerns the 
school-building (domus scolaris) of Zsuk, a village in Kolozs county. In the 
fifteenth century records, we find schoolmasters mentioned in several vil­
lages. To study at foreign universities was, of course, beyond the means of 
most Transylvanians, but even so their number was quite significant: by 
1520,2,060 students identified as "Transylvanian" had enrolled at universi­
ties abroad. In the twelfth century, most of them had attended the Univer­
sity of Paris; from the thirteenth century on, they were likely to have gone 
to Bologna and Padua, and from the mid-fourteenth century, to Prague, 
Cracow and Vienna. The majority of them were noblemen or burghers from 
towns or boroughs, but some of them came from the villages.
Both structurally and stylistically, parish church buildings were differ­
ent from the episcopal and monastic churches. Before the middle of the 
thirteenth century, village churches were built with just the single nave and 
no aisles, the chancel separated from the nave with a Romanesque trans­
verse arch, and ending in a semicircular apse. Archaeological evidence dates 
the earliest of these churches, at Malomfalva, to the eleventh century. 
Transylvanians continued to build their churches in this style for three hun­
dred years, and the square apse replaced the semicircular one only in the 
middle of the thirteenth century. In the Szekelyfold, however, all the churches 
except for one are in the latter, older style. The Saxon population, in both 
their autonomous districts and in the seignorial villages, built themselves 
basilicas with a nave and two aisles, a style typical of German colonization 
in the east. In most Hungarian and Saxon churches, the preeminent posi­
tion of the leading part of society is reflected in the galleries they had built 
for themselves.
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Romanian Landowners and Serfs within, 
and beyond the Carpathians
After the Cumans had moved out of Cumania, an area lying south and east 
of the Carpathians, the king of Hungary as we have seen, entrusted the 
country to the voivodes of the Romanian population living there, officials 
appointed in the same way as the voivode of Transylvania. However, the 
constantly recurring Mongol attacks made it impossible to consolidate this 
system of government, except in Wallachia, on a narrow strip of land at the 
foot of the mountains, where a few such voivodes were able to exercise 
their authority. Moldavia, on the other hand, was still politically a no man's 
land and scarcely populated even at the beginning of the fourteenth cen­
tury. It was finally cleared of the Mongols only in 1352 by the troops of 
Endre Lackfi, the ispdn of the Szekelys.
Taking advantage of the political turmoil in Hungary at the turn of the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the voivodes of Wallachia followed the 
example of the Hungarian oligarchy, and made a joint attempt at independ­
ence of the central power. In 1330 King Charles Robert was unable to com­
mand the obedience of Basarab, the voivode of Wallachia (terra Transalpina)
— by that time, the name "Cumania" had been forgotten. The campaign the 
king conducted against the voivode not only failed, but very nearly cost 
him his own life. From then on, the voivodes of Wallachia were, in effect, 
independent rulers, and the kings of Hungary had to content with their 
oath of fealty, which left them extensive political freedom. The Romanian 
voivode of Moldavia, Bogdan I also rebelled against the king of Hungary in 
1359, and here, too, the king settled for suzerainty instead of effecting rule 
over Moldavia.
The continued Mongol threat prompted real migrations to Transylvania 
of the peoples living beyond the Carpathians. Fourteenth-century documents 
present a picture of lively activity in eastern Hungary: in regions so far un­
mentioned in the documents or presented as uninhabited, a whole series of 
villages appeared, some only to disappear shortly afterwards, and make 
room for new ones in their place or in their neighbourhood. This was un­
doubtedly the time of the immigration and settlement of the Romanians, 
who were arriving in Transylvania in great numbers. In 1292, as we have 
seen, the lord of Illye in Hunyad county was granted royal permission to 
settle Romanians. In 1350, his descendants jointly inherited "Romanian settle­
m ents" (possessiones olacales) of unknown number which were not yet listed; 
by 1468, in the same seigniory fifty Romanian villages were already recorded 
by name. The R6kdsi family, who came from Wallachia in 1359, was granted 
the district of Ikus in Krass6 county in 1365. At that time, the district had five 
villages; by 1404, however, thirteen were recorded, though only one was of 
the original five. Ikus had thirty-six villages in 1510, but only two of the 
above-mentioned thirteen were among them, the other eleven having dis­
appeared and thirty-four having come into existence in the century inter­
vening. Thus the final settlement of the Romanians took place over a lengthy 
period of times and generally speaking continued until the end of the Mid­
dle Ages, as proved by numerous examples of changed village names. 214
Until the middle of the fourteenth century, the Romanian immigration 
only affected the as yet uninhabited mountains and their immediate prox­
imity. It was only later that the compact settlements of the Hungarians and 
Saxons in the centre of the Transylvanian Basin were broken up by inter­
spersed Romanian communities. Some of the transhumant Romanians who 
came down from the mountains to the Mez6s6g stayed there and settled on 
the edge of the Hungarian and Saxon villages. This is how the great number 
of "tw in" villages bearing the forenames "M agyar-" (Hungarian-), "Sz&sz-" 
(Saxon-) or "Oldh-" (Vlach-) came into being. The Romanian villages were 
administered by their founders, the kenezes, who were serfs of the Hungar­
ian, Saxon or Romanian landowners, and ranked as village judges. The so­
cial stratification leading to nobility or to serfdom took place also among 
the Romanian population of eastern Hungary, Transylvania included, but 
the development differed from the pattern of other ethnic or social groups 
in many respects.
The Romanian voivodes and kenezes whose social and legal status was 
relatively similar to that of the Saxon gerebs went through the same process 
of social advancement as the latter to reach nobility. The similarity, how­
ever, stopped there, and did not extend to the mass of the Romanian popu­
lation. In recognition of their military services, the kings granted some 
voivodes and kenezes possession of those Romanian villages which they 
had established, and administered, but their obligation to pay dues for the 
office held, and to render personal military service remained. The legal sta­
tus of the landowning kenezes was regulated by King Louis I in 1366. He 
declared landowning kenezes whose possession was confirmed by royal char­
ter to be of equal standing to the nobility when they acted as witnesses in a 
court of law. This, however, did not mean "real" nobility for the kenezes, 
that is exemption from royal taxes for themselves of for those living on their 
estates. On the other hand, this was the first step towards the In ezes' dis­
tinction from the common Romanians (communis Olachus) who had, so far, 
been equal to them before the law though they had had administrative ju ­
risdiction (but not the authority of the landowners). They were also distin­
guished from that class of kenezes who had not been confirmed in their 
property by a royal deed (communis kenezus). Members of this later kenez 
group were pronounced the legal equals of those judges (villici) of the Hun­
garian and Saxon villages who were villains themselves but who neverthe­
less enjoyed some tax advantages. Such distinctions had been already in 
effect in the Romanian keneziates: for example, at the H£tszeg assembly of 
1360 already mentioned, besides the twelve kenezes and six priests, there 
were six Romanian commoners (Olachi populani), three of whom were re­
ferred to as "serfs" (iobagiones) of the kenezes. Nevertheless, they all sat to­
gether in the court, like Kenez Basarab Longus and his serf, Mihul (like every 
commoner at the time, he is mentioned by first name only).
A voivode or kenez who rose to the seminoble status was described in 
charters and deeds as "noble voivode" (nobilis vaivoda) or "noble kenez" 
(nobilis kenezius), and his social status corresponded exactly to that of the 
Hungarian "conditional" noble (conditionarius), whose nobility was "condi­
tional" on his rendering specified services. The bishops of Transylvania and 
215 V3rad rewarded the Romanian voivodes who served in their private ar-
K e re s te le k g
□  Venter 1349
^ I'ojeny 1554 1
KocsubirTssT 
[i] Kiskoh 1554Korossebes 1 5 3 8 ®
,:||l^% l!,s,yar cenV’ Zalatna I5ih ccnt 
v  G u ra sz a d a  13th ccn t. ' S '
x J ^ Q P a p T a l v a  14#8 !, /
R a k o ^ L | ^ r ~ X > s  / a  E r k e s . l  
■,1387 P a p a l t g a Q J  A JT o n k a  1 4 9 8  v
U j * jd a h u r w . jd [ g f  / an  AI so  v a r u s * /
w fo w ik r  ■ 7 S7̂ K w M m
ncmsiTs 136(111 l llMva '3(>f7TKg 
1360 Pestenvfa va# N H i ^ H





Church of undetermined material
□  Priest mentioned in diploma





D * •  Kucso 1̂ - Paptelek* / u ^ n  
1450 / ,
Dank 143.''
y s  A E rk es1
  
D  l vurus^jj






i e i m.u •.Ruszkova lafalva 14th cent. 151 a
• Rozavlya 1516
Q  Konyha 14th cent.
Szentgyorgy 1450^?- MaJ ° r  ̂450
Naszod 145
Szentpeter 
lahfrata « 14 w arago
z io m z o l/d) g  Mezopagocsa 1539
|apu\« • Mezogere^enes 1447
^ 5 3 9 * • Ik ând 153^ /
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mies by granting them "ecclesiastic nobility", which was similar to condi­
tional nobility. This meant that they enjoyed the land which they had origi­
nally only administered as if it had been their private property, and dis­
posed over its free Romanian population as over serfs. However, the right 
of ownership still belonged to the king or to the bishop. As for their legal 
status, the Romanian nobles remained under the judicial authority of the 
royal or episcopal castellan. The heirs of the seminoble Romanian voivodes 
who were vassals of bishops continued in this state until the beginning of 
modern times when the Reformation put an end to great church estates. 
The noble voivodes and noble kenezes who held estates on royal land, how­
ever, continued to rise socially and sooner or later reached unconditional, 
that is "real" or "national" nobility: in respect of their rights and duties they 
were an integral part of the Hungarian nobility.
The prime difference between the nobles of Szekely and Saxon origin 
and the Romanian nobles was that while the former were granted estates in 
the counties, that is outside the Saxon and Szekely territories, the Romanian 
voivodes and kenezes were granted landlord's rights over the land which 
they had earlier been administering. The inevitable consequence was that 
the common Romanians lost their personal freedom and became the serfs 
of the noble voivodes and keneze s. The Romanian population, after a few 
sporadic attempts at resistance, reconciled themselves to their fate. The king 
had no interest in defending the personal liberties of the common Romani­
ans who performed no military service against voivodes and kenezes who 
were soldiers. Thus, by the end of the Middle Ages, the great masses of the 
Romanian population were the serfs either of Hungarian or Saxon nobles, 
or of Romanians risen from their own ranks. This explains why no separate 
Romanian "Estate" could evolve: the serfs, whatever their language, pos­
sessed no political rights, while the nobility, again regardless of origins, 
formed a single social Estate, a single "Nation".
The social advancement of the privileged Romanians proved to be the 
most rapid outside Transylvania proper, in M&ramaros for the simple rea­
son that in the fourteenth century Hungary faced the greatest threat from 
the still aggressive Mongols along its northeastern border. The Romanian 
voivodes and kenezes of Maramaros and Bereg took part in the campaigns 
of King Charles Robert and Louis I, first against the Mongols, later against 
the Lithuanians, then finally against Bogdan, the rebel Romanian voivode 
of Moldavia, and by the middle of the century, more and more of them 
were being ennobled. One voivode and kenez family after the other was 
granted "real" nobility: the Barcknfalvis in 1326, the Bed<5h£zis in 1336, the 
Bilkeis in 1339 and the Ilosvais in 1341. Real nobility exempted them from 
all taxes and specified services, and obliged them only to perform personal 
military service.
In 1365, the voivodes Balk and Drag who had been driven out of Moldavia 
by Bogdan moved to Maramaros with their brothers, prompting quite a 
migration. In the following years, the so far uninhabited northern moun­
tains of Transylvania were speedily populated by the Romanian common­
ers they brought with them; one of the brothers even led Romanian settlers 
to Poland. Drag's descendants, the Drkgffys, acquired large seigniories of 
more than a hundred villages in the Maramaros, Ugocsa, Szatmar, Bels6-
Szolnok and KOzep-Szolnok counties as early as the fourteenth century, and 
became the first aristocrats of Romanian origin in Hungary to play a role in 
national politics. The voivodes of Mdramaros became the royal ispans of 
M^ramaros county, and it was at their instigation that the Romanian nobles 
of this county formed their own system of self-government in approximately 
1380 on same pattern of the other noble counties, electing nobles, judges 
and jurors from among themselves to assist the work of the king's appointee, 
the ispan.
A similar but less rapid process started in another strategically impor­
tant part of Hungary: in Temes and Krassb, the two counties of the Banate 
of Szoreny which lay on the Transylvanian side of the Carpathians. There 
was a sudden increase in the Romanian population here, too, in the four­
teenth century. There are data to prove that large numbers of people ar­
rived from outside Hungary's borders. In 1334 a certain Voivode Bogdan 
was granted land in Temes county, and he brought so many people with 
him to his new estates there that the move took nine months to complete, 
and the king even sent one of the highest dignitaries of the land, the arch­
bishop of Kalocsa, to assist him with the arrangements. In 1359, six mem­
bers of another distinguished Romanian family from Wallachia settled in 
Temes "leaving all their properties in Wallachia behind". First they received 
thirteen villages, and six years later a further five estates which formed the 
already mentioned district of Ikus. Their descendants were the Rek£si and 
Dobozi D&nfi families, later of noble rank.
Between 1365 and 1369, King Louis I used this area as a bridgehead dur­
ing his campaigns against Wallachia and Bulgaria, in which the most he 
could achieve was to get purely formal oaths of allegiance from the rulers 
of those countries. For this campaign he wished to gain the support of the 
kenezes of Temes and Krass6 counties, and tried to ensure their loyalty by 
converting them to the Roman Catholic faith. A royal decree of 1428 which 
has survived only in the form of a nineteenth century copy mentions a puta­
tive decree of Louis I according to which only Roman Catholic noblemen 
and kenezes would be granted land in the Sebes district of Temes county. 
Independently of whether the document is genuine or a forgery, in reality 
there is evidence for only one authentic case of conversion, from 1366, when 
Sorban, one of the kenezes of the castle of Vil^gos in Arad county was con­
verted to the Catholic faith and received the name Istv&n in baptism. How­
ever, he never succeeded in obtaining full noble rights. Members of the 
Mutnoki kenez family, which was demonstrably of local origin, were first 
described as nobles in 1376, probably because they were one of the few 
Catholic families. This is indicated by the fact that in 1394 a member of their 
family was the canon of the Gyulafeherv^r chapter. It was at approximately 
the same time that the ancestors of the Temeseli Desi kenez family in Temes 
county acquired nobility. However, the majority of the kenezes in the Roma­
nian districts of Temes and Krass6 counties lacked royal confirmation even 
of their kenez status around 1379.
Conversion to Roman Catholicism was so infrequent in the fourteenth 
century that it prompted Alvema, the Franciscan vicar of Bosnia, to com­
plain in 1379: "There are some stupid and indifferent people who disap- 
2 1 9  prove of and abuse the recently-begun holy work of His Majesty the King of
Hungary ... that is, the conversion and baptism of the Slavs and Romanians 
living in the country". Resistance came not only from where it was natural, 
from the Romanians, but from the Catholic Hungarian landowners, whose 
interest lay in keeping the Romanian settlers on their estates by providing 
them with a priest of their own religion. This practice was so widespread 
that even landowners who were churchmen followed it; in fact, the Catho­
lic bishop of Varad is the first on record to have given permission, in 1349, 
to a Romanian voivode named Peter to keep a tax-exempted Romanian priest 
(presbyterum Olachalem) in his village of Felventer. From the end of the four­
teenth century, the Hungarian noblemen themselves had wooden churches 
built for their Romanian serfs and kept Romanian priests for them in the 
Mez6s6g.
In such circumstances, it is not surprising that in 1391 the voivodes Balk 
and Drag, who were also the ispdns of Szatmar and Maramaros counties, 
approached the patriarch of Constantinople and subsequently obtained the 
right for the prior of the Monastery of Kortvelyes, which was their founda­
tion, to ordain and oversee the Romanian priests and to consecrate the Or­
thodox churches on their estates in M&ramaros, Szatm&r, Ugocsa, Bels6- 
and KOzep-Szolnok counties. Their descendants, the Dr&gffys only turned 
Catholic in the fifteenth century — one of them even held the office of voi­
vode of Transylvania — but they continued to be patrons of the Greek Or­
thodox Monastery of Kortvelyes. The Monastery of Priszlop in Hunyad 
county established at the end of the fourteenth century enjoyed the same 
right of ordaining Greek Orthodox priests as KOrtvelyes in the north, ex­
cept that it was not under the immediate authority of the patriarch of Con­
stantinople, but of the archbishop of Wallachia.
The most zealous and devoted of the Greek Orthodox faithful were the 
"noble kenezes" of the Romanian districts of H^tszeg, Vajdahunyad and 
Deva. They had yet to rise to noble rank in the fourteenth century, but they 
had stone churches built and had themselves and their families depicted as 
the founders on frescos which had Slavonic inscriptions. Besides the names 
of the founding kenez and the priest, the name of the painter, Teophil, can be 
read on the 1313 fresco of the church in Sztrigyszentgyorgy; the church 
itself, judging by its semi-circular clerestories, must have been built in the 
thirteenth century. Here, too, as in the whole of the region, the priests came 
from kenez families. There are other thirteenth century Greek Orthodox 
churches in Zeykfalva and Malomviz. The contemporary church of Demsus, 
built in the Byzantine style and centrally planned, has a centred tower in 
place of the cupola, which copies the Catholic church towers built in Transyl­
vania in the first half of the thirteenth century. Apart from the church in 
Demsus, written sources mention four other Romanian churches in 1360; of 
these the only one still standing is that in Osztr6. The Osztr6 church and 
another one in Lesnyek, also built by a kenez, has elements linking it to four­
teenth century Transylvanian Gothic architecture. The Greek Orthodox 
churches of Kristyor, Ribice and Lupsa on the mountain estates of the Catho­
lic bishop of Varad and Transylvania were also built in the Gothic style in 
the fourteenth century. The church in Gurasz^da, an early Byzantine stone 
building, was the only one built not by a kenez but by a Hungarian land­
owner who had settled there after 1293 for his Romanian serfs. It is surpris­
ing, on the other hand, that no mediaeval Greek Orthodox stone church has 
survived in Maramaros and Bereg both of which had early Romanian set­
tlements, or in the Fogaras region, or, indeed, in the Romanian districts of 
Temes and Krass6 counties. There is not as much as a mention of stone 
churches here, only of wooden churches, whose present condition gives no 
real clue as to their origin form.
3. The Three Nations of Transylvania 
(1360-1526)
The Transylvanian Concept of Nation
The Age of Estates was a distinct phase in the development of European 
feudalism, and is characterized by a shift in power: the absolute authority 
of the sovereign — and of his immediate entourage — was replaced by the 
corporate participation of certain privileged groups in legislation and in 
government. These groupings, as well as the bodies representing them, were 
called Estates. In most countries, the Estates convened at the national as­
semblies were the aristocracy, the nobility and the city burghers. In some 
countries, as in England, prelates, the "Lords Spiritual", formed a separate 
Estate; while in others, as in Hungary, they formed one Estate along with 
the aristocracy. The evolution of the Estates in Hungary started at the end 
of the thirteenth century with separate meetings of the aristocracy (the so- 
called barons) and the nobility at the Diet. However, development suffered 
a setback of about a century and a half during the decades of particularism 
bordering on anarchy, aiid the subsequent heavy-handed rule of the Anjou 
kings, who relied exclusively on the barons. The first Diet to claim legisla­
tive power met in 1439, with representatives of the barons, the nobility and 
the royal free towns. Just a few years earlier, in 1437, the leaders of the 
Three Nations (nationes) of Transylvania — the nobility, the Szekelys and 
the Saxons — had called their "Assembly of the Province". Although the 
decisions made at this forum did not have the force of law — legally bind­
ing rulings could only be brought by the full Hungarian Diet of which the 
Transylvanians were also part — they did become statutes regulating con­
ditions specific to Transylvania. These assemblies were nevertheless genu­
ine assemblies of Estates, although of Estates that were entirely different 
politically from the Estates comprising the Hungarian Diet. This is why 
they were called "Nations".
In the Hungary of the early fifteenth century, the word "nation" (natio) 
generally meant "the nobility". By then, the ethnic sense of the word had 
faded, and it came to be primarily a social and political concepts denoting 
the set of all people with political rights. The change in the meaning of the 
term was greatest in Transylvania, where only individuals owning land 
either privately or communally could be members of a "N ation". Serfs — 
whether Hungarian, Saxon or Romanian — were excluded. They had no 
privileges and were under the authority of the landowners.
The Nation formed by Transylvania's nobility was the one that corre­
sponded most closely to what was meant by "nation" in the rest of Hun­
gary, and included all those free landowners who were obliged to do per­
sonal military service and owned their land outright, and not communally. 
Ethnic origin was irrelevant here: in the nobility Saxon landowners were to 
be found alongside Hungarians and a considerable number of Romanians, 
as we have seen, also rose into this grouping. The "hungarianization" of the 
Saxon and Romanian nobles occurred not as a matter of principle — the 
Hungarian nobility had always had non-Hungarian speaking members — 
but through compliance with the majority, with no coercion to adopt the 
Hungarian language. The way of life of the nobility was peculiarly Hungar­
ian, and assimilation to it came about naturally. The "nation" comprising 
Transylvania's nobility was the "Hungarian nation". How far the Transyl­
vanian nation concept was from being an ethnic category is best illustrated 
by the Szekely Nation, the communitas of all those enjoying Szekely rights 
and liberties. By the time Transylvania's Estates had taken form, the Szekelys 
had long ceased to be a separate ethnic unit; in fact, they were commonly 
regarded as the most Hungarian of all Hungarians. Only the Saxon Nation 
still carried the implication of a separate ethnic group, but even it did not 
apply to the whole of Transylvania's German population, since the burgh­
ers of towns living outside the Sz&szfold in the counties were not included 
in the “natio Saxonica", nor were the Saxon serfs. There was no Romanian 
Nation; its development had been forestalled, as we have seen: the rising of 
the voivodes and kenezes above their fellows had put an end to the freedom 
of the Romanian commonality. The Romanian nobles became members of 
the Nation formed by the nobility, that is, the "Hungarian nation", and those 
Romanians who were reduced to serfdom lost their claim to their Roma­
nian status and the rights it had involved in earlier times.
The co-operation among the three estates of "nations" — Hungarian, 
Szekely and Saxon — was initially restricted to the maintenance and possi­
ble extension of their privileges, and to local self-government. The idea of 
joint political action did not even arise. There is no sign of there having 
been some sense of specifically Transylvanian identity among the nobility, 
the Szekelys and the Saxons in the fourteenth century. Transylvania at the 
time was still a purely geographical concept, and although it was regarded 
as a somewhat independent region within the Kingdom of Hungary this 
stemmed not so much from some form of Transylvanian local patriotism, 
but from the voivode's exceptional authority.
As the chief justice, governor and military commander of the Transylva­
nian counties, the voivode exercised a degree of influence which unavoid­
ably affected the Szekely and Saxon territories as well, although formally 
they were governed by ispdns independent of the voivode. In fact, the 
Szekelys and Saxons insisted on having their own ispdns, as they feared that 
if they fell under the same jurisdiction and administration as the nobility, 
their own system of law and order would be superseded. However, the 
kings, whose interest was to create a unified government in this far-away 
province, usually ensured concordance between the high officials of Transyl­
vania by appointing the ispan of the Szekelys from among men close to, or 
related to, the voivode. 222
The first institutional contacts between the nobility, the Szekelys and the 
Saxons were established through the voivode. Questions of land owner­
ship, administration or military service affecting all three parties regularly 
arose, and needed joint action. It was to settle these matters that the king 
personally called a meeting of the whole of the province (generalis congregatio) 
at the end of the thirteenth century. Here, as we have seen, the Romanians 
were still represented. In the first decade of the fourteenth century, Voivode 
L&szl6 K£n called such meetings of his own authority; between 1322 and 
1414, the voivodes acting for the king, annually convened these assemblies 
on the meadow of Keresztes near Torda, on the estate of the Knights of St. 
John. Often only the nobles came, who were joined by the Szekelys and the 
Saxons if the matters so required. For the Romanian kenezes of the royal 
districts, the vice-voivodes called separate juridical meetings. The assem­
blies, near Torda, helped the leaders of the nobility, the Szekelys and the 
Saxons to recognize their joint interests.
This series of assemblies broke off after 1414, and the political unrest of 
the ensuring years suspended relations between the three nations. The male 
line of the Anjou dynasty died out with King Louis I in 1382, which led to 
severe internal struggle over the succession. The oligarchy, which Charles 
Robert and Louis I had managed to keep under control, again gained ascend­
ancy, and the struggle among the barons unsettled the whole country. The 
new king, Sigismund of Luxemburg, who emerged victorious from the civil 
war, recognized that he had to share power with the strengthened aristoc­
racy. The high dignitaries of the realm were mainly concerned with main­
taining their share of central power; they had no time to carry out all their 
official duties in person, but left them to their familiaries. The king tried to 
remedy this situation by appointing two people to each of the most impor­
tant posts, but to little effect. In Transylvania, Sigismund appointed his close 
confidant, an eminent Polish soldier formerly in Louis I's service, Stibor 
Stiborici, to be voivode between 1395 and 1401 and then again between 
1409 and 1414. Stiborici did at times appear in person to discharge his du­
ties as voivode. His successors, however, Miklbs Csaky and his son, Laszlo, 
voivodes in 1415-1426 and 1427-1437 respectively, did not as much as visit 
Transylvania for those more than two decades, but left the task of govern­
ing Transylvania to their vice-voivode, Lorand Varaskeszi Lepes. The lat­
ter, together with his brother, Gy orgy, the bishop of Transylvania, success­
fully furthered their family's interests, but was unable to keep a firm hand 
on the province, partly because as vice-voivode, he did not have the requi­
site authority. Government was in great disorder, yet these were the years 
that Transylvania was going through one of the most critical periods of its 
history, and was crying out for righteous and protective rule.
Turkish Threat and Peasant War
A threat comparable only to the great Mongol invasion now menaced Hun­
gary from the south. The Ottoman host, having conquered the peoples of 
the Balkans in less than fifty years, was, by the end of the fourteenth cen- 
223 tury, attacking the marches of Hungary. King Louis I had been obliged to
repel one of their attacks as early as 1375. Later Mircea, the voivode of 
Wallachia and a vassal of the king of Hungary, put up a heroic fight to ward 
off another Turkish attack, but was forced to flee to Transylvania and to 
request the support of King Sigismund. In 1395 he returned to Wallachia 
with Hungarian troops, but was defeated again; one of the Hungarian com­
manders, Istv&n Losonci, also fell. King Sigismund's crusade against the 
Ottoman Turks, which united western knights and heroic fighters from the 
Balkans under Hungarian leadership, ended in defeat at Nicopolis in 1396.
Not long afterwards Wallachia, Transylvania's advance bastion, fell to 
the Turks and Mircea became a taxpaying vassal of the Porte. However,
King Sigismund, who had the welfare of his Wallachian liege men at heart, 
on several occasions sent Hungarian troops to help restore voivodes who 
had been driven out by the Turks. But the task became increasingly diffi­
cult: there were always Romanian pretenders willing to lead Turkish troops 
against these voivodes as soon as the Hungarian armies were withdrawn.
In this way Wallachia became a battlefield, and the Turks, usually supported 
by their own voivodes, made raids into Transylvania more and more fre­
quently.
It was in this situation that in 1419 King Sigismund first recognized the 
legislative competence of the Transylvanian Nations. On his initiative, it 
was declared that in case of an Ottoman attack, every third nobleman and 
every tenth serf would take up arms in support of the Szekelys and the 
Saxons, who, living on the border, stood to bear the brunt of any offensive.
The wisdom of this was demonstrated in 1420 when, without such assist­
ance, Voivode Mikl6s Cs&ky tried vainly to check a Turkish attack near 
H&tszeg; the attacking troops subsequently devastated Hunyad county and 
Sz^szv&ros, taking a large number of prisoners. In 1421 an Ottoman army 
appeared outside Brass6, and smashed the Saxon and Szekely troops. In 
1432 Turkish and Romanian forces from the neighbouring voivodates broke 
into the area, and except for the recently rebuilt castles of Brass6 and Szeben 
which were able to withstand the siege, the Szaszfold and even the Szekely- 
f<5ld suffered major damage.
The increasing defence burden fell primarily on the serfs. The Romanian 
serfs paid tax on their flocks to the king only; since they belonged to the 
Greek Orthodox church, they paid no tithes. However, when urban devel­
opment induced large numbers of Hungarian and Saxon serfs to leave their 
lords to seek their fortunes in the towns, the landowners settled Romanians 
on the plots left vacant. At the request of the bishop of Transylvania, the 
king agreed that the Romanians who settled on so-called "Christian lands", 
abandoned by Roman Catholic serfs, should pay the tithes due on their 
holdings. This measure made for a great deal of dissatisfaction among the 
Romanian serfs, who had been used to the much lighter tax known as the 
fiftieth.
But the circumstances of the Hungarian and Saxon serfs were also dete­
riorating. The changeover to a money economy, growing material demands 
from the nobility, and the Ottoman threat — all placed new financial bur­
dens on them. The landowners began to insist again on the payment of the 
new tax introduction in 1351: the ninth — i.e. the second "tenth" of the 
serfs' produce — which had fallen into disuse. This tax was collected, how- 224
ever, without relieving the serfs of those taxes which they had been paying 
hitherto. The rent on the land was raised, extraordinary taxes were im­
posed, and, most onerous of all, the landowners took every opportunity to 
hinder the movement of the serfs. The performance of personal military 
service also constituted an unusual and grave burden for the peasantry, 
who had not been called on to bear arms for centuries. The serfs became 
restive throughout Transylvania, and in several places refused to pay the 
church tithes. Bishop GyOrgy L6pes resorted to a double-edged weapon in 
an attempt to resolve the situation: he excommunicated those villages which 
refused' to pay their tithes, declaring that the only way they could obtain 
redress was to pay the church taxes owing in a newly-issued currency whose 
unit value was ten times that of the old. In the meantime, priests who had 
studied in Bohemia were passing on to the peasantry the radical Taborite 
ideas of the Hussite rebellion — which turned it against the church even 
more. In the spring of 1437, the Transylvanian serfs, led by Antal Budai 
Nagy of the lower nobility, rose against their ecclesiastical and temporal 
landlords.
The rebels consciously called themselves the "universitas", "the univer­
sality of the Hungarian and Romanian inhabitants of Transylvania" and 
"m en of free status"13 — deliberately describing themselves in terms usu­
ally applied only to the nobility to proclaim the egalitarian Hussite social 
programme. They also followed the example of the Hussites when they 
established a redoubt in a Transylvanian "Tabor" (camp) on the extensive 
plateau of Mount Bdbolna near Alparet in Doboka county. From this camp 
their captains sent four legates to Voivode L&szl6 Cs&ky who had hurried 
to Transylvania on hearing the news of the rebellion. They asked that their 
grievances be remedied: that the abuses over tithe payments stop, that the 
sentence of excommunication be lifted, and that the serfs' right to free move­
ment be generally recognized.
The voivode first had the envoys mutilated, then killed. With his troops 
he then attacked the peasants, but lost the subsequent battle, in which he 
himself disappeared. The nobility felt forced to negotiate, and, in an agree­
ment made in front of the Convent of Kolozsmonostor on 6 July, 1437, prom­
ised to remedy the peasants' grievances. The bishop reduced the tithes by 
half, and eased the terms of payment for the sums outstanding. The land­
owners compromised: ten denaria were to be paid in rent as opposed to 
one and a half gold florins. They agreed on one day's socage per year per 
holding and promised to abandon the collection of the ninth. Also renounced 
was the so-called ako (approximately twelve gallons), a tax previously lev­
ied and paid in kind. All this amounted to the abolition of all seignorial 
taxes in the form of both services and produce. The fact that the landown­
ers settled for a moderate money rent was a great achievement for the peas­
ants, with implications for the future. Finally, the serfs' right to move freely 
was guaranteed. The most significant condition of the proposed agreement 
was to have been the recognition of the serfs' right to call an annual armed 
assembly on Mount Babolna, where alleged abuses of authority by the land­
owners were to be discussed and, if necessary, punished.
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Such an unprecedented affront to its self-esteem and interests was intol­
erable to the nobility, and in a short time the struggle broke out again. How­
ever, the peasants continued their resistance, and one manor house after 
another was put to the torch. Neither side showed any mercy. To relieve 
the nobles in their desperate plight, in mid-September the vice-voivode called 
the leaders of the other two Nations to a general assembly at Kkpolna. This 
was the first time that the Transylvanian Estates assembled without royal 
authorization or without waiting for the appointment of a new voivode. 
They agreed to join forces in "brotherly union" against all internal and ex­
ternal threats to the province, and promised to support one another against 
all aggressors except the king. For some time yet, however, this mutual 
assistance pact existed on paper only. A few days after the Kapolna assem­
bly, there was another bloody confrontation with the peasants, and the nobles 
were again obliged to negotiate. On 6 October, in the village of Dell6apati in 
Doboka county, the two sides agreed to send their delegates to the king to 
ask his arbitration. But King Sigismund was gravely ill and died on 9 De­
cember; his successor, the Austrian prince Albert of Habsburg, had not yet 
arrived in the country. Thus a royal decision was delayed.
In the meantime the peasants won the support of the citizens of Kolozsv&r, 
thereby acquiring a strong fortified military base from which they contin­
ued their skirmishes against villages supporting the nobles. Eventually, in 
December, with the help of extra troops from other parts of Hungary, the 
nobility won a major victory near Kolozsmonostor led by the newly-ap- 
pointed voivode, Dezsd Losonci BSnffy, who was closely affected since his 
estates lay next to Bcibolna. Antal Budai Nagy was killed in battle. At the 
beginning of 1438, the final stronghold, Kolozsvar, also fell. On 2 February, 
the representatives of the Three Nations met, and after solemn renewal of 
their union, the reckoning with the peasants took place: their leaders were 
tortured and then executed, and the rest of those captured were blinded 
and mutilated. Kolozsvar paid for its participation by losing its municipal 
liberties, and did not regain them until several years later. There was, of 
course, no further talk of the contractual rights which the serfs had won 
previously.
The Hunyadis
Although the Transylvanian Estates eventually managed to crush a badly- 
armed and gullible peasantry, they lacked the strength to withstand the 
Turkish onslaught. In 1438, Turkish, Romanian and Serbian troops broke 
into Transylvania through the Iron Gates, in Hunyad county. The Turkish 
attackers were accompanied by Vlad Dracul, voivode of Wallachia, formerly 
King Sigismund's vassal and a Knight of the Order of the Dragon, to which 
the cream of the Hungarian aristocracy then belonged. It was to Voivode 
Vlad's troops that the town of Sz&szsebes surrendered; most of its inhabit­
ants were taken prisoner. The invading armies then turned on Szeben. When 
the town managed to withstand an eight day siege, they ransacked Gyula- 
fehervar and Kukiill6vcir. After almost two months of devastation, the en­
emy left through the Barcas&g, taking with him much booty and thousands 
of captives.
After the sudden death of Albert, the newly-crowned Wladislas I, who 
was already king of Poland, made the struggle against the Ottomans his 
principal concern. In 1440, the first year of his reign as king of Hungary, he 
decided to reorganize the country's defence system completely, and to cen­
tralize the government of the southern border region, which had hitherto 
been in the hands of several royal officials. For this enormous task he ap­
pointed Mikl6s Ujlaki, ban of Macs6, and his old companion-in-arms, J&nos 
Hunyadi, ban of Szc5r6ny, as ispans of Temes and voivodes of Transylvania, 
at the same time allowing them to retain their former titles. The defence of 
the western half of the long border region became the responsibility of tJjlaki, 
while the defence of the eastern half was entrusted to Hunyadi.
At long last, the fate of Transylvania was entrusted to the right hands. 
Hunyadi himself was a Transylvanian, and the affairs of the province were 
therefore nearer to him than to his predecessors, who had all come from 
other parts of Hungary and whose estates were similarly distant. Hunyadi, 
an outstanding figure of fifteenth-century European history, started life in 
modest social circumstances, but enjoyed a prodigious career. His father, 
who was probably from a Wallachian boyar family, had served as a knight 
in Sigismund's court and in 1409 had been granted the castle and seigniory 
of Hunyad for his services. The young Hunyadi, whom contemporaries re­
garded as Sigismund's illegitimate son, first served as a soldier under Hun­
garian barons, then at the courts of George Brankovic, the Serbian despot 
and the duke of Milan, and finally as a knight at the Hungarian royal court. 
It was King Albert who had appointed him to head the Banate of Szoreny, 
which was under constant attack from the Ottoman Turks. Wladislas I en­
trusted Hunyadi, his closest advisor and bravest soldier, with the command 
of the campaigns against the Turks. Hunyadi's successes were amply re­
warded by the king; as a result of the 1444 peace negotiations with the Turks, 
he acquired Brankovic's vast Hungarian estates. He came to own property 
on a scale unprecedented in Hungarian history, and never matched since. 
At the time of his death, his estates covered five and a half million acres of 
land, a quarter of which was in Transylvania. The revenues from this enor­
mous property and the military and political power of his countless retinue 
Hunyadi (unlike most of his contemporaries) used not for personal aggran­
dizement, but in the common interest: for years he personally met the greater 
part of the expenses of the wars with the Turks.
In 1442 Hunyadi defended Transylvania against a Turkish attack led by 
Mezid bey. Although he lost the first battle near Szentimre, where Bishop 
GyOrgy Lepes fell, help brought by Mikl6s Ujlaki enabled Hunyadi to di­
vert the Ottoman army from its siege of Szeben and in a pitched battle to 
destroy it completely. In the same year, he put the troops of Sehabedin 
beylerbey of Rumelia to rout in Wallachia near the Ialomifa River. In 1443 
he himself launched an offensive and won a series of victories; only harsh 
weather forced him to turn back from the Balkan Mountains. Despite the 
fact that a subsequent campaign launched by Wladislas in violation of a 
peace treaty with the Turks ended in disaster, and the king himself was 
killed in the Battle of Varna (1444), the Hungarian frontiers were saved 
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King Wladislaw I was succeeded by the child Ladislas V; during his mi­
nority, Janos Hunyadi, the celebrated hero of all Christendom and the idol 
of the Hungarian lesser nobility, was elected governor of Hungary. He in­
tended to use his increased power to eliminate the Turkish threat once and 
for all. Hunyadi's third Balkan campaign failed, however, owing to the hos­
tility between him and Brankovic, and because of the irresolution of the 
Romanian voivodes. He was heavily defeated at the Battle of Kosovo Polje 
in Serbia in 1448.
Although Hunyadi was unable to realise his long-term plans, he contin­
ued to maintain Hungary's defence successfully. Sultan Mohammed II, af­
ter occupying Constantinople, launched a campaign against Hungary, and 
in 1456 laid siege to Nandorfeherv&r. Hunyadi's troops scattered the be­
sieging army with the help of peasant crusaders recruited by Giovanni di 
Capestrano, a Franciscan friar who was later canonized. (It is in commemo­
ration of this battle that church bells ring at noon each day.) This great vic­
tory halted for decades the Turkish advance towards Hungary. But at the 
height of his glory, Hunyadi fell victim to the plague, which broke out in his 
camp after the battle. His body was laid to rest at Gyulafeherv^r. Hunyadi's 
death triggered a fierce power struggle between his sons and his opponents 
who had been enviously watching the success of the one-time governor. 
The elder of the two, Ldszl6 Hunyadi, was beheaded by royal command. 
When, however, the throne became vacant within the year, under military 
pressure from the lesser nobility and the fam ily's num erous retainers, 
Mdty&s, the second son, was elected king in 1458.
In Transylvania, King Matthias was received with mistrust, and the alli­
ance of the Three Nations that was again solemnly declared at the 1459 
assembly displayed the character of a united front against the king. This 
show of defiance, though, was aimed not at Matthias, who was not much 
more than a child, but at his maternal uncle, Mih^ly Szil£gyi, who was no­
torious for his vehement and aggressive nature and who was governing the 
country on behalf of his nephew. In violation of Saxon autonomy, Szil&gyi 
granted himself the district of Beszterce, together with the hereditary title 
of count bestowed on Janos Hunyadi by Ladislas V when he resigned as 
governor in 1452. Szildgyi disregarded the privileges that his predecessor 
had been so careful to guarantee the citizens of Beszterce, and began to 
treat them as ordinary serfs. It was this that led Beszterce to revolt in 1458. 
Matthias, fearing an outbreak of disorder in Transylvania, stripped his un­
cle of his power, taking the government into his own hands. In 1465 he 
restored the liberties of Beszterce. However, the atmosphere of hostility 
towards him did not ease. The burdens of his expensive campaigns and his 
strictness towards an aristocracy unaccustomed to a firm hand led to oppo­
sition movements throughout the country.
The Transylvanian nobility found it particularly irksome that Matthias 
replaced the lucrum camarae tax, from which they had been exempted by 
Louis I, with a newly-introduced tax which he then imposed on them, too. 
In 1467, Benedek Farnasi Veres, a descendant of one of the conqueror tribes 
of Transylvania, organized a military uprising against the king, persuading 
the voivode of Transylvania, J£nos Szentgyorgyi, to join in. High-ranking 
Saxons and Szekelys also took part in the sedition. However, Matthias
quickly intervened and took the disorganized rebels by surprise; the voivode 
was the first to beg his monarch for mercy, and many of those who had 
masterminded the rebellion fled abroad. The wrath that subsequently de­
scended upon the Transylvanian nobility was comparable only to the land 
confiscations ordered by Charles Robert after Voivode L&szl6's fall. Transyl­
vanian families of many centuries' standing — such as the Farnasi Veres, 
Suki, Ikl6di, Kecseti, Dragi, Bog£ti, Losonci Banffy, Somkereki Erdelyi, Do- 
bokai, Illyei and Folti families — became homeless overnight. The king dis­
tributed their estates among his relatives and proven supporters, with the 
lion's share going to the new voivodes, Jdnos Dengelegi Pongrac and Miklos 
Csupor, as well as to J&nos NSdasdi Ungor. Had these families, due to a 
peculiar misfortune, not all died out within a few decades, Transylvania 
would have witnessed the rise of a new aristocracy. What in fact happened 
was that some of these windfall seigniories were soon divided up amongst 
the female descendants; others the king gave back to their original owners 
whom he pardoned after his initial anger had passed.
The net result was that great estates practically ceased to exist in Transyl­
vania. It was not only the nobles who were punished, but also the Szekely 
and Saxon rebels: the mayor of Szeben paid with his head. Thus the politi­
cal significance of the Transylvanian Estates greatly diminished, while the 
king gradually increased the authority of the voivode, who, from the begin­
ning of the 1460s, regularly held the post of the ispan of the Szekelys as well. 
This authority was counterbalanced only by the autonomy of the Saxons, 
which the king deliberately strengthened. In the same year, soon after the 
rebellion, Matthias went to war with £tefan, voivode of Moldavia, who had 
been one of its instigators. Although the king was injured in a clash and 
withdrew his troops, the voivode thought it unwise to persist in his enmity; 
instead he swore allegiance.
King Matthias managed to organize effective defence for Transylvania 
against Turkish attacks. In this he was assisted by the same Stefan, the most 
distinguished of Moldavia's voivodes (1457-1504) and later justly dubbed 
"the Great", since with Hungarian military support he won a number of 
victories over the Turks. Matthias also supported the courageous but ruth­
less Vlad, another voivode of Wallachia (1456-1462, 1476) and the son of 
Vlad Dracul. This second Vlad was called "The Impaler" (Tepes) by his 
enemies since this was the way in which he executed captured Turks and 
those boyars who sympathized with them. He had frequent political and 
commercial conflicts with the Transylvanian Saxons, and had several of 
them murdered also. Because of this the Saxons published alarming pam­
phlets that spread his notoriety throughout Europe, thus laying the founda­
tions of the "Dracula" stories of later times.
During the reign of Matthias, the Turks launched only one serious attack 
against Transylvania, in 1479. Voivode Istvan Bathory, however, headed 
off the main body of their army at Keny6rmezo in Hunyad county. Here, on 
13 October, the bloodiest battle ever fought with the Turks in Transylvania 
took place. Due to the well-timed arrival and intervention of Pal Kinizsi, 
the ispan of Temes, who was famous for his victories over the Turks, the 
enemy suffered a major defeat, and for the next decade gave Transylvania a 
229 wide berth. Defence against the Turks also became more systematic: be-
tween 1387 and 1438 walls with projecting towers were built around the 
Saxon towns, while the villages in southern Transylvania turned their 
churches into fortified shelters, thus creating the peculiarly Transylvanian 
Gothic church-fortress.
The Turkish threat meant that the military services of the kenezes in the 
royal counties of the southern marches were increasingly in demand. This 
development was not without its effect. A long list of Romanian kenezes in 
Temes, Krass6 and Hunyad counties were raised to noble rank, and by the 
end of the fifteenth century they had become members of the national no­
bility. It is no coincidence that the mass ennoblement of the kenezes is linked 
particularly with the name of J&nos Hunyadi: having been brought up in its 
midst, he well understood this stratum's desire to rise. The first Transylva­
nian voivode to hold both the voivodeship and the post of ispdn of the 
Szekelys, Hunyadi naturally had a great many Hungarian fam iliares; but 
many Romanian kenezes also joined his retinue, and it is understandable 
that it was these expressly personal followers of the powerful governor who 
primarily enjoyed his favours. The later brilliant careers of several Roma­
nian kenez families started in Hunyadi's service; for example, those of the 
Nadasdi Ungor, the Malomvizi Kenderesi, the Kendeffy and the Csulai fami­
lies of Hunyad county, and the Csomai, Bizerei, Mutnoki, Temeseli D£si 
and Macsk£si families in SzOreny county. In the fifteenth century in Hunyad 
county along the number of new Romanian noble families descended from 
the kenezes of the royal district of H&tszeg — the Bajesdi, Barb&tvizi, B&ri, 
Brettyei, Csolnokosi, Farkadini, Fejervizi, Galaci, Karulyosdi, Kemyesti, Klo- 
potivai, Lindzsinai, Liv£di, Macesdi, Oncsokfalvi, Osztr6i, Pestenyi, Ponori, 
Puji, Riusori, Szacsali, Szentpeterfalvi, Szilv^si, Totesdi, V£di, V&rhelyi and 
Zejk&nyi families — was nothing short of the number of Hungarian petty 
nobles in any county. Some of these kenez families acquired large estates 
with several villages — for example, the Sz£llaspataki family and the Muzsi- 
nas of Demsus. Hunyadi's mother probably came from the latter family. 
Titles of nobility and lands were granted also to the voivodes of Sebesvar in 
Kolozs county, to the ancestors of the Meregjoi Botos, Kalotai Vajda, Csicsei 
Vajda and Danki Vajda families, and to the Lupsai Kendes in Feher county. 
The legal status of the Romanian ruling elements in the Fogaras region in 
the second half of the fourteenth century and at the beginning of the fif­
teenth, was regulated still by the voivodes of Wallachia, who at that time 
held the area as a feudal grant from the king of Hungary. Here, therefore, 
the social stratum equivalent to the kenezes was described by the originally 
Bulgar term "boyar" which was used for the nobility of Wallachia. The boyars 
of Fogaras were rewarded for their services with approximately the same 
level of nobility as the noble kenezes of the other royal counties, except that 
their services were greater. However, several families from among them 
rose to the ranks of the real nobility, as, for example, the Majl^th family 
which played such an important role from the sixteenth century on.
Naturally, the Romanian nobles not only acquired the titles of the Hun­
garian nobility, but also adopted their entire legal system, administrative 
framework, institutions and way of life. In M&ramaros, as we have seen, a 
county system evolved which corresponded exactly to the Hungarian, and 
in the second half of the fifteenth century, the kenez law -court of the
TemeskOz districts developed into a typical county law-court, and the 
kraynik, the official who prepared and administered the sentences, gradu­
ally took on the role of aszolgabiro. A similar process occurred in the H&tszeg 
area. In the fourteenth century it was still the royal captain who convened 
the assembly of the kenezes and his authority dominated the agenda. By 
the first half of the fifteenth century, however, the kenezes collectively passed 
judgement or issued charters without his authorization — that is, they prac­
tised self-government similar to that of the nobles. In time, however, since 
Hunyad county had an established Hungarian nobility and, therefore, a 
noble law-court, the Romanian nobles adapted themselves to the existing 
framework, and the keneze s' law-court ceased to exist.
Not all the ennobled Romanian kenezes converted to Catholicism. In Mara­
maros a considerable number stayed Greek Orthodox. In Hatszeg, churches 
were still built in the Transylvanian Gothic style in the fifteenth century, 
but they were Greek Orthodox churches decorated with Byzantine orna­
ments and religious inscriptions in Slavonic, and their priests were from 
kenez families.
In the second half of the fifteenth century, the kings raised Romanians to 
confidential posts and high public offices with no objection from the Hun­
garian nobles although they, by then, had a strong sense of national iden­
tity. The highly responsible post of ban of Szoreny was held by Mih&ly Csor- 
nai between 1447 and 1454, by Istvan and Mihdly Mutnoki between 1467 
and 1469, and by P6ter Macskdsi at the end of the fifteenth century. J£nos 
Malomvizi Kenderesi, Mih^ly Pestenyi, and later Peter Temeseli Desi were 
ispdns of MSramaros and Bereg counties. Jdnos N^dasdi Ungor, whose fa­
ther had taught J£nos Hunyadi the art of warfare, was one of King Matthias' 
favourites: through his wife, who was from the Lendvai Banffys, he was 
related to the oldest aristocratic families of the country; and because of his 
talents as a talented military commander, he acquired huge grants of land. 
The career of the H£tszegi Csulais is also typical. Of the seven sons of the 
ennobled small landowning kenez Vlad Csulai, five reached high public of­
fice: L&szl6 Ficsor became ban of Jajca, later of Szoreny; Mikl6s Kende be­
came ban of Sabac, Gyorgy M6re ban of Szoreny and N£ndorfeherv£r, janos 
B&ncsa captain of Balvanyos, and Fiilop More bishop of Pecs. Their wives 
came from Hungarian aristocratic families such as the Bethlen, Haranglabi 
and D6czi families.
The Towns and the Saxon Autonomy
Urban development played an essential role in the evolution of the Age of 
the Estates in feudal Europe, since it was by relying on the towns that the 
monarchs were able to counterbalance the political influence of the aristoc­
racy. In Transylvania, in addition to other peculiarities, it was especially 
notable that urban development took place mainly within the political frame­
work of the Saxon Nation and under its effective protection. The successful 
economic policy of the Anjou kings, the boom in mining and the cattle trade 
in Hungary, the introduction of a stable gold currency, and increased trade
with neighbouring countries also stimulated the development of the Transyl­
vanian towns. The fruits of this were primarily enjoyed by Saxon villages 
which grew into craft and trade centres, that is, into towns. The three big 
Saxon centres, Szeben, Brass6 and Beszterce, were far ahead of the Hungar­
ian towns (Des, Torda and Gyulafehervar), the Szekely centres (Maros- 
v&s&rhely, Udvarhely, Sepsiszentgyorgy, etc.), and even of other Saxon towns 
such as Szdszsebes, Medgyes, Segesv&r, and Sz&szv^ros primarily because 
they dominated the passes leading to the Romanian voivodates. Some of 
the smaller Szekely towns also lay near the border, but the Szekelys' mili­
tary way of life inhibited the early rise of a professional merchant stratum 
in society; by the time mercantile development started among them, the 
leading role of the Saxons was assured.
Only Kolozsv&r, with its mixed Hungarian-German population, was able 
to compete with them. Since it lay on the crossroads of commercial routes 
from the rest of Hungary to Transylvania, Kolozsv&r controlled their traf­
fic; and its originally German inhabitants, leading at first a noble-peasant 
way of life, played an important part in the evolution of Transylvania's 
urban burgher economy and society. Already in the second half of the four­
teenth century, the trades and crafts flourishing in Kolozsv&r, combined 
with the attractions of civic freedom, lured the Hungarian serf population 
of the surrounding area to move into the town. German craftsmen from the 
Szaszfold and from the German states also settled in the town, although in 
much smaller numbers. They became the leaders of the guild-based crafts­
men — which meant that those involved in foreign trade now demanded 
their part in the administration of the town alongside the proprietor-trader 
patricians. This rising social group had no ambition to acquire land and 
was consciously German, a quality which the old civic aristocracy, with its 
noble-military aspirations, lacked. Thus established, German particularism 
undermined the earlier ethnic understanding: the new burghers, with the 
support of the king, began to oust the old elite families from power (1405) 
and the struggle for leadership in Kolozsvar turned into a conflict between 
Hungarians and Saxons. Temporarily the Saxons dominated the scene; how­
ever, by 1458 the Hungarians, who already outnumbered them, achieved, 
with the support of the central government, that the offices of judge and 
councillors be shared equally. From then on, although the contract guaran­
teeing this arrangement was conscientiously adhered to by both parties for 
centuries, natural increase favoured the Hungarians: the Saxons gradually 
diminished in number, and by the beginning of early modern times the 
majority of Kolozsv&r's population was Hungarian.
By the fifteenth century Des, Torda and Gyulafeh£rvcir were already en­
tirely Hungarian towns. Their German population must have been very 
small even initially, and when Hungarian peasants from the neighbouring 
areas started to pour into the towns at the end of the fourteenth century, the 
German townsmen were absorbed by the Hungarian majority. A similar 
fate was in store for the German populations of the Hungarian mining towns 
of Szek, Kolozs, Abrudb^nya, Zalatna, Offenb£nya, Torocko, and for the 
Hungarian populations of Saxon towns. For example, in Sz£szsebes only 
one street, called "Szekely", has preserved the memory of the Hungarians 
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the considerable growth of trade and craft activities in the Hungarian vil­
lages: in fifteenth century registers, a considerable number of serf families 
appear under names denoting various handicrafts. This indicates that the 
serfs who moved into towns already had their basic craft skills. Thus, be­
sides the German citizens, there were also large groups of Hungarians in 
the late mediaeval towns of Transylvania. Romanians, however, did not 
play a role in the development of Transylvanian towns.
One of the major incentives for the growth of Transylvanian towns was 
the lively trade with the two Romanian voivodates. Although the Hungar­
ian royai authority became weaker in the territories beyond the Carpathians, 
it still exerted considerable influence. Under royal protection, the two Ro­
manian voivodates, which were rich in raw materials, opened up to Transyl­
vanian merchants. In the late Middle Ages, the voivodates were still at an 
early stage of their development and were still suffering from organiza­
tional difficulties — for example the first church was not built in Wallachia 
until the beginning of the fourteenth century —, and the population badly 
needed the Transylvanian merchants to exchange Romanian products for 
western goods. King Louis I's economic policy, which aimed to re-establish 
the old Eastern trade routes leading through the country (Eastern trade had 
been bypassing Hungary for several hundred years), also fostered Saxon 
trade. In 1369 the king granted Brass6 a staple right which obliged Polish 
and German merchants on their way to Wallachia to sell their most sought- 
after merchandise, broadcloth, to the tradesmen of Brass6: the latter were 
now able to resell the goods in Wallachia. In the same way, foreign mer­
chants were obliged to trade on the Brass6 market the merchandise, agri­
cultural produce or livestock which they had bought in Wallachia. In 1378 
Szeben received the same rights over the international trade route passing 
through the town; Beszterce had already gained control over the Polish route 
through Moldavia in 1368.'
Initially, however, this lively commercial traffic took up not Saxon, but 
western European products, particularly textile goods, since the Saxons had 
scarcely developed any market-oriented craft activities by the fourteenth 
century. Saxon merchants did not have a very active role in actual export­
ing, but, relying on their staple rights, sold the acquired goods in their town 
markets to Balkan merchants and bought up their merchandise in return. 
This is not surprising, as this was common practice even for Viennese mer­
chants in the Middle Ages: their staple right ensured that their transactions 
also were carried out locally. Saxon tradesmen seldom went east, except 
perhaps to the Romanian voivodates in order to arrange some important or 
delicate business; on rare occasions did they venture any further. They pre­
ferred to go to western, particularly to German cities, especially after King 
Louis exempted them from the staple right of Buda. They took produce 
from Wallachia and Moldavia, and brought back cloth and spices. Of their 
two usual routes the first went through Kassa to Bohemia and Poland, and 
finally to Danzig; the other through Buda, and from there, either to Vienna- 
Regensburg-Basel or to Zara and Venice.
Saxon handicrafts started to take advantage of the great economic boom 
only fairly late. Guilds appeared throughout Transylvania in the mid-four- 
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the Saxons, he re-established the guilds in 1376 and issued new regula­
tions for their operation. The large number of guilds at the time (nineteen 
guilds comprising twenty-five types of activity) is quite misleading. It cer­
tainly does not add up to a large quantity of goods produced, for there is no 
indication of quantity control in contemporary regulations. Limits on the 
quantity each guild member could produce appeared in charters of incor­
poration only later, when the guilds started to be market- and even export- 
oriented. This change took place in the fifteenth century, and thereafter the 
products of Transylvanian tradesmen and craftsmen also found their way 
to the east. Trades and crafts developed at such a pace that we can find 
guilds with over a hundred members even in villages. The range of mer­
chandise exported to the Romanian voivodates became wider and wider, 
as is indicated by fifteenth-century customs regulations listing ready-made 
clothes, pots and pans, knives, weapons, semi-finished metal articles, spices, 
jewellery, parchment, paper, carts and even dried fruit and confectionery.
However, the type of goods imported from the voivodates remained un­
changed: produce, not so much agricultural produce as the products of ani­
mal husbandry: livestock, hide, wax, honey and, less frequently, cereals.
The new patricians of the Saxon towns who had risen to a leading role 
through commerce were, like the gerebs, a narrow social stratum consisting 
of a few families only, and they clung to their power no less jealously. Their 
authority was challenged by burghers involved in the trades and crafts at 
the end of the fifteenth century, but not with much success. The result of the 
movement was the establishment of the so-called "Body of a Hundred" (Hun- 
dertmannschaft, 1495), which had already been operating in towns in the rest 
of Hungary and in Kolozsv&r. Although this institution also represented 
the guilds, its members were appointed by the city council consisting of 
patricians only, and thus the guilds remained in a rather dependent posi­
tion. The Saxon commonality of the towns felt increasingly oppressed, and 
rose against the town leadership in 1511 in Segesv&r, and in 1513 in Szeben. 
Disgruntled peasants murdered the mayor of Segesv£r in 1520. However, 
neither the urban lower middle class nor the village peasantry were able to 
break the authority of the new elite; after a temporary advancement of the 
lesser nobility, the upper strata of society again gained the upper hand and 
with it, royal support throughout the country. As the fate of the serfs and 
the common Szekelys took a turn for the worse, so did the political and 
economic dependence of the common Saxon citizens on the patricians grow.
The new Saxon social order was built on the primacy of the towns. The 
Saxon peasantry not only suffered from the oppressive power of the patri­
cian community leaders, but also experienced the economic pressure that 
the towns put on the villages. Even the lower classes of the towns were 
ahead of the peasantry. The centres of the autonomous districts systemati­
cally hindered the development of the other settlements under their au­
thority, and above all maintained their exclusive right to hold fairs and 
markets. Brassb foiled Foldv&r's attempts to hold their own weekly market 
in 1378, Nagysink prevented Szent^gota from the same in 1379, and Segesv£r 
obstructed Henndorf in 1428. Later, town guilds also extended their power 
to village guilds by granting town guild masters supervisory rights over 
village handicrafts. 234
The Saxon notion of equality before the law could not, thus, manifest 
itself reality. But the Saxon peasant was still in an incomparably better posi­
tion than his counterpart in the noble counties or the poor Szekely com­
moner. This was due particularly to the fact that Saxon society had become 
gradually demilitarized after the gerebs had moved into the counties, and 
thus the danger of developing the noble-serf social duality disappeared.
The shift from the noble-peasant pattern to the burgher-peasant one was 
accompanied by the evolution of Saxon ethnic self-consciousness. The Saxon 
middle class displayed the same exclusive and enthusiastic ethnic bias as 
the Hungarian nobility of the late Middle Ages. The first practical manifes­
tation of the new attitude was the exclusion of alien elements from Saxon 
towns and guilds. The first known measure of this kind was taken by the 
Council of Szeben in 1474: they ruled that the Dominican monastery which 
had been built in the suburb would be allowed to move within the walls 
only if the majority of the monks were German. This continuously strength­
ening self-awareness of the Saxon middle class and the rising German eth­
nic consciousness of the whole of Saxon society was encouraged and almost 
institutionalized by the kings who, from the beginning of the fifteenth cen­
tury, granted more and more Saxon seats the right to freely elect their own 
chief justices. The process was completed by King Matthias. In 1469 he 
granted all the seats this right, and in 1486, joined all the Saxon seats and 
the districts of Beszterce and Brass6 in the Saxon University (universitas 
Saxonum), entrusting its leadership to the ispan of the Saxons — who, in 
fact, was the elected mayor of Szeben — in his new capacity as count of the 
Saxons (comes Saxonum).
The Szekely Fight for Freedom and 
Gyorgy Szekely's Peasant War
During the reign of King Matthias, Transylvania enjoyed the return of the 
prosperity which had characterised the Anjou period. After the 1467 rebel­
lion, the king selected his voivodes carefully. From 1470, the number of 
deeds issued by the voivodes in connection with Transylvanian matters 
increased perceptibly, which indicates that they could no longer regard their 
office as a mere title or source of income, but had to attend to their duties in 
person. Under the kings of the House of Jagiello, Wladislas II and Louis II, 
however, the development of the feudal state was accompanied by party 
struggles causing serious disturbances in the whole country. The oft-repeated 
Turkish attacks, the rivalry between various aristocratic cliques — in which 
the lesser nobility sometimes had only a subordinate role, but sometimes 
took part as an independent force —, and finally Gyorgy (D6zsa) Szekely's 
peasant war, were all signs of disintegration. In 1493 Transylvania suffered 
two Turkish attacks which mainly affected Saxon areas, and its internal 
peace was disturbed by Saxon and Szekely movements.
The defeat of the peasant war of 1437 suppressed the peasants' open 
struggle for a long time to come. The centre of social unrest was transferred 
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and the related mercenary army system, the traditional way of life of the 
free Sz£kely peasantry came to a point of crisis. Since their urban develop­
ment was rather slow, free Szekely peasants had no option to being drawn 
into feudal dependence — unlike their Saxon counterparts, who produced 
for the market —, and the demand for up-to-date and permanent fighting 
units made it impossible for every Szekely to do military service. The grow­
ing disparity of wealth excluded more and more people from actually exer­
cising their Szekely liberties. The land once held in common by the commu­
nity had gradually became divided into smaller and smaller units, and thus 
the majority of the prolific Szekely families became dwarf-holders. In order 
to secure their living, vast numbers of them entered the service of their 
more prosperous fellow Szekelys.
The leaders of Szekely society who owned land both in the SzekelyfOld 
and in the counties would have liked to see their lands in the SzekelyfOld 
worked by underlings as completely dependent as the serfs on their estates 
in the counties. To this end, the landowners attempted to change the volun­
tary contractual relationship existing in the Szekelyfold into a form of feu­
dal tenure, and impose their economic and judicial authority on the free 
Szekelys working on their estates. These violations of civil rights occurred 
with increasing frequency, and led to revolts by the mid-fifteenth century: 
the commoners attacked their superiors and tried to regain their freedom 
by force of arms. Since Szekelys who were reduced to serfdom no longer 
rendered military service, the central authorities intervened in the interest 
of maintaining an adequate supply of potential soldiers. J£nos Hunyadi in­
troduced measures supporting the Szekely commoners against their nota­
bles first as governor in 1446 and then as voivode of Transylvania in 1453. 
His son, King Matthias, continued to make similar efforts. In 1466 the king 
instructed the voivode of Transylvania who was also ispan of the Szekelys 
to call an assembly in Zabola for the Transylvanian nobles and the elders of 
the Szekelys in order that on the basis of their testimony, the Szekelys' liber­
ties were written down. By the ruling issued at this meeting, common 
Szekelys were not to be forced into servitude; what work the commoners 
did for the notables was to be done voluntarily. The Szekely commonality, 
for their part, tried to make use of the Zabola assembly in influencing pub­
lic administration and justice: it was declared that two-thirds of the jurors 
in the law-courts of the Szekely seats should be elected from among them. 
However, the captains of the seats — or to use the term current by then, the 
hadnagys (lieutenants) — and the justices continued to be elected according 
to ancient Szekely custom from among the wealthy families. The central 
power — initially only in a supervisory role — was now represented by a 
new office holder appointed by the ispan of the Szekelys. He was called the 
kiralybiro  or Konigsrichter (iudex regius).
However, the settlement of 1466 did not prove to be stable: the theoreti­
cal freedom of the common Szekelys did not yet provide them with the 
material means to undertake military service. By then, the majority of them 
had not the means even to take part in the light cavalry, and so, in 1473, the 
king issued a new decree in which the existing social stratification was for­
mally recognized. Those Szekelys who were able to supply at least three 
mounted mercenaries or armed retainers belonged to the high-ranking
prim ores; those who performed mounted military service in person formed 
the class of lofo or prim ipilus class; and the majority, the free commoners of 
pixidarii fought as foot-soldiers. This last measure legally reduced to servi­
tude those who were unable to finance themselves even as foot-soldiers. As 
for the differentiation of the lofo group from the commoners, this had the 
result that office holders and jurors were thereafter chosen only from the 
two upper strata, while the lowest, the pixidarii, was soon completely ex­
cluded from public life.
The Szekely crisis entered a new stage with acts of violence by theprim ores  
and the prim ipili against the commoner. In the background were events that 
were affecting all of Hungary: at the beginning of the sixteenth century, 
diets were held with increasing frequency, and they were attended by large 
numbers of the lower nobility who carried arms and intervened or appeared 
to intervene in the county's affairs. The waves of this movement reached 
Transylvania also, and encouraged the rebellious soldiering Szekely com­
moners to take an even more determined stand against those of higher sta­
tus among them. In 1505 they held their assembly in Udvarhely and in 1506 
at Agyagfalva without royal summons or the participation of a royal repre­
sentative. The Diet's meetings which occurred at the same time on the field 
of Rakos, were no match for it in sabre-rattling and high-sounding rhetoric 
during debates. Rigorous judgement was passed on those who had vio­
lated the Szekely liberties, and the equality of all Szekelys was reiterated — 
this time, of course, only for the commoners.
Szekely self-consciousness had reached a height previously unknown. 
From the thirteenth century, the Szekelys had been regarded as the descend­
ants of Attila the Hun's people who had found shelter in Transylvania when 
the Hunnish Empire disintegrated. This tradition became more and more 
widespread, and by the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries it had 
gained political significance. Their sense of having descended from the leg­
endary Huns not only filled common Szekelys with pride and the convic­
tion that it was they who had best preserved the szittya (Scythian) military 
virtues of the Hun-Hungarian kindred people, but also provided the ideol­
ogy they needed to back the privileges they demanded as their due. The 
Hungarian lesser nobility also admired the szittya ancestors, and were en­
couraged to do so by the ancient chronicles which were then appearing in 
various adaptations — one of these, the first book printed in Hungary, had 
been widely read since 1473 — which presented the Hungarians and the 
Huns as the same people. This romantic adulation of the Huns, which was 
the strongest element of the Hungarian nobility's self-awareness towards 
the end of the Middle Ages, placed the Szekelys in the centre of interest, 
and readily accepted their claim to priority.
The sense of outraged self-esteem among the Szekelys was near the boil­
ing point when in 1506 the king ordered that according to the ancient Szekely 
custom called dkorsiites, that is the branding the oxen for the king's use, the 
tax in oxen be collected on the occasion of his son's birth. The soldiering 
Szekely commoners, who regarded themselves as nobles, were outraged by 
this attempt at taxation; the nobility had not paid taxes in Hungary for gen­
erations. The tax on their cattle also imposed a heavy financial burden on 
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pride, led them to revolt. P&l Tomori, captain of Fogaras, was sent out to 
restore order, but he lost the battle and fled to his castle, himself injured; 
the uprising was suppressed only after the involvement of further royal 
troops. Since the Saxons of Szeben participated in the crushing of the Szekely 
rebellion, the Szekelys launched an attack on them the following year under 
the leadership of Gyorgy Makfalvi D6zsa. He is often identified with Gyorgy 
Szekely, who acquired eternal fame as the commander of the 1514 Hungar­
ian peasant war.
These rearguard fights for Szekely liberties, however, did not last long. 
In 1510, the king was pressed by the nobles to appoint the twenty-four year 
old Janos Szapolyai, the nobility's much admired candidate for the throne, 
voivode of Transylvania. This powerful magnate, the patron, in actual fact 
the exploiter of the nobility on the national political scene, was as much of a 
tyrant to Transylvania as his predecessors. The Szekelys soon learnt the 
enormous difference between political slogans and real life. The common 
Szekelys who rose against the arbitrary measures of the ispan of the Szekelys 
were routed by Szapolyai himself in 1519. In order to bring them to their 
senses, he also confiscated the rebels' properties for the royal treasury, al­
though by law the "Szekely inheritance" was not be transferred to the king 
even in case of treason but was to devolve on the relatives. Szapolyai's mea­
sures meant a new turning point in Szekely history. Thereafter, the central 
power consciously aimed at restricting Szekely privileges, a policy which 
forced the soldiering Szekely commoners to constant resistance for centu­
ries to come.
The Szekely commoners, unlike the peasants, fought for the recognition 
of their noble rights, rather than against their noble oppressors. Thus Gyorgy 
Szekely (D6zsa), who came from the marches of the Lower Danube to lead 
the 1514 anti-feudal uprising of the peasantry originally assembled to go on 
a crusade, was an exception. To the best of our knowledge, no other Szekely 
soldier, apart from his brother, joined the peasants. Although the waves of 
the peasant war which started in the Great Hungarian Plain reached Transyl­
vania also, they did not affect the Szekelyfold, but primarily the storm cen­
tres of 1437. Here noble manor houses again went up in flames, and two 
boroughs, D6s and Torda, joined the uprising. The peasant troops coming 
from the Great Hungarian Plain also roused the mining area of Abrudbanya, 
Zalatna and Torock6. The voivode, however, guarded feudal interests well. 
His men suppressed the movement everywhere, and Szapolyai himself set 
out with his troops for the south, on the information that D6zsa was lead­
ing the main army of the peasants into Transylvania. On the way, he called 
an assembly of the Three Nations to meet at Deva on 18 June; it was there 
that he learned that D6zsa turned towards Temesv&r. Therefore he also 
moved his troops in that direction.
In the meantime, Dozsa's deputy, Friar Lorinc, who was occupying Varad, 
started a deflecting manoeuvre against Kolozsv^r to engage the nobility's 
forces. The town council of Kolozsv&r did not intend to jeopardize their 
position again as they had in Antal Budai Nagy's time, but did not dare to 
resist the rebels either. The town's mayor, Jcinos Kalmar, devised an inter­
mediate solution: the officers of the peasant army were allowed to enter the 
town fortifications, but the troops had to set up camp on the open fields
outside the walls. It was there that Lenard Barlab&ssy, the vice-voivode, 
attacked them, but was defeated. Meanwhile, however, the town's guards, 
on Kalm&r's orders, assassinated the peasant officers within the town. Friar 
L6rinc, who had been left outside, thus lost his rear guard, and had to lead 
his troops out of Transylvania. By that time, the peasant war was already 
approaching its tragic end elsewhere. The outcome affected the fate of 
Transylvania only indirectly.
Gothic and Renaissance Culture in Transylvania
The early elements of Gothic architecture showing considerable French in­
fluence were spread throughout Transylvania by the masons from the ca­
thedral in Gyulafehervdr and the abbey in Kerc built in the first half of the 
thirteenth century. Following the example of these two centres, rose win­
dows, recessed portals with lance arches and polygonal chancels appeared 
in refurbished or newly-built Hungarian and Saxon churches in the second 
half of the thirteenth century.
Gothic architecture reached its peak due to the requirements of the highly 
popular mendicant orders, who claimed that the church should serve as a 
unified space for preaching. First they built churches with a single nave, 
and from  the second half of the fifteenth century buildings in which the 
nave, the two aisles and the chancel were all of the same height. This meant 
that instead of using cross vaulting, they had to introduce net vaulting, 
which embraced the entire inner space of the church without, however, 
breaking the soaring Gothic arches: the ceiling is not oppressive, but sug­
gests infinity by seeming to float boundless in the air. The mendicant orders 
settled in the towns, thus their influence on parish churches was also con­
siderable. In fact, some parish churches were the finest examples of mature 
Gothic architecture. In the middle of the fourteenth century, when Transyl­
vania experienced the first big wave of urban development the material 
possibilities and artistic demands brought Gothic art to its full glory.
The nave of the church in Szeben is already of this high Gothic style, 
though the lower vaulting in the aisles had preserved the basilica tradition. 
In other places, though, the aisles were raised to the height of the nave, as in 
the mountain church of Segesvar or the church at Sz&szsebes. The latter is 
particularly noteworthy for its rich typically high Gothic sculptural orna­
ments. The Anjou coat of arms there, the statues of kings, and the generally 
high standard of three-dimensional work suggest the influence, if not the 
direct influence, of the royal court. In Transylvania the most outstanding 
architectural achievement of mature Gothic art is the parish church of Saint 
Michael in KolozsvSr, which was originally started as a basilica with a nave 
and two lower aisles, but towards the end of the fourteenth century the 
plans were altered, and it was completed with the nave and aisles of equal 
height. Its style was heavily influenced by the cathedral in Kassa, which 
disseminated the values of a flourishing south German architecture. With 
its impressive spaciousness, excellent vaulting and richly ornamentation, 
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to the sky, the church of Saint Michael in Kolozsvar is a worthy symbol of 
Kolozsv&r, this real centre of Transylvania's economic and intellectual life, 
and of the most fertile soil for Hungarian-Saxon co-existence.
While ecclesiastic architecture in Kolozsvar followed German patterns, 
painting and sculpture, which also served religious functions, looked to­
wards Italy. This cannot be attributed only to the Anjou kings' close ties 
with Italy, but also to the fact that the Hungarian artists of Kolozsvar — 
unlike their peers in the Sz&szfold — were drawn to the dynamism of Flor­
ence and Siena, to late Gothic and early Renaissance art which had aban­
doned rigid Byzantine forms, and depicted the world in a more vivid, natu­
ralistic and above all, more emotional, way. Research in art history gives 
reason to suppose that around Mikl6s Kolozsv&ri, the only painter of the 
period known by name, at least four painters formed a (probably Hungar­
ian) school of painting. Their works show individually identifiable charac­
teristics and can be found in Magyarfenes, Almaker£k, Marosszentanna and 
Barcaszentpeter. The frescos of the first two churches are usually attributed 
to Mikl6s Kolozsvdri, whereas the fresco in Marosszentanna, which shows 
a Mongoloid-faced Madonna holding an oriental-looking baby Jesus dressed 
in local clothes, is thought to be the work of another highly talented master.
Mikl6s Kolozsvari's gifted sons, Merton and Gy Orgy, created a whole se­
ries of statues which are part of the European tradition of early Renaissance 
art, such as the Saint George statue in Prague, the statues of Hungary's 
canonized kings in Varad which were destroyed in the seventeenth cen­
tury, and a former, now lost version of the Saint Ladislas Herm presently to 
be found in Gy6r. Art historians used to suppose the direct influence of 
Italian masters on these works; however, recent opinion assigns their fea­
tures to the internal strengthening and self-realization of eastern-central Eu­
ropean art which also absorbed Italian influences.
This period — judging also by the roughly simultaneous establishment 
of a number of eastern-central European universities — was indeed an era 
of cultural prosperity, a prosperity based on political and econom ic 
stabilization. It was an era when Hungary was not on the periphery of Eu­
rope, but within the immediate reach of Venice and the south German re­
gions which were already developing an early capitalist economy. This gen­
eral prosperity attained its peak at the turn of the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries, and brought Kolozsvar's leading role in Transylvanian art to frui­
tion. Tam£s Kolozsv^ri painted the most beautiful Hungarian triptych of 
the century for Garamszentbenedek in 1427: its pictures, which depict the 
Calvary and the miracles of Saint Nicholas and provide abundant illustra­
tion of the material culture of the time, combine the best traditions of the 
Italian trecento and Burgundian-Dutch Gothic in a new light. As, however, 
the Transylvania of the time was a culture of many colours it is not surpris­
ing that in the immediate vicinity of western-inspired "m odern" works of 
art one can find a whole range of churches in the Szekelyfold with old- 
fashioned frescos showing oriental, Byzantine stylistic features. These fres­
cos, embodying the frontier-guard mentality of the Szekelys, represent the 
legend of Saint Ladislas' struggle with the pagans in naive, strongly local 
colours. According to some art historians, these frescos combine the mi­
raculous deeds of the Holy Knight with motifs from heroic epics of eastern 240
24. Detail of a pietA of the Lutheran church at Nagyszeben, around 1400
25. The interior of the nave of the Saint Michael church at Kolozsvdr, 1430s
26. Fresco by J&nos Rozsnyai in the sanctuary of the Lutheran church at Nagyszeben, 1445 ►
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28. View of Vajdahunyad castle from the southeast. Pen-and-ink drawing and watercolour, 1735
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33. Romanian church frescoes: 1. St. Stephen, St. Ladislas and St. Imre, Kristyor; 2. Vladislav and AH 
church founders, Ribice; 3. Balea, his wife Vi^e and his son £tefan, church founders, Kristyor (15th cel
nomadic peoples. The frescos of Bogoz and Gelence, depict opposite to the 
legend of Saint Ladislas events in the life of Saint Margaret of Antioch, and 
the Last Judgement. The legend of Saint Margaret presented in a Byzantine 
style later re-appeared in frescos in other Szekely churches — undated in 
Maksa, Csfkszentmih£Iy, ErdSfiile, Bibarcfalva, Homor6dszentm&rton, and 
Sepsibesenyd; from the end of the fifteenth century in Sepsikilyen — with 
such frequency that for some time they were believed to be copies of a fresco 
in V3rad. Today, art historians tend to think that these off-repeated ele­
ments served as the illustration of a wide spread oral tradition.
The: most significant example of Saxon art is the so-called Black Church 
in Brass6 which started to be built at the end of the fourteenth century and 
was completed in the fifteenth century. It bears certain similarities to the 
cathedral in Kassa, of a style transmitted by KolozsvSr, but modified ac­
cording to local taste. It is a huge and impressive building with an air of 
authority. Eighty-nine metres long, it is one of the largest Gothic churches 
not only in Transylvania, but also in whole eastern-central Europe. The or­
namentation of the church is late Gothic, and of a date contemporary with 
the spread of the triptych in Transylvania which started from the Szaszfold 
and influenced the Szekelyfold as well. Of the 1,981 fourteenth to sixteenth- 
century triptyches surviving in Hungary, 324 were painted in Transylva­
nia, including the one in Csikmenasag from 1543, the latest known to date. 
Some of the most beautiful were painted for the churches of Segesv&r, 
Medgyes and Sz£szsebes; it was under their influence that Gothic fresco 
painting revived in the middle of the fifteenth century. Outstanding exam­
ples of this are the fresco of the Calvary painted by Janos Rozsnyai of Szeben 
in 1445, and another representation of the same theme in the southwestern 
chapel of the parish church in Kolozsv&r.
Secular architecture and painting did not produce significant works of 
art in Transylvania until the fifteenth century. The castles of the great land­
owners, of which five were commissioned by the Losonci B^nffys or granted 
to them by the king, were rather gloomy, plain buildings. By the middle of 
the fifteenth century, however, the Gothic-ornamented castle of Vajdahunyad 
was already standing, the walls of which King Matthias made decorate with 
elegant Renaissance court scenes — according to some, the frescos depicted 
the Raven-legend of the Hunyadi family. The first Gothic burghers' houses, 
among them King Matthias's birthplace in Kolozsvar, were built in Transyl­
vanian towns also in this period.
During the fifteenth century, Saxon, and later the Szekely churches of 
Csfk, were fortified against possible Turkish attacks, which gave Transyl­
vanian architecture a distinctive appearance unique in the whole of Hun­
gary. Particularly picturesque are the ones which had their chancel raised 
by one or two storeys. These were equipped with ambulatories, loopholes, 
and holes through which tar could be poured on the enemy. Thus the chan­
cel, rising high above the roof, appears to be a second tower opposite the 
real one built with the same features. Of 230 Saxon churches between the 
Maros, Kis-Kiikiill<5, Olt and Homor6d rivers, thirty are like this. The north­
ernmost one is in Sz&szbog&cs and than Bolk&cs, Buzd, Nagydisznbd, M&r- 
tonhegy, Nagysink, Szaszfeheregyh^za, Magyarkapus, Berethalom and Ecel 
encircle the area where these peculiar buildings can be found. Almost all of
them were surrounded also by a separate wall with bastions. In the major­
ity of cases, however, the church itself did not undergo alteration, but was 
surrounded by a fortification which had store rooms on the inside with 
ambulatories and loopholes above. It was some time later, when Turkish 
attacks were expected from the direction of Moldavia also, that the fortifi­
cation of Szekely churches in the Cslk district began as well, for example in 
Csikkarcfalva and Csikrakos, in typically local styles.
The end of the fifteenth century was again a period when churches of the 
mendicant orders and parish churches of smaller towns were built. The 
hall-like churches of Torda, Des and Kolozsv&r (Farkas Street) show char­
acteristics similar to the churches of Debrecen, Nyirb&tor and Szeged: they 
all represent a late Gothic style specific to eastern Hungary. We find late 
Gothic motifs side by side with the ornamentation of the Tuscan Renais­
sance in the earliest painted ceilings: the one in Goganv&ralja, which was 
started in 1503, and the slightly later one in Szekelydalya. The high art of 
the Italian and southern German Renaissance is represented in the Laz6i 
Chapel in Gyulafehervdr and in the door of the vestry in the parish church 
o f  Kolozsv&r commissioned by the vicar, Johan Klein. In these works, Tran­
sylvanian art stepped into the Renaissance, which really started to flourish 
only in the sixteenth century.
The most important achievement of fifteenth century Transylvanian cul­
ture was, however, the spread of the vernacular. In this, the leading role 
was taken by the Saxons, who had maintained continuous links with their 
motherland and with the German intellectuals who already corresponded 
in their native tongue. Nevertheless, the Saxon patricians and civic office 
holders usually learnt Hungarian also besides Latin, as is indicated by a 
fourteenth-century Latin-Hungarian word list from Beszterce. The earliest 
extant document in the Hungarian language from Transylvania is the will 
of a nobleman, J&nos Rodi Cseh of Kolozs county, written in his own hand 
in 1507. It was also he who drafted the first document issued by a county in 
Hungarian in 1508. By this time, religious texts were often translated from 
Latin into Hungarian for nuns of the mendicant orders and for their associ­
ates. The traditions, however, of religious literature written in the vernacu­
lar in Hungary go back to the Hussites. The first translations of the Bible 
into Hungarian were made in the 1430s by Hussite priests who had been 
driven from Hungary to Moldavia. Stories from the Bible and legends of 
the saints translated into Hungarian by literate members of the mendicant 
orders have survived in the so-called Teleki, Szekelyudvarhelyi and Laz£r 
codices.
The Romanians who lived in Hungary were ahead of the voivodates 
across to the Carpathians in starting to use their mother tongue in writing 
already in the sixteenth century. The first Romanian manuscripts, transla­
tions of Orthodox Slavonic texts, were written in the Kortvelyes monastery 
in Maramaros. It has an interesting history. At the end of the fifteenth cen­
tury, the Ruthenian bishop of Munkdcs made an attempt to draw the mon­
astery under his authority. The Romanian nobles of M&ramaros, who op­
posed this plan, turned for help to Bertalan Dr&gffy, the voivode of Transyl­
vania at the time. Although Drdgffy's family had previously converted to 
Catholicism, he was, nevertheless, the monastery's patron. He put an end 242
to the dispute by placing it under the auspices of the Roman Catholic bishop 
of Transylvania. Although no formal union was ever declared between the 
two churches, the Greek Orthodox monks of KOrtvelyes had to yield to the 
Roman Catholics on major dogmatic issues. For instance, the Psalter trans­
lated into Romanian at KOrtvelyes — the Psaltirea §cheiana — contains the 
Catholic formula according to which the Holy Spirit proceeds not only from 
the Father but also from the Son (Filioque). The Hungarian Catholic church's 
use of the vernacular in Transylvania thus affected the Romanians also, and 







I. The Emergence of the Principality 
and its First Crises (1526-1606)
1. From the Kingdom of Hungary 
to the Principality of Transylvania
Transylvania and the Disintegration 
of the Mediaeval Hungarian State
On 29 August, 1526, Hungary suffered a decisive defeat at the hands of the 
Ottoman Empire. King Louis II fell in battle at Mohacs and the victorious 
Suleiman I captured and then sacked the capital Buda. A power vacuum 
came into being in Hungary, which two men undertook to fill. One of them 
was Ferdinand of Habsburg, archduke of Austria, the brother-in-law of Louis 
II and brother of Emperor Charles V, whose claim to the throne was based 
on a dynastic agreement concluded in 1515. It was he who symbolized the 
assistance that Hungary hoped to get from the Holy Roman Empire against 
the Turks.
The other candidate was J&nos Szapolyai, voivode of Transylvania since 
1510. He was not the scion of a ruling family: the favour of King Matthias 
had enabled his father to join the ranks of the great landowners of the coun­
try. During the long period, however, when Wladislas II vainly kept hop­
ing for an heir, the elder Szapolyai raised his eldest son as a possible con­
tender for the Hungarian throne. In 1526, the greater part of the magnates 
and the whole of the nobility supported his candidacy. The masses, up till 
then always disappointed in the issues of foreign help, saw in him the sav­
iour of the country.
On 10 November 1526, Szapolyai had himself elected king by the Diet in 
Szekesfehervar, and his coronation took place the next day. The new king, 
John I, attempted to set the Hungarian state on its feet again. He ruled with 
a strong hand, but the bankruptcy of his foreign policy soon made his indis­
putable domestic policy achievements count for nothing. He aspired to make 
an accord with the Habsburgs, to whom he offered an alliance against the 
Turks. Ferdinand, however, who had been king of Bohemia since October 
1526, and who had been pronounced king of Hungary in Pozsony by a hand­
ful of supporters in December of that year, was, naturally, unwilling to ne­
gotiate with his rival, in spite of the fact that his brother, Charles V, had just 
that summer been forced into a new war by a European coalition led by the 
French. This coalition on the other hand would have admitted John I but, 
with the Turks at his back, he did not want war.
The unexpected successes of the imperial mercenary troops in Italy caused 
a decisive turn in events. In the summer of 1527 they occupied Rome, and 
forced Pope Clement VII, the French king Francis I's chief ally, to conclude
peace. Ferdinand's hands were freed, and, since he was afraid that Hun­
gary weak as it was, would, out of necessity, come to an agreement with the 
sultan, and that Austria and Bohemia would thus be put at risk, he himself 
began to conquer it.
In July 1527, German mercenary troops crossed the Hungarian border. 
W inning one victory after another, they were joined by more and more 
Hungarian lords who had been vacillating in fear of war on two fronts. The 
German troops, in their first push, occupied Buda and then in September, 
defeated John's forces near Tokaj. King John fled to his former province, 
Transylvania, but that winter the inhabitants of even this apparently secure 
base for operations, turned against him. Georg Reicherstorffer, Ferdinand's 
skilful and unscrupulous agent, had instigated revolts against John first in 
Brass6 and later in the other Transylvanian Saxon towns. Meanwhile P6ter 
Perenyi, whom John had appointed to succeed him as voivode of Tran­
sylvania, not only deserted the king but also handed the Holy Crown over 
to the Habsburgs. This was used to crown Ferdinand I king of Hungary on 
3 November, 1527.
John's remaining supporters held out stubbornly in Transylvania. Istv&n 
Tomori, for example, defended the fortress of Fogaras until July 1528. But 
in the meantime their king had suffered another defeat (on 8 March, 1528) 
at Szina, near Kassa. After this King John, with a small entourage, fled to 
Poland.
During the period of the military operations, the Turks had repeatedly 
offered an alliance to John, and after Ferdinand's coronation, the Turks 
stepped up their attacks along the’country's southern border. All this led 
John to conclude that Suleiman I would not stand idly by while the most 
powerful dynasty in Europe came to power in neighbouring Hungary, and 
his recent experiences certainly indicated that, of his two foes, the Turks 
were the stronger.
Given his Christian conscience and the legacy of hatred which sprang 
from a century of warfare against the Ottomans, it must have been difficult 
for John to arrive at the decision he did. It was probably the Transylvanian 
revolt of late 1527 which finally made up his mind, and in this way, the 
territory, albeit indirectly, had a decisive influence on Hungarian politics 
for centuries to come. For in late 1527, John I sent an envoy, his Polish ad­
herent Hieronymus Laski, to Constantinople to ask the Turks for support.
The sultan's response was unusually prompt. After just a few weeks of 
intense negotiation, he signed a treaty of alliance with King John, even prom­
ising that he would "never abandon him whatever his need".1
In the meantime Hungary had been bitterly disappointed in Habsburg 
rule. The new government lacked money and was incapable of any effec­
tive action. Charles V, who was fighting the French for Naples, was unable 
to extend assistance. On receiving news that the Turks were preparing for 
war, John returned to Hungary, a move which was all the more necessary
1. L. Szalay, Adalekok a magyar nemzet tortenetehez a XVI. szazadban. (Data on
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in view of the threat that the Turks might seize the country for themselves. 
By the spring of 1529 the whole of the Great Hungarian Plain was again 
under John's rule. The Turkish advance launched that same year pressed 
on as far as Vienna, and although the Turks were then forced to retreat, the 
fighting which dragged on until the end of the year left the Great Hungar­
ian Plain and the eastern part of Transylvania — including Buda — in John's 
possession.
The following years brought more war and unrest. Turks repeatedly at­
tacked the Habsburg armies in Hungary, and, in 1532, renewed their march 
on Vienna. In late August however, the Turkish advance was halted at 
K<5szeg. The opposing forces were similar in strength and the front line 
established in 1529 shifted only slightly when King John succeeded in tak­
ing control of the eastern part of Upper Hungary. As a result, just three 
years after the Battle of Moh&cs, Hungary was divided into two.
Transylvania was situated in the eastern part of the divided country and 
lay far from Vienna, but this did not mean that it would automatically side 
with John, in spite of the fact that Ferdinand's rule proved no more effec­
tive in that territory than in other parts of Hungary. In the Saxon towns 
Reicherstorffer's men unleashed a reign of terror, even going so far as to 
threaten the Habsburg loyalist count of the Saxons, Markus Pemflinger. Peter 
Perenyi, whom Ferdinand had allowed to remain voivode, was not able to 
come to terms either with the Saxons or with the Hungarian nobility. Fer­
dinand was prepared to send in troops but only if Transylvania would fi­
nance them —this kind of help was declined.
Meanwhile, John and his supporters had successfully cut Transylvania 
off from the rest of the country. On orders from the Turks, Petru Rares, 
voivode of Moldavia, invaded the Sz6kelyfold and, in June 1529, he de­
feated B6lint Torok's pro-Ferdinand forces at Foldv^r, near Brass6. Further 
resistance to John was broken in a series of small campaigns by, his gover­
nor in Transylvania, Istv&n Bathory of Somly6. The Transylvanian Saxons 
held out the longest in support of the Habsburgs, but in the summer of 
1530 Brass6 opened its gates to the beleaguering Hungarian, Romanian and 
Turkish troops. In January 1531, Segesvdr surrendered, and in early 1532 
Istvan Majlath the last Transylvanian magnate to side with the Habsburgs, 
also went over to John. Szeben, the last Saxon stronghold was already un­
der attack when some unexpected events interrupted John's series of victo­
ries.
At Christmas 1530, during an urgently summoned Diet in Buda, John 
had Aloise (Lodovico) Gritti nominated governor of Hungary. The bastard 
son of the doge of Venice, Andrea Gritti was a banker who had become a 
confident of Ibrahim, the Turkish grand vizier. For John, Gritti represented 
an opportunity to secure the Turks' support, to straighten out the eco­
nomy, and to share with another the burden of what amounted to a politi­
cal crisis.
But Gritti had greater ambitions than anyone could have conceived. He 
wished to be the sole ruler of Hungary, first with the support of the sultan 
and later by playing Vienna off against Constantinople. After several years 
of manoeuvring in Buda and Constantinople, Gritti took a decisive step in 
249 the spring of 1534. Approaching from Transylvania he crossed the border
near Brassd and not long afterwards instigated the murder of John's most 
popular and most powerful supporter, Imre Czibak, bishop of V&rad.
The nobility of Transylvania and the county of Bihar took up arms. Czi- 
bak's nephew, Ferenc Pat6csy, and GottMrd Kun, the commander of King 
John's Transylvanian armies, led the campaign. A huge army drove Gritti 
into the town of Medgyes. He called on Petru Rares for help, but the latter, 
by a complete change of front, joined the besiegers. On 28 September the 
citizens of Medgyes opened their gates to the attacking force, and then mas­
sacred the governor and his Turkish encourage.
At the beginning of the conflict, King John faced a difficult decision. If he 
abandoned Gritti, the sultan might retaliate, but if he helped him out, his 
own subjects would most certainly turn against him. After some hesitation 
John decided on the first course of action and, following the drama at 
Medgyes, he made preparations for the storm which was to be expected 
from Constantinople. In the summer of 1535, John even sent envoys to 
Charles V offering his abdication, but the danger soon passed. The sultan 
ordered an investigation into the death of his courtier but, as Gritti's pa­
tron, Grand Vizier Ibrahim, was falling from favour — he was executed in 
March 1536 — the whole matter soon blew over.
As a result King John was able to withdraw his offer to abdicate, the 
more so as the emperor was unwilling to accept his main condition for such 
a step — the supplying of the major Hungarian castles with adequate garri­
sons.
The Gritti affair ended with no effect on politics as a whole, and in Transyl­
vania the struggle between the two parties began again. In late 1535 and 
early 1536, Ferdinand's followers attempted to relieve Szeben, which was 
still under siege, but without success. On 1 March, 1536 the town surren­
dered to John. For the time being, the civil war in Transylvania had come to 
an end.
The events concerning Gritti had, however, one important consequence. 
John's close follower, a friar of the Order of St. Paul named Juraj UtjeSenovic, 
or Friar George, who up till then had been an obscure figure, emerged into 
eminence. He received the see of the assassinated bishop of V&rad and the 
office of treasurer that Gritti had held. At the beginning of 1538, it was this 
man (also known as Martinuzzi, a name mistakenly later attributed to him) 
who was to help John put an end to what was, by then, eleven years of 
internal strife in Hungary, and after the death of the king Friar George be­
came the most prominent figure in the country's politics.
At the time of the friar's rise John had already lost most of his extensive 
family holdings, and as royal possessions had only Buda, Solymos and Lippa. 
Tax collection proved difficult in time of war — and both rulers had only 
half a country from which to collect. The most valuable mines and revenues 
were in the hands of Ferdinand. In John's part of the country, the predomi­
nance of the great aristocrats, which had weakened the state long before the 
Battle of M oM cs, now grew anew. Men like Balint Torok or Peter Perenyi 
wielded much greater power in their respective areas than did the king. As 
for the situation on the opposing side, a bitter report from Ferdinand I's 
Hungarian counsellors says: "The rogues, who are legion, escape punish­
ment by joining the enemy, and escape the enemy by rejoining us (...), and 
with this always provide new reasons for war and turmoil in the land (...)".2
These were indeed times of changing loyalties, prompted by material 
considerations rather than principles. Political unreliability, however, was 
not uncommon in a situation, where neither party could cure the country's 
grievous ills, nor even offer any hope for a remedy.
Transylvania did not achieve political significance in the part of the coun­
try with uncertain borders and chronic internal and external problems which 
came under King John's rule. There was no unity among the Three Nations. 
The Szekelys always liked to rebel against authority of any kind; the Saxons, 
although defeated, continued to incline towards the Habsburgs; and the 
nobility of Transylvania, though bearing the brunt of the struggles with the 
Saxons, was unable to acquire much weight in the politics of the region. 
Among the Hungarians, Istvan Majlath was the only landowner of any real 
note and, accordingly, the only individual to wield power of any magnitude.
Towards the Formation of the Transylvanian State
In the year 1536, King John won a series of minor victories. Besides taking 
Szeben he managed to recapture the strategically important city of Kassa. 
The following year, Ferdinand I's army launched a counter-offensive. In 
Upper Hungary it also achieved successes but down by the banks of the 
Drava River, the nearly forty thousand strong army led by Hans Katzianer 
lost the most important battle on Hungarian soil since Mohkcs — not against 
the main Turkish forces but against a detachment of beys stationed along 
the border. There was to be no other battle of similar significance until the 
engagement at Mezdkeresztes in 1596.
King John had long expressed his willingness to negotiate, and Ferdinand 
now also realized that the "Hungarian question" could not be solved by 
military means. The two parties began serious talks in late 1537. On the side 
of the Habsburgs the emperor's representative was Johann Wese, archbishop 
of Lund. John appointed as chief negotiator Friar George, known until then 
primarily for his economic expertise but who now proved to be equally 
skilled as a diplomat.
The peace treaty was signed in V&rad on 24 February, 1538. Both rulers 
were allowed to retain their title of king of Hungary along with the territo­
ries which they then held. At the same time John agreed to the provision 
that after his death his part of the country would recognize Ferdinand as its 
king, and if in the meantime John should have an heir, his old family estates 
would be declared a "duchy" to be ruled by the latter.
Both parties were aware of the fact that the sultan would not be happy 
with such an accord. The peace was therefore concluded in secret, and 
Charles V charged with defending Hungary if necessary. But when the sul­
tan launched a campaign into Europe in the autumn of 1538, John I called
2. L. B a r d o s s y ,  Magyar politika a mohdcsi vesz utan. (Hungarian Politics after the
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on Charles in vain. The emperor was willing to fight the Turks only on the 
Mediterranean Sea, and Ferdinand I belatedly sent only a few thousand 
mercenaries. As it turned out, Suleiman marched only against Moldavia, 
but John had to face up to the fact that the Treaty of V&rad was a dead 
letter. In consequence he tried to back out of its stipulations.
Friar George assisted King John all through the following intricate politi­
cal manoeuvrings, and did everything he could to prevent the Hungarian 
lords from taking the secret oath as specified by the treaty. As a result he 
attracted both criticism and attention. The king, meanwhile, sought and 
found a wife, one of the daughters of the Polish king, Sigismund I. John's 
marriage to Isabella, on 2 March, 1539, was clearly a political move. The 
future heir would provide, the pretext for breaking the Treaty of V£rad, 
and open the way to continuing the pro-Turkish policy — the inevitable 
necessity of which the past years had repeatedly indicated.
At this point Transylvania came into play again. Following the fateful 
events of 1538, the local lords, led by King John's two voivodes, Istv&n 
Majl&th and Imre Balassa, started plotting. Not much is known about the 
aims of the "conspiracy", but it appears that the intention was to detach 
Transylvania from the territory of the Kingdom of Hungary, thereby saving 
it from the growing threat of war with the Turks. The more eminent land­
owners of the province supported the movement. It was not easy, however, 
to break with the centuries-old tradition of the unity of the whole country's 
ruling class and, moreover, the foreign powers who were approached in 
connection with the matter — everyone from the sultan to the Moravian 
Estates — did not take the offer too seriously. The venture collapsed imme­
diately, John's armies appeared in the province. Almost all its participants 
asked for, and received, clemency; only M ajlith chose instead to take ref­
uge in the strong hold of Fogaras.
But John I was ill when he arrived in Transylvania. His wife gave birth to 
a son on 7 July and soon after this eagerly awaited news reached him, the 
king's condition worsened. He took to his bed and, on 22 July, died in 
Sz&szsebes. Friar George was left with a difficult task: to prevent — in the 
name of a baby only a couple of weeks old — the dismemberment of that 
part of the country which had belonged to the late king. A wave of deser­
tions immediately began, with the Treaty of V&rad providing the justifica­
tion. John's most powerful followers submitted to Ferdinand one after the 
other — among them Peter Perenyi, the eminent diplomat Ferenc Frangep&n, 
archbishop of Kalocsa; and Voivode Istvdn Majl&th.
Friar George hurried to Buda to have the infant elected king by a hastily- 
summoned Diet. (Throughout his life this child held the title of "John II,
King Elect of Hungary".) Then, just after the election, with a remaining hand­
ful of supporters led by the young king's guardian P6ter Petrovics and Bilint 
Torok, Friar George successfully defended Buda against a siege by Ferdi­
nand's armies in the autumn of 1540. Furthermore, he sent Chancellor Werb6- 
czy to Constantinople to request assistance.
Suleiman I graciously promised support. No sooner had WerbSczy left 
with the good news, however, than Ferdinand's envoy, Hieronymus task i, 
who had changed sides since his mission on behalf of John I, came to pay 
his respects at the Sublime Porte. His mission was to inform the sultan 2 5 2
of the Treaty of V&rad. Vienna calculated that if it could turn the sultan 
against his protege, the Szapolyai party would be forced to submit to Fer­
dinand, and as a result, troublesome, pro-Turkish Hungary would cease to 
exist.
In order to leave nothing to chance, Wilhelm Roggendorff's German army 
and Peter Perenyi's Hungarian troops again laid siege to Buda, which then 
in May 1541 was in the hands of the Szapolyai party. A few days of bloody 
skirmishes left both sides exhausted. Soon Suleiman arrived with his full 
army. The ominous advance was not accidental: the sultan wished to settle 
accounts with the untrustworthy Hungarians. The defenders of Buda had 
good reason to be fearful: the town was in no state to withstand another — 
and this time Turkish — siege.
On 29 August, to mark the fifteenth anniversary of the Battle of Mohacs, 
the sultan summoned the Hungarian lords to his camp to pay their respects. 
While the reception was taking place, the janissaries, who had ostensibly 
gone to see the sights of Buda, occupied the Hungarian capital. Friar George 
and Peter Petrovics were at the same time informed that King John's son 
could rule over the territory east of the Tisza River, including Transylvania, 
on payment to the Porte of an annual tribute of 10,000 gold florins. Buda 
remained under Turkish occupation.
This event marked the beginning of another bleak chapter in the history 
of Hungary: the country was trisected into three parts, with its heartland 
concerted into a mere province of the Ottoman Empire. But at the same time, 
it represented a milestone on the way to the development of the Transylva­
nian state.
The intentions of the Turkish conquerors were demonstrated in 1541 and 
it was then also clear that the Habsburgs would not protect Hungary. Evi­
dently, the basic situation which had determined the course of Hungarian 
politics since 1529 was unchanged: the eastern part of the country belonged 
to the Turkish sphere of influence and those who lived there had to get 
accustomed to this fact.
Listening to Queen Isabella's reproofs, enduring the malice of the Hun­
garian lords who blamed him for the loss of Buda, Friar George set about 
reorganizing the government. He had at his disposal the territory lying east 
of Kassa and the Tisza River. In the seigniories of the Diocese Vdrad, his 
power was complete, and in Transylvania the Turks had cleared the friar's 
way by removing his staunchest enemy Istv&n Majl^th, who, on grounds of 
treason, had been taken to Constantinople as a prisoner for life. On 20 Janu­
ary, 1542, at an assembly held in Marosv^sarhely, the Three Nations recog­
nized Friar George as governor of Transylvania, then in late March, at a 
meeting in Torda they invited Queen Isabella and her son, the king, to move 
to Transylvania.
W ith Buda in Turkish hands, the Szapolyai part of the country lacked 
any real centre. Lippa, the last of the great Szapolyai seigniories, was too 
near to the Turks to allow the court, which had retreated there in the au­
tumn of 1541, to remain in residence for long. Isabella's stronghold was 
now Transylvania. As the Diocese of Transylvania had just fallen vacant, 
the queen was able to take up residence in the bishop's palace at Gyula-
feh£rv3r; Friar George had the vast church holdings assigned to the treas­
ury, and no new Transylvanian bishop was appointed.
General bitterness prevented the new administration from working ef­
fectively. Although on 18 October, 1541 a Diet was held in Debrecen at 
which the lords of Transylvania and the Tisz&ntul counties swore allegiance 
to the Szapolyai dynasty, Ferdinand was planning a campaign to capture 
Buda from the Turks and for once he received the support of the Holy Ro­
man Empire. Hoping for success, on 29 December, 1541, in the fortress of 
Gyalu, the friar concluded an agreement with Ferdinand's envoys that Hun­
gary was to be united and ruled by the Habsburgs under the terms of the 
Treaty of V&rad which they had broken not so long before.
The imperial army's campaign in Hungary, however, soon petered out
— in the summer of 1542. While Charles V was again busy with one of his 
many French wars, the Turks proceeded, in 1543-1544, to capture one Hun­
garian castle after another. Under this pressure Ferdinand I decided not to 
continue a struggle which had become hopeless. On 10 November, 1545, his 
envoys signed an armistice with the Turks in Adrianople. Hungary was 
again left to its fate.
After the disappointment of 1542, on 20 December of the same year Friar 
George called a new Diet at Torda where he forced the Transylvanian lords 
to swear allegiance to him. The "Union of the Three Nations" was renewed, 
and the Gyula Accord of 1541 declared null and void, despite Saxon pro­
tests. In early 1543, 10,000 florins, the first tribute in the whole history of 
Transylvania, arrived in Constantirtople. At the August 1544 Transylvani­
an Diet, the representatives of the Tiszantul counties, and other counties 
along the Tisza, sat as full members, alongside the Transylvanians.
Friar George had reached the high point of his career. As Transylvania's 
governor, he had acquired most of the seigniories and castles of the voivodes 
of Deva and Gorgeny. He had also taken possession of all estates belonging 
to the See of Csandd, as well as the fortunes of a few wealthy families that 
had died out.
His power was not without its limits, however. There were still areas of 
the Szapolyai part of the country which were in the hands of other lords. 
North-west of the Tisza, the area around Kassa was ruled by Captain Len£rt 
Czeczey, and the triangle between the Tisza and Maros rivers by the comes 
of Temes, Peter Petrovics. In addition, there were still quite a number of 
powerful landowning magnates in the Szapolyai areas outside Transylva­
nia: the Pat6csys in B6kes, Jdnos Torok in Debrecen and the Dr&gffy and 
Perenyi families in the region from Maramaros to Kraszna. Further on, in 
Zemplen, Borsod and Abauj counties, there were the Balassas, Losoncis, 
Bebeks, and the Homonnai Drugeths.
What proved to be decisive, however, was the fact that law and tradition 
demanded that the queen direct the affairs of state. Friar George neverthe­
less retained his office of treasurer, governed Transylvania as "royal lieu­
tenant", and finally created a new office for himself — that of chief justice. 
Accordingly, he controlled finance, public administration, and the judici­
ary. Other high-level royal offices, for example, those of the palatine, the 
lord chief justice, and the chancellor, remained unfilled. No new voivode 254
was appointed, and the daily conduct of affairs fell to a vice-voivode from 
the lesser nobility, L^szlo Mikola.
Isabella had disliked the coarse-natured and frugal friar-bishop from the 
start. Inexperienced and at times capricious, the dowager queen for the time 
being nevertheless had to submit to the purposeful monk, although at times 
she even toyed with the idea of abdicating and leaving the country, along 
with her son.
Isabella did have her allies, however, in the traditional Szapolyai sup­
porters led by their distant relative, Peter Petrovics. They were drawn to 
the queen not only by dynastic links and a fear of losing power, but also by 
their disdain for the socially-inferior friar. Yet even they had to realize that 
Friar George was successful in implementing a policy which suited their 
interests — in spite of the queen herself if need be. They could do nothing 
but acquiesce in his control.
The rivalry between the queen and the friar-bishop constituted a perma­
nent threat. Hungarian society, from aristocrat to burgher and from lesser 
noble to the thinking peasant, wanted first and foremost to see the country 
united. People acknowledged the arguments for the alliance with the Turks 
and yet were ready to see the continuation of Szapolyai rule which was 
linked inseparably to it as a purely family affair. They put continual pres­
sure on Friar George, as leader of the eastern part of the country, to achieve 
this reunification by giving up the support of the queen and the king elect. 
He regarded the reunification as a sacred aim but did not believe it to be 
possible. Thus, the friar-bishop held on to power, but was not really able to 
win acceptance either for himself or for his policies.
Collapse and Revival
The political upheavals of the late 1540s increasingly upset the delicate bal­
ance of power that had come into existence under the rule of the Szapolyais. 
The process actually began in early 1546 when the Turks began to demand 
two southern fortresses — Becse and Becskerek — in order to secure their 
line of communication between Belgrade and Szeged, which town they had 
captured in 1543. The year 1547 brought more trouble. On 31 March the 
French king and sworn enemy of the Habsburgs, Francis I, died. On 24 
April, Charles V's armies won a decisive victory at Muhlberg against the 
rebellious Protestant princes, and on 19 June an armistice between the 
Habsburgs and the sultan was established in a peace treaty signed in Con­
stantinople.
The pro-Turkish policy initiated by John I had up to now achieved its 
primary aim: the protection of eastern Hungary, which had been left to 
itself, under Turkish conquest, but without relinquishing of its independ­
ence. But the affair of the two castles in the south indicated that, in the 
longer run, the Turks wanted to continue their expansion as before. In addi­
tion, the Peace of Constantinople ended the Habsburgs' passive but stub­
born resistance which had until then restricted the Porte's freedom of ac­
tion in the Carpathian Basin. Clearly related to all this was the fact that
Suleiman I had not been willing to include Isabella and her country in the 
treaty.
The court at Gyulafeh6rv&r dispatched a despairing message to Charles V: 
"N o peace is possible with an enemy who seeks not only to subjugate Us, 
but who also plots against Our life... hitherto contenting himself with trib­
utes, he is now demanding more and more of Our castles and seeking ever 
more occasion to undo Us".3 Ferdinand I's Hungarian advisers also asked 
the emperor not to sanction the peace, their only purpose in serving the 
Habsburgs being to oust the Turks from Hungary.
Charles V, however, refused to believe that the death of Francis I and the 
victory at Muhlberg had solved the problems of the Holy Roman Empire, 
and the Peace of Constantinople accordingly came into effect.
Isabella and Friar George used the general anxiety for renewed manoeu­
vring. In the spring of 1548 the queen again began to negotiate with Ferdinand 
about her own possible departure. For his part the friar decided to break 
the vicious circle that had determined Hungarian politics for a quarter of a 
century, and offered Transylvania to Ferdinand I.
It took the king over a year to send troops to the defence of his new 
province. Having achieved his most important goal, however, in Septem­
ber 1549, Friar George signed a third accord, in Nyirbator, to unite the two 
parts of Hungary. Isabella and her son were to receive the duchies of Opole 
and Ratiborz in Silesia. Ferdinand appointed Friar George voivode of Tran­
sylvania, enabling the latter to retain the power he had held in the territory 
up until then.
On hearing news of this deal (which had been concluded without her 
knowledge or consent), Isabella showed her true colours. There was no fur­
ther talk of her going away or abdicating. Resolved to hold to the power of 
the dynasty at any price, she immediately denounced her "unfaithful" royal 
lieutenant to the sultan. Later, in the summer of 1550, Isabella denied Friar 
George entry into Gyulafehervar, while Peter Petrovics advanced from the 
Temeskoz along the Maros Valley into Transylvania. On this the friar quickly 
gathered his troops and laid siege to Gyulafeh£rv£r, taking it after six weeks. 
He now turned against the Turkish and Romanian troops, who in the mean­
time were pouring into Transylvania from the voivodates of Moldavia and 
Wallachia. The Diet, held under arms, met at Torda on 29 October, and in 
the general uproar the friar was able to win over its members. In the follow­
ing weeks, J3nos TOrok forced Casim, the pasha of Buda, to retreat and 
Janos Kendi defeated the Wallachians. Friar George himself drove Ilie, the 
voivode of Moldavia, back beyond the Carpathians. By the onset of winter 
the country was once more at peace.
Amidst conspicuous weeping, Isabella was reconciled with her royal lieu­
tenant on 30 November, but in May 1551, Transylvania was again under 
arms. Isabella feared for her rights and those of her son, while Petrovics, 
and his companions (along with Ferenc Pat6csy, a magnate in Bekes), were 
anxious about their estates, which since 1541-1543 bordered on Turkish 
territory. The majority of the Transylvanian politicians however stood by 
Friar George in his efforts to unite the country. He was now convinced, 
more than ever, that Isabella had to be removed from Hungary.
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In the meantime, European politics had taken another turn. At the Impe­
rial Diet of Augsburg in 1550, Ferdinand I for the first time came into seri­
ous conflict with his brother, Charles V over the eagerly awaited help for 
Hungary which never arrived. With all hope of German help now gone, 
however, Ferdinand tried to postpone the implementation of the NyirbStor 
Accord. On the other hand, his Hungarian subjects, who were burning to 
see their country unified, were virtually forcing him to comply with it.
In the end, in the summer of 1551, Ferdinand sent Giovanni Battista 
Castaldo, his "military governor", and Tam&s Nddasdy, the lord chief jus­
tice of the Hungarian Kingdom, into Transylvania with an army of between 
six thousand and seven thousand men. This was, as one observer ironically 
remarked, "too small for an army and too large for an embassy".4 By the 
time the troops reached Gyulafehervar, Friar George had again forced 
Isabella to surrender. In despair she abdicated on 19 June, renouncing her 
own rights and those of her son. On 26 July, the Diet, meeting in Kolozsvdr, 
recognized Ferdinand I as the country's sole ruler. Amidst pomp and cer­
emony, the Holy Crown that had been in the hands of the Szapolyais since 
1532 was taken to Pozsony.
The sultan, on learning of the troop movements in Transylvania, ordered 
the governor-general of Rumelia, Mehmed Sokollu to attack. At the begin­
ning of August, the pasha was already in the TemeskOz, and despite Friar 
George's message that yearly tribute to the sultan had been remitted, the 
Turks captured Becse, Becskerek, Csanid, and Lippa. The successes molli­
fied Sokollu, although he could not take Temesvir, and he was willing to 
give credence to the friar's assertions that only Petrovics had been a traitor, 
and that royal garrisons had been sent only to Petrovics's castles.
Ultimately the political manoeuvring begun in 1549 ended badly. Al­
though Isabella was expelled, the country united, and even a war with the 
Turks provoked in the hope that they would be defeated, the most impor­
tant tasks, to involve the Holy Roman Empire, had not been carried out. As 
Charles V refused all help, Friar George had to abandon his original plan, of 
war against the Turks, but this proved increasingly difficult. Under pres­
sure from Ferdinand and public opinion, he led an army to recapture Lippa. 
(In this the friar received assistance from Giovanni Battista Castaldo and 
Tam&s N&dasdy, as well as from the mercenary commander Sforza Palla- 
vicini.) The Turks were forced to surrender the castle but Friar George took 
care that the enemy garrison withdrew unharmed.
In the meantime, Friar George had been made a cardinal, but Ferdinand 
I continued to distrust him. Accordingly, the king was more than ready to 
lend an ear to the groundless accusation made by Castaldo and his men 
that the friar was preparing treachery. In the early hours of 17 December, 
1551, Sforza Pallavicini, acting on orders from the king, had Friar George 
murdered in his castle in Alvinc. In just a few weeks Castaldo, and the 
newly appointed voivode, Andris Bathory, took control of Transylvania.
The Habsburgs, meanwhile, were tied down by another uprising of the 
German Protestant princes, and by the French attack which was launched
4. A s c a n io  C e n t o r io  D e g l i H o r t e n s i,  Commentarii della guerra di Transilvania. Vine- 
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to support this. The sultan immediately proved that although he was un­
able to win a decisive victory, he was nevertheless the strongest in Hun­
gary. During their 1552 campaign, the Turks captured a number of border 
castles, including Veszpr£m, Szolnok, Lippa, Temesv£r, Kar&nsebes, and 
Lugos. The Turkish advance claimed the greatest amount of land from the 
former Szapolyai territories, and, this done, Suleiman sent word to the 
Transylvanians to recall Isabella and her son, on pain of being wiped from 
the face of the earth. Castaldo and B&thory were unable to prevent the 
Transylvanian politicians from opening direct negotiations with the Turks. 
P6ter Haller, the mayor of Szeben and earlier a totally reliable Habsburg 
loyalist, assumed the role of envoy. These events showed that Friar George 
had made a mistake in allowing the Habsburgs to enter Transylvania. But 
by having the friar murdered, Ferdinand I, as he must have realized, had 
solved absolutely nothing.
In the autumn of the same year, 1552, while the underpaid mercenary 
army in Transylvania was pillaging local villages and towns instead of fight­
ing the Turks, Castaldo, aware of his impotence, had him self recalled. 
Bathory resigned as voivode, and in the summer of 1553, the nobility be­
yond the Tisza organized an uprising to bring Isabella back. P6ter Petrovics 
immediately hurried to the assistance of the rebels.
The voivodes of Transylvania appointed by Ferdinand, Istvan Dob6 who 
had gained fame in the defence of Eger in the battles of 1552, and the Transyl­
vanian magnate Ferenc Kendi, were faced with the task of suppressing the 
revolt. Fortunately, the sultan was engaged in a war with Persia and there­
fore forbade the pasha of Buda to support the insurgents. The uprising col­
lapsed, but in 1554 Suleiman I presented the towns of Lugos and Kar&nsebes 
to Petrovics who in the meantime had escaped to Poland. Envoys from the 
Porte were again sent to Transylvania to demand the return of the Szapolyais. 
All Ferdinand I could do was to pay himself, in early 1555, the tribute due 
to the Constantinople treasury. His envoys, however, were obliged to re­
turn with the news that the sultan would only be appeased if Isabella were 
given back her country.
On Turkish instructions, Moldavia and Wallachia prepared for war, and, 
under Petrovics's leadership, the Tiszdntul rose in revolt once again. On 23 
December, 1555 the Transylvanian Diet, meeting at Marosvas&rhely, sent 
word to Ferdinand I: "W e were happy to be ruled by a Christian prince and 
to be connected to the Holy Roman Emperor, but God did not wish this to 
last for long... Accordingly we ask your Majesty for one of two things: ei­
ther to assist us so that we can resist Suleiman, or to be so kind as to absolve 
us from our oath."5
They did not really expect an answer. At the Diet held in Torda at the 
end of January 1556, Menyhart Balassa, commander of the Transylvanian 
armies, decided that a message should be sent to Queen Isabella, who was 
residing at that time in Poland, saying that she was expected back. Petrovics 
and his army advanced into the country from Kar&nsebes and on 12 March, 
the Diet, now meeting in Sz£szsebes, swore an oath of allegiance to "the son 
of King John".
5. EOE I, 475. 258
On 14 June, 1556, Ferdinand I stated in a letter to the sultan that he would 
return Transylvania to the Szapolyais. He was too late: in May Ali Khadim, 
pasha of Buda, attacked Szigetv£r, thus drawing the royal troops from 
Transylvania into Transdanubia. One after another the royal castles in 
Transylvania opened their gates to the armies of Petrovics and Balassa. 
Isabella and her son entered KolozsvSr with much pomp and ceremony on 
22 October although Voivode Istvan Dob6 defended Szamosujv&r until 
November 1556, when he was finally obliged to surrender. Vdrad opened 
its gates in April 1557, and GttmOr, Abauj and Zemplen counties also went 
over to the Szapolyais. In the eastern part of the country only the castles of 
Gyula, Vil£gos, and Jen6 remained loyal to the Habsburgs, but later, in 1566, 
these fell to the Turks.
By the summer of 1557 Isabella's rule again extended all the way to Kassa 
and the Szepesseg. A bloody warning was given to waverers: on 31 August, 
1558 the queen had Ferenc Bebek, Ferenc Kendi, and S£ndor Kendi assassi­
nated in Gyulafeherv^r on charges of treason. But just over a year later, on 
15 November, 1559, she died; the nineteen-year-old John II, king elect of 
Hungary, was left to rule Transylvania. Meanwhile, Ferdinand I had signed 
another armistice with the Turks, but was willing to negotiate with the 
Szapolyai party only in the matter of recovering the throne from them. A 
solution to the stalemate seemed possible when Menyh&rt Balassa took sides 
with the Habsburgs in 1561, bringing with him the nobility of the Tiszantul. 
An army sent to win them back suffered a serious defeat at Hadad on 4 
March, 1562. The Szekelys now rose in revolt, and although they were scat­
tered by Ferdinand's troops, the territory of Szapolyai Hungary was trun­
cated. From the Tisz&ntul only Bihar and M&ramaros remained in King John's 
hands.
The repeated counter-attacks of the following years yielded significant 
results only in the winter of 1564-1565, with the capture of Szatmar and 
Nagybanya. But, in the spring of 1565, the two towns were retaken by Lazarus 
Schwendi, an army commander of the new Habsburg king, Maximilian I. 
Because of these successes, John II now concluded an accord (the Peace of 
Szatmar) with the young Maximilian, in which he renounced the royal title 
in return for recognition of his rule in Transylvania. The Turks, however, 
now made haste to assist their protege. On 29 June, 1566, John II, with an 
entourage of representatives from the Three Nations, paid his respects, to 
Suleiman, who had arrived at Zimony with an army. The sultan assured 
him of his support, and the Turkish troops then proceeded to attack 
Szigetv&r, the capture of which would open the way to the occupation of 
the whole of Transdanubia. But while the siege was going on, Suleiman 
died. Pertev pasha, his second in command, captured Gyula, Jend, and 
Vil£gos, and with this the Habsburg enclave in the southern Tiszantul was 
lost to the Ottomans. Not much later on 17 February, 1568, Maximilian con­
cluded peace with the Turks at Adrianople. In this latest peace with the 
Turks Maximilian also dealt with the "other" Hungary.
Now that accord which Istv&n B&thory of Somly6 had spent years in 
reaching even suffering imprisonment for his pains, was signed by the new 
favourite of King John, G^sp&r Bekes. It happened at Speyer on 16 August, 
259 1570. In the Accord of Speyer Szapolyai agreed to renounce the title of king
of Hungary in favour of the title "Johannes, Transylvaniae et Partium Regni 
Hungariae Princeps". That meant that he regarded himself and was regarded 
by his adversary as the ruler of the former province of the kingdom, Transyl­
vania, together with "the parts of the Hungarian Kingdom". The latter were 
some eastern countries later called "Partium " (or "Reszek") which became 
an integral part of the Principality of Transylvania. He also agreed that, 
should he die without an heir, his principality, as part of the Hungarian 
Crown — would revert to the Hungarian king. Maximilian soon ratified the 
accord, but just a few days later, on 14 March, 1571, John II died. He left his 
people no heir, only an unclear legal situation.
The Diet which had met at Gyulafeh6rv£r on 8 September, 1567 in the 
wake of the Turkish successes had sworn "by the Almighty Father that ... 
should it be God's unalterable will to call our gracious lord from among us 
with no heir having been bom  to him, we shall elect a Prince by joint design 
and not out of partiality."6 With God's will done, the Transylvanian Estates 
were now faced with the choice of abiding by their oath or accepting the 
agreement signed in Speyer. Finally they decided on the first possibility 
and on 25 May, 1571, "without further dispute" elected Istvan B&thory of 
Somly6, to be their ruler.
Bathory was bom  in 1533, the son of the Transylvanian voivode at the 
time, whose name was also Istvdn B£thory. The young B&thory had been a 
page at the Viennese court and had seen something of the world. He re­
turned to Transylvania in the mid-1550s. When Isabella came home in 1556, 
it was B&thory who welcomed her on behalf of the Estates. His first impor­
tant assignment had come in 1553 when the queen appointed him captain 
of V&rad, in other words, ruler of the militarily important county of Bihar. 
At that time Bathory was already the greatest landowner in the Szapolyai 
part of the country.
B&thory's election in 1571 was not without risks and he himself was aware 
of then. He therefore renounced the high-sounding titles of the two 
Szapolyais, contenting himself with the style once used by the appointed 
royal officials governing Transylvania, "voivode" and even took a secret 
oath of allegiance to Maximilian, thereby recognizing that Transylvania be­
longed to Hungary. At the same time the Porte also upheld its right to nomi­
nate a successor to the Szapolyais, although the ahdname brought by the 
courier Amhat to the Gyulafeherv^r Diet had been made out to Bathory in 
advance: "Voivode of Transylvania, Istvan B&thory! ... Transylvania has 
long been under my protection, ... and the country is my own as are the 
others in my possession... Therefore, out of my power, in accordance with 
your fealty to me I make Transylvania over to you/'7
Transylvania consequently had to continue to balance between the two 
great powers. At first Vienna presented the bigger problem, because al­
though Maximilian, learning from his father's failures, was unwilling to 
interfere openly in Transylvanian affairs, he permitted his officers in Upper 
Hungary actively to support G£sp&r Bekes in the latter's efforts to become 
voivode.
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Bekes's first attempt at this was unsuccessful and he was forced to flee 
Transylvania in 1573. Then, in the summer of 1575, with an army recruited 
in Upper Hungary, he made a second bid to take over the country. Al­
though the Szekelys rose in revolt behind B&thory's lines, the voivode nev­
ertheless won the decisive battle at Kereldszentp&l on 8 July, 1575. Bekes 
escaped, but five of the lords who supported him were hanged on the bat­
tlefield. Another seven (together with three dozen Szekely leaders) were 
later executed on orders from Bathory.
The fame of this victory was so great that when the briefly ruling king of 
Poland Henry of Valois returned to his homeland to become Henry III of 
France, on 15 December, 1575 the Polish nobility elected Bathory to be their 
new ruler. His rival was the Emperor Maximilian himself, but impending 
conflict was suddenly averted by the latter's death on 12 October, 1576. 
Maximilian had shown caution in his dealings with Bathory, but his succes­
sor, Rudolph went out of his way to avoid challenging the ruler of a large 
and powerful Poland for possession of Transylvania and a handful of coun­
ties appended to it.
While the threat from the West therefore diminished, pressure from the 
Turks gradually increased. Although in 1572Selim II recognized the Bathory 
family's right of succession, this did not prevent him from threatening to 
recognize G&sp£r Bekes as the rightful ruler. No sooner had Murad III, his 
successor, come to the throne than he raised Transylvania's tribute from
10,000 to 15,000 gold florins annually. Furthermore, the "presents" to be 
given to Turkish dignitaries were increased, while a pretender to the throne 
of Transylvania was kept in reserve at Constantinople. (This man was a 
Transylvanian nobleman named P£1 M£rkh&zi, and it was clear that the 
Turks were employing the same method towards Transylvania as they used 
to keep in check Moldavia and Wallachia.)
Bathory, however, whose family estates lay in the Partium, was familiar 
with the dual pressures involved in living in close proximity to the Turks. 
Back in 1567 he had warned a confidant of Ferdinand that "the Turks will 
not tolerate just anyone as ruler of Transylvania. His Majesty fares better if 
there is a go-between in the province, who can render service in such a way 
that with the passage of time ... Transylvania might become joined to Hun­
gary." He had no illusions. This statement also comes from Bathory: "The 
army of the Turkish emperor does not pick strawberries into other people's 
baskets."8 Thus, Bathory paid the increased tribute and gave "presents" to 
the Turkish authorities, forebode the soldiers in his border castles to pro­
voke the Turkish detachments, and harassed the Moldavian voivodes flee­
ing from the Turks. In short, he did everything possible to keep the peace.
The question now arose as to whether Bathory's taking the Cracow throne 
had affected Transylvania's position as far as the Turks were concerned. 
The second half of the sixteenth century was Poland's golden age, when 
grain exports to the West made the country rich and strong. 1 he traditional 
weakness of its political system had hitherto prevented Poland from be-
8. E. V e r e s s , Bathory Istvan erdelyi fejedelem es lengyel kiraly levelezese. (Correspon­
dence of Istvan BSthory Transylvanian Prince and Polish King.) I. KolozsvSr 1944, 
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coming a leading eastern European power, but Bathory had came from a 
country where central power had been able to overcome the particular in­
terests of the Estates.
Istv&n B&thory, who became King Stephen — unusually in those days — 
continued to consider himself a Hungarian in his new realm. His Polish 
subjects were justly vexed with the king when he let slip the remark in 1577 
that God had created him not for the Poles but for the Hungarians. As a 
result of his Hungarian concerns King Stephen was constantly preoccupied 
by the Turkish question. The situation in Europe was not the best, even 
now. Following their spectacular defeat at Lepanto on 7 October, 1571 the 
Turks had been recovering their strength. Venice, abandoned by its allies, 
was forced to make peace with the sultan in 1573. With the St. Bartholomew's 
Day Massacre on 24 August, 1572, France was again involved with its Hu­
guenot wars. The Holy Roman Empire however, was unable to take advan­
tage of France's vulnerability since, because of Catholic-Protestant rivalry 
and opposition to the imperial power, the Habsburgs enjoyed real author­
ity only in their Hereditary Provinces and in the Lands of the Bohemian 
Crown.
The idea of crushing the Turks seemed to persist only at the papal court.
Bathory, however, was at first impeded from moving in that direction by 
the fact that Pope Gregory XIII had supported Maximilian in the struggle 
for the Polish throne. Only in 1577, the year after Maximilian's death, were 
relations established between King Stephen and the papacy. The papal nun­
cio Laureo arrived at B&thory's court with a plan for an anti-Turkish league 
and was followed, in 1579, by the nuncio Caligari, who came with a similar 
suggestion. But nothing came of either of these proposals. Then in 1581, 
and again in 1582, King Stephen himself suggested that the Christians of 
eastern Europe should unite to march against the Turks.
The prospective allies however — Venice and Philip II's Spain — were 
incapable of even the most rudimentary co-operation. B&thory now came 
up with a new idea: in the spring of 1584 he asked the Holy See to help him 
in the conquest of Russia, after which the Russians, and even the peoples of 
the Caucasus, could be launched against the Turks. The Jesuit Antonio 
Possevino took the proposal to Rome, but is was rejected by the Papal Cu­
ria. As the dauphin had just died and the throne of the "M ost Christian 
King" was set to pass to the Protestant Bourbon, Henry, king of Navarre, 
the pope had no time to waste on eastern Europe. But Bdthory persisted: in 
the summer of 1586 he sent his nephew, Cardinal Andres B&thory to Rome, 
but in vain. The support promised by Sixtus V (25,000 ducats a year) was so 
ridiculously low that negotiations were broken off. On 12 December that 
same year King Stephen died in Gr6dno. His elaborate plans had come to 
nothing.
There was hardly a ruler of note in Europe during the previous 150 years 
who had not considered leagues or thought about crusades against the Turks.
In real life however Stephen Bathory remained wary of the Turks both as 
mere voivode of Transylvania and as king of Poland. He did everything to 
keep the peace, even executing Cossacks who had pillaged Turkish terri­
tory, and beheading two Moldavian voivodes, loan Potcoava, and Iancu 
Sasul, who driven out by the sultan were preparing to return home. King 2 6 2
Stephen had good reason for all this: the Polish Estates were determined to 
preserve the existing peace with the Porte, and had made him promise to 
do this in his coronation oath, the Pacta Conventa. The Poles feared the power 
of the sultan, as well as the enmity of the powers surrounding them — 
Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburgs.
To ignore the will of the Estates was beyond the power of even such a 
determined king as Stephen. His early popularity evaporated just when he 
attempted to strengthen royal power. His secretary and confidant, Jan 
Zamoyski, who came from the middle nobility and who was later to be­
come his all-powerful chancellor, was widely hated. The Zborowski broth­
ers, who were earlier Stephen's main supporters, organized a revolt against 
him, but when Bathory had them executed for treason, which was the prac­
tice in Transylvania, the whole country protested vehemently.
Poland's neighbours also contributed to the wrecking of Bathory's most 
important plans. Danzig refused to take the obligatory oath of allegiance 
and the war fought in 1576-1577 to break its opposition brought rather ques­
tionable results. Between 1579 and 1581 the king conducted three success­
ful campaigns against Tzar Ivan IV, but was unable to break his power 
permanently. Perhaps this interlude contributed to Bathory's thinking on 
the interrelation of the Russian and the Turkish questions, and to the fact 
that his anti-Turkish plans gained a degree of popularity among the Lithua­
nian nobility, although unfortunately too late.
No doubt, King Stephen was preoccupied with driving the Turks from 
Europe. Yet his political experience taught him that to force such an under­
taking would be hopeless not only militarily but also from the foreign and 
domestic policy points of view. For this reason he set out to create the nec­
essary preconditions for it, and only his untimely death prevented him pro­
ceeding further. Although in Poland Stephen Bathory was mourned as one 
of the country's greatest kings, he had hardly succeeded in furthering the 
affairs of Hungary.
Transylvania had undoubtedly sensitized Stephen Bathory to the Turk­
ish question, and the problems of the little country were continually with 
him during his ten years as king of Poland. Nevertheless he left the day-to- 
day business of government "back home" first to his brother, Krist6f, and 
then, after the latter's death in 1581, to Krist6f's son, Zsigmond, bestowing 
on these two lieutenants the title of voivode. Stephen himself took the title 
of prince of Transylvania, naturally, retaining the right to make the impor­
tant decisions himself. He established a separate Transylvanian chancellery 
in Cracow, and through this supervised and directed the activities of his 
voivodes.
Transylvania's foreign policy was conducted entirely by Bathory. Maxi­
milian and later Emperor Rudolph wanted to force him to adhere to the Speyer 
Accord, but he for his part demanded the return of the territories lost be­
tween 1564 and 1567. Neither side wished to become involved in war, but it 
was not until 1585 that an agreement was negotiated. (As a result of this, 
the extremely lucrative NagyMnya gold mine reverted to the prince.)
In the meantime, Bathory, a sovereign ruler as a result of his gaining the 
Polish throne, revived the idea — current during the time of the Szapolyais 
2 6 3  — that Hungary could be united from the east. When it seemed that Em­
peror Rudolph was terminally ill, Stephen repeatedly alluded during nego­
tiations with the nuncio Caligari to the idea that if the Turkish consented, 
Hungary would elect him as her king. Stephen certainly did have his sup­
porters in Hungary, and in contemporary correspondence, there are a few 
references to this possibility. But nothing was done to realize the plan. Nev­
ertheless, Bdthory's successors on the throne of Transylvania in the century 
to come, were all under the influence of his plans and achievements.
2. Economy, Society and Culture 
in the New State
The New State
Istvan Bathory died just sixty years after the Battle of Moh&cs. In those sixty 
years, Hungary had been partitioned into three, with the central territory 
annexed by the Turkish Empire, and the western and northern parts ruled 
by "Hungarian" kings from the House of Habsburg. The "identification" of 
the eastern territories, however, was more complex. John I had been "king 
of H ungary", Isabella "queen of Hungary", and their son, John II, was 
"electus, rex Hungariae”, or "king elect of Hungary" all his short life. The title 
of princeps, or prince, did not exist until it was first applied to John in the 
Speyer Accord of 1570, and the term "Transylvania" as the name determin­
ing the part of the country under Szapolyai rule was used only unofficially, 
simply to distinguish between the two "Hungarys" at this time. Sure enough, 
the Habsburgs refused to recognize the Szapolyais' royal title, firstly on 
account of their own election to the Hungarian throne, and later on account 
of the Varad, Gyula, and Nyi'rb&tor accords. Poland, France and Turkey, on 
the other hand, did recognize the Szapolyais, and the other European pow­
ers oscillated between these two positions, depending on their relationship 
with the Habsburgs at any given moment. The Hungarian people solved 
the problem of having two rulers by not only adding "Transylvaniae" to the 
title of one, but also by leaving the precise sense of Isabella's title unde­
fined: "regina" meant both a queen reigning in her own right, and queen 
consort. For his part, John II was spoken of as the "son of King John".
The Speyer Accord had been intended to resolve the constitutional mud­
dle by creating the title "prince of Transylvania". John II, or John Sigismund 
(this often used name was fixed on him originally by pro-Habsburg histori­
ans) died soon after the agreement, and with him the only dynasty with a 
legitimate claim to the titles of "king of Hungary", as well as "prince of 
Transylvania". When he was elected to rule Transylvania, Istvan B&thory 
relied on the old Hungarian legal system and chose the title of "voivode" 
which was formerly held by provincial governors. But while earlier voivodes 
were appointed to the office, Bathory had been elected as ruler by the Diet. 
B&thory, however, wished to protect the relative independence of his state 
and could not, of course, hide behind such a dubious title for long. What he
could not do as a "sim ple magnate" or as a ruler of doubtful legitimacy — 
that is, take the title "prince of Transylvania" — he was able to do when he 
became king of Poland. In addition he was able to make this title heredi­
tary, and to get it internationally recognized.
The difficulty experienced by the country and its rulers in finding legiti­
mate titles for themselves was matched by the difficulty of establishing a 
new machinery of government. Before 1526, when the Kingdom of Hun­
gary held a Diet, the nobles of the mother country either attended in person 
or were represented by county delegates. From Transylvania, on the other 
hand, went the jointly elected delegates of the counties, with the Saxons 
sending their own. (There is no data concerning the participation of the 
Szekelys at the Diets.) The province's internal affairs were managed at joint 
meetings of the Three Nations.
Under John I this system continued unchanged. The first Diet in Hun­
gary in which the Transylvanians, including the Szekelys, participated on 
equal terms, that is, personally and not just through representatives, were 
called by Friar George on 18 October, 1541 in Debrecen. After this the coun­
ties of the mother country and the Transylvanians again held their separate 
assemblies until 1544. Then, in August, a Diet of the Three Nations was 
called at Torda, with the participation of a fourth party enjoying full rights
— the deputies of the Tiszdntul counties and other counties along the Tisza 
River. From then on, the role of the Diet was appropriated in the eastern 
kingdom, the later principality, by the former provincial assembly of Transyl­
vania enlarged with representatives from the Partium.
The other legal successor of the earlier Hungarian Diet continued un­
changed in Habsburg Hungary and was to become an effective interest or­
ganization for the Estates by the early part of the sixteenth century. No 
taxes could be imposed, or laws passed, without its consent. Indeed, this 
Diet also went on to exercise a certain degree of control over the royal ad­
ministration. The Transylvanian Diet, too, performed these functions, at 
least in theory. In practice, however, its importance decreased more and 
more. Although the Transylvanian diets met quite frequently, up to four or 
five times a year, their composition altered. After 1545, the number of par­
ticipants from the Partium and the Transylvanian counties, the Szekely and 
Saxon seats, and individual towns constantly varied. Much more impor­
tant politically than these delegates to the Diet were the leading figures in 
the prince's government — his advisers and chief officials —, and a slightly 
larger group of eminent lords, the Regalists (regalistak) whom the ruler in­
vited personally to attend the Diet. The Regalists included, naturally enough, 
a number of big landowners, but the primary requirement for being chosen 
for this honour was popularity with the ruler.
The custom of convening the Diet at the request of the Estates was dis­
continued in Transylvania after 1556. Now only the ruler could call a Diet. 
It was he who determined the agenda, and his proposals were for the most 
part accepted without modification. The Estates made proposals concern­
ing local affairs only, and the outcome of these was always uncertain.
Foreign and military affairs now came under the ruler's authority, as did 
financial matters, with the sole exception of the imposition of taxes and
even this right was nominal. The former "liberties" of the Estates lived on, 
but to a lesser degree and purely in matters of local administration.
Only in exceptional cases did the Diet oppose the ruler's will, as for ex­
ample when the conflict between Isabella and Friar George raised the ques­
tion of who had the right to govern, or when "Voivode" Bathory, threat­
ened by the Bekes movement, was asked to honour the promises he had 
made when elected — although without result.
Nevertheless, the strengthening of the central power did not entail the 
modernization of the state administration. The state apparatus, which John 
I had organized in Buda on the exact lines of the pre-1526 model, disinte­
grated in the upheavals of the period 1540-1541. Even the small bureau of 
assistants to the Transylvanian voivode which Szapolyai had tried to up­
date before 1526 had ceased to exist.
In the midst of the chaos, Friar George established a unique chancellery 
responsible for everything relating to government, from financial affairs to 
diplomacy and military matters and from bestowing of estates to the ad­
ministration of justice. This office soon proved ineffective, and Friar George 
attempted in his last years to reorganize it by establishing a so-called "sm all 
chancellery" (cancellaria minor) for judicial matters. Its head, the protho- 
notarius, was still only the deputy of the chief justice (Friar George himself) 
at the time of the friar's ascendancy. After 1556, the prothonotarius became 
the first judge of the country; later, however, two men shared this post.
In 1556 Mih&ly CsSky was appointed as the first chancellor to head the 
"greater chancellery", and remained in this post until 1571. A separate treas­
urer was designated to supervise financial matters in conjunction with the 
chief tax collector and the chief tithe lessor. The ruler also appointed the 
leaders of the army (the most important posts were those of the captains of 
Varad, Deva, K6v£r and Huszt), as well as the foispans (comes supremi) of 
the counties and the Szekely officials. Only the Saxons were able to pre­
serve their right of self-government, to a greater or lesser extent.
In spite of this pronounced centralization, the state administration re­
mained quite archaic, primitive by comparison even with mediaeval Hun­
gary where much more clearly defined and efficient institutions had oper­
ated. The leading officials, with the exception of the chancellor, were little 
more than clerks and even the chancellor and his subordinates were unable 
to exercise anything like the amount of power required for up-to-date gov­
ernment. Their task was to implement the ruler's decisions and not to for­
mulate them. Most conspicuous in this respect was Istv&n Bathory's admin­
istration. Though exceptionally able men headed his Gyulafehervar chan­
cellery (Ferenc Forg^ch, Imre Sulyok and Farkas Kovacs6czy), the king en­
trusted Marton Berzeviczy who directed his "Transylvanian Chancellery" 
in Cracow, with the handling of the country's most important affairs.
Transylvania's main dignitaries were automatically members of the Royal 
Council, later the Prince's Council. This council had been modernized be­
fore 1526, with its members being partially elected by the Diet, and par­
tially chosen from specially trained secretaries from the royal court. In this 
way the royal power had been balanced both by the Diet and by profession­
als. John I, however, returned to the old, less defined council made up of
chief dignitaries and aristocrats. In 1542, the Three Nations wished to cre­
ate an elected twenty-two member council to restrain Queen Isabella (and 
especially Friar George). However, this resolution was never implemented, 
although it was passed repeatedly. Isabella and later John II chose their ad­
visers at will and eliminating thereby any possible supervision by the Estates.
If we look at these persons who may be termed the country's leaders at 
this time, we cannot help but be struck by how much they had changed. In 
John I's time, the key role was played by aristocrats attempting to strengthen 
their local power. During the rule of Friar George, the number of local power 
groups began to decline and after the 1560s these groups disappeared com­
pletely — partly because many (like Menyh&rt Balassa or the Perenyi fam­
ily) became disloyal and partly because, strangely and without apparent 
cause, the greatest families (for example the Dragffys or the Jaksicss) died 
out. The great lords of Transylvania proper (like the Kendis or Majl^ths) 
were left with only smaller estates. In addition, these traditional leaders 
were constantly obliged to share power with "foreign" (i.e. non-Transylva­
nian, and sometimes even non-Hungarian) courtiers — first with John I's 
close advisers and later with their descendants (for example Antal Verancsics 
from Dalmatia, or Orban Batthyany from Transdanubia). When these ad­
visers and the great lords died, their place was taken by "new m en": Mih&ly 
Csaky, a petty noble, rose to the office of chancellor; Tamas Varkocs from 
Silesia became captain of Varad. Then there were the Poles, Stanislaw Nie- 
zowski and Stanislaw Ligeza, who arrived in Isabella's retinue and the Ital­
ian Giorgio Blandrata, the Queen's personal physician. The list could be 
continued.
During Bathory's rule the situation changed only to the extent that sev­
eral former graduates of Padua were to be found among the most impor­
tant courtiers, and especially in the chancelleries. Among them was M&rton 
Berzeviczy, head of the Transylvanian Chancellery at Cracow who had been 
born in Upper Hungary. Others were Berzeviczy's two deputies (Farkas 
Kovacs6czy from Slavonia, and Pal Gyulay, a peasant raised to nobility). 
Yet another was the aristocrat Ferenc Forgach who had fled Hungary and 
who first became bishop of V&rad and then chancellor at Gyulafeherv^r (to 
be followed in this office by Kovacs6czy).
The development of Hungarian society before Moh&cs had clearly been 
leading to a strengthening of the Estates' role. After 1526 this process came 
to a halt in the eastern part of the country, where with the establishment of 
the Principality of Transylvania, the ruler's power became dominant once 
again. This was indicated not only in the machinery of power, and in the 
decrease in the number of those participating in power, but also by the 
ever-growing manifestation of despotism on the part of the ruler himself.
During the reign of Matthias Hunyadi or his immediate successors, the 
execution of members of the political elite had been quite rare, and later the 
Estates compelled the kings to adhere to this tradition in Habsburg-ruled 
Hungary. By contrast, Queen Isabella, as we have seen, simply extermi­
nated those aristocrats she considered to be dangerous, with the Diet pro­
nouncing the death sentence on them afterwards. Bathory also had execu-
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tions carried out after the Battle of Kerel6szentp£l, without bothering to 
consult the Estates at all — the semblance of legality being given by the 
prothonotarius who pronounced the verdict.
The fact that the ruler possessed so much power was due in part to the 
court's growing financial means. Friar George had laid down the founda­
tions for this primarily by increasing the size of the treasury's land hold­
ings. By the second half of the sixteenth century the prince's estates com­
prised 700 villages, or fifteen to twenty per cent of the country's territory. 
The largest seigniories were Gyulafeh£rv&r, D£va, V&rad, Gyalu, Fogaras, 
K6v3r, Gorg6ny, Kolozsmonostor, Szamosujv&r, Jen<5, Lugos, Kar&nsebes, 
Szekelyt^mad, Szekelybcinja, Zalatna, Huszt, and TOrcsv^r. To this were 
later added the enormous estates of the B&thorys. It is impossible to esti­
mate the monetary income from all these, but it is certain that through them 
the prince exercised direct control over a large part of the country. With 
such enormous lands to draw on, it was easy to put the treasury's affairs in 
good order.
Besides the takings from these immense estates, the income of the Transyl­
vanian treasury consisted of roughly regular revenues, that is of sums made 
up by the taxes levied on the serf households called portas, by those levied 
on the Saxons in two forms, by those of the Szekelys and the towns, further 
by the returns of the salt mines, and of the tolls and duties, of the gold 
exchange and the leasing of the titles. It can be estimated that the regular 
yearly revenues in the last third of the sixteenth century were as follows:
Together with the income from the treasury lands and the prince's pri­
vate estates, the total yearly income of the Transylvanian treasury was as 
much as 300,000 gold florins. Even with the heavy devaluation of money in 
the sixteenth century this is a vast sum if one considers that before 1526 the 
royal income was a mere 200,000 gold florins annually from the whole coun-
Clearly, the prince now had ample resources to support his increasingly 
expensive army. In spite of this military expenditure rose only moderately.
But while the small number of princely bodyguards — some one thousand 
to two thousand men — could be regarded as an up-to-date mercenary 
unit, the strengthening and maintenance of the border castles often necessi­
tated the collection of additional taxes. The 300,000 florins income covered 
the tribute due to the Turks (initially 10,000, but later 15,000 florins), the 2 6 8
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salaries of the leading dignitaries — the chancellor, the prothonotarius, the 
army commanders, and the councillors —, besides Istvan BSthory's always 
modest household expenses.
Why was the power of the Estates weaker in the new Transylvania than 
it had been in the old Hungary?
The first reason was political. The Principality of Transylvania devel­
oped gradually — not as a result of its own strength, but rather on account 
of Turkish pressure. Without Turkish intervention in 1529 the part-state of 
the Szapolyais would never have been bom; without Turkish intervention 
in 1541 it would not have survived, and without the campaigns of 1552- 
1556 it could not have been reorganized. King John, Friar George, and their 
successors accepted the Turkish alliance only because in their own experi­
ence eastern Hungary could not be sustained in opposition to the Turks. 
This forced acceptance of events masked fear and even aversion. When pres­
sure from the Estates for unification or the political situation in Europe al­
tered the delicate balance of the country, Transylvania was always ready to 
seek peace with the "other" Hungary tied to the Habsburgs, even if this 
meant to betray her powerful patron in Constantinople.
One should remember, of course, that the Turks, too, were hardly re­
nowned for their sincerity. Turkish policy towards Transylvania was geared 
toward preventing the unification of the two Hungarys. As long as the leaders 
of the new Transylvanian state refrained from promoting unification, Con­
stantinople permitted the country a large measure of independence, but 
any treason would always be immediately and ruthlessly punished. The 
Turks would then take more territories, as they did when they captured 
Buda in 1541, or when they overran the Temeskoz in 1552. If, on the other 
hand, the balance of power favoured the Turks, they would offer their "good 
will" in exchange for new concessions. The situation in the late 1540s and 
that in the early 1570s differed only in that in the 1570s the sultan demanded 
not just the strategic border fortresses but also an increase in the amount of 
taxes and "presents". In addition, claimants to the throne now sought sup­
port in Constantinople. The Porte's aim was to subjugate Transylvania, as it 
had done with Wallachia and Moldavia, and finally to incorporate them 
into the Ottoman Empire.
With the Turkish-Transylvanian alliance being as insincere as it was, it 
is not surprising that it enjoyed virtually no support in the country — in 
spite of the fact that the very establishment of the new state had rested on 
the connection with the Porte. Determined opposition from the Estates had 
prompted the attempts at unification in 1540-1541 and again in 1551-1556. 
Both attempts failed, and resulted in minor tragedies, but there were also 
two positive effects. Firstly, the attempts drew the Turks' attention to the 
fact that the proximity of the Habsburg power meant that the eastern part 
of Hungary could count on help if pressure from the Porte became too great. 
This threatened Transylvania's dependency of Constantinople and explains 
why, even in the early 1570s, the Turks made no such excessive demands 
on Transylvania as on the neighbouring Romanian voivodates. Secondly, 
these repeated failures made the Estates aware that they would have to 
269 accept an alliance with Turkey whether they liked it or not. What King John
had realized years before was now accepted first by the nobility of the 
Partium which was directly threatened, and later by the lords of Transylva­
nia as well.
Tension remained high among the Saxons who had strong ties with the 
German and Austrian domains, with the West, ties which were both eco­
nomic and emotional. Although their intellectuals, from Johannes Honterus, 
the Reformator, to the poet Christian Schaeseus, tried hard to hold on, against 
a newly-born German consciousness, to the old tradition that all the peo­
ples of Hungary belonged together, on Isabella's return in 1556, Szeben 
staged a genuine popular uprising against her. It claimed the life of the 
chief justice, Johannes Roth, who had allegedly agreed to a compromise. 
Only with great effort could the level-headed count of the Saxons Peter 
Haller, re-establish order and gain acceptance for Isabella.
The direction of development was clear but the end result by no means 
secure. Too much fear and coercion, and too many ulterior motives had 
contributed to it. Transylvania's rulers, and the Estates in whose name they 
exercised power, resolutely adhered to the idea of their state being part of 
Hungary. Their policy served the interests of Hungary as a whole and not 
just those of Transylvania, and this was true even during the rule of Istvan 
Bathory. The new country, although heeding its Turkish masters, would 
constantly attempt to unite with the kingdom, right up until 1690.
The second reason for the Estates' loss of influence in Transylvanian poli­
tics was social. For over a century (since 1437) the Three Nations had grown 
accustomed to cooperating within the province, but the differences, and 
even antagonisms, between them had not diminished. Many years would 
have to pass before they learned to regard themselves as the leaders of an 
autonomous state.
Only Istvan Majl&th's — unsuccessful — uprisings between 1539 and 
1541 represented an attempt to act on behalf of the whole province, the first 
such movement in centuries. More characteristically, following the coun­
try's unification in 1551, the Szekelys, the Saxons, and the Hungarians con­
tacted Ferdinand I separately, each paying their own taxes and raising their 
own standing armies. Conflict between Saxons and Hungarians arose re­
peatedly, irrespective of whether an emperor, a king, or a prince ruled 
Transylvania. The Szekelys were always ready to stage an uprising, thereby 
arousing the enmity of the rulers and the other two Nations. The nobility of 
the Partium was, by the very circumstance of the region's belated annexa­
tion, not included in the legal fiction of the Three Nations partnership. Be­
sides the fact that both the experience and the institutional framework of 
common political action were rudimentary, the Three Nations also had dif­
ferent interests. The proud nobles, the Saxons with their civic mentality, 
and the Szekelys with their free peasant status were all pulled in different 
directions on account of the differing privileges they enjoyed.
There was also a third reason for the Estates' loss of power: the compet­
ing forces were weak also on their own.
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The Transylvanian State and the Outside World 
in the Second Half of the Sixteenth Century
The new state of Transylvania evolved between 1529 and 1571. Its birth was 
as difficult as the establishment of its borders. The two Hungarys were for 
a long time interlinked like pieces of a jigsaw puzzle. Eventually, in 1571, 
the borders were marked out by the Speyer Accord. Then John II relin­
quished all the lands that lay inside Habsburg-controlled territories. In re­
turn he was awarded the counties of Maramaros, Kraszna, Kozep-Szolnok, 
and Bihar to be attached to Transylvania. These were the counties known as 
the Partium.
Though not included in the Speyer Accord, the Banat of Lugos and 
Kar&nsebes (a part of the Temeskoz) also passed to Transylvania, as did 
parts of the counties of Arad and Zar&nd at the western foot of the Bihar 
Mountains (these bordered on Turkish territory).
The Principality of Transylvania thus comprised some 38,600 sq miles of 
territory of which Transylvania itself contributed some 22,800 sq miles. As 
for its population, the absence of reliable data permits only a very rough 
estimate to be made, and the same is true for its ethnic relations.
Table 1. The population of the Principality of Transylvania 
at the end of the sixteenth century





Sz6kelyfOld 150,000 ? ? - 160,000
SzSszfOld ? 65,000 15,000 - 85,000
Counties 240,000 20,000 200,000 460,000
Partium 170,000 - 110,000 80,000 360,000
Total 560,000 90,000 330,000 85,000 1,065,000
By comparison, the territory of the pre-1526 Kingdom of Hungary com­
prised some 135,000 sq miles, and had an estimated population of over 4 
million.
The Principality of Transylvania, as it had developed during the course 
of the sixteenth century, was small compared to the old Hungary of which 
it had formed a part. In addition, the new state was exposed to a number of 
adverse foreign influences which it had no power to control.
First among these was the slow Turkish advance which brought about a 
continual state of war whether openly or implicitly, because Turkish troops 
did not balk at pillaging territories beyond their borders, actions which the 
Hungarian border detachments repaid in kind. Soon there was a strip of 
land which was taxed by both sides. The Turks were, even at the height of 
their power, unable to prevent incursions and the Hungarian ruling class
quickly learned to take advantage of the pillaging ventures. It asserted not 
only state authority, but also seignorial rights in territories under Turkish 
occupation: a state of affairs that was to have serious importance later dur­
ing the war of liberation. The Turks, on their part, were out to tax any land 
they could lay hands on — in line with the traditional tactics of wearing 
down their opponents.
Although Transylvania was allied to, and was a vassal of, the Porte, the 
double-tax zone existed also along their common border. The Turks laid 
claim  to territories well inside Transylvania, taxing all including the 
westernmost villages in Hunyad county. Fifty-three per cent for instance of 
Bihar county's taxpayers were laid under tribute by both Transylvanian 
and Turkish authorities.
The constant state of war had adverse effects on the new state's commer­
cial links. The main road which connected Transylvania with central Hun­
gary and, eventually Vienna (the route was Kolozsv&r-Debrecen or Nagy- 
v^rad-Szolnok-VSc-Pozsony-Vienna) was still much travelled after the 
Turks occupied the Great Hungarian Plain. Nevertheless, merchants now 
preferred to take a different route — from Kolozsvar to Kassa, and through 
the Vag Valley to Pozsony. Cracow was becoming Transylvania's second 
major trading partner after Vienna.
The fate of the trade route running from the lower Maros River through 
the Sava Valley into Dalmatia and on to Italy is not quite clear. Evidently 
the toll farm on it at Kar&nsebes was very valuable (in 1583 6,000; in 1588 
1,900 florins). However, this m ay be due to increased trade with the Bal­
kans. The roads leading from Beszterce, Brass6, or Szeben to the Romanian 
voivodates had become almost completely neglected by the middle of the 
sixteenth century. Beszterce's customs house, where the toll called harmincad 
(tricesima) was collected, was leased for ridiculously low sums: 200 florins 
in 1552, 70 florins in 1569 and 100-200 florins around 1574. While the cus­
toms house in Brass6 dealt with 167,000 florins worth of goods in 1503, by 
1530 the figure was a mere 33,000 florins (admittedly, Transylvania was 
engaged in a war at this time). Even during the second half of the sixteenth 
century the turnover of the Brass6 customs house never exceeded 80,000 
florins. With about half the commerce of Brass6, Nagyszeben's trade was 
also in decline.
A direct cause of the falling off of commerce was the Porte's restrictions 
on exports from Moldavia and Wallachia, which were obliged to supply 
Constantinople with food. On the other hand, an upswing in incomes from 
commerce at the end of the century was due to the renewed use of the 
Levantine trade route from the southern Ukraine to Transylvania.
Along the western borders of the Szapolyai territories, Friar George es­
tablished new customs houses, and after 1556 an effective foreign trade 
route with toll gates came into existence. In the absence of adequate data 
we can only estimate (from the 929 florins income of the relatively minor 
Zilah customs house in 1558) that its turnover must have been quite high. 
Of course, the Turks and later royal Hungary also set up customs houses on 
their new borders. Merchants going to the West from Transylvania across 
the Great Plain which then belonged to the Turkish Empire encountered
two new borders within Hungary, thus they had to pay tolls at four new 
places.
W ith foreign trade on the decline, less capital was invested in Tran­
sylvania. Salt was the principality's most lucrative resource, with rich mines 
in Vfzakna, Des, Torda and M&ramaros. In the early sixteenth century, the 
Fuggers had aspired to lease Transylvania's salt-mines; in the skirmishes of 
1528-1529, Gritti took over this profitable business and after the latter's 
death John I had Bavarian merchants join in. However, after 1541 the mines 
became the concern of not very wealthy local businessmen.
Similar was the fate of the gold mines reopened by Gritti in the Bihar 
Mountains: after initial success they were left unexploited. In Istvan Bathory's 
time some rather dubious Italian businessmen leased them. There is little 
data on iron and mercury extraction during the sixteenth century, although 
these were growing in importance later.
It was something more than caution which prevented w estern busi­
nessmen from investing in the embattled Carpathian Basin. Around 1546, 
for example, the Fuggers gave up even their relatively well-protected cop­
per mines in Upper Hungary. The real reason was that the Atlantic trade, 
spices from the East Indies, and precious metals from South America of­
fered faster and larger profits, something which the Fuggers, and others, 
were quick to realize. Aztec and Inca treasure reduced the demand for gold 
from European mines, and Transylvania experienced the effects of this at 
first hand.
At the same time, the Carpathian Basin now began to feel the effects of 
the "price revolution" — brought about by the influx of Spanish-American 
gold, an upswing in European industry, and a sudden rise in the popula­
tion of western European towns. In the international division of labour the 
region ranked among the great deliverers of food and raw materials. Be­
tween 1520 and 1580, the price of cattle, the most important export item at 
the time, tripled. The price of wine quadrupled in the same period. The cost 
of grain, which was not exported, rose fivefold as a result of the general 
price increases during these years.
The distant and small state of Transylvania was only marginally affected 
by the general development of Europe. The Saxons alone knew modern 
methods of working the land, but the Szekelys were just beginning to rest 
the soil every third year. Only at the end of the sixteenth century did inter­
est in vegetable and fruit production increase in Transylvania accompanied 
by the first experiments in stabling animals and growing fodder.
Grain could not be exported because of the distance to western markets 
which, in addition, lay upstream along navigable rivers. Cattle from the 
Great Hungarian Plain had a better taste than those from Transylvania, be­
sides being nearer to their markets. Transylvanian wine experienced com­
petition from the newly-established Tokaj vineyards, and salt was also ex­
ported from Cracow.
Transylvania's balance of trade accordingly remained in deficit. Imported 
industrial goods, such as cloth, tools, weapons, or luxury items, could not 
be paid for even if the volume of imports were reduced. Only the gold 
mines brought in small sums, but with South American competition they
could never become really lucrative as continuing inflation lowered the value 
of gold coins. The country introduced a series of desperate price regula­
tions during the second half of the sixteenth century, but these were insuffi­
cient to remedy the problem.
Saxon and Hungarian Towns
Hungary in the past had only a few towns and these were quite small. In 
the Transylvania province however, towns were relatively numerous. Be­
sides the leading Saxon settlements Segesv&r, Sz&szv&ros, and Beszterce, 
Kolozsvar, Des, Tor da, Marosvas^rhely, and Gyulafehervar also employed 
various privileges. The Partium was again more like Hungary generally: 
two of its urban settlements, V£rad and Debrecen, were not towns by rights, 
and the third, Nagyb&nya, had mining town privileges.
As commerce with the West became more difficult, and as the other 
Hungarian towns — Kassa, Buda and Pest — were cut off and no longer 
presented any competition, the Saxon towns gained in economic impor­
tance. In addition, with the union of the Three Nations, the Saxons' self- 
government now became one of the cornerstones of politics as conducted 
by the Estates of the new state.
The leadership of the Saxons remained unambiguously in the hands of 
their patricians, also after the evaluation of the principality. The great mer­
chant families, the Hallers, Rapolts, Armbrusters, Offners, and Lulays, con­
stituted the social elite. Social discontent, as expressed in the 1556 Szeben 
uprising, surfaced only rarely. In the guilds Saxon craftsmen competed ef­
fectively with their Hungarian counterparts, and south-eastern Europe's 
first cloth manufactory was established in Brass6 in the 1570s.
Even in the years of upheaval, Saxon towns continued to develop into 
increasingly beautiful places, with wooden houses being rapidly superseded 
by stately stone edifices. Saxon gold- and silversmiths created exquisite 
objects to satisfy demanding customers, who in these troubled times may 
have wished to invest their money in items which could be easily hidden or 
taken to safety.
The population of these towns increased only slowly, however. By the 
end of the sixteenth century Brassb had only 8,000-9,000 inhabitants, up 
from 7,000 in less than a hundred years, while Szeben had no more than
6,000 people. Other towns boasted no more than 2,000-3,000 inhabitants.
One reason for the slow growth was the Saxons' traditional desire for seg­
regation. Hungarian craftsmen and merchants were prohibited from set­
tling in their towns, and family connections were kept up only with Ger­
mans, either in Hungary or in the Holy Roman Empire. The Saxons's origi­
nal protectiveness of their privileges acquired political overtones in the years 
around the Battle of Moh£cs, when the Saxons tended to support the 
Habsburgs' cause. Simultaneously, they were determined to restrict the 
numbers of the privileged burgher population.
Slow growth was also due to the fact that, although Transylvania had a 
relatively dense network of towns, this was supported by only a sparsely 274
populated and economically undeveloped hinterland. When Transylvania 
broke away from the mother country, local craftsmen were quick to fill the 
void, but with isolation from the West came a series of economic problems. 
Rising prices were accompanied by a shortage of money, and the tradi­
tional Saxon markets in Moldavia and Wallachia were now scarcely acces­
sible. The initial economic upswing ground to a halt.
New competitors appeared from the Turkish Empire. Greek, Turkish, 
Armenian, Romanian and Serbian merchants brought in cheap wares. Sta­
ple rights offered little defence against these goods which were produced 
for local use only especially since the "intruders" avoided the mandatory 
transportation routes. The figures listed in the previous chapter on tolls 
collected at Kardnsebes, reflect the situation at this time.
There was also competition from the country's non-Saxon burghers. But 
the Hungarian towns of Des, Torda, Marosv^sdrhely and Gyulafeherv&r 
had no staple rights and no major trade routes passed through them. Of the 
non-Saxon towns, only Kolozsvar, which earlier had a Saxon majority but 
whose population was now increasingly Hungarian, got a key role in the 
new country's commerce. Both main roads to the West, via Kassa and via 
Vdrad, began here. The town's merchants took advantage of these roads 
and, in order to express their appreciation for their increasing profits, stressed 
their support for the Szapolyais, at the same time giving vent to anti-Saxon 
sentiments. In return for its support, in 1558 Queen Isabella re-awarded 
Kolozsv&r the staple rights it had lost in 1437. The Balkan merchants, to­
w ards whom  the Saxons had been so inhospitable, proved useful for 
Kolozsv&r: the goods they brought into Transylvania by circumventing 
Szeben and Brass6 were in great demand on the town's market. Although 
the Saxons repeatedly secured decrees from the Diet (in 1556, 1560, 1571, 
and 1591) to limit the freedom of move of Armenian, Greek, and other Bal­
kan merchants, these remained ineffective — partly because other towns 
that profited from the foreigners' presence were unwilling to enforce them.
By the end of the sixteenth century, Kolozsv&r's population of 9,000-
10,000 exceeded that of Brass6, the largest Saxon town. Construction work 
was even livelier in Kolozsv&r with what amounted to miniature palaces 
being built in quick succession. The finest of those that have partially sur­
vived is the so-called Wolphard-Kakas House. The masons of these found 
their models in the prince's newly erected palaces in nearby Kolozsmonostor 
and Gyalu. Istvan B^thory even had Italian architects design a university 
building to be erected in Kolozsvar. Furniture and fittings were fashioned 
in the new Renaissance style, as in Saxon residences. Comfort came to ac­
quire an importance hitherto unknown.
No other town was able to develop as spectacularly as Kolozsvar. Con­
ditions were nowhere so favourable. Of the other two major Hungarian 
towns, Varad had originally been the centre of a diocese, rising to the rank 
of a civitas only in 1556. Debrecen remained a borough with only limited 
rights of self-government, under control of the landowner on whose prop­
erty it lay.
Varad was traditionally one of the main settlements of the Tiszantul, an 
important stopping place on the road from Kolozsvar to Vienna, and where 
from the 1540s onwards deliberate fortification works took place up until
the Fifteen Years' War. Although there are no precise data, we know that 
the town was considered quite wealthy, and that many burghers from Pest 
moved there to escape the Turks.
For Debrecen's rapid development there is no convincing explanation.
At a geographically insignificant location and situated in a not very fertile 
area of the Great Hungarian Plain, Debrecen had 1,300 paying portas and an 
estimated population of 20,000 in the middle of the sixteenth century. It 
was therefore by far the largest town both in Transylvania and in the King­
dom of Hungary.
In the Great Hungarian Plain, with no royal free town anywhere near, 
settlements that acquired the right to hold fairs became centres for serfs 
working in industry or trade. These town-dwelling peasants soon realized 
the business opportunities afforded by cattle and wine. As the nobility 
shunned anything to do with trade or money, and as the royal free towns 
showed no interest in such lowly pursuits, the inhabitants of Debrecen, called 
"cives", like those of most market towns boroughs, soon controlled the cat­
tle and wine trades. Pastures surrounding the town were expanded and the 
herds raised on the Plain of Hortob&gy elevated Debrecen to the level of an 
economic power. Debrecen's commercial links extended as far as Cracow,
Vienna, Briinn and Breslau.
The phenomenon of serfs participating in international trade was un­
precedented. In contrast, the other great export item, Polish grain, was not 
sent the market by serfs, but by the manors of the Polish nobility. Because of 
the shortage of labour in Poland, the feudal service was increased substan­
tially, with the result that the nobility there remained in power for centu­
ries, and social mobility was non-existent. In Hungary, on the other hand, 
the growing prosperity of the market towns provided the peasants with an 
opportunity to establish farms. Feudal landownership was negatively af­
fected by the fact that serfs who were sinking into poverty left their hold­
ings (sometimes the entire vicinity of a village), and these were then leased 
by the inhabitants of the market towns. The result was that the landowners 
were no longer paid feudal dues on these holdings.
With the dismemberment of Hungary in the late 1520s, the Great Hunga­
rian Plain with its many market towns found itself on the periphery of the 
war zone. Then with the fall of Buda, this region disintegrated and came 
under different authorities. Constant battles took place along the new bor­
ders and even in times of peace incursions were common, hampering com­
mercial activity. The practice of double taxation in the border areas meant a 
heavy burden for the population, and the animosity between Transylvania 
and the Habsburg territories had additional negative effects. For example,
Debrecen, which gradually became the economic centre of the Tisz&ntul, 
not only owed services to its landlords, but, after 1567, also paid taxes to 
the Principality of Transylvania (3,200 florins yearly) to Constantinople (2,000 
florins yearly), and to the royal government (1,000 florins per annum).
In spite of this, the boroughs experienced no perceptible decline. In Bek6s 
county, wedged between Transylvania and the territory under Turkish rule, 
there were these important market towns (Gyula, Sim&nd, and Bekes) which 
actually flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century. The cives there 2 7 6
paid their ninth in money and their robot was well below the one day per 
week decreed in 1514. Even so seignorial income there reached several thou­
sand florins annually — primarily from the taxes put on the commerce in 
horses and cattle.
Although we have no specific data on the market towns of Transylvania, 
there is no reason to believe that they fared differently. On the other hand, 
it would be unreasonable to think that their prosperity, which continued 
until the last decade of the sixteenth century, stemmed primarily from eco­
nomic reasons. The constant state of war, multiple taxation, and the grow­
ing arbitrariness of landowners desperate to save their economic position 
forced the serfs of villages to leave their homes. These people initially sought 
protection in the larger, more secure settlements, the market towns; when 
these became threatened as well, the wealthier left again. For example, after 
1552 most of the citizens of Szeged moved to Nagyszombat, Kassa and 
Debrecen.
Transylvania was severely affected by the continual unrest. Many fac­
tors inhibited the development of peasant commodity production: the coun­
try was far from western markets, its pastures were poorer than those of 
the Great Hungarian Plain, and its wine inferior to that made in Tokaj. In 
addition, the dense network of Saxon towns also constituted an obstacle. 
The Saxons repeatedly blocked any progress toward peasant commodity 
production, referring to their privileges. In the early 1520s, for example, 
Brass6 initiated litigation which lasted several years against nearby Sepsi- 
szentgyOrgy, with the result that the latter was deprived of its right to hold 
a market. Only settlements with exceptionally good chances were able to 
rise above the general level: places such as Torda and Des situated near rich 
salt mines acquired market town rights. At the beginning of the principality 
period these were even regarded as towns, although they would not have 
gained this position had they not been situated on the king's — and later 
the prince's — estates. Another pseudo-town to become wealthy was Maros- 
vas&rhely, one of the most important market in non-Saxon Transylvania 
and the commercial centre of the Szekely Nation.
The degradation of market towns on the Great Hungarian Plain under 
Turkish rule and the flight of the populace which resulted from the renewed 
Turkish advance meant that the Transylvanian state lost its socially and 
economically most promising population strata at the moment of its birth. 
This put an end to the development of the Hungarian towns founded on 
agricultural commodity productions. John I still could count on the cives as 
an important economic force: in 1529 he raised Lippa to the status of a royal 
free town, and in 1529 he repopulated Buda, whose German burghers had 
fled, with Hungarian peasants. He did the same with Kassa in 1538, and in 
1530 and 1536 he re-established the serfs' right to free migration, which had 
been revoked in 1514. Obviously, John, in his turn, received financial and 
intellectual support from the cives. His successors, however, did not con­
cern themselves with the affairs of this group. Debrecen remained alone in 
its spectacular development and the other market towns trailed a long way 
behind it with regard both to population size and economic weight. In 1569, 
Tasn&d had 319 tax-paying portas, and Kraszna only 281, which means that 
2 7 7  their total population must have been fewer than four thousand souls.
The Serfs
A serf class in the classical, feudal sense had come into being in Transylva­
nia by the end of the fourteenth century — later than in the other Hungar­
ian territories. As the new state developed, the peasantry continued to di­
vide into different groups. Earlier the cives of Transylvania-ruled Tiszintul 
were mentioned but the rights of the free Saxon peasants and those of the 
arms-bearing Sz6kelys differed from those of serfs proper. Traditionally, 
however, serfs were grouped into three categories; the copyholders called 
telkesjobbagy in Hungarian who were under the obligation to pay various 
taxes in kind or in money to the landlords; the freeholders called szabados 
who, though possessing a farming holding under seignorial authority, were 
exempt for the most various reasons from all or some duties to the land­
owners; and finally people called cotter (zseller), who either lived in the 
households of copyholders or managed some sort of enterprises without 
direct obligations to the landlord.
Among copyholders differentiation resulted from such factors as size of 
family, quality of land, skills, and, often, luck. In the more developed Hun­
garian counties the "holdings" called telekin  Hungarian were already mostly 
halved by the fifteenth century, but in the villages of Transylvania undi­
vided teleks were still relatively numerous as late as the mid-sixteenth cen­
tury, when they constituted thirty-five per cent, for instance of the total in 
the seigniory of Szamosujvar, sixty-five per cent in the area around Kdvir, 
and sixty to ninety per cent in Erd<5d, in the Partium. The primary reason 
for this was probably the low density of population. Considering, however, 
that sheep and cattle breeding were important here, size of holdings cannot 
be regarded as adequate for categorizing the serf population. Unfortunately, 
there is no data on what ratio of the livestock was in the possession of serfs.
The second group, the freeholders, included those serfs who worked as 
the servants of the lord, some artisans and tradesmen (for example fisher­
men and butchers), and village leaders of various statuses. The third group 
also showed diversity. In most seignories these were the poor, often newly- 
arrived farm hands, who had no holdings. Legally, those cives who lived 
from dealing in cattle or growing wine and who had given up their hold­
ings to do this were also zsellers. However, as they were quite well-to-do, 
they did not really belong to this group in any but a legal sense. Neither did 
those clerks, called deak who were literate to some degree and worked for 
seigniories or in the market towns.
The differences that existed between and within the different layers of 
the peasants living under seignorial authority were not necessarily differ­
ences in wealth. Actually in many places the zsellers had to perform less 
services than other serfs, and their duties were set out in contracts. Moreo­
ver, they could gain exemption from these duties by paying a lump sum to 
the landlord. Since there was enough land available, there was no need to 
subdivide holdings until they were no longer large enough to support a 
family and this hindered the growth of the proportion of zsellers generally. 
In Habsburg-ruled Hungary, 25 per cent of the serfs were zsellers at this 
time but in Transylvania and the Partium the figure was between five per 
cent and twenty per cent.
The amount of taxes owed to the state varied considerably. Rating was 
for whole villages, with local justices determining its distribution by family. 
The basis for imposition was either the holding or the number of draught 
oxen, and in some places a direct tax to be paid to the lord was also added. 
Thus the amount of tax varied from area to area, although it was usually 
less than the one florin per head of family laid down in the law of 1514. 
Even the devaluation of money seems to have had no effect on this: the tax 
for the market town of Tasn&d was 1,000 florins in 1569 and the same sum 
twenty years later, and the treasury income from the Kolozsmonostor sei­
gniory was around 180 florins both in 1580 and in 1599.
Similarly diverse were the agricultural commodities which had to be 
handed over as payment in kind. Oats were mandatory everywhere and 
wheat in most places, with chicken, pigs, sheep, eggs, honey, vegetables, 
fruit and firewood also being required in some locations. The amounts to 
be handed over rose slowly as the century wore on.
More general was the payment to the landlord of the ninth, or nona. The 
Transylvanian Diet of 1549 upheld the 1514 law on the ninth, which at the 
time had been considered a novelty. Until the mid-sixteenth century is was 
collected only in the Partium, and even there it did not reach the proportion 
required by the law. Later on, collection became stricter: in the seigniory of 
Gyula the nona yielded 400-500 florins in 1526-1527, but thus had risen to 
almost 2,000 florins by 1562.
The title until the early 1540s preserved its original function of providing 
the church with income. Almost all types of produce were collected, from 
grain and fruit to wine and pigs. Later, political necessity resulted in change. 
In 1542 the Diocese of Gyulafehervar fell vacant, with its income going to 
the treasury. Then, in 1556, the tithe of the Diocese of Vdrad followed suit. 
The practice however of leasing out the collection of the tithe, usually to the 
lord from whose peasant it was due, was continued also by the treasury.
A further difference in the circumstances of the peasantry in different 
parts of the principality resulted from the variance in the corvee (robot) 
they were forced to perform. The Transylvanian Estates traditionally main­
tained that the relationship between lord and serf was a private affair. They 
kept this to such an extent that they refused to pass a law regulating the 
robot and never referred to the law of 1514 which set the level of it at one 
day per week. Some estates allocated robot on a head of household basis, 
others according to the number of draught animals owned. In the second 
half of the century, though, the burden of robot increased. In the estate of 
Fogaras for instance, in 1508 two days of hay-making had been required 
annually, in addition to bringing in two cartloads of wood. In 1570 this was 
augmented by three days of harvesting per year. And in 1596 the serfs were 
complaining about having to do work around the manor as well. In 1556, 
when the Dragffys owned the market town of Csehi in the county of Szilagy, 
the serfs had only to cart supplies to the castles of Erd6d and K6var. When 
Gyorgy Bcithory became the new lord, he demanded ploughing and har­
vesting, even going so far as to dispose of the manor's own ploughs. In 
another of Bathory's seigniories, at Beltek, which he had also inherited from 
the Dragffys, all demesnial work had to be done by means of robot and the 
2 7 9  vineyards which had earlier been cultivated by hired hands were also worked
in the same way. In addition, no limit was set for the number of days manual 
labour was to be performed, and each serf had to work "according to his 
ability" (pro facultate).
By the end of the century labour "according to ability", which was effec­
tively unlimited in duration, was common throughout Transylvania. The 
labour required was no longer specified in terms of the time to be spent on 
it, but rather in terms of the tasks to be completed. Some seigniories de­
manded what amounted to labour every third day, three times the level 
laid down in the law of 1514, and which even then had been considered 
excessive.
There was in the meantime another type of work which also fall to the lot 
of the serfs. Because of continuing wars, the borders of the new state had to 
be fortified, and the construction of castles — and places — required a great 
deal of manpower. This gave rise to a new kind of manual labour in the 
form of castle service. It soon became obligatory and unlimited, as was the 
traditional labour service.
There was a definite decline in the legal protection the serfs had enjoyed. 
Instead, there were now restrictions on their freedom to move, and no real 
maximum on the labour that could be required. That all this did not result 
in extensive poverty was due only to the fact that the mountainous borders 
were difficult to supervise, and the continuing availability of new land left 
the serfs with ways to protect themselves. They could run away from their 
lord, peasant holdings could be bought and sold with the permission of the 
landowner, and purchased and newly-cleared land could change hands 
freely. This enabled the serfs to b eir not only the growing burden of socage 
but also the increasing state taxes called dica.
The uniform dica system changed only slowly. In 1543 the dica had to be 
paid by those serfs with wealth of three florins or more. This amount rose 
to six florins in 1552, when the porta was no longer a serf's holding but 
merely a unit of taxation. Draught animals constituted the basis for taxa­
tion, with six florins being the tax on a pair of oxen. The tax was usually one 
florin per porta until the 1540s, just 60 dinars in 1545, again one florin in 
1550, and finally, after 1556 two florins annually.
As early as 1540, however, there were added taxes for the upkeep of the 
border castles, the tribute for the Turks, the construction of new castles and 
for military expenses in general. These amounted to a total of three florins 
per porta.
Throughout the period every eighth to sixteenth head of household was 
recruited for military service. Their troops were the telekkatonasdg (military 
from the telek). Istvan Bathory even ordered the review of them twice a 
year. But by the 1560s this sort of levee en masse was no longer required. The 
diets forgot about it, and even during the Fifteen Years War which began in 
1593 it was not reinstituted.
Modem warfare required a well-trained standing army. For this reason 
a new layer of freemen arose from the ranks of the serf soldiers: these were 
the darabonts (guardsmen), who were gradually relieved of labour duties 
by the rulers. They constituted a cheap and readily available army which 
had ties neither to serfs nor to the nobility and which was therefore ready to 
serve only the prince. 280
34. The north facade of the chapel of J4nos LAz6i at Gyulafeh6rvAr, 1512
35. Detail of John Sigismund's sarcophagus in the GyulafehervSr cathedral, around 1571
36. Wooden belfry at MezScs^vSs, second half of the sixteenth century
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37. The map of Honterus on Transylvania, 1532
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Filip, on the Nagyszeben Gospels, 1546
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41. Portrait of Istvan Bocskai. Copper engraving, 1605-1606
After the middle of the sixteenth century the lives of serfs became in­
creasingly difficult. Ordinary Transylvanian peasants who had never been 
able to link themselves into commodity production were now increasingly 
unable to do so. They were mere passive observers, or even victims of the 
tragic events that befell Hungary, and of the rise of the new state in which 
they lived. Throughout the period, serfs were never a political factor, not 
even the cives of the Partium.
The Romanians
Turkish conquest and the continuing wars with the Habsburgs determined 
the western borders of the new Transylvanian state in such a way that it 
incorporated all the Romanian-inhabited territories of the former Kingdom 
of Hungary. The process by which the Romanians gradually gave up their 
transhumant lifestyle in favour of agriculture, continued throughout the 
sixteenth century together with their sometimes changing religion and lan­
guage. Assimilation was slow and devoid of violence, as a result of which it 
is difficult to trace the fate of the Romanians, who became serfs in the clas­
sical sense of the term.
The assimilation of Romanians that did occur was offset by the large 
numbers of people who migrated to the principality from Moldavia and 
Wallachia in the last third of the sixteenth century. With the collapse of 
mediaeval Hungary, these two voivodates had lost a neighbour which, al­
though it had regarded them as client states, had counterbalanced the power 
of the Porte. There was incessant competition for the thrones of these two 
defenceless Romanian states. The Porte took advantage of their weakness 
and tightened the pressure on them still further, stationing permanent gar­
risons in Moldavia and Wallachia, and always offering the position of 
voivode to the candidate who offered the greatest amount of tax and who 
promised to be the most subservient. In Wallachia this meant for instance 
that there were nineteen different voivodes in sixty-four years, and only 
two of them died of natural causes. Along with general instability came an 
ever-increasing tax burden which in turn led to the massive flight of the 
shepherds and peasants from there.
The immigrants into Transylvania journeyed along the ancient roads on 
the lower slopes of the mountains. But the population of these areas had 
grown considerably over the past centuries. Newcomers therefore settled 
on the poorer pastures which earlier had been used only occasionally. A 
Romanian-populated belt of territory took shape from M iram aros through 
the Belenyes Basin and the snowy peaks of Gyalu to the county of Hunyad, 
the Szorenyseg and Fogaras. As the Habsburg official, Zacharias Geizkoffler, 
noted in 1602: "Earlier there were only a few Romanian villages but now 
these are greatly multiplied, for as opposed to the desolation of the plains, 
the mountainous land is very much developed".9
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The search for land and settlement took place in an organized manner: a 
kenez or voivode would lead the group of immigrants who would come to 
an agreement with their new seignior as to where they would live and the 
services they would own. When a new village was established, both the ruler 
and the lord would grant a set of temporary exemptions from taxes and ser­
vices, realizing that a large working population served the interests of all.
The still predominant transhumant lifestyle of the Romanians, however, 
did not make for prosperity and for agriculture forced by the landowners 
upon the newcomers who were left only poor-quality land. Moreover, the 
peasants from Moldavia and Wallachia were backward when it came to 
farming skills. As opposed to the local population which increasingly prac­
tised crop rotation, the immigrants went in only for rotational grazing. A 
necessary consequence of this was that Romanian peasants ranked among 
the poorer inhabitants of Transylvania.
Their language of course had been immaterial during the Middle Ages. 
Although villages had been designated as Saxon, Hungarian, or Romanian 
(possessio hungaricalis, saxonicalis or walachicalis), this referred not to the lan­
guage used there but to the services owed and the villagers' legal status. A 
serf's ethnic origin was only one of the factors determining his status, and 
all villages were, in fact, ethnically mixed.
In one respect, however, the Romanian villages enjoyed an advantage 
over Hungarian or Saxon ones: since they were not Catholic, they did not 
have to pay the tithe. At the most Romanians who adopted the Catholic 
religion were forced to do so, and of course those settling on "Christian 
soil", as it was the custom since mediaeval times and then decreed by the 
Diet in 1559.
The Romanian peasants on the Fogaras estate found themselves in a dif­
ferent situation. There is no indication that they paid the fiftieth, perhaps 
because the seignior, the voivode of Wallachia, was such a long way off. 
They were, however, required to pay a tax in the form of "fish money" or 
"silver money", and here the serf was not termed as a "colonus", or "iobagio", 
but, following the terminology of Wallachia, a "vecin".
The rise of Romanians into the higher ranks of society continued in me­
diaeval fashion. A case of elevation to noble status was that of Mikl6s Olah, 
the most prominent sixteenth-century Romanian Transylvanian. Born in 
Szeben to parents who had come from Wallachia, Ol&h was brought up to 
become a Catholic priest, and eventually got to be archbishop of Esztergom, 
the head of the Roman Catholic Church of Hungary. As a renowned hu­
manist, Olah regarded himself as a "Hungarus". His main writings dealt 
with the condition of Hungary, with Attila, the king of the Huns, and King 
Matthias; they proclaim the ideals of the Hungarian nobility.
The Decline of the Szekely Community
While centuries of development had produced a feudal system in the sur­
rounding communities, as late as the beginning of the sixteenth century, the 
Szekelys still preserved their ancient rights. They kept their village commu­
nity and levee en masse. They also retained their system under which landed 2 8 2
property reverted to the community on the death of its owner, as well as 
the autonomy which made all these things possible. The "dkorsiites" ("brand­
ing of the oxen" was, as before this time, an indirect and rarely-performed 
obligation which, in any event, did not compromise the Szekelys' exemp­
tion from taxes since the oxen to the king were always regarded as gifts. 
Szekely society continued to be organized into three strata.
As, however, the population increased, land became so scarce that more 
and more Szekelys had to accept employment with the better-off families. 
What began as voluntary service gradually turned into servitude by the 
end of the fifteenth century. Several Szekely officials on the other hand joined 
the ranks of the Hungarian nobility and acquired estates in the royal coun­
ties. The next generation would attempt to turn the Szekely inheritance into 
feudal estates, including the lands of those who had voluntarily entered the 
family's service.
At first, development in this direction had practical, rather than legal, 
ramifications, but after the Battle of Moh&cs the situation changed. The 
Szekely territories — the Szekelyfold — became an important part of the 
Szapolyai kingdom, and continuing warfare demanded increased military 
service from the Szekelys. At the same time, the financially-embarrassed 
Szapolyai administration was obliged to impose special taxes on them as 
early as the reign of King John I, while Friar George taxed them because of 
the tribute demanded by the Turks.
The otherwise bellicose Szekelys watched passively as their ancient rights 
were curtailed, probably because of the ever-present threat of war. A 1554 
law exempted the primores and the lofos from taxation, and put them on a 
par with the nobility in this respect. At the same time, the very poor, who 
were in their service, also received tax exemption. On the other hand, all 
foot soldiers, thepixidarii, who were considered freemen, were taxed, which 
resulted in a double burden of military and monetary obligations. On her 
return to power in 1556, Queen Isabella braced herself for a long and diffi­
cult struggle. As a result, the diets that met in the following years passed a 
series of laws on the Szekelys' tax liability and mandatory military service. 
Taxes were sometimes imposed on the entire Szekely Nation and some­
times by portas. In 1557 the Diet also passed a law which decreed that a 
majority vote of two Nations was also legally binding on the third.
The liberty of Szekely commoners was actually limited to two areas: they, 
too, could serve as jurors, and those who had so far avoided undertaking 
service could not be subordinated to a lord and remained exempt from 
labour. On the other hand, in 1559 it was decreed that elected military and 
law court officials of the Szekely seats, jurors included, were to come under 
the supervision of the chief justice, kirdlybiro appointed by the ruler.
This series of laws merely sanctioned a process that had affected Szekely 
society in the previous half century. "Modernization", in other words, the 
introduction of feudalism, which was inevitable, now received a legal ba­
sis. The state got its way, and, in return, the Szekely commoners retained 
their personal freedom.
Their double obligations, however, caused discontent among thepixidarii, 
who were ready to turn against the privileged upper strata. The fact that 
their position deteriorated only gradually delayed the explosion, until a 
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In December of 1561, Menyh&rt Balassa went over to the Habsburgs. The 
sudden conversion was carefully prepared, and the ringleaders approached 
the Szekelys, promising them the restoration of their "ancient liberties".
Many Szekelys took up arms in the spring of 1562, but by then John II had 
lost the Battle of Hadad and, as a result, had concluded a peace with 
Ferdinand I's envoys. The Szekelys were not informed of the agreement, 
and John's troops were forced to engage them, scattering a smaller detach­
ment near Gorgeny. After this the larger body stationed near the village of 
Holdvilag broke up. The principal leaders were impaled, and many others 
had their hands, noses, or ears cut off.
The Sz6kely question was obviously a critical one and John II attempted 
to settle it at the Diet held in Segesv^r on 20 June, 1562. First of all he or­
dered a series of reprisals, suspending the Szekelys' court of appeal which 
operated in Udvarhely, and ruling that commoners could no longer serve 
as jurors in the law courts of the seats. He abolished the Szekelys' special 
local military and legal offices; these duties were now taken over by the 
kiralybiro. The mining and sale of salt were declared a state monopoly, and 
the law which said that Szekelys guilty of treason would have to turn their 
landed property over to the ruler was upheld, which meant that such prop­
erty would cease to be the possession of the Szekelys' community. Lastly,
John II made it the sovereign's prerogative to bestow the rank of primor or 
primipilus on common Szekelys.
Of much greater consequence, although not set down in law, was the 
measure by which the foot soldiers were no longer under compulsory mili­
tary service. With this the Szekelys lost the legal justification for the liber­
ties they had traditionally claimed. John II also decreed in 1562 that free 
Szekelys without means to perform military service were to be royal serv- 
ant-people thus relieved of military duties and seigniorial services. Perhaps 
this ruling was originally intended to prevent the Szekelys from sinking 
into serfdom. But just four years later, in 1566, the king consigned them by 
the hundreds to seigniors, primores, and pritnipili, who treated them as serfs 
and demanded the usual services from them.
The elimination of Sz6kely foot soldiers as such from the military organi­
zation of Transylvania was directly compensated for by the serf army. Those 
who were called darabont and puskas (gunner) elsewhere were called "red 
darabont" (because of the colour of their uniforms) in Sz6kely territory.
Szekelys perhaps enjoyed an advantage within this army: because of their 
experience and traditional skills, they made better soldiers than did other 
serfs.
Had it not been for these measures, the introduction of feudalism would 
probably have been delayed even more and this would have caused even 
greater instability. Ancient Szekely liberties were at odds with the feudal 
system and posed a serious threat to the tranquillity of the state, as indi­
cated by the repeated, and externally supported Szekely revolts.
There were no illusions about the fact that rights which had been in ef­
fect for centuries could not possibly be annulled by a mere stroke of the 
pen. With this in mind, John II had two castles constructed in the territory 
to keep an eye on the perpetually discontented Szekelys. The castle in 284
Udvarhely was named "Sz^kelyt^mad" ("Sz6kely-assault"), the one in 
H&romszek "Szekelyb^nja" ("Szekely-regret").
When Istv&n Bathory came to the throne the Szekelys entertained hopes 
that their ancient liberties would be restored, especially since their leaders 
were also dissatisfied with having lost their offices, and resented the pres­
ence of the Hungarian nobles who had settled in the Szekelyfold. In 1571, a 
group of Szekely commoners actually staged an armed revolt but over­
whelming force again compelled them to submit. When G£sp3r Bekes or­
ganized his campaign in 1575 the exasperated Szekelys joined in, but after 
the Battle of KereldszentpSl retributions followed, finally crushing opposi­
tion for a quarter of a century.
As a results of coercion on the part of the state, the transformation of 
Szekely society was nearly complete. Szekely liberties were not forgotten, 
however, and these flashes of remembrance foreshadowed the disturbances 
that were to come.
Power and those Who Held it
The nascent Principality of Transylvania was handicapped by its isolation, 
it was weighed down by monetary and financial difficulties. At the same 
time, military expenses were multiplied. Those who assumed the leader­
ship of the state necessarily had to face these problems.
The nobility "over there" in royal Hungary could enrich itself by joining 
in agricultural commodity production and by introducing demesne farm­
ing. Great estates, which at the end of the fifteenth century had been operat­
ing at a near loss, were by the late sixteenth century yielding enormous 
profits.
Transylvania was unable to follow this example. It could not export grain, 
of which it had little anyway, because of the distance to foreign markets 
and the consequent transportation problems. Its attempts to export wine 
and cattle were also unsuccessful: the country was unable to overcome its 
economic and geographical limitations.
The only way in Transylvania was to increase seignorial incomes at the 
cost of the peasantry. In his Tripartitum of 1514, Werbdczy had put down 
only the aim of the nobility to be the absolute owners of the serfs' holdings. 
In the Principality of Transylvania, however, in the late sixteenth century 
such ownership was accepted as customary law. It made the base on which 
manorial farming could be organized. As this spread, an increase in robot as 
described in the chapter on the peasantry had to follow. There developed 
the practically self-supporting demesne structure, with the peasants pro­
ducing everything needed to ensure the continuity of production as well as 
the supplies necessary for their own livelihood. The landowner's house­
hold, too, was now provided for almost entirely by his serfs, who included 
for instance trained Cartwrights, tanners, and tailors. The lack of money 
meant that grain became nearly the measure of value. Landowners tried to 
acquire as much of it as possible. They rarely marketed it, but instead used 
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also used wheat to buy wine for retail, and to feed everyone who worked 
for them, from the builders and furnishers of their castles to the hands on 
their farms.
Along with the introduction of manorial farming, the dues in kind were 
also increased. There was great competition for the lease of the tithe, the 
number of manorial mills grew, and the nobility's ancient right to retailing 
their vintage became increasingly profitable with an ever growing number 
of taverns on the estates. Milling and the sale of wine were the two activi­
ties that earned money for the landowner, money which was otherwise hard 
to come by.
Such possibilities, however, were open only to holders of larger domains, 
because medium and small-sized estates could not operate self-supporting 
economies. At the same time Transylvania proper had only very few truly 
large domains — Fogaras, Gyulafehervar, Hunyad, and Kolozsmonostor
— and even most of these had fallen into the hands of the treasury. Real 
large seignories were in the Partium which had experienced what might be 
termed typically Hungarian development. The domain of Szatm&r, always 
one of the stakes in the war of the castles, brought its lord an income of
18,000 florins in the year 1569-1570 while in the same years the estate of 
Kolozsmonostor, yielded just 1,800 florins. The few aristocratic families — 
the B&thorys, Balassas, DrSgffys, and Perenyis — who owned castles and 
seigniories in the Partium achieved absolute financial superiority over the 
nobles in Transylvania, and this was reflected in the positions they occu­
pied in the new state.
The Saxons at this time were politically passive as a result of economic 
hardships and their pro-Habsburg bias. The Sz6kelys were in decline, with 
inner strife and frequent rebellions against the government preventing them 
from becoming a constructive factor in politics. No new force took the place 
of these groups, which had fallen by the wayside, and as the market towns 
in the Tisz&ntul became more and more isolated, their development slowed 
to the degree that they were unable to win political rights for themselves.
On their own the Hungarian burghers of Kolozsv&r could not fulfil the func­
tions of a classical Third Estate.
Accordingly, the nobility could stabilize its economic position in the ab­
sence of any real competitor. From the very beginning of its autonomous 
existence, Transylvania had been an archaic feudal country, and this is what 
it continued to be. The nobility constituted the leadership of society, and 
within this class the wealthiest families, the great landowners of the Partium, 
enjoyed the most political power. It was one of these families, the Bithory 
family, that assumed rule over the principality. This relative concentration 
of political and economic strength also explains why the power of the rul­
ing princes was so unusually great.
While the sharp rise of the incomes of the great domains was ensured in 
part by the increase in defence spending, it was accompanied by a transfor­
mation of lifestyle, tastes, and attitudes. Along with the reconstruction of 
the Saxon towns and Kolozsv^r, Transylvania's fortresses, castles, and manor 
houses were transformed and embellished in "Italian mode" that is in Ren­
aissance style. The fortress at SzamosujvSr and the castle at Alvinc were 
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struction work at Bonyha in 1543. The Kendis' beautiful castle at Marosvecs 
was modernized from 1555 onwards, and the Apafis' castle at Ebesfalva 
was also brought up to date around this time. G ibor Komis began recon­
structing Huszt around 1577, and Captain Ferenc Geszty started to rebuild 
D£va in the late 1570s.
Two of the most beautiful buildings from this period are the Bethlen 
family castle at Keresd and Benedek Kereszturi's manor house at Szent- 
benedek, begun in 1593. Both were far away echoes of Cinquecento Renais­
sance, like many places in the principality by Italian architects.
The former bishop's residence in Gyulafehervir, which now served as 
the prince's palace, was continually enlarged. In Kolozsvir an Italian archi­
tect designed the building of the academy founded by Istv&n B&thory as a 
regular Renaissance palace with an arcaded courtyard. On the basis of Ital­
ian plans, m odem  Italian-style castles were constructed from the late 1540s 
on at V irad, and from the 1580s on at Fogaras.
A society almost completely isolated form the rest of Europe was trying 
to follow western Europe, if somewhat belatedly and in rather a poor way. 
The Christians of Transylvania firmly declined to accept either a political 
structure or a new culture from the Asiatic world of the Ottomans.
Culture and Reformation, Religious Tolerance
The Reformation spreading all across Europe reached Hungary as early as 
the 1520s, and found its first foothold among the German population of the 
royal free towns. At the court of King Louis II, in the entourage of Mary of 
Habsburg his queen, there was a circle of humanists sympathetic to Lu­
theran ideas. This included two personalities who were to play a leading 
role in Transylvanian politics: Georg Reicherstorffer and Markus Pemflinger.
Luther's teachings were introduced into Transylvania by a priest from 
Brass6, Johannes Honterus, who had been educated in Vienna, Cracow and 
Basel. An exceptionally erudite man with a methodical mind, Honterus es­
tablished a printing press at Brass6 in 1538-1539 (the second in Transylva­
nia after the one at Szeben established in 1529), and used it to publish his 
widely popular works on theology and geography. In 1542-1543 Honterus 
formulated the basic tenets of the Saxon Lutheran church which was now 
coming into existence. The last Catholic mass in Brass6 was celebrated in 
October 1542, and in 1543 the Gyulafehervir Diet gave free passage to the 
Brass6 preachers it had previously summoned on charges of heresy. In April 
1544 Honterus became the pastor of Brass6, and his first actions in this ca­
pacity were to reorganize the town's school and to found a library.
Inspired by the example of the most populous Saxon town, the whole 
University took similar steps. In November 1545, the Saxon National As­
sembly, meeting at Szeben, decided that Luther's teachings as interpreted 
by Honterus were to be uniformly adopted. In early 1553 a synod of the 
Saxon clergy elected its own bishop (superintendents) in the person of Paul 
Wiener. In this way, in the 1550s the foundations of the Saxon Lutheran 
church were laid, and these were to endure for centuries to come. After
such splendid victory, however, came a cultural through. While the press 
at Brass6 was at its height, the printing shop of Szeben did not publish a 
single book either in German or in Latin, and in the second half of the cen­
tury the only major Saxon work to appear was the collection of the laws 
concerning the Nation's privileges. Selecting and editing work was consci­
entiously performed by Mathias Fronius, and Albert Huet, the count of the 
Saxons, secured the prince's approval for the edition. To print the law-book, 
the equipment of the Brass6 and the Szeben presses was pooled in 1583, 
with the result that both got into a period of crisis.
Only a few years after the Saxons had adopted Lutheranism, the Hun­
garians also took to it. In Kolozsvar the ardent follower of Luther, Kaspar 
Helth, became the minister in 1544. In this town, the population of which 
was mostly Hungarian by this time, Helth began writing and preaching in 
Hungarian, and even used his name in the Hungarian form: G&sp&r Heltai. 
A printing press established in 1550 also helped his work. Heltai published 
besides his own language books parts of a Bible translation. In 1554, Tran­
sylvania's Hungarian Lutherans established their separate church, with a 
former monk, Tam&s, as bishop.
Tamds was not unique in his turning to the Reformation: Most of the 
early Lutheran preachers were former Franciscans, friars of that Order which 
had played a key role in the 1514 peasant uprising. In the same way that the 
revolt had been a movement originating in the market towns, now the Ref­
ormation, too, found its first Hungarian followers among the burghers of 
these settlements. The most effective early Lutheran evangelists, Maty&s 
Devai Bir6, Andres Szkharosi Hory&t, Istv&n Bencz6di Szekely, J6nos G51- 
szecsi, Andras Batizi, all Franciscan friars except the last two, worked in the 
much disputed territory between the Szapolyai- and the Habsburg-ruled 
parts of the country. They enjoyed only limited freedom of action. But what 
they could not achieve on their own by preaching, was accomplished by 
secular authority. In 1549, P6ter Petrovics, the omnipotent ruler of the 
Temeskoz, set up a Lutheran diocese, the second in all of Hungary after the 
Saxons'. The synods held at Torony in 1549 and 1550 were attended by the 
reformed ministers of Arad, Mak6 and Szeged, and — even before the Saxons
— they elected a bishop, M3t§ Gonci, who also came from a market town. 
In the upper area of the Partium, from Ugocsa to the county of Szil&gy, the 
Perenyi and DrSgffy families supported the new religion. Anna Bathory, 
the widow of Gasper Dragffy, afforded protection to the Synod of Erd6d 
held on 20 September, 1545, at which the ministers of Szabolcs, Szatm£r, 
Szilagy, and Ugocsa adopted the Lutheran confession and elected Demeter 
Tordai as bishop.
Scarcely had Lutheran teachings established themselves in Transylvania 
when the second, Calvinist, wave of Reformation struck the country. Cal­
vinism gained ground rapidly in the Szapolyai-ruled territories. Towards 
the end of his life, M£ty&s D6vai Bir6, the Debrecen minister, began to dis­
pute several of the original Wittenberg theses, and in 1551 his successor, 
Mdrton Kalmancsehi Santa, was actually accused of heresy by the town 
council on account of his Calvinist teachings. K&lm&ncsehi sought the pro­
tection of P6ter Petrovics, who was now living in Munk£cs. With the latter's 
support a synod was held in December 1552 at Beregsz£sz, where the minis­ 288
ters of the area were the first in Hungary to adopt a Calvinist confession of 
faith.
The failure of the uprising staged by Petrovics in the Tiszantul in 1553 
interrupted the spread of Calvinism, but only temporarily. When the tide 
turned in 1556 it conquered this region with lighting speed. K&lm&ncsehi 
became the Tiszantul's first Calvinist bishop, with his seat in Debrecen. After 
the Iatter's early death, Peter Melius Juh^sz, Debrecen's chief pastor, was 
elected. Melius was an energetic man with a talent for political organiza­
tion, a talent which he was to make abundant use of as Calvinist bishop of 
the Tisz&ntul.
Under Melius, Debrecen became a major centre of the Reformation. In 
1560 the bishop invited G61 Husz^r from Transdanubia to set up the coun­
try's first Calvinist printing press. (This was the second press in this region, 
after the one at Varad, which had been in operation since 1550.) Melius also 
compiled a book on herbs, began a Bible translation, and wrote theological 
tracts, poems and sermons.
In 1561, when Melius was already a bishop, he set down his confession 
of faith based on the Calvinist creed, which later became known as the 
Debrecen-egervdlgyi hitvallas (Confession of Debrecen and Egervolgy). In 1567, 
the Debrecen synod of ministers from the Tiszantul adopted M elius's con­
fession. This involved the regulation of all aspects of life, from dogma and 
divine worship to individual and public morality and even intimate details 
relating to the conduct of family life.
"Pope Peter", as he was dubbed by his adversaries, faced struggles 
throughout his life: against those who remained Catholics, against Luther's 
Hungarian and Saxon followers, and finally against the latest strand of the 
Reformation of his time, the Antitrinitarians led by Michael Servetus. In the 
end, Melius succeeded in halting, at least in the Tiszantul, the successive 
waves of the Reformation going beyond Calvinist sectarianism which had 
swept over the area in the previous thirty years. When Melius died in 1572, 
there was no one of comparable calibre to take his place. Only uninspired 
followers remained to continue where the organizer, theologian and writer 
had left off. The fire that had characterized the region dimmed consid­
erably.
M elius had protected Debrecen from the army of peasants gathered 
around the religious enthusiast Gy Orgy Karacsony, and had driven Tamas 
Arany and his Antitrinitarians from the town. However, in those areas which 
were outside his power religious dispute continued unabated. In Kolozsvar 
Ferenc David (Franz Davidis, or Franz Hertel), who, like Heltai, was of 
Saxon birth, became the Hungarian Lutheran bishop in 1556. Like Melius's, 
David's life centred around religious controversy. But his sceptical mind 
dove him from one crisis of faith to another. After fierce disputes with the 
Calvinists, he found himself doubting the truth of the position he had been 
advocating. He resigned his port as Lutheran bishop in 1559, only to take 
up the Calvinist faith, and the Hungarian burghers of Kolozsv&r were quick 
to follow their popular minister. In 1564 the Nagyenyed synod of Transyl­
vania's Hungarian ministers again elected D&vid as their bishop, with the 
result that the whole diocese now turned Calvinist.
When John II appointed DAvid to be his court chaplain, the bishop met 
with another challenge. The court physician, the Italian Giorgio Blandrata, 
was a declared Antitrinitarian. Years of dispute followed until finally, in 
1568, D^vid announced that he no longer believed in Christ being one god­
head with the Father. Again, the town followed him, as did his sovereign. 
Accordingly, the Antitrinitarians became a recognized denomination in 
Transylvania, and some of Europe's most daring theological thinkers — 
Johannes Sommer, Christian Francken, Jacobus Paleologus, and Mathias 
Vehe-Glirius — visited the new country.
Kolozsvar became an important intellectual centre: Heltai's press pub­
lished numerous prints, including the works of its owner which made Heltai 
the most outstanding literary figure of his time and one of the most famous 
in the whole history of Hungarian literature. It also published poems by 
Sebestyen Tinddi Lantos, the first great poet to write in Hungarian, as well 
as a Hungarian translation of Werbdczy's Tripartitum.
By the late 1560s Transylvania presented an unusual picture as far as 
religion was concerned. Three Protestant denominations existed, although 
Catholicism did not disappear completely. Some of the Szekelys of Csik 
and Haromszek remained Catholic, as did some of the nobles in the Partium. 
Most of the Romanians retained their Greek Orthodox religion.
Transylvania was unique alongside Poland in that religious persecution 
never really took place there. John I, while remaining a Catholic himself, 
always showed tolerance towards his priests who were constantly disput­
ing various questions of dogma. Friar George, w hose coarser nature 
prompted him to act more forcefully from time to time, made the Diet pass 
a law in 1545 which prohibited innovations in religion, but, this was the last 
measure of its kind. The Diet held at Torda in 1543 already recognized Lu­
theranism, forbidding only additional innovations.
Soon, however, the Calvinists appeared on the scene, followed by the 
Antitrinitarians. The 1568 Diet announced general freedom of religion, say­
ing that "faith is a gift of God".10 Only two years later, however, a law had 
to be passed to curb theological excesses. By this time, though, four de­
nominations existed side by side and more or less harmoniously. Transylva­
nia's fifth denomination, Greek Orthodoxy, was tolerated, although it was 
not considered as being on an equal footing with the others.
One explanation for such tolerance lies in the strong divisions within 
this feudal society. Lutheranism was supported by the autonomous Saxons; 
the nobility, faced with the dismemberment of the old Hungary and a spir­
itual crisis, initially followed the teachings of Luther, but then adopted Cal­
vinism; Antitrinitarianism became the denomination of Transylvania's Hun­
garian burghers in Kolozsvar.
Political as well as intellectual and ethnic factors determined the choice 
of religion. Responding to the new political circumstances, the Transylvani­
an Saxons accepted the teachings that originated in Germany. The staunchly 
anti-Habsburg Peter Petrovics had obvious political reasons for decisively 
and on two occasions-supporting the Hungarian Calvinists. In search of his 
own and his country's identity, the ever-restless John II found in Antitrini-
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tarianism the means through which he could express both his adherence to 
the Christian world and the distance from it that politics forced him to main­
tain. As for the Szekelys, some stuck to Catholicism, seeing in it a safeguard 
of their manifestly diminishing rights. Others accepted the successive strains 
of Protestantism, from Lutheranism all the way to Antitrinitarianism, with 
a few of them even embracing the latter's Sabbatarian offshoot. Economic 
decline or prosperity seems also to have influenced a particular group's 
acceptance or non-acceptance of the new creeds. While the stagnating Saxon 
towns became Lutheran but went no further, Kolozsvdr, which continued 
to flourish economically as well as intellectually, adopted almost every 
branch of the Reformation.
But if the ruler's power was almost unlimited how could the Estates, 
and even social state which did not enjoy their rights, remain independent 
in matters of religion? The answer must lie in the exceptional situation of 
the new country.
In a state that had come into existence by accident rather than by design 
and whose future was uncertain, the religion of their subjects was of sec­
ondary importance for the rulers.
Istv^n Bathory's religious policies clearly reflect the relationship between 
the government and religion. In the 1570s, the tireless Ferenc D&vid took 
biblical criticism one step further, and declared that Christ was not to be 
worshipped. The voivode, Krist6f B&thory, had no desire to coerce David, 
and summoned Faustus Socinus, the famous Antitrinitarian thinker, to 
Transylvania to convince the bishop of his error. But Socinus was unsuc­
cessful, and finally the voivode had D&vid arrested on various charges, 
some of which were false. Ddvid died in the fortress of Deva in November, 
1579, and after this the Antitrinitarian sect disintegrated. A moderate wing, 
led by Blandrata, went on to become the Unitarian church. The radicals, on 
the other hand, formed the Sabbatarian sect: under the influence of Mathias 
Vehe-Glirius, a one-time follower of Dkvid, they rejected the New Testa­
ment.
Meanwhile Istv&n Bathory was doing what he could to save Catholicism 
from extinction in Transylvania. In 1579, he forced the Transylvanian Diet 
to allow the Jesuits into the country. Then Bathory founded for them a school 
of university rank in Kolozsv&r, and also permitted them to run a number 
of elementary schools in other locations. The Protestants were openly hos­
tile to the initially Polish and Italian, but later also Hungarian, Jesuits. Faced 
with pressure from the Protestant Estates, Bathory made just one conces­
sion: he did not reorganize the Catholic church, which was already without 
a bishop. A new bishop of Gyulafehervar was appointed only later, under 
Prince Zsigmond B&thory.
Equally effective was Bdthory's interference in the conversion of Ortho­
dox Romanians by Saxons and Hungarians, which had been going on since 
1540. In 1544 Szeben's printing press had published a catechism and other 
works by town interpreter Filip Moldoveanul — written in Romanian and 
in the spirit of the Reformation. In Brass6 Coresi, a Greek orthodox priest, 
and his followers had a series of ecclesiastic books printed in Slavonic and 
several in Romanian during 1558 and 1582 but few were in the spirit of the 
Reformation.
By the end of the 1560s, the Calvinist church of the Transylvanian Roma­
nians had come into existence in the Hatszeg region. Bathory, however, 
prevented its development, not by the use of force, but by supporting the 
Greek Orthodox church. After many attempts he appointed a priest named 
Ghenadie to be the Romanian bishop in 1574: With the continuing influx of 
Romanians from Wallachia and Moldavia, the Orthodox church was con­
stantly replenished, and finally the Romanian Reformation was segregated.
With this the Romanians also lost their chance of gaining any of the privi­
leges that the Estates enjoyed. Inspite of recognition of their bishops, Ortho­
doxy was not a fully accepted denomination.
The uninterrupted maelstrom of religious renewal and the Counter-Ref­
ormation that was now beginning both assuaged the population's thirst for 
knowledge and the same time stimulated it. By the end of the sixteenth 
century, Transylvanians had the opportunity to read tens of thousands of 
books printed at home and abroad. These were largely theological treatises,
(with Melanchthon being the most read author), followed by the classical 
authors and contemporary humanists: primarily the writings of Aristotle,
Erasmus, Ramus, Justus Lipsius, and Boccaccio.
But Transylvania was also producing its own literature — not only the 
earlier-mentioned works by Heltai, but also ones written in the newly dis­
covered and increasingly popular fable genre. Strangely enough the Hun­
garian awareness is the inspiration for such works as the great epos Ruinae 
Pannonicae written by the Saxon Christian Schaeseus. Christian Pomarius 
to Beszterce tortenete (The History of Beszterce) provides a description of 
the country and folk of the Saxons. A specifically Transylvanian area of 
writing in this period was historiography. Antal Verancsics and Gyorgy 
Szeremi, formerly at the Szapolyai court, and the Transylvanian-bom Miklds 
Olah, all wrote important chronicles of Habsburg Hungary. Bishop Ferenc 
Forgach, who fled to Transylvania from Ferdinand's court, on his arrival in 
the country wrote a history of the years 1540 and 1570. Farkas Kovacs6czy, 
another chancellor-author, wrote the first Hungarian book on political theory.
Pal Gyulay, a former tutor of Zsigmond Bathory, wrote a chronicle of Istvan 
Bathory's Russian campaign of 1579-1581. Best of all was Istvan Szamos- 
kozy's analytical and unbiased history. And then there were the "official" 
historians, Gian Michele Bruto, who had been called in from Italy, and his 
successor, janos Baranyai Decsi, a teacher from Marosvasarhely.
Court historians wrote in Latin, probably with an eye on the interna­
tional reading public. Nevertheless, a Hungarian-language literature was 
also beginning to evolve at this time. Furthermore, Hungarian became the 
official language of government, since after 1565 all laws were framed in 
this tongue.
Culturally, Transylvania did not become isolated from the West. The 
Reformation in the country had been started by young people from Hun­
gary who had attended universities in western Europe. Honterus encoun­
tered Protestant thinking at German and Swiss centres of learning, as did 
many Saxon and Hungarian preachers of the generation which followed. 
Wittenberg and Basel were preferred to Catholic Vienna or Cracow. To get 
there, a basic education had to be acquired. Accordingly, in 1543 Honterus 
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Brassd. Secondary schools sprang up one after the other in Kolozsv^r, Ma- 
rosv£s£rhely, Gyulafeh£rv&r, Nagyenyed and Szekelyudvarhely — mostly 
with the active support of the princes.
As far as religious tolerance and the flourishing of Hungarian-language 
literature were concerned, the newly-formed Principality of Transylvania 
was unusually advanced. Its relative backwardness showed itself in other 
areas. One example was its belated adoption of the Renaissance mode of 
living. Many had remodelled their castles in the new Italian fashion as far 
back as the time of Friar George, but behind the modem walls people con­
tinued to live in a mediaeval manner. Of course, the more puritan atmos­
phere of the Reformation did not favour a lifestyle stemming from joie de 
vivre. The mediators of the latter were primarily the Catholics who came 
from Italy, first those at the court of Queen Isabella and later those at the 
court of John II. The final breakthrough was achieved by Zsigmond B&thory, 
a staunch Catholic. His court was full of Italian musicians, artists, and arti­
sans. Through the musician Gianbattista Mosto and the captain of the guard 
Gianandrea Gromo, he was in touch with Girolamo Diruta, and even the 
composer Palestrina. At first, Transylvanian society regarded the court's 
"m odem " Renaissance pomp with suspicion, and the average nobleman 
and simple burgher felt outright hostility. The culture of the general popu­
lation remained mediaeval until the early seventeenth century. Where new 
concepts might have taken root, as the market towns, for example, the Ren­
aissance clashed with the Reformation, and the struggle was clearly de­
cided in favour of the new religion with its simplicity and rigour.
3. Transylvania in the Fifteen Years' War
The highly-centralized Transylvanian government had one major weakness: 
it was excessively dependent on the personal competence of the head of the 
state. It was the ruler's ability, or lack of it, which constituted the single most 
important factor when the country suffered a sudden change of fortune.
When Istv&n Bathory died in 1586, a struggle for power inevitably devel­
oped around his successor, still a minor, Zsigmond Bathory. Opposing 
Zsigmond was Janos Ghiczy, governor since 1585, who now confronted the 
powerful Bathory clan — the younger Istv5n Bathory, captain of Fogaras; 
Boldizs£r Bathory, captain of V£rad; and Istv^n Bocskai, the boy Zsigmond 
Bathory's uncle. A third faction was the chancellery, headed by Farkas 
Kovacs6czy. The Estates, which had been kept under control for thirty years, 
now took advantage of the situation to assert their power: at the Diet held 
in October 1588, they maintained that they would declare the sixteen-year- 
old prince no longer a minor on the stipulation that the Jesuits were ex­
pelled from the country. Brought up as a devout Catholic, Zsigmond B&thory 
resisted this demand, especially since his own confessor, the Spanish Friar 
Alfonso Carillo, was himself a Jesuit.
Accordingly, the Diet was dissolved — only to be convened again in 
December. The B&thory cousins now sided with the Estates, and the Diet 
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end of the attempt to establish a university in Kolozsv&r. Embittered, the 
aged Ghiczy resigned his post as governor, and died shortly afterwards. 
The ambitious Bathory clan now reinforced its ties with the Estates, which 
were headed by the Kendi family. The ruler's powers were increasingly 
curtailed. In November 1591, the Diet compelled the prince to secure the 
consent of the Council before taking decisions of national importance. Later 
it also demanded the establishment of an army and a treasury controlled 
by the Estates. In the ever more intricate struggle for power Zsigmond 
informed Boldizsar Bathory of a possible conspiracy against the latter's 
life. By way of response, Boldizsar had two top chancellery officials, the 
erudite secretary Pal Gyulay, and Janos Gaifi, Zsigmond's former tutor 
murdered.
When the prince failed to react to the crime, Chancellor Kovacs6czy made 
overtures to the opposition, and even established marriage ties with the Ken- 
dis and with Boldizsar Bathory, the husband of the other Kendi daughter.
For Zsigmond one support remained — the army. The soldiers of the 
late King Stephen, battle-hardened in Polish campaigns, had for the last 
years been idling in Transylvania's border fortresses. In 1593 this army re­
ceived an unexpected opportunity to influence the course of politics.
That year Hungary became involved in another war with the Turks. Sur­
prisingly, the Christian troops were initially at an advantage. Zsigmond 
Bathory, educated by the Jesuits and heir to King Stephen's grand designs, 
sent Friar Carillo to Emperor Rudolph, to propose an alliance. In February 
1594, the prince announced in Gyulafeherv^r that the country would join 
the Holy League. A few weeks loiter Transylvanian troops set out for the 
Temeskoz to attack the Turkish garrisons there.
However, the Transylvanian Estates had not forgotten the lessons they 
had learned in the 1550s. They realized that the coalition consisted of just 
the emperor, Venice, and the pope. The immediate neighbour, Poland was 
pursuing an expressly pro-Turkish policy. Accordingly, at the Diet held at 
Torda on 12 May, 1594, they refused to endorse the declaration of war. In 
early July, Zsigmond again convened the Diet but the Estates marched in 
fully armed and passed a resolution for the maintenance of peace. The war's 
principal supporters had already left to defend the border castles from the 
Turks. The prince, greatly disappointed, abdicated his throne.
This action on the part of the ruler caught the opposition off guard, and 
Boldizsar Bathory, Sandor Kendi, and Farkas Kovacs6czy, spent weeks ne­
gotiating for a replacement. In the meantime, the captain of K<5v&r, Krist6f 
Kereszturi, and his associates, Istvdn Bocskai, the new captain of V&rad, 
Ferenc Geszty, captain of Deva, G£sp£r Komis, and Laszlo Gyulaffy per­
suaded Zsigmond Bathory to return. This he did, at the head of his army, 
and the Estates did not oppose him. The Diet, meeting on 20 August, 1594, 
had the leaders of the opposition arrested: Sandor Kendi, his brother Gabor, 
and three members of the council were beheaded, while Boldizsar Bathory, 
Farkas Kovacs6czy, and Ferenc Kendi were all murdered in prison. On 28 
January, 1595 Istvan Bocskai signed a treaty in Prague confirming Tran­
sylvania's membership of the Holy League. In return Emperor Rudolph 
officially recognized Zsigmond's title of prince and even designated a bride 
for him, in the person of Archduchess Maria Christina of Habsburg. 294
In the spring of 1595, the Transylvanian forces attacked the Turks, and 
Gyorgy Borbely, captain of Karansebes, recaptured almost every fortress 
along the Maros River — from Vilagos to Arad and from Facset to BorosjenS. 
In the late summer the sovereign himself led the main army into Wallachia 
to assist his secret ally for the past year, Mihai Viteazul. Mihai, voivode of 
Wallachia since 1593, was threatened by the 40,000 strong army of Grand 
Vizier Sinan pasha, sent to subdue the "rebellious vassal". On 23 August, 
Mihai succeeded in stopping the Turks at Calugareni, but in face of supe­
rior force he was compelled to retreat. Bathory now called the Szekelys to 
arms, inviting them to participate alongside the princely army and the troops 
of the Estates. The Szekelys quickly seized the opportunity to secure from 
the prince the re-establishment of their ancient liberties. They alone com­
prised some 23,000 men, and with the army thus reinforced, Bocskai took 
Tirgoviste in mid-October, destroying most of Sinan pasha's retreating forces 
near Giurgiu on 25 October.
The country had to pay dearly however for the brilliant victory. The 
Transylvanian nobility started to object to the liberation of the Szekelys, 
since this deprived them of thousands of serfs. Zsigmond, although at first 
appearing to negotiate, rescinded his decision at the beginning of 1596. Be­
trayed by the prince who owed his victory to their heroism in battle, the 
Szekelys were on the verge of revolt when Istvan Bocskai's troops fore­
stalled the action with extraordinary brutality, staging an event which came 
to be known as the "Bloody Carnival". But the fortunes of battle took a 
turn. The siege of Temesv£r had to be abandoned in the summer of 1596, 
and between 23 October and 26 October the united Christian forces, which 
included Bathory's army, lost the Battle of MezSkeresztes against Sultan 
Mohammed III. In January 1597, the prince went to the court in Prague and 
offered to abdicate in favour of Emperor Rudolph. Once more he was per­
suaded to stay on — although the series of military defeats which contin­
ued throughout the year eventually changed his mind, and Friar Carillo 
was sent to the imperial court to mediate over Bathory's abdication. Rudolph 
conceded, and in April 1598 imperial commissioners arrived in Transylva­
nia to take over the reins of government. Bocskai had the army swear alle­
giance to the emperor, and, as recompensation, Bathory was given the small 
Silesian duchies of Oppeln and Ratibor.
The repeated military defeats and the emperor's interference in Transyl­
vanian affairs rekindled the Estates' pro-Turkish sentiments. When Bocskai 
was relieved of his post as army commander he turned to Zsigmond Bathory, 
who then secretly returned to Transylvania in August 1598, assuring the 
army of his support and reinstating Bocskai as commander. The main pro- 
Turkish official, Chancellor Istvan J6sika, was executed, and the imperial 
commissioners were sent home.
Naturally, imperial Prague did not accept the new state of affairs; the 
Turks, exploiting the instability, laid siege to V£rad, the gateway to Transyl­
vania. (Ironically, it was the imperial garrison that defended the castle.) 
The sultan refused Bathory's offer of peace, whereupon Friar Carillo turned 
to Poland's all-powerful chancellor, Jan Zamoyski, for support. In March 
1599 Zsigmond again abdicated his throne — this time in favour of his cousin, 
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backed the new prince, Constantinople agreed to this new arrangement. 
Transylvania's change of sides, on the other hand, had cut Wallachia off 
from its Christian allies. The voivode, Mihai Viteazul, therefore decided to 
march against Prince Andris, and in this he had the support, both moral 
and financial, of Emperor Rudolph. In the Battle of Sellenberk, fought near 
Szeben on 28 October, 1599, the Transylvanian commander G isp ir  Komis 
was defeated by the Wallachians, who were backed by the Szekelys. On 3 
November the Szekelys, out of hatred for the B&thorys, murdered the re­
treating cardinal-prince. On 1 November, Mihai Viteazul entered Gyula- 
feherv&r; and at the end of the month, the Diet recognized him as imperial 
governor. He was never made a prince and it never occurred to him to 
connect Transylvania with Wallachia: the government of the two countries 
remained separate.
Although Mihai Viteazul installed Wallachian boyars in the more impor­
tant offices, he did not interfere with the Transylvanian system of govern­
ment by the Estates. He also sought the support of the Hungarian nobility. 
Transylvania's Romanians were granted no new political rights; the only 
change was that the Greek Orthodox church was now recognized. Mihai's 
rule was never secure, however. First, it was shaken by the brutality of the 
Szekelys in their retribution for the "Bloody Carnival" of 1596. Then, Mihai's 
own unpaid Romanian and Serbian mercenaries began pillaging. Finally, 
the emperor withdrew his support when he realized that the voivode wanted 
to keep the province for himself.
In May 1600, Mihai Viteazul hurriedly organized a campaign against 
Moldavia, but although he succeeded in taking it from the pro-Polish voi­
vode Ieremia Movila, the booty in that poverty-stricken land was insuffi­
cient to support his army for long. In Transylvania, there seemed to be no 
end to the excesses. In the name of the Estates, Istvin Csaky turned for aid 
to Emperor Rudolph's general, Giorgio Basta, who in Septem ber 1600, 
marched into the country with a strong army of mercenaries. After he de­
feated Mihai Viteazul on 18 September at Miriszlb, Transylvania was once 
more a province of the Habsburg Empire. In late October the Transylvanian 
Estates swore allegiance to Rudolph. At the same time, Szekely liberties, 
which Mihai had restored, were revoked, and Istv&n Bocskai was driven 
into exile.
With their pay almost always in arrears or not forthcoming at all, Basta's 
soldiers soon began pillaging Transylvania, which proved a more lucrative 
source of booty than war-torn royal Hungary had been. The brutal deeds of 
Hungarian, Walloon, Italian, Bohemian, and German mercenaries fill the 
diaries of contemporaries. All the while, Turkish and Tatar raiders were 
making incursions along the undefended frontier.
In desperation, the Transylvanian nobility again turned to Zsigmond 
Bithory, who arrived quickly at the head of a Polish army, and reclaimed 
his throne in 1601. Basta withdrew without battle, simply to reinforce his 
troops. In the summer of the same year he launched an offensive, assisted 
by Mihai Viteazul, who had been driven out of Wallachia and who hoped 
to regain his power with Rudolph's support. Basta defeated Bathory at 
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his camp. Centuries later the voivode was to be remembered as a heroic 
figure in the struggle for Romanian unity.
The atrocities of the m ercenaries began anew, and, to crow n it all, 
Zsigmond Etethory returned to his devastated country for a fourth time: he 
who had earlier driven Transylvania into a war against the Turks, now faced 
his own subjects as an ally of the sultan and with an army that included 
Turkish and Tatar soldiers. By the beginning of 1602, Bathory was again the 
ruler of Transylvania. But seeing the effects of his "conquest" for the devas­
tated country he became distraught, and after only a few months in power 
he left Transylvania for the last time. He died in Prague in 1613.
On hearing of the prince's intention to leave Transylvania, Basta marched 
into the country once more, defeating the troops of the Estates at To vis and 
occupying the entire principality by July 1602. The mercenaries' depreda­
tions and the senseless wars with the Turks soon prompted the Transylva­
nian people to make a last desperate attempt to save their homeland. In 
April 1603 M6zes Szekely rallied the Transylvanian troops and routed Basta's 
mercenaries with the aid of Turkish and Tatar auxiliaries. On 8 May, Szekely 
even assumed the title of prince. But the cruelty of the Tatars surpassed 
even that of the mercenaries, and Radu Serban, the new voivode of Wallachia, 
attacked Transylvania as an ally of the emperor. The Szekelys sided with 
Radu. Mozes Szekely fell in the Battle of Brass6 on 17 July, 1603, which his 
supporters lost.
Basta returned with a new army, and after again plundering the entire 
region, withdrew his troops in early 1604. Transylvania, exhausted and 
humiliated, was left with no strength to act.
Istv&n Bocskai's Uprising and the Resurrection 
of the Transylvanian State
While Transylvania laboured under its own cross, in the territories of the 
kingdom the war between imperial and Turkish forces which had been go­
ing on since 1593 became deadlocked. Repeatedly, but always unsuccess­
fully, the Christian forces laid siege to Buda. On the other hand, in 1600 the 
Turks captured Kanizsa, and in doing so came menacingly close to the Aus­
trian border.
In the county of Nograd the emperor's soldiers still controlled the terri­
tories they had occupied at the beginning of the war. But the annual cam­
paigns forced both sides to use increasing numbers of irregular troops, since 
trained men and financial resources were in ever shorter supply.
Finding itself in desperate straits, the imperial government took an un­
precedented step, indicting the most powerful Hungarian landowners on 
false charges of treason. One of its targets was Istvan Bocskai, who had 
retired to his estates in the Tisz&ntul. Bocskai was accused of maintaining 
contact with the Transylvanian exiles who enjoyed Turkish protection, that 
is, with the remnants of the pro-Turkish party. A Hungarian army of haiduks, 
who were notorious for their cruelty, was sent against Bocskai. En route, 
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vinist policies. Joining up with Bocskai's own troops, they routed Barbiano, 
the captain of Kassa, in a battle fought near Almosd on 15 October, 1604.
On 11 November, Bocskai and the haiduks marched into Kassa itself, 
encountering almost no resistance. Not much later the leader of the exiles,
Gabor Bethlen, handed Bocskai the ahdname in which the sultan recog­
nized him as prince of Transylvania, and soon Turkish and Tatar reinforce­
ments arrived on the scene. Giorgio Basta, who was now the commander of 
all Hungary, launched an offensive which, although initially successful, was 
subsequently halted by Bocskai. After this the entire Tiszantul, with the 
exception of V&rad, submitted to the Turkish-supported prince.
From April 1605 onwards, the roving haiduk and Tatar armies swept 
over almost all of royal Hungary. A group of Hungarian lords headed by 
Istv5n Illesh^zy, the man most severely affected by the estate confiscations 
which the treason trials entailed, sided with Bocskai. By September most of 
the troops were pillaging the areas along the Austrian border, between 
Sopron and Vienna. A laboriously-assembled imperial army led by Count 
Tilly counter-attacked, but could only retake Transdanubia.
In the meantime, on 20 April, 1605, the Diet, meeting at Szerencs, had 
elected Bocskai prince of Hungary. He went on to ask the sultan to grant 
him the title of king of Hungary, but by the time Grand Vizier Mohammed 
Lalla arrived with a splendid crown, the defeats in Transdanubia had damp­
ened spirits. Bocskai, still mistrustful of the Turks, finally gave up the idea 
of the coronation. Instead, he began to take charge of Transylvania — not 
just nominally but also in reality.
For years the new prince had enjoyed no contact at all with the country 
he was now to govern. His retinue consisted of haiduk captains, Hungarian 
lords, and a few nobles who took his side. Transylvania was however, wary 
of trusting the man who had embroiled them in war, who had brutally 
punished the Szekelys, and who had contributed to their general misery.
Yet the Estates felt powerless to act and stood idly by as Bocskai occupied 
the Partium, and, afterwards, Lugos and Kardnsebes. When in early 1605 
Bocskai sent an army under L£szl6 Gyulaffy into Transylvania, the Szekelys 
left the Habsburg camp, choosing to accept Bocskai's word that he would 
restore their liberties. Resistance was now confined to the Saxon towns and 
the few troops who remained loyal to the emperor. Old but tenacious, Albert 
Huet count of the Saxons organized opposition but to no avail: when Bocskai 
himself entered Transylvania in 1605, the Saxon towns and imperial garri­
sons capitulated one after the other. As they laid down their arms, the Fif­
teen Years War came to an end in Transylvania. On 14 September the Diet, 
meeting at Medgyes, installed the new prince in office.
However, in the rest of Hungary, the war continued. Bocskai delegated 
the running of Transylvania to Zsigmond R5k6czi, aged landowner from 
the Partium, and set out in person to secure peace. In this he encountered 
opposition from some of his supporters, and the emperor attempted to have 
him murdered. But Bocskai persisted. The haiduk captains, who refused to 
stop fighting, were executed. Most of the haiduks themselves were settled 
on land in the devastated Tiszantul, and were given collective liberties on 
the Szekely model. Negotiations with the imperial court finally led to the 
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nia was restored, and its western border was redrawn, with Bocskai receiv­
ing the counties of Szatm&r, Szabolcs, Ugocsa and Bereg and the castle of 
Tokaj, although admittedly only as non-hereditary donations. In the King­
dom of Hungary freedom of religion was re-established, and it was de­
cided that henceforth only Hungarians would be nominated to the high 
offices of the realm.
Less than six months after the Peace of Vienna, another, no less signifi­
cant, treaty was concluded, with the Turks. This was the Peace of Zsitvatorok, 
signed on 15 November, 1606. The borders of the Turkish occupied terri­
tory were defined according to the situation at the moment. Neither the 
emperor nor the sultan, drawn into another war with Persia, was able to 
alter the given situation.
One and a half decades of fighting had came to an end. The military 
balance was almost equal: the Turks had taken Kanizsa and Eger, while the 
Christian forces had advanced to N6grdd county and along the Maros River 
in Transylvania. This state of affairs was extraordinary, as contemporaries 
were quick to realize: for since 1521 the Turks had not waged a war with 
Hungary that had not resulted in their victory. Time was undermining Con­
stantinople's colossal military machine, and lacking new conquests, the Ot­
toman Empire was now beginning its slow decline.
Transylvanians realized, as so often before, that the House of Habsburg 
would be unable to protect their distant country from the Turks, while at 
the same time they needed the emperor's support to neutralize the Otto­
man threat. Just as in the mid-sixteenth century it had been the Hungarian 
ruling class that had established the new state to secure its own survival, it 
was again the great lords of the Tiszantul who now came to revive a coun­
try that had almost ceased to exist. Once more the Transylvanians submit­
ted to the Turks, belatedly and partly out of compulsion. Nevertheless, in 
Bocskai's time there was something new in the relationship between Transyl­
vania and royal Hungary: the realization that the Hungarian Estates could 
profit from Transylvania. "As long as the Hungarian Crown is with a na­
tion mightier than ours, with the G erm an,... it will be necessary and expe­
dient to have a Hungarian prince in Transylvania, for he shall provide pro­
tection and be of use to them", wrote Bocskai in his testament.11
The lesson that Hungary and Transylvania had learned was a cruel one. 
While the devastation does not appear to have been as great as on the Great 
Hungarian Plain or around Buda, where whole counties were almost en­
tirely depopulated, the military operations, the excesses, and the epidemics 
that followed in the wake of the campaign in Transylvania greatly reduced 
the population there.
What had not been destroyed in the fighting had been gravely affected 
by the systematic looting. The inhabitants of the smaller settlements were 
no more spared having to pay exorbitant sums in ransom money than those 
who lived in the larger towns. There is evidence that during the rampages 
of Basta's armies, the area around Brass6 paid out some 35,000 florins. 
Moreover, it was rumoured that the general himself took two tons of gold
n n  11 .M agyar tortenelmi szoveggyujtemeny. (Hungarian Historical Texts.) Ed. by Gy.
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and silverware from Transylvania. For a country that already was short of 
money, the removal of its coin and precious metals threatened to precipi­
tate economic collapse. At the same time, the huge estates formerly owned 
by the ruling prince had been broken up. In addition to all the destruction, 
the Szekelys were a constant danger, not having forgotten the atrocities that 
had been committed against them.
Bocskai was able to resurrect Transylvania, but the country could never 
become what it had been before. Poorer and more vulnerable than ever, its 
revival was not so much due to its own strength as to the exhaustion of its 
two main neighbours. Should one or both of these recover sufficiently to 
resume hostilities against the other, the fate of the principality would once 
again be uncertain.
The new ruler was an outstanding military leader, and, in the last years 
of his life, an able diplomat and statesman. Had he lived longer, he would 
perhaps have speeded up the recovery of the country. But this was not to 
be. Only a few weeks after reaching the peak of his life, the conclusion of the 
Vienna and Zsitvatorok agreements, Bocskai died in Kassa, his temporary 
capital, on 29 December, 1606. In their unbridled grief, his haiduks mur­
dered Chancellor M iM ly Kathay, whom they suspected of having poisoned 
the prince. This, however, could not alter the fact that Transylvania had to 
choose another ruler.
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At the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, famine swept over 
the entire continent of Europe. Introducing a so-called "little ice age" the 
seventeenth century brought cold, rainy summers, with hail and repeated 
flooding. In the Carpathian Basin at this time the Fifteen Years' War added 
to the misery. In Transylvania, conditions were especially critical: cases of 
cannibalism were reported by horrified contemporaries.
The precise scope of the devastation is difficult to assess. In the multi­
form region of the counties Bels<5-Szolnok and Doboka, exact data show for 
instance that in the lowlands Hungarian and Saxon villages had lost over 80 
per cent of their people, while the Romanians living in mountainous areas 
lost only 45 per cent of theirs. Even allowing for the fact that part of the 
missing population did not die but had sought safety somewhere, the effec­
tive population loss was clearly enormous.
Other facts also indicate that people in hard-to-reach areas were less af­
fected by the devastation than the inhabitants of settlements along the mili­
tary routes. Fortified towns provided a degree of protection as well. But 
even such towns as Szeben and Brass6 had lost as much as three quarters of 
their population by the time peace was concluded in 1606. Another figure 
concerns the tanners' guild of Beszterce: a mere 10 per cent of its masters 
had remained in the town.
Clearly, generalizations from any of these isolated figures would not be 
very reasonable. Yet, along with data on taxation, they suggest that ap­
proximately one half of the population of Transylvania was destroyed at 
the turn of the seventeenth century by the coincidence of natural catastro­
phes and war, and only some 10 per cent of the country's wealth and 
economy remained.
As to the process that led out of the crisis, there are a number of aspects 
to be considered. Owing to a lack of precise statistical sources only conjec­
tures are possible, which suggest that by the 1650s the population recov­
ered to approximately its late sixteenth-century level.
In the first place certain changes in public attitude give proof of demo­
graphic stabilization. From the 1620s on, for instance, the Diet took a new 
stand regarding deserting serfs. While at earlier Diets the primary concern 
had been to force serfs to return to their lords, there is hardly any mention
of such demands after 1628. Another indication of stabilization is the fact 
that while in the first two decades of the seventeenth century the Diet fre­
quently relieved new settlers of paying taxes for a six-year period, after the 
1620s such dispositions become increasingly rare. This shows that by the 
late 1620s, the domains must have been operating satisfactorily, even if their 
population did not reach the pre-war level. There are signs of similar devel­
opments in the towns, though it is sure that in the Saxon areas as late as the 
1650s many houses were still vacant. Nevertheless they had stabilized their 
economy, one sign of this being that in the period of the greatest monetary 
devaluation, in the late 1620s, only the Saxons were able to change their 
worthless tax in coins into gold.
One of the reactions to the catastrophes was a sudden rise in the birth 
rate, as is frequently the case under such conditions. This is manifest in 
many interrelations, but genealogical accounts provide the hardest data.
Clearly, however, such accounts are available only for the high-born. The 
generation of the turn of the century sired a remarkably large number of 
children. An example is L&z5r Apor who lived in the first half of the seven­
teenth century. He had ten children, but only two grandchildren and three 
great-grandchildren; his forebears in the sixteenth century all had only two 
or three offspring. Another family, the Hallers, registered three children or 
fewer per generation until the early seventeenth century, when P&l Haller 
had nine children by three wives. In the Miko family, one or two offspring 
were the rule before the seventeenth century, but there were four or even 
five for the ensuing generations. The L&z&rs are perhaps the only exception, 
with two generations having seven children in the sixteenth century, and 
later L£zSrs siring no more than five children at most.
Such genealogical data are of course not wholly reliable sources on num­
bers of births, since probably only family members reaching adulthood were 
entered in the family chronicles. Since, however, a certain consistency can be 
presupposed, genealogical tables can be taken as indicative if not of the pre­
cise number of descendants, certainly of the comparative sizes of families.
There was clearly a demographic explosion following the period of de­
struction. There are no available facts, as to the exact circumstances that led 
to this change, nor is there any circumstantial evidence with regard to a 
possible lowering of the marrying age, or regulations to encourage children- 
bearing. It is also possible that the demographic explosion was simply the 
result of the increased care given to children when, following the shock that 
accompanied the vast depopulation, the value of life rose.
A second factor which aided regeneration was the fact that after the de­
mographic explosion, the birth rate never seriously declined, as it did in the 
rest of Europe in the seventeenth century.
In the domain of Gyalu, between 1640 and 1666 the proportion of boys to 
heads of families exceeded 1.0 in every one of these years. This means that 
the average family size was above 4.0. Only for the year 1638 is there a 
record of the number of girls, when the average family sizes was 3.8, 4.4,
3.7, and 4.3 in four different locations within the seigniory.
An even higher population growth was evident in the county of Fogaras 
between 1632 and 1640 when the male population increased from 0.9 to 1.4 
per family in Fogaras itself, and from 1.4 to 1.6 per family in Porumb&k. 3 0 2
Only in Komdna was there a decrease from 1.6 to 1.3, but on the average the 
entire domain shows a population growth. The average number of male 
offsprings to a family head was 1.07 in 1632; 1.3 in 1637; and 1.4 in 1640. The 
rate of growth applying to entire families is not documented either in Fogaras 
county or Gyalu, nevertheless it is clear that the population was increasing 
and there was a tendency to have larger families both in the seigniory and 
the county as a whole.
It is unlikely that all parts of Transylvania or all of its social groups evi­
denced the demographic explosion indicated by the above statistics of the 
early seventeenth century. Still, this was the most significant factor in the 
principality's recovery.
Nevertheless the Romanian population did grow in this period, due in 
part to the fact that many of them moved into the villages depopulated 
during the war. The Romanians also tended to have larger families than the 
Hungarian population. This also explains the difference between the in­
crease in the population of Fogaras county and of Gyalu: the population of 
the former was Romanian, of the latter, Hungarian.
The Free Election of a Prince and Gabor Bathory's Coup
The most poignant lesson to be learned from the exhausting Fifteen Years' 
War was that the two Great Powers with interests in Hungary were unable 
to outmatch each other. This realization strongly influenced Hungarian 
politics for many decades. One direct result, however, was that domestic 
affairs could be conducted without blatant foreign interference for quite 
some time. Its political mobility being greater than ever, Transylvania's enor­
mous demographic and economic losses seemed recompensed at least to 
some degree.
Following Istv&n Bocskai's death a race began for the throne of Transyl­
vania. Many aspirants were gathering backers, but two in particular had 
hopes of getting elected. One was Balint Homonnay Drugeth, whom Istvan 
Bocskai had designated to follow him in office: the other was Gabor Bdthory, 
a relative of the Bathory princes. Initially, their chances were by and large 
equal: there were considerations for and against both. They were young, of 
noble birth, skilled soldiers and well-known personalities, and both had 
fought on the side of Istvan Bocskai.
The Transylvanian Estates, however, held against them precisely those 
arguments on which they themselves based their claims: Homonnay's elec­
tion would mean that the Estates would recognize a prince's right to desig­
nate his successor; while another Bathory posed the threat of dynastic rule. 
Both candidates thus endangered the Estates' right freely to elect the prince. 
They also held against Homonnay the fact that he enjoyed external support: 
Constantinople had officially recognized him as Bocskai's successor. In the 
end, this was the reason why most Transylvanian politicians turned against 
him. The Fifteen Years' War, in which they rightly felt the country had been 
a pawn in the hands of foreign powers, had left them with the desire to 
settle their own life.
With neither of the two contenders winning undivided support, the no­
bility of the Principality of Transylvania nominated their own candidate. 
He was Zsigmond R&k6czi, who by the appointment of Bocskai, had been 
serving as governor since 1605. His contemporaries did not consider him a 
particularly able statesman, nonetheless in his own way he must have been 
a man of considerable talent. He was among the few who had been able to 
take advantage of the political situation at the turn of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries and rose from the nobility to the ranks of the aristoc­
racy. On taking the office of governor of Transylvania, he had moved here 
from Felsc5vadcisz in the Kingdom of Hungary with his affluent wife and 
two barely teenage sons, and immediately turned his attention to the two 
Romanian voivodates of Moldavia and Wallachia and the affairs of the lands 
of the Exchequer. He was involved in examining the possibilities of reviv­
ing foreign trade and in taking account of the revenues available to the 
treasury when the news of Istvkn Bocskai's death reached him. His claim to 
the throne was obvious.
Objectively speaking he was at a disadvantage as compared to Homonnay 
and Bathory since he had no hope of external support. For the Transylvanian 
Estates, however, this was a deciding factor in R£k6czi's favour, making 
him able to stand for election as their own candidate. R£k6czi's objective 
advantage over his rivals was that he was personally present in Transylvania, 
while his opponents had to organize their support from outside the princi­
pality.
No one wanted to hurry the election, however. The Diet set the date for 
sometime after Bocskai's funeral; and did not count on any unexpected oc­
currence. Thus it was with no feigned surprise that the Estates received a 
letter from Archduke Matthias calling upon them to delay the election until 
Emperor Rudolph — in keeping with the provisions of the Peace of Vienna
— notified them of his intentions.1 Their astonishment was all the greater 
since no part of the 1606 peace treaty even implied that the emperor had 
such rights of interference. What the archduke's communication in fact made 
clear was that Rudolph's government did not consider the issue of Transyl­
vania's independence settled by the 1606 Vienna agreement. This attempt 
at intervention set Transylvania in motion: on 12 February, 1607, the Diet 
elected Zsigmond R&koczi prince of Transylvania. With this election, a fa it  
accompli was created. It seemed as though the treaties of 1606 were being 
implemented literally, and Transylvania, again independent, had succeeded 
in carrying out her first self-motivated action. True, the seizure of power by 
Rak6czi set off an immense uproar outside the principality but none of the 
parties concerned raised a real objection.
It was Constantinople where the major injury was left unavenged. In 
fact, Mustapha agha who brought the ahdname of the sultan and the princely 
insignia for Homonnay, was already stationed at the border when R£k6czi 
was elected, but was presumably bribed by the latter. R3k6czi was afraid of 
serious revenge so that, in exchange for his recognition as prince of Transyl­
vania, he offered the grand vizier, Murad pasha two fortified castles, Lippa 
and Jen<3 which had come in to the possession of Transylvania in the course
1. The edition of the letter: EOE V, 480.
(Church founders, 1409. A fresco completely repainted in 1743 in the Greek Orthodox Romanian 
lurch at SztrigyszentgyOrgy. Watercolour reproduction
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of the Fifteen Years' War. The reply of the Sublime Porte was, however, 
surprising, Murad rejected the castles and wrote to Rak6czi to do as they 
wished only not to wage a war.
★ * *
Royal Hungary was equally eager to prevent war. Even though before 
Rakoczi's election both the kingdom's politicians and the Habsburgs had 
supported first Homonnay then Bathory, no one was willing to launch mili­
tary action. Rather they tried to pressure Transylvania through negotia­
tions to effect Rak6czi's abdication.
Initially Zsigmond Rakdczi, along with most of the Transylvanian politi­
cians, refused to negotiate, but finally the wish to preserve the peace im­
pelled them treat with the Habsburgs. The threat to Transylvania's peace 
was being posed by the haiduks. This special military force, which had fought 
valiantly throughout the Fifteen Years' War, had been completely ignored 
after Istvan Bocskai's death. Ever since 1606, their discontent had hovered 
over the country like a black cloud. And the country, though trembling at 
the prospect of another war, did nothing to calm them, nor to meet their 
demands. They were not asking for much, only for their pay, a sum of 45,000 
florins. But in the penurious year of 1607, neither Transylvania nor Hun­
gary had any cash.
The soldiers restlessness erupted in a movement organized by the haiduk 
general, Andres Nagy, in the autumn of 1607. His men even negotiated 
with the pasha of Buda, Ali. Until the provisions of the Treaty of Vienna 
were implemented, they declared, they would not lay down their arms. In 
December 1607 they even considered electing Baiint Homonnay as king of 
all Hungary. By then, though, the young aristocrat had tired of struggling 
for the rule of Transylvania and was doing all he could to evade the haiduks' 
envoys. But the haiduks would not be pacified. Having no definite goal, 
they were like a weapon lying on the ground, waiting to be picked up. They 
would serve anyone who bent down to them.
In the end, it was Gabor Bathory, who availed himself of the opportu­
nity. In a Machiavellian spirit, he negotiated throughout the year 1607 with 
those considering steps to protect the country's law and order against the 
haiduks, and then in February 1608, he signed a pact with them. According 
to the accord, General Andras Nagy and Captain Janos Elek agreed to form 
an alliance with Gabor Bathory to help him to power as prince of Transyl­
vania. He in turn agreed to support the Calvinist faith and to make Andres 
Nagy the second man in the principality. The haiduks' preacher, Mate Foktui, 
would be rewarded with goods and chattels and would be appointed as 
one of the prince's counsellors. And finally: Gabor Bathory would see that 
the haiduks got lands to settle on in the area between Varad, Ecsed and 
Kail6.
Soon after the pact was concluded the stage was set for Bathory's elec­
tion. The agreement was signed on 5 February, 1608 and on 7 March, Gabor 
Bathory became prince of Transylvania. Not a shot had been fired. Bathory 
had negotiated with the backing of the country's only military power, and 
Transylvania surrendered for fear of that power. Zsigmond Rak6czi abdi-
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In W ar and in Peace
Zsigmond Rak6czi displayed great political acumen when he resigned his 
title. To insist on his rightful office at the cost of opposing B&thory would 
have been a tragic mistake. It would have meant his defeat, and further 
devastation for Transylvania. For the alliance between G&bor Bdthory and 
the haiduks was a clear sign that the young aristocrat was willing to risk 
war to attain his ambitious goal.
R&k6czi's resignation did dampen Bathory's zeal, however, as indeed 
did Transylvania's statesmen shortly thereafter. They were appalled to hear 
of his designs, to attack Moldavia and Wallachia without delay. His mind 
had been set on the war even before he had taken his title, though both the 
conditions set for his election by the Estates as well as the political course of 
his predecessors obliged him to aim at good relations with the two voivo- 
dates. Another clash with the neighbours right after an exhaustive war was 
abhorrent to everyone.
Nonetheless only a month after his installation, Bdthory sent a confidant 
to Michael Weiss, the respected justice of Brass6 and a man knowledgeable 
in the neighbouring principalities' affairs, to inquire about a possible way 
to overthrow the Wallachian voivode, Radu Serban. The sage justice sought 
to dissuade him in the strongest terms. His concern was that of the circum­
spect Saxon unwilling to sever the profitable economic ties with the two 
voivodates. He was unable to change B&thory's mind, however. The prince 
sent secret envoys to Moldavia, tp win the support of the young voivode's 
mother, Ieremia Movila, a woman known for her political abilities, against 
Wallachia.
The Prince's Council, however, opposed the rash plan, openly voting 
against the prince at a meeting in May 1608. They agreed only to his negoti­
ating a new alliance with the two countries. According to the ensuing agree­
ment, signed on 18 July, 1608, the thirteen-year-old Constantin, voivode of 
Moldavia, became Transylvania's vassal and was obliged to pay a tribute of 
8,000 florins a year. The Wallachian voivode, Radu £erban, had already 
sworn an oath of fealty to Transylvania's envoys on 31 May.
The 1608 treaties with the Romanian principalities secured peace along 
the borders. At the same time they again focused attention on the problem 
of the haiduks. It would have been much easier to tie them down with war­
fare against the neighbours than to find the time, energy and money need 
for their settlement. Since Bathory did not fulfil the conditions of their mu­
tual agreement, the threat of the haiduks' turning against him was immi­
nent, when development came to his rescue. The Habsburg archdukes were 
determined to take political decision-making out of Rudolph's hands both 
because his melancholic disposition made them question his fitness for it, 
and because they thought it wise to make him the scapegoat for the trag­
edies of the turn of the century. Archduke Matthias was assigned the task 
of executing the plans.
In early 1608, Matthias gave up his attempts to undermine the Treaty of 
Vienna, and, in an attempt to win supporters against Rudolph, presented 
himself as committed to both the Vienna agreement and the Peace of Zsitva- 
torok. On 1 February, 1608 he forged an alliance with the Estates of both 3 0 6
Hungary and Austria. But since after the long war he could expect little 
armed assistance from the nobility, he, too, like Bathory a few years earlier, 
decided to turn to the haiduks. Proceeding shrewdly, on 27 March, 1608 he 
confirmed the privileges granted by Istvdn Bocskai. Three weeks later, he 
recruited an army of 6,000 haiduks. Bathory was left with only 3,000.
In this way the fate of the haiduks had become a matter of common 
concern to Matthias and Gabor Bathory. It was with the backing of the 
haiduks that the archduke had been able to negotiate Rudolph's abdication 
from the Hungarian throne and from the rule of the Austrian Hereditary 
Lands, and this had involved them more closely than ever in the country's 
affairs. Thus, Matthias' and Bathory's envoys conducted talks about the 
future of the haiduks, they were at the same time discussing the question of 
future relations between Transylvania and royal Hungary. For though Ru­
dolph's abdication had left Matthias with high hopes of the Hungarian 
Crown, before he could take further steps, these two matters definitely 
needed to be settled.
On 20 August, 1608 two agreements were signed. The first specified that 
the haiduks as free men, would serve both Hungary and Transylvania, their 
obligations corresponding to those of the Szekelys. The other pact contained 
the promise that Gabor Bathory would not declare Transylvania's inde­
pendence from the Crown of Hungary. At the same time, the agreement 
recognized him as prince of Transylvania.
In the early autumn of 1608, no more than half a year after Gabor Bathory 
had been elected to rule the principality, there was peace in Transylvania. 
Shortly thereafter, the Porte also expressed its recognition of Bathory's title. 
A leader of the pro-Ottoman party, Gabor Bethlen, had been sent to Con­
stantinople to secure the sultan's endorsement, and already in mid-August 
Bathory learned the good news. Bethlen himself arrived only in late No­
vember, and with him an embassy from the sultan. They had brought along 
the traditional insignia of installation: the flag, the sword, and the ornate 
document which secured three years of tax exemption for the principality 
and confirmed Gabor Bathory as prince of Transylvania.
The Estates of Transylvania were content. Even though the young ruler 
had procured his title by threatening the Estates with the haiduks' might, 
now that he was in power, he had been taught to respect Transylvania's 
traditional interests. Gabor Bathory commenced his rule in compliance with 
the wishes of the Estates.
The Prince without the Support of his People
Gkbor Bathory was not the man to tolerate inaction for long. In taking over 
power in Transylvania, his aim had never been to serve the welfare of his 
subjects: he had simply been driven by the ambition to rule. And rule he 
did; but he was too restless to find ways of stabilizing his rule.
His advisors were men of all sorts. One group stemmed from old fami­
lies who had played a role in Transylvania's history since the Szapolyais. 
307 Another consisted of members of families that had risen to leading posi-
tions under the Bathorys. A third group had come to Transylvania only 
during Bocskai's war of liberation. Tension between the long-established 
families and the newcomers had been intensified by the power struggles of 
the recent past. Many were related to the members of the pro-Turkish op­
position persecuted in 1594. Others had taken up arms in support of 
Habsburg rule during the Fifteen Years' War. Some were considered fol­
lowers of Voivode Mihai. The few years that had passed since the upheav­
als at the turn of the century had not erased the political differences. Be­
sides that, disparity in religion divided the intimates of B&thory. Though 
most of the Calvinist prince's followers shared his creed, a handful of them 
were Catholics. When all was calm, religious differences were not of signifi­
cance, but even a minor crisis was certain to rekindle animosities.
Instead of trying to smooth over the differences, however, the prince 
only aggravated them with his capricious grants of land. These donations 
seemed to be in no evident way given for merit, with the result that Bathory's 
liberality made him more enemies than friends. There were rumours about 
the prince's mistresses, and suggestions that it was the wives of the confi­
dants who procured Bathory's benevolence for their husbands.
Nor was the prince any more adept at dealing with his burghers. They, 
just like the lords of castles, were obliged to play host to his extravagant 
gallivantings. Entirely unprepared to govern, the young ruler consumed 
the towns' resources instead of profiting from the burghers' wealth by some 
suitable form of taxation. He did not realize that though the wealth of the 
towns could be tapped, their continued ability to pay taxes depended on 
the support of their industrial and commercial interests. No better than a 
feudal overlord, Bathory's treatment of the towns was the next thing to 
extortion.
G ibor Bathory's irresponsible ways earned him more and more enemies.
Only one year after his election the general mood became menacing when, 
disregarding the Diet's remonstrations, he started to prepare for a war against 
Wallachia with Moldavian support.
That war could be avoided, or at least postponed, was due only to the 
fact that G&bor B&thory was stopped short by a conspiracy of his leading 
statesmen. How long the plot had been in the making is not known; by the 
spring of 1610, at any rate, the conspirators had decided to have the prince 
murdered. The occasion was to be a journey in March. But at the last mo­
ment, the would-be assassin recoiled: although he had already entered 
Bathory's bedroom, he could not bring himself to stab the prince. Instead, 
he confessed everything. Chancellor Istvan Kendi immediately took flight, 
but the count of the Szekelys, Boldizsdr Komis, who had instigated the plot, 
was captured. As it turned out, there had been just a handful of conspirations: 
only a few lords and Kendi's household had known of the plot.
Contemporaries were quick to conclude that Boldizsar Kornis had been 
driven to seek to murder the prince because of Bathory's attentions to his 
wife. But the truth was that the conspiracy had been brought on by a power 
struggle among the various parties behind Bathory. He, however, refused 
to look beyond the direct threat on his life, and did not stop to examine the 
many reasons for discontent which had in no way been connected with the 
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date anyone who dared oppose him. On the other hand those who had 
proven faithful were promoted. The traitor Kendi was replaced as chancel­
lor by an old favourite of the prince, Jin os Imrefi, and G&bor Bethlen was 
named count of the Szekelys.
The shock of the conspiracy, however, did not last long. By December, 
Gdbor Bathory resumed his preparations for war. In fact, it seemed that his 
wilfulness knew no bounds. For though, according to the Saxons' privi­
leges, a prince had no right to reside on their territory, Bathory occupied 
their main town, Szeben, a deed which infuriated not only the Saxons but 
public opinion in general. For though there was no denying the truth of 
Bathory's assertion that Gyulafeh£rv5r lay in ruins and was unfit to serve 
as the prince's seat, the disregard of the privileges of the wealthiest Saxon 
town was an unpardonable affront. Nevertheless turning a deaf ear to all 
objections, Bathory proceeded to launch his campaign against Wallachia. 
He set off on the second day of Christmas, 1610, and hoped for nothing less 
than a splendid victory. Voivode Radu £erban, however, informed of Batho- 
ry's approach, had escaped. The Transylvanian troops reached Tirgoviste 
without meeting any armed resistance. There Gabor Bathory installed him­
self as prince of Wallachia, and then thought to procure the Porte's permis­
sion for the campaign.
He sent a great embassy to Constantinople, charged with convincing the 
Porte of an elaborate fabrication: namely, that by ousting Radu Sperban, 
Bathory had wished to secure Wallachia for the Porte. This was to be fol­
lowed by his occupation of the Kingdom of Poland. Should the Porte ap­
prove, Bathory would ensure it by placing on the throne of Poland a king 
forever loyal to the Ottoman Empire. There can be no doubt that Bathory 
really did have ambitions to attain the Polish crown; his forebear, Istvan 
Bathory's, example had been a challenge to all subsequent princes of Transyl- 
vania. Bathory's timing, too, was correct: Constantinople really had relin­
quished its policy of peace at all cost.
Where Bathory was mistaken, however, was in thinking that the recov­
ering Turkish Empire would allow him to take the initiative. After ordering 
Bathory to return home, the Porte named Radu Mihnea the new voivode of 
Wallachia. Gabor Bathory had no choice: after an absence of two months, 
he returned to Transylvania. In an effort to save face, he left Gabor Bethlen 
and a small group of men in Tirgoviste. It was Bethlen who received the 
new voivode and concluded an agreement with him. Only after Radu's in­
duction, in early April, did Bethlen return to Transylvania.
2. The Reign of Gabor Bethlen 
The Porte Regains its Power
At the time he was receiving the new voivode of Wallachia, in the spring of
1611, Gabor Bethlen, though one of the most influential politicians, gave 
little indication that he was to become the greatest prince of Transylvania. 
It was history itself which forced him to take the reins of government, a
claim of events which began with the Porte showing renewed interest in 
Transylvania.
When the Porte ordered G&bor Bdthory to return to his principality it 
became clear that Ottoman strength was again on the rise. Though Radu 
Serban asked both Vienna and Poland for aid, he was able to oust Radu 
Mihnea only temporarily. In Moldavia the ruling Movila family, which had 
been backed by Poland, was forced to flee, to be replaced by a voivode with 
ties to Constantinople. The Porte's influence in the two Romanian voivodates 
had not been so strong for many decades.
For the moment, Transylvania was left out of these changes, though it 
felt the effects of the struggle between the great powers. As Gcibor B£thory 
returned home, war followed in his wake. First two pashas from Hungary 
had marched against the principality while the prince was busy interfering 
in Wallachia. Then troops from the Kingdom of Hungary entered to inter­
fere in the clash between B^thory and the opposition.
The two pashas remained only a short time in Transylvania before the 
Porte ordered them out. But Turks had entered the country, ravaging the 
haiduks' settlements, and they, upon learning of the Turkish advance, aban­
doned the war on Wallachia to defend their lands. Having ransacked the 
Romanian counties, they inundated Transylvania, and the neighbouring 
regions of royal Hungary. All the effort involved in having settled them 
had come to naught. Returning dispirited and unable to pay off the haiduks, 
Bathory decided to send them on to the wealthy Saxon town of Brass6, 
which was the next prize on which he had set his eyes.
In the meanwhile, Zsigmond Forg^ch, captain of Kassa, had come from 
royal Hungary to take advantage of Bathory's weakness. Though the pala­
tine, Gyorgy Thurz6, refused to sanction the undertaking, most of the lords 
of Upper Hungary supported Forgach, and some even joined his forces. 
The prince took refuge in Szeben, and it was to force him to surrender that 
Wallachian troops laid siege to the town. Gdbor Bethlen had sent to the 
Porte for aid, and by early September the Turks also arrived. Thus, by early 
autumn 1611, Transylvania was in an uproar, with all sides at war with all 
the others. Devastation comparable to that at the turn of the century seemed 
imminent when an unexpected turn of events ensued.
With the arrival of the Turkish troops the warring parties began to re­
gain their composure. It was almost as if the rightful lord had returned to 
his neglected estate. Everyone fled from the troops of the pasha of Bosnia, 
Omer. Both Forgach and Radu Serban left without battle in mid-September, 
though the voivode could not return to Wallachia as Radu Mihnea who 
attached himself to the Turkish army on its march on Transylvania had 
reclaimed his seat in Tirgoviste.
With the arrival of Omer and Forg&ch's retreat, it became evident that 
Transylvania was experiencing the same kind of shift in the balance of pow­
ers as Moldavia and Wallachia had a few months earlier. The Porte was 
again asserting its political presence in the region. To the Turks, Transylva­
nia and the two Voivodates constituted a military zone on their onward 
push to the West. And they once again had the force to rebuff anyone who 
would stand in their way.
In light of this new realization, Brass6 and the prince's opposition that 
had assembled there sought contacts with the Porte. They found their man
in A ndris Ghiczy, a former haiduk captain, who was sent on behalf of 
Bathory as his envoy to Constantinople. The prince wished him to thank 
the Porte for its support against Forgich. The envoy, however, stopped off 
in Brass6 on his way, and it was the message of the opposition organized 
there, that he forwarded to the Porte in November. In the name of the coun­
try's Three Nations they requested the Porte's aid in ridding Transylvania 
of the tyrannical prince's rule.
The leaders of the movement were certain of success. They went on to 
organize a veritable state within the state, incorporating the Saxon territo­
ries around the town. They minted money and were preparing for the show­
down with Bathory. However, the Turks were very slow in responding, for 
in the autumn of 1611 decisions in Constantinople were most difficult to 
make. The formidable old pasha, Grand Vizier Murad, had died in August 
and his successor, Nasuh pasha had not yet returned from the war in Persia.
Even so, A ndris Ghiczy was able to get a decision form the Divan, prob­
ably without Nasuh pasha's knowledge: he himself was to oust Bathory 
and take the title of prince of Transylvania. He was even promised military 
aid. In return, Ghiczy promised to hand over Lippa and Jend and to resume 
annual payments of the former tax of 15,000 gold florins. On leaving, he left 
his brother behind as surety.
A ndris Ghiczy arrived back in Transylvania in June, 1612. The news of 
his success in Constantinople had much preceded him. Thus the opposition 
was confirmed in its determination. Bathory, on the other hand, reacted 
like many of the princes of Transylvania before: at the Diet held on 26 June,
1612, he suggested that Transylvania renounce Turkish suzerainty, and join 
the Kingdom of Hungary. In face of the Turkish threat, he intended to resume 
the political see-saw that had proved fatal so often before.
The Diet quite understandably refused to approve Gabor Bathory's plan. 
Not only past experience spoke against it, but also the conditions of the 
time. What made the situation especially dangerous was the person of the 
new grand vizier, Nasuh, a familiar figure in Hungary, since he had been 
stationed here during the Fifteen Years' War. It was he who had been forced 
to give up the castle of Fulek, and it was known that he had never forgotten 
that humiliation. Nasuh had planned revenge against the Turkish negotia­
tor of the Peace of Zsitvatorok, Ali pasha, the commander of Buda, and had 
relinquished the scheme only upon direct orders of the sultan. The new grand 
vizier was, thus, a staunch opponent of the peace in Hungary. Nothing good 
could be expected from him, even without an attempt to break away from 
Turkey. But it was impossible to guess precisely Nasuh's intentions con­
cerning Hungary now that he had the full power of the grand vizier.
Gabor Bethlen Stops the War
Gabor Bethlen decided on a desperate move: on 12 September 1612 with 
fifty of his trusted men went into Turkish exile. His once confidential rela­
tionship with Gabor Bathory having greatly deteriorated by then, his de­
parture resembled a flight. In the past Bethlen had been indispensable to 
Bathory, probably because of his ties with Constantinople and his knowl-
edge of Turkish ways. Especially since Bethlen had won the Porte's appro­
val for Bathory's princely title, B&thory had held him in high esteem. But 
now that B&thory's intention was to renounce Turkish suzerainty, Bethlen 
had become downright undesirable. The prince considered the level-headed 
Bethlen a nuisance, and unfairly suspected him of complicity with the Saxons, 
and it was alleged in fact, that he contemplated having Bethlen assassi­
nated.
But Bethlen fled not just because he feared for life, nor that he was envi­
ous of Ghiczy's success, though indeed he might well have been. For Ghiczy, 
in securing the Porte's order for his own election, had been proceeding along 
a line that Bethlen had planned out originally. The idea that Turkish troops 
could usher in an aspiring prince came to him back in 1603, when the coun­
try was suffering Habsburg occupation and he had wanted to bring in a 
ruler appointed in Constantinople.
At that time, Bethlen had won Istv&n Bocskai for the task. But Ghiczy 
was no Bocskai, and Bethlen felt compelled to take measures against him.
Having served three rulers and even endured prison for one, Bethlen had 
worked his way up the ladder to power. He could rightly consider himself 
more suitable than any other candidate for the title of prince of Transylvania 
as he set about the nerve-racking task of acquiring it.
In the principality, in the meanwhile, an alliance with the Habsburg king 
seemed increasingly imminent. For an open battle on 15 October, 1612,
Bathory had overthrown the opposition forces centred in Brass6. Mayor 
Justice Weiss was killed, as were a great number of his men. Those who 
survived, along with Andr&s Ghiozy, withdrew to safety behind the walls.
The victory brought renewed strength to Bathory. At the Diet in Novem­
ber, he proscribed all leaders of the opposition, whether at home or abroad, 
including G5bor Bethlen. Then he secured the election of commissioners to 
be sent to negotiate the Habsburg alliance. At the insistence of the Estates, 
however, he also named envoys to be sent to the Porte.
The commissioners sent to Vienna were the first to set to work, conduct­
ing talks there and then in Pozsony, where the Diet was meeting. In April
1613, an agreement was signed in Pozsony declaring Turkish suzerainty 
over Transylvania invalid; but Bathory did not want a confrontation with 
the Porte. The envoys he had sent to Constantinople arrived at the Porte on 
22 May, but were unable to put in B&thory's case. Grand Vizier Nasuh even 
refused to accept their gifts, for only a few weeks earlier, the Divan had 
made the decision to replace Bathory as prince of Transylvania by Gdbor 
Bethlen.
Some time earlier in the autumn of 1612, one of the commanders of the 
Turkish occupied territories, the pasha of Kanizsa, Skender, had put Bethlen 
in touch with Grand Vizier Nasuh, as after leaving Transylvania, Bethlen 
paid his respects to the leading officers of Turkish-occupied Hungary. He 
had been to Temesv&r and to Buda, and had spent the winter in Belgrade, 
because he knew that the commanders of the territories around the princi­
pality met there regularly with the top officials coming from Constantino­
ple. Here was an opportunity for Bethlen to meet influential Turkish per­
sonages. He had previously written to Gyorgy Thurz6, in the Kingdom of 
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In the early spring of 1613, Gabor Bethlen continued on to Adrianople 
where both the grand vizier and the sultan were staying at the time. It was 
here that Skender pasha had become Bethlen's most active supporter for 
many years to come, and recommended him to Nasuh. The outcome of this 
meeting was Bethlen's nomination as prince by the Divan in March 1613. At 
the end of April he was given the symbols of rule. A number of Turkish 
military commanders and both Romanian voivodes were ordered to ac­
company Bethlen in his march on Transylvania.
The future prince left Constantinople in August, along with troops com­
manded by Skender pasha. They reached Transylvania in early October. In 
early Septem ber other Turkish troops had arrived along with Voivode 
Mihnea from Wallachia, as had an advance guard of Tatars. Three weeks 
later Ghirei Khan brought in the main Tatar army, and on 3 October the 
pasha of Buda, Ali, reached the outskirts of Gyulafeherv£r. Some 80,000 
troops had gathered to win Transylvania for Gabor Bethlen. There were 
probably more Turks and Tatars in the principality than at any time before. 
The outcome of the contest was evident.
Yet Bethlen did not wish to circumvent the necessary formalities, a con­
sideration which only emphasized Transylvania's vulnerability. For it was 
Skender pasha who called the Diet, something no Turk had ever done be­
fore. But the threat of war made refusal to appear impossible. The Diet was 
given five days to complete the election; they proved sufficient. On 23 Octo­
ber, 1613 Gabor Bethlen was already prince of Transylvania. In their fear 
they elected him freely, as a sarcastic contemporary penman put it.2
On the day after Skender's orders, the Diet had Gabor Bathory dismissed 
with an eloquent letter of farewell. The Estates enumerated their grievances, 
his sly escape from the Turkish armies, and his intention of breaking with 
the Porte; finally they pointed to the danger looming large over the country. 
But Bathory had retreated to Varad by then, and it is uncertain whether he 
actually ever received the letter. He was assassinated four days after the 
election; contemporaries had it that the assailants had been haiduks in­
structed by Ghiczy.
On learning of Bathory's death, the Turkish troops withdrew. Plunder­
ing, pillaging, and taking thousands of prisoners as slaves, they marched 
out of the country. They left behind woeful devastation and the certainty 
that Transylvania was again under the suzerainty of the Porte.
The Professional Prince
While Gabor Bathory had ruled with extravagance and capricious irrespon­
sibility, Gabor Bethlen's government was a time of order and purpose. 
Bathory, handsome and charming, won over even his enemies when they 
came into personal contact with him, but he could not command lasting
2. Nagy Szab6 Ferenc memorialeja. (The Recollections of Ferenc Nagy Szab6.) ETA
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loyalty. In contrast, Bethlen, stocky, battle-scarred and ungainly as he was, 
inspired more enduring sentiments. Those close to him, however, felt re­
spect, rather than friendship, and his enemies despised him. But Bethlen 
was not the man to bother about the feelings of others and he never sought 
emotional contact. It was for this reason that he was able to work well with 
everyone. There is no evidence of the prince's ever having been subjective 
in the awarding of offices.
Gabor Bethlen's forebears had become involved in Transylvanian poli­
tics in support of Queen Isabella. His father was a member of the Prince's 
Council under Zsigmond B&thory. At thirteen young Bethlen, already an 
orphan, went to live in Zsigmond B&thory's court at Gyulafehervcir. Noth­
ing is known of his education or the influences that shaped him. Neverthe­
less, Bethlen's deeds until he came to rule the principality shed light on two 
very characteristic and special elements of his disposition. The first of them 
became manifest in the course of the Fifteen Years' War, when Bethlen was 
fighting on the side of M6zes Szekely and always excelled just in the task 
that needed to be done. If it was necessary he conducted diplomatic nego­
tiations, if required commanded soldiers. He had a sense for dealing with 
people, whether on a personal basis or through a well-worded appeal to the 
masses. Bethlen had the ability to grasp events, to see through the intrica­
cies of a human relationship or a military situation. This diverse expertise 
remained the most striking talent throughout his life.
The other outstanding quality was Bethlen's unbounded objectiveness.
Not as if he would have made plans realistic by today's standards. He was 
just as prone to ignore the realities of a situation as any of his contemporaries.
And facts were certainly not his main concern especially in matters of di­
plomacy. His objectiveness consisted in his ability to ignore everything that 
was incidental to the accomplishment of his projects. Bethlen took the meas­
ures required to achieve his goal, and pursued them without any scruples.
This objectiveness was a life-long characteristic, but was perhaps most 
evident in the way he went about getting elected to the principality. Bethlen 
did not organize a party in Transylvania, he did not bother about the king 
or about royal Hungary, not even about public opinion at home. He turned 
to Constantinople, knowing that it was there that Transylvania's fate was 
decided. And subsequently, Bethlen had no second thoughts. There is no 
evidence of any regret expressed over the devastation the troops paving his 
way had caused, or for the enforced elections. Bethlen accepted unemo­
tionally the implacable reality that Transylvania was — for the time being
— under the undisputable power of the Turkish Empire.
But in spite of Bethlen's rational and consistent pro-Turkish stance, the 
relationship between the Porte and the prince was not harmonious. In re­
turn for the confirmation of this title Constantinople demanded from Bethlen 
the surrender of Lippa and Jenc5. What his predecessors had repeatedly 
promised to the Turks, he was now to deliver. Zsigmond Rak6czi's offer to 
deliver the two castles had been expressly turned down, Gabor B&thory 
had not been asked to relinquish them. Bethlen was pressed to give the 
strongholds over lest they be taken by force. In September 1613, news came 
that Skender pasha had pitched his tent on the border. After having put 
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The pasha's demand placed Bethlen in a bad predicament. With the lib­
eration of Jen6 and Lippa from the Turks, during the Fifteen Years' War, 
large areas had fallen again to Transylvania, inhabited by thousands of 
Hungarians who payed taxes to Szolnok, Gyula and Temesvdr. Their fate 
also was now at stake. And never had a ruler surrendered castles to the 
Turks without resistance. At the same time, Bethlen knew that it would be 
disastrous to provoke Skender's attack. He could not afford a war with the 
Porte.
Amidst this crisis the prince began a series of manoeuvres that included 
year-long negotiations and appeals to all his acquaintances at Constantino­
ple. By the end Bethlen won a partial victory: he could keep one of the 
fortresses. Lippa was chosen to be handed over, since it was closer to the 
border, and therefore meant a smaller loss in population. Even so Bethlen 
himself had to take Lippa, fighting against his own soldiers there, before 
the Turks marched in. In the end, he was able to resettle these men at Vaja, 
and gave them haiduks' privileges.
With the fall of Lippa, Transylvania had reached the lowest point of its 
history. It was at the complete mercy of the Porte. Had G&bor Bethlen died 
then, he would have been remembered as one of the most sinister figures of 
Hungarian history. In fact ruling Transylvania for another sixteen years 
gave him time to emerge as one of the greatest of Hungary's historical per­
sonalities.
Gabor Bethlen and his Country
Bethlen had to apply all his statesmanship when he took over Transylvania, 
as the forces determined to destroy the power of the prince were stronger 
than ever before. Both the nobility and the Saxon University opposed him, 
though their resistance was addressed not so much to Bethlen personally as 
to the legacy of his predecessor. Bathory had been a tyrannical but weak 
ruler whose importunity earned not only him, but also his office, the hostil­
ity of Transylvania. Thus Bethlen's position was an intricate one. Although 
he had delivered them from the despised ruler, the new prince was not 
hailed as a liberator; instead Bethlen had to bear the consequences of the 
acts of the incompetent man he had replaced.
Actually it would have been logical to expect a chain of repercussions: 
that Bethlen should try to suppress with brute force the spirit of opposition 
which the tyrannical Bathory had provoked. But Bethlen was no dilettante; 
with him Transylvania had gained a proficient sovereign.
Bethlen began to build up his power already at the Diet that was to elect 
him. Here he appeared in person and asked the Estates who were assem­
bled by command of Skender pasha to revoke the proscription issued after 
his escape in 1612. With this said, he withdrew. This departure signalled his 
acknowledgement of the fact that he had no right to be present until the 
sentence was rescinded. Though, with an army behind him, the move was 
no more than a polite gesture, it was characteristic of Bethlen to make it. He 
315 wished to convey to the lords of Transylvania at the nadir of their humilia-
tion that he would not abuse his power after victory. And this was in fact 
what happened. After the Turkish and Tatar troops withdrew according to 
the agreement Bethlen had concluded with the Porte, the new prince went 
about winning the country with a care verging on courtesy.
First and foremost he had to settle his relations with the Saxons. They 
were not even willing to take the oath of allegiance and refused all obedi­
ence until they were given back the town of Szeben which Bathory had 
declared the official seat and residence of the prince. Bethlen tried to nego­
tiate, but he did not try to use force. When it became apparent that the 
Saxons were relentless and unwilling to accept his presence even for the 
winter, on 17 February, 1614 the prince returned Szeben to the Saxons, and 
left the following day.
Later, too, he managed to avoid confrontation not only with the Saxons 
but also with the Estates. Bethlen devised an uncommon strategy for rul­
ing: he organized his power not in opposition to their power, but parallel to 
it. He did not touch the Estates' privileges, for his aim was not to curtail 
these, but to shift the balance so that his power predominated over theirs.
For this purpose, he did not need to interfere with their rights, but merely 
to use his own princely power to its maximum. Bethlen worked toward this 
end by taking advantage of Transylvanian society's peculiarities.
One of these was that there were no laws governing the composition or 
functioning of the Diet. There was not even an unwritten law on the matter.
This allowed Bethlen to choose carefully the men who were to participate at 
the Diets. Though certain people were to attend on the strength of their 
elective offices, by 1615 the prince had established the practice whereby 
they made up only one third of the whole body. That meant that the major­
ity consisting of the Regalists or of officials appointed by the ruler, owed 
the very right of attending to Bethlen and he did not have to bother with a 
Diet that might oppose him. Even so Bethlen limited the number of ques­
tions that were to dealt with. The only matter the Estates could bring up 
and decide on at will was that of the relationship of the serfs to their lords.
All others, including foreign, military and financial affairs, Bethlen gradu­
ally took out of the competence of the Diet.
The other peculiarity which enabled Bethlen to expand his power was 
that the state's revenues were not handled by delegates of the Estates but 
by the prince's officials. The Diet only had the right to levy and to allocate 
taxes. Without questioning this right, Bethlen concentrated on increasing 
state revenues from sources over which the Diet had no control. By the 
1620s, the 60,000 to 80,000 florins from taxes made up only 10 per cent of all 
state incomes. This meant that it did not much matter to the ruler how 
many taxes the Diet levied, or what it appropriated them for.
It is doubtful whether there was another ruler in Europe at the time who 
managed to realize so much of what he had set out to attain. Bethlen's means 
to his ends were in the first place the highly modern method of mercantil­
ism, which required, among other things, that the balance of exports to 
imports be strictly regulated by the treasury. The aim was to increase ex­
ports and thus the influx of currency. Secondly, it required the creation of 
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By taking the steps he did with regard to the Diet and the economy, 
Gabor Bethlen in essence eliminated all control by the Estates over the 
prince's power. He became a ruler independent of the Estates, without, 
however, touching the privileges of Transylvania's Three Nations. The other 
strata of society he left equally untouched.
Outdated Methods of Taxation 
and Modern Economic Policy
That G£bor Bethlen refrained from impinging upon social relations is well 
reflected in the particular methods of taxation in Transylvania. While in 
other countries taxes were levied according to wealth, and the sum to pay 
grew greatly in the seventeenth century, in Transylvania conditions in this 
regard remained almost unchanged. State taxes levied according to wealth 
were introduced only in a few towns, such as Kolozsvar. The Szekelys paid 
irrespective of personal wealth only some extraordinary taxes; the serfs again 
irrespective of their wealth were taxed by tens; and the Saxons' taxes were 
set to equal the total tax income which it was presumed would be collected 
from the serfs, an amount which had nothing to do with the size of the 
Saxons' population or the prosperity of their economy.
All things considered, Bethlen actually made financial sacrifices in order 
to secure social tranquillity, for taxes levied according to wealth would cer­
tainly have brought in more money especially in the Saxon towns. As it 
was, Bethlen seems to have thought the sacrifice was worth making, and 
his subjects had no cause to complain.
A state organized upon such a basis was certainly nothing like absolut­
ism in the West since, precisely because of the peculiar system of taxation, 
there never developed the kind of interdependence between the state and 
the bourgeoisie that was typical there. East of the river Elbe, however, there 
did evolve what can be called the eastern type of absolute state. Here, the 
rulers established a central power independent of the Estates not because of 
social pressure, but because of foreign threat.
It was this eastern type of absolutism that Gdbor Bethlen organized in 
Transylvania. In fact, his was the first government of this type east of the 
Elbe, perhaps because he needed the freedom to act quickly and decisively 
in light of the country's precarious position of being constantly threatened 
by two Great Powers.
But Bethlen, even in the clutches of powerful enemies, did not restrict 
himself to a merely defensive strategy. He was aware of the fact that a great 
international coalition was being organized against one of his adversaries, 
the Habsburg imperial government. In 1610, King Henry IV of France actu­
ally set out on a campaign against Rudolph II; the clash was forestalled only 
by H enry's assassination. In 1611 the conflicts between the emperor and the 
German electors impeded the election of the future head of the empire. 
And in 1613, England joined the ranks of the enemies of the Habsburg em­
peror with the marriage between Princess Elisabeth Stuart and the elector 
palatine. It was under such circumstances that Gdbor Bethlen made prepa­
rations to participate actively in international politics. And when in 1618 
events in Bohemia really offered the opportunity to intervene against the 
emperor, Bethlen could decide to do so without any regard to domestic 
considerations.
3. Transylvania in the International Coalition 
against the House of Habsburg
Hungary and the Thirty Years' War
G ibor Bethlen had a decision to make on whether or not to launch a cam­
paign against the House of Habsburg in the strictest sense of the term, for 
meanwhile war in the west was imminent, and the enemy to the east also 
experienced trouble. In 1619, the young and ambitious sultan, Osman II, 
marched against Poland. The war ended in victory for neither side. Never­
theless, it had become clear that Poland and the Porte had reached a state 
analogous to the one existing between the Porte and the Habsburgs since 
the turn of the century: neither side was able to get the better of the other.
A number of forces were at work to draw Bethlen into the conflict in the 
east. For one, his old friend, Skender pasha, was a key figure in the cam­
paign against Poland, and he sent repeated orders for the prince to join in 
the war. On the other hand, Bethlen's own diplomats were begging him to 
take action, especially because of the uncertain outcome of the power strug­
gle that had emerged among the various factions at the Porte. Grand Vizier 
Nasuh had died, and with his death, there surfaced animosities against 
Bethlen previously suppressed on the part of those who had considered 
him Nasuh's protege. The various parties all had their own plans for Transyl­
vania, none of which was favourable for the principality. This was the rea­
son why the Transylvanian envoys were pressing the prince to re-establish 
his situation in Constantinople.
But Bethlen had no intention of getting involved on that side. Following 
some clever diplomatic manoeuvres, he kept postponing the day he set off 
for Poland, and finally arrived only when the war was over. He had avoided 
fighting on the side of the Turks. Nor was he concerned with the conflicts 
between the Turkish factions; in fact, they but served to convince Bethlen of 
the weakness of the Ottoman Empire. And he did nothing to appease his 
enemies there. Instead, the prince launched negotiations in Constantinople 
on a campaign against Ferdinand II of Habsburg, who had succeeded to the 
Hungarian throne on 20 March, 1619.
With that, Bethlen had made the decision to enter into war in the west. 
With fine political acumen he realized that the conflict around Constantino­
ple would be of no advantage to Transylvania. For though it was clear that 
the Ottoman Empire was losing strength, no one would have imagined that 
it would finally collapse at that time. On the other hand, like most of his 
contemporaries, Bethlen believed that a war against the Habsburgs could 
only lead to the overthrow of the dynasty in Austria.
On this side the descent into war started with the 23 May, 1618 uprising 
in Prague against Habsburg rule. Bethlen was quick to recognize its signifi­
cance. He concluded that without hope of help from abroad Bohemia would 
not have embarked on so grave an undertaking. The rebels first approached 
England, and after it had refused support, turned to the Dutch. Here they 
found an ally against the common enemy, since the Dutch were eager to tie 
down Habsburg forces as far from their own soil as possible. The Nether­
lands supplied the financial resources to aid Frederick V, the elector pala­
tine who had been elected king during the rebellion in Bohemia. And it was 
in the Netherlands that Frederick took refuge, when following the imperial 
army's victory on 8 November, 1620, he was forced to flee Prague. On Dutch 
soil, Frederick was safe, but his idyllic domain by the Neckar River was 
overrun by Habsburg mercenaries. Thus the war spread to the German 
Empire. It was to last until 1648, engulfing the entire continent of Europe. 
By the time peace was concluded in Westphalia between the Habsburg 
emperor Ferdinand III and his opponents, King Louis XIV of France and 
Queen Christina of Sweden, the exhausting struggle had already earned 
the designation "Thirty Years' W ar". It had started with the rebellion of 
Bohemia against the Habsburgs, but peace was forced on Ferdinand by 
powers far away from Prague. Imperial rule, in spite of all hopes, had not 
been annihilated; it was only transformed.
Gabor Bethlen as Prince of Hungary
G&bor Bethlen joined the war in August 1619 following negotiations with 
the rebels, as a member of the international coalition forming around Bohe­
mia. He did not have to go far to join in the war against the foe of half of 
Europe. Right on his doorstep, in the Kingdom of Hungary ruled by mon- 
archs from the House of Habsburg, the intervention of the prince of Transyl­
vania was most welcome.
The man who called on G£bor Bethlen for help was Gyorgy Rak6czi, the 
son of Zsigmond, the former prince of Transylvania, leader of the Protes­
tant opposition in royal Hungary. But in fact most of the aristocracy fa­
voured Bethlen's handling of the politics of the kingdom. They became his 
staunchest supporters in the hope of further increasing their already con­
siderable power.
From Matthias II, who had been elected king of Hungary after the Fif­
teen Years' War, the Estates had secured full guarantees for their privi­
leges. They had made clear their claim to conduct the internal affairs of the 
country and had excluded the king from interference in matters concerning 
relations between the landlords and their serfs. More could have been gained 
only by having a sovereign of their own nationally and thus being relieved 
from all danger from foreign interests to the country's welfare. The experi­
ences of the past few years only confirmed the desirability of this kind of 
change. For after the death of Palatine Gyorgy Thurzo in late 1616, they 
were deprived of the highest dignitary of the realm as no Diet was called to 
elect a new palatine. Only two years later were the Estates given this oppor­
tunity, but at the same time they were supposed to accept Archduke Ferdi­
nand as the successor of Matthias II. The Diet acquiesced in electing him 
king of Hungary after the election of a palatine, but the issue aroused strong 
opposition. The misgivings of the Estates were based on the fact that the 
archduke was known to have established absolute rule with the support of 
the Catholic church, in his Hereditary Lands. With his rule there, therefore, 
loomed over the lords of the Kingdom of Hungary the danger of a strong 
central government.
All this resulted in Gabor Bethlen's being an ideal candidate to the throne. 
Of their "ow n blood" as the Estates later put it, he would not be influenced 
by foreign interests, and he obviously did not have the means to establish 
his power independently of the Hungarian lords. The general feeling was 
that they could gain a national king without actually handing him the reins 
of government.
With the aristocrats' support, Bethlen's troops advanced quickly. On 27 
August, 1619 he left Gyulafehervdr and by 21 September he was already 
calling the first meeting of his adherents in royal Hungary. They gathered 
in Kassa to discuss the spheres of influence to be assigned to Bethlen at the 
head of an army, and to those who had chosen to side with him. Finally, it 
was established that the prince had come not to attack, but to back their 
cause, like Jephthah that of the children of Israel. In other words, he was to 
be the official representative for their opposition to the king.
Support for Bethlen snowballed. The prince himself took part in the oc­
cupation of Pozsony on 14 October. Meanwhile Gyorgy Szechy, one of Beth­
len's young followers, has won over the mining towns. When Palatine Zsig­
mond Forgkch called the Diet to meet on 11 November, most of royal Hun­
gary was already in Bethlen's hands. It was at about the same time that his 
army, after joining up with Bohemian and Moravian troops, reached the 
gates of Vienna.
A siege of the imperial city, however, was not attempted. On 29 Novem­
ber, 1619 Bethlen withdrew his forces, causing an immense public uproar 
both at home and abroad. Not only had the prince forgone his promised 
campaign, he had also abandoned his Bohemian allies. Bethlen's excuse was 
the need to attend to domestic matters. In reality, he must have recognized 
the hopelessness of assault on Vienna, and preferred moral defeat to a mili­
tary one. The move was calculated correctly. In spite of the uproar, the 
retreat did not tarnish Bethlen's reputation at home at all.
Gkbor Bethlen's political success reached its zenith after this, when the 
Estates meeting at the Diet in late 1619 and early 1620, offered to elect him 
king of Hungary. He turned down the offer. The reason was a diploma the 
lords had composed, stating their conditions. It outlined the rules of opera­
tion for an ideal republic of nobles, where the king would have no rights 
except to call the Diet and to approve the laws enacted. In declining the 
election, Bethlen was refusing to meet the conditions. Even so, the Diet passed 
a motion declaring that the Estates of the Kingdom of Hungary had unani­
mously and "absolutely" handed over to Gabor Bethlen the rule and gov­
ernment of the country.3
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A King Is Elected but not Crowned
The Habsburgs were officially deposed and the new king was elected at the 
following Diet in Beszterceb£nya on 25 August, 1620. It was then, after 
lengthy negotiations, that Bethlen finally signed the diploma. During these 
negotiations the delegates were officially informed that Bethlen would rule 
the country as a Turkish protectorate. An ambassador from the Porte read 
them the letter from Osman II in which the sultan vowed to defend Hun­
gary. The Transylvanian chancellor, Simon P£chi, spoke at length about the 
advantage of the new system. He called on the Diet — now that royal Hun­
gary and Transylvania were one — to settle the kingdom's affairs following 
the Transylvanian model. The Diet had no choice but to accept the fact that 
in turning away from Habsburg sovereignty they also had to renounce the 
hope of driving the Turks out of the country.4
In signing the diploma, Bethlen had made a compromise: he had ac­
cepted the limitation of his power in return for the Estates' accepting the 
Turkish protectorate.
But he declined any coronation, which perplexed his contemporaries and 
historians since they have fabricated various theories as to his motives. The 
explanation is probably very simple. With circumstances such as they were 
in 1620, a coronation in Beszterceb&nya would have been a poor show at 
best. Bethlen clearly wished to receive the Holy Crown with due pomp, 
after his power had been consolidated. At the time of his election, he had 
certainly no doubts as to the final victory.
After November 1620, however, events took an unfavourable turn. On 4 
November, the pasha of Buda, Mehmed Karakas, occupied V5c. Soon after 
that came word that Ferdinand II's army had defeated the Bohemians in a 
battle on the White Mountain near Prague, and was taking a bloody re­
venge. The pasha's act caused distrust in the consequences of Bethlen's fi­
nal triumph, while Ferdinand's reprisal foreshadowed the no less unhappy 
outcome of a possible defeat.
Gdbor Bethlen himself carried on as if nothing had happened. He set 
aside the conditions and the laws in drawing up his strategy. The condi­
tions set by the Estates did more than curtail his personal power: they also 
inhibited the effectiveness of the whole movement. Before long, the states­
men of Hungary had to realize that Bethlen was not the man to lead on a 
leash. They had needed a new king to have a state in which their privileges 
were unbridled but the very existence of this state depended on Bethlen's 
victory. And that victory was impossible with Estates enjoying unlimited 
freedom.
Bethlen Loses the Kingdom of Hungary
The political situation in Hungary became full of contradictions, contradic­
tions which seemed insoluble. Bethlen's victory seemed less and less desir­
able, while defeat was sure to be followed by reprisals as severe as in Bohe-
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mia. Nevertheless, the Hungarian lords found the solution. They opened 
negotiations with Ferdinand II about their voluntary surrender, thereby cir­
cumventing the consequences of both victory or defeat.
While in the autumn of 1619 they had refused to accept the offer of peace 
from Vienna, by December 1620 they forced Bethlen into initiating negotia­
tions. Peace talks began on 25 January, 1621 in Hainburg, Austria's eastern­
most town, and continued in spite of several interruptions. More and more 
of Bethlen's followers were for peace, and made sure the talks continued. 
Even Imre Thurz6, the country's most gifted young politician, especially 
dear to Gabor Bethlen, joined the peace party; he died of smallpox but the 
negotiations did not break off.
The talks were moved to Nikolsburg and were concluded there on the 
last day of the year 1621. In accordance with the peace, Gabor Bethlen re­
nounced his title of king of Hungary, and agreed not to interfere in the 
future kingdom's affairs. In return he was granted rule over seven counties 
in Upper Hungary, though with certain restrictions, and was also awarded 
a number of great estates. For themselves, the lords attained complete am­
nesty from Ferdinand II.5
Thus, Bethlen's state was liquidated by the founders themselves. They 
had experimented with organizing a national kingdom and, when it could 
not be realized in form of a republic of Estates, they dropped the experi­
ment. With that they escaped the fate of Bohemia. And while Protestant 
refugees from there flooded Europe, Hungary elected a Lutheran palatine 
in the person of SzaniszI6 Thurz6, a leading supporter of Bethlen's. When 
taxes were levied at the Diet of 1622, it became clear that the Hungarian 
lords had not fared badly financially. While Bethlen had levied a tax of 
twenty-eight florins per unit of taxation, Ferdinand was satisfied if they 
approved three. While Bethlen had obliged them to pay twenty-two of those 
twenty-eight florins themselves, now it was the serfs who had to come up 
with the three florins. The Diet of 1622 also incorporated in its laws the 
Royal Diploma, a measure unheard of from time immemorial under Habs- 
burg rule in Hungary.
The short deviation in favour of Bethlen had no disadvantageous conse­
quences, nevertheless the lords in power did not run the risk again. Gabor 
Bethlen launched two more campaigns to win back the kingdom, but he 
could not gain real support from them.
The Struggle for Hungary and Gabor Bethlen's Final Plans
G^bor Bethlen attempted to regain Royal Hungary in August 1623, although 
most of his councillors as well as the lords of Upper Hungary advised against 
the undertaking. Even Gytirgy Rak6czi would meet Bethlen in his camp 
only after the grape harvest. Bethlen convoked the Diet for 19 November, 
but it voted for reconciliation. On 2 April, 1624 the prince signed the peace 
documents, which in essence reiterated the points set down in the Agree­
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ment of Nikolsburg. Since that treaty had been signed, there had been no 
real changes on the domestic scene in Hungary. Thus G ibor Bethlen had 
been mistaken in launching a campaign against the Habsburg king in 1623.
The second time he marched into the kingdom in August of 1626, condi­
tions were much more favourable. Bethlen had become a member of a pow­
erful international anti-Habsburg coalition. The ambassadors to Constanti­
nople of England, France, Holland and Venice had sounded him out on the 
matter already in 1625 via his envoys. Then these same powers turned to 
Bethlen directly, to know his intentions in case such an alliance should form. 
Bethlen for his part, gathered information on political conditions in the Ger­
man Empire. After the death of his wife, in the spring of 1625, he sought the 
hand of Katherine of Hohenzollem, daughter of the elector of Brandenburg, 
in marriage; the wedding was held one year later. With this, King Gustavus 
Adolphus of Sweden became Bethlen's brother-in-law, and the Transylva­
nian prince in effect joined the Protestant Powers led by him.
In launching his 1626 campaign, Bethlen was, thus, counting on the back­
ing of his powerful allies. But fate decreed it otherwise: it was he who was 
always being called upon to aid the others. For a few months even the thea­
tre of war was removed from the empire to Hungary: Count Mansfeld, the 
commander of the Protestant forces, had taken refuge there, pursued by the 
mighty imperial general, Wallenstein. Bethlen's cause was overshadowed 
by the western interests of his allies. A peace agreement, concluded in De­
cember 1626, between Ferdinand II and the prince only reiterated once more 
the conditions of the 1621 Peace of Nikolsburg. Still, it did relieve Hungary 
for a time of the devastations of the Thirty Years' War.
In the interim between his last two campaigns, and before he married 
Katherine of Hohenzollem, Bethlen took the astonishing step of proposing 
marriage to one of the daughters of Ferdinand II, Cecilia Renata. To the 
marriage proposal he attached a political one: with the marriage, Bethlen 
was to become governor of Hungary. And once he had the support of the 
House of Habsburg and their allies, he would turn against the Turks. If they 
took his advice, he assured Vienna the Ottomans would be driven from 
Hungary within four or five years.
Bethlen's unexpected offer caused a commotion in diplomatic circles, 
but was politely and repeatedly declined. Only a few Hungarian magnates, 
were seriously attracted by the idea of a war against the Turk launched 
from Transylvania. In 1627 and in 1628 Archbishop Peter Pizmdny and 
Palatine Miklos Esterhazy discussed the plan with intermediaries sent by 
the prince. By then, of course, Bethlen had already committed himself to 
Katherine, but to some Hungarian politicians the idea of a war against the 
Porte led by Transylvania remained attractive. However, there was no at­
tempt to implement that plan as Hungary's hopes for a war on the Ottoman 
Empire were in fact based on the assumption that after the great war in the 
western Empire came to an end, the emperor and king of Hungary would 
turn his armies against the enemy in the east. The war in the German Em­
pire was not over, however. And following his third campaign, Bethlen 
gave up his aspirations for the throne of Hungary.
Instead, he turned to acquiring the crown of Poland. Bethlen had pon­
dered on the idea since 1627, and to realize it he sought to strengthen his
ties wTth his brother-in-law, King Gustavus Adolphus. This was the time 
when the talented and energetic Swedish sovereign began to take a leading 
role in the war in the empire. But Bethlen's time was running out. Beyond 
conducting negotiations, he was unable to do much to realize his plans.
The prince fell ill, although he fought against it with all his might, he 
succumbed to his growing weakness. Hardly able to eat any more, he nev­
ertheless travelled to V&rad in October 1629 to discuss with Gyorgy R£k6czi 
what should be done after his death. Exhausted by the return journey, he 
died an hour before noon on the day after his arrival, on Thursday, 25 No­
vember, 1629.
The Contest for the Kingdom and Transylvania
Gabor Bethlen had accomplished a huge task: he had restored Transylvania 
and its prince to the prestige they had enjoyed in the 1570s and 1580s. Like 
his predecessors, Istvan Bathory and initially Zsigmond B&thory as well,
Bethlen was able to play an influential part in international politics. From a 
"Turkish puppet" he had risen to become an ally of major powers. One of 
his admirers likened him to Matthias Corvinus and to Istv&n Bathory, and 
there can be no doubt that he was one of Transylvania's greatest rulers.
The principality, however, had never supported his efforts for the throne 
of Hungary. It seems that the Transylvanian Estates were not aware of the 
possibilities inherent in G^bor Bethlen's scheme, seeing it only as a matter 
of personal ambition. It never appeared to them as part of a plan to over­
throw the Habsburg dynasty, the primary aim of the international alliance 
throughout the Thirty Years' War.
Bethlen was aware of the sentiments of his subjects; he never counted on 
the Transylvanians in the fight against the Habsburgs. And in the course of 
his wars, really nothing happened that would have affected the principality 
directly. At the two legislative Diets Bethlen had held in royal Hungary, 
nothing touching on Transylvania was discussed. Even when the seven coun­
ties of Upper Hungary came under the rule of the prince as agreed in the 
Peace of Nikolsburg, neither the Estates of those counties nor Bethlen did 
anything to establish their constitutional union with Transylvania. When 
the Transylvanian Diet made a half-hearted attempt to gain jurisdiction over 
the revenues of the seven counties, the prince decidedly rebuffed them.
Transylvanians thus measured their rulers' growing international influ­
ence by the changes taking place in external appearances at court: Bethlen 
gave expression to his absolute power in the splendour and pomp of his 
surroundings. Ostentation of this sort was expected of a sovereign in the 
seventeenth century, but it was not an obligation that Bethlen chafed under.
To rule was a duty bestowed upon him by the Almighty, but this did not 
prevent Bethlen from enjoying everything allotted to it. He took pleasure in 
conducting diplomatic negotiations, in writing letters and he never wearied 
of warfare. But most of all he enjoyed establishing a court fit for his posi­
tion, as he was very much addicted to luxury. Bethlen loved dressing in 
bright colours, even for nightwear. He purchased jewellery worth fortunes, 324
and appreciated a good cuisine and specialities to eat. He sent for deep-sea 
fish, snails, tropical fruit, and confections. From foreign countries he often 
ordered masks, though whether he actually liked to dance is not sure. Bethlen 
had his own musicians from Germany and Italy as well as actors to provide 
entertainment.
All these devoured increasing sums of money. While prior to his first 
campaign against Ferdinand, Bethlen spent about as much as any magnate 
in royal Hungary, after 1624 his budget reached the proportions of Euro­
pean sovereigns. His revenues grew concurrently, however, and by and 
large he spent about as much of his total income on luxuries as contempo­
rary rulers in the West. Bethlen desired to impress his adversaries with the 
splendour of his court, as they did. That way he demonstrated the coun­
try's international rank.
4. A Prince under the Force of Circumstances 
Political Crisis and the Triumph of Gy orgy Rakoczi I
Gabor Bethlen died childless, but he had provided a successor. In June 1626, 
only months after the wedding, he had Princess Katherine elected to suc­
ceed him. She had no equal in this respect in all of Europe, since there was 
no other woman who had been elected to rule, as Bethlen pointed out in his 
testament.6 It is doubtful however, whether she on her own part ever sought 
this honour. What is certain is that when it came to it, Katherine had no real 
inclination to rule. In fact, it was as if she deliberately sought to irritate her 
subjects. She showed no respect for the wishes of her late husband: the very 
day of his death she called on Ferdinand II to resume rule over the seven 
counties of Upper Hungary.
If in nothing else, in this one matter Katherine and the Transylvanian 
Estates concurred. Neither in Transylvania nor in Upper Hungary did any­
one like those counties to belong entirely either to the principality or to the 
kingdom. But that was where agreement between the new ruler and her 
subjects ended. The crisis did not erupt, however, until it became known 
that Katherine wished to place Transylvania under Ferdinand II's rule, with 
her lover, Istvdn Cs&ky, as intermediary.
News from Gyorgy Rak6czi only added to the crisis. He had been ap­
proached by an opposition grouping on behalf of the seven counties, in­
cluding two of Gabor Bethlen's favourites, Istvan Bethlen, the Younger, 
and D&vid Z61yomi. Holding out the aid of the haiduks, the only effective 
power that favoured the counties' alliance with Transylvania, they sought 
to secure the rule of the principality for RSk6czi. Reluctant at first, R&k6czi 
finally joined the haiduks in late September 1630. He did so only after hav­
ing received a message urging him to take this step from the late prince's 
brother, the elder Istvan Bethlen.
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At the time Istvin Bethlen the Elder sent his message to Rak6czi, he was 
still governor to Princess Katherine, but by the time R ik6czi had reached 
the haiduks, Bethlen had already been elected prince. For Katherine, made 
weary of ruling, was forced to resign on 28 September. To complicate mat­
ters, R£k6czi did not turn back. Though Palatine Esterhizy repeatedly dis­
patched orders for Rak6czi's return, and though the newly elected prince 
conveyed repeated threats against him, Rik6czi sent the young Istvin Bethlen 
to enlist the aid of Muharrem pasha, the commander of Szolnok. R£k6czi 
himself, however, did not come beyond V irad, except to compel Prince 
Istvin  Bethlen to negotiate.
In late October, they came to an agreement. But since the position of both 
of them was precarious and the strength of their supporters at the Porte 
about equal, they wished to have the matter decided by the Transylvanian 
Diet. According to an agreement between Istvan Bethlen and Gyorgy R£- 
k6czi, the Diet was to choose between them six weeks thence. They had 
judged the situation well: the Porte did not give preference to either of them.
The sultan had sent two contradictory edicts, one to elect Bethlen, the other 
to choose Rak6czi. Katherine had to decide which edict to have read out. As 
she had always despised her brother-in-law it was Gyorgy R ik6czi who 
became prince of Transylvania.
The election was held on 1 December, 1630, and the news reached R ik6czi 
in V irad  two days later. He left for Transylvania to be instated before Christ­
mas. Muharrem pasha of Szolnok, and the envoy of the deputy grand vizier 
followed him a day later, to be presented when R£k6czi took his oath of 
office on 24 December, 1630.
The new prince did not break relations with the haiduks until several 
months later when they, commanded by the young Istvdn Bethlen and D ivid 
Zolyomi, launched an attack against royal Hungary. Their underlying aim 
had been to stir Rak6czi into action in support of the seven counties of Up­
per Hungary. But instead of taking advantage of the initially successful fight 
of the haiduks, R ik6czi signed a peace with Ferdinand II on 3 April, 1631, 
promising never to enlist the haiduks' aid against the Kingdom of Hungary.
Good External Relations and Internal Conflicts. 
Economic Policy
The Estates of Transylvania greeted Gyorgy Rikbczi by recalling the memory 
of his father. Yet Prince Zsigmond and Prince Gyorgy did not have much in 
common. The elder R&k6czi had been inherently flexible, had communi­
cated well with everyone, had been a man who had scaled the ladder to 
power by accommodating to every situation. And when the interests of his 
country required it, he had been wise enough to step down. In contrast,
Gyorgy Rikbczi had barely begun to reach for the throne when he sent a 
message to the palatine that he would not renounce his aspirations though 
it cost him his life.
This was typical of Gyorgy Rak6czi I: he was stubborn, and clung stub­
bornly to whatever he felt was his due. He was a demanding ruler, and 326
during his reign he obtained through litigation more of his subjects' estates 
than any other Hungarian sovereign before or after. Even so, he became a 
great man, largely owing to the favourable circumstances of his years of 
rule. The country and the neighbouring territories had years of peace that 
they had not had for many generations.
The Thirty Years' War, which was sapping all the strength of the Aus­
trian Habsburgs had, was most unfavourable for them just at the time of 
Rakbczi's election. They had no energy to deal with the affairs of Hungary. 
To the east, Constantinople was in turmoil from the series of the janissary 
revolts going on since 1622. From the 1630s on, the Turks were effectively 
absent from Europe for two decades.
It is indicative of the tranquillity in the area that there had been no inter­
ference by any major power in the quick succession of elections held in 
Transylvania in 1629 and 1630. At home, however, Rakoczi stirred up a 
great outcry among his subjects when, in the agreement of 1631 he also 
committed himself to garrisoning imperial troops in one of his family's cas­
tles at 6n od . There the soldiers were to stay until one of his sons should 
move permanently to royal Hungary as a subject of the king. Since both his 
sons were around ten years of age at the time, the disposition was obvi­
ously meant to be of long duration.
The measure affected more than just the Rak6czi family. The inhabitants 
of vast territories were affected by it. 6nod , situated at the mouth of the 
Saj6 River opposite Eger, was of strategic significance. Lying at the frontier 
of the Turkish occupied territories, besides the estates it protected also the 
people of the region. The garrison of 6n od  had consisted of soldiers re­
cruited from the surrounding estates and had been protecting their own, 
their brothers' and their relatives' possessions against the Turkish pillagers 
from Eger. The population was terrified to think that their lives and lands 
would now depend on the goodwill of an imperial garrison of foreigners.
The commoners in the vicinity of 6nod, feeling they had been betrayed 
by those who ruled them, began to organize their own protection. Like the 
haiduks they first sought to engage a leader from among the nobility. When 
that failed, the peasant captains organized themselves under the leadership 
of Peter Cs^szar. They sent out letters calling on the people of the villages 
around 6n o d  to join them. In late July 1631 they planned a meeting with the 
nobility, but the lords would not commit themselves. Thus the peasants 
met at Gone in mid-August, and chose a body of peasant commanders for 
each county.
By then it was clear that the movement had a twofold purpose: the radi­
cal wing was voicing demands for social change; CsSsz^r and his support­
ers on the other hand were more anxious to find a leader from among the 
nobility. They sent delegates to David Zolyomi, but he only referred them 
to the prince. In January of 1632 Peter Cs&sz&r went to Gyulafehervar. With 
that his fate was sealed.
Until that time, the nobility of Hungary had not paid much attention to 
the peasant movement. Since it took place on a R£k6czi estate it affected 
primarily the prince. Those in discord with him even watched the events 
with some degree of malicious glee. But when Csasz&r's appeal to the prince 
brought about the fear that R3k6czi, instead of suppressing the movement
might support it, the politicians of the Kingdom, turned on the peasants.
They took Peter Cs£szdr captive, and on 2 March, 1632 put him on trial 
before a summary court in Kassa. He was accused of political crimes, and 
after suffering terrible tortures, was executed.
Though there were then no atrocities to mention against the landowners,
Csasz^r's execution let loose the most violent passions. The nobility of Up­
per Hungary now made attempts to negotiate with the peasants, but the 
gesture came too late. Only some of the rebels laid down their arms; most 
of them marched on Transylvania. They never got there. Istv&n Bethlen the 
Younger, and D&vid Zblyomi suppressed them in a violent clash.
In theory, it might have been otherwise. The peasants were ready to fight, 
and, since the death of Gcibor Bethlen, the two young politicians had been 
urging an attack on the kingdom. Now the rebels gave them a chance, al­
though the 1630s were probably not the right time for a clash between the 
principality and the kingdom. Nevertheless, it is indicative of the political 
elite's attitudes that, quite independently of the turn of events, Bethlen and 
Zblyomi did not even consider assuming leadership of the peasant army.
They were held back by prejudices and not by prudence as is shown by 
the fact that in late 1632 Ddvid Z61yomi was increasingly active trying to 
organize an anti-Habsburg venture. Istv&n Bethlen then was already dead, 
but Z6lyomi boasted, that the envoys of three different rulers were negoti­
ating in his castle at the same time. After a while, Gyorgy Rak6czi had had 
enough: though he was indebted to Z61yomi for promoting his election, he 
had him arrested in the spring of 1633 and brought to trial for treason.
Along with Z61yomi, M6zes Szekely was also put on trial. He had been 
persuaded by the followers of his late father to try for the throne of Transyl­
vania, and sought the support of the Porte. Instead of taking steps against 
him there, R£k6czi waited until Szekely returned home, and then had him 
imprisoned. He was brought to trial together with his followers. The simul­
taneous trials of M6zes Szekely and his men, and David Z61yomi were meant 
by R3k6czi to intimidate the opposition. Judicial proceedings of this sort 
were to become the sorry hallmark of his rule. There was hardly a year 
during the prince's reign when sentences to loss of life and property were 
not issued.
The group R^koczi dealt with most severely were the Sabbatarians. This 
denomination, a Unitarian offshoot of the Reformation, had lived without 
harassment in Transylvania for many decades. What social theories they 
had were rather nebulous, but after 1620, a few of their members had spo­
ken out for the right to political oppositions. M6zes Szekely for instance 
had been a leading Sabbatarian. In his time, Gabor Bethlen did not bother 
about them; rather he engaged Sabbatarians in diplomatic dealings with 
the Porte.
R£k6czi on the other hand felt a personal aversion to Sabbatarian theol­
ogy, and he refused to tolerate their political contacts. Last but not least, 
some of the Sabbatarians had attractive estates. R&k6czi decided for perse­
cution. But he was a stickler for appearances. First a great theological dis­
pute was staged at Des to stress the ideological background of the proceed­
ings. R£k6czi initiated a series of trials only after this in July 1638. 3 2 8
Many of the accused sought refuge by joining the officially recognized 
denominations, but those who remained true to their faith were sentenced 
to loss of life and property. At the last moment, the prince graciously stayed 
the sentence of execution. But without exception, all were deprived of their 
land. One man had died in the persecutions: a goldsmith from Kolozsv&r 
named J£nos Torockai had been stoned by order of the law-court.
Even with the atrocities he committed against the Sabbatarians, Rak6czi 
was not able to eliminate opposition completely. In his later years, too, the 
prince liked to bring opponents to trial on charges of treason. These trials 
served a double purpose: they kept the opposition in line, and aggrandized 
the R£k6czi estates.
R3k6czi had evident reasons for amassing so much land: he changed the 
basis of the prince's power from that of G&bor Bethlen. Instead of state 
trade and mercantilism, Rakoczi sought to enlarge his personal wealth. He 
was almost fanatical about the need to accumulate more land, but was at a 
loss when it came to making intricate economic policy decisions.
At amassing estates, the prince proved extremely adept, the size of the 
family's property increasing manifold in the course of his reign. At the time 
he was elected prince, Rakoczi possessed fully or in part ten great seigniories; 
in his last will he disposed over thirty-two such estates. Around 1648,27,000 
serf families laboured on Rikbczi's estates in Hungary and Transylvania. 
Over 100,000 people lived in his countless villages and his fifty-six towns. 
The produce of sixty-six dairy farms and vineyards served the consump­
tion of his family, or earned a profit from retail. The prince actually owned 
more serfs than all Transylvanian landowners combined.
In this way he established a peculiarly medieval style of rule unparalle­
led in the seventeenth century. Rakoczi was unique among his contemporary 
counterparts, who all benefited from a money economy. Yet he was no weak­
er than other rulers. Personal wealth made him no less independent of the 
Estates than Gdbor Bethlen had been with his own kind of mercantilism.
What is more, Rdkdczi's subjects were less imposed upon in certain re­
spects: the treasury's monopolies were revoked, and Gyorgy Rakoczi low­
ered taxes to three-quarters of what they had been.
A Victory over the Turks
Gyorgy Rak6czi's power was not evident for quite some time. He seemed 
to be gathering wealth and influence for its own sake. When he did become 
involved twice in international matters, he did so only by force of circum­
stances.
First he was compelled to take action against the Turks when the Turk­
ish commander of Buda, a son of the grand vizier Nasuh pasha , upset the 
existing relationship between Transylvania and the Porte. Personal antipa­
thy between Hussein Nasuh and Rakoczi only added to the conflict, though 
primarily it was sparked by a group of malcontents around Nasuh's son 
who were determined to shake off the absolute control of Constantinople. 
Instead, they wished to govern the region around Hungary without inter­
ference from the highest officials in the central government.
The dissenters used Istv£n Bethlen the Elder to support them in the re­
volt against Constantinople. He had fled to Buda in 1635 to escape the trea­
son trials. Ddvid Zolyomi was his son-in-law, and his son, P6ter Bethlen, 
had already been arrested. The former prince Bethlen had every reason to 
believe that Rak6czi would not pardon any member of his predecessor's 
family. At the same time, Istv£n Bethlen's support offered Hussein Nasuh 
an excellent opportunity to take action against R&k6czi.
GyOrgy R£k6czi made an attempt to halt Hussein N asuh's effort by 
putting the matter to the officials in Constantinople. But these left it up to 
the Divan in Buda to take a stand on the matter. Thus R3k6czi was left 
without an ally, especially since it was no secret that Buda was backing 
Istv&n Bethlen.
The politicians in the kingdom, including P6ter P5zm5ny and Mikl6s Es- 
terh£zy, all advised the prince against a war. Still, Rak6czi had no option but 
to prepare for battle. And luck was on his side. One night in October, 1636, 
his troops descended on the Turkish camp below Szalonta and routed the 
enemy with a ruse like something out of a folk-tale. Months later, splendid­
ly robed corpses were still to be found in the surrounding marches, and for 
several years, Turks captured that night were traded throughout Hungary.
In this first military action, which Gyorgy R3k6czi had undertaken against 
his will, he had come out victorious. Not for many decades had a Tran­
sylvanian prince defeated Turkish troops. He was hailed as a hero, even if 
his victory had been won not against Constantinople, but against an enemy 
of the central imperial administration. Respect for R^koczi grew immensely 
both at home and abroad.
W ar with the Habsburg, and Separate Peace
Again it was not Gy6rgy Rdk6czi I's own determination, but rather out­
ward expectations that made him embark on his second large undertaking: 
it was taken for granted that he would continue his great predecessor, Gabor 
Bethlen's anti-Habsburg policy. All Bethlen's former allies and all his one­
time enemies sought to discover Rakoczi's intentions, but he, though adopt­
ing after the victory over the Turks, a more decisive tone in his dealings 
with the pro-Habsburg political leaders of the kingdom, gave no indication 
of contemplating any action.
Thirteen years of weariness on the enemy's side and as many years of 
urging on the other finally drove the prince to take action. In the spring of 
1643, he concluded an agreement with Queen Christina of Sweden, which 
automatically committed King Louis XIII of France to his support. In Febru­
ary 1644, R&k6czi set out against Ferdinand III, and with this, Transylvania 
was involved in the Thirty Years' War again.
It is unclear why R&k6czi chose this particular moment. The state of af­
fairs in royal Hungary had offered several, much more suitable, occasions.
Not that R&kdczi had ever had an active supporter in royal Hungary such 
as he himself had been to Gabor Bethlen. As it was, he could not claim that 
anyone in royal Hungary had sought his aid. Rak6czi's declared aim was to 330
resurrect the national kingdom, yet the most influential politicians did not 
stand by him. He had called upon the Hungarians to fight for the freedom 
of Protestant religion, but by 1644 most of the great landowners had re­
verted to Catholicism. In essence, the aristocrats of royal Hungary had con­
verted to the religion of the dynasty to express the sincerity of their recon­
ciliation with the king following the short interlude when they had sided 
with Bethlen upon his seeking the Hungarian kingdom. Rak6czi's rallying 
cry of religious freedom for Protestants was therefore unable to stir the 
lords of the Kingdom of Hungary because of their ties both to the Catholic 
church and to the king. And without their backing, the overthrow of Habs- 
burg rule was inconceivable.
Nevertheless, Rkkdczi was initially very successful, in spite of the fact 
that his allies in the West gave him no military aid. As with Bethlen, they 
had various reasons for not taking part in the actions agreed on with Rkkbczi. 
The only help the prince received was a sum of 200,000 thalers from France, 
and that when the campaign was already nearing its end. Even so, Rak6czi's 
army was undefeated until the battle at Galg6c on 9 April. But with this, 
Rakoczi's luck turned. The imperial troops were winning battle after battle. 
Aided by peasants from the surroundings regions Rak6czi was able to hold 
Kassa, but he had to realize that it would be wiser to try to negotiate than to 
continue fighting.
His decision proved correct. Though Rakoczi was undoubtedly weaker 
militarily, his able diplomats, who set to work in May of 1644, eventually 
succeeded in negotiating a favourable peace. Extending also to matters of 
public concern, the Peace of Linz signed in December 1645 most impor­
tantly secured freedom of religion even for the Hungarian peasantry. Per­
sonally, Rak6czi not only gained several large estates, but was awared con­
trol of the seven counties of Upper Hungary that Princess Katherine had 
returned to the kingdom.
Ferdinand III made major concessions in the peace. The reason for this 
was that Rak6czi received indirect support from his allies: when Ferdinand 
learned of the approach of Swedish troops, he could only concede to the 
Transylvanians' demands. In June already, before the treaty was concluded 
Rak6czi has sent his favourite son, Zsigmond, and his chief military com­
mander Jknos Kemeny to Moravia to join the allies. But as soon as the peace 
treaty received its final formulation, he immediately recalled his men from 
the Swedish camp.
The Allies' Mutual Indifference 
and Rakoczi's Final Plans
Upon the withdrawal of the troops from Moravia, the prince offered to 
Torstensson, the Swedish commander, who thus had to give up the siege of 
Brtinn, the explanation that he was forced to give up the campaign on or­
ders of the Porte. The excuse, though credible, was difficult to verify. Prob­
ably no effort was made to do so, since the anti-Habsburg allies no longer 
required Rakoczi's aid. From the summer of 1645 on they were winning
one victory after another. Peace negotiations were already in progress in 
Westphalia. Before Ferdinand Ill's enemies completed their plan to storm 
Prague, the war was over.
The fact, that no full effort was made to take Prague, shows characteris­
tically the total indifference of the western allies as regard Habsburg rule in 
Bohemia. The imperial armies had suppressed Bohemian liberties at the 
very onset of the war, and after that they were forgotten. Ferdinand III 
signed the Peace of Westphalia as the loser of the war, but there was not a 
word in the documents about the Lands of the Bohemian Crown, just as no 
mention was made of Hungary either. Gyorgy Rakoczi I's negotiators suc­
ceeded only in including Transylvania, as an ally of Sweden and England, 
among the countries listed in the Peace of Westphalia on the side of the 
signatories.
Western indifference towards the areas surrounding Hungary was un­
derstandable enough. In the world of politics unselfish sacrifices do not 
exist, and in the Thirty Years' War there had been no altruism on the part of 
the rulers of Transylvania either. They supported their allies only so long as 
their own interests allowed. Bethlen had abandoned his allies at Vienna, 
and Rak6czi had withdrawn his troops from Brtinn.
Perhaps it was these manifold disappointments in the collaboration with 
Western allies which directed Rakoczi's attention to Poland. It must have 
seemed that there he was not on visionary grounds, since one prince of 
Transylvania, Istvan Bathory, had in fact once ruled Poland. Rak6czi had 
supporters there in the person of the duke of Ostorog, Janusz Radziwill 
and his followers. Together they worked out a grandiose plan to make 
Zsigmond Rak6czi, the prince's younger son, king of Poland after the death 
of the ailing Wladislas IV. Transylvanian diplomacy was already at work, 
when the plan received an unexpected impulse.
In the summer of 1648, Gyorgy Rak6czi I learned of the uprising of the 
Cossacks in Poland. Recognizing in them his possible allies, the prince, for 
once on his own initiative, contacted their leader. The Cossack hetman, 
Bohdan Khmelnytsky, in fond memory of Istvan Bathory, promised sup­
port. But Gyorgy Rak6czi I was never to read the warm response. He died 
on 11 October, 1648. It was left to his sons, Gyorgy and Zsigmond, to com­
plete what he had set out to do. He delegated the rule of the principality to 
the elder, Gyorgy Rak6czi II. The new prince of Transylvania was taking 
over a country for which the past three and a half decades had been a time 
of perhaps its most unqualified prosperity.
5. Transylvanian Society under an Absolute Rule
The road leading from the demographic and economic recession at the time 
of the Fifteen Years' War to the flowering in every sphere of life and the 
new latitude open to Transylvanian politics in the mid-seventeenth century 
had actually not been long. The population regenerated relatively quickly 
as a direct result of three and a half decades of peace and stability. The 
social fabric and economy, however, were not as easily restored, and not 
every stratum of society was effected equally positively.
The Serfs
Even as compared to the condition of the serfs in other parts of eastern 
Europe in the seventeenth century, the position of the serfs in Transylvania 
was discouraging. On the one hand, they had had the burden of the Fifteen 
Years' War to bear; the other extra burden was that the country's ruler was 
also the country's greatest landowner.
The extensive devastation at the turn of the century had physically anni­
hilated much of the peasantry, and those who had been spared their lives 
were left homeless. With this the whole structure of serfdom was upset. 
Since no one had a secure abode, everyone moved freely, though this free­
dom of movement was, in fact, the need to flee. In any case, it was a move­
ment that the landlords were not able to prevent.
When the war was over, the country's leaders set about trying to restore 
the old feudal relations. The serfs, however, were most reluctant to see the 
status quo ante restored. This is indicated by the fact that great numbers of 
serfs continued to desert the estates until the mid-century, in spite of tax 
reliefs promised to those who returned, and threats of retribution against 
those who moved on.
The community of interests between the prince and the large landown­
ers further aggravated the position of the peasantry seeking to shake off 
bondage. Instead of siding with the serfs and using their resistance to being 
bound anew to curb the power of the lords, the rulers concentrated their 
efforts on curbing the free movement of the serfs. They did not encourage 
even those serfs who wanted to enlist in the army or to work in the mines, 
though this would have fed the treasury. Anyone who sought the protec­
tion of the state was turned away, and it was prohibited even to settle on 
the lands of the Exchequer. In short, the princes of Transylvania did not 
check the power of the landlords in any way.
All through the seventeenth century, the serfs continued to exist without 
hope of betterment. Their attempts to break out of the restrictions that 
hemmed them in met with unrelenting opposition. In their relationship to 
the serfs the rulers and the Estates formed a united front; their determina­
tion to get the most out of the serfs bridged whatever differences they oth­
erwise had.
The Lords
At the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the principali­
ty's ruling class was made up of the landowners of the seven Transylva­
nian counties and the Partium, as well as those enjoying noble privileges 
in the Szekelyfold. Romanian boyars continued to be excluded from this 
class in spite of the fact that their power over their serfs had grown consid­
erably.
There are no exact figures on the privileged classes of the Partium. We 
do, however, have such figures for Transylvania proper. Here, 350 to 400 
families comprised the nobility. The majority of villages were divided up
among several landowners, so that 80 per cent of these families owned only 
a part of a village. Fifteen per cent had possession of one to three entire 
villages, and only a total of six families among owned seigniories extending 
over several entire villages, though these properties still did not come near 
in size to the latifundia, or really great estates. Two families, the B&nffys of 
Losonc and the Cs&kys, made up the elite. Even by the standards of royal 
Hungary, they held truly great estates: B&nffyhunyad and Alm&s, respec­
tively. The great estates that had been in noble hands in the Middle Ages 
had reverted to the treasury after the Fifteen Years' War. The Transylvani­
an great estates that stayed in noble hands were incomparably smaller than 
the enormous network of seigniories of families like the Zrinyis in the King­
dom of Hungary.7
Including the Partium in this picture altered it only in showing the Cs&kys 
and the Banffys to even greater advantage, for they owned estates in the 
Partium as well. In addition, the Bathorys of Somly6 also had estates there; 
the bulk of their properties, however, lay in royal Hungary. A few "new " 
families also had seigniories in the Partium: the Bethlens of Iktdr, the Z61yo- 
mis and the Wesselenyis.
No Szekelys rose into the class of truly wealthy Transylvanian landown­
ers. By the standards of the Szekelyfold, however, the Lazars, the Mikes 
family, and the Apors were considered affluent. All through the seventeenth 
century, this structure of the ruling class remained unchanged. The aristo­
crats grew poorer during the rule of those princes who amassed seigniories, 
especially the Rak6czis, but the proportions were always the same. That 
there was property left with the1 nobility even after the predatory princes 
had had their will was probably due to the fact that their belongings were 
spread out over different parts of the principality. As the nobility as a whole, 
grew poorer, less and less property was enough to raise above the others. 
That explains why the group of families considered the social elite did not 
change. When the Csakys left Transylvania to move the royal Hungary, the 
Banffys of Losonc remained the only truly great landowners of the princi­
pality.
No modern hereditary aristocracy evolved in the principality. The social 
superiority of the elite families was a matter of convention. None of the 
rulers from the Szapolyais onwards had awarded hereditary titles. The Tran­
sylvanian nobility really was possessed of an undifferentiated unity, the 
"una eademque nobilitas", a unity which, in royal Hungary, had become ficti­
tious by the mid-seventeenth century.
As regards landed property and social influence the prince was unques­
tionably at the top of the hierarchy. Even in the late sixteenth century, there 
had been no family in Transylvania to approach the Bathorys in wealth, 
and in the seventeenth century, when the rulers came to monopolize land- 
ownership, the wealth of the entire ruling class did not come near to the 
immense richness of the princes. In the seventeenth century, the prince was 
both ruler and landlord to the majority of the serfs in Transylvania.
7 . The conscription of the nobility: Zs. J ak6 , Adatok a dezsma fejedelemkori admi- 
nisztrdciojahoz. (Data about the Administration of the Tithes in the Age of the 
Principality.) Kolozsvar 1945.
The Szekelys
The Szekelys entered the seventeenth century with their privileges again 
intact. They were relieved of paying regular state taxes, something which 
was a basic right of the Szekelys, but a right which had been alternately 
revoked and then again recognized throughout the sixteenth century. The 
other side of their traditional privileges, the obligation to do military serv­
ice, was only partially in effect: by the seventeenth century, not every male 
Szekely was liable to do military service. A social stratum had evolved which 
was considered to have serf status, the members of which, in return for 
various services, were not obliged to go to war. These Sz6kely serfs paid no 
regular state taxes either, as a result of which in practice state regulations 
did not apply to them. The Szekely privileged class considered it an affront 
if their serfs were as much as registered.
This situation as a whole, was definitely advantageous for the Szekely 
serfs. Though in the seventeenth century they still had to pay the extraordi­
nary taxes occasionally levied — taxes which, earlier, the entire Szekely 
Nation had been required to pay — this was a drawback to their standing 
only with respect to the free Szekelys. Otherwise, the Szekely serfs carried a 
considerably smaller burden than the non-Szekely serfs of Transylvania. 
When an extraordinary tax was levied in 1616, for example, to cover the 
tribute to be paid to the Porte, each ten Szekely serfs paid eleven forints, 
while for every ten non-Sz6kely serfs the tax was nineteen forints. Moreo­
ver, the 1616 tax had not been fully collected from the Szekely serfs even by 
1622. Their own officials protected them with every possible means against 
the state.
Under these conditions, to be a serf among the Szekelys became a defi­
nitely desirable position. A census of 1614 reported that in Marossz6k sixty 
per cent of the serfs expressedly stated that their becoming serfs was not 
against their will. As reasons for wanting to enter this state they listed their 
desire to escape the consequences of poverty, starvation, illness, and mili­
tary service.8 At a time when the Transylvanian peasantry elsewhere was 
compelled to take up serfdom either by threats or promised advantages, 
with the Szekelys it was taken up. By 1622, there were an estimated 20,000 
heads of families among the Szekelys who were serfs, which came to about 
20 per cent of the total serf population of the principality.
Nevertheless, when the rulers launched attacks on Szekely privileges, 
the reason was not that more and more subjects were not paying regular 
state taxes, but that there were fewer and fewer Szekelys prepared to take 
up arms. For in addition to the standing army of 4-5,000, the Szekelys pro­
vided the roughly 10,000-strong force which could be deployed at any time 
and at extremely low cost.
For this reason, as a first measure, in 1619 G ibor Bethlen prohibited fur­
ther free Szekelys from becoming serfs, and those who had taken up serf­
dom after 1614 had to leave it and go back to the "privilege" of military
8 . The edition of various conscriptions of the Szekelys also from later times: Szekely
felkeles 1595-1596. (The 1595-1596 Szekely Uprising.) Eds S. B enko — L. D emeny 
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service. When this measure failed, like many others, and the Szekely militia 
still dwindled, Bethlen decided to attack the problem from another angle. 
In 1623 he obliged the Szekely serfs to pay regular state taxes like all of their 
counterparts in the principality.
The regulation however, instead of solving the problem, initiated a new 
process: increasing numbers of Szekelys moved away from the Szekelyfdid. 
The situation became serious enough for the Diet to take up the matter at a 
meeting of 1638. But there were no tools to keep the Szekelys on their home­
lands. Before their privileges had bound them to the Szekelyfold; with these 
gone, the whole Szekely Nation was disintegrating.
In 1636, Gyorgy Rak6czi I, so as to improve the status of the Szekelys, 
gave up the right of the treasury to the landed property of persons con­
victed of treason. But this did not alleviate the burden of military service. 
Already in 1648, a decree had to be published ordering Szekelys into the 
army under pain of capital punishment. And though Gyorgy R3k6czi II re­
scinded the law before it was ever actually put into effect, the very idea of 
such a ruling shows how great a liability the freedom to undertake military 
service had become which once was one of the Szekelys' jealously-guarded 
privileges.
Gyorgy Rak6czi II attempted to impose conditions on the Szekelys, rather 
than using force. The effects of his regulations had no time to make them­
selves felt, however; with the outbreak of war in 1658, they were swept 
away by destruction.
The Saxons
The Kir&lyfold, a privileged territory in Transylvania that was inhabited by 
the Saxons, preserved its special status well into the seventeenth century. 
Not until the middle of the century did the absolute prince interfere in the 
internal affairs of the Saxon Nation.
By the end of the sixteenth century, a social structure typical of the re­
gions east of the Elbe had become consolidated in Transylvania's towns 
and in their surroundings as well; the wealthiest craftsmen had joined the 
stratum of merchant patricians to form the urban elite: against them, the 
common craftsmen, though protected by their guilds, were powerless. The 
burghers' theoretical equality before the law was never questioned, the so­
cial distance between the leading families and the poor craftsmen however 
was not to be bridged. A similar superiority of the rich over the poor devel­
oped in the relations between the towns and the surrounding villages: the 
village judges were townsmen appointed by the towns, and the village guilds 
came under direct control of the town guilds.
The unquestionable power of the Saxon town senates was brought home 
in the matter of the levying of taxes. Since the Middle Ages, the entire Saxon 
community had paid one lump sum. In earlier times, the kings had speci­
fied the amount of the taxes they were to pay in each particular year, but 
since Transylvania had become a principality, state taxes came to a fixed 
amount equal to 2,000 units of taxation anywhere else in Transylvania. The 
amount to be contributed by any given town and community was decided
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by the Saxon Nation at meetings presided over by the mayor of Szeben. 
This made the senate of Szeben the leading body of the entire Saxon Nation.
If development had followed the pattern typical of other regions east of 
the Elbe, the Saxon communities would have undergone considerable change 
in the course of the seventeenth century. Typically in these areas, including 
the Kingdom of Hungary, the burghers acquired land and took up agricul­
tural production when the market for industrial goods deteriorated. And, 
as the corollary of this same process, more and more noblemen moved into 
the towns, while the towns, as corporations, started to acquire land.
Nothing like this happened, however, with the Transylvanian Saxons. 
The privileges they held as an Estate allowed them to guard their bourgeois 
character. The Kiralyfold functioned as if it were a single large town. Land 
here could not be held by right of nobility, and outsiders had no means of 
obtaining Saxon land. Feudalism was unable to penetrate Saxon society ei­
ther in the abstract sense, for concretely through the intrusion into their 
communities of members of the landed nobility. The burghers, on their part, 
did not strive for land either individually or collectively. In theory, equality 
of rights among the Saxon towns and the Saxon villages was sustained.
Besides the common privileges, the Romanian voivodates had a decisive 
role in keeping up the bourgeois-style Saxon existence. This was because 
until the mid-seventeenth century, they did not build up self-supplying in­
dustrial economies. Thus in the relatively long period of their recuperation 
after the wars at the turn of the century and in the years of the political 
consolidation that began around 1630, the voivodates were a market for all 
types of industrial products manufactured by the Transylvanian Saxons. 
There were, of course, controversies between the voivodates and Transyl­
vania even during these years. On such occasions, the transit roads were 
blocked. When the conflict blew over, however, letters came to Brasso or 
Szeben asking them to reopen the roads, and to send off a shipment of shin­
gling nails. That was the product most in demand, along with everything 
else needed for building castles and churches. But everything imaginable 
was exported to the Romanian principalities, from medical instruments to 
boots.
Thus the Saxons were able to sustain their own internal order both be­
cause of their privileges, and the demand for their goods coming from the 
Voivodates. In consequence, it was a severe blow to them when, in the mid­
seventeenth century, both these conditions ceased to obtain almost simulta­
neously, though independently of each other. With the return of peace, the 
principalities developed their own industry and sought to close their mar­
kets to products from Transylvania. It was at about the same time that 
Gyorgy Rak6czi II launched his attack on Saxon privileges.
In earlier times, rather than interfering with their rights, the prince's pred­
ecessors had tried to drain the Saxons' wealth. His father, for example, had 
obtained large sums from them through imposing fines of various sorts. He 
had never encroached on Saxon privileges, but had, rather, reinforced them 
on three separate occasions. The younger R£k6czi did just the opposite: 
indifferent to the Saxons' wealth, he methodically set about eliminating them 
as one of the three privileged Estates of Transylvania.
The Diet of 1651 revoked the privilege whereby the Saxons were not to 
be summoned directly, that is without their own jurisdiction as first in­
stance, to appear before the Prince's Court. Two years later it was decreed 
that non-Saxons, too, could buy houses in the Saxon towns. The effects of 
the measures, however, were palliated from the first by other contin­
gencies: Gyorgy R3k6czi II was obliged to make concessions to the Saxons 
when he prepared for war against Poland, and the devastation that fol­
lowed in 1658 swept away the prince's measures regarding the Saxons, along 
with much else.
The Romanians
In the early seventeenth century, the Romanians were still not part of Tran­
sylvania's Three Nations, though they were an integral part of society as a 
matter of course. This coexistence was conceived as problematic neither by 
the Romanians nor by the other inhabitants of the principality until the mid­
dle of the seventeenth century.
Those Romanians, who rose to the rank of nobility, were integrated into 
the nobility, as were the Slovaks and Croatians in the Kingdom of Hungary, 
or the Saxons in the Principality of Transylvania. The serfs, for their part, 
were similarly inconspicuous parts of Transylvanian society, in spite of the 
fact that most of them continued to observe their Orthodox faith, and to 
follow a traditional lifestyle different in many ways from that of the rest of 
the population. ,
The position of the nobility remained unchanged throughout the seven­
teenth century. Fam ilies of Romanian origin like the Kendeffys or the 
Macskasis were considered every bit as honourable as any nobles of similar 
affluence. One of Gabor Bethlen's diplomats, Voivode Marko, for example, 
a man whose name was known throughout Europe, was of Romanian birth. 
There were Romanian seigniorial officials who were no less aggressive and 
no more judicious than any Hungarian holding a similar position. Their 
Romanian origin made them neither better, nor worse. When, for example, 
in 1657 the Diet was debating whether or not to elect Akos Barcsai prince of 
Transylvania, his allegedly Romanian ancestry was no more of a disadvan­
tage than his lack of wealth or of heirs.
In the case of the serfs, the situation worked out differently. For a long 
time, they had been divided into two, sharply distinct strata, and the rela­
tionship of one of these strata to the rest of society changed drastically in 
the course of the seventeenth century. It was this change that was to lead to 
the altered relationship of the Romanians as a whole to the rest of Transyl­
vanian society.
The serf group whose relationship to the rest of society remained unal­
tered were the Romanian copyholders (telkesjobbagyok). There was no more 
difference between the Romanian copyholders and the majority of Transyl­
vania's agriculturalist population than there was between nobles of Roma­
nian and any other ethnic origin. The position of the Romanian serfs was 
unlike that of other serfs only to the extent dictated by the peculiarities of 
the geographic location and organizational structure of the seigniories they 
lived on. Even their religion did not necessarily entail a unique pattern of
life — holidays, feast days, and so on — since from the mid-sixteenth cen­
tury there had been Romanian Protestants in Transylvania. And around 
1566, a Romanian Calvinist diocese had been organized as well.
The wider relationships of the second group of Romanian serfs — the 
transhumant shepherds -  however, changed greatly. They who originally 
had lived in the mountains had been geographically segregated from the 
serfs working on holdings. Their lifestyle and that of the others did not 
meet. The devastation, however of the wars, and the aspirations of the land­
lords anxious to replenish the workforce of their estates together changed 
this situation many places. After the end of the war, lots left unclaimed 
because their owners died or disappeared attracted men who had never 
called a clod of earth their own; landlords lured the shepherds into the 
communities of settled peasants. The peculiar life-style and religious prac­
tices of the new arrivals often stirred hostility among the locals. And be­
cause it was they who were conspicuous, in the course of the seventeenth 
century they came to be considered as typical of all Romanians.
It is indicative of the social rating given by their peers to the stratum of 
transhumant shepherds that their way of life, for all its freedom from prac­
tically all obligations, was never an alternative that attracted the sons of 
those who worked the land. The few of them on the margins of society who 
took up the ways of the Romanian transhumant shepherds were rare ex­
ceptions among the huge masses of the serfs.
"Re-nom adization" of this kind is not to be confused with a pattern of 
behaviour that was typical of the settled serfs during wars. At times of dan­
ger, they sought safety in the mountains, taking their varied livestock with 
them, and caring for them there until it was safe to return home. There are 
records describing the return of these peasants coming down from the moun­
tains with their beehives, chickens, ducks, pigs and cattle. It is evident that 
their taking to the mountains was not the adoption of the transhumant shep­
herd's way of life, and meant no permanent move by the vast majority of 
these village serfs.
The transhumant Romanian shepherd stratum, therefore, was not speak­
ing, a force disruptive of the feudal system for the simple reason that their 
lifestyle was not one that cared to emulate. In spite of this incessant at­
tempts were made to integrate them. It was as if the land-owning nobility 
were determined to bend these semi-free people to their will, to wedge them 
into the feudal society so foreign to them. The state supported the landlords 
fully in this. Though they achieved some degree of success, it was only 
small groups that they were able to integrate out of the free Romanians 
staunchly resisting majority.
Reconstruction
For much of the first half of the seventeenth century, Transylvania was in­
volved in the work of reconstruction. The country's leaders were deter­
mined to restore the conditions that had prevailed before the Fifteen Years' 
3 3 9  War. Special attention was given to rebuilding Gyulafehervar, but money
was also chanelled to renovate Kolozsv&r, and the strategically important 
fortress of Varad. G3bor Bethlen initiated the reconstruction, but was un­
able to complete it. GyOrgy R5k6czi I employed foreign masons to rebuild 
the famous Farkas Street Church in Kolozsv£r. He also renovated a church 
in Torda that had lain in ruins for decades. He had buildings and bridges 
put up on the estate belonging to the salt office of D6s, and in VSrad he had 
cleared away an entire district of the town which had burned down. Chroni­
clers of the reign of his son, however, GyOrgy R3k6czi II, mention no fur­
ther renovation, only construction.
The four decades of G&bor Bethlen and GyOrgy R&k6czi I's rule were 
years when war damage was restored, and mark a period of considerable 
significance in the architecture of Transylvania. The princes themselves con­
tributed much to this. Their more or less consistent promotion of the new 
architecture greatly contributed to the spread of the Renaissance style in 
Transylvania. Beautiful arcades and airy edifices crowned with cornices 
were built at their instigation. And yet, the most significant aspect of this 
great period of reconstruction was independent of the two rulers' activities.
This aspect, though most clearly manifest in the architecture of the pe­
riod, was an emanation of a profound and comprehensive cultural change. 
It found reflection in architecture in that elements of the Renaissance style 
were to be found even in buildings put up by village masons and carpen­
ters. This is not to say that from the seventeenth century on village houses 
had staircases with loggias and frescoes of mythological characters on their 
walls. Such costly Renaissance hallmarks remained confined to the manor 
houses of the wealthier landowners and the houses of the most affluent 
burghers in Transylvania. Nor did the new attitude introduce virginals into 
the parlours of peasant women, or induce the men to sit down after a good 
day's ploughing to compose poems on the beauty of nature.
But the essence of the Renaissance, which was to clarify the relationship 
between man and his environment, did reach the villages of Transylvania. 
It is characteristic of this period that more than anything else it transformed 
the structure of living space. Small nooks and comers disappeared, along 
with rooms at differing levels, indoor stairs and capriciously located exit 
doors appeared to facilitate escape. Windows were now larger and were 
glassed in: you could look in, and you could look out. People moved out­
side the confines of the houses, and into the new gardens. And as the houses 
were enlarged by the surrounding gardens, so the towns were enlarged 
with places to take a stroll in. For the first time in the history of Transylva­
nia, townspeople were taking excursions to the surrounding countryside.
The settlements themselves changed as well, most notably in their struc­
tures. Towns no longer had narrow alleys, and canalization was introduced. 
At road intersections open squares with fountains or statues were now to 
be found and here and there a park was established. Everything became 
more open and more lucid.
No purely Renaissance towns were built in Transylvania, but the medi­
eval character of the towns was transformed. Gabor Bethlen had two foun­
tains installed in Gyulafehervdr, one in the market square, the other behind 
the cathedral. GyOrgy Rak6czi I had the market square of Gyalu enlarged to 340
insure a better view from the surroundings houses. In Gyulafehervar, on 
one of the bastions, he had soil brought in to plant a fruit and flower gar­
den. As for the Saxons, buildings of the same style within the same street, in 
Szeben or Beszterce confirm that the city landscape was deliberately planned. 
Moreover, excursion sites were recorded close to major Saxon settlements 
as early in the mid-seventeenth century.
Following the great devastation of the villages of Transylvania, the trans­
formation of the pattern of settlement that could be observed since the Mid­
dle Ages took a faster course. As the peasants rebuilt their living quarters 
after their flight, a new practice of site allocation came about. The previous 
method, whereby blood relations built side by side, was no longer followed. 
In place of the earlier "pile villages", registers from the seventeenth century 
tell overwhelmingly of villages with a symmetrical ground-plan, built ac­
cording to a regular order, with rows of houses reflecting the affluence of 
their inhabitants.
The richest lived around a natural or artificial centre and the poor had 
their living quarters further away in regular order, in line with their de­
creasing means. While not characteristic of all village settlements at the time, 
this form established itself permanently. It seems indeed, that it was highly 
suitable: it has been able to survive up to the present, in spite of centuries of 
destruction and social change.
But this structure was only the skeleton. A given village was as different 
from any other as are two persons in spite of their identical bone structures. 
For example, in the villages in the seigniory of Fogaras, in 1637 there were 
anywhere of between five and sixty-seven holdings. Some of these villages 
contained every size of plots (telkek) from a whole holding to an eighth of a 
holding. In the villages of another seigniory, plots were generally of equal 
size within a single settlement, with all whole holdings in one, and all half 
holdings in another.
In this same period, ending in the middle of the seventeenth century, 
peasant homes were acquiring their new appearance. Most notably, they 
were no longer of a temporary character. Most peasant houses in the seven­
teenth century were built to last, as is indicated by the fact that seigniorial 
records list "abandoned houses" that had stood vacant for several years. 
What was new in the layout of these houses was their division into several 
rooms, as opposed to the earlier single living space. Attics and cellars were 
often added for storage.
This type of peasant house, with several rooms and levels holding cel­
lars and lofts must have been quite common by the mid-seventeenth cen­
tury. There are, however, no records of the houses of the landless cotters, of 
the people living off the same land as the jobbdgy.
Nor are there any sources stating that peasants in the seventeenth cen­
tury already planted flower gardens, though there is reason to assume they 
did. The most eloquent indication is a picture of a Romanian girl, an illus­
tration in a book published in Nuremberg by a university student from 
Szeben named Johann Troester. On her head the girl is wearing a dense 
wreath of flowers. Troester describes how these were made from roses and 
other flowers, and notes that the Romanian girls wearing them looked like
the Roman maids of antiquity on their way to a festival of Flora. Roses are 
usually considered the flowers of the elite, but from this it seems that they 
were grown in the gardens of peasants as well. There is also reference to a 
gardener on one of the seigniories who grew violets and carnations in pots 
in his room.
The Value of Work
The peasant practice of gardening suggests that for these simple people, 
work was an end in itself; certainly, the "fruit of one's labour" was not to be 
measured in terms of real profit. Their clothing implies this as well. It was 
in the seventeenth century that Transylvanian peasants began to set aside a 
separate holiday attire which they decorated with rich embroidery or made 
of cloth woven in colourful patterns, and intricately ornamented. The mak­
ing of such a Sunday best must have involved tremendous work.
Beyond gardening and making these colourful costumes, however, the 
peasants of Transylvania did not work as a pastime. Village entertainment 
in the seventeenth century was by and large, the same as it had been in the 
Middle Ages. They liked to dance, either in groups or in pairs. The Roma­
nian men performed a three-beat round dance to the accompaniment of 
fife-music. Contemporaries have noted that the mountains shepherds played 
beautifully.
Work on colourful, ornate clothing and gardening for the pleasure of it 
among people at the lower end of the social scale, however, only served to 
underline the true character of their daily labour. Work was no source of 
pleasure to those who performed it, but a heavy burden borne for the pleas­
ure of others. It is hardly a coincidence that this recognition was bom  at the 
very moment when the mass of society was discovering beauty for its own 
sake, while the other, smaller part was growing cloyed with inordinate luxury.
The man to formulate this realization in Transylvania was Jdnos Szal&rdi, 
the custodian of the prince's archives in Gyulafehervcir. On seeing the prince 
of Liechtenstein's park in Moravia with all the intricacies or Renaissance 
landscaping, Szal&rdi was appalled by the money squandered on it. But 
even more than by the extravagant spending he was struck by the enor­
mous amount of work the creation of the park entailed. With the fresh eyes 
of an outsider he recognized that Renaissance splendour was the product 
of the labour of many people, a rarely noted fact.9
This approach, which saw the perfect workmanship behind the wonders 
of the park, and contemplated the hard labour it required, was quite wide­
spread in Transylvania in the seventeenth century. Provincial poets and the 
verses of village preachers sang of a respect for workmanship and labour. 
They wrote of the indispensability to lord and peasant alike of all that work 
creates. Clearly, it would be an exaggeration to see in these poets the early 
proponents of some labour theory of value. There is no doubt, however,
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that they pondered over the amount of hard work required to generate a 
product. And they expressed their respect for work in a tone reserved by 
professional poets for the praise of their society's most valued quality, 
knightly virtue.
The new respect for labour was a direct consequence of the extraordi­
nary growth in the demand for workers. Indeed, this was the major hall­
mark of the modem age for those who produced all that was needed for the 
m odem  lifestyle with the work of their hands.
The new demand affected the peasantry the most directly, since the sev­
enteenth century was the time when landowners were striving to become 
increasingly self-sufficient. That meant that they had most of their require­
ments satisfied by goods produced by their serfs. How far this was so is 
indicated by the fact that village craftsmen were exempted from perform­
ing the regular labour service required of each inhabitant of the settlement, 
and instead rendered it in the form of work in line with their own craft. 
Furriers, carpenters and smiths laboured for their seignior on demand. Most 
of the trades practiced in the villages were related to construction and build­
ing, a few  people were involved in the production of food. But some 
seigniories even had craftsmen working in trades that were usually found 
only in towns, for instance tailors and joiners. In some places, even the pro­
viders of luxuries — bird-catchers, gardeners, and game-keepers — did 
their work in lieu of other services due.
The products generated by serfs in the form of service due reached even 
the highest classes. Proceeding down the hierarchy from the prince's castle 
to the village manors, more and more of the labour employed was serf la­
bour. Transylvanian architectural history speaks of works created by vil­
lage carpenters and other serf craftsmen. Serfs also manufactured furniture 
and home-decorating textiles. Peasant-made carpets and homespun textiles 
decorated even the most elegant homes, while the most artistically executed 
furniture included peasant-style beds, tables and benches.
Studying memorial household furnishing obviously, it is impossible to 
separate the products of the town guild craftsmen from the objects made in 
the villages. This is due to the fact that hardly any objects survived from the 
seventeenth century, and information stems largely from inventories, for 
instance, dowry lists. Most likely, serf craftsmen created products that could 
compete with the best of those made by master craftsmen, and it is almost 
certain that goods produced by town guilds stood in the houses of the no­
bility. The extant records of the furnishings to be found in the homes of the 
nobility show remarkable similarity to the furnishings of patrician homes. 
And since the goods manufactured by serfs were never sold on the market, 
the similarity can only mean that the guilds, too, were producing every­
thing that the taste and fashion of the time required.
Like the town craftsmen, the serf craftsmen, too, were sensitive to the 
new requirements. They had to manufacture more and more, and espe­
cially, they had to produce different types of wares than earlier. Though 
this change required that they work more, on the whole it had a positive 
influence on the circumstances of craftsmen in villages and towns alike. 
Those living on the estates had better lives, and in the towns, craftsmen's 
wages did not lag behind the astronomical rise in prices even in 1625.
6. Culture and Education
The Schools
In the area of education the most striking change taking place in the early 
seventeenth century was the considerable increase in the proportion of serfs 
to the total number of students. This fact was noted by contemporaries such 
as the outstanding teacher and authority on education around the middle 
of the century, J&nos Ap^czai Csere. He remarked that there were so many 
serf children in the schools that the offsprings of the nobility had difficulty 
in keeping their benches in the classes. He also noted the reason for this 
love of learning the serfs' desire to rise out of serfdom and poverty.10 And 
so it must have been. In Transylvania, customary law, which under Bethlen 
was reinforced, had long insured the serfs' freedom to learn. Their land­
lords could not deprive them of this freedom, and studying remained a 
difficult, but generally attainable, means of climbing up the social ladder.
A relatively dense network of schools facilitated entry into the system. 
There were schools in every region of Transylvania, though their distribu­
tion was not uniform. The Saxons had the greatest number of schools: a 
Census in 1660 recorded 238 ministers and 224 schoolmasters serving this 
nationally, which meant that by and large, every congregation had its own 
teacher. Of the Hungarian language areas, only the Szekelys had a compa­
rable supply of teachers. The Rojnanian areas, however, were incompara­
bly worse off. Though it is likely that there was teaching in some of the 
monasteries, there were only two actual Romanian-language schools. In 1657 
Zsuzsanna Lorantffy, dowager of Gyorgy R&k6czi I, founded a third such 
school on the estate of Fogaras.
The structure of education was transformed in two respects in the course 
of the seventeenth century. Firstly schooling for girls was initiated. This 
was an enormous step forward, since it provided the masses with an op­
portunity for learning totally neglected until then. Secondly, in 1622 an acad­
emy was added to the schools system, which until then had a number of 
colleges (kollegiumok) roughly the equivalent of grammar schools, as its high­
est-level educational institutions. Though the founding of the academy came 
quite late when compared with the rest of Europe, the fact that it came into 
existence and survived, at all was remarkable, considering that the univer­
sity in Kolozsvar founded by Istvdn Bathory had operated for only a few 
years. The Gyulafehervar Academy with its faculties of theology, philoso­
phy and law, Bethlen had intended to have expanded into a university. 
This, however, Gyorgy R&koczi I failed to accomplish. Nevertheless, a great 
number of students found in the academy their opportunity for both intel­
lectual and social advancement.
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The Saxons also considered the establishment of an academy. At their 
synod in 1647 they discussed the matter, and in 1653 the Saxon University 
took up the question again. The fact that no Saxon Lutheran academy was 
founded in the seventeenth century was due to a lack of support from the 
prince and his government. As it was, the most talented pupils continued 
to study at universities abroad, so that the Saxons were the most numerous 
group to study at foreign universities. In the course of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries, about 4,500 Transylvanians known by name studied 
abroad; of these 55.5 per cent came from the five largest Saxon towns. The 
others hailed form a total of fifty-six localities.11
It was a characteristic of Hungarian education in general that many stu­
dents attended foreign universities. The reason was most probably the lack 
of such institutions of higher learning closer home. But the fact also speaks 
of the need generally felt for higher education: with her medieval universi­
ties now extinguished and the partition of the country Hungary was in dan­
ger of being cut off from the mainstream of European culture and educa­
tion. That it did not happen, clearly had a great deal to do with the determina­
tion to see that it would not. Oddly, not even the wars curbed the flow of 
students to foreign universities. In the sixteenth century, for instance, the 
decade between 1521 and 1530 saw most students leaving Transylvania for 
universities abroad, and that number was surpassed only in the decade be­
ginning in 1630, with 304 students enrolled in universities in other countries.
The choice of the country in which to study changed at the turn of the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Under the Calvinist princes, that is, 
from the election of Istvan Bocskai, Transylvanians did not attend Catholic 
universities for several decades. Around the middle of the seventeenth cen­
tury did they again start studying in Padua, which was known to have the 
best medical school. During the years when the Thirty Years' War was rav­
aging Germany, the universities of England and Holland became the pre­
ferred institutions. In this sense Transylvania actually profited from the war, 
since its students went to the Netherlands and England at a time when 
these two countries where at their intellectual zenith. A Transylvanian even 
contributed so to speak, to the scientific revolution in England, Jin os Binffy- 
hunyadi, a reputed chemist, who taught at Gresham College in London 
until 1646.
The Intellectuals
A much more surprising development was that certain outstanding per­
sonalities were permeated in England with the complex system of princi­
ples which is usually denoted by the term puritanism. The novel relation­
ship between the individual and the church was treated by them in much 
the same way as they handled the question of public education or taught
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the new elements of metaphysics elaborated by Descartes. Pcil Medgyesi,
J&nos Tolnai Dali, and J&nos Apaczai Csere were the best known among 
them. Their activity — around the middle of the century — was the culmi­
nation of Hungarian puritanism. Medgyesi was primarily responsible for 
ecclesiastic life, Tolnai Dali was especially active in schools and Ap&czai 
Csere primarily in the renewal of scientific life. These were followed by 
lesser known personalities who were active mainly in the eastern part of 
the Kingdom of Hungary.
Of the young people studying at universities surprisingly few remained 
abroad. In the almost two hundred years between the beginning of the six­
teenth and the end of the seventeenth centuries only 2.4 per cent did not 
return. They came home often in spite of attractive job offers from foreign 
institutions, aware of the fact what that meant. They came to play a decisive 
role in the revival of education, their very person a testimony to the pivotal 
effect of learning. It was mostly the teachers and preachers who started on 
their way those young serfs who overcame all objective and emotional hur­
dles to take advantage of the possibility to study.
The school in Kolozsv&r was unusual in that many of the teachers who 
taught there were physicians. One such outstanding personality was M&t§
Csanaki, a man who after visiting several recognized universities earned 
his Doctor of Medicine degree in Padua. Since the only faculty for Unitarian 
theology was in Poland, anyone of this creed studying at schools in the 
W est had to take up another field. Most enrolled in the medical faculties, 
yet back home they often worked as teachers, or practiced both professions 
concurrently. Frequently professors from Poland also taught at the Unitar­
ian schools in Kolozsvar.
Of all the teachers invited from abroad to teach in Transylvania in the 
first half of the seventeenth century those working in Gyulafehervcir are the 
best known. Martin Opitz, perhaps the most noted German poet of the time, 
moved there for a short period, but he disliked living in Gyulafehervcir and 
left. Following him, in 1629, the final year of G ibor Bethlen's rule, came 
three professors from the dissolved university of Herbom. Among them 
were the renowned encyclopaedist, Johannes Alsted, and Johannes Bisterfeld, 
primarily a diplomat, both of whom remained in Gyulafehervcir for the rest 
of their lives.
Of the Transylvanians teaching in this town, Pal Kereszturi was one whose 
personal magnetism and excellent teaching personality moulded the lives 
of generations of students. He was new in that his teaching went out to his 
students as individuals: it was not only how much information they man­
aged to retain that interested him, but also why it was that certain things 
made an impact on them and others did not; in short, he was interested in 
the process of learning.
By the 1640s the other important school of V&rad had risen to be a centre 
of learning in Transylvania. It was primarily the reform activities of Mihaly 
Kecskemeti that earned the institute its fine reputation. This was the first 
school in the principality to use the books of Comenius, Ramus and W illiam 
Ames, and the first to stage a play. The school attracted many outstanding 
teachers, among them Gy5rgy Martonfalvi, who had come to V&rad from a 
university in Holland. With him there, Varad would have offered the latest 3 4 6
in the natural sciences; but hardly had Martonfalvi arrived when the Turk­
ish siege of 1660 forced the school to relocate to Debrecen.
These outstanding teachers, who actually belonged to the clerical intelli­
gentsia contributed to the growth of this stratum's social prestige in the course 
of the seventeenth century. Under G^bor Bethlen, the state helped this proc­
ess along. For absolute rulers usually had also a state religion, and under its 
Calvinist rulers the Calvinist church became the state church in Transylva­
nia. Bethlen's approach was unique in that though he had no ecclesiastics in 
his council, he elevated the heads of the Calvinist church into the ruling elite.
The social prestige of the ecclesiastic intellectuals grew in such measure 
that even the Romanian priests, who were the farthest removed in every 
sense of the term from the dominant Calvinist church, benefited from it. 
Already Gabor Bethlen had emancipated them from serfdom, and under 
Bethlen and his successors their status among Romanians grew even more. 
The number of Romanian priests increased significantly in the first half of 
the seventeenth century. For example, in the seigniory of Fogaras, while 
there were twenty-nine Romanian priests in thirty-three settlements in 1632, 
their number had more than doubled by 1640.12
Only the Saxons seem to have experienced a reverse development. The 
Saxon University had made itself master over the Saxon clergy, and by the 
middle of the century, this secular authority regulated everything from the 
lesson preached at the service to the clothing that the priests' families were 
to wear. Since the Saxon church fell outside the competence of the prince's 
church policies, the University automatically assumed the role of patron. 
But the exceptional erudition of the Saxon lay intellectuals was no less of an 
important factor. The mayor of Brass6, Michael Weiss, for example, had 
studied at better universities than any of the church leaders in his time. 
Why should he have looked up to them?
Michael Weiss is a good example of how difficult it is to define the cat­
egory of lay intelligentsia in the seventeenth century. Certainly, the fact that 
a person had studied, even at a university, is not an unambiguous criterion. 
Nor did everyone employed in an intellectual job, belonged absolutely to it. 
An illustration of this is a mayor, Tam£s Borsos of Vasarhely, who for many 
years worked abroad as a diplomat, but whose main concern throughout 
that time was how his estates were being managed at home.
And yet the only way of defining the set of seventeenth-century lay intel­
lectuals is in terms of the activity they were engaged in. In the course of the 
century, their numbers grew significantly. First of all with the principality 
broadening its international relations, more and more people were needed 
to conduct its diplomacy. Though the country had permanent representa­
tion only in Constantinople, its envoys frequently visited the courts of other 
powers as well. These envoys included everyone from noble lords to letter- 
bearing couriers, but most of them came from the ranks of the middle nobil­
ity and the town burghers. It is likely that the government "bureaucracy" 
also grew, though the structure of the central government organs did not
12. D. P rodan  in Urbariile gives conscriptions of Romanian villages. G. MOller in 
Die siichsische Nationsuniversitdt (SUBB-H 1973) gives conscriptions of Saxon
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change in the course of the seventeenth century. On the other hand, there 
was a growing demand for intellectual work in every sphere of life, result­
ing in an increase in the number of trained professionals also in the govem- 
ment-boards of the counties, of the Szekely districts and of the towns.
The lowest stratum of the lay intelligentsia employed education it had 
acquired mostly through a few years of local schooling in the villages, mar­
ket towns, and seigniories. They were the clerks working at the courts of 
the higher nobility, some of them rising to the rank of bailiff. Those who 
managed the estates, the courtjudges (udvarbiro), mostly came from the lower 
nobility. They can be included among the intelligentsia only with some res­
ervation. For their level of education was generally low, and frequently 
they managed also some property of their own, whereas their practical 
knowledge was exceedingly broad. They possessed a balanced combina­
tion of theoretical and practical erudition.
Erudition
Following the catastrophe of the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth cen­
turies, Transylvania's intellectual life was the first to recover. The first book 
after the war appeared in 1610 in Kolozsvar; it was a didactic poem on 
morals written in Hungarian. The following year a Latin poetics was pub­
lished in Szeben. The fast recovery did not entail continuity, however, for 
the lively spirit of polemics that had still characterized Transylvania at the 
end of the sixteenth century had disappeared, and had given way to neo­
stoicism and a turning away from the vicissitudes of life to seek solace in 
the pleasure of thinking.
Transylvania's overall situation provides reasons enough for the change. 
The political failures of the turn of the century had made it clear that the 
country would remain wedged and torn between two great powers. Noth­
ing could be done to change that. As for the churches, after long and futile 
disputes, they turned instead to their own internal affairs.
The elite representatives of this introspective culture came from the fol­
lowing of Istvan Bathory of Somly6, lord chief justice of the Kingdom of 
Hungary, whose court had been the last Hungarian aristocratic court of 
European stature. A distant relative of the Bathory princes, this exception­
ally erudite aristocrat was a writer of Stoic disposition. After a youth filled 
with political and military success and reaching the height of his prestige, 
he retreated from public life. Bathory withdrew to the gloomy castle of Ecsed, 
where he established a court of intellectual splendour and simple externals. 
Istvan Bathory's spiritual contacts included personalities such as Justus 
Lipsius. Though he died at the beginning of the Fifteen Years' War, even the 
first two Transylvanian princes to be elected after the war were under his 
influence: Zsigmond Rak6czi had been his friend, and Gabor Bathory has 
been educated at his court.
The process of intellectual regeneration in time gave rise to a more secu­
lar culture. This is reflected by figures on book publication up until 1630. 
Between 1611 and 1630, of the eighteen Hungarian-language publications 
that appeared, ten were not on theology. After that year, however, the ratio 348
was reversed: 62.5 per cent of the publications appearing between 1631 and 
1650 treated theological matters or were intended for church use.13 These 
statistics, however, give only a superficial view of the realities. In fact, the 
most thoroughly religious works had a temporal application, and often ex­
plicitly addressed themselves to the natural sciences. Sermons often dis­
cussed illnesses, and theological writings had introductions dealing with 
the mysteries of nature. Religious publications show thorough acquaint­
ance with both the occult explanations of natural phenomena and the new 
discoveries in the natural sciences. Though the best educated intellectuals 
were within the church rather than working as scholars; they conveyed their 
secular knowledge even from the pulpit.
Besides the secular concerns of religious instruction, seventeenth-cen­
tury Transylvanian culture was characterized also by the growth of pub­
lishing.
Most of the growing number of books were initially published by the 
prince's press in Gyulafehervar. Founded by Gabor Bethlen, it came into its 
own during the 1630s. Possibly Gyorgy Rak6czi I had cyrillic letters brought 
from Wallachia and from 1639 the printer of the princely family published 
very many Romanian-language publications. Perhaps even more distinc­
tive was the publishing house established in V irad by Abraham Szenci 
Kertesz in 1649, which contributed to the dissemination of works in the 
Hungarian language. Kertesz had no ideological axe to grind, thus he was 
the person to publish the period's only Jesuit work to appear in Transylvania. 
He put out works by Comenius as well as statutes of the Calvinist church. 
The publication of the book Approbatae Constitutiones, a collection of legal 
regulations, was a major undertaking in V&rad. The revised edition of the 
G ispar Karolyi Bible translation was also commenced, but on account of 
the destruction of the city in 1660, was only completed in Kolozsvar later. 
From 1640 until the fall of VSrad in 1660, this publisher came out with 113 
works of which 70 were written in Hungarian.
This growing book production meant first of all that works on events in 
the distant past were outnumbered by accounts of the deeds of contempo­
rary princes, primarily the military accomplishments of Gyorgy Rak6czi I. 
New were also the expressedly scientific works, foremost those in linguis­
tics: dictionaries and a book on the theory of translation by Istvan Geleji 
Katona entitled Grammatikacska (A Little Grammar).
The new interest in linguistics captivated even the prince's family. While 
still heir apparent, Gy5rgy Rak6czi II and his brother Zsigmond partici­
pated in work on the dictionary being complied by J&nos ErdSbenyei. The 
number of works on linguistics, however, does not reflect the growing in­
terest in language that existed around the 1640s. This was the first wave of 
Hungarian language reform, and although the problems were hotly debated 
in all of Hungary, the centre of activity was Transylvania. The dispute re­
volved around whether to use orthography based on etymology, which 
would be accessible only to the educated, or on phonetics, a simpler form 
that could be learned by anyone who spoke the language. The advocate of
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the first approach was the Calvinist bishop Istvan Geleji Katona, and of the 
second, P&l Medgyesi, the court preacher of GyOrgy R&koczi I. The two 
were to be integrated later towards the end of the seventeenth century by 
Mikl6s T6tfalusi Kis, a printer who had studied in the Netherlands.
The question of the mother tongue also arose among the Transylvanian 
Romanians. Their problem however, was more complicated than that of 
the Hungarians, iptefan Simion Romanian bishop of Gyulafeh6rv3r com­
plained that it was impossible to prepare a Bible translation suitable for 
every Romanian because they do not speak uniformly. Obviously he was 
thinking not only of those living in Transylvania but of those Romanians in 
different counties whose language usage showed discrepancies. These de­
viations in the Romanian, and in the Transylvanian principalities might have 
been resolved by the Eastern Orthodox church. This however retained the 
old Slavic use — in keeping with orthodox universality — and did not sup­
port the efforts to use the mother tongue.
Thus the use of the Romanian language in the Orthodox church which 
was so promising in the sixteenth century stalled from the beginning of the 
1580s. After this the mother tongue became restricted to the Romanians of 
Protestant denomination. The first completely Romanian New Testament 
was published in 1648 for Romanian Protestants by the princely printer in 
Gyulafehervcir in Romanian literary language. A pastor named Silvestru 
and 5?tefan Simion did a lot to develop the Romanian literary language. In 
Transylvania the intertwining of the Romanian mother tongue and Calvin­
ism had peculiar consequences. In the first place a contradiction arose be­
tween local Romanian pastors and the Romanian mother tongue with re­
spect to how certain intellectuals insisted on orthodoxy.
In the second place the mother tongue relationship evolving in Transyl­
vania and in Wallachia became contradictory. For just in the middle of the 
seventeenth century the spread of mother tongue in printed form had com­
menced in this area. Since this remained within the confines of orthodoxy 
the polemics conducted with Transylvania were greatly reinforced thereby.
Among the Saxons there were no such problems. This was primarily so 
because since the reformation the products of German culture reached them 
in ever more uniformly. However a certain segregation was preserved: the 
German text regarded as literary was read in the schools according to the 
different Saxon dialects. Interest in their vernacular was demonstrated in 
that they sought the local precedents of their own language. They dealt 
with etimological problems on the basis of the sixteenth-century legend of 
the Get-Gothic-Transylvanian Saxon continuity.
Equally noteworthy was the growing interest in history and medicine 
from the late 1630s on. A book on mathematics in Hungarian appeared as 
well, but it stopped at simple arithmetic. The books on history and medi­
cine discussed the concerns of the time, the former analysed the 1657 catas­
trophe in Poland, the latter treated the possible causes of the recurring epi­
demics ravaging the country.
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An Open-Minded Society
The Transylvanian scholars of the seventeenth century were typically in­
volved in everyday life. They had neither the opportunity, nor perhaps the 
need, to seclude themselves in the ivory tower of science, to ponder on some 
problem, or to conduct scientific experiments. The fact that the highly edu­
cated were in constant touch with those who looked to them for guidance 
had several positive effects. But since there was no opportunity for creative 
scientific investigation, religion remained the focus of intellectual interest 
in Transylvania. Scholarly disputes were always connected to problems of 
religion. The revolutionary epistemology of Descartes, for example, was 
first formulated in Hungarian by J&nos Ap&czai Csere, a theologian with a 
doctorate from the university of Harderwijk. His Magyar encyclopaedia (Hun­
garian Encyclopaedia), a work highly influential for the development of Hun­
garian science and scientific language, was published in Utrecht in 1655.
Transylvania's active intellectuals combined an interest in religion with 
great receptivity to new ideas. It is more difficult to say who it was that the 
ideas mediated by them actually reached. There is one area, however, which 
definitely shows that the preoccupation of the greatest thinkers of the time 
had filtered down to a broader segment of society. Surprisingly, the seg­
ment involved is the Sabbatarians, a religious community which, in the 
course of the seventeenth century, no longer had an educated elite.
Sabbatarianism, this peculiar form of Stoicism evolved in the last third 
of the sixteenth century, had, in the seventeenth century, spread beyond the 
circle of the intellectual and political elite to the uneducated and the lowly. 
It is difficult to assess the size of the movement at this time, since the 
persecutions of 1638 obviously destroyed much of the evidence. It is, in 
fact, the restatement and the great severity of laws against the Sabbatarians 
which indicate that the movement had taken root among the Transylvanian 
peasants, especially among the Szekelys, and could not be destroyed.
The fact that the sect was immune to all persecution was probably due to 
its members' natural defiance in the face of aggression, to their rage against 
social and political oppression. At the same time, Sabbatarianism's grow­
ing strength had a great deal to do with the fact that it filled a strongly felt 
cultural void.
The void was due to a general lack of popular education. The official 
Churches had stopped playing the role of teachers of the poor, which, origi­
nally, had been a means of winning converts to their particular faith. As 
they became accepted and consolidated, however, they lost interest in the 
lowest strata of the population, for proselytizing, the old motivation, was 
checked on all sides by the tacit agreement among the received religions 
not to upset the denominational status quo. It is characteristic in this con­
nection that Calvinism, the dominant religion in seventeenth century Transyl­
vania, was from the turn of the century on, concerned with the popular 
education only of the Romanians whom it wanted to convert.
The Sabbatarians, on the other hand, with their neophyte zeal for con­
verts, took popular education into the churches, providing the faithful in­
formation about day-to-day matters of general interest. They responded to 
the concerns of their congregation. The hymns they sang at their services 
conveyed with a disarming immediacy, all the teachings of creed.
The Sabbatarians' hymns were not sombre and were not preoccupied 
with sin and punishment, the motives of other religions. They taught that 
man could not follow God's will, the Laws, but that through His grace he 
could still find salvation. Salvation, as proclaimed in the Sabbatarian hymns, 
was a certainty for all the faithful. This secure knowledge gave them the 
peace that comes from "cheerfulness of spirit", and the carnal pressures 
that went with the Sabbath. One hymn even claims that the holy days must 
be observed for the simple purpose of man's relaxation.14
This anthropocentrism was familiar with the hierarchies that made the 
world go round, but took the Stoic tenet of the vanity of all worldly careers 
to the people. Many handwritten hymn books contain the originally Ana­
baptist verse declaring that man must adapt to the world as created by 
God, because the desire to lead the life of the nobility brings only sorrow 
and suffering.
The Sabbatarians' self-education, however, with its repudiation of every­
thing worldly, was not an end in itself. Rather it sought to understand the 
secrets of Nature, and preached man's secure place in the world with the 
tranquility of the pantheists. The Sabbatarians believed in the stability of the 
laws of Nature, which not even God's unpredictable, sudden wrath would 
disturb. They proclaimed these immanent laws of Nature along the world 
concept of the Ptolemaic system. God "hung the Earth in the middle" says 
one of their hymns, and even argues that it is only man's imperfection that 
bars him from seeing that the "Heavens" revolve around the Earth. Granted 
that all this was contrary to the Copernican heliocentric theory, but in the 
seventeenth century a number of great thinkers adhered to the same view.
For those who have little access to culture, the fact that certain questions 
are posed is probably more important than the answers given. For one starts 
thinking about things constantly heard of. That was certainly true of 
Sabbatarians: verses dealing with the laws of Nature or arguing with the 
Copernican world view were set down in many handwritten hymnals. They 
would not have been copied repeatedly if they had not aroused interest.
These hymnals leave no doubt that the modem scientific theories spread 
by the intellectuals were received with utmost attention by seventeenth- 
century Transylvanian society.
7. The Miscarriage of Great Hopes 
Connections with the Romanian Voivodates
Gyorgy R&k6czi II, who took the throne in 1648, was the first ruler in Transyl­
vania to succeed his father and to attain his title without confrontation. He 
had been elected by the Diet to succeed him while Gyorgy Rdk6czi I was 
still alive and consequently had no particular domestic problems. But just 
when he took over the government, conditions abroad were becoming ex­
tremely involved.
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Follow ing the Cossack uprising in Poland in 1648, there was unrest 
throughout eastern Europe. The Cossacks' movement thus took on a his­
toric importance similar to that which the Bohemian uprising had for west­
ern Europe, since it sparked off a lengthy war in eastern Europe which, like 
the Thirty Years' War, resulted in the restructuring of relations between the 
various countries.
Zsigmond R ik6czi's plan to win the Polish throne failed at the very be­
ginning of the conflagration. GyOrgy Rakoczi I's death had polarized the 
Rdkbczi party in Poland. Jan Casimir, the brother of Wladislas IV, became 
king. Though the strife around the Polish throne did not cease, for the time 
being the R£k6czi party was not a part of it.
Transylvania found a more immediate and portentous opportunity for 
action when it reviewed its relations with the Romanian voivodates. The 
opportunity came when the leaders of both principalities failed to realize 
the significance of the Cossacks' uprising, and took a stand against them. 
Gyorgy Rikoczi II was able to take advantage of the ensuing chaos by in­
stalling in both countries voivodes committed to him. Gheorghe Stefan took 
over the government of Moldavia, and Constantin Serban became voivode 
of Wallachia. In both cases, a popular uprising supported Rak6czi's choice.
The course of events — in Moldavia in 1650 and in Wallachia five years 
later — was similar in the two countries. The Cossacks attacked, and the 
people rose in the wake of the disorder. Taking advantage of the anarchy, 
the aspiring rulers drove out the voivodes in power, and with the aid of 
Rikoczi took up voivodeship. They turned to crush the popular movements. 
Rakoczi personally marched on Wallachia since the uprising there threat­
ened to spread to Transylvania; to Moldavia he only dispatched an army.
In aiding the new voivodes Rakoczi had reasons that went far beyond 
political ties: he realized that social stability in the voivodates was in the 
interest of his own principality. Frequently during times of unrest the disaf­
fected had made their way to Transylvania, instigating rebellion there. Al­
ready in May 1619, Moldavians had incited what was tantamount to a peas­
ant revolt. Moreover, self-proclaimed voivodes and defeated peasant lead­
ers were constantly turning up in Transylvania. Rak6czi thought it easier to 
help settle social unrest in the Romanian counties than to fend off the incen­
diaries.
The Hopes of Politicians in the Kingdom
His intervention in the voivodates won Gyorgy Rak6czi II great respect. 
The court at Gyulafehervar became the centre of east European diplomacy 
where Polish, Turkish, Tatar, and Cossack ambassadors communicated. The 
expectation was that the prince would intervene in the war which had bro­
ken out in Poland in the wake of the Cossack uprising.
The politicians of the kingdom waited in the greatest anticipation. A lead­
ing group of these were looking to Rakoczi to act. The most influential aris­
tocrats, who had not long before been indifferent or even hostile to his fa­
ther's military attempts in royal Hungary were now pinning their hopes on
the younger R6k6czi. In his father's time, led by Count Miklbs Esterh£zy, 
they had declined Transylvanian interference, because they had come to 
believe in the course of the Thirty Years' War that the Habsburgs with all 
their forces in the West would be able to put end to Turkish occupation.
Once peace was restored in the empire, they claimed the emperor would 
turn his attention to the matter of Hungary.
Once the Peace of Westphalia was signed, however, it was clear that 
their hopes would be disappointed. No attack on the Turks was attempted.
It was at this point, in 1649, that their attention turned to the R&k6czis, 
initially to the younger of them, Zsigmond.
Zsigmond R&koczi was a captivating personality and a staunch realist.
In the course of his father's campaign he had come to realize what the elder 
R&k6czi never would, namely that the slogan of freedom of religion for 
Protestants would no longer do as a rallying cry for the restoration of the 
independent Kingdom of Hungary. Setting the issue of religion aside, he 
established contacts with Catholic aristocrats, winning the support of Mikl6s 
Esterhazy and his party which, after the palatine's death, was headed by 
Count Pkl P&lffy, also a Catholic. When it became clear that there would be 
no war against the Turks, Zsigmond R^koczi joined them in working out a 
plan to drive the Habsburgs out of Hungary. The political coalition that 
formed around him in the autumn of 1651 was, thus, one that stood above 
religious differences. Zsigmond Rkkbczi had even been able to win some 
western allies to what had the seen balance of a great turning-point in sev­
enteenth-century Hungarian politics, until expectations were dashed by the 
death of the young, though politically mature politician on 4 February, 1652.
It was at this point that political attention turned to GyOrgy R£k6czi II at 
the instigation of Count Mikl6s Zrinyi, who took over the leadership of the 
party formerly headed by P&lffy in the spring of 1652. In Zrinyi, the Transyl­
vanian prince had won the support of royal Hungary's most prominent 
aristocrat. No contemporary history book failed to recount the deeds of his 
great-grandfather, Mikl6s Zrinyi, who had died a hero during Suleiman's 
siege of the fortress of Szigetvkr in 1566. Minstrels sang of his exploits, and 
even in the seventeenth century he remained the embodiment of the ances­
tors' heroic struggle against the Ottoman Empire. Thus the Miklbs Zrinyi 
who lent support to Gyorgy Rak6czi II had history on his side. And by his 
own deeds Zrinyi had gained great recognition by leading battles against 
the Ottoman forces since early youth. In the years when the Habsburg king 
was still believed to be about to liberate Hungary from the Turks, Zrinyi 
had written an epic about his great-grandfather, and had got involved in 
politics on Miklds Esterh&zy's side.
Zrinyi was the ideal political leader. It was largely due to him that by the 
time Gyorgy R&koczi II was contemplating involvement in Poland after the 
victories in the Romanian principalities, royal Hungary's population, from 
the leading aristocrats to the petty nobles and from the people in the market 
towns to perhaps even the village peasantry was waiting in anticipation for 
Rakoczi to act. While the prince was off on the Polish campaign, he and 
Zrinyi were exchanging letters on the practical aspects of Rakdczi's rule in 
royal Hungary. The plan was that, as in Gkbor Bethlen's time, the kingdom 
like Transylvania, was to become a vassal of the Turkish Empire. 354
The Polish Campaign and the Beginning 
of Transylvania's Decline
Gyorgy Rak6czi II began his march on Poland in January 1657, as an ally of 
King Charles X of Sweden. Following lengthy negotiations, they had agreed 
that after jointly conquering Poland, Rak6czi would become its king, with 
territories south of and including Warsaw.
In Transylvania, there was serious opposition to the undertaking, includ­
ing the prince's mother, Zsuzsanna Ldr&ntffy, and his wife, Zs6fia Bathory. 
Equally apprehensive were the older members of the Prince's Council. But 
the younger ones, who had been appointed by Rakoczi, as well as the intel­
lectuals in his entourage, were enthusiastic, and quoted the great Bohemian 
exile, Comenius, who, in a letter to one of Rakoczi's men back in 1655, had 
said that nothing was more certain than the fall of Poland, and with it, of 
the papacy.15
Indeed, it seemed that Rak6czi's victory was a foregone conclusion. Some 
two thirds of Poland's territory was in the throes of Cossack revolts and 
peasant uprisings. Swedish and Russian armies were ravaging the country, 
and in July 1656 Warsaw fell without the Polish king's only ally, Leopold I 
of Habsburg, having entered the war. Rakoczi was counting on a Polish 
defeat, and his aims were only natural for someone in the seventeenth cen­
tury. He was looking to secure Transylvania's trade routes, since Poland 
was the principality's gate to the West.
The prince and his supporters were of the opinion Sweden's attack on 
Poland was only the first step to an international coalition and war against 
the Habsburgs. It was with this future all-out war in mind that he allied 
with Sweden, the power which could be expected to be the most effective 
against the Habsburgs when the Polish campaign was over.
But the Polish campaign proceeded contrary to all expectations. Already 
in 1657 it stalled, when the Sweden suddenly withdrew because of an at­
tack from Denmark. One month later, in July, the Cossacks also withdrew 
from the war. By that time, the troops of Leopold I had arrived. Neverthe­
less, it was the Poles themselves who decisively defeated Gyorgy Rakoczi 
II. National opposition organized against him was becoming increasingly 
effective. Those who had fled into the marshes or the mountains now ral­
lied to drive out the hated intruders. The regular troops were no match for 
popular actions of this sort.
Rakbczi was compelled to accept a humiliating peace without having 
lost a single battle. He had to agree to all the conditions set by the Polish 
supreme command. It was when he finally set off on the journey home that 
it became evident that though he had been the first Transylvanian ruler 
since John II to have been brought up to rule, he had neither a sense of 
responsibility nor the requisite military know-how. On the way, he made 
unnecessary detour, when he learned of the approach of Tatar troops. He 
left his army to be captured while making his own escape. The soldiers
15. Comenius' letter to A. Klobusiczky: Erdely es az eszak-keleti haboru. (Transylva- 
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were driven off to the Crimea; RSk6czi arrived at Ecsed to join his family in 
early August.
Upon his return, he vowed to sacrifice even his personal fortune if neces­
sary to ransom his captured army. Yet he did nothing. It is believed that 
Rakoczi suffered a nervous breakdown, but even on recovering he did noth­
ing to bring his soldiers home. Soon the highways and byways of Transyl­
vania were filled women and children begging for money to pay their men­
folk's ransom. The generations of absolute rule by Transylvania's princes 
were now taking them toll: there was no one to take decisive action in this 
hour of the country's desperate plight.
Turkish W ar in Transylvania
Meanwhile, in the Ottoman Empire, an unexpected event had happened; 
power had been taken over by an extraordinary strong personality. He was 
Mehmed Kopriilu, a very old man, who started his career as an illiterate 
soldier of Albanian birth, and who had risen from the very lowest to the 
highest rank of society. He become grand vizier, taking over the Great Seal 
of the Empire from the hand of the infant sultan's mother on 15 September,
1656. He accepted only on condition that he would have absolute power.
He took over power in the midst of inordinate chaos and after the empire 
had suffered severe defeats, yet in a matter of months, order was restored.
He crushed the janissaries' revolts and reorganized the empire's finances.
Kopriilu is a good example of how a great personality can alter the course 
of history. Turkish historians refer to the two decades of his rule followed 
by that of his son both as grand viziers, as the Kopriilu Renaissance.
For Transylvania, Koprulli's coming to power was an enormous blow, 
especially since it happened unexpectedly. In late January 1657 KOpriilii 
had already dispatched on order to Gyorgy R5k6czi II to return home from 
Poland. The order was not heeded, however. Nothing but news of chaos 
had been coming from Constantinople for decades, and the prince had grown 
accustomed to ignoring the orders coming from the Porte. KOpriilii was the 
fifth grand vizier to be named to the post in 1656, and not even his well- 
wishers thought he would last more than a few months. But he remained in 
power, and was adamant that his orders be followed.
When, after repeatedly ignoring instructions, the prince returned home 
only after the humiliating peace, in late October 1657 Kopriilu sent out a 
command for R£k6czi's deposition. By that time, Transylvania's politicians 
should have been able to assess the changes that had transpired at the Porte, 
but in Transylvania, Rakoczi still seemed more formidable than the grand 
vizier. They did not dare to press R&k6czi to resign. First, they merely handed 
him Koprulii's letter, only later pleading with him to consider heeding it.
Rak6czi, however, made conditions, and wanted to secure the future of his 
estates. And the Diet negotiated with him.
The intolerable situation lasted for the rest of Rakoczi's lifetime. The prince 
insisted on his title without the least sense of regal responsibility for his 
country. And Transylvania's politicians were either not able or not brave 356
enough to drive him out. With foolish impotence they rather brought on 
themselves the revengeful deeds of the Porte.
First, Mehmed Koprtilu arrived in person, at the head of the main Turk­
ish army. After having removed Rak6czi's allies in both Romanian voivo- 
dates, he arrived at the Transylvanian border in late August 1658, and or­
dered the prince to appear before him. R&k6czi refused to comply. It is 
difficult to imagine whose help he was counting on with the Transylvanian 
soldiers still prisoners in the Crimea. Leopold I had been evasive when 
asked for support. The leaders of royal Hungary tried to gain help from the 
king, to no greater avail. Leopold had hardly any cause to assist R&k6czi as 
it was because of the prince that he had had to send his troops to Poland. 
Some hope perhaps could be placed on the haiduks, because with them — 
still before Koprulii's arrival — Rak6czi had defeated Ahmed Seide, the 
pasha of Buda.
In response to Gyorgy Rakoczi II's refusal to yield power over Transyl­
vania, the troops of the grand vizier flooded the country. First they cap­
tured the fortress of Jen<5, then marched on and laid waste to the rest of the 
principality. In early September, they reached Gyulafeherv^r. Street after 
street the capital was burnt down. The prince did not stay to witness the 
destruction however. He took flight in the direction of Debrecen, and the 
Turkish troops followed him to the Berettyo River.
Back in Transylvania, the head of the Prince's Council, Akos Barcsai, did 
the only thing left to be done: he went to the camp of the grand vizier and 
acceded to all of KOpriilu's conditions, including the capture of Gyorgy 
R&k6czi II. On 7 October, 1658 the Diet recognized Barcsai as the new prince 
of Transylvania. With that, Kopriilii and his entire army marched out of the 
country.
At last peace was restored. Instead of, urgently fulfilling the bargain with 
the grand vizier however, Rikoczi's and Barcsai's men jumped at each oth­
er's throats. Civil war broke out. The conflict was joined by a third party 
when Janos Kemeny, the commander of the Transylvanian army, returned 
from captivity in the Crimea in the autumn of 1659. The politicians of the 
principality had no time to remake relations with the Porte.
In April 1660 the Turkish main army from Constantinople set out for 
Transylvania a second time. But before it arrived, on 7 June, 1660, Rakoczi 
died from wounds received in a battle near Szaszfenes against the pasha of 
Buda. The Turks did not turn back, however. Ali pasha, commander of the 
arm y, took Akos Barcsai prisoner as surety for the taxes promised to 
Koprulii. The prince duly sent word from the pasha's camp for the taxes to 
be paid, so that measures were taken to collect them. But in the meanwhile, 
Varad was already laid under siege.
On 14 July, 1660, the Turks set up camp on the banks of the Koros River 
in the vineyards and orchards around Varad. Before the siege began, Ali 
pasha called on the fortress to surrender. The military commanders, how­
ever, supported by the town council, decided on defence. They evacuated 
the town itself, and some one thousand soldiers, burghers and students 
withdrew to the castle.
They held out for forty-four days, repulsing repeated attacks. But after 
the enemy drained off the water in the moat and no more gunpowder was
left, they surrendered on 17 August, 1660. Even then they made conditions, 
and the impact of their valiance was such that the Turkish command agreed 
to their demands. The soldiers could leave the town with arms, the burgh­
ers who so desired were allowed to remain, while those who chose to leave 
were permitted to take with them the school's equipment and the printing 
press. The Turkish commander-in-chief promised not to loot or pillage lands 
not belonging to VSrad, and to secure the reduction of Transylvania's taxes 
to the Porte.
The immense Turkish army looked on stupefied as only three hundred 
people walked out of the castle that had held out against six weeks of siege.
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III. The End of Turkish Rule 
in Transylvania and the Reunification 
of Hungary (1660-1711)
1. Changes in Politics
Prince Mihaly Apafi and the Turkish Wars of 1660-1667
In the autumn of 1660, a flood of pamphlets and diplomatic reports alerted 
western Europe to the most recent blow that the Ottoman Empire had struck 
at Christendom: Gyorgy Rakoczi II had been beaten in a clash with Turkish 
forces, and had died of the wounds he had sustained in the battle. Varad, 
the most important border fortress of the principality, had fallen into Turk­
ish hands. W ith Vdrad lost, "The road lay open to the barbarians to take 
Hungary, Moravia, Silesia and Poland".1 Transylvania's tragedy rekindled 
the hopes of Hungary's leaders — for instance the palatine, Ferenc Wesse- 
l§nyi, and Mikl6s Zrxnyi, ban of Croatia — that Christendom would finally 
rally to take the offensive they had been vainly urging since the Peace of 
Westphalia, and would at last liberate the peoples of Europe from the Turk­
ish yoke.
Leopold I's appeal for help was heeded by the pope, by Venice and by 
the German electors, including Johann Philipp, elector of Mainz, and presi­
dent of the League of the Rhine: the emperor could count on their support 
in the event of a campaign to rid Transylvania of Ottoman occupation.
After the death of Gyorgy Rakoczi II, Akos Barcsay, who was trying a 
policy of cooperation with the Porte, took over as prince of Transylvania. 
After the fall of Varad, however, the Estates lost confidence in him, and 
elected J6nos Kemeny, a man in his fifties, to be their prince.
J&nos Kemeny — who had served as a diplomat under Gabor Bethlen, 
and as a general under Gyorgy Rak6czi II, and had returned from captivity 
among the Crimean Tatars only the year before, — called on Transylvania's 
population in 1661 to arm, certain that help would be forthcoming from the 
Christian princes of Europe. There was no time to lose, for the Tatar armies 
were already wreaking havoc in the Szekelyfold, and Ali, pasha of Temesv&r 
had been ordered by the grand vizier to "pacify" the Saxons. In this hour of 
utmost danger, a comprehensive plan of action was worked out in Vienna 
on the advice of the high lords of Hungary: Montecuccoli was to lead the 
main body of the imperial army in an attack on Esztergom, the fortress on 
the Danube protecting Turkish-occupied Buda, and then lay siege to Buda
1. F. DeAk, Nagyvarad elvesztese 1660-ban. (The Loss of Nagyv&rad in 1660.) Buda­
pest 1878, 32.
itself. Mikl6s Zrinyi was to start the campaign in Transdanubia, laying siege 
to the Turkish stronghold at Kanizsa, in the hope of drawing off the Turkish 
forces that had descended on Transylvania.
Fortunately, however, the grand vizier Mehmed KOprulu, who had been 
at war with Venice since 1645 and was even at that moment on the island of 
Crete trying to wrest Candia from Venice, had no desire to wage war on 
two fronts. Accordingly, he offered the Habsburgs a deal which, it seems, 
they could not resist. By the terms of the secret treaty of 1661, Vienna recog­
nized V&rad to be an Ottoman possession, and promised not to aid J&nos 
Kemeny; in return, the Sublime Porte undertook to terminate its punitive 
expedition into Transylvania, and to see that a new prince was elected. It 
was this secret treaty that was behind the surprising new order General 
Raimondo Montecuccoli received from Vienna: he was to march his troops 
to the Transylvanian border by way of a show of strength, and await the 
election of the new prince. Montecuccoli was outside Kolozsv&r when he 
received word that on 14 September, 1661, the Diet that Ali pasha had had 
herded together had, under duress, confirmed the pasha's choice of Mih&ly 
Apafi as prince of Transylvania. The very next day, Montecuccoli with­
drew the bulk of his troops to the Kingdom of Hungary. The unsuspecting 
J&nos Kemeny did his best to cope with the new wave of marauding Tatars 
who were laying waste the Sz£kelyfold, and died in the clash near Nagy- 
sz<5116s on 23 January, 1662.
Prince Mihdly Apafi had been brought up and educated by Cartesian 
teachers. His main interests were philosophy, astronomy and mechanics.
He, too, had been among the prisoners taken by the Tatar khan in 1657 at 
the end of the Polish campaign, and had spent over three years in captivity.
The dignity of prince of Transylvania had been forced upon him, but he 
managed to pursue a policy that soon brought his realm a period of peace.
With gifts for the pashas and compensation for the Porte and promises of 
higher tributes than had ever been paid he persuaded the Turkish and Tatar 
troops to withdraw from Transylvania. He won the Saxons to his side, and 
restored order in the Szekelyfold. The most influential and respected of his 
precedessor's advisers he entrusted with key positions: J&nos Bethlen was 
made chancellor, D6nes Banffy military high commander, and G&bor Haller 
and Mihaly Teleki councillors in what was soon a strong central govern­
ment. While declaring himself a loyal vassal of the sultan, Apafi was a ruler 
in his own right whom even the Habsburgs had to recognize. He was vocal 
in his conviction that Transylvania and the Kingdom of Hungary formed 
"tw o Hungarian homelands", and that the survival of one was inseparable 
from the survival of the other. Apafi was on confidential terms with the 
dignitaries of the Kingdom of Hungary, and cooperated closely with them.
When in early 1663 the new grand vizier Ahmed Koprlilti sent him word to 
prepare for a campaign against Hungary, the purpose of which was to make 
the entire country into a vassal state like Transylvania, Apafi immediately 
notified the palatine. Though fear of Tatar retribution kept him from openly 
defying Koprulii's army of a hundred thousand, which marched into Buda 
in the summer of 1663, and then on to lay siege to the strongest western 
fortress of the Kingdom of Hungary, Ersekujvar, Apafi secretly supported 
the Hungarian side. 360
42. View of Kolozsv&r from the north. Copper engraving, 1617
43. Banister of the pulpit of the church in Farkas Street, Kolozsvar. The alabaster inlays were made 
by Elias Nicolai, 1646
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44. Portrait of Gabor Bethlen. Copper engraving by Egidius Sadeler the Younger, 1620
WONIMFNT-------------
a3H’Hat loca aui iuiPHUiTifte pannnpcr 'uhk <f
■ ( (  ©• TINI f#cTI*ANKofafcpulia jacniri
t r  &;,Qv6mir,qu3rH.,pK?inTC).\/i!rus&,wjiiiim
i y 4 V !? 5  ^ Cft *  'n potentate canet .
1 ^BL a  nnfiilpiAf rvitrijp Km/'n .m u uiConfiilcrat pafruE bis b oi urbis a h h i i i  
. AnnoypoOComi;5.clarrtliono»ctribu^
45. Gravestones of Saxon comes in the Lutheran church at Nagyszeben. On the left is Valentin 
Seraphin (d. 1639), next to him Valentin Frank (d. 1648)
"W 1 i
WWy,A»/ ~ .
S S ^ S ^ c a r a s B i





W  . m ■ •- -  - * <
!?$■ ----------- ----------  ■■•'* W






»■■' /" _  / .» * -  ,' j  "  % TK|
!2 v c J !& ,?$' H3«« jl» r f r t in t * ,  iim c m i i w « i > n «  ^






j t iS j . f ;i*v »v ii
C - . 7 ,
' f r i / ' s  *, A t y i  „&cA&.
IaW J c j(c K«tTffr
^ go^ nn  *u'f» aih
, _ oAt fyn' t f hh »in'«A fi L * .  
A"A»s* Ptfwm'fncjt, t(J ftiMUdf* an i£$M  
n0f^"K‘<,A, " n/*^H*  K^TO-tT* KIATiUAA,
U A f, ■
■• r; t r i 0 f'R KC 
K f A 10 A k .
H n ^ o A .
TvnipHT̂«4\f AMtflH UM
JvnoTfA ^lb  J.imtxm iwcotf,
m »  i  0  t  j  
*  AffriAl fit*A T T  1
e e A r f i  A * A* Jf'
j[ii?n ,A fA 4 *rf\ 2 rH V £  W M w rifin  
*•*&  Nom-rf I c  f c *  * K *  "  ♦>% 
l y f u t w  r * « * A / ^
'«■ .A*
46. The New Testament in Romanian published by GyOrgy RAk6czi I. 
Gyulafeh6rv£r, 1648
47. Greek Orthodox Romanian church in Fogaras founded by Constantin Brincoveanu, ►
voivode of Wallachia, 1697-1698

48. Coins issued by princes:
1. Ten forint coin issued by Gyttrgy 
RAk6czi 1,1631. Obverse and reverse
Thaler issued by GyOrgy Rdk6czi 
and minted at Nagyb&nya, 1652. 
Obverse and reverse
3. Thaler issued by Akos Barcsay. 
Minted at KolozsvAr, 1661. Obverse 
and reverse
4. Thaler issued by Jinos Kem6ny. 
Minted at KolozsvSr, 1661. Obverse 
and reverse
49. MihSly Apafi and Charles of Lorraine, 1688
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50. Interior of the Roman Catholic church at Csfkdelne. Building: second half of the fifteenth century;; 
ceiling: 1613; altar: 1675
In collaboration with Mikl6s Zrinyi, Palatine Wesselenyi, Lord Chief Jus­
tice Nadasdy and GyOrgy Lippay, archbishop of Esztergom turned in the 
summer of 1663 to the League of the Rhine to send an international army to 
succour Christian Hungary. By then, Ersekujv&r was in Turkish hands, and 
the hawks had carried the day in Vienna, which until then had been anx­
ious to make peace with Koprulu. In the autumn of 1663, the League of the 
Rhine meeting in Regensburg proposed that the pope, the Habsburg em­
peror, Venice, Poland and Russia form a coalition and take the offensive 
against the Turks. Transylvania, Moldavia and Wallachia were also to form 
part of the alliance.
In the meantime, the towns and counties of the Kingdom of Hungary 
w ere flooded with "patents" issued in Apafi's name, in which Ahmed 
KOprulu promised self-government, freedom of religion and absolute pro­
tection to any town or country that would, like Transylvania, submit to the 
Porte's authority, and accede to a lump sum payment of a not overly high 
annual tax. In fact, the grand vizier's idea was not so far-fetched as might 
seem at first glance. Especially those living in the border towns and coun­
ties had wearied to the point of despair as much of the waves of religious 
persecution suffered from the Habsburgs as of the destruction wreaked time 
and again by the bands of marauding Turks. For these people, an explicit 
Turkish orientation seemed a possible way to put an end to the decades of 
death and destruction. That Koprtilii's plan did not succeed was due to a 
great extent to the position taken by Apafi himself, who worked hand in 
glove with the high lords of the Kingdom of Hungary to frustrate it.
It was only after the grand vizier's third summons that Apafi and the 
Transylvanian army appeared in the Turkish camp at Ersekujvar, and then 
only to forestall the Tatar punitive expedition that Koprulu had threatened 
him with. KOprulii needed Apafi, for he was a key figure in his plans: Apafi 
was to be made ruler of the prostrate Kingdom of Hungary. The prince, 
however, made use of the entire arsenal of contemporary political manoeuv­
ring — feint, cunning diplomacy and bold risk-taking — to keep himself 
from becoming the pitiable tool of the Porte's designs. Koprulu had issued 
patents in Apafi's name calling on the population to submit. These only 
served as an occasion for the palatine to make a public declaration of his 
own. Wesselenyi's proclamation issued in the autumn of 1663 gave a dra­
matic picture of Transylvania's utter vulnerability under the Porte's suze­
rainty, and declared that if the Kingdom of Hungary came under Ottoman 
rule it would mean the end of monarchy in Hungary even as an ideal, and 
would lead to Transylvania's complete destruction. In the meanwhile, Apafi 
was sending out secret instructions of his own to the people of the counties 
bordering on Transylvania: let them not give credence to the promises of 
the perfidious Turks, let them stand firm, hard though it be, for the time 
was at hand when all Hungary would be freed from the Turkish yoke.
Apafi took enormous personal risks in helping to organize the anti-Turk­
ish alliance. Relying on the goodwill that G5bor Bethlen had won for Transyl­
vania among the Protestant princes of Europe, Apafi turned to the English 
ambassador to the Porte, Winchelsea, in 1662, and in 1664 appealed directly 
to Charles II of England to champion Transylvania's cause. It was due partly 
to Transylvanian diplomatic efforts that all of Europe was humming with
news of the Christian forces' successful campaigns in the winter of 1663 
and early 1664, when the army led by Mikl6s Zrinyi, together with the ar­
mies of the League of the Rhine under Count W. Julius Hohenlohe, inflicted 
considerable losses on the Turks, including on 2 February, 1664 burning the 
bridge on the Dr&va River at Eszek which formed part of the major trans­
port network for Turkish supplies and reinforcements.
France, though not openly at war with the Turks, took part in the cam­
paign as a member of the league. In the spring of 1664 Mikl6s Bethlen, son 
of the chancellor, J&nos Bethlen, returned from Paris with a letter to Apafi 
from the minister of foreign affairs, Hugues de Lionne, and General Henri 
de Latour d'Auvergne, vicomte de Turenne, who had been appointed to 
lead the French troops against the Turks. Apafi had also established con­
tacts with the Romanian voivodates, and won the voivode of Wallachia, 
Grigore Ghica, to join in the anti-Turkish alliance. The official notification 
Leopold I sent Apafi of the international preparations being made against 
the Turks contained the clause that Vienna was counting on Transylvania's 
co-operation. This was tantamount to the recognition that Transylvania 
would participate in the alliance as a sovereign state.
The plans of the spring campaign of 1664 called for the Hungarian, the 
imperial, the German and the French troops to launch an attack on three 
fronts. Zrinyi, the commander of the Hungarian troops, was to lay siege to 
Kanizsa supported by the League of the Rhine armies. The main body of the 
allied army under Montecuccoli was to attack along the Danube. A cam­
paign was to be launched in the V&rad region, too, with a view to recaptur­
ing Varad itself. Though it had beeh a difficult start, it was an auspicious 
one: on 1 August, 1664, the allied armies won a great victory against the 
grand vizier at SzentgottMrd, and hopes ran high in Transylvania that the 
generations of Turkish vassalage were nearby ended. These hopes were 
dashed when, at the end of September, an imperial proclamation informed 
the country that on 10 August, Prince Johann Ferdinand Porcia, president 
of the Imperial Privy Council and leader of the faction opposing the war 
with the Turks, had made peace with the Porte at Vasv&r. The treaty had 
been kept secret; neither the other allied countries, nor even the officers of 
the imperial army knew of its existence until the proclamation was issued 
nearly two months later.
The Peace of Vasvar thoroughly disregarded Transylvania's interests in 
every detail. The Habsburgs had given Apafi no hint that they were about 
to come to terms with the Porte. V&rad and all its vast surrounding region, 
as well as the territorial gains the Turks had made, Lugos and Karknsebes, 
were to remain in Ottoman hands. The castle at Szekelyhid, which was now 
the westernmost fortress not in Turkish hands, was to be razed to the ground. 
Leopold I and the Porte agreed not to aid each other's enemies, and that, of 
course, included Transylvania.
After the Peace of Vasv&r, Apafi co-operated even more closely with the 
political leaders of the Kingdom of Hungary, who, counting on a long-term 
Habsburg-Ottoman truce, were devising ways of safeguarding Hungary's 
statehood. The idea of a confederation including the Kingdom of Hungary, 
the Principality of Transylvania, Croatia and Poland was put forward. Then, 362
on 18 November, 1664, Miklbs Zrinyi was killed while hunting wild boar. 
Apafi, mourning him, was the first among the many who would note that 
the nation had lost its greatest politician at the most critical moment. He 
was all too well aware that after this, Transylvania's chances were not what 
they had been.
Apafi's Balancing Act 
and the Transylvanian-French Alliance
Though the allied anti-Turkish campaign of 1664 had ended in failure, Prince 
Apafi and his advisers could have no doubt that the Ottoman Empire was 
no longer as strong as it had once been. Perhaps at greater cost than they 
had envisaged, but the time to rid Hungary of the Turks would soon be at 
hand. Apafi was a politician of European vision, who was determined to 
safeguard what the principality stood for, to modernize his government, 
and thus strengthen Transylvania's sovereign statehood. Precariously bal­
anced between the Porte and the Habsburgs, determined to revive the King­
dom of Hungary, Apafi achieved considerable domestic stability, and took 
full advantage of the changes on the international scene to establish con­
tacts abroad. Apafi's immediate circle consisted of strong individuals of 
considerable erudition and experience: the venerable chancellor, JSnos 
Bethlen; the young privy councillor, M ihily Teleki; Denes Banffy, a diplo­
mat and the commander of Kolozsv&r; the young Mikl6s Bethlen, and oth­
ers of equal stature. Apafi's corps of diplomats whether of noble or non­
noble birth and whether accredited to the Porte, to Poland or to the courts 
of the German electors, consisted, as Transylvania's diplomatic corps al­
ways had, of men of outstanding competence, and, for the most part, of 
men who had been brought up on Descartes.
Apafi based the power of the central government on a stable economy 
and a modern armed force, which he achieved through domestic loans, a 
free trade policy, and the building up of enterprises financed by the trea­
sury. The reforms to be introduced were submitted to the Diet for approval, 
and it was the Diet — which Apafi convened with unprecedented frequency
— that supervised their implementation. Along with the representatives of 
the "Three Nations" — the Hungarian nobility of the counties, the Szekely 
seats, and the towns of the Saxon University — Apafi invited to the Diet the 
Greek Orthodox bishop of Transylvania, the representative of the only in­
stitution that Transylvania's Romanian population could call its own. Though 
there is no indication that the bishop ever addressed the Diet during the 
years of Apafi's rule, the innovation was still a milestone: it was the first 
time that Transylvania's Romanians had access to a political forum.
The new circumstances in which the Kingdom of Hungary found itself 
after the Peace of Vasv£r dictated that Transylvania, too, try a new orienta­
tion. The chief dignitaries of royal Hungary — Lord Chief Justice Ferenc 
N£dasdy, Peter Zrinyi, ban of Croatia, and Archbishop Gyorgy Lippay — 
joined with the palatine, Ferenc Wesselenyi, in trying to find a way to re­
store the integrity of the Kingdom of Hungary. The Habsburgs' agreement
with the Porte prohibited even defensive warfare, and yet the garrisons in 
Turkish occupied Hungary continued to conduct regular forays into the 
neighbouring kingdom, exacting enormous tributes, and annexing riding 
after riding to the area under direct Turkish control. Wesselenyi and his 
supporters wanted to see the country reunited. They pinned their hopes on 
Ferenc R&k6czi I, the son of Gyorgy R£k6czi II and designated prospective 
prince of Transylvania since 1652, who had turned Roman Catholic after 
his father's death, and lived with his mother, the dowager Princess Zs6fia 
Bathory, on the family's estate at Munk&cs castle, which secured the thor­
oughfare between Poland and Transylvania, or at S&rospatak.
Though Wesselenyi toyed with the idea of a Rak6czi comeback as a way 
of strengthening Hungary through union with Transylvania, when neither 
French nor Polish help was forthcoming against the Turks, he decided to 
seek a modus vivendi with Apafi instead. In the summer of 1666, the digni­
taries of the Kingdom of Hungary met with Mihdly Teleki and Mikl6s Bethlen 
at Mur£ny, and agreed, among other things, that the Tisza River would 
constitute the border between Transylvania and Hungary once they had 
managed to drive the Turks out of the area. Until they did, however, there 
was but one way to forestall the total collapse of the Kingdom of Hungary 
as far as Wesselenyi and his supporters could see: they had to try to come to 
terms with the Ottomans in the hope that an even higher yearly tribute 
would buy the country some measure of security. Their approach to the 
Porte in the autumn of 1666 through the tried and tested diplomatic chan­
nels that Apafi put at their disposal met with a rebuff from Ahmed KOprulu. 
The grand vizier, still busy with the siege of Candia, did not want war with 
the Habsburgs at the moment, and kept to his secret agreement with Leo­
pold I that they would not aid or abet one another's subjects. After he took 
Candia in 1669, Kopriilu, sure of his power in the Mediterranean, was ready 
for a new war, and prepared to march against Poland. To guarantee peace 
in Hungary in order to secure the Habsburg-Ottoman trade routes, the Porte 
made a new agreement with the Habsburgs.
Things went from bad to worse for the Wesselenyi group. With W esse­
lenyi's death in the spring of 1667, they had lost their most judicious leader. 
Subsequent actions were such that they provided the hard-liners in Vienna 
with a fine opportunity to try to eradicate what was left of the independent 
statehood of the Kingdom of Hungary: in the spring of 1670, the pockets of 
local resistance to the imperial troops were ruthlessly suppressed, along 
with the rebellion in Upper Hungary led by Ferenc Rak6czi I. Lord Chief 
Justice Nadasdy, Peter Zrinyi, ban of Croatia, his brother-in-law Ferenc Fran- 
gepan, Count Erasmus Tattenbach, a Styrian aristocrat, and Ferenc B6nis, 
one of the leaders of the insurgent lesser nobility of Upper Hungary, were 
tried for treason and for conspiring with the Turks, and executed in 1671. 
The constitution of the Kingdom of Hungary was suspended, the Hungar­
ian border regiments, about 10,000 men in all, were dismissed, and impe­
rial troops garrisoned in the border fortresses. Urban self-government was 
abolished, and Protestant ministers were summoned to appear before spe­
cial courts set up in Pozsony. The hundreds of noble families from Upper 
Hungary who were implicated in the conspiracy had their lands confis­
cated, and had to seek refuge abroad (1670-1674). 364
Apafi's Transylvania followed its own sovereign course throughout this 
entire period, becoming a tool in the hands neither of the Turks, nor of the 
Habsburgs. As the sole embodiment of Hungarian statehood, Transylvania 
kept Europe informed of developments in the Kingdom of Hungary. It be­
came a place of refuge for the persecuted Hungarians, and gave a helping 
hand to the now destitute former soldiers of the border castles, to fugitive 
serfs and fugitive noblemen to rally and arm along the border and in the 
Partium, and conduct forays against the imperial forces stationed in their 
homeland.
Behind Apafi's successful balancing act was a new king of Transylvani­
an foreign policy. Apafi's ties abroad were multifarious. He made peace 
with Poland and cooperated closely with the voivodes of Moldavia and 
Wallachia. He built on the contacts Transylvania's Reformed churches had 
in the Netherlands, England, the German principalities and Sweden to es­
tablish cultural and political ties with the Protestant powers. At the same 
time, Apafi signed an agreement with Leopold I, normalizing relations be­
tween Transylvania and the empire.
Apafi was quick to realize that the renewal of the Habsburg-Bourbon 
rivalry was something that Transylvania could exploit to its advantage, as 
indeed had P&zmany and Zrinyi in their time. Apafi was not the first prince 
of Transylvania to pin his hopes on the French connection, but he was un­
usually energetic in its pursuit, establishing ties through the French ambas­
sador to Vienna, through the French residents at the Sublime Porte, and 
through Francophile Polish politicians. In November 1673, the hetman Jan 
Sobieski, after a brilliant victory over the Turkish armies, turned to Apafi 
asking him to join France to mediate between Poland and the Porte in the 
war that had been going on since 1672. The French orientation, however, 
aroused considerable opposition in Transylvania. Apafi ruthlessly sup­
pressed the faction trying to force him to follow a pro-Habsburg policy. 
Their leader, Denes Banffy, was executed, and his supporters eliminated. 
In March 1675, the French envoy, Roger du Fresne Akakia, who had come 
to Transylvania with the Polish ambassador, signed a preliminary agree­
ment with the prince of Transylvania in Fogaras. The Franco-Transylvanian 
alliance itself was signed in Warsaw, in May 1677, by the marquis Francois 
Gaston de Selles Bethune, the new French ambassador to Poland, and Apafi's 
envoy, Daniel Absolon. By the terms of the treaty, France, which was at war 
with the Habsburg emperor, undertook to support the Hungarian army of 
exiles assembled on the Transylvanian border with an annual sum of 100,000 
thalers, and promised French and Polish support for any major action against 
Leopold I. Transylvania was to provide the exiles with a general, Mihaly 
Teleki, and with commanders, and to guarantee them a retreat area, but 
without openly going to war against Hungary's Habsburg king. Louis XIV 
promised to represent Transylvania's interests, too, at the peace negotia­
tions with the emperor, and, in case the Turks sent a punitive expedition, to 
defend the principality against the Ottoman aggression.
The Porte had meanwhile made peace with Poland, and did not want to 
jeopardize its own French connections with an open attack on Transylva­
nia's Francophile foreign policy. Instead, it secretly encouraged P&l Beldi, 
3 6 5  an ambitious aristocrat determined to exploit domestic disaffection in Tran-
sylvania. Apafi, however, proved to be the better politician, and B<§ldi fled 
to the Porte, where, in fact, he was disowned.
It was at this time that the exiles assembled along the Transylvanian 
borders began to be called kuruc. The origin of the expression is uncertain.
From the late 1670s, a kuruc was anyone who took up arms against the 
Habsburgs' rule in Hungary, and fought for the Protestant faith and for the 
country's liberty. Their first military attempts did not bring lasting success.
Teleki was a fine organizer and an enterprising diplomat, but had no real 
talent as a military commander. In the spring of 1678, the exiles, in the pres­
ence of the delegate of the French king, elected Teleki as their "chief magis­
trate", and the command of the army was taken over by the new general, 
the twenty-year-old count Imre ThOkOly.
Imre Thokoly, who had fled to Transylvania from the Kingdom of Hun­
gary in 1670 as a child to escape the repression of those suspected of com­
plicity in Wessel6nyi's movement proved to be nothing short of a military 
genius. Europe watched in awe as his cavalry regiments and their French 
and Polish reinforcements took the mining towns of western Hungary in 
the autumn of 1678. Thokoly's military success had a great deal to do with 
France's including Transylvania in the Treaty of Nijmegen. For Apafi, it 
was an unprecedented diplomatic success. Though Article 3 of thetreaty men­
tioned the principality and its interests only in general terms, Louis XIV's 
letter to Apafi of 8 June, 1679 made clear that by the terms of the treaty, 
Transylvania had been recognized as one of France's allies. Soon another 
ally, John III Sobieski, elected king of Poland in 1674, but crowned only in 
1676, appointed an ambassador to Apafi's court, and Transylvania was send­
ing Daniel Absolon to Paris as its special envoy. The Habsburgs, too, had to 
start reckoning with Transylvania's new diplomatic weight, to say nothing 
of Thokoly's military successes. After a nearly twenty years' recess, they 
convoked the Diet at Sopron, restored Hungary's constitution, appointed a 
palatine, filled the other high posts of the realm, and agreed to a limited 
degree of religious liberty for the Protestant sects.
In the meanwhile, Thokoly, who, with his army of twenty thousands 
men had became a power to be reckoned with, had determined to make 
Upper Hungary into an independent principality. Thokoly had the support 
of the wealthy burghers of Upper Hungary: of Eperjes, B^rtfa, and L<5cse, 
and his marriage to Ilona Zrinyi, widow of the hereditary prince of Transyl­
vania, Ferenc R£k6czi I, had made him master of the enormous R£k6czi 
estates, and heir to the Rdk6czis' and Zrinyis' traditional authority. The 
Porte was relatively quick to recognize that Thokoly's advent upon the Hun­
garian political scene was potentially divisive of the forces committed to 
restoring Hungary's independent statehood. Support for Thokoly would 
isolate Transylvania, and clip Apafi's wings. In 1682, the Porte commanded 
Thokoly, whose latest spectacular victory had been the occupation of Kassa, 
the heart of Upper Hungary, to join, the Ibrahim pasha of Buda at the castle 
of Fiilek, where Apafi, too, was ordered to appear with his troops if he did 
not want the Tatars to ravage Transylvania.
Apafi had to stand by and watch the carnage as Ibrahim pasha took Fiilek 
at great cost to his own men as well. With the fall of Fiilek, the Kingdom of 
Hungary lost the fortress that had secured the roads between "Lower Hun- 3 6 6
gary" in the west, and "Upper Hungary" in the east. Ibrahim pasha cel­
ebrated his victory by declaring ThOkoly prince of Upper Hungary. Apafi 
had no illusions about the dangers that the Ottoman "divide and rule" policy 
and ThokOly's sovereign power involved for Transylvania.
But neither the venerable old prince, nor his ageing advisers felt in the 
position to alter the course that it seemed events were bound to take.
Secret Membership in the Holy League
The renewal of the Turkish wars (1683-1699) resulted in radical changes in 
the position of the independent Principality of Transylvania. The change, 
however, war gradual, and for some time it was not clear just what direc­
tion it would take. For as soon as France had secured her positions in the 
Habsburgs' political hinterland, she set about strengthening her influence 
with the Porte. After the death of the grand vizier Ahmed Koprtilu (1676), 
the forces of internal disintegration within the Ottoman Empire seemed, for 
a while, to gain ascendancy. With the janissaries in revolt and the empire's 
coffers empty, Grand Vizier Kara Mustafa looked to a new western cam­
paign to restore morale and solve his financial difficulties. Encouraged by 
Louis XIV's dislike of the Habsburgs, he set out with an army of a hundred 
thousand in the summer of 1683, making his way through Hungary to lay 
siege to Vienna.
Apafi and his seasoned government were less impressed by the Otto­
man armies than most of Europe. Postponing the moment with "gifts" of 
Transylvanian gold, Apafi heeded the sultan's call to arms only in the late 
summer. Even then, he marched into the Kingdom of Hungary only with a 
Szekely regiment a few thousand strong to link up with the grand vizier's 
army. In fact, Kara Mustafa did not trust him to let him near the scene of the 
battle itself, but had Apafi and his troops guard the bridges on the rivers 
R iba  and Ribca just south of GySr. All the while, Apafi kept in constant 
contact with the palatine, P£1 Esterh&zy, who remained loyal to the Habsburg 
side throughout the campaign. Apafi formulated his political creed as fol­
lows: they should all steer the course of events in such a way that "final ruin 
might not come to the Hungarian nation".2
On 12 September, 1683, the Ottoman forces were routed at Vienna, thanks 
to the timely arrival of John III Sobieski and Charles, duke of Lorraine. By 
the time Apafi and his plague-decimated troops had made their way through 
a Hungary ridden with marauding bands of defeated Turks, a great many 
things had changed in Transylvania's favour. The Porte had made Thokoly 
the scapegoat of the battle lost at Parkany (9 October, 1683), and had de­
cided to seek support from Apafi instead. Mihaly II Apafi, the ageing rul­
er's little son, whom the Transylvanian Diet had elected to succeed his fa­
ther, was now confirmed by the Porte as the next prince of Transylvania. 
The lessons of the previous few months, however, were not lost on Apafi 
either. The future, and so Transylvania's future, lay with Christendom.
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In the spring of 1684, Pope Innocent XI gave his blessing as Poland, Ven­
ice and the Habsburg Empire joined to form the Holy League, a military 
alliance dedicated to driving the Turks out of Europe. The members of the 
league were quick to realize Transylvania's strategic importance in a war 
that would involve the entire area stretching from the Ukraine to the Medi­
terranean and down into the Balkan Peninsula. Over and above its poten­
tial as a supplier of food and raw materials, Protestant Transylvania's stand 
in the upcoming struggle had also a symbolic importance: the German prin­
cipalities, as well as England and the Netherlands which had promised the 
league financial support, all set great store by Transylvania, a Protestant 
power, being on the Christian side in the historic struggle. In fact, the inter­
national agreements containing the plans for the great campaign specified 
as much. Leopold I was building on tradition, as well as satisfying interna­
tional expectations when in April 1684 he invited Prince Apafi to join the 
Holy League.
Transylvania, however, was not in the position openly to join an anti- 
Turkish alliance. On the western borders, Turkish garrisons in Vkrad, Temes- 
v&r and a host of smaller fortresses watched every move Apafi made. One 
word from the Porte, and the Tatar hordes would cross the Carpathians 
and leave Transylvania in smouldering ruins. And though the Turks had 
been scattered before Vienna, the Ottoman forces were still formidable, as 
their successful defence of Buda the following year showed.
Besides the objective difficulties, there was also Apafi's well-founded 
reluctance to treat with the Habsburgs. Transylvania's involvement with 
the Holy League, however, was sopn being urged also from another quar­
ter: the Francophile John III Sobieski, who had fallen out with Leopold I, 
was encouraging Apafi to join the anti-Turkish alliance under his aegis.
In the end, it was again expediency that determined Apafi's course. Seek­
ing to get whatever guarantees he could of his small country's security, he 
tentatively set about making joint cause with Christendom fighting the Ot­
tomans. With Teleki's mediation, in the spring of 1685, Transylvania signed 
a secret preliminary agreement in Kercsesora with the Habsburg emperor.
By the terms of the agreement, Transylvania recognized the suzerainty of 
the king of Hungary, while Leopold I guaranteed Transylvania's indepen­
dent statehood and independent political institutions. Transylvania became 
a secret member of the Holy League, and undertook to provide certain of 
the imperial troops with winter quarters. Concurrently, Apafi made a treaty 
with Wallachia, in which the parties promised one another mutual protec­
tion against the Habsburg emperor and the Porte, and tried to get Poland, 
to guarantee the agreement. With ThokOly, however, Apafi was unable to 
come to terms.
As prince of Upper Hungary, Thokoly had had no part in the siege of 
Vienna, and after the fiasco, offered to join the Christian cause with his 
twenty thousand men. The Habsburg government, however, smarting un­
der the affront that his princely title offered to the dynasty, rebuffed him; in 
vain did Charles, duke of Lorraine, insist that he could not afforded to do 
without Thokoly's seasoned troops in the Hungarian theatre. The Porte, 
however, did not take kindly to being crossed, and ordered Thokoly's ar­
rest. Apafi refused to carry out the order, and probably even alerted Thokoly 368
of the danger he was in. He could not, however, overrule the pro-Turkish 
party in the Diet: Thokoly's Transylvanian estates were confiscated in the 
spring of 1685, and his followers imprisoned. In the autumn of 1685, the 
pasha of Vdrad captured the prince of Upper Hungary by ruse. Thokoly's 
army — the only one in the Kingdom of Hungary or Transylvania that could 
have fought for Hungarian interests — disbanded, though scattered units 
of his men, integrated into the imperial regiments, were to fight against the 
Turks. About four thousand of his soldiers, as well as Thokoly's diplomatic 
corps, sought refuge in Munk^cs castle, the home of Ilona Zrinyi and the 
Rak6czi children. It was they who, under the chatelaine's leadership, de­
fended the castle, when late in 1685 the imperial troops lay siege to it with a 
great show of strength.
Thanks to the mediation of the pope, Russia and Poland made peace in
1686. The tzar joined the Holy League, and the Russian troops engaged the 
Crimean Tatars, much to the relief of Poland and Transylvania. The impe­
rial forces abandoned their siege of Munkacs, the Kriegsrat directing the 
war having wearied of the outraged protestations coming from abroad and 
the humiliatingly protracted and futile effort. The castle was put under block­
ade instead. Munkdcs was no longer the issue; more momentous things 
were in the making. All of Europe watched in anticipation as the allied 
forces of the Holy League proceeded to surround Buda. Thokoly, who had 
in the meanwhile been released by the sultan, did not take up arms. The 
time had come for Transylvania's envoys to finalize with Vienna the de­
tailed conditions of Transylvania's joining the alliance.
The agreement signed on 28 June, 1686, by Jdnos Haller for Transylva­
nia, and Chancellor Heinrich Johann Strattmann and Hermann of Baden, 
president of the Kriegsrat for Vienna, pronounced Transylvania a member 
of the Holy League. The agreement was to remain secret until V&rad was 
recaptured from the Turks. As long as Temesvar and Belgrade were in Turk­
ish hands, Transylvania would not go to war, but would contribute fifty 
thousand imperial thalers a year to the war effort, as well as transport and 
foodstuffs. To facilitate the provisioning, for the duration of the war, the 
garrisons in D6va and Kolozsvar were to consist of two-thirds imperial 
troops, and one third Transylvanian soldiers. Transylvania, as part of the 
Holy Crown of Hungary, recognized the king of Hungary as its sovereign 
lord. Leopold I, for his part, would vouch for the free election of Transylva­
nia's princes, for the inviolability of its effective ecclesiastic and secular laws 
and adm inistration, and for the independence of its governm ent and 
economy. The treaty concluding the war was to make explicit reference to 
Transylvania's interests. (A copy of the agreement is among the documents 
kept at the Public Record Office in London.)
Apafi was to more than fulfil his part of the agreement in the autumn of
1687, when, at enormous risk to the entire country, he provided the utterly 
exhausted imperial armies with winter quarters. The Christian forces' re­
capture of Buda (2 September, 1686) had spurred the Porte to reorganize 
the Ottoman military machinery, and it was with this reinforced army that 
the grand vizier set out in the summer of 1687 to retake Buda castle, the 
Ottoman Empire's administrative centre in Hungary. The Ottoman forces
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battle led by Charles of Lorraine. But it was close to a Pyrrhic victory for the 
Holy League, for the long-standing personal antagonisms within the high 
command exploded. With no unified leadership, the allied army broke into 
fragments; a great many of the rank and file simply deserted. The duke of 
Lorraine was left with only the imperial army to command. Their food sup­
plies exhausted, their horses dying for lack of fodder, their ranks decimated 
by disease, the imperial troops struggled on over roads made practically 
impassable by weeks of relentless rain. In was this exhausted army that 
Apafi — defying the advice of the Diet — offered to quarter and provision 
for the winter in late 1687.
An agreement signed at Bal&zsfalva on 27 October, 1687, provided for 
the imperial troops wintering in Transylvania, with utmost regard for the 
interest and security of the population. Signed by Charles of Lorraine and 
Mih&ly Teleki, it confirmed the principality's status as an independent po­
litical entity, reiterating the provisions of the agreement of 1686.
Reunion with the Kingdom of Hungary 
within the Habsburg System
In early 1688, Leopold I appointed General Antonio Caraffa commander- 
in-chief of Transylvania with explicit instructions to bring the principality 
into line with the new constitution approved by the Hungarian Diet in 
Pozsony. ,
Hungary, traditionally an elective monarchy , had recognized the Habs­
burgs as the country's hereditary monarchs. In return for the Hungarian 
Estates' giving up their ancient right of election, Leopold I undertook to 
respect the traditional institutions they set about restoring once the Turks 
had been driven out of the country. It was a compromise that both sides 
expected to benefit from. In Transylvania, however, Caraffa used military 
terror to pressurize the Estates to renounce the country's independence. By 
the Declaration of Fogaras, they recognized Leopold I — and his 9-year-old 
heir, Joseph I — as the principality's hereditary rulers, agreed that imperial 
troops should garrison the country's fortresses, and acquiesced in paying 
Vienna an annual tax of seven hundred thousand florins.
When Transylvania's leaders reminded Leopold I of the political guar­
antees he had given in the agreement of 1686 and at Bal&zsfalva, the only 
right he confirmed was that of freedom of religion, with a promise to put an 
end to the army's abuses. However, no concrete measure followed in either 
area. A number of towns — Nagyb&nya, Beszterce and Brass6 among them
— took up arms to protest against the Declaration of Fogaras, and either 
finally surrendered in the unequal struggle, or held out to the last, as did 
the insurgent population of Brass6 which, led by the goldsmith G&sp&r 
Kreutz, had towed cannons onto the town ramparts. Transylvania's central 
government organs and the feudal institutions of the Estates were but a 
shadow government. The commmander-in-chief had absolute power, and 
collected the imperial tax by force of arms.
Prince Apafi, who had been gravely ill during the last year or so of his 
long reign, died on 15 April, 1690. The Sublime Porte immediately pro­
claimed Imre ThokOly the new prince of Transylvania.
After his release from Turkish captivity in 1686, Thokoly was never again 
trusted by the Christian allies. Casting in his lot with the Turks once and for 
all, he had been fighting against the troops of the Holy League in Wallachia, 
forming a confederation with the voivode, Constantin Brincoveanu in 1689. 
But it was the shift in the European balance of power that gave him a chance 
of obtaining the throne of Transylvania.
The imperial troops' occupation of Belgrade (1688), and their advance 
into Wallachia gave the Habsburgs such an edge in the area that France and 
Poland began to seek ways of restoring the balance. Louis XIV's troops in­
vaded the German principalities, and the Sun King looked to Transylvania 
as the potential ally to keep the Habsburgs in check in east-central Europe, 
as indeed did John III Sobieski, who had driven the Turks out of Kameniec 
at enormous cost. But while Louis XIV declared himself ready to help fi­
nance Thokoly's accession to the princedom, Sobieski could not bring him­
self to trust him, even when the Porte showed an inclination to make peace.
The matter was brought to a head by the Ottoman counter-offensive. On 
21 August, 1690, having crossed the well-nigh impassable high mountains 
with an army of six thousand Hungarians, Wallachians, Turks and Tatars, 
Thokoly surprised and annihilated the core of the imperial troops stationed 
in Transylvania. Mihdly Teleki, who had been Apafi's most influential coun­
cillor, lay dead on the battlefield of Zernyest. Thokoly was elected prince by 
the Diet assembled at Keresztenysziget. As the new prince of Transylvania, 
he pledged himself to implement the country's constitution, reaffirmed each 
subject's right to practice freely any of the four received religions, and con­
firmed the Three Nations in their prerogatives, and the Estates in their free­
dom to elect the prince (libera vox). At the same time, he offered to come to 
terms with Leopold I: he would turn against the Turks and side with the 
Holy League if the Habsburgs recognized him as prince of Transylvania 
and honoured him with the title of "duke", and if Venice and Poland would 
guarantee the agreement.
In the meanwhile, the grand vizier Mustafa Kopriilu had surrounded 
Belgrade with an army of sixty thousand, reoccupying it on 8 October, 1690, 
after almost a week's siege. But the supreme commander of the imperial 
troops, Louis of Baden, thought Transylvania to be of greater strategic im­
portance than Belgrade. Leaving the gateway to the Balkans to its fate, he 
marched the main body of the imperial army against Thokoly. The two men 
never met, for Thokoly, after his lieutenants had lost most of his army, 
crossed the Bodza Pass with the remnants of his army on 25 October, never 
to return.
Councillor Mikl6s Bethlen, all the while, was using to Transylvania's 
advantage the commotion caused in Vienna by the news of the Turkish 
counter-offensive: the fall of Belgrade and ThokOly's election. He presented 
the emperor with a draft diploma that would guarantee Transylvania free­
dom in domestic matters, while recognizing the foreign policy restrictions 
imposed on it by the political realities of its situation. The Diploma Leo- 
poldinum  which received royal sanction in late 1690 and was the basic docu­
ment of Leopold I's rule over Transylvania, put an end to military rule and 
guaranteed Transylvania a sovereign civil administration. It also provided 
guarantees for freedom of religion and for free trade and commerce, and 
guaranteed the inviolability of Transylvania's cultural and educational in­
stitutions.
The Transylvanian Estates assembled at Fogaras in early 1691 elected a 
Gubernium, a governor's office, to administer the country's affairs for the 
duration of Mih&ly Apafi II's minority. GyOrgy B&nffy, son of the executed 
Denes B&nffy, was elected governor; Mikl6s Bethlen was chosen chancellor. 
Gergely Bethlen was chosen commander-in-chief, and J&nos Haller was 
elected lord treasurer. The Gubernium was divided in many respects, but 
agreed on gingerly aiming at an English-Dutch orientation. In 1690, at Mikl6s 
Bethlen's urging, the boy Mih&ly Apafi II signed a declaration recognizing 
the elector of Brandenburg and William III of England, as his guardians. 
This appeared a realistic move under the circumstances, for not even the 
immeasurably costly victory of the Christian forces at Szal&nkemen was 
able to stem the Turkish tide.
The Habsburg government was suffering one loss after the other, and its 
allies, the maritime powers, England and the Netherlands were anxious to 
see Leopold I make peace with the Porte, and save his forces for effective 
action in the impending war against France. Peace in Transylvania was also 
being urged by the English and Dutch Protestants, as well as by the com­
mercial interests of these countries, and it was because of pressure from 
these groups that Transylvania's liberties were expressly provided for in 
the draft peace treaties. The treaty proposed to the Habsburgs and the Porte 
by the English and Dutch mediators insisted that Transylvania maintain its 
independence. In March of 1691, Leopold I himself approved the draft treaty 
that the English envoy, Sir William Hussey, presented to the Porte, and 
which provided for Transylvania's remaining an independent state, with 
Mih&ly Apafi II ruling the country under an internationally guaranteed joint 
Turkish and Habsburg protectorate. Later, Lord William Paget was to re­
commend that the prospective peace treaty guarantee Transylvania's secu­
rity and independence in view of the principality's past political role. The 
grand vizier, too, adopted the English and Dutch position, and by January 
1698 was taking the stand that Transylvania had to be restored to its former
— pre-1688 — status.
The Habsburg governing circles were in two minds about it. In the end, 
however, the more intransigent position carried the day: an independent 
Transylvania guaranteed by the English and the Dutch posed a threat to the 
dynasty that they could by no means countenance. From 1692 on, Vienna 
thus, raced against time to consolidate its hold over Transylvania before 
the peace negotiations effectively got off the ground. After a costly siege, 
the imperial troops took Varad from the Turks in 1692. Mih31y Apafi II was 
detained in Vienna, and never again allowed to return.
In 1695, an imperial force of eight thousand again occupied Transylva­
nia. In 1696, it was put under the military government of General Rabutin 
de Bussy.
The change was attended by a shift in the relative strength of the various 
denominations of Transylvania. The Catholic church had been gaining 372
ground for years. Wealthy Catholic aristocrats were acquiring political ap­
pointments, and were in the position to make rich endowments for the ben­
efit of their parishes and schools, and to give financial support, too, to the 
scattered groups of Jesuits working in the country. In early 1690, the Catho­
lic Estates presided over by Istvan Apor came to an agreement with the 
Calvinist consistory over the disputed church properties. Bishop Andres 
Illyes, the head of the Catholic church in Transylvania, sent a memoran­
dum to Rome outlining the principles along which he wished to reorganize 
the See of Transylvania: in the spirit of Catholic universalism but also in a 
national spirit worthy of the nation's history, within the ancestral frame­
work of the Kingdom of Hungary, but in keeping with the interests of the 
principality.
In the 1690s, the Greek Orthodox bishop of Transylvania was still ap­
pointed by the metropolitan of Wallachia, though subject to confirmation 
by the prince of Transylvania. The bishop was invited to attend the Diet, 
the Greek Orthodox priests had been exempted from feudal services and 
dues and enjoyed the prince's protection against their landlords, and the 
wealthy among the Greek Orthodox faithful had ties to Transylvania's lead­
ing political circles. By the end of the seventeenth century, the Greek Ortho­
dox church of Transylvania thus had not only evolved as a discrete and 
characteristically Transylvanian body thanks to its vernacular culture, but 
had also become integrated into the state system. The Calvinists' attempt at 
union and Rome's persistent efforts to win converts did not have much of 
an impact. While Transylvania was governed by Transylvanians, the tradi­
tions of religious toleration were kept alive.
This organic process of development was cut short by the Habsburg gov­
ernment. The "Transylvanian Council" under Chancellor Kinsky had de­
cided on rude intervention in Transylvanian religious affairs. Religion was 
now to serve the empire's interests, and the Jesuits working in Transylva­
nia under the direction of the Austrian provincial were to receive state sub­
sidies to see that it would. The other measure — the union of the Greek 
Orthodox church with the Roman Catholic — was to guarantee the Roma­
nian population's "integration" within the Habsburg system.
After preliminary talks, Leopold issued an imperial patent declaring that 
if the Greek Orthodox church accepted union with the Roman Catholic, the 
Romanian clergy would enjoy certain feudal privileges including exemp­
tion from state taxation. After the theological basis of the union was agreed 
on — essentially, the Greek Orthodox church's recognition of papal su­
premacy —, in 1697 Bishop Theophilus proposed to the Orthodox synod 
the union of the church entrusted to his care with the Roman Catholic church, 
on condition that its priests were given the promised social and economic 
privileges. In 1699, Leopold issued an imperial diploma confirming that the 
Uniate Greek church shared in all the rights of the Roman Catholics (the 
First Diploma Leopoldinum). In 1700, Athanasie Anghel, the new Greek 
Orthodox bishop, declared at the meeting of the synod that the church ac­
cepted the union, and the protection of the Habsburg government. Bishop 
Athanasie was consecrated bishop of the Greek Catholic church midst due 
pomp in Gyulafehervar, and with this, the union was formally accomplished.
It was confirmed by Leopold in 1701 by the Second Diploma Leopoldinum, 
which reiterated the Greek Catholic Romanian clergy's exemption from feu­
dal obligations and affirmed their noble privileges. They were to gain ad­
mittance to the Catholic institutions of higher education, and to be eligible 
for Catholic scholarships. An "auditor general" appointed by the archbishop 
of Esztergom was to aid the work of the Greek Catholic bishop.
In the long run, the union served the rise of the Romanian nationality in 
Transylvania. It was, in part, a political agreement, and the masses of the 
faithful had difficulty following the changes involved. The Romanian serfs 
protested against the union, and so did the merchants and small nobility. 
The disaffected formed the Greek Orthodox Estate, under the leadership of 
Gcibor Nagyszegi. The imperial general, however, soon had him in prison. 
The government in Vienna pushed through the union in a race against time 
as the peace negotiations with the Turks were also going on.
In 1698, the English mediator at the negotiations wanted the principali­
ty's independence and freedom of religion for the Protestant churches made 
a provision of the proposed agreement. But with the union, the Protestant 
churches had lost their numerical superiority, and this provision was never 
included. The Peace of Karlowitz of early 1699 ended the fifteen years of 
war with the Turks, attaching the principality to the central government of 
the Habsburg Empire.
Ferenc Rakoczi II, Prince of Transylvania
Hungary's fate had been decided by the Porte and the Habsburgs without 
as much as Hungary's diplomatic representation. "Sine nobis, de nobis" was 
the way Ferenc Rak6czi II put it in his "Manifesto to the Peoples of the 
W orld", antedated as of 7 June, 1703, the day of the start of the Rak6czi war 
of independence, but actually published only in early 1704. And yet, the 
Principality of Transylvania had contributed beyond its strength, as an ally 
fully recognized in international agreements, to the victory over the Turks.
The imperial government's implementation of the terms of the Peace of 
Karlowitz was equally resented by all social classes in both Hungary and 
Transylvania. Instead of their reunification, Hungary and Transylvania were 
incorporated with the Habsburg Empire as two separate units. With com­
plete disregard for the agreements of 1686 and 1687, both were divested of 
the basic preconditions of independent statehood: they lost their armies 
and their domestic self-government; the population was deprived of its free­
dom of religion and of its right of culture in the vernacular; and both Hun­
gary's and Transylvania's foreign contacts were severed, and with them, 
their opportunities for keeping abreast of developments in the rest of Eu­
rope. There was hardly a reflective person of whatever rank or station in 
either land who did not see the situation as leading to Hungary's complete 
integration with the Habsburg Empire. The future of the Hungarians as a 
nation was at stake. In Transylvania, it was not only the Hungarian aristo­
crats, noblemen and burghers and the Szekely lieutenants who were of this 
opinion, but the Saxon leaders as well. A wealth of contemporary docu­ 374
ments testify to the fact that the people of Transylvania — Hungarians, 
Saxons and Romanians alike — believed that only an independent princi­
pality stood to secure them a future.
Transylvania's geographic position and its traditional active western ori­
entation made it particularly sensitive to changes in the international bal­
ance of power. And in this respect, the new century certainly seemed the 
dawn of new alternatives.
The decline of Ottoman power in Europe involved changes in the inter­
national power structure as a whole. The balance of power between the 
Bourbons and the Habsburgs had been of vital interest to every country of 
Europe for generations. Thus, when the long-ailing king of Spain finally 
died at the end of 1700, England and the Netherlands were far from indif­
ferent to the question of who would succeed him: Leopold I's candidate for 
the Spanish throne, or Louis XIV's. At about the same time, Sweden found 
itself faced with a new competitor for the Baltic trade routes, Russia. It had 
been clear ever since 1698, the time of Tzar Peter I's visit to Vienna, that 
Russia, too, was aspiring to a greater role in European politics. When the 
War of the Spanish Succession broke out, Transylvania found that old trea­
ties and alliances tied it to a number of participants on the two opposing 
sides: to France, but also to England and the Netherlands which supported 
the Habsburgs. Transylvania also had an old treaty with Sweden, which 
was fighting Russia in the north, and was also tied to it by a sense of com­
munity as a Protestant nation. Religious sentiment, as well as church schol­
arships and foundations, to say nothing of personal ties of friendship, all 
drew Transylvanians to the Protestant communities now confronting each 
other, especially to the German principalities.
The war of independence led by Ferenc Rakoczi II was Transylvania's 
attempt to break out of the bind that the Peace of Karlowitz had put it in. 
The two simultaneous great wars had made it clear to the countries of east- 
central Europe that the Habsburgs' hegemony in the area was not yet a 
foregone conclusion. In Upper Hungary, members of the lesser nobility as 
well as the small nobility, captains of the border castles as well as enterpris­
ing serf tradesmen rallied around Ferenc Rak6czi II in the first years of the 
new century in an effort to define a new place for Hungary in what looked 
to be the birth throes of a new power constellation. The uprising that broke 
out in Upper Hungary in the spring of 1703 had a social as well as a patri­
otic programme: its leaders hoped to win and then secure the country's 
independence to modernize its government, and to reform its social order. 
With this accomplished, they hoped that Hungary would be strong enough 
to achieve the traditional aim of union with Transylvania, and to resume its 
former place among the countries of Europe.
Ferenc R&k6czi II was only twenty-seven years old in 1703. Descended 
from the Bathorys and the R3k6czis, his life had been intimately tied up 
with the last quarter-century of Transylvania's and Hungary's history. His 
father was Ferenc Rakoczi I, prince elect of Transylvania, whose marriage 
to Ilona, daughter of Peter Zrinyi, ban of Croatia, was arranged to serve the 
interests of the Wesselenyi group. When the conspirators were discovered, 
Ferenc Rakoczi I paid enormous sums for his own safety, and died in 1676, 
a few months after his son was born. The orphan Ferenc Rakoczi II was
brought up to rule. His grandmother, Zs6fia Bathory, looked back to Istv&n 
Bathory, prince of Transylvania and king of Poland, and instilled in the boy 
the sense that he was heir to the Polish crown; Ilona Zrinyi, his mother, saw 
her son as the heir to the Transylvanian throne. Throughout the vast R&k6czi 
estates and in all of Upper Hungary, the boy was called "prince", or "the 
young prince" by all he met. He was known and kept track of in Vienna, but 
also in all Hungary. At the age of nine, he joined his stepfather, Imre Thokoly 
in his campaign in Upper Hungary; he was in the castle of Munk&cs all the 
time it was under imperial siege, and his name became known throughout 
Europe. In the three years that she withstood the siege, Ilona Zrinyi took 
effective diplomatic steps to provide for her son's education either at the 
Polish or the French court. After Munk&cs surrendered, the twelve-year- 
old boy was brought up among the sons of the Austrian aristocracy as 
Leopold I's ward in the Jesuit college at Neuhaus in Bohemia. At the Uni­
versity of Prague, he studied mostly architecture and natural sciences. Sub­
sequently, he lived with his brother-in-law, Count Aspremont, a Francophile 
Austrian soldier aristocrat, in Vienna and was soon at home with the com­
plexities of the European political scene. Ferenc R3k6czi II was also well 
read in contemporary political theory and in the modem theory of govern­
ment. As the scion of Transylvanian princes, and as the young hopeful of 
Hungarian politics, he won for his wife Charlotte Amalia, daughter of the 
duke of Hessen-Rheinfeld, and with her family's help, the title of prince of 
the Holy Roman Empire.
In 1694, he moved home to the R&kbczi estates and entered Hungarian 
politics as hereditary foispan (lord-lieutenant) of the county of S&ros. Just 
then, in 1697, a rebellion broke out in the Hegyalja, one of the country's 
most famous wine-growing districts, which held the bulk of the R£k6czi 
estates. The growers, serfs, burghers of market-towns, taking up arms un­
der former captains of Thokoly's army, turned to Rkkbczi to lead them in 
their struggle against Habsburg military rule, which had added the mo­
nopoly of trade to its instruments of oppression. Rkkoczi, however, turned 
down their request. He did not believe that a movement which represented 
only particular interests both socially and geographically had a chance of 
success, and their hopes of getting Turkish help he thought particularly 
unrealistic.
After 1698, however, it was a nation-wide movement that looked to him 
for leadership. The organizers were Mikl6s Bercsenyi, lord-lieutenant of 
the county of Ung, as well as a number of other aristocrats, and the network 
built up by the nobility of Upper Hungary spread throughout Transylvania 
as well. R£k6czi himself contacted Louis XIV. In the spring of 1701, how­
ever, Leopold I discovered the conspiracy, and Rak6czi was arrested. He 
was put in the prison cell whence his grandfather, Peter Zrinyi had gone to 
meet the executioner, and it took an internationally engineered plot to ef­
fect his escape and save him from certain death. He fled to Poland, where, 
with Miklbs Bercsenyi, he set about organizing the diplomatic, financial 
and military backing needed for a war in Hungary against the Habsburgs.
In the years 1700-1701, while Bercsenyi, R^koczi and their supporters 
were preparing for the insurrection, they sent envoys to Transylvania, too, 
who had talks with the governor and the chancellor Mikl6s Bethlen. What 376
Rak6czi and his allies had in mind in connection with Transylvania, how­
ever, can be reconstructed only from the plans they sent to the French and 
Polish monarchs. These called for ThOkOly to return from Turkey, rally his 
scattered troops, and take over as prince of Transylvania. In the spring of 
1703, however, it became known that the Porte would not let ThOkOly re­
turn, for to do so would violate the peace made with the Habsburgs. With­
out him, however, Thokoly's lieutenants and old soldiers who did manage 
to return were unable to organize the rebels into an effective army.
Since its occupation by the imperial troops, Transylvania itself had been 
the scene of incessant local unrest. After 1701, plots and insurrections were 
ever more frequent in the towns, especially Kolozsvar and Gyulafehervir, 
in the Szekelyfold and M^ramaros, as well as in the districts of K<5v£r and 
Fogaras, to say nothing of the mining centres, but all were discovered and 
ruthlessly suppressed. The commander of the well-trained imperial army 
of eight thousand men, Rabutin de Bussy, had filled the prisons with bur­
ghers, priests, tradesmen, Szekelys and serfs. The Partium was kept in ter­
ror by the Serbian auxiliaries stationed around Varad. In the summer of
1703, Rabutin had Gabor Nagyszegi, the leader of the Romanians opposing 
the religious union, imprisoned, the Transylvanian Estates — aristocrats, 
noblemen, and all those holding public office — summoned to Szeben, and 
had the military guard the town gates locked behind them. The Saxon count 
Johann Harteneck, who had refused to countenance the violations of their 
rights, was tried and beheaded by the order of Rabutin. The young count 
Mihaly Teleki, commander of the district of KSv&r, was the only one who 
refused to obey Rabutin's summons, and took shelter in K6v&r castle.
In the autumn of 1703, after his troops had occupied Upper Hungary 
and the Tiszantul, and Huszt castle, Nagybanya and Debrecen had sworn 
allegiance to him, R^koczi issued proclamations addressed to the Estates of 
Transylvania, separately to the counties, to the Szekelys and the Saxons. 
Simultaneously, R^koczi addressed the "Vlach nation" in a separate proc­
lamation, the first Hungarian statesman ever to do so. But it was not until 
the spring of 1704 that Rakbczi's general staff was in a position to send 
troops to Transylvania. Louis XIV's plan that a joint French, Bavarian and 
Hungarian army would surround Vienna came to nought, and on 13 Au­
gust, 1704, the duke of Marlborough commanding the allied armies of Eng­
land and the empire, the latter led by Prince Eugene of Savoy, won a great 
victory over the French at Hochstadt-BIenheim. It was clear that the war 
would be a protracted one. Diplomacy would play an increasingly impor­
tant role, and Rakbczi, too, needed to establish relations with the countries 
of Europe which, in the past century, had recognized Transylvania. For by 
including Transylvania in a number of international treaties, these coun­
tries had recognized it as an independent state. R^koczi, once he was prince 
of Transylvania, would be representing lawful authority and a sovereign 
state. Until then, no envoy of his could be received in the courts of the Prot­
estant states — Sweden, England, the Netherlands, and the German princi­
palities.
What is more, the aristocrats and high dignitaries who had managed to 
get out of Szeben by some ruse or other, and the Saxon seats, whose insur- 
377 gent forces gathered near Brass6, as well as the deputations sent by the
burghers of the counties and the towns were all appealing to Rak6czi to 
cross into Transylvania. The military and economic backing available for 
the independence movement in Transylvania fell far short of that in the 
Kingdom of Hungary; every day that decisive action was postponed was 
costing thousands of lives. The leader of the Romanian insurgents of M&ra- 
maros and the KSv&r district, Grigore Pintea, had already fallen in battle.
The Szekely armies under Mihaly Henter were losing one battle after the 
other, and so were some of Thokoly's old captains: Istv&n Guthi and P&l 
Kaszcis. On 13 March, 1704, a punitive detachment of imperial troops had 
burned down Nagyenyed and the Calvinist college, slaughtering those who 
had taken refuge there. Women, children, teachers and students suffered 
terrible wounds or died inside the charred ruins.
The chancellor, Mikl6s Bethlen, who had stayed in Szeben, addressed a 
pamphlet to the countries of Europe, asking for their intervention so that 
peace might be restored to Transylvania. His Columba Noe appeared in 
Amsterdam under the pseudonym Fridericus Gotefridus Veronensis. He 
suggested that the country's independence be restored under a Protestant 
monarch and be internationally guaranteed, for Transylvania could then be 
a factor in restoring the balance of power in Europe. (This argument was 
one that Rakoczi and his circle also used.) Meanwhile, in the late spring of
1704, R&kbczi sent reinforcements into Transylvania, and the revolutionary 
forces acquired control over the more important parts of the country. The 
new commander-in-chief, Count Simon Forgach, had turned the tables on 
Rabutin, and held his troops trapped in Szeben and Brass6. J^nos Rad- 
vanszky, a councillor of the Consilium Aulicum, the new governing body 
that had been set up in Hungary, could begin to organize the administra­
tion and the economy in those parts of Transylvania that were already un­
der R&k6czi's rule.
On 8 July, 1704, the Estates of Transylvania assembled at the Gyulafe- 
h£rv&r Diet elected Ferenc R&k6czi II prince of Transylvania. The following 
year Rak6czi and his government settled the matter of Transylvania's rela­
tionship to Hungary at the Diet that met in Szecs£ny in September. It was 
while it was in session that the news was brought of Prince Imre Thokoly's 
death in Nicomedia, and this gave added urgency to the matter. The Sz6cs6ny 
Diet ruled that the two Hungarian "homelands", the Kingdom of Hungary 
and the Principality of Transylvania, were to be united in a confederation.
A few weeks later, Rak6czi set out for Transylvania, but on 11 November,
1705, his troops were stopped at the Zsib6 Pass. And it was not until the 
spring of 1706 that the Transylvanian Estates could confirm the two coun­
tries' confederation at the Diet meeting in Huszt. The Szekelys had Benedek 
Henter for their spokesman, the counties Zsigmond Balogh, the towns P£ter 
G£lffy, the Partium (some counties, originally "parts" of the Kingdom of 
Hungary, for certain periods under Transylvanian administration) Gyorgy 
Dolhay, the Saxons Andreas Soppel, and the Romanians G ibor Nagyszegi.
The army, too, sent its representatives. For the aristocratic party, Simon 
Kemeny, Mih&ly Teleki, Mih&ly Mikes, Abraham Barcsay, and J£nos Sandor 
voted for the confederation, among others.
Emperor Leopold I, who died in the spring of 1705, was succeeded on 
the throne of Hungary by Joseph I, the first ruler to succeed to the Hungar- 378
ian throne by hereditary right. R&koczi's rule was a threat to both the Habs­
burgs' supremacy and to their dynastic interest. For this reason, Vienna 
continued to send considerable forces for the "defence" of Transylvania, 
and used all its diplomatic weight to try to discredit R&k6czi's principality. 
In England and the Netherlands, however, there was ever-growing sympa­
thy for the Protestant cause in Transylvania, and collections were taken up 
in England to help rebuild the college at Nagyenyed. The governments, for 
their part, were anxious to get access to the copper and quicksilver mines of 
Lower Hungary and Transylvania whose products serviced their loans, and 
in the summer of 1706, started mediating between Prince Ferenc R&k6czi II 
and the Emperor Joseph I. The English envoy, Lord George Stepney, and 
the Dutch ambassador to Vienna, Jacob Jan Hamel-Bruyninx, both recog­
nized Hungary's and Transylvania's demand for the status of an independ­
ent state as valid, and recognized also their claim to economic independ­
ence and freedom of religion. Vienna, however, would not hear of the inter­
nationally guaranteed peace with Transylvania, which they proposed.
The military situation was such that it was only in the spring of 1707 that 
Rdk6czi crossed into Transylvania. "Transylvania is in need of nothing but 
a good prince, who will be a father to his people",3 noted RSk6czi, after he 
had visited most of his forbears' principality, and he appeared before the 
Diet meeting in Marosv£sSrhely to confirm him in his high dignity. A number 
of the resolutions passed by this Diet served to modernize the Transylvani­
an state. To create a standing army, they emancipated the serfs doing mili­
tary service from their feudal landlords. They set the economy on a more 
sound footing, gave mining a boost, provided guarantees for the free prac­
tice of religion, and tried to regulate the burdens that devolved on the popu­
lation with the army's quartering. The Consilium was made the chief organ 
of central government; the feeding and supplying of the army was entrusted 
to a Commissariat, and the mines were put under the competent manage­
ment of the outstanding Jakab Grabarics. For all their efforts, however, Tran­
sylvania's self-government did not meet with much success: the new com- 
manders-in-chief, Count L6rinc Pekry, and then Baron Sandor Karolyi, were 
unable to hold the country in the face of the imperial troops' overwhelming 
numerical superiority, and it was occupied by the Habsburg army. Rakoczi's 
Transylvanian army under General Mihaly Mikes sought refuge in Moldavia. 
Smaller armed units and countless Transylvanian families were given shel­
ter in the nearby counties of Upper Hungary.
By the turn of 1708-1709, it was clear that the powers of Europe were 
exhausted, and preliminary peace negotiations were started. Since they 
sought to make a peace that would take most of the conflicting interests 
into account, the negotiations dragged on for years. RSk6czi and his gov­
ernment realized the significance the discussions had for Transylvania's 
future, and did everything they could do to hold France to the promises it 
had made before the start of the war. As for England and the Netherlands,
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in 1706 they declared it both right and necessary that Hungary's relations 
with the Habsburg dynasty be settled with international mediation, and 
that the Principality of Transylvania, too, be included in the "universal peace" 
that was to bring the European war to a close. R3k6czi sent envoys to the 
preliminary peace conferences held at the Hague in 1709 and at Geertrui- 
denberg in 1710. Though it was only semi-official talks that they could con­
duct with the two maritime powers, England and the Netherlands, they 
were able to present their demands to the English Parliament as well, and 
the move proved a success. Rak6czi pronounced himself willing to renounce 
his princely title, if only the country's independence and sovereignty were 
guaranteed. The duke of Marlborough and Anton Heinsius, the leader of 
the Dutch government, both approved of R3k6czi's position as fair-minded. 
It was at this time that there appeared in England an album on Transylva­
nia, containing about a hundred and fifty pictures painted on fine Norfolk 
paper, each with a caption explaining the illustrations to the English reader. 
It was not only on Protestant Transylvania that the still unknown painter of 
the highly artistic pictures focused; the album provides a realistic overview 
of the religious and ethnic heterogeneity of the country. This unprecedented 
English interest in Transylvania was probably due to the dominant political 
conviction of the time, a principle which Daniel Defoe put as follows: "A  
just Balance of Power is the Life of Peace".4 This conviction coincided with 
the one Rak6czi and his government had been consistently voicing, namely, 
that an independent Principality of Transylvania could become a bastion of 
the European balance of power, in short, a bastion of peace. It was this same 
line of thought that was expounded by Rak6czi's diplomat, Domokos Bren­
ner, in a pamphlet published in French and Latin for distribution through­
out Europe. Citing Grotius and arguing from natural law, he outlined the 
major agreements that had been made in the past between the Habsburg 
government and Transylvania, documenting in this way the validity of the 
principality's claim to independence. Brenner's pamphlet appeared in Au­
gust 1710, at the same time that a proclamation of R^kdczi's announced to 
the country that peace negotiations were to start with the Habsburgs through 
international mediation. In a letter to Queen Anne, Rakoczi asked her to use 
her influence that the agreement about to be made might be one that the 
allied powers might guarantee. Queen Anne sent a special envoy to Vienna 
to assist the English ambassador with the peace negotiations. One of the 
main tasks entrusted to Charles Mordaunt, earl of Peterborough, was to 
make sure that Joseph I's negotiations with R^kbczi formed part and parcel 
of the preliminaries of the peace treaty that was to end the War of the Span­
ish Succession.
In the meanwhile, Prince Eugene of Savoy, anxiously protecting the in­
terests of the Habsburg dynasty, was doing everything possible to make 
sure that the war in Hungary would be concluded not by an internationally
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negotiated and guaranteed treaty between sovereign states, but in the form 
of an agreement between the monarch and his subjects. The prince of Savoy 
was especially determined that the Habsburgs should keep Transylvania, 
and used a combination of brute force and the promise of unconditional 
pardon to win over the Transylvanian elite from Rdkdczi's side. Those who 
had fled from Transylvania had their homes, properties, and estates all con­
fiscated; their homes were ransacked and members of their families who 
had stayed behind, and even their distant relatives, were subject to ruthless 
reprisal and extortion. At the same time, Joseph I promised complete par­
don and restitution of all their properties to those who would return to 
Transylvania, and swear allegiance to the House of Habsburg.
W hile the two generals charged with the preparations for the armistice, 
Count J&nos Palffy, commander-in-chief of the imperial forces in Hungary, 
and Baron S&ndor K&rolyi, commander-in-chief of Rak6czi's forces, were 
negotiating, the Hungarian and Saxon members of the Transylvanian Council 
established in 1710 again swore loyalty to Rakdczi, declaring that they had 
the welfare of the peoples of "the dear homeland" at heart. Meanwhile, 
Rdkdczi and his government, in order to be able to keep up their interna­
tional contacts, removed to Poland. Though he managed, indirectly, to stay 
in touch with the earl of Peterborough throughout the latter's negotiations 
with Prince Eugene of Savoy, Rak6czi was unable, considering the pressure 
the country was under, to delay Hungary's coming to terms with the em­
peror. In the spring of 1711, when K&rolyi made a separate peace with P&lffy, 
and surrendered the castle of Ecsed to the imperial forces, and relayed a 
message from Palffy to Mih&ly Mikes in Moldavia, Transylvania's politi­
cians panicked. As Vienna's treaty with the Porte had been renewed, and 
the Porte had declared war on Russia, the Transylvanians, whose country 
the Ottoman troops would have to cross, dreaded the thought of Turkish 
intervention. Without R5k6czi's knowledge, they sent a few members of 
the Consilium to Hungary to attend the Szatm£r assembly involved in the 
peace negotiations. Meanwhile, to take the wind out of the English and 
Dutch mediators' sails, and to be able to bring the war in Hungary to a 
conclusion before the news of Joseph I's unexpected death (on 17 April, 
1711) became widely known, Eugene of Savoy included some of Rakoczi's 
provisions among the points of the agreement: he promised not only that 
the nobility's properties would be returned, but also that provisions would 
be made for freedom of religion.
Among the Transylvanian signatories of the Peace of Szatmar of 29 April, 
1711, Mihaly Barcsai and Mih&ly Teleki the younger signed for the Transyl­
vanian Consilium, and Judge IstvSn Hunyadi from Nagybanya and Judge 
J&nos SzAsz from Fels6b&nya signed for Transylvania's towns. All their 
names, as indeed the names of both the Transylvanian and the Hungarian 
generals, appeared on the document in a private capacity; there was no talk 
of their representing a sovereign state. The peace itself was a compromise 
between the dynasty and the Estates, and contained no guarantees.
Practically every Transylvanian nobleman who had sought safety in Po­
land, Moldavia or in Hungary returned to Transylvania. Mihaly Mikes took 
his oath of allegiance to the imperial commander of Brass6 in the summer 
of 1711. Very few Transylvanians followed Rakbczi into exile.
In France, R£k6czi tried once more to secure international guarantees for 
Transylvania in the European treaty that was still in the making. At the 
time the peace conference was meeting in Utrecht, Rak6czi still trusting in 
France's promise, again sent out an appeal to the peoples of Europe. He 
reminded them that "it is a dictate of human rights that in extreme cases, 
oppressed subjects be succoured" by the powers of Europe, and adduced a 
series of historical examples to prove that a number of small countries had 
been able, through peace treaties, to regain their independence, an inde­
pendence which "various great powers, on a number of pretexts — at times 
simply by right of conquest — had taken away. Transylvania's case is more 
or less a case of this kind; and to Transylvania, too, these same rights are 
due''.5
2. Economy and Society 
Population and the National Economy
The population trends in Transylvania were determined in the fifty years 
following 1660 by three kinds of factors: whether there was war or peace, 
the government's economic policy, and cultural traditions.
For the two decades following 1662, in the country substantially reduced 
in size by the loss of V irad there were no foreign armies. From 1683, how­
ever, Transylvania was the transit zone of Turkish, Tatar, German and Hun­
garian troops, and then the scene of battles and military occupation. After 
1687, imperial armies eight to ten thousand strong used to spend some time 
of each winter in Transylvania, turning into an army of occupation in 1696. 
By the turn of the century, the population clashed regularly with the hun­
gry soldiers. From 1703 to 1709, Rikoczi's forces fought against the impe­
rial army on Transylvanian soil. By the time peace was concluded, emigra­
tion, famine and epidemics — primarily the plague — had decimated the 
population.
The five decades saw three changes in administration and in the eco­
nomic policy of the state. During the decades of Apafi's rule (1661-1690), 
the solid economic circumstances of the first two decades of peace not only 
contributed to natural population increase, but also attracted immigrants 
from the neighbouring countries in great numbers. With the economy boom­
ing, there was a shortage of labour, and immigrants were welcome. Apafi's 
policy of religious tolerance made Transylvania a haven of refuge for perse­
cuted religious minorities of all kinds, and the government deliberately en­
couraged population growth. By way of contrast, during the period be­
tween 1690 and 1703, when Transylvania came under the direct rule of the 
Habsburg emperor in his capacity as king of Hungary, the exorbitant tax
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burdens imposed on the population made for a veritable wave of emigra­
tion. The Counter-Reformation being enforced at the point of bayonets also 
impelled many Protestant families and communities — Hungarians as well 
as Saxons — to seek refuge abroad. The census figures of 1689-1690 indicate 
that 33 per cent of the holdings had no serf families living on them. This is a 
significant number, even if we remember that it cannot be taken at face 
value: no tax census of the time could escape the distorting effects of the 
population's determination to boycott taxation. The union resulting in the 
establishment of the Greek Catholic church caused unrest among those serfs 
and trader and merchant groups who would not give up their Greek Ortho­
dox faith. And the government's policy of economic exploitation drove large 
groups of tradesmen, artisans and merchants out of the country. Even when 
Ferenc Rakoczi II ruled as prince of Transylvania from 1704 to 1709, the 
government's policy of religious tolerance and its deliberate attempts to 
attract artisans and merchants proved inadequate to counterweight the ef­
fects of the ongoing war, which, to put it mildly, discouraged resettlement, 
to say nothing of immigration.
The third factor with a decisive effect on Transylvania's population trends 
in the last half of the seventeenth century was something peculiar to the 
country's long-term development. The scholars returning from universities 
abroad, the merchants doing business at the fairs of western Europe, and 
the aristocrats spending time in Vienna, all brought back information that 
contributed to improved hygiene and to better nutrition. Medical care im­
proved especially in the towns and in the Kir&lyfOld, inhabited by Saxons, 
and in places conditions were better in this respect than in Hungary. The 
population relied on its great traditions of survival to weather the years of 
crop failure or war: grains were stored, perishable foods were salted down, 
fruit and vegetables were dried, or preserved in other ways. All this re­
sulted in a gradual, long-term population growth, in the decline of mortal­
ity, and in the biological stabilization of the population. At the same time, 
the fact that the troops of the Holy League managed to drive the Turks out 
of two-thirds of Hungary that had been under occupation resulted in mas­
sive population movements in Transylvania. Especially after 1692, when 
the Turkish garrison withdrew from V^rad as well, great masses of people 
emigrated west. They went particularly to the neighbouring county of Bihar, 
but the more enterprising also to much more distant, sparsely populated 
areas.
There is no documentary evidence for the size of the country's popula­
tion as a whole. The best we can do is to make estimates on the basis of local 
sources, tax censuses, registers of statutory labour, and on the basis of the 
population figures and the number of houses in certain towns. The eco­
nomic reports compiled for the Habsburg government by the Cameratica 
Commissio, and those of Rak6czi's war commissars are also informative. On 
the basis of all these, we can state with a considerable degree of certainty 
that between 1660 and 1711, the population of Transylvania proper varied 
between seven and nine hundred thousand people.
The distribution of the population was predetermined by Transylvania's 
topography and settlement structure. We have no way of knowing even the 
relative population densities of the non-populous river valleys and plateaus,
of the isolated mountain villages, and of the settlements of the transhumant 
shepherds. However, Transylvania's relatively dense urban network con­
sisted of towns that had populations of between one and five thousand 
people each. There were quite a large number of market towns as well. By 
the second half of the seventeenth century, the border of the Turkish occu­
pied area had moved very close to Debrecen. While Apafi still gave the 
town a great deal of support, after the Turks had left the country it could 
not be counted as one of the principality's towns. Thus, Brass6 and Szeben 
became Transylvania's most populous towns, with three to five thousand 
inhabitants each. The towns were surrounded by a ring of suburbs and vil­
lages whence the serf population brought in produce to the market. A rela­
tively densely populated area was the Barcas&g (Burzenland), where the 
population was engaged in the hauling trade. All in all, Transylvania counted 
as a populous country when compared with Moldavia, Wallachia or the 
Ottoman territories, but was relatively sparsely populated when compared 
with Upper Hungary.
We have no more precise data for the ethnic distribution of the popula­
tion, and must rely on estimates here as well. The majority of the Hungar­
ians were Calvinists, with a much smaller group of Catholics, and com­
prised 40-50 per cent of the total population. (In the dozens of Hungarian 
villages of Moldavia, there were about ten thousand Csango Hungarians, 
who were Catholics.)
The Saxons comprised no more than 10-15 per cent of the population, 
their relatively small numbers being offset by their strong urban character 
and powerful — Lutheran — cfyurch organization.
The Romanians must have made up about 30 to 40 per cent of the total 
population. One part of them, those who settled in the country in previous 
centuries, lived primarily in the villages and on the outskirts of the towns, 
intermixed with Hungarians and Saxons. More homogeneous blocks of 
Romanians were to be found in the Erchegyseg, and particularly in the coun­
ties of Hunyad and Fogaras in the south of the country, though there were 
large numbers of Hungarians working in the iron foundries.
Finally, a very small portion of the population was made up of a number 
of other ethnic and religious groups: Greeks, Macedo-Romanians, Armeni­
ans, Jews, Moravians, Poles, Serbs, Gipsies, and even Turks. Some of these 
groups, for instance, the Armenians and the Jews, played an increasingly 
important part in the economy in the last decades of the century. The differ­
ences in economic position, legal status and privilege did not quite follow 
the ethnic demarcation lines.
Transylvania was a society in flux, one characterized by an open-ended 
hierarchical order. Modern research has confirmed the contemporary opin­
ion that the population was divided into three large structural units: the 
upper estate, the middle estate, and the lower estate. The majority of those 
in the upper estate were Calvinists, but there were some Catholics and 
Lutherans as well. The two major groups comprising it, the aristocracy and 
the middle nobility were predominantly Hungarian. During Apafi's rule, a 
great many of the leading government posts were filled by upstarts, most 
of them Calvinist Hungarians. But, for example, Count Harteneck, one of 
the leaders of the Saxon University, was the son of an immigrant Lutheran
pastor. Among the nobility of the county of Maramaros, there were many 
Romanians.
The middle estate, a typically Transylvanian social formation and nu­
merically rather a large group, was a mixture of Hungarians, Saxons and 
Romanians. The freemen doing military service were also mostly Hungar­
ians, but around Fogaras, for instance, there were considerable numbers of 
Romanians. The burghers of the towns, who comprised the majority of the 
middle estate, were Saxon and Hungarian. Kolozsvar became a military 
town after 1660; the inner city was Hungarian inhabited, while in its sub­
urbs, Saxons, Hungarians and Romanians lived peacefully side by side. 
Merchants of every nationality and religion were to be found in Transylva­
nia in the second half of the seventeenth century. After 1672, the large im­
migrant Armenian community which had been given substantial trading 
privileges consolidated its hold on the economy. The miners were Hungar­
ians and Romanians. The salt traders were a considerable group, and from 
the contemporary invoices that have come down to us, we find that some of 
them were Mohammedan Turks.
The main body of the intellectuals — clergymen, schoolmasters, teachers 
at the grammar schools and colleges, clerks, and bailiffs — formed a special 
group within the middle estate, and were Hungarians or Saxons. The Ro­
manian intellectuals were clergymen and schoolmasters. Independently of 
ethnic affiliation, a great many members of the middle estate hoped to get a 
boost up the social ladder by buying themselves patents of nobility.
The lower estate consisted of the peasantry, or the serfs. The Saxons lived 
in homogeneous settlements, and the Hungarians also formed a more or 
less uniform block of settlements from the Szekelyfold to the Partium, with 
some mixed Romanian-Hungarian villages interspersed. In the southern 
part of the country, most of the peasantry were Romanians. The mountain 
shepherds were Romanians, with some Hungarians among them. The more 
enterprising among the lower estate were not only able to buy themselves 
patents of nobility, but during Apafi's rule were able to do so without re­
gard for ethnic origin or religious affiliation. The union of 1698 placed the 
Greek Catholic clergy within the ranks of the privileged.
Production and Governmental Economic Policy
As has repeatedly been pointed out, Transylvania's natural resources were 
such that it had for a long time been part of the European economy. The 
expansion of this economy, and especially the ongoing changes put a pre­
mium on the mineral wealth that served as the raw material for the nascent 
industries: the world market price of minerals kept rising. Transylvania's 
rich salt deposits had won the interest even of the Fuggers in 1528; after 
1661, the Turks wanted to occupy them. The Apafi government, however, 
succeeded in protecting the salt "ports" along the rivers from the Ottoman 
raiders. Thus, the country's income from the sale of salt was enough to 
cover the tribute it had to send to the Porte each year. Sweden had been one 
of the first to realize the value of Transylvania's copper mines. Around the
turn of the century, when the Habsburgs had to take up English and Dutch 
government loans, it was Transylvania's copper mines — along with the 
equally substantial quicksilver deposits — that served as security. Though 
the country's precious metal mines were nearing depletion, there was still 
enough for what the mints needed. R&k6czi, too, must have derived sub­
stantial income from the mines at AbrudMnya and Zalatna, which were 
put under a manager capable of directing their expert exploitation.
One of Transylvania's greatest natural endowments, the hydro-energy' 
from rivers and streams springing in the mountains had traditionally been 
put to use in a great many ingenious ways. In the last half of the seven­
teenth century, the building of watermills, of mechanical systems capable 
of using and transforming water energy, was the most profitable invest­
ment. Besides the simple mills for grinding grain, there were plenty of more 
complex systems working. The recognition that it was overshot mill wheels 
that worked with the greatest efficiency was generations old in Transylva­
nia. The Turkish traveller Evlia Chelebi noted with approval the hundreds 
of sawmills operating west of the castle of Udvarhely. For decades, enter­
prising aristocrats and burghers vied with one another for the possession of 
the great mill of Torda. From the contemporary technical descriptions of 
the sawmills in Szentimre and Huszt it is clear that the technology used 
was essentially identical with that used in earlier — and subsequent — centu­
ries, but the widespread appearance of sawmills is definitely peculiar to 
this half-century. Mills were used to supply energy to the most diverse 
machinery. Inventories and registers indicate that mills were used to oper­
ate oil presses, to make grits, to grind grain, to pulverize gunpowder, to full 
cloth, and to crush ore. The use of hydro-energy in the mining and smelting 
of iron ore, and in the ironworks, however, was limited by the extreme 
temperatures of the long, cold Transylvanian winters. Very "m odem ", on 
the other hand, are those Sz6kely village by-laws which show how aware 
these communities were of their streams and rivers as supporters of life: 
their pristine state was consciously protected and measures were prescribed 
to minimize the pollution of the water by trades such as tanning or cloth 
dyeing, and by the retting of hemp.
Though the three decades of war caused great losses to Transylvanian 
industry, the attempt to meet the needs of the army did have a stimulating 
effect on production, especially in the iron industry. The years of Apafi's 
rule had been years of economic openness and stable growth. The Habsburg 
government's economic policy, on the other hand, with its uniform cen­
tralization, its tariff regulations and trade monopolies, and not least delete- 
riously, its attempts to make the right to engage in trade conditional on 
ethnic and religious qualifications, brought this organic economic develop­
ment to a halt, which in certain areas was followed by a steep decline. Ferenc 
Rakoczi II tried to return to Apafi's basic policies, though in many respects 
updated them. There were some local results, but His rule was too short for 
any more palpable change.
Transylvania's markets showed radical fluctuations throughout these fifty 
years. After 1660, the country lost a number of the markets for its flourish­
ing clothing industry. With the end of the Turkish occupation, the markets 
of the reconquered territories also opened up to Transylvania, but the more 3 8 6
developed western industries tended to export more to the principality than 
vice versa. It was at this same time that inexpensive frieze from the Balkans 
started to become widely available in Transylvania. But all in all, through­
out the period, demand kept growing for some of Transylvania's major 
products: iron utensils, roughly prepared timber, pewter and copper table­
ware, pottery, glassware, and wooden articles.
Of the wealthy entrepreneurs and known politicians among the aristoc­
racy — J3nos P iter, Andras Horvath, L£szlo Szekely, J&nos Bethlen, Istvin 
Apor, and later Mih&ly Teleki and Miklos Bethlen — practically all were 
involved to some extent in the Levantine trade. They all managed to accu­
mulate considerable fortunes. It gave a great boost to their activity that Apafi, 
like the greatest of his predecessors, promoted trade and commerce with 
considerable treasury subsidies. In the 1660s and 1670s, Apafi lent state 
support to every enterprise, and the entrepreneurs were all given a place in 
the state's administrative apparatus either as silent partners, or as active 
policy makers.
Apafi's governing group, well aware of the greater role that other coun­
tries had allotted to the promotion of industry, patronized all industrial 
activity in Transylvania as a deliberate policy. It is left for subsequent re­
search to determine the effectiveness of the mercantilism practised by Apafi, 
and subsequently, by the Habsburg government. In Transylvania, as in the 
Kingdom of Hungary, the major industries grew up not in the towns, but in 
the countryside. They were run by enterprising aristocrats and by people 
who rose to prominence purely on the strength of their economic acumen.
The salt mines tripled their production between 1660 and 1680, and this 
gave great impetus to the industries related to their exploitation, for in­
stance the iron industry, rope making, the leather and timber industries, 
and the development of lighting technology.
For quite some time, there had been a tendency to locate iron foundries 
in the close proximity of the mines. The iron foundry at Csikmadaras, for 
example, used the latest hydro-technology. As far as we know, the mining 
and smelting of iron ore found at Csikmadaras began in the middle of the 
sixteenth century. Istvan Bathory and Zsigmond Bathory had both been 
aware of its value, and there are sporadic data indicating that G£bor B&thory 
and later Gdbor Bethlen subsidized iron production there. From the time of 
Gyorgy Rakoczi II, the foundry was princely property. Detailed informa­
tion on the value of the foundry and its production, its technology, and the 
working conditions of its labour force have so far been uncovered by re­
searchers only for the years of Apafi's rule.
The iron foundry with the largest output was the one in the county of 
Hunyad, which operated partly with modern "Germ an" blast-furnaces, and 
partly with the more traditional "Vlach" blast-furnaces. The iron mines and 
the foundries were owned partly by the Exchequer, partly by landowners, 
some of them being rented out to entrepreneurs. Whoever ran them, they 
all suffered from a shortage of labour. Those working in the mines were 
paid task wages. The skilled workers employed in the foundries and forges 
were paid wages as well. Haulage, however, the stoking of the furnaces, 
and every kind of work that did not call for skilled labour was done by serfs 
387  as robot. The iron foundries produced pig iron cast in various shapes and
sheet iron which was marketed for subsequent processing. They also manu­
factured cannonballs, thousands of horseshoes, nails, and simple tools.
The famous older iron mine and foundry located near Torockd was 
worked along very different principles. The region lying to the northwest 
of Torockd, an area rich in iron deposits, was originally communal prop­
erty. Though the population of Torock6 were serfs, they enjoyed a great 
deal of freedom as compared to the villeins who owed robot to their lords.
The basis of their freedom was communal property. The "burghers" of 
Torock6, that is, the members of the community, were free to exploit what­
ever iron deposits they discovered on the communal land. They were equally 
entitled to their share — regulated by customary law — of the landed prop­
erty of the community. They were free to use water for energy, and had the 
freedom of the forests. Certain communal rules specified the procedure of 
the smelting and the working of the iron, setting out a diversified system 
for the division of labour, but essentially, both forms of activity were areas 
for private enterprise. The many foundries of Torocko all had their bellows 
and hammers powered by hydro-energy. In the course of time, however, 
landlords acquired the arable and forests of Torockb for their own prop­
erty, and with this, the community's charcoal and fodder supply was lost. 
Communal iron production by the "burghers" of Torockb had fallen on 
very hard days by the last half of the seventeenth century.
Three urban paper-mills built at the beginning of the century were still in 
operation. The paper-mill at Gorgenyszentimre, destroyed during the wars, 
was rebuilt by Prince Apafi in 1663; additions were made to it later on. It 
was this paper-mill which supplied the needs of the court, as well as the 
printing presses and schools of Transylvania. Fine-quality paper was im­
ported.
By the beginning of the sixteenth century, there were glaziers working in 
guilds in the Saxon towns of Szeben and Brass6. We have data for a gla­
ziers' guild in Marosvas^rhely in 1615. It is the inventory made for the sei­
gniory of Fogaras in 1632 that makes the first mention of a new develop­
ment in the era, the establishment of the glass officinas. This glass works 
located in Porumb^k made great strides forward in the second half of the 
century. Here, too, the haulers, the woodcutters, and the stokers were serfs.
The skilled work was done by wage labourers. The “officina vitraria" pro­
duced bottles, carafes, decanters, and other glassware for household use, 
and sheet glass for window-panes. While in the case of most crafts and 
trades practised in Transylvania the technical language was German, the 
names of the tools as well as of the work processes used in glass manufac­
turing are given in the Fogaras inventory in Hungarian.
But it was the Moravian Anabaptist artisan communities (called "H a- 
bans") that had the most conspicuous impact on the development of Transyl­
vanian handicrafts between 1660 and 1680. These communities, which set­
tled in the country to escape religious persecution, received a great deal of 
support from Apafi, and did much to improve the standards of pottery and 
broadcloth production, until the Habsburg takeover obliged them to move 
on from Transylvania as well.
The first sporadic instances of investment of working capital in the manu­
facture of broadcloth can be found in this era. An entrepreneur at Alvinc 3 8 8
was supported by the prince's court which helped him with the transporta­
tion and marketing of his commodities. The most sought-after broadcloth 
throughout the period was that produced in Brass6. The homespun prod­
ucts and blankets of peasant weavers were also much in demand. Both in 
pottery and linen production, there was a tendency for the cottage to work 
together with the master craftsmen, a development analogous to that tak­
ing place on the estates of enterprising landowners, where the industry was 
complementary to the type of agricultural production engaged in on the 
estate, and vice versa.
Within the guild system, silversmiths continued to produce goods up to 
the traditional high standards, in spite of the fact that demand fluctuated at 
best. The Transylvanian silversmiths' ties to the western guilds loosened 
toward the end of the century, as fewer and fewer journeymen were in the 
position to improve on their skills by going to work abroad for a while. 
Tinsmiths and coppersmiths, however, were perfecting their trade, and were 
producing more and more quality consumer goods. W oodworkers and 
masons still relied on the old technology, and were much in demand with 
the constant rebuilding that needed to be done.
With 70 per cent of Transylvania's territory consisting of high moun­
tains, it was only natural that animal husbandry and forestry were the ma­
jor agricultural branches; nevertheless more and more energy was being 
turned to the cultivation of cereal crops. On the narrow strips of land in the 
fertile river valleys and basins, market gardening flourished alongside the 
grain. At the foot of the mountains and on the sunny lower slopes and pla­
teaus, there were grazing lands, vineyards, and orchards. The forests were 
a source of livelihood for thousands. The Szekely village by-laws reveal a 
strong awareness of the need for forest conservation. Even when the for­
estry industry was booming, there were strict sanctions against those who 
disrupted the balance of nature in these genuinely ecology-minded com­
munities.
The greatest part of the land was owned by the treasury, the aristocracy, 
and the nobility. The churches and the towns, too, had considerable estates. 
The area of land owned by non-noble freemen grew in the first half of these 
fifty years, and then fell back by the end of the century.
The seigniories continued to consist of discontinuous units of small or 
medium-sized estates. The large estates, "latifundia" many thousands of hec­
tares in size, which were coming to predominate in the Kingdom of Hun­
gary at about this time, were most rare in Transylvania, though those hold­
ing high government offices tried to acquire properties grouped around the 
prince's estates. The prince's private estates and the lands of the Exchequer 
were handled separately. These latter, the treasury's estates, were rather 
larger in size, and tended to lie in continuous blocks. They were managed 
by an adroit group of entrepreneurs responsible to the dowager princess, 
Anna Bomemissza, Apafi's wife.
The seigniorial centre, the manor, was located on one of the lord's small 
or medium-sized pieces of land, the wooden-balconied manor house or castle 
standing at the centre of the surrounding settlement. At this time, the lord's 
demesne generally was still on one rotation with the serfs' holdings, and 
was not distinguished from those in any way except in respect of who had
title to the produce. In Transylvania, unlike in the kingdom, no noble small 
holder class developed. On the other hand, there were a great many mem­
bers of the lesser nobility who farmed estates providing a livelihood only 
for themselves and the one or two serf families with whom they worked it.
The manorial lands were, for the most part, worked by the serfs as part 
of the feudal service they owed the lord. Among the serfs doing labour, 
however, quite a few were better-off, and many of them had a number of 
draught animals.
In Transylvania, the manorial system did not develop as fully as in the 
Kingdom of Hungary. What was produced by the manors was a function of 
the quality of the land, of the climate, and of the demand of the accessible 
market. Throughout the period, there was a shortage of labour. The land­
owner tried to protect his serf, to tie him to himself and not to his land, and 
to welcome every new settler. The manors produced mostly cereal crops: 
maize was introduced at this time, and would soon replace millet. Flax and 
hemp were cultivated with great care, and tobacco appeared. On the mano­
rial lands, as on the serfs' holdings, a great quantity of fruit was produced.
Richly diversified vegetable gardens surrounded the manor houses and the 
serfs' homes. Apiaries and fishponds lay on the outskirts of the towns and 
villages and contributed to the population's improving nutrition. The tradi­
tional wine-growing areas — the Kukiill<5 Valley, and the region around 
Beszterce and Enyed — were still unmatched, but grapes were grown in a 
great many other places as well, and the quality of the wine produced was 
extremely varied.
Animal husbandry was an organic part of the manorial system. The 
prince's studfarms were the centres of horse-breeding for which Transylva­
nia was famous. It is indicative of the standards of cattle and sheep farming 
that there was enough butter, cheese, milk and wool produced not only to 
satisfy local consumer demands, but also to sell on the market even in the 
most difficult decades.
The greatest part of the agricultural produce came off the serfs' hold­
ings, and off the communal lands worked by the various privileged com­
munities. They grew mostly bread grain and oats. The three-field system 
was common, but by no means universal. Nevertheless, though Transylva­
nia lost much of its corn-producing lowlands in 1660, it was still able, in the 
following decades as well, to produce enough bread not only for its own 
population, but also for the various armies of occupation and re-occupa­
tion, which practically fattened on Transylvania.
Trade in these decades depended on the accessibility of the trade routes, 
and this varied a great deal with the fortunes of war. There was a real dan­
ger of Transylvania's economic isolation. Entrepreneurs, aristocrats, burgh­
ers, serfs, soldiers, professional merchants and the economic interests rep­
resenting the successive state treasuries all competed for Transylvania's 
trade
In the second half of the seventeenth century, hardly an aristocrat in 
Transylvania was not engaged in trade. Chancellor J£nos Bethlen bought 
up cattle to have them driven to Vienna. Councillor Mihaly Teleki added to 
his fortune by trading in salt, wine and horses. Istvan Apor regularly shipped 
wine to Wallachia, PS1 B61di to Moldavia. The aristocrat merchants, though 3 9 0
they faced stiff competition, managed to keep their dominant position to 
the last decade of the century. Nevertheless, great inroads were being made 
by the so-called "Greek" trading companies, the Compania Graeca of Brass6, 
which included Hungarian and Saxon burghers as well as concerns located 
in Szeben and England, by the Armenian merchants, and by the agents of 
the Habsburg-backed Compania Orientalis. The Hungarian aristocracy took 
the defensive step of allying themselves with some burgher entrepreneurs 
to form trading companies of their own.
There was a certain dualism in the trade policy that Apafi pursued. On 
the one hand, he maintained his control over the more important articles of 
trade by introducing government monopolies or semi-monopolies. On the 
other hand, however, he tried to compensate for the system of monopolies 
by granting trade concessions, restricted trading privileges, and treasury 
loans, and by regulations that served to stimulate domestic trade. The tariff 
registers and reports dealing with those three decades show a steady and 
unbroken upswing of trade: the great trade fairs of old were revived, tariff 
revenues grew, and every year showed more and more profit from the sale 
of salt. The Compania Graeca, as the intermediary of the English Levant 
Trading Company, built up a system of connections to a number of Balkan 
merchant companies, and became the company with the largest capital as­
sets in Transylvania. They granted loans to the government and conducted 
transactions to further the prince's economic policies; the prince, in turn, 
pursued a flexible trade policy that promoted their development and pro­
tected the company from foreign competition, especially that coming from 
Vienna.
The head of the Brass6-based Greek Company, Jin os Piter, was one of 
the most daring of all Transylvanian entrepreneurs at the time, and in 1671 
won for the company the right to market some of the country's salt.
The introduction of Habsburg rule radically changed Transylvania's eco­
nomic life. The treasury closed the quicksilver mines at Zalatna, so that 
they might offer no competition to the mines in the Tyrol. Cattle trade be­
cam e the m onopoly of the Compania Orientalis of Transylvanian pro- 
Habsburg aristocrats living in Vienna. In 1695, a request for the formation 
of a similar company made by some other Transylvanian aristocrats was 
refused. The salt monopoly was given to the Palatino-Transylvanica Soci- 
etas set up with the capital backing of the chief pro-Habsburg entrepreneur, 
Sa-muel Oppenheimer, and under the auspices of Palatine P&l Esterh&zy. 
The salt mines in the personal possession of Mihaly Apafi II, now interned 
in Vienna, were taken over by the Hofkammer in 1701.
The price of salt skyrocketed from 1 florin to 5 florins, and the local sale 
of salt was paralyzed. The tariff regulations introduced by the court in 1702 
cut the country off from its traditional markets. The towns became deserted 
as entire industrial branches came to a standstill. It was an economic policy 
based on the theories of the "cameralists", a group of the imperial govern­
m ent's policy makers, and a policy designed to serve the interests of the 
"court" aristocrats, and one that took absolutely no account of local condi­
tions. It was, moreover, a policy gravely deleterious to Transylvanian soci­
ety, for it completely inhibited the circulation of money.
In the last decade of the century, all over the country people were com­
plaining of having been forced out of trade and commerce. The govern-
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merit's policy was such that they were unable to make profits sufficient to 
cover the investments that needed to be made in industrial production and 
marketing, nor did they have enough to be able to pay their taxes. There are 
no end of written sources expressing contemporaries' opinion that the coun­
try was poor because commerce was taken out of the hands of those of its 
sons who held it dear. In reflecting on the causes of the R&k6czi-led war of 
independence, they emphasize that one of the reasons for their taking up 
arms was that the profits from commerce ultimately benefited foreigners.
The only way to balance the economy was to revive the country's trade.
The success of Apafi's fiscal policy is the best indication that there was a 
great deal that the state could do to help even a war-torn economy. Be­
tween 1657 and 1662, Transylvania's war against the Turks practically ex­
hausted the country's supply of money. Apafi's government was able to 
stabilize the currency relatively quickly, and even achieved a certain degree 
of financial equilibrium. The essence of the policy was the following: the 
export of precious metals was prohibited, provisions were made for the 
regular issuing of money and for the centrally-controlled exchange of for­
eign currencies, and Draconian measures were introduced to put an end to 
the minting of counterfeit coins. A great deal of good Dutch money came 
into the country — probably through the trading companies — the so-called 
"lion thaler", and this contributed greatly to the revival of trade between 
1660 and 1680.
After 1687, the expenses of the Turkish war and of the wintering of the 
allied armies ate up the country's supplies of money. But the economic policy 
of that period restricted trade, and there was no way to refill the empty 
coffers. The "emergency money" issued by Leopold I — worthless coins of 
copper and leather — and the system of vouchers were hardly calculated to 
help the situation. The results were so catastrophic that even taxation be­
came impossible between 1690 and 1703.
The tax burden of the Transylvanian population accrued to it from a 
number of different obligations. The country was obliged to pay an annual 
tribute to the Porte, an amount of forty thousand florins. On top of this, 
however, there were the extraordinary taxes and the food ransoms in times 
of war. Including all the back payments on the unpaid war indemnities, 
between 1664 and 1686 Transylvania paid Constantinople a sum of between 
one hundred and ninety and two hundred thousand florins a year. After
1687, the taxes to the Porte were replaced by the obligation to quarter and 
provision the imperial troops. The actual amount to be paid was the subject 
of lengthy negotiations. At the treaty of Balazsfalva signed in 1687 the amount 
agreed was close to two million florins, for it included also the cost of what 
was squandered in the slovenly transport and wasteful distribution of the 
provisions. Certainly, there was no way to give a realistic estimate of the 
value of the tramped-down vegetable gardens, the burned corn fields, the 
sheaves of unthreshed wheat used to fodder the horses, the destroyed mills, 
and the fruit trees used for firewood. Securing the "discretion" of the party 
to whom the tax was to be paid also amounted to a regular supplementary 
tax, and took the form of "gifts" to the commander-in-chief, to the various 
officers, and to the tax collectors. These gifts took a number of forms. Be­
sides the cash payments, the officer would specify whether he wanted a 3 9 4
pair of handsome horses, a carriage, or some other valuables. It was not just 
his "trouble" that the taxpaying communities, counties, towns and villages 
were thanking him for in this way; they were also hoping to win special 
treatment thereby. It was, in fact, both a tip and a bribe; and except for the 
value of the goods involved, there was nothing particularly new about it. 
When traditional power relations are as thoroughly upset as they were with 
the eight to ten thousand strong imperial army's occupation of Transylva­
nia, the collection of taxes too, becomes a form of undisguised tyranny. The 
controls were simply not working: everything was subordinated to the in­
terests of the military. This kind of taxation, which was far more than they 
could pay and was collected by force, drove the population to find a more 
peaceful life in the area reconquered from the Turks. Others took up arms, 
and with their determination to restore Transylvania's autonomous gov­
ernment, were the vanguard of the Rak6czi-led war of independence.
How far was Transylvania able to support the costs of government as an 
independent state? It was, as we have seen, capable of covering the ex­
penses of Istvan Bathory's and Gabor Bethlen's grandiose state-building, 
foreign policy, and foreign wars. By the time of Apafi's rule, the expenses of 
government were growing throughout Europe. In Transylvania, from the 
1660s on the money needed to run the central government was handled 
separately from the money needed to cover the expenses of the prince's 
household. The first, which included the cost of keeping up the court in a 
way that foreign visitors would find impressive, as well as the cost of enter­
taining them, also included the upkeep of the prince's guard, and came to 
between seven and eight thousand florins. The prince's private, family ex­
penses amounted to four or five thousand florins. Maintaining the prince's 
court thus cost Transylvania an average of eleven to thirteen thousand flo­
rins. Besides this, there were the substantial expenses of government ad­
ministration, and the salaries and other emoluments paid to the officials 
and high dignitaries of the realm. It would be difficult to arrive at a figure 
for these, for a great many of the government officials received a substan­
tial part of their remuneration in kind.
Transylvania in the 1670s was even able to feed and give regular pay­
ments of money to the host of eight to ten thousand refugees — members of 
the lesser and middle nobility, and the soldiers discharged from the garri­
sons of the border castles — who crossed over from the Kingdom of Hun­
gary.
When the Habsburgs took over Transylvania, its tax burden was set at 
between eight hundred thousand to a million Rhenish florins in cash, and 
the supplying of an army of from six to ten thousand men. This unprece- 
dentedly high tax, when allocated to the various towns and regions of the 
country, proved to be simply too much to pay. In the most difficult years, 
Apafi had been able to see to it that the nobility contributed to the payment 
of the tax, and that the aristocracy helped out the population with loans. 
The Habsburgs' attempts to introduce similar measures failed, primarily 
because with the system of monopolies there was not enough money left in 
circulation within the country.
In the first years of the war of independence, Ferenc Rak6czi II tried to 
make up for the lack of currency and to stimulate the economy by issuing
emergency money himself, the copper "libertas". The period of his rule, 
however, was too short to permit any conclusions as to the effectiveness of 
his economic policy. The profits from the partial monopolies could not cir­
culate back into the Transylvanian economy. For years, the small principal­
ity had two armies and two state bureaucracies to finance. The pro-Habsburg 
Gubemium had moved to Szeben, and the imperial army had control of the 
southern part of the principality throughout, while the rest of the country 
was, more or less continuously, in the hands of R3k6czi's army and govern­
ment. Both governments collected taxes, and the taxpaying population was 
totally exhausted. RSk6czi's plans called for reviving the economy with re­
forms that extended to the kingdom and the principality as well. The Diet 
that met at Onod in 1707 passed a tax reform which called for a regular 
income tax on every member of the population, the nobility included. The 
only group to enjoy exemption was to be the families of the men doing 
military service. The taxable income was to come from the restoration of 
free trade, and the development of mining and industry, both of which 
were to be given state support. Transylvania, however, had no time even to 
introduce the reforms.
Social Mobility in a Society of Estates
The constant changes in the country's economy and government did a great 
deal to accelerate the ongoing process of the restructuring of society, to 
hasten the dissolution of the closed autonomous communities of Transyl­
vania. In the decades of stability under Apafi's rule, there was an organic 
process of restructuring, as the diverse social groups of the old feudal order
— the aristocracy, the nobility of the counties, the burghers of the towns, 
the Saxon University, and the Sz6kely districts along with the majority of 
the population, the serfs — regrouped into the three large social groupings 
that had been evolving for some time: the upper estate, the middle estate, 
and the lower estate. During the fifteen years of Habsburg military occupa­
tion, this organic development was cut short, and Transylvania seemed well 
on its way to social anarchy. A series of riots broke out, and by 1702 or so, 
every social group in Transylvania was looking to R&k6czi's rule to restore 
social order. In the eight years of the war of independence, R£k6czi man­
aged to introduce measures which tended to restore social harmony, and 
promoted the kind of long-term organic social restructuring that had been 
arrested.
The most populous group within the lower estate was the serfs. Its num­
bers were continuously augmented by the declasses, people who had fallen 
outside the protective shell of the various closed former communities, and 
by Romanians from Moldavia and Wallachia seeking refuge from poverty 
in Transylvania. The serfs were far from being a homogeneous social group. 
The differences between the circumstances of the Saxon peasantry and the 
inhabitants of the Hungarian villages were matched by the great discrepan­
cies that existed among the Sz6kely serfs, the Romanian mountain shep­
herds, the old Romanian agriculturalists and the new Romanian settlers.
There was a constant labour shortage, and this, and the economic prosper­
ity behind it, opened new opportunities to them, which in itself made for 
considerable social tensions within the class. The landowners, for their part, 
tried to bind as many serfs as possible to perpetual servitude. From the 
1660s, the amount of service exacted from the serfs on the nobility's estates 
was no longer tied to any upper limit in terms of man hours. The serf was 
adscript not so much to the soil as to the landlord, which meant that the 
landowner was free to move him and his family from one estate of his to the 
other, as need dictated. The landed nobility's involvement in trade and com­
merce meant that the serfs were obliged to do a great deal of haulage; as for 
the industries that were established on the estates, these involved an infi­
nite variety of jobs for the serfs. Those serfs who worked in the paper-mills 
learned a great deal, and their horizons broadened. But the work load was 
excessive: reports on the iron works in the county of Hunyad indicate that 
the serfs employed there had not one day of rest. On the treasury's estates, 
however, circumstances were somewhat better. Apafi's government sought 
to protect the serfs from over-exacting bailiffs and landlords, as well as 
tyrannical soldiers. But the institutional framework through which the serfs 
could turn to the government for the redress of their grievances was estab­
lished only by Ferenc R3k6czi II. During the last half of the seventeenth 
century, as indeed before, the serfs' interests had been protected only by 
the communities, by customary law and the village by-laws, and not least 
importantly, by the churches. Even landowners were known to set up hos­
pitals and poorhouses for the sick and very old on their estates, though on a 
very modest scale.
The other great and even more heterogeneous group in the lower estate 
was the well-off peasantry, the enterprising cotters engaged in a craft or in 
trade, the hauliers, the drovers, and the day labourers. Those who rose to 
the middle estate would be mostly from this group. There were a number 
of kinds of way up: armed service, a patent of nobility gained with money, 
with loans, or with merit. The more talented sons of the serfs would go on 
from school to help manage the seigniory, or, after spending a few years 
teaching in an elementary school, would go abroad to continue their stud­
ies, to return to fill posts as pastors or teachers at the grammar schools.
The middle estate was a loosely-knit class consisting of a great many 
social strata. Most characteristically in this period, it consisted of the mili­
tary stratum coming into existence as a result of the modernization of the 
country's armed force, and of the enterprising burghers and members of 
the lesser nobility.
During these decades the principality was building up an army consist­
ing partly of paid soldiers, and partly of soldiers who were given the free 
use of state lands and other privileges. The centralizing princes had long 
been trying to draw the closed and autonomous Szekely military communi­
ties under their own control. There are two highly significant censuses avail­
able on the Szekelys: one from 1614, the other from 1720. A comparison of 
the data shows that the homogeneous Szekely society of yore was breaking 
into discrete groups with different occupations and statuses, and that these 
then integrated into society at large. Apafi sought to speed up this process 
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signed to garrison the various castles. But there were also considerable num­
bers of Szekelys who remained within their original communities and con­
tinued to enjoy the old Szekely privileges in return for their readiness to 
perform military service. Foot soldiers, guardsmen and cavalrymen, it was 
they who comprised that considerable military force that the Szekely dis­
tricts still represented. It is interesting to note, however, that Apafi appointed 
men of his own to command the armies of the Saxon districts. Of those 
Saxons who were no longer fit for warfare, many went to work in the salt­
mines, or found work transporting salt. Others were reduced to serfdom, 
or farmed their land as freemen, or earned their living as hauliers. Of the 
lands once held by the privileged Idfo Szekelys, more and more had been 
taken over by outsiders. The Sz6kely villages, however, stoutly protected 
their communal social order and self-government.
The most energetic group within the middle estate were those who had 
just recently been awarded patents of nobility. Apafi liked to recognize the 
services that soldiers, officials, merchants and entrepreneurs had rendered 
the country. In a quarter of a century, so many people acquired nobility in 
this way that one contemporary source declared half the population to be­
long to the nobility. Transylvania had no well-to-do landed gentry owning 
estates of medium size, and so the road to advancement lay wide open to 
the newly ennobled and to the lesser nobility. The imperial official taking 
the tax census in 1703 compared the growing group of Transylvania's lesser 
nobility following the peasant way of farming to the free peasantry of the 
German principalities and Silesia.
During the years of Habsburg centralization, a great many people in the 
middle estate stood in danger of sliding back into serfdom. In social terms, 
however, it was the burgher stratum that suffered the most. The years from 
the 1660s to the 1680s had been a time of a peaceful and steady increase in 
prosperity for this bourgeoisie, and also a time when the closed, autono­
mous urban economies were opened up by irresistible forces. The new entre­
preneurs, merchants and artisans of Szeben and Brass6, taking part person­
ally, with investments or loans, in the state enterprises, themselves promoted 
the process slowly evolving everywhere in Europe, namely, that the closed 
urban economies opened up and were integrated into a national economy.
Among the traditional urban groups, the financial superiority of the gold­
smiths and silversmiths appeared to be untouched. In other trades, only a 
small group managed to become really wealthy and to acquire the prestige 
that goes with wealth, and there was a growing number of those who were 
poor. In Gyulafehervar, which was slowly being rebuilt, there was an in­
crease in the numbers of hauliers and gold washers, while in other towns, 
there were more and more carpenters, masons, rope-makers, tinsmiths, 
watchmakers, millers, barbers, and so on. Torda and Des were given privi­
leges of nobility; Kolozsvar was declared a military town, and a great number 
of noblemen chose to settle there among the burghers. It was at this time 
that the Szekely towns, for instance Csikszereda, and especially Maros- 
v£sarhely, acquired their leading positions. It was in Marosv£s&rhely that 
the last prince of Transylvania in the person of Ferenc Rak6czi II was in­
stalled in his office by the Diet. The life of the urban middle estate contin­
ued to centre around the beautiful homes they had started cultivating at the
beginning of the century. They now had "bath-closets", glazed windows, 
and libraries. The Danish ambassador on his way from Vienna to St. Peters­
burg, stopped over in KolozsvSr in the home of Ferenc SzakSl, master car­
penter, and spoke with the highest approval of the comforts available and 
the fine taste in which it was furnished.
The elite among the urban burghers had social and business ties to the 
upper estate, as for instance did Councillor Mathias Miles of Szeben, and 
the Greek entrepreneur J&nos Pater. Many of them, however, could not keep 
pace with the stiff competition for a place higher up the social ladder; oth­
ers were to fall in political battles.
The upper estate, in whose hands effective political power was concen­
trated, was composed of diverse elements. The old aristocratic families 
emerged considerably shaken from the political struggles of 1657-1662, and 
had been much reduced in number. Soon, however, new upcoming fami­
lies of a first-generation elite joined their ranks. Transylvania's most influ­
ential politician in this period, Mihdly Teleki, who had the duties of chan­
cellor, was the son of a prison warden. The father of Laszlo Szekely, a mem­
ber of the Prince's Council and postmaster general, had worked as a stew­
ard, managing one of the large estates. Mdrton Sarpataki, who held the 
office of protonotary, was the son of a serf.
The size of the estates owned by the aristocracy was generally about 
what a middle landowner in the Kingdom of Hungary could boast: 10 to 30 
villages. Most of Transylvania's aristocrats were Calvinists; some were 
Catholics. Religious affiliation, however, was still not an issue for those as­
piring to high office. The Catholic Hallers — Janos, Gabor and P&l — were 
all councillors and members of the corps of diplomats. The orphaned son of 
Istvdn Apor, the Catholic chief magistrate of Kezdivas^rhely, rose from pov­
erty to become one of the highest dignitaries of the land. The upper estate 
was open. Education, talent, money, economic finesse, service rendered to 
the state were all passports to the upper estate, but it was just as easy to fall 
back to a lower estate. Apafi's rule was a difficult one for the aristocracy. 
Denes Banffy was beheaded because he did not understand what Apafi 
meant by centralization. The conspiracy organized by Pdl Beldi landed many 
aristocrats in prison. Nevertheless, what was achieved during Apafi's rule 
had a great deal to do with the political astuteness of this Janus-faced upper 
estate.
The aristocratic families were close-knit. They preferred to educate their 
children abroad. It is indicative of their insatiable need to keep up with the 
best that after the German principalities, the Netherlands became the mea­
sure of what a state should be, and after the French orientation had had its 
day, they turned with ever greater interest to England. Chancellor J^nos 
Bethlen's son, Mikl6s, had barely visited England; his grandson, Mihaly, 
went there to study. Transylvania's aristocracy enjoyed a growing afflu­
ence, and were able to consummate their already luxurious life-style. Their 
chateaux had cut-glass windows, and spacious halls with open fireplaces. 
Two cultures met in the interior decoration of these sumptuous homes: 
Turkish and Persian rugs and Venetian, Dutch and French tapestries on the 
walls; Eastern clothes and hunting weapons, and Western clocks and vir­
ginals. Alongside the gold and silver dishes on their tables, glass and porce­
lain tableware and earthenware appeared. Their account books reveal strict 
economy: half a sack of nuts was put on the books no less than a set of 
silvered harness. They kept a lot of expensive jewellery in the house: since 
there was no bank, this was the way of keeping their savings safe. They 
made generous endowments to their church, not only having their salva­
tion in mind, but also seeing this as a contribution to the church's ability to 
give loans in case of need, and as a way of securing the education of future 
generations.
W hen the Habsburg government took over, initially most aristocrats 
flocked enthusiastically to Vienna, and were anxious to be among the first 
to receive the title of count or baron, distinctions Leopold I conferred in an 
effort to make them into docile courtiers. When Rabutin ordered them to 
Szeben in 1703, practically all of Transylvania's aristocracy heeded the com­
mand. It was not until the general took all the valuables that they had taken 
with them for safekeeping — money, jewellery and provisions — that they 
realized that they had been trapped. It was at that point that they went over 
to Rakoczi, even risking their lives to break out of the town. When the Peace 
of Szatmar was signed, however, the young Kelemen Mikes was the only 
one to follow Rdkdczi into exile.
3. The Varieties of Culture
Cultural Policy, the Intellectuals, and the Vernacular
The heyday of Transylvanian culture was just this half-century, when wars 
and local skirmishes ravaged the countryside for over thirty years, and the 
trauma of the country's palpable loss of independence shook every mem­
ber of the population. During these decades, Transylvanians remained sus­
ceptible to the intellectual currents coming from the West, and produced 
works which set the trend that the country was to follow in culture and 
education for generations to come.
Attaching importance to education was rooted in Transylvanian tradi­
tion, but was reinforced by the infectious spirit of innovation that spread 
throughout Europe in those years. It was Transylvanian society's imma­
nent needs that coincided with the challenge of the age, and this resulted in 
some spectacular progress in the field of education. The framework and the 
opportunities, however, were provided by the state's educational policy.
The fact that education was the cement of the country and the token of 
its development was something Mihaly Apafi recognized as well as the best 
minds of that century. Apafi was called the prince who put Descartes's 
theories on education into practice by contemporaries such as the theolo­
gian F. Istv&n Tolnai, who had studied at English and Dutch universities, 
and Ferenc Papai P^riz, the greatest Hungarian physician and physicist of 
his time, who had studied in Basel. Apafi, an avid student of the writings of 
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prince's most important task was to develop the school system, and to pro­
vide the institutional framework in which modem science might flourish.
Apafi took over as prince of Transylvania when the court at Gyulafeher­
vcir had just been destroyed. Until it could be rebuilt, he set up his court at 
Fogaras. Apafi set great store by pomp and circumstance. A great many 
ceremonial occasions enhanced the splendour of his court. The gifts received 
from other rulers were exhibited as diplomatic tokens of Transylvania's 
esteem abroad. The exquisite gardens laid out with great care were meant 
to symbolize peace, renewal and rebirth. Apafi and his wife, Anna Bor- 
nemissza, whom he on occasion called his "co-ruler", did their utmost to 
make the court the centre of Hungarian culture, a culture which measured 
itself by the standards of western Europe, but safeguarded national tradi­
tions as well. Apafi surrounded himself with a small group of second-gen- 
eration Hungarian Cartesians, all of whom had studied abroad. He regu­
larly informed his adherents of the news from abroad in little circulars, or 
"novels". He was dedicated to religious tolerance, and intervened person­
ally to guarantee freedom of thought and education. His greatest dream, to 
establish a modem university in Transylvania, Apafi did not live to realize. 
But he had continued traditions which made for standards of culture and 
education that stood the country in good stead in later, less auspicious years.
The Habsburg educational policy of the 1690s was diametrically opposed 
to every one of Transylvania's traditions. The dynasty's interests were 
thought to require an empire where there was but one religion, and the 
school system, though based on the Jesuit schools which were known for 
their high standards, met with fierce resistance from Protestant Transylva­
nia as bastions of religious intolerance. The court was in far-away Vienna, 
and could have little cultural impact. Szeben, General Rabutin's military 
headquarters and the home of the Gubemium, was no more than the centre 
where orders were issued and decrees were made known.
Ferenc Rak6czi II and his government were intent, as far as the ongoing 
warfare permitted, to emphasize the continuity of his court with those of 
his historic predecessors, even while having to remove constantly: from 
Gyulafeherv&r to Marosvas^rhely, and then to Kolozsvar. In the time he 
had at his disposal, R3k6czi attempted to restore Apafi's spirit of openness 
and tolerance in educational and religious affairs.
Though Transylvania could boast an intelligentsia which was numerous 
in comparison with that of the neighbouring regions, it was not enough. 
The category of "intelligentsia" as such covers a most motley group. The 
creative intellectual elite and the "service sector" — schoolmasters, scribes, 
village painters, officials, court and army musicians — may all be included. 
The ecclesiastics were still in the majority, but the weight of the lay intelli­
gentsia was growing. All the great writings in this period were secular works 
written by laymen. The scholar who wrote the internationally acclaimed 
history of mining in Transylvania, or a physician or a printer were more 
determinative of intellectual life as such than the man in the much more 
prestigious job of court chaplain, or any member of the Hungarian, Saxon, 
and, after the union, Romanian clergy. The proportion of those with univer­
sity degrees within the population was high. In respect of their ethnic dis­
tribution, the Hungarians and the Saxons greatly predominated.
During Apafi's and R&k6czi's rule the country's official language was 
Hungarian, but the prince's decrees to the Saxons and Romanians were 
published in their native language as well. Apafi set such great store by 
education in the vernacular, that at the request of the Greek Orthodox Ro­
manian lower clergy he removed Bishop Sava Brancovici from his office, 
because he refused to obey the prince's order that religious instruction was 
to be given and books were to be printed in Romanian for the greater edifi­
cation of the faithful. The Habsburg government used mostly German, and 
sometimes Latin in its communications with the population. General Rabutin 
who, for all practical purposes, ruled Transylvania as a viceroy, knew only 
French. The German officers were unable to communicate even with the 
Saxons, who spoke their own dialect.
The Principality of Transylvania was extraordinarily open to languages. 
Considerations of foreign policy, the need for diplomats accomplished in a 
number of languages, also contributed to the encouragement of study abroad. 
In times of peace foreigners were attracted, in times of war they inevitably 
moved to the country, but both groups brought along their own language. 
The language of science was still mostly Latin, but the language of educa­
tion for those who studied abroad, could be German, Dutch, French, and in 
the last decades of the century, English. Samuel Koles£ri probably also at­
tended Newton's lectures in England, since after his return to Transylvania 
he was an exponent of Newtonian ideas as opposed to those of Cartesian 
physics. But in these same years a plea was made for Hungarian as a lan­
guage of science and it was made so forcefully, that it sounded modern 
even in the age of the Enlightenment. French was coming to replace Latin as 
the language of diplomacy, but the voivodes of the Romanian principalities 
frequently corresponded with Apafi in Hungarian. Most of the orders sent 
from the Porte, it seems, arrived in Hungarian, translated by scribes in Buda, 
Temesv&r, but mainly Constantinople, but all the princes of Transylvania 
employed scribes who knew Turkish well.
In this multilingual milieu, it is interesting to note the emphasis placed 
on the use of one's native language. Transylvanian Hungarian, which had 
undergone a linguistic renewal in earlier decades, was now enriched with 
categories in areas to satisfy the new cultural demands: government, politi­
cal theory, social responsibility, history, epistemology, and science all needed 
to be discussed in a precise terminology, as indeed did the various branches 
of industry and commerce. The facile language of light-hearted social inter­
course developed at this time, as did forms of communication capable of 
transmitting more complex feelings and ideas. A comprehensive programme 
of linguistic renewal was worked out, but cut short by the political crisis. 
M ikl6s M iszt6tfalusi Kis, a typographer and printer of rare artistry and 
ingenuity, was the one who standardized Hungarian spelling. A new, re­
vised Hungarian edition of the Bible was printed, designed for mass read­
ership.
The cultivation of the German language was an important part of Saxon 
culture and education. German was the language of schooling, of the 
churches, of science, and of urban life among the Saxons, especially after 
Pietism got a foothold in Transylvania (before anywhere else in the region). 402
Apafi's educational policy gave a great boost to the modernization of the 
Romanian language, and the union with the Catholic church had the posi­
tive effect of raising the standard of the vernacular among the Romanian 
clergy. It was in Transylvania that the first Romanian-Latin word book was 
compiled.
Schools, Presses, and Science
By the mid-1660s, the prince's educational programme and the system of 
endowments had brought teaching in the vernacular and education for girls 
to the village schools. The four "received" religions and the Greek Ortho­
dox church were obliged, by social pressure, to establish more and more 
schools. It was during these years that the college at Sz^szvaros — a type of 
school close to the English public school of the period — was established, as 
well as the Calvinist college at Szekelyudvarhely. Unitarian schools were 
becoming more efficient and the Greek Orthodox school system got off the 
ground. Apafi not only consolidated the financial foundations of the Roma­
nian school of Fogaras established by the dowager Princess Zsuzsanna L6- 
r&ntffy in 1657, but gave it his special princely patronage so that it might 
grow into the most prestigious Romanian educational institution of the time. 
Though we have no way of establishing the precise number of Romanian 
elementary schools operating in the villages around Fogaras, and in Brass6, 
H&tszeg and Lugos, it is quite certain that there were relatively many Ro­
manian schools in Transylvania at the end of the seventeenth century. It 
was in Transylvania that the first Romanian textbook was printed in 1699, a 
Cyrillic primer entitled Bucoavna.
The elaborate system of foreign scholarships established by the Protes­
tant schools was extended, including scholarships to Frankfurt on the Oder, 
Leyden, Franeker and Zurich. Though by this time the focus of interest was 
in the Netherlands, Switzerland and England; fifty-three Transylvanian stu­
dents enrolled at Wittenberg between 1700 and 1703. In 1702, passing through 
Transylvania on his way home from Constantinople, the English ambassa­
dor Lord William Paget was joined by three Hungarians and one Saxon 
student — the young painter, Jeremias Stranoves — who were to continue 
their studies in London.
Catholic education picked up after the Jesuit order was settled in Transyl­
vania. The Franciscans made immense contributions to the education of the 
Catholic Szekelys. The Habsburg government made no attempt to carry on 
with Apafi's plans for a university; they wanted no institution of higher 
education in the principality. R£k6czi, in his turn, founded "The Society of 
Noble Youths", a court institution located at Kolozsvar and designed to 
educate and train young men suited for high government jobs and high 
military posts. Hungarians, Saxons and one Romanian youth were among 
the members.
In education, more attention than ever before was paid to teaching ev­
eryone to read and write. In the "public schools" and colleges, the emphasis 
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Transylvania's wonderful old libraries suffered irreparable losses in this 
period. The court library in Gyulafehervir was burned down by the Tatars, 
the library in Brass6 burned down in 1689, and the library of the college at 
Enyed was destroyed by the imperial army. The price of books probably 
declined somewhat; their value had certainly grown. Apafi's court made a 
concerted effort to reassemble "the country's library". The number of pri­
vate libraries was growing; school libraries were augmented with the teach­
ers' own collections, and with specialized literature classified and grouped 
according to subject matter. Books published expressly for children, and 
some especially with women readers in mind crop up on the book lists.
Books in Hungarian were beginning to comprise an ever larger percentage 
of all publications. Samuel K5les£ri, the physician of Szeben, had a library 
of four thousand volumes.
Transylvania's presses proved inadequate to the growing demand for 
something to read. Between 1650 and 1680, nearly four hundred books were 
issued by the presses of Brass6, Szeben, Kolozsvar and Gyulafeh6rv£r, and 
with the type salvaged from the press in Varad in 1660 and taken to Debrecen, 
and thence to Szeben. Printing in Transylvania began to make great strides 
once Abraham Szenci Kertesz and Mihaly Veresegyhazi Szentyel returned 
from learning the trade in the Netherlands and set up their own presses.
But it was Mikl6s Miszt6tfalusi Kis, who also had learned his art in Hol­
land, who modernized Transylvanian printing. It is indicative of his skill as 
a cutter that his type characters have been considered to equal those of 
Garamond and Grandjean, and recent research has demonstrated that the 
famous "Janson type" was actually first designed and cut by the Transyl­
vanian master printer. Besides working to fulfil Dutch orders, he cut punches 
for the types needed in Polish, Swedish, German, Armenian, English, Ital­
ian and Georgian orthography. On returning to Transylvania, Miszt6tfalusi 
Kis set up his Typographica Officina with the prince's help, publishing inex­
pensive but aesthetically satisfying books in large editions. W ith the 
Habsburg takeover, he found it even more difficult to work because of the 
personal attacks against him. After 1690 the workshop declined, and then, 
following his early death, disintegrated.
Cartesianism was the dominant intellectual current in Transylvania from 
the 1660s on. Outstanding among the first generation of Cartesians was 
Sdmuel Enyedi, a physician, who subscribed to a variant of rationalism which 
owed a great deal to Henricus Regius' theories, with Cartesian dualism 
being central to his system of thought. It was he who, after the fall of Varad, 
established the second centre of Cartesian rationalism at the college at Enyed, 
together with the much younger Janos Nadanyi, Marton D6zsi, and others. 
Descartes's philosophy was given a systematic exposition in 1690 by the 
eminent third-generation Cartesian, Ferenc Papai Pariz. In a work published 
in Amsterdam, Mikl6s Apati, a member of Poiret's circle, maintained that 
free will was at the centre of all consciousness, and, adapting Descartes's 
methodology, concluded that mathematical reasoning was the principal 
means of our discovering the laws of nature, something that Apaczai, too, 
had maintained. Mihaly Regeni, who taught at the Unitarian college in Ko- 
lozsvar, contributed to the Europe-wide controversy sparked by Descartes's 404
theories by building on the philosophy of Ehrenfried Walter Tschirnhaus, a 
free-thinker who anticipated Newton in some respects. Mechanics and as­
tronomy as taught in Transylvanian schools evidently derived from the 
heliocentric Copemican theory. The latest approach to the natural sciences 
is reflected in the lecture notes on mathematics published by Samuel Kaposi, 
who taught at the school in Marosvas^rhely after completing his studies in 
England and the Netherlands, as well as by J&nos Kopeczi's De Cometis, and 
Samuel Koleseri's discourse on light. Exceptionally influential was the Saxon 
rationalist Andreas Teutsch, who had studied medicine in Utrecht, and re­
turned to Transylvania via Leipzig and Halle with the ideas of Jakob Spener 
on the need to free scientific thinking from thralldom to religious belief, and 
of Spener's fellow Pietist, August Hermann Francke, on education. He prac­
tised medicine on his return, and became Saxon chief magistrate. In the 
KiralyfOld, anticipating Maria Theresa's decree, it was Teutsch who prohi­
bited witch trials.
Another doctor of medicine, Bartholomeus Bausner, a native of Kohalom 
who had studied in Amsterdam, published a treatise on the circulation of 
the blood, and on the harmony that existed between the various parts of the 
human body. Regius' textbook on medicine which ran into several editions 
made reference to the work of three young Transylvanian doctors: Janos 
Sik6, Sam uel Enyedi, and Johann Gunesch. The prescriptions of J&nos 
Bdnffyhunyadi of Nagyb&nya, a specialist in the preparation of medicines, 
were included in the textbook on pharmacology published in 1681 by 
Jonathan Goddard, a chemist and Fellow of the Royal Society. Koleseri's 
work in medicine was pioneering in that he observed and described the 
diseases afflicting miners as a direct consequence of their working condi­
tions; he also did a great deal to organize free medical care for the poor. 
Koleseri recongized that it required the central government's nation-wide 
intervention to prevent the occurrence and spread of plague epidemics. But 
he was not the only one to realize the importance of preventive medicine. 
The Regimen Sanitatio Salemitanum  put out by the renowned Schola Saler- 
nitana as a collection of guidelines to healthy living was translated into 
Hungarian by Gyorgy Felvinczi (Kolozsv£r, 1693), and into German by the 
Transylvanian physician Lucas Seuler (Brasso, 1694).
The most outstanding medical work to appear in Transylvania, how­
ever, was Ferenc Papai P^riz's Pax Corporis, a treatise on the maladies o f  the 
body, their causes, their hotbeds, and the means to cure them, which appeared in 
1690. The need for the book was enormous. The practice of medicine in the 
villages, manors and market towns was still largely in the hands of "heal­
ers" using home remedies, while bones were set, teeth were pulled and 
wounds were attended by barbers, whose work was regulated by guilds, 
although in every larger Transylvanian town, there were university-trained 
medical doctors to be found by this time. It was for this largely non-profes- 
sional army of "medical practitioners" that Pdpai P^riz's book, written in 
lucid Hungarian, was so invaluable. A systematic presentation of the latest 
in medicine, the book emphasized the scientific approach to healing, calling 
attention to the importance of prevention and hygiene, and maintaining 
that human negligence and not predestination was the cause as much of
mankind's illnesses, as of its ills. Pax Corporis became the textbook of thou­
sands. Eleven editions of it are known to have come out in the eighteenth 
century, and among the Hungarian-speaking CsSngbs of Moldavia, it was 
used as a handbook of home medicine even in the twentieth century.
Material Culture and Mentality
Transylvania's material culture in the second half of the seventeenth cen­
tury was a unique admixture of the traditional and the modem.
People continued to build with unflagging energy throughout the pe­
riod. In Kolozsvar, about 1,800 houses had to be rebuilt after 1655; and 
practically all of Brass6 was rebuilt after the great fire in a relatively short 
time. The most important piece of school architecture was the Calvinist 
college in Kolozsvar, designed as a public school for boarders by the Italian 
Agostino Serra. The aristocracy were great builders: in a little over a dec­
ade, from 1666 to 1679, the Teleki chateau at Sorostely was put up, as was 
the Bethlen family's at BetlenszentmikI6s; the chateau in Keresd was rebuilt, 
as were the manor houses at Bethlen, Uzdiszentp6ter, and Bonyha. Church 
architecture preferred to use wood; the great bell tower at Magyars&ros 
was built in 1699. In the Fogaras region, Greek Catholic churches were built.
Both the chateaux and the manor houses consisted of a number of build­
ings enclosed by a wall. The main building was the home of the noble lord, 
a two-storey edifice consisting of four, but usually eight, and sometimes ten 
or more rooms, some with wooden balconies. The upper storey was di­
vided into ladies' and gentlemens' quarters. Downstairs were the common 
rooms — the dining room and the reception room — and these often had 
crystal glass windows. The other windows, and the windows of the other 
buildings were of plain glass, or crown glass, or had only wooden shutters. 
The aristocracy's town houses and the more elegant of the burghers' homes 
generally had window panes set in lead, tile roofs, and fireplaces. The rooms 
were friendly and comfortable, with painted or inlaid, highly polished fur­
niture. Aristocrats were likely to have furniture ornamented with patterns 
of shells brought from the Netherlands via Poland. A piece of furniture 
adopted from peasant homes was the bench with a hinged back. Tapestries 
from the great tapestry-weaving centres of western Europe covered the walls 
of the palatial homes, depicting well-loved Biblical stories and scenes from 
mythology. The hangings covering the walls of the less affluent homes 
showed scenes that were simply painted on, and there was a kind of tapes­
try woven in many colours, called "painted cloth". Turkish carpets were 
widely used, including the so-called "Transylvanian carpets". Brass and 
iron candelabra were popular, and lanterns with sides made of glass were 
just coming into use. Earthenware and ceramics, as we have seen, enjoyed 
popularity at every social level, and were provided in abundance by the 
highly-advanced domestic industry. Glazed and tin-glazed vessels, pots and 
tableware were basic household items. Glazed tiles decorated only the more 
affluent homes. 406
Transylvanians loved their gardens: no holiday, no great family event, 
no birthday, no wedding, no funeral was complete without flowers. Herb 
gardens offered health to the body, and the streams, bridges, and gold-fish 
ponds of the affluent proffered refreshment to the soul.
The relatively large number of household inventories kept by aristocratic, 
noble and burgher householders that have come down to us testify to a 
highly developed sense of hygiene. No better home could do without a 
variety of copper and wooden bath tubs, adult size and children's size, as 
well as numerous silver, copper and pottery basins, and towels of every 
type and size. The master plumbers of Brass6 were known far and wide, as 
were the mineral water vendors of the Szekelyfold. Transylvania was rich 
in mineral waters, and the hot water springs and sulphur and mineral springs 
of various kinds supplied baths which had long been a part of Transylvani­
an urban living, and which now people came to frequent not only for their 
health, but also for relaxation, for purposes of socializing, and even to keep 
in the mainstream of political events.
As for clothing, Hungarian style dolmans and mantles were made equally 
from expensive English broadcloth, Turkish velvet, and inexpensive cloth 
from Brass6 and later from the Balkans. Turkish, Polish and Austrian fash­
ions all made their influence felt. The latest Italian, French and German 
models were soon copied, but the older styles were also to be seen. Cloth­
ing reflected one's status, one's office, but principally, one's ethnicity. The 
use of jewellery was widespread, and not just among the very well-off. The 
jewellery made of gold and precious stones worn by the Saxon ladies were 
no more famous than the pewter and tin jewellery and glass beads of the 
Saxon peasant women. Even poor Romanian farmers' wives had their glass 
beads and silver chains. Among the men, no aristocrat or nobleman was 
really well dressed without his sabretache, beaded and embroidered with 
gold thread, his bejewelled sword, and his gold, silver or brass plume clasp, 
which served to attach to his hat the plumes which generally indicated also 
his military rank.
A coupe, one with glass windows in particular, was a status symbol, but 
so was a thoroughbred, a fine firearm, or a clock. Inventories make mention 
of "English clocks" — masterpieces of precision which mark the time with 
the rotation of miniature heavenly bodies, the clashing of armies, or danc­
ing figurines — as the pride of aristocratic households. Binoculars were 
treasures of equal value.
People of every rank were deeply religious, and set great store by a happy 
family life. Scrupulously frugal, they wrote wills which indicate that an 
unsullied reputation and the goodwill of their neighbours was something 
they wanted to have even after their death. Hospitality was regulated by 
custom refined to the level of art; the guest's right to hospitality was unas­
sailable.
Recent research on the sense of cohesion in the Transylvanian society of 
the time indicates that it was influenced both by factors general to the soci­
eties of east-central Europe, and by its peculiarity of being an amalgam of 
three ethnic and five religious groups.
By the end of the seventeenth century, however, the feudal categories 
were being slowly undermined by the forces of those intellectual currents 
407  which were to become decisive for the future.
On the one hand, there was the new value system of the Cartesians, the 
Puritans and the Pietists, which placed education, knowledge, the succour­
ing of the poor and the use of the vernacular at the centre of what a commu­
nity should aim at, thereby paving the way to a modem "national" con­
sciousness. Their ideas were especially attractive to the middle strata of 
society, to the merchant and the soldiering classes.
The second type of current was a nascent sense of ethnicity bom  of a 
growing awareness of the diversity of popular culture and folk traditions, 
as well as of the ethnic differentiation expressed even by the varied national 
costumes. This sense of ethnicity, however, was no more than a conscious­
ness that Transylvanian society was composed of diverse coexisting ethnic 
groups, and was, in fact, the tolerant acceptance of the fact of this diversity.
At the same time their common past tended to reinforce the sense of 
mutual dependence. The Saxons, for all their insistence on safeguarding 
their traditions, rallied to Apafi's state. R£k6czi addressed his proclama­
tions to the "Saxon Nation" and the "Vlach Nation", and the Romanians 
identified with the goals of the R&k6czi government. The policy of religious 
tolerance had as its corollary the support of education in the vernacular, 
and pointed in the direction of Transylvania's developing into a modem 
state. At this point, it still could have grown into the Switzerland of east- 
central Europe.
Transylvanians, especially the townsfolk, were becoming aware of the 
value of time. Clocks appeared above the entrances to manor houses and in 
the town squares, as neither noblemen nor the urban intellectuals could do 
without them. Idleness was a sin; there was no way to make up for time lost 
doing nothing. Calendars did a lot to influence these attitudes; and partly 
in deference to those denominations which did not accept Pope Gregory's 
calendar reform, gave the dates both Old Style and New Style. (In Transyl­
vania, too, "tim e is money"; but there was also an awareness of the signifi­
cance of historical time, and the more educated were becoming familiar 
with the concept of "relative time".)
The pace of life of the Hungarian, Saxon and Romanian population was 
a function of Transylvania's climate and history, a history kept alive by 
tradition and folklore. The yearly cycle of religious holidays that set the 
rhythm of agrarian life throughout Europe was rendered a little discontinu­
ous by the multiplicity of religions, and had, at any rate, to be adapted to 
the demands of the environment: the mountains, the snow, the mines, and 
the rivers, all of which involved elements of uncertainty.
Art and Literature
In the most impressive building of the period, the chateau at Betlenszent- 
mikl6s, the Italian Renaissance was wedded to local traditions. Its open 
arcades are reminiscent of Venetian palaces. But Transylvanian Renaissance 
architecture is mostly home grown. In Kolozsvar, Brass6 and Szeben we 
find typical garlanded stone door posts and window frames. Zsigmond 
Kornis's chateau at Szentbenedek was reconstructed in a style that is a blend 408
of Renaissance and early baroque stylistic elements: garlanded pilasters and 
coping. In Greek Orthodox church architecture, Byzantine stylistic elements 
were revived.
The paintings of the period were mostly commissioned by the Protestant 
churches, and reflected their demands. The local masters used Renaissance 
motifs, and both Christian and antique symbolism. It took a sculptor of 
extraordinary talent to create the exquisite Renaissance pulpit in the Uni­
tarian church at Kolozsvir, the pelican feeding its young on its sounding 
board carrying the same symbolic meaning as the one on the top of the sun­
dial at Corpus Christi College in Oxford, or indeed, any of the contempo­
rary pelican reliefs to be found in Rome or Amsterdam.
Most of the masters of the applied arts — wood-carvers, painters on 
wood, potters, ironmasters, and leather-workers — working in this period 
have remained anonymous. One outstanding goldsmith known to us by 
name is Sebastian Hann, a Saxon. Of the coffered ceilings, one of the most 
beautiful is the one in the church at Csfkszentmarton, its paintings are the 
work of Saxon carpenters. The painting on the baroque coffered ceiling of 
the chapel at Csiksomly6 was done by a Franciscan friar of Italian origin. 
One of the first of Transylvania's baroque altars was executed by Peter 
Lengyel for the Franciscan friary at Sz&rhegy. Jeremias Stranoves of Szeben 
painted the early baroque altar piece of the church at SegesvSr. The symbol­
ism of Transylvanian folk art was what it had ever been: birds facing one 
another for love; birds with their backs to one another for fidelity beyond 
the grave; and the tree of life for survival.
Transylvanian literature produced all the genres typical of the times. 
School plays were written and performed in the Unitarian, Calvinist, and 
later the Jesuit schools. The first theatre manager of KolozsvSr, Gyorgy Fel- 
vinczi — originally the town's sheriff and a popular lawyer — got imperial 
permission in 1696 to put on performances on the town square, his idea 
being to make the theatre, which he saw as performing essentially an edu­
cational function, available to all. He himself wrote didactic poems and 
dramas. His Comico-tragoedia, with its many classical allusions, is in many 
ways akin to Marc Antonio Cesti's II pomo d'oro, the most popular opera of 
the time.
Diaries and memoires are the genres most characteristic of the period. 
All the authors without exception wrote in their native langue, Hungarian, 
or German. Among the great number of these diaries the most informative 
are Jin o s Kemeny's autobiography written when he was in Tatar captivity, 
and Istvdn Wesselenyi's voluminous diary written while he and the rest of 
Transylvania's political elite were interned by Rabutin in Szeben. Miklbs 
Bethlen started his autobiography in 1708, when he was transported from 
Szeben to Vienna, and finished it there just before his death. Bethlen's work, 
with its consistent attempt at objectivity, is one of the finest of Hungarian 
prose works. Many of the diarists and memoirists copied among the details 
of their personal lives those contemporary documents which they deemed 
to be significant. The Historia written by Mihdly Cserei, a member of the 
middle nobility, is a veritable storehouse of the various contemporary re- 
4 0 9  flections on the ever-changing political scene.
Pamphlets were mostly meant for a home audience; the works written 
for a European audience were more carefully thought out. Best among these 
are the — mostly French — works written in the years of R&k6czi's rule, 
which base their arguments on natural law and seek to demonstrate that an 
independent Transylvania would promote European stability.
Histories were written in various languages and were of various kinds. 
Hungarians and Saxons wrote histories of their schools and churches for 
the first time, and the first attempts were made in the field of the history of 
urban development. Of the Hungarians writing in Latin, J&nos Bethlen's 
works of 1663-1664 are the best. J&nos Nadanyi's Florus Hungaricus appeared 
in English as well, and is noteworthy for disowning the theory of the Hun­
garians' Hunnish ancestry; by dispensing with chronicles, it makes an at­
tempt to give an overview of Hungary's history that is based on primary 
sources. Continuing an unfinished manuscript work of Istv&n Szamoskozy,
Farkas Bethlen wrote a separate history of Transylvania. The first history of 
Transylvania in Hungarian was Janos Szalardi's Siralmas magyar kronika 
(A Woeful Hungarian Chronicle) of 1662. In discussing Transylvania, he 
examines what it was that led to its greatest catastrophe so far, the Turks' 
ravaging of the country in 1657-1660, and gives a detailed account of the 
heroic defence of Varad.
The Saxon historians, in line with the humanist trend of tracing the ori­
gins of the various peoples of Europe, wrote such "genealogies" of their 
own, Johann Troester in 1666, Lorenz Toppelt in 1667, and Mathias Miles in 
1670. These works trace Transylvania's Saxons to the Dacians, the Huns, 
the Goths and other peoples who had passed through Transylvania before 
the Hungarian Conquest, and contain a great deal of fascinating informa­
tion on contemporary life in Transylvania. It was the Saxon count Valentin 
Franck von Franckenstein, a fine poet as well as historian who proved these 
theories to be ahistorical in a work published in 1696, and demonstrated 
that the Saxons were the descendants of settlers brought in by the king of 
Hungary in the twelfth century.
Fascination with the early history of Transylvania as the Roman prov­
ince of Dacia dated back to the Humanists of the fifteenth century, and was 
still a pet preoccupation of historians, the Hungarians included. The idea of 
relating this period and its inhabitants to the Romanian population of mod­
ern Transylvania was one introduced by Moldavian chroniclers earlier on 
in the century, but was not taken up in Transylvania, not even by the Roma­
nian humanist poet, Mihai Halici. A chronicle written in Romanian by 
Gheorghe Brancovici in 1687 discusses Transylvania's ties with Wallachia 
as well.
Two significant literary works were produced in this period. The one,
D&vid Rozsnyai's Horologium Turcicum, a Hungarian translation of the Turkic 
version of the Panchatantra, was never published. J&nos Haller's Harmas 
historia (A Tripartite History) which appeared in Kolozsvar in 1695 corre­
lates three sets of legends: the Gesta Romanorum, the "lives" of Alexander 
the Great, and the Trojan War.
The Transylvanian writers of the time were most profilic as poets. Po­
ems were written in praise of the arts and crafts, of soldiers, of chivalry and 
of valour; poems reflected on student days, others on life in exile. The first 4 1 0
significant woman poet appeared: Kata Szid6nia Petr<5czy. Mihai Halici, a 
translator of psalms who had studied with Cartesians at Enyed, was the 
first to write metric poetry in Romanian.
Both conceptually and in respect of their symbols, these were typically 
both Renaissance and baroque poems. They relied as much on ancestral 
word pictures as on the classical allusions and symbolism of the seven­
teenth century. The expressions used as well as the thoughts expressed re­
flected the new personal religiousness, the nascent sense of individualism, 
and the communal experience of political strife, wars, and concern for the 
country's future. The historical epics revolve around the "nation", and re­
flect the value system of antiquity, the Renaissance cult of the hero, and the 
preoccupation with the nation's economy. The poems of these mostly anony­
mous writers were moulded and polished by the community, as indeed 
were the folk songs and folk ballads. The ballads often carry historical mo­
tifs, as for instance, the ballad of L3szl6 Rak6czi, who died during the siege 
of V&rad in 1664; the ballad of Izsak Kerekes we can find in a number of 
variants. The various Romanian ballads on Grigore Pintea all commemo­
rate Rakoczi's war of independence. Certain details and motifs of the politi­
cal poems would crop up again in the folk ballads and outlaw ballads of 
later centuries, preserved in manuscript hymnals, or simply in oral tradi­
tion.
The musical life of the Saxon and Hungarian towns was traditionally 
lively, and church and school choirs flourished. In the homes of the aristoc­
racy, friends gathered to play chamber music, and the children's music edu­
cation was a priority. Though Puritans and Pietists frowned on instrumen­
tal music and the Calvinist church renounced singing in parts, the school at 
Enyed used an organ in the teaching of hymns.
Singing was an important feature of the cultural life of villages of what­
ever nationality. Transylvania had always been a thoroughfare musically 
speaking as well. Music historians have proved that some Transylvanian 
folk song motifs hark back to seventeenth-century hymns, some others to 
sixteenth-century French chansons. One of the versions of the Rdkoczi Song 
appears as dance music in the Kdjoni Codex of Csi'k (1634-1670), the other 
version was registered as a "Vlach dance" in the Vietorisz Codex. The tune 
itself is still current — it is now a church hymn. Most of the Transylvanian 
tunes are of the old type; it was only after the turn of the century that the 
antecedents of the later "Verbunkos" (recruiting) music appeared.
The apogee of late seventeenth-century culture was a literary work born 
in exile. Kelemen Mikes, a Szekely nobleman and a bodyguard of Rdk6czi's 
accompanied him through Poland and France to Rodosto in Turkey. He 
wrote his classic Torokorszdgi levelek (Letters from Turkey) between 1717 
and 1758. His taste had been polished in Paris and his perception shaped by 
the years of exile, but the basic tenor of his delightful prose reflects the 
Transylvanian mentality, the linguistic heritage of a homeland lost but never 











I. The Long Eighteenth Century 
(1711-1830)
1. The New Order
With the Peace of Szatm^r,1711, the integration of Transylvania into the Habs- 
burg Empire — begun in 1698 — gathered momentum. The Habsburgs con­
tinued to ignore the old feudal constitution, and in the first half of the cen­
tury wanted more than once to introduce military rule in the principality.
At the beginning of our period, the court saw Transylvania as being pri­
marily of military value, constituting as it did the empire's eastern bastion 
against the Turks. In the 1710s Vienna was able to defeat the weakened 
Ottoman Empire in a new war, and — something which was significant for 
Transylvania also — was able to seize Oltenia from it. However, in the sec­
ond half of the 1730s, this acquisition (which amounted to the western half 
of Wallachia) was again lost to the Turks.
Vienna was determined to pursue a policy that would guarantee the long­
term stability of Habsburg rule in Transylvania. In 1723, Charles III got the 
Diet to accept the Pragmatica Sanctio — which recognized the Habsburgs' 
right of succession through the female line in the event of there being no 
male heir — by holding the vote when not even half of the members of the 
Upper House aristocracy were present. The preamble of the bill ran as fol­
lows: "H ow  great the advantage which accrues to this Hereditary Princi­
pality and the territories attached to it from enduring union with His Maj­
esty's Hereditary Lands and Provinces, which makes permanent the ties 
based on primogeniture with respect to both sexes; what national glory and 
security, and what benefit to every citizen of the land ..." }
It was at this time that the special administration of Transylvania was 
brought into line with the governmental principles and practices applying 
inside the empire generally. The Gubemium was reestablished in 1712-1713. 
From among the so-called "essential offices" specified in the Diploma Leopol- 
dinum, only that of governor was filled. The Transylvanian Estates still en­
joyed no influence on military and financial matters. The office of captain- 
general was not filled; experts from the Hereditary Lands directed the treas­
ury administration and were answerable only to the Hofkammer. The Gu- 
bernium, which directed administrative and judicial affairs at the national
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level, was under the control of the Transylvanian Court Chancellery in Vi­
enna. The court's decisions, of course, were not made there but in the Impe­
rial M inisterialkonferenz, which Prince Eugene of Savoy headed for two 
and half decades. It was the Ministerialkonferenz which proposed to the 
monarch as to membership of the Diet, as well as on the date and place of 
this convocation. National offices were filled and proposed bills accepted 
or rejected on the recommendation of the Ministerialkonferenz, which also 
took the initiative in all political measures, reforms included. The Transyl­
vanian Court Chancellery was little more than a purely executive organ.
Transylvania had moved from the often purely nominal Turkish vassal­
age of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries into a Habsburg Empire gov­
erned with a comparatively high level of organization, or, in other words, 
from a state of loose dependency to one of strict integration. A military 
success in Transylvania for the R5k6czi exiles, with Turkish support could 
have provided an alternative; the price of such support would, naturally, 
have been the restoration of Turkish vassalage. On a number of occasions, 
this seemed like a plausible option. The first occurred in the summer of 
1717 when some of the R6k6czi emigres joined an army of Turks, Tatars 
and Moldavians to enter northern Transylvania. But nothing came of this 
on the political level, for the Turkish and Moldavian forces turned back on 4 1 6
hearing of the Turkish defeat at Belgrade. A second occasion was in 1737. 
The commander-in-chief of the imperial armies unexpectedly attacked the 
Turks, and initially scored victories against the enemy, which was taken by 
surprise. J6zsef, the son of Ferenc R^koczi II, has a plan to establish a Transyl­
vanian principality. The ahdname sent him by the Porte was essentially the 
same as that enjoyed by the Transylvanian princes in the sixteenth and sev­
enteenth centuries. The hopes that attached to the re-emergence of the 
R&k6czi name, however, proved to be illusory. The Hungarian troops in the 
Habsburg army did not desert to Joseph, and in Transylvania itself no move 
was made for independence or for a return to a Turkish alignment.
Population and Society
Transylvania's belonging to the Habsburg Empire brought it one hundred 
and fifty years of peace. By contrast, the neighbouring Romanian princi­
palities served as the theatre for continual Russian-Turkish (and from time 
to time, Austrian) military campaigns and occupations — lasting for one 
hundred and thirty-six years between 1689 and 1857. The "Pax Habsburgica" 
brought important changes in the population not just of Transylvania itself 
but also of the whole area. As far as it can be made out, migration processes 
begun earlier were completed, although, partly on account of the inaccessi­
bility of local sources, historiography has yet to provide an in-depth and 
fully objective examination of this issue.
The population of Transylvania without the Partium around 1710 can be 
estimated at around 800,000-860,000 persons. According to the census evi­
dence, this figure rose to 1.5 million in the 1770s and to 2 million by the 
middle of the nineteenth century. The average annual rate of population 
increase fluctuated between 0.6 and 0.7 per cent during the eighteenth cen­
tury, falling back to about 0.45 per cent between 1786 and 1850, although 
after the great famine of 1817 (the 1820s to the 1840s) it approached 1 per 
cent. Great surges and falls are likely to have occurred during the eigh­
teenth century, too — the result of epidemics, famines and, especially at the 
beginning of that century, vigorous emigration. The plague of 1717-1720 
carried off almost 20 per cent of the population. Epidemics of this kind 
were enough to depopulate whole settlements, and triggered large-scale 
internal migration among the serfs. An unprecedented impetus was given 
to such migrations by the extraordinarily strong vacuum effect of the (much 
depopulated) Hungarian territories liberated from the Turks.
The lords of the Great Hungarian Plain lured Transylvanian serfs to their 
virtually-deserted estates in that region with offers of exemption from taxa­
tion and services over a number of years. Probably hundreds of thousands 
of serfs, mainly landless cotters, left infertile and intractable soil and set out 
for the land of promise — prompted all the more to do so by the heavy 
burden of feudal services and onerous taxes applying in Transylvania. In 
some cases, it was the Transylvanian landlords who owned land in both 
places transferring their serfs to their estates in Hungary. "M any villages 
4 1 7  are nearly deserted", lamented the Transylvanian authorities. In vain did
the court order the return of those who had migrated to Hungary. "Those 
deserted places", wrote the Transylvanian government agency to the chan­
cellery, "have swallowed up the migrants so completely that we are unable 
to trace them ".2 Such complaints recurred continuously until the middle of 
the eighteenth century.
But migration was not one-way. People moved to Moldavia and Wallachia 
also, although far fewer than those moving westwards. Nevertheless, the 
attraction of the areas beyond the Carpathians seems to have been consid­
erable. As late as the 1810s, the population density of Wallachia — 13-14 
persons per sq km — was still somewhat lower than the population density 
of Transylvania one hundred years earlier. These migrants were attracted 
by the much lower grain prices, and the exemptions promised by the land­
lords there. Even so, while during the first half of the eighteenth century, 
there were still more people coming into Transylvania from beyond the 
Carpathians than vice versa.3 In the second half of the century, migration 
beyond the Carpathians was the "morbus Transylvanicus”. With the passing 
of lean times in Transylvania, the greater part of these migrants returned, 
mainly on account of the vicissitudes of war and the tax burdens, which 
were heavier in Moldavia and Wallachia than in Transylvania. These dis­
advantages were not always offset by the fact that the Romanian land­
lords had not been able to increase the robot to the level applying in Transyl­
vania. Their attempts foundered in the face of opposition from the peas­
antry (whose main weapon against their lords was migration), and in eco­
nomic and social conditions different from those in Transylvania.
In 1776, the Hofkammer expressed to the king its disapproval of the fact 
that the Transylvanian authorities were letting in so many refugees from 
Wallachia. "For these people have ties of kinship to the Romanians of Transyl­
vania, or have forged close ties of friendship with Transylvanian Romani­
ans; in consequence, they can easily persuade the penniless populace here 
to emigrate, something which the latter are all the more likely to do because 
of these close ties. Soon one will be hard put to find a Romanian who has 
not crossed over to Moldavia or Wallachia at least once in his life".4 The 
peasants' struggle against their lords, their keen instinct for survival, and 
the appeal of a freer way of life was the basis of this movement of peoples 
across the Carpathians, in which Hungarians, principally the Szekelys, also 
took part. The Romanian population, as some Romanian historians have 
also stressed, was more mobile because it was poorer. Migration was a form 
of "adaptation". For the Hungarians, on the other hand, moving on was a 
form of revolt. When, in the 1780s, many people were crossing into the 
principalities to escape the famine (only to return later, according to county 
records), an Austrian report on the situation concluded that, besides brutal 
treatment of the peasants by the nobility, the other cause of Transylvania's 
depopulation "is the antipathy that the nobility feels for the Hungarians of 
Transylvania. The reason for this is the spirit of resistance that is in the
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4. Hofkammerarchiv, Vienna, SiebenbUrgen, r. No. 256, 5 June, 1776. 4 1 o
nature of the Hungarians, which makes them less likely to bow their heads 
to the yoke of servitude than the Romanians." Instead, the Hungarian serfs 
migrated to Hungary proper or to Moldavia. "W e can find proof of this in 
many villages where forty or fifty years ago there were only Hungarian 
subjects: today, half the population is Romanian." If this continues, "there 
can be no doubt that in half a century, measures of this sort will have com­
pletely annihilated the subject peoples of this nation, unless the demesnes 
are soon obliged in villages which fifty or more years ago were inhabited by 
Hungarians to gradually again bring Hungarians in place of the Romanian 
settlers that they had brought in, and to do so on less systematically...".5
Table 2. The breakdown of the population of the historical Transylvania 
by ethnicity-nationality with respect to the combined data of the 1850/51 
and 1930 Census (broken down according to areas existing before 1848)
Ethnic
unit




1850/51 1930 1850/51 1930 1850/51 1930 1850/51 1930
Romanian 781,791 1,203,046 54,246 102,167 207,810 320,650 1,043,650 1,625,863
Hungarian 159,396 319,613 303,975 440,243 25,063 68,288 488,434 828,144
Saxon 49,166 56,887 1,163 2,399 141,425 177,738 191,754 237,024
Jewish 10,644 45,229 1,042 10,370 165 9,725 11,851 65,324
Gipsy 41,117 41,750 10,022 11,657 25,244 16,025 76,383 69,432
Others 6,935 9,638 2,464 1,724 1,544 4,492 10,953 15,854
Total 1,049,049 1,676,163 372,912 568,560 401,251 596,918 1,823,222 2,841,641
As a result of these multi-directional migrations, the ethnic composition 
of the various areas was continually changing. In the seventeenth century 
Vasile Lupu, voivode of Moldavia, keen to emphasize how numerous the 
Romanians were, wrote that more than one-third of Transylvania's popula­
tion was Romanian. A government estimate of 1712-1713 put the propor­
tion of the Romanians in Transylvania at around 34 per cent, that of the 
Hungarians at 47 per cent, and that of the Saxons at 19 per cent — with the 
total number of families being put at the unrealistically low figure of 80,000. 
The question is to what extent the spectacular spread of the Romanians in 
certain regions (for example, the Sz^szfold for which we have the most reli­
able data) can be attributed to internal or external migration. According to 
church registers, the rate of increase in the number of Romanians far ex­
ceeded the national average (between 1733 and 1761 almost 2 per cent, be­
tween 1750 and 1761 as much as 2.7 per cent). By then the Romanians al­
ready constituted an absolute majority of Transylvania's population, with 
estimates ranging from between 50 per cent to 60 per cent. From the 1820s 
onwards, the increase in the Romanian population — as far as our data
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show — did not exceed the national average. After the 1820s, ethnic pro­
portions in Transylvania were relatively stable, because there was no new 
settlement to disturb the co-existence of the peoples already there for quite 
some time. Both in 1850 and in 1930 the proportion of Romanians was 57.2 
per cent; that of the Hungarians rose from 26.8 to 29.1 per cent during the 
same period, while that of the Saxons, that is, the Germans, fell from 10.5 to 
8.3 per cent.
The area under cultivation grew in line with the increase in the popula­
tion, and by the 1820s the greater part of the cultivable land was being tilled. 
While this was taking place the centre of gravity of agricultural activity 
shifted from animal husbandry to land cultivation. Afterwards this pro­
cess, given the backwardness of the productive forces, was to lead to a cri­
sis of relative over-population, from which only a change of production 
methods could offer relief.
At the beginning of the eighteenth century, Transylvanian society was 
restless, and almost all of its constituent parts appeared to be in a state of 
flux. Integration within the empire had brought significant changes in its 
make-up, if not in its overall structure. The Habsburgs rewarded their sup­
porters primarily by distributing new titles of aristocracy, but the building 
up of a new aristocracy in this way did not have much effect on the internal 
balance of power. Political influence in Transylvania during the eighteenth 
century was in the hands not of the newly-appointed top officials or the 
military aristocrats, but of six or seven powerful families which had ac­
quired patents of aristocracy before the end of the principality period. These 
families provided almost all of the governors, chancellors and holders of 
other national offices. Only a few members of the Saxon Seeberg and Bru- 
ckenthal families were truly new men, e.g. Samuel Bruckenthal, who rose to 
be governor in the 1770s and 1780s. In total the number of aristocratic fami­
lies in eighteenth and nineteenth century Transylvania can be put at fifty to 
sixty. The number of tax exempt (aristocratic, middle and small landown­
ing noble) families was roughly four thousand.
The middle landowning nobility survived by means of the role it played 
in municipal life, in county and district-level jurisdiction and public admin­
istration, which were very much interconnected. The central government 
smothered the small nobles, whose way of life was similar to that of the free 
peasants — making those who had three or fewer serfs or landless cotters 
liable to taxation. The lesser nobility made up 5 or 6 per cent of the popula­
tion of the counties, and more than half of the population of the Szekely fold. 
Of course, even the small nobles could not be deprived of their political 
rights, and accordingly these people came to constitute the social bedrock 
of feudalism. For their feudal liberty was practically all that made their 
lives more attractive than the existence led by the peasant serfs, who were 
at the mercy of landlords and state alike.
Paradoxically, the state was most able to intervene in the life of society 
where feudalism had really managed to establish itself: in the Kiralyfold 
(Konigsboden, or Fundus Regius), and in the Szdszfold (Sachsenland). In the 
free peasant village communities of the Sz&szfbld, bitter struggles some­
times broke out between the Saxons (who possessed the political power in 
these communities and who regarded themselves as the rightful inhabit­ 420
ants) and the Romanians, whom they declared to be "Johnny-come-latelys". 
Under the pressure of relative over-population, the Saxons restricted the 
Romanians' usage of land. Occasionally, these conflicts were exacerbated 
to such an extent that the Saxons would even attempt to expel the Romani­
ans from the village, something which was only prevented by the interven­
tion of the central government. At the same time it was no accident that the 
most cultured Romanian villages of Transylvania were to be found in the 
Kir&lyfold. This was primarily due to the freer way of life existing there, but 
also to the fact that the conditions for commodity production were the most 
favourable in this region. In the Brass6 and Nagyszeben area the villages 
involved with transhumance developed dynamically, and transhumance 
itself, interconnected with small-scale trading, grew in Transylvania gener­
ally. There were reasons for this: because of the increase in land cultivation, 
pastures were shrinking and, at the same time, industry's demand for wool 
was growing. Around the 1750s, 20-25 per cent of the one million-strong 
taxable sheep stock was driven every year to winter pasture on the banks of 
the Lower Danube. One hundred years later, sometimes more than half of 
the sheep stock, which had in the meantime grown to two million, made the 
same journey. Similar possibilities for commodity exchange existed only in 
certain regions bordering on Hungary, for example in Zarand county, which 
delivered wood to the Great Hungarian Plain and to the Banat and where, 
according to Commander-in-chief Andras Hadik, who gave a detailed de­
scription of eighteenth-century Transylvania, every inch of available land 
was cultivated. "The plough has brought results beyond all expectation", 
and "they have been able to lessen the sway of miserable poverty thereby".6 
The free peasant way of life of the Szekelyfold was such that hard work 
paid.
Within the system of feudalism, large and small farms, in spite of their 
interrelations and their interdependence, were not able to foster each oth­
er's development. The ratio of allodial land to villain holdings was 1 :2 , 
with the holders of the latter making up about one half of the population. 
The landlord led every form of peasant activity, and by means of his mo­
nopolies — which extended to the sale of alcoholic drinks and the grinding 
of grain — strove to exploit the purchasing power of the peasants to the 
fullest possible extent. For example, only the landlord's inn would operate 
for much of the year, or the village inn would be obliged to sell the lord's 
wine. It was characteristic of Transylvania's backwardness at the beginning 
of the nineteenth century that in spite of the boom in grain sales resulting 
from the Napoleonic wars, the Banffy estate at Bonchida, near Kolozsvcir, 
for instance, made as much money on a yearly average from the sale of 
beverages as from the sale of grain, hay and animals combined. Actual com­
modity production was minimal. In line with their earlier practice, estates 
stored their produce for long periods and in time of famine sold or ad­
vanced it to their own serfs. The commodity production activities of the 
latter, however, were aimed almost exclusively at earning the sums neces­
sary for the paying of their taxes.
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Transylvania's network of towns was not developed enough to act as the 
motor of commodity production; indeed the population of the towns was 
growing more slowly than that of the villages. At the beginning of the eight­
eenth century, Brass6, with its 16,000 inhabitants, had been by far the big­
gest town of the whole historic Hungary. By the 1780s — when it had 18,000 
inhabitants — it was only the ninth biggest, although still the largest in 
Transylvania and ahead of KolozsvSr and Nagyszeben, each with a popula­
tion of 13,000 to 14,000. Urbanization in Transylvania developed primarily 
as a function of the fact that the region was within the empire and could fit 
itself into the east-west division of labour. During the second half of the 
eighteenth century, the growing agricultural boom primarily favoured agrar­
ian Hungary. Hungary cut Transylvania off from the markets of the He­
reditary Lands, and Hungary mediated the more developed agricultural 
practices which by the end of the eighteenth century had increased agricul­
tural productivity to the point at which modern urbanization became pos­
sible. Meanwhile, urbanization in the Transylvanian counties was largely 
determined by the movement of a part of the landowning nobility to the 
towns during the second half of the eighteenth century. The consumption 
demands boosted town industry to some extent. Nevertheless, it was town 
commerce which primarily benefited, as well-to-do nobles and patricians 
tended for the most part to purchase Austrian goods.
Those who brought goods into the country from abroad and integrated 
the country into the division of labour between East and West were prima­
rily immigrants from the Turkish Empire who had settled in Transylvania, 
and whose privileges had bee,n conferred by the Transylvanian princes. 
Armenians settling in Transylvania in the 1670s had, by the beginning of 
the eighteenth century, already founded two towns: Erzs6betv&ros and 
Szamosujv^r. At the top of the merchant hierarchy (which extended all the 
way down to the village grocer) were those who drove cattle from Moldavia, 
and to a more modest degree from Transylvania, to Vienna — via the Great 
Hungarian Plain, where the animals were fattened up. Armenian leather 
dominated Transylvania's market with especially red leather boots. The 
"G reeks", a term which was also applied to Macedo-Romanian, Bulgarian, 
Albanian, Serbian and also to some Transylvanian Romanian merchants, 
linked the economy of the Ottoman Empire with the economies of the 
Habsburg Empire and of central Europe generally. It was they who im­
ported raw materials from Turkey, for the most part Macedonian cotton, 
and at the same time delivered the products of the Saxon, Hungarian and 
Romanian handicrafts and cottage industries to the territories beyond the 
Carpathians. In the 1770s, more than 60 per cent of all Transylvanian ex­
ports went to Hungary, one-third to the Turkish Empire, and the rest to the 
Hereditary Lands. Consumer products of every kind were delivered to the 
Ottoman Empire, mostly to the well-to-do peasantry and to medium-in- 
come consumers in the towns. Broadcloth was delivered primarily to Hun­
gary, likewise to better-off peasant consumers.
For Transylvania integration into the Habsburg Empire brought security 
above all else. During the second half of the eighteenth century, as the 
Habsburg Empire assumed prominence in the international sphere, the east­
ern traders attempted to take out Austrian citizenship. The more advanced 422
provinces of the empire, of course, developed more rapidly. The division of 
labour within the empire was an inheritance from the past, but the imperial 
policy-makers, pointing out that the Hungarian nobility paid notax,did their 
best to preserve it. It was not that they necessarily wanted to hinder the 
industrialization of Transylvania. For example, they took steps to develop 
iron production there when they saw that it represented no competition for 
Styrian industry. Nor was it to Transylvania's disadvantage that, to all in­
tents and purposes, the high tariffs imposed excluded foreign industrial 
products from the empire's markets. It was, rather, Transylvania's periph­
eral position that accounted for its slow development. At the same time, it 
was natural that contemporaries urged economic and political measures 
that had proved successful in the more developed provinces — in the spirit 
of fairness and reciprocity. Economic self-interest thus sometimes dictated 
co-operation between different power groups which normally opposed each 
other. The determination to overcome backwardness inevitably took a po­
litical form.
The Counter-Reformation and its Consequences
In Transylvania, too, the imperial policy was to try to strengthen loyalty to 
the state by insistence on the Counter-Reformation. The religious equality 
established during the hegemony of the Calvinist religion — the system of 
four "received" denominations — was ruthlessly destroyed. In the first place, 
the authority of the Roman Catholic bishop was increased to the detriment 
of the others. Charles III appointed the Catholic bishop first councillor to 
the Gubernium, which meant that he presided in the governor's absence. 
The Roman Catholic religious orders, primarily the Jesuits and the Piarists, 
were strengthened in their authority, and many churches were taken back 
by the Catholics.
The Counter-Reformation (using methods which had proved successful 
elsewhere) attempted to win over primarily the most influential elements 
in Transylvanian society. Lest evangelizing zeal prove insufficient, it relied 
also on more effective measures: Catholics were preferred in appointments 
to offices and in government agencies. This was also true when posts were 
being filled in the municipalities, the Saxon ones included.
It was the Unitarians who suffered the most from the Counter-Reforma­
tion. Relatively speaking, it was they who incurred the biggest losses as the 
result of church repossession by the Catholics. They were also systemati­
cally forced out from official positions.
The offensive launched by a reinvigorated Catholicism appeared to en­
danger the whole of the Transylvanian constitution. Already in 1712, the 
Catholic Estates had demanded the modification of those paragraphs in the 
Diploma Leopoldinum  which seemed injurious from their point of view. This 
action was without consequence. In 1724, they called for the repeal of the 
anti-Catholic paragraphs of the Approbata and the Compilata. At the same 
time, they urged the punishment of apostasy, the severing of non-Catho- 
lics' foreign ties (even their contacts with Hungary), and a severe restriction 
4 2 3  of the activities of the Unitarian church. They called for a declaration that
Unitarians were ineligible for office, and for the suppression of Sabbata­
rianism. The immediate result was a few court actions against Sabbatarians 
(1724-1729). Such attempts, however, were to recur. In 1731, an arbitrarily 
convened Gubemium proposed unhindered the abolition of the system of 
the four received religions. It suggested that the churches, etc. built by the 
Catholics be handed back to them; that the Protestants' foreign contacts be 
banned; that the censorship of books be introduced, and that cases involv­
ing mixed marriages be referred to the Holy See. These demands, however, 
were unsuccessful. By the middle of the 1730s, the opposition was growing 
stronger in Transylvania. In the spring of 1738 — to the alarm of the Protes­
tant Estates — the administration arrested the Calvinist bishop, Istv in  
Szigethi-Gyula, along with many other church figures and numerous Cal­
vinist nobles on charges of conspiring to effect a Rikbczi restoration, but 
was forced to release them at the beginning of 1739. In 1741-1743, the issue 
widened into official demands for the repeal of the anti-Catholic and anti- 
Habsburg laws, and for the enactment of the Pragmatica Sanctio. In 1744, the 
Estates accepted the abrogation of their right to elect a prince, as well as of 
the decrees dealing with the links between Transylvania and the Porte. They 
also enacted the Pragmatica Sanctio and, finally, repealed the anti-Catholic 
laws.
Transylvania's re-CathoIicization, however, was not totally negative in 
its effects. It brought some worthwhile cultural results. With the Counter- 
Reformation, baroque culture began to spread in Transylvania in a big way
— principally through Catholic ecclesiastical architecture. As a pattern there 
served the Jesuit church at Kolozsvir, which was built between 1718 and 
1724, perhaps on the basis of plans drafted in Vienna. Initially, the baroque 
sculpture of the time was associated with ecclesiastical baroque architec­
ture, but later also became linked with baroque country-house architecture, 
which came in during the middle of the century.
By way of self-defence in the face of the Counter-Reformation, the Prot­
estants reacted not only with political activism, but with renewed efforts to 
preserve their ties with western European Protestantism and with Euro­
pean intellectual life. The Protestant determination to continue to provide 
modern education in Transylvania was a major form of this effort. After a 
lengthy struggle and in spite of repeated attempts at official restriction, 
Transylvanian Protestantism was able to remain in touch with western Eu­
rope, primarily with the German universities. It was from here (primarily 
from Halle) that Pietism together with the early German Enlightenment 
reached Transylvania. Within the Saxon Lutheran church, the battle between 
the Pietists and the religious conservatives had begun as early as the Rdk6czi 
War of Independence; with the victory of the Prussian Pietists in 1719, how­
ever, the intellectual basis of conservatism was considerably weakened. Very 
soon, primarily among the Saxons, Christian Wolff had a decisive influence 
on the Transylvanian Enlightenment.
Pietism had fewer influence in the Calvinist church, although Professor 
Andris Huszty, who established the teaching of law and political science at 
the college at Kolozsvdr, was a Calvinist and a Pietist. Huszty also contrib­
uted to the foundations of Finno-Ugrian linguistics, establishing, with al­
most complete accuracy, the order of relation among the Finno-Ugrian lan- 424
guages. The pioneer of natural sciences education, Istv&n V^sarhelyi T6ke, 
introduced the teaching of experimental physics into the college at Nagy- 
enyed. S&muel Nadudvari, a teacher at the Marosv£s3rhely Calvinist col­
lege in the 1730s and 1740s, translated many of the works of Christian Wolff. 
Worthy of note was the contribution made by the Unitarian college at Kolozs- 
v£r to modem education. Mihcily Szent-Abrahcimi, the greatest figure of 
eighteenth-century Transylvanian Unitarianism, began teaching law and 
geography there just before the transfer of the college to the Catholic church. 
This marked the beginning of systematic legal education in Transylvania. 
The Kolozsv&r college was organized anew after 1718, and Szent-Abrah&mi 
taught experimental and theoretical physics there in 1726; his geography 
notes of 1727 expounded also Copernicus' theory.
The greatest Transylvanian figure of the early Enlightenment was S&muel 
Koles6ri, a public administration official, who worked as a doctor, then as a 
mining expert, and, finally, as secretary and adviser to the Gubernium. 
KOleseri's scientific and scholarly connections extended from Constantino­
ple and Venice to Paris, London and St. Petersburg, and articles of his were 
published in German journals. His activity was of fundamental importance 
in many branches of natural science. His best-known work, the Auraria 
Romano-Dacica (Romano-Dacian Goldmine), dealt with the mineral riches 
of Transylvania and with their exploitation. But he also wrote works on 
medical science: in the one dealing with scurvy in the Erchegys£g, he linked 
the disease to poor nutrition among the miners (seven years after Ramazzi- 
ni's work, which laid the foundations of industrial pathology).
By the middle of the century, the culture of the period was already less a 
function of contemporary politics than it had been during the previous dec­
ades. True, with the strengthening of absolutism censorship made its ap­
pearance: Maria Theresa issued a decree in 1753 ordering the Gubernium to 
prohibit printing houses from publishing works which undermined respect 
for God, were hostile to the person and rights of the ruler to the public 
order, and to the "received" religions, or contained new heresies. All mate­
rial intended for publication was to be presented to the Gubernium, with­
out whose permission it could not be put on sale. The decree, however, had 
little practical effect, for censorship was inefficient. And enough people had 
ties with western Europe for some fine scholarly libraries to get off to a 
good start.
It was in the 1750s — somewhat later than the Protestant schools — that 
the Jesuit academy at Kolozsv&r could boast its first really outstanding fig­
ures: men such as the astronomer Miksa (Maximilian) Hell, who was to 
achieve world fame and who came from Nagyszombat to head the acad­
emy's mathematics department in 1752. Hell established an observatory in 
his home and set up a physics laboratory at the school. His contributions to 
establishing the connection between magnetism and electricity were of last­
ing influence. In 1755, Hell was promoted director of the Observatory in 
Vienna, and was appointed university professor.
The most important Transylvanian scholar of the age was Peter Bod, a 
Calvinist village parson and uncompromising theologian. An ecclesiastical 
historian, he wrote an extensive history of the Hungarian Calvinist church, 
4 2 5  and was also an expert in canon law. However, Bod is renowned primarily
for his literary works and works on cultural history. Bod was the author of 
the first Hungarian literary lexicon, the Magyar Athenas (Hungarian Athe­
naeum) published in 1766, which was also the first systematic treatment of 
the whole of Hungarian literary history. He was also the first since J&nos 
Apaczai Csere to call for a Hungarian academy. In 1756, Bod proposed the 
establishment of a "literary society" consisting of members from Hungary 
and Transylvania. He called for a conscious cultivation of the language, 
and for the publication of a good Hungarian grammar book. In 1760, Bod 
was already explicitly pressing for a "Hungarian society consisting of learned 
men, a society like those that exist in other nations, for the revival of the 
Hungarian language". His ideas at their best, marked the beginnings of the 
Enlightenment.
Romanian Religions and National Movements
A form of Catholic expansion peculiar to Transylvania was Greek Catholi­
cism, a union of the Romanian Orthodox with the Roman church.
The foundation of this religious union had been laid during the previous 
era, at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Following a 
spectacular start, it was badly shaken by the storms of the Rak6czi War of 
Independence. It was almost impossible to tell who was Orthodox and who 
was Uniate among those following the Greek rite in Transylvania during 
the five decades after 1711. There was only one legal church for the Greek 
faith in Transylvania, the Greek Uniate church. However, the government 
was obliged to tolerate the existence of an Orthodox enclave in Brass6. For 
the Transylvanian Orthodox church, though it functioned without bishops, 
had protectors outside Transylvania: the Russian tzar, the Serbian Ortho­
dox archbishop of Karlowitz, and the churches of Moldavia and Wallachia. 
The Uniates enjoyed considerable state support. Their bishops received es­
tates, and, as a result of the union, they enjoyed better opportunities for the 
training of their clergy and other intellectuals than those available to the 
Orthodox church. Besides the Jesuits college at Kolozsv&r, the Uniates could 
also attend the university at Nagyszombat, could study in Vienna and also 
at the Collegium de propaganda fide in Rome.
The Uniate church was given a certain political standing by the govern­
ment; its bishops loan Pataki and Inochentie Micu-Klein were raised to the 
rank of baron, and after 1732 the latter was invited to attend the Diet as a 
royal favour. The greatest Romanian personality of eighteenth-century 
Transylvania, Micu-Klein took office in 1729. He immediately set about 
improving the position of his clergy and his church, and since he was deter­
mined to extend his authority to those of the Greek Orthodox faith, in prac­
tice his efforts meant the amelioration of the lot of all Transylvanian Roma­
nians. The legal basis of his argument was the so-called Second Diploma 
Leopoldinutn on the Union of 19 March, 1701. This document of disputed 
validity exempted Uniate priests from rendering feudal services, and re­
garded as Catholic not only the Uniate clergy but also the Uniate laity, and 
even the commoners (plebeae conditionis homines). Through his persistent
endeavour, Micu-Klein was able to get the monarch to appoint a committee 
in December 1732 to examine his grievances. In 1733 his petitions were also 
read out at the Diet. The Estates, however, doubted the stability of the Un­
ion (and rightly so). They had Micu-Klein declare the catechism and creed 
of his church and found both to be in order. Nevertheless, they thought it 
necessary to order a census of the Romanian priests and of their congrega­
tions as well.
It was in 1735 that Inochentie Micu-Klein first spoke of the Transylvani­
an Romanians as a body politic. The bishop, referring to the findings of the 
1733 Census, argued that the Romanians were a larger group than any 
Transylvanian "nation", and that although the second Diploma Leopoldinum  
entitled Uniates to hold any public office, Romanians were still discrimi­
nated against in favour of the Calvinists and Lutherans. (With understand­
able tact, the bishop chose to ignore the fact that it was the Catholics who 
occupied the majority of public posts). It was not true — he justly wrote — 
that there were no learned Romanians of noble rank who were suitable for 
office. Accordingly, he asked the monarch to appoint him to the post of 
councillor which was about to fall vacant at the Gubemium. Micu-Klein's 
request was not granted, as the Ministerialkonferenz opposed it. His ap­
peal, though, may have played an indirect part in the fact that in 1736 Petru 
Dobra, the first prominent secular politician of Romanian origin of the post- 
1711 era, became the director fiscalis of Transylvania.
It was also in 1735 that the Daco-Roman, or to be more precise, the Ro­
man continuity conception of history first appeared in Micu-Klein's pro­
nouncements. "W e are the oldest inhabitants of Transylvania, here since 
the time of the emperor Trajan", he wrote in his petition to the monarch. 
The timing was crucial. There already existed the three necessary precondi­
tions for the emergence of the Transylvanian Romanians as a political fac­
tor: the Uniate church as an organizational framework (into which the bishop 
was prepared to force all Transylvanian Romanians); an historical ideology 
serving as the basis of a national identity; and finally the demand for a 
share in public offices.
From the spring of 1736 until 1738, Micu-Klein fought at a number of 
Diets for the Uniate clergy's right to their share of the tithes collected, but to 
no avail. When in the autumn of 1737, he tried to speak "totius nationis per 
Transylvaniam valachicae nomine", in the name of the whole Romanian na­
tion in Transylvania, the Estates protested against this expression. How­
ever, the bishop, this lone precursor of the Romanian national movement, 
had the resilience to withstand such rebuffs. In August 1742, he petitioned 
again in Vienna. Now Micu-Klein already explicitly urged that the Romani­
ans be recognized as the fourth "Nation" of Transylvania and that they be 
integrated as such into the existing "Three Nations" system. Because the 
regional separation of this fourth nation would be almost impossible, he 
envisaged this in the form of the Romanian nation's joining the Hungarians 
in the Hungarian counties, and the Szekely and Saxon nations in the Szekely 
and Saxon municipalities. A more important new suggestion, and proof of 
Micu-Klein's political genius, was his demand that the people should not 
be burdened with unlimited taxes and that the robot should be reduced to 
427  two days per week. This was not merely a case of the "shepherd" protect-
ing his "flock". Micu-KIein was formulating what was to become a persist­
ent feature of the national movements among the Transylvanian Romani­
ans: national demands conjoined to peasant demands. It was this idea that 
would later develop into the "Hungarian landlord — Romanian serf" the­
sis. It should be noted that there was indeed a higher percentage of Roma­
nians in the Transylvanian serf population than the percentage of Romani­
ans in the total population warranted. If, however, we consider the Roma­
nian peasantry as a whole (that is, if we include the free Romanian peasants 
of the Kir^lyfold) we shall find that the percentage of peasants who were 
Romanian roughly corresponded to the percentage that Romanians com­
prised of the total population of Transylvania.
In 1744, after a long battle, the existence and properties of the Transylva­
nian Greek Catholic diocese were recognized by law. It seemed that the 
Uniate church, and the Transylvanian Romanians as a political factor, would 
be removed from the political scene.
In the spring of 1744, however, a Serbian Orthodox monk named Visarion 
Sarai, who could not even speak Romanian, arrived in Transylvania from 
the Banat. As the saintly Visarion made his way to Szeben preaching pro­
vocatively through an interpreter, the Union in southern Transylvania dis­
integrated at almost a single blow. The Uniate Romanians drove out their 
priests and in their place Orthodox priests suddenly sprang up. Visarion 
was arrested and taken to Vienna, and nothing more was ever heard of 
him, but his exploits put a valuable card into the hands of those who had 
argued that the Union was only apparent and not real. (In many places the 
Calvinist nobility had supported Orthodoxy all along, not only for the sake 
of peace with the serfs, but also in the spirit of toleration which was reviv­
ing in the face of Catholic oppression.) Micu-KIein declared himself pre­
pared to bring the renegades back into the Uniate fold by peaceful means, 
provided that his long-standing demands were met. Because of this, how­
ever he became suspect not only to the Estates but also to the military high 
command, and even to the central government of the empire, which now 
saw him as superfluous. In June 1744, when Micu-KIein was ordered to 
Vienna, the bishop responded with a last bold move. He summoned the 
synod to Bal^zsfalva: Romanian laymen, even Orthodox laymen (nobles 
and serfs) were in attendance, in addition to the clergy. It was real national 
assembly, the only Romanian national assembly, in fact, until 1848. Its com­
position pointed very much to the future, as did the issue raised by the 
bishop: as the letters of privilege from the time of Leopold I which needed 
to be confirmed (and which served as the public law basis of his programme) 
also applied to the people, should the people be asked whether they would 
be willing to take part in this struggle and, if so, in what way? The sugges­
tion was tantamount to calling for a straightforward plebiscite. However, 
no one dared to follow the century's greatest Transylvanian Romanian this 
far. The synod approved the participation of the people in theory, but, un­
der the circumstances, did not want to involve them directly.
Micu-KIein had gone further than even the boldest of his supporters con­
sidered expedient. He was called to Vienna for questioning in the autumn 
of 1744; inevitably, his political career would be at an end. He therefore fled 
to Rome; he died in exile, a lonely old man. His followers showed more 428
astuteness in pressing their national demands. Following the Roman Catholic 
model, they gradually developed Bal^zsfalva into an important spiritual 
centre. In addition to attempts to improve the standards of culture and 
education, they tried to stabilize their position by fighting Orthodoxy.
By this time, the Orthodox church was leaning on Russia for support, the 
more so because the Habsburg-Russian alliance of 1746 was one of the em­
pire's most important foreign policy pillars. At the end of the 1740s, the 
first Romanian to visit Russia for political purposes set out for St. Petersburg. 
He was Nicolae Pop, a former Uniate dean, who was able to get the em­
press Elizabeth to have her ambassador in Vienna inquire about the prob­
lems of the Orthodox Romanian clergy and laity in Transylvania, and if 
necessary, to intervene at the Habsburg court on their behalf. The Orthodox 
church also received support from Wallachia and from the Serbian Ortho­
dox church of Hungary. When, with the outbreak of the Seven Years War, 
the Habsburgs had increasing need of the Russian alliance and also of do­
mestic calm in Transylvania, the court was obliged to be more lax about the 
Union in the principality.
In the summer of 1758, it was decided to appoint an Orthodox bishop 
independent of the archbishop of Karlowitz; within a year, Vienna issued 
the Orthodox decree of toleration. Though the decree contained only the 
promise of the bishop's appointment, people left the Uniate churches en 
masse. The secession movement acquired a leader in the person of a monk 
named Sofronie (Stan Popovici), whom the authorities were powerless to 
deal with. The government now hastened to send its chosen bishop (Dionisie 
Novacovici, formerly the Serbian Orthodox bishop of Buda) to Transylva­
nia, and simultaneously commissioned Baron Buccow, the military high 
commander of Transylvania to separate the Uniate and Orthodox congre­
gations along with their respective properties. Buccow found that there were 
25,164 Uniate and 126,652 Orthodox heads of families. The government, 
while salvaging the organization and endowments of the Uniate church, 
now gave legal recognition to the Transylvanian Orthodox church as a "tol­
erated", though not "received" religion.
Feudal Constitutionalism and the Viennese 
Central Government
In the first half of the eighteenth century, the political activity of the Habsburg 
administration in Transylvania was confined to the imposition of taxes and 
to the promotion of the Counter-Reformation.
The Estates' most important forum of representation, the Diet, had no 
particularly valuable traditions dating from the time of the principality. The 
Estates had usually been galvanized only at times of changes in the dynasty 
or simply when one prince succeeded another. Any moves towards the crea­
tion of a larger role had been regularly thwarted by the strengthening of the 
ruling prince's power. Initiatives of any importance in the Diet were also 
with the ruling prince, and he could make the Diet accept whatever he
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There had been no changes in the structures of the Diet after 1711. It was 
still unicameral; the place of the Prince's Council had been taken by the 
Gubernium (the governor, the councillors, and even the secretaries), the 
judicial board was invariably present as were the high-ranking municipal 
officers and Catholic high clergy; there were the Regalists men, summoned 
by the crown attending in numbers varying from fifty-five to one hundred 
and ten, as well as the elected representatives of the municipalities, and of 
the Hungarian and Szekely towns. The government, had it wanted to, would 
have been able to vote down its opponents in the Diet, had the principle of 
majority voting applied at all, which it did not, any more than it had before 
1690. In accordance with the principle "vota ponderantur sed non nume- 
rantur" (the votes are to be weighted but no counted), it was the opinion 
which was considered decisive, as interpreted by the president of the Diet. 
The government could avoid implementation of Estates resolutions which 
were inconvenient for it by not confirming the proposed laws; conversely, 
it could issue in the form of a decree bills which had been rejected by the 
Estates. The government took a position adopted by the Estates into ac­
count only on grounds of political expediency.
As a result, little could be expected from the Estates. Up to 1750, Diets 
were held almost annually, and not infrequently twice a year. The issues on 
their agenda, however, were for the most part commonplace ones: taxation, 
the maintenance of the army, nominations to posts subject to election by the 
Diet, and discussion of legal cases. This rather monotonous routine was 
rarely disrupted by more substantial initiatives.
It was only once, in 1725, that the Estates worked out an economic policy. 
This alone gave them an edge over the Habsburg administration, which 
lacked a comprehensive plan. However, the system of protective tariffs they 
devised to relieve the shortage of money proved to be unacceptable to the 
imperial government.
The little that was done up to 1758 to ameliorate the lot of the serfs was 
also initiated by the Estates. The Diet held at the beginning of 1714 passed 
the earliest law for the regulation of the feudal services owed by the serfs of 
Transylvania: serfs were to perform four days of robot service per week, 
and landless cotters three. This burden of service seems horrendous, yet 
was moderate when compared with the earlier, unlimited, robot. However, 
as is known, this law remained a dead letter for several decades; it only 
received royal sanction in 1742, when the Viennese court, now in defiance 
of the Estates, began to enforce its policy of the protection of serfs.
Beyond this, to the late 1740s, the Estates were mostly preoccupied with 
their grievances: demands that the court observe the feudal constitution, 
and the struggle for the vacant posts.
Towards 1750, however, fundamental changes began to unfold. The cen­
tral government now turned its attention to Transylvanian affairs. The em­
pire had lost Silesia and its debts had grown considerably during the War 
of the Austrian Succession. It now needed to develop its resources, to stabi­
lize its economy. Although the Habsburgs had still no deliberate economic 
policy for Transylvania, taxation and excise were made much more system­
atic. While earlier the tax burden had been allocated between the three con­
stituent Nations, which themselves were then responsible for arranging the
manner of the imposition and the recovery of the taxes, the new taxation 
system was based on the tax-paying individual. It was the individual tax­
payer who paid both poll tax according to his legal status, and a property 
tax according to his assets. In addition, members of certain trades and pro­
fessions also paid income tax. If it is a criterion of absolutism that the mon­
arch can collect taxes from his subjects without the Estates' acquiescence, 
then 1754 counts as a landmark in the history of Habsburg absolutism in 
Transylvania. By levying tax on the taxpayers' land, the new taxation sys­
tem shattered the feudal principle of "onus non inhaeret fundo"  (burden does 
not attach to land).
In the spring of 1751, a committee of the Diet headed by L£szl6 Teleki, 
and including, among others, S&muel Dobosi, a rich Szeben merchant, drew 
up a draft proposal whose original purpose had been to recommend ways 
of increasing trade turnover. But what this draft actually amounted to was 
an economic reform programme. It recommended establishing new settle­
ments to augment the population, and importing animals for breeding pur­
poses, as well as more careful animal husbandry (keeping animals indoors, 
etc.). It suggested the introduction of cheesemaking, the revival of beekeep­
ing, the breeding of silkworms, the regulation of grain prices, the establish­
ment of granaries, improvements in the methods of winegrowing, and meas­
ures aiming at producing industrial crops — all of this in many cases com­
bined with restrictions on imports. Teleki and Dobosi's plan was to make 
admittance to the guilds easier, and to invite craftsmen from abroad to set­
tle in Transylvania. It also provided for the establishment of factories, espe­
cially in the textile industry, primarily with a view to breaking into the 
markets of the two Romanian principalities, and supplying the seven regi­
ments of soldiers who were stationed in Transylvania every winter. The 
plan also proposed the abolition of the tariff barrier between Transylvania 
and Hungary. To achieve all this it suggested the creation of a monetary 
fund and the setting up of a commercial committee (Commissio Commercialis), 
as well as more road repairs and the regulation of credit. The idea was to 
make room for all innovations which would make the country ready to 
benefit from possible structural reforms from above.
The plan, however, was frustrated. The part of it that was realized was 
put into effect by the central government some decades later. In the autumn 
of 1751, the draft proposal was rejected by a conservative-dominated Transyl­
vanian Diet as "unrealistic". Some of Teleki's most progressive proposals 
were outright scoffed at. After this, the Ministerialkonferenz deemed it suf­
ficient to set up an economic committee in Transylvania for the develop­
ment and supervision of manufactories. L3szl6 Teleki was appointed to 
chair this committee as well, but conditions were such that no results could 
be achieved.
In the Transylvania of the 1760s, the Habsburgs began to experiment 
with wholesale changes in their earlier methods of government.
- The Diet in Transylvania was summoned in the autumn of 1761 for the 
last time. The military high commander, Baron Buccow, surpassed himself 
in manipulating and blackmailing the Estates, whose political activity, from 
his point of view, was entirely superfluous. The representation to the mon- 
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for shaking up the country's administration: the governor was to be forced 
to resign; he, Buccow was to be appointed to head the civil government 
also, and councillors from the Hereditary Lands were to be appointed to 
the Gubemium. All land grants were to be subject to review. Buccow was 
also determined to give substance to the principle that the privileges of 
nobility accrued to persons, and not to land. Finally, it proposed the organi­
zation of a 7,000-strong frontier regiment.
The newly-formed Staatsrat received the plan with polite silence; never­
theless, it was this proposal which set the tone for the changes which took 
place in Transylvanian's power structure during the 1760s. In the middle of 
1762, the military high commander took over as president of the Gubemium. 
After this, the military high commanders headed the Gubemium for almost 
a decade, with the rank of royal commissioners. (Buccow was succeeded on 
his death by Andr&s Hadik, who was followed by O'Donel.) This amounted 
to a civilian-military regime which, in terms of its form, was unprecedented 
in Transylvania since 1711.
The organization of the frontier regiment proved to be the most delicate 
issue. The men were drawn partly from the Szekelyfold, partly from the 
Fogaras region, from Hunyad county and from certain parts of the Kir&lyfOld. 
Among the Szekelys, a certain constitutional basis was offered for the re­
cruitment by the obligation of the Szekely nation to render military service
— an obligation specified also in the Diploma Leopoldinum. In the case of the 
Romanian frontier regiments, no constitutional justification was attempted. 
Border guard service, however, did not involve the old type of obligation to 
stand ready to go to war in return for which the Szekelys had enjoyed their 
privileges. Rather, it was a late version of the military colony, a well-known 
by-product of east-central European and east European backwardness, and 
which did duty for a mercenary army. (In the south of Hungary, it had been 
introduced quite some time earlier.) Recruitment began in the region of 
Naszbd, a Romanian area, and in the Szekelyfold. Nasz6d had an old dis­
pute with the people living in the Beszterce region: the latter considered the 
Naszbd people to be serfs, while they themselves demanded rights equal to 
those of the Saxons. Buccow now offered freedom to those people of the 
Nasz6d district who were willing to join up. To begin with, large numbers 
of men volunteered and turned Uniate, a condition for joining the frontier 
regiment. The Szekelys, after taking up arms as evidence of their willing­
ness to join the frontier force, proceeded to set definite terms for their par­
ticipation: restoration of their old rights, restriction of their military service 
to within Transylvania, and treatment according to the ancient laws. Here, 
the recruitment was effected partly on a voluntary basis, and partly through 
the use of force. It was such force that triggered off a disturbance at the 
beginning of September 1762 in the district of Udvarhely, when the inhabit­
ants of a number of villages refused to do military service or sought to 
evade conscription. Buccow himself went to Udvarhely, where a violent 
clash was only narrowly averted. In the Csik and Gyergy6 districts, those 
called on to take the oath of border guard reiterated the old demands, mak­
ing them more specific and adding to them in places. Now they also wanted 
to be allowed to serve under their own officers, and asked to see the royal 
edict setting up the frontier regiment. Later, having grown tired of the fruit- 432
less negotiations, they attacked the place where Buccow was lodging. But 
for the intervention of the fokiralybiro (lord chief justice), the commanding 
general would have been beaten to death. As it was, only a handful of peo­
ple ended up taking the oath.
This, however, was only one battle in what can be described as the "bellum 
omnium contra omnes" which developed in the Szekelyfold in the course of 
the attempts to organize the frontier regiment. Such battles were numer­
ous. The nobility in the Szekely districts made repeated demonstrations 
against encroachments by army officers. On the other hand, the Szekelys 
who had joined up in the frontier regiments turned on the nobility in many 
places, looting their houses and attacking those who failed to take up arms
— individuals and even whole villages. It boded ill for the future that some 
of the border guards refused to till their lands, and sold their cattle to buy 
horses. The officers in charge of organizing the frontier regiments enlisted 
serfs in some places, relieving them arbitrarily of the bonds of serfdom. 
Tension mounted between landlords and those of their serfs who had joined 
up as border guards, or who wanted to join up. By the first half of 1763, 
freemen who had refused to join the frontier regiments were setting out for 
Moldavia to escape the onerous services the officers tried to impose upon 
them, and in the effort to flee the wanton hostility of those who had joined. 
The Nasz6d region was no less troubled, but there opposition focused on 
the authorities' attempts to force all would-be border guards to turn Uniate.
It was at this point that the government decided to change its tactic. On 
6 January, 1763, the queen ruled that only volunteers would be accepted in 
the frontier regiments. At the end of January, Baron Buccow sent a joint 
military-civilian committee headed by General Antal K^lnoki, a Szekely 
aristocrat, to the Csik and Hdromszek districts to calm passions. Shortly 
thereafter, however, the central government entrusted a new man, Lieuten­
ant General Siskovics, with the organization of the frontier regiments, for 
Buccow's methods had not proved to be sufficiently effective.
Siskovics, determined to brook no further resistance, went to Csik in 
December 1763. The male population, no less determined to avoid being 
recruited into the frontier regiments, took refuge in the woods. Fearful that 
this kind of insubordination would spread, in the early morning of 7 Janu­
ary, 1764, Siskovics ordered 1,300 troops, with two field guns, to attack 
M^defalva, the place where the rebels had gathered. Though there was no 
armed resistance, the soldiers slaughtered many hundreds of people. As a 
result, Szekely opposition to the recruitment was broken; the Szekely fron­
tier regiments were set up within two and a half months. The Romanian 
border guard was organized with less violence, but blood was nevertheless 
shed in the process, at least in the Nasz6d region.
The differences in attitude which developed between Szekelys and Ro­
manians to the frontier population's organization into military colonies were, 
however, due not so much to the different circumstances of the two frontier 
regiments' establishment, as to the very diverse social and cultural implica­
tions that the organization of the border guard had for the two nationali­
ties. The self-government and the established rights of the Szekely villages 
were both seriously undermined by the fact that the frontier regiment corn- 
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border guards themselves were allowed to conclude property deals and to 
marry only with the consent of their officers (the latter also being empow­
ered to ban them from dancing, smoking a pipe, and even attending the 
funerals of relatives). The frontier regiments seriously interfered with agri­
culture in the border areas and in the Szekely school system. Only the cohe­
sive strength of the village community gave protection against the military 
authorities: the village officials simply did not carry out a great many of 
their instructions. The organization of the Romanian frontier regiments had 
involved fewer grievances, although there were some cases of Romanian 
and Hungarian small nobles' having been pressed to enlist (e.g. in Hunyad 
county), and of boyars in Fogaras who were unwilling to serve being de­
prived of their houses and animals. The long-term consequences, however, 
were much more propitious. The organization of the frontier regiments en­
tailed a significant step forward for Romanian education in Transylvania. 
In the places where the regiments were based (Naszbd and Orlat), Latin 
and German grammar schools were set up, and in every centre of the 2nd 
Romanian Frontier Regiment elementary schools as well. The frontier regi­
ment as an institution even helped to foster a consciousness of the Roma­
nian nation as forming a continuity with ancient Rome: the inscription on 
the colours of the 2nd Romanian Frontier Regiment was "Virtus romana 
rediviva”.
The central government began to address itself to the fundamental issue 
of feudal services and dues in Transylvania only when the matter was al­
ready being dealt with in Hungary. Following protracted preparatory work 
based on the stance adopted by, the Gubernium, the charter of the first ex­
periment in the regulation of feudal relations in Transylvania, the Bizonyos 
Punctumok (Certain Points), was published in the autumn of 1769.
Essentially, the charter was an extension of the laws already in force. It 
did not contain any particular provisions on the size of serf holdings, but 
rather general guidelines to the effect that the landlord should provide his 
serfs and landless cotters "with a suitable dwelling in line with their sta­
tus", and in addition, parable and meadows "in  accordance with the en­
dowments of the outlying areas". Thus, it avoided the firm assignment to 
the serfs of plots of land of definite size in line with regional and local agrar­
ian conditions, as was the case in Hungary. Among the serf's benefits, it 
specified that the woods used by the village community should remain in 
its possession, with the landowner's property rights being reserved. As re­
gards the services the serfs were oblige to render, it resorted to earlier meas­
ures: at most four days a week of manual labour, or three days work with a 
plough — four days if the "buddy system" of sharing a holding was in 
effect. Retained was the obligation of the serf to pay the tenth and the ninth.
The Bizonyos Punctumok, therefore, was no real settlement in respect ei­
ther of the size of serf holding or of the services owed. In the decades that 
followed the heterogeneity of feudal services and dues as defined by local 
factors continued intact, as indeed it had for centuries.
2. From the Enlightenment to Liberalism
Enlightenment and National Cultures
The Enlightenment virtually exploded onto the Transylvanian scene at the 
beginning of the 1770s. Once again, culturally, Transylvania was much far­
ther ahead than was plausible, given her pitiful social and economic cir­
cumstances. There was a simultaneous flowering of two seemingly anti­
thetical intellectual trends: of Illuminism, with its strong supranational ele­
ment, and of national sentiment which was to lay the foundation of the 
various national cultures of the area. But we do not find two distinct camps: 
the followers of Christian Wolff, the translator of Montesquieu; the Freema­
sons; the government officials who believed in the Habsburgs' enlightened 
absolutism; and the internationally-oriented neutral scientists on one side, 
and those dedicated to promoting their own national cultures on the other. 
On the contrary: every one of Transylvania's intellectuals at the time be­
longed to both sides to some degree. Nor is this particularly surprising, 
given the national complexion of Transylvania, and the nature of her intel­
lectual climate.
Freemasonry was the principal cohesive force behind the Transylvanian 
Enlightenment. It was in the early 1740s that two Hungarian aristocrats and 
the Saxon Samuel Bruckenthal, later one of Transylvania's great conserva­
tive statesmen, first came into contact with Freemasonry. Maria Theresa 
rewarded their initiative by confining them to their Vienna residences for a 
time in 1742. Nevertheless, the Freemasons soon became established in 
Transylvania, though for the first few decades only among the Saxons. The 
first short-lived lodge, "Zu den 3 Saulen" (3 columns), was established in 
Brass6 in the early 1750s. More successful was the Saint Andrew lodge set 
up in Szeben in 1764. Its founder was a young Saxon patrician, Simon 
Friedrich Baussnem, and its members were Saxons who had become Free­
masons during their student years in Germany. To 1778, the lodge's Transyl­
vanian members were exclusively Saxons. But it also had some members 
from the Hereditary Lands, like Alexandru Moruzi Mavrocordat, whose 
brother was a Moldavian prince. The first Hungarian member of the lodge 
was Gyorgy Banffy, the later governor. During the 1780s and 1790s, the 
intellectual elite of Transylvania, many Romanians among them, were all 
members of the Szeben lodge. The new lodges that were set up were all 
coordinated by the Saint Andrew lodge, led by Grand Master Banffy.
The opportunities open to Freemasonry altered somewhat when Joseph 
II ordered the fusion of the lodges in 1785. In Transylvania, the reform pa­
tent allowed the operation of only one lodge, the one in Szeben. In January 
of 1796, Francis I ordered the dissolution even of that. Freemasonry, which 
in its heyday would attract the most illustrious of Transylvania's political 
leaders, had become suspect to a central government still in a state of shock 
from the French Revolution. Yet Transylvanian Freemasonry from the 1770s 
on had primarily been an alliance of those morally committed to promoting
the public weal. It was far from being a political force of some definite com­
plexion, much less a political party. A role of this sort would have been as 
incompatible with the essence of Freemasonry as with Transylvania's po­
litical situation at the time.
The flourishing of modern science confirmed the spirit of the Enlighten­
ment in Transylvania, where some outstanding men made their appear­
ance from the 1750s on.
J6zsef Benk<5, Peter Bod's spiritual heir, was a true Enlightenment per­
sonality, equally at home in the social and natural sciences. His major work, 
Transsilvania, was pioneering in its methodology, and conceived of history 
as the manifestation of the spiritual development of a society, as well as of 
its material progress. Benk6 followed Linnaeus's taxonomy in preparing 
his trilingual (Latin-Hungarian-Romanian) botanical dictionary, the Flora 
Transsilvanica. He was the first to write a handbook of speleology in Transyl­
vania, and also published his suggestions for the utilization of sumach in 
the leather industry (A kozepajtai szkumpia — The KOzepajta Cotinus), and 
on tobacco growing. He also took advantage of the new opportunities that 
journalism provided for the popularization of science, contributing articles 
to the Magyar Hirmondo (Hungarian Herald). All this would have earned 
him a university appointment anywhere else. But at home, BenkS never 
received the recognition he deserved: he spent most of his life as a village 
pastor, after his few years of teaching at Udvarhely were terminated by 
petty intrigue. Driven from one parish to the next by the machinations against 
him, he turned to drink for consolation. It was a pattern familiar to the 
outstanding sons of Transylvania, and one that would often be repeated in 
the future. 1
The career of his contemporary, J6nos Frivaldszky, was perhaps less remi­
niscent of that of a folk ballad hero, but he, too, received less recognition 
than his achievements warranted. After receiving his degree in Vienna, he 
was appointed professor of Latin and natural sciences at the Jesuit acad­
emy in Kolozsvcir. Unlike Benko, he was primarily interested in the natural 
sciences, in fact, in the applied sciences. For Frivaldszky was an innovator 
whose inventiveness found fertile ground when the Societas Agriculturae 
was established with a view to promoting Transylvanian agriculture. He 
came up with methods for using potatoes to make bread and to brew beer, 
and found ways of distilling spirits from com, and of making paper from 
reeds, rushes, flax, and hemp. He held demonstrations to the society to 
show how peat could be used for fuel. But neither his comprehensive pro­
gramme of economic reform, nor his countless innovations and suggestions 
were ever put to practical use. Neither the social nor the technological pre­
conditions were ripe for their adoption.
The third outstanding Transylvanian natural scientist of the period, J6zsef 
Fogarasi Pap, had a brilliant start: his dissertation on "force" in the broad­
est sense of the term won first prize at the Berlin Academy of Sciences in 
1778. His work reflects the influences of Leibniz and of German idealism. 
For example, he held that the final cause of all force lay outside matter, in 
God; and that the force of imagination was also a true natural force. But 
Fogarasi Pap was also in close contact with the latest currents in natural 
sciences. He died just before he could take the chair he had been offered at 
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Both the Calvinist colleges and the well-equipped Saxon secondary 
schools were workshops for the new learning. J6zsef Kov&cs, who taught 
physics at Nagyenyed from 1767 on, translated and published Krueger's 
Newtonian physics in 1774. Another teacher at Nagyenyed was Ferenc 
Benk<5, the geologist, botanist and mineralogist, a member of the Jenaische 
Naturwissenschaftliche Gesellschaft (Natural Science Society of Jena).
Natural sciences at the KolozsvSr academy, which was taken over by the 
Piarists after the dissolution of the Jesuit order, received considerable im­
petus in the 1780s when Andre Etienne, professor of chemistry and metal­
lurgy and the popularizer of Lavoisier, joined the staff, along with the ocu­
list loan Piuariu-Moln^r. The medical books were all written by practising 
physicians, (e.g. Istvan MStyus and Samuel R£cz) whose chapters on the 
importance of diet and of preventing disease are a fine source of informa­
tion on the state of medicine and hygiene at the time.
Freemasonry and the natural sciences: these were the supranational mani­
festations of the Enlightenment, the forces making for the cohesion of other­
wise diverse groupings. But in Transylvania, the awakening of national con­
sciousness coincided with the Enlightenment. Initially, this awakening was 
non-political in nature. For these were decades when the political sphere in 
Transylvania was restricted indeed: no Diet was convoked for almost three 
decades after 1761, nor was there any other nationwide political forum. The 
awakening of national consciousness during these decades took the form of 
the revival of the various national cultures.
Initially, the Saxons were at an advantage. For Saxon students had con­
tinued to study at the German universities: in 1774, for instance, Michael 
Hiszmann, Martin Lang, Karl Bruckenthal and Johann Filtsch were all at 
Gottingen. The Konigliche Deutsche Gesellschaft (Royal German Society) in 
Gottingen had close ties with the leading Saxon intellectuals of Transylva­
nia. In 1799, Filtsch, J. C. Eder and A. Wolf were made corresponding mem­
bers. Hiszmann stayed on in Gottingen after completing his studies, and 
was a prolific translator of English and French philosophical works. An 
Enlightenment thinker himself, his works abound in scathing attacks on 
metaphysics. Preoccupied with the relationship of mind to matter, he was 
often critical of Leibniz, and decidedly antagonistic to Wolff. In the Lessing- 
Goethe dispute, he took Lessing's side. His philosophical activity, however, 
effectively cut him off from returning to Transylvania. The Lutheran bishop 
Andreas Funk proscribed the circulation of Hiszmann's philosophic "let­
ters", and his friends dissuaded him from attempting a return.
Stronger yet than these scholarly ties was the influence that the German 
theatre had on Transylvania's Saxons. It was as a by-product that their first 
modem literary efforts were published, in the Theatralisches Wochenblatt (The­
atrical Weekly) which appeared for a time in Szeben, in 1778. More than a 
theatre review, it informed its readers of what was going on in literature 
abroad, primarily in the German-speaking world.
Of all the branches of Saxon scholarship, historiography was the most 
instrumental in raising national consciousness. For instance, there were the 
series of articles Johann Seivert wrote on leading Saxon churchmen and 
politicians in the Ungarisches Magazin (Hungarian Magazine) that appeared 
in Pozsony. No less significant was his major work on Saxon cultural his­
tory: Nachrichten von siebenbiirgischen Gelehrten und ihren Schriften. Another 
key figure during these years was J. C. Eder, the nucleus around whom the 
Saxon historical society formed in the 1790s.
Indicative of the expansion of Saxon culture was the growing demand 
for regularly available reading matter. The Samuel Bruckenthal Collection 
also functioned as a public library. The first lending library opened in Szeben, 
in 1782. The first reading society was established two years later, to be fol­
lowed by more. The Enlightenment also introduced periodicals among Tran­
sylvania's Saxons — some local publications, and a number of German pe­
riodicals. It was this latter feature of Saxon culture — the advantage of 
having direct access to all the German-language literature coming in from 
abroad — that proved to be its greatest weakness. Some of the finest Ger­
man literature was being written at this time, and its availability seemed to 
discourage, rather than inspire native Saxon writing.
Literate Hungarian Transylvanians who tried their hand at writing had 
reference points of quite a different kind. The previous half century had 
produced only one Transylvanian Hungarian writer of note, Kelemen Mikes, 
the young scribe to Ferenc Rakoczi II. His "letters" written from exile to a 
fictive aunt lay in a desk drawer in Rodosto (Turkey) for decades, and were 
published only in 1794, but then became an inspiration to Hungarian patri­
ots for generations to come. All the stay-at-home writers likewise wrote 
diaries or memoirs. The swan song of Transylvania's memoirists was the 
autobiography of Kata Bethlen, an aristocratic widow, Calvinist to the point 
of bigotry in the face of the Counter-Reformation, a woman of iron will who 
had a paper mill built to supply paper for the religious tracts she was deter­
mined to see published, and who was the patroness of Peter Bod. She, how­
ever, had to wait another two hundred years for true recognition.
It is an irony of history that the Hungarian literature of eighteenth cen­
tury Transylvania was bom  in Rodosto and Vienna. The pioneers of Hun­
garian Enlightenment literature were the "guardsman writers", the young 
noblemen in Maria Theresa's Hungarian Bodyguard, a formation established 
by the empress with the explicit aim of heightening the baroque pomp of 
her court. For decades, the Hungarian Bodyguard was the major workshop 
for Hungarian literature. The principal figure was Gy5rgy Bessenyei; but 
the man generally considered to have been next in importance was a Transyl­
vanian, Abraham Barcsay. Barcsay retired from the army with the rank of 
colonel, but no Hungarian poet ever sang more eloquently of the blessings 
of peace, the precondition of all human liberty.
No Hungarian periodical was published in Transylvania during these 
years. But a great many Hungarian Transylvanians contributed to the Hun­
garian journals appearing in Hungary and Vienna. For this reason, too, as 
well as by virtue of the many ties of friendship and shared conviction link­
ing them to their counterparts in Hungary, the considerable literary output 
of Transylvania's Hungarian writers must be seen as an integral part of 
Hungarian culture as a whole.
Of the three nations living in Transylvania, the Romanians were at the 
greatest disadvantage during these Enlightenment decades. All the more 
impressive, then, is what they achieved.
There was no flowering of Transylvanian Romanian literature during 
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sciousness — to take up again the cause that Inochentie Micu-Klein had 
fought for. It was in this that the three most significant spokesmen of Transyl­
vanian Romanian culture — Samuil Micu-Klein, Gheorghe ^incai and Petru 
Maior — achieved their most impressive results. All there were polymaths 
who had also studied in Vienna and Rome, outstanding research scholars 
as well as popularizers of their findings, in the best traditions of the Ency­
clopaedists. Central to their system of thought was the theory of Daco-Ro- 
man continuity. Equally important was their conviction that the Romanians 
living on the two sides of the Carpathians were one and the same people. 
Though they were Greek Catholics, they were free of the anti-Orthodox 
prejudice of the previous generation, and had a fine understanding of the 
intricacies of Orthodox church history. Their writings on religious matters 
were an amalgam of Gallicanism, of Josephinism and of Orthodox tradi­
tionalism.
Encouraged by the possibilities inherent in enlightened absolutism, and 
arguing on the legal grounds that all these areas had once been lands of the 
Hungarian Crown, Samuil Micu-Klein expressed his hope that a religious 
union that respected Orthodox traditions might become the basis of the 
unification under the House of Habsburg of all the Romanian-speaking ar­
eas. His Elementa linguae Daco-Romanae sive Valachicae (Elements of the Daco- 
Roman in Valachian Language) was published in Vienna in 1780, and was 
meant to convince primarily the non-Romanian reading public of the Latin 
origin of the Romanian language. Micu-Klein himself published his works 
using the Cyrillic alphabet, but he was the first to use a Latin transcription 
in the Romanian-language prayer book he put out in 1779. His translation 
of the Bible also appeared in 1779, but his historical works were published 
only later. Some of them are in a manuscript form even today.
Gheorghe Sincai took an active role in implementing the educational 
policies of enlightened absolutism. As inspector of the elementary schools 
of the Uniate church, he helped set up a great many village schools. He also 
wrote a Latin-Hungarian-Germ an-Rom anian primer for the schools in 
Balazsfalva, a Romanian primer for use in the other Romanian schools of 
Transylvania, a Latin grammar, an introduction to arithmetic, and a cat­
echism. Practically all his life he kept working on his comprehensive his­
tory, th eHronica romanilor (Chronicle of the Romanians). Among the sources 
he cites we can find the scholarly works of every east European nation, but 
primarily Hungarian works. He also relied heavily on Transylvanian fam­
ily archives, on dietal reports and on sources collected by Hungarian schol­
ars, many of whom were his personal friends. It was while in Vienna that he 
came to know Jozsef Benk6, Daniel Comides, and Marton Gyorgy Kovachich. 
In the course of his chequered career, the Wass family came to his aid on 
several occasions. He found his final resting place on their estate.
The most active years of Petru Maior, the third member of the great triad 
of the Romanian cultural revival, coincided with the Reform Era, and are 
best discussed in that context.
Of the Greek Orthodox Romanian scholars, the classic example is the 
Brass6 schoolmaster, Dimitrie Eustatievici. He studied in Kiev, and wrote a 
Romanian grammar in 1757. For him, however, Romanian national identity 
4 3 9  did not involve turning away from the Greek language of the Orthodox
liturgy. Politically, he sided with those who wanted to see the Romanians 
recognized as heirs to the rights of the Illyrian nation. Secretary to two Or­
thodox bishops, he was inspector of the Greek Orthodox schools of Transyl­
vania under Joseph II, organizing the six-week crash courses (for groups of 
11-12 prospective teachers) meant to temporarily ease the shortage of edu­
cators. Another dedicated champion of the Orthodox school system was 
loan Piuariu-Moln&r, who was also professor of ophthalmology at Kolozsv&r. 
It was he who had the greatest impact as a popularizer of obstetric and 
agricultural know-how, primarily because his pamphlets and books were 
written in a language that his readers had little difficulty understanding. 
The best Romanian grammar was also his work.
The Romanian cultural revival went hand in hand with a growing politi­
cal role for Transylvania's Romanian intelligentsia. During the reign of Joseph 
II, Romanians held positions both in the Gubemium and in the Transylva­
nian Court Chancellery. Istv^n Koszta was a councillor of the Gubemium 
during the last years of Joseph II's rule, and was later made cancellarius 
provincialis, the chief overseer of the Gubemium as the executive arm. He 
was a bureaucrat of exemplary diligence and precision: thousands of extant 
pages in a beautiful hand testify to his thoroughness and inventiveness in 
seeing matters through to their conclusion. In the course of the slow dis­
mantling of the Josephine system, it was he who attended to the unpleas­
ant, and at times dangerous, tasks facing the Gubemium. At the county 
level, however, very few Romanians were to be found in the administrative 
apparatus, for there was no real Romanian landowning class to speak of.
The First Decades of Enlightened Absolutism
It was around 1770-1771 that enlightened absolutism began to have an im­
pact on Transylvanian politics. Least felicitous from Transylvania's point of 
view was the economic policy adopted by the Habsburg court. In fact, none 
of the economic reform proposals that the various new committees (e.g. the 
Commissio Commercialis /Trade Committee/, and the Commissio CEconomica 
/Economic Committee/) came up with were calculated to bridge the enor­
mous gap separating Transylvania from the industrially more developed 
western parts of the empire. On the contrary, since manufacturing was dis­
couraged, and restricted to the production of household staples, Transylva­
nian industry fell even farther behind in these decades. Those industries 
that were set up functioned in defiance of official policy, some of them, e.g. 
the paper mill at Orldt and the iron, gold and silver works set up with the 
help of other government agencies.
The 1770s were no more successful from the point of view of resolving 
the matter of the serfs' feudal services and dues. The government could 
come up with nothing better than to keep to the status quo, nor did it really 
want to. True, in June of 1770, Maria Theresa — fearing that rumours of the 
serfs' emancipation in Moldavia would lead to a large-scale exodus across 
the border — did order that steps be taken to work out the regulation of 
feudal services and dues along the lines proposed in Hungary, but her good 
intentions foundered in the morass of bureaucracy.
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In church-state relations and education, however, the government was 
much more successful in implementing its policies. Vienna was determined 
to place the Roman Catholic church under closer supervision, and to put an 
end to , or at least to restrict, its prelates' assuming high government posts. 
The Catholic bishop of Transylvania was divested of his right to preside 
over the Gubemium. The central government's intervention in the Catholic 
church's affairs was far-reaching: it acquired control over its organization 
and finances, and practically over all matters involving education. In 1781, 
the Norma Regia (Royal Norms) placed every aspect of education in Transyl­
vania under the G ubem ium , more specifically, its newly established 
Commissio Litteraria (Literary Committee). The uniform system of educa­
tion was binding on all denominational schools. Elementary education was 
made compulsory from the age of six. Secondary education, however, was 
reserved for those who had not only the proficiency, but also the financial 
means to attain it.
The "second decade" of enlightened absolutism is generally identified 
with the person of Joseph II, who came to the throne in 1780. Few rulers 
have been so variously evaluated by contemporaries and historians alike. 
The "libertarian" school of thought portrays Joseph II and all his measures 
as a direct attack on Hungary's liberties and on Hungarian interests. At the 
other end are those who picture the emperor as more than a reformer: he is 
seen as a veritable revolutionary, one who would have introduced a new 
and perfect order into his empire, but who was overcome by the forces of 
reaction. Countless variations and permutations exist of these two themes.
It is not only Hungarian considerations that are reflected in the pictures 
that have evolved. Joseph II's policies opened hitherto unimaginable op­
portunities to the most conscious advocates of Romanian national rights. 
The Saxons, on the other hand, stood to have their privileges totally annihi­
lated by the ruthless rationalism of Joseph II's system. In fact, the emperor's 
main motive in everything he did was to consolidate the strength of the 
empire. For all that, his Patent of Toleration published in 1781 was a signifi­
cant step toward the freedom of religion and conscience in Transylvania as 
well.
Joseph II's economic policy had two main elements: free competition in 
the domestic market, unfettered by the restrictions imposed by the trade 
guilds; and protectionism in foreign trade. The emperor's goal was to make 
the empire an autarchic economic unit. The tariff barriers between Transyl­
vania and Hungary were removed, which was tantamount to the economic 
unification of the two areas, coming, as it did, after their administrative 
unification. The tariff barriers which guaranteed the Hereditary Lands their 
preferential treatment were, however, preserved, with the result that the 
more complete the autarchy that the empire managed to achieve, the more 
stark were the differences in the economic development of its various parts.
Joseph II had no comprehensive industrial policy in Transylvania, but in 
practice, there was no sign of discrim ination. For instance, G iovanni 
Gallarati's attempt at silk production enjoyed definite government support, 
and it was at this time that the iron foundries of the Vajdahunyad region 
received a real impetus. Transylvanian industrial products enjoyed protec­
tion even against the goods coming in from the Hereditary Lands, for the
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simple reason that Transylvania, as Joseph II pointed out, carried a heavier 
tax burden than Hungary.
There can be no questioning Joseph II's good intentions towards the serfs. 
What measures were, in fact, introduced, how far these were implemented, 
and how they were received is, perhaps, the best reflection of the Josephine 
system in Transylvania. During one of his visits to Transylvania, in 1783, 
Joseph II ordered Vice-Chancellor P&lffy to draw up immediately the proc­
lamation of the serfs' emancipation. The chancellery was able to torpedo 
the plan, but Joseph II's decree of 16 July, 1783 guaranteed the serfs the 
right to marry and to learn and practice a trade or profession without their 
lords' permission, to dispose freely of their lawful possessions, and to enjoy 
security of tenure in their holdings unless removed from them by court 
order. The decree specified that they were not to be relocated from one 
county to another, and that they were not to be obliged to perform services 
inconsistent with the temporary regulations already in effect. Before, how­
ever, either the conclusive regulation of feudal obligations or an emancipa­
tion proclamation could be promulgated, one of the most violent peasant 
revolts of all its history swept through Transylvania.
The Horea-Closca Revoltt
A whole set of circumstances had prepared the ground for the violence that 
erupted in the autumn of 1784. Throughout Transylvania, relations between 
landlords and serfs had been getting more and more strained. As for the 
Erchegyseg region, there were specific reasons for the growing discontent. 
The Zalatna seigniory of the Exchequer, was a mountainous area with ex­
tensive forests. The terrain was such that the inhabitants of the scattered 
villages had had no difficulty concealing just how many people actually 
lived there, i.e. how many were liable to pay taxes. As the result of a close 
investigation, however, after 1772, the tax burden of the seigniory doubled; 
the obligatory feudal services, too, were specified, and were substantially 
more than what had been customary. The robot was set at two days a week, 
obligatory wage labour (at notoriously low wages) was introduced, and a 
number of concessions were withdrawn. The treasury received three times 
its former income from the more than seven thousand tenant farmers on 
the Zalatna seigniory. The people turned directly to the emperor to seek 
redress of their grievances. The delegation that went to Vienna in 1779 in­
cluded Horea and Closca, leaders of the 1784 uprising.
Horea was born Vasile Nicula in 1730. First a fugitive serf, he later re­
deemed himself and had travelled extensively throughout Transylvania. 
Working as a carpenter, he had acquired a considerable fortune by peasant 
standards. It was because of his reputation as a man of experience that he 
was sent to Vienna in 1779 to represent the people of the seigniory . Subse­
quently, he was to go there a number of times. In May of 1782, a distur­
bance broke out in Top&nfalva at the annual fair over the licensing of the 
tavern on the Zalatna estate. Local people, angry that two Armenians had 
been given the licence, pierced the bottoms of the two lessees' barrels. The 442
manorial court of Zalatna passed death and other grave sentences on the 
culprits, while the two lessees demanded compensation. Horea (who took 
part in the disturbance) again went off to Vienna with the appeal, and was 
received by the emperor. There was nothing extraordinary in this, as Joseph 
II was in the habit of personally receiving the serfs' written requests, speak­
ing a few words of encouragement as he did so. In April of 1784, however, 
even at the chancellery Horea was assured that the Gubemium would be 
obliged to protect the people of the Zalatna seigniory from abuse by the 
local and the county officials until Joseph II brought a decision on their 
case. A ccordingly, Horea and his fellow plaintiffs, when neither the 
Gubemium nor the county authorities would come to their assistance, turned 
to the military command at Gyulafehervar for support.
Shortly before, Joseph II had decreed that volunteers living in the fron­
tier zone be registered with a view to reinforcing the frontier regiments. In 
June of 1784, as the result of a misunderstanding, the peasants who had 
come up for the Gyulafehervar fair volunteered en masse, so that by mid- 
August, the menfolk of 80 villages were ready to take up arms. A number of 
the conscripts, on returning home, refused to perform their robot, others 
aggressively urged the stay-at-homes to join them in the army. In many 
ways, the situation was similar to what had transpired when the Szekely 
frontier regiments were being organized in 1762-1763. The Gubemium, 
however, which had had no part in the conscriptions and even no knowl­
edge of them, intervened, put an end to the registrations, and invalidated 
the conscriptions that had already taken place. It was at around the same 
time that Horea and his fellows turned to the Gyulafehervar military com­
mand. Thanks to another misunderstanding, the rumour was soon abroad 
that Horea had received an order from the emperor to take up arms. From 
here on, the revolt was practically inevitable. Gheorghe Crisan, a fugitive 
serf from the Zalatna seigniory, called a meeting of the peasants of the Feher- 
Koros Valley in Mesztakon; from there they set out for Gyulafehervar to 
ask to join the frontier regiments. They were accosted along the way by a 
troop of county officers and haiduks, and a violent skirmish ensued. The 
revolt had erupted, and in days the peasantry of all south-western Transyl­
vania had joined. In Zarand county, the insurgents looted dozens of manor 
houses, and the violence spread to the adjacent parts of Hungary as well. 
Practically the whole of Hunyad county was in a state of revolt. The peas­
antry of the Erchegyseg — led by Horea and Closca, and by Crisan, who 
had joined them with his men — wreaked havoc in Abrudb&nya and 
Verespatak, lynching county officials, officers of the treasury, non-Roma- 
nian priests, and even the village judges.
The government was slow to take decisive action. Governor Samuel 
Bruckenthal asked the army to move against the insurgents, but the high 
command, having received no orders, was at a loss what to do. With the 
revolt spreading like wildfire, the military high command and the Guber- 
nium both began separate negotiations with the rebels. In the meanwhile, in 
some places the nobility started to organize their own defence: at Deva, 
they routed the insurgents with the help of the local hussars, summarily 
executing fifty-six of the captured rebels. The rebels clashed with the nobili- 
4 4 3  ty's forces in a number of other locations as well. In some areas, the army —
mostly Hungarian and Szekely hussars — clashed with the rebels even be­
fore orders arrived.
Joseph II and the central government's difficulty in taking a unanimous 
stand on the rebellion was compounded by the fact that they had very little 
news of what was actually going on. The reports that did get through were 
out of date and contradictory. The central government was still debating 
what policy position to adopt. Initially, considerations of national security 
dominated. Joseph II first received word of the revolt on 12 November,
1784, and immediately sent orders to the military high commands to quash 
the rebellion by force of arms. Soon, however, social policy considerations 
came to predominate. Reading a circular put out by the Gubemium around 
17 November, Joseph came to suspect that the revolt was, in part, sparked 
by abuses on the part of the county authorities. By 19 November, he was 
convinced that the responsibility lay with the landowners who oppressed 
their serfs in every way they could, and sent Antal Jankovics, one of his 
most trusted men, on a fact-finding mission to the troubled area.
The emperor was experiencing a profound crisis of conscience. On hear­
ing of the mass executions at Deva, he could not help but sympathize with 
the nobility. On the other hand, he felt that the revolt showed that his own 
policies had been a failure. He was reluctant to condone the idea of some 
harsh reprisal, and considered it politically mistaken as well, being of the 
opinion that counter-violence would erupt at the next opportunity. Accord­
ingly, he gave orders which were intended to stop summary convictions, 
and to prevent the nobility as a body from taking up arms. Joseph II was 
convinced that the first step to a political solution was to announce the eman­
cipation of the serfs.
Considerations of national security — the military's arguments — how­
ever, won through. On 13 December, 1784, the emperor published a whole 
series of ordinances, whose drift was that military might was the only way 
to put an end to the revolt. It was a mistake to have vacillated so long, and 
time for the army to take decisive action. By then, however, the insurrection 
had been put down. The two battalions of 750-800 men each that the mili­
tary high command had sent into the Erchegys6g had scattered the rebels. 
Horea and Closca were turned in by the peasants at the end of December.
The retribution that followed was in keeping with Joseph II's explicit 
wishes. The rebel leaders were to be made an example of. They were put on 
display in all the places where they had committed their most "heinous 
crim es", and were to be executed before the assembled serfs in a way that 
would discourage such acts in the future. Altogether, six hundred and sixty 
peasants were put on trial. The three hundred who had joined the rebels 
under duress, and against whom there was no weighty evidence, were al­
lowed immediately to return to their homes. Those who had volunteered 
for the rebel army or had plundered and looted, about one hundred and 
eighty men, received corporal punishment and were also sent home. Of the 
hundred and twenty people accused of capital crimes, thirty-seven received 
the death sentence; the rest were given prison sentences. Joseph II pardoned 
all those condemned to death, except the three leaders. Crisan committed 
suicide in prison; Horea and Closca were broken on the wheel on 18 Febru­
ary, 1785, in full view of the crowd of peasants ordered there for the ordeal. 444
Had there really been an element of national vengeance in this peasant 
revolt, as Joseph II thought? The unrest had flared up in areas where the 
serfs were predominantly or exclusively Romanian, and the landowners 
and county officials were Hungarian, or considered themselves as such. 
The putatively "national" character of the insurrection seems also to be borne 
out by the fact that the rebels "rebaptized" their noble hostages according 
to the Orthodox rite, and forced the daughters of Hungarian noblemen into 
mock marriages with Romanian peasant lads. It appears, however, that in 
all this the decisive motivation was rooted not in ethnic or national consid­
erations, but in religious ones, reinforced by a strong peasant "egalitarian­
ism ": determination to level social and class distinctions. The most recent 
research has shown that Hungarian and Saxon peasants also volunteered 
for the frontier regiments, and then joined in the revolt. There were Hun­
garian miners from Abrudbanya, even among the leaders. The Saxon vil­
lages around Kisenyed, as well as the predominantly Hungarian village of 
Torock6szentgyorgy also swelled the ranks of the insurgents. In Torda and 
Kolozs counties, a number of Hungarian serfs were sentenced for their part 
in the revolt. At the same time, the spokesmen of nascent Romanian nation­
alism, the Romanian intellectuals had absolutely no sympathy for the re­
volt. Samuil Micu-Klein, for instance, called Horea and his followers "ac­
cursed men" who "wanted to destroy the nobility".
The peasant revolt confirmed Joseph II in his conviction that the serfs' 
grievances required an immediate political solution. With the publication 
of the edict of 2 August, 1785, which reiterated the provisions of the 16 July, 
1783 decree, the serfs were free to move: they were no longer tied to the 
land. Beyond that, however, Joseph could do no more than to legislate on 
some questions of detail. He could make no real headway in the matter of 
regulating feudal services and dues. The preparatory work was begun in
1785, when the serfs' holdings, usufructs and services were registered as 
they had been in Hungary. But no consensus was even reached on just what 
area of land was to constitute a "full holding". Joseph II decided to let the 
matter rest for a while, but never returned to it. The regulations with which 
the emperor tried to lessen the burden of the serfs' dues and services had 
very little practical effect. For one thing, the landowners resented this kind 
of government interference in their dealings with their serfs. For another, 
the details of Joseph's regulations were hardly in keeping with the realities 
of Transylvania. For instance, the 1787 regulations provided not only that 
the landlords or their bailiffs keep written records of each serf's robot, but 
that the serfs themselves each keep a book in which the bailiff could put 
down the number of days they were to spend in robot, and keep track of the 
number of days work already done.
Administrative Reforms
Joseph II tried to introduce some rational order into government at all lev­
els, and took steps to unify the Hungarian and the Transylvanian chancel- 
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ian Crown, he proposed the possible reintroduction of the office of voivode 
as it had existed before Transylvania's "first separation" from the Kingdom 
of Hungary.
One of the most difficult problems was the matter of municipal adminis­
tration, and the need to modernize the existing administrative units. For 
the counties spanned the entire width of the country from east to west, in 
strips at times no more than a village or two wide. The Saxon and Sz6kely 
seats, all separate administrative units, were hardly the size of a riding, and 
Fels6-Feh£r county was particularly fragmented. There could be no ques­
tion that some administrative re-organization was imperative. A great many 
things, however, militated against it. One serious obstacle was the reluc­
tance of the local nobility — and of the Saxon patricians in the Saxon re­
gions who likewise monopolized the offices of local government — to cede 
their prerogatives. A further complication was that the municipalities re­
flected the settlement patterns of the Three Nations, and thus often had 
administrative powers and traditional rights specific to one or the other 
nation. No thoroughgoing modem administrative reform, however, could 
take these national differences into account.
For all that, the Josephine government embarked on the programme of 
reform. The first blow was suffered by the privileged Saxons when equality 
of citizenship was extended to the Romanians of the KirflyfOld living there 
(Concivilitdt). The next blow came in 1782, when Joseph II had the treasury 
confiscate the properties of the Saxon nation, giving as his grounds the cir­
cumstance that the Kir&lyfOld belonged to the Exchequer.
In 1784, Transylvania was divided into eleven counties which fact put an 
end both to the traditional system of the Three Nations, and to municipal 
autonomy. In January 1786, regional commissions were set up: the counties 
were grouped into three regions, with Szeben, Fogaras and Kolozsv^r as 
the three administrative centres, each headed by a regional commissioner. 
The system was meant to function as the administrative arm of centralist 
absolutism, but in fact remained a dead letter.
The attempts to separate clearly the judicial from the administrative arm 
were equally unsuccessful. The new Criminal Code, an admixture of en­
lightened ideas and the belief that only the full rigour of the law could be a 
deterrent to crime, was introduced in 1787 in Transylvania, as in the rest of 
the empire. It is questionable, however, how far Transylvanian justice was 
receptive to the spirit of the new law.
One of the most controversial of Joseph II's measures both at the time 
and subsequently was the introduction of German as the official language. 
He saw it as a step towards the uniform administration of the entire em­
pire, recognizing the fact that Latin was no longer suited to be the common 
official language. The central government was switching more and more to 
doing business in German; and it therefore seemed logical to have German 
replace Latin in its official communications with Hungary and Transylva­
nia as well. However, only 12-15 per cent of Transylvania's population was 
of German origin; a considerably larger percentage was Hungarian, and the 
absolute majority was Romanian. Introducing the language of the smallest 
national minority to replace an obsolete official language which, however, 
had the advantage of being the native tongue of none of the nations was 446
something for which not even the Saxons could muster enthusiasm. The 
decree of 1784 made German the official language of dealings not only with 
the central government offices, but also with municipal and town authori­
ties. Later, Joseph II wished to see German made the official language of the 
Diet, too, although he never convoked it. From the autumn of 1784, admit­
tance to secondary school was conditional on the applicant's proving that 
he could read and write German. Naturally, the decree was implemented 
half-heartedly at best. The Gubemium published its ordinances with the 
German and Hungarian (sometimes Latin) text running in parallel columns. 
The lesser authorities had a great deal of difficulty in finding staff capable 
of satisfying the provisions of Joseph's language decree. Its most lasting 
effect proved to be the significant growth of Hungarian nationalism  in 
Transylvania.
Resistance to Joseph's reforms in Transylvania, too, was motivated partly 
by conservatism, and partly by the new demands of a new age. In just what 
proportions is reflected by the memoranda the Three Nations submitted to 
the court in 1787. Practically everyone of any influence in all three nations 
took part in working out the positions to be adopted. The months of discus­
sion, however, yielded no common platform. The Natio Hungarica and the 
Natio Siculica submitted a joint memorandum, while the Natio Saxonica sent 
a more cautiously-worded remonstrance of their own.
The remonstrance of the Hungarian and the Szekely nation took as its 
premise the doctrine that the Estates were members of the Holy Crown of 
Hungary: they shared with the king. Joseph II, however, had overturned 
the fundamental laws, the whole system of government: no Diets had been 
convened; the Three Nations no longer existed, for Concivilitdt had made 
newcomers and foreigners coequal with the Estates; and the counties had 
lost their former jurisdiction. The introduction of German as the official 
language they found particularly offensive: the Hungarians had become 
strangers in their own country; having had to change their language, they 
could next expect to lose their liberties.
The memorandum cited the frequent changes in the administrative sys­
tem as a major cause of the Horea-led revolt. It practically accused the cen­
tral government of inciting further insubordination: the serfs, seeing that 
the rebels' heinous crimes were not punished with the full rigour of the law, 
were growing ever bolder, especially now that capital punishment was abol­
ished. There would be no security of life and property until the landlords' 
authority — all official authority — was restored. It was difficult to argue 
against the next point, namely, that the serfs' new freedom to migrate re­
moved the incentive they had to renovate their homes, to make improve­
ments or to fertilize the soil. The framers of the memorandum pointed out 
something else that would be sure to give its readers food for thought: the 
serfs could easily believe that they had achieved their freedom to move 
through their revolt. The regulation of feudal services and dues, however, 
was still undecided. The tentative steps that had been taken in this direc­
tion came in for a great deal of criticism. Another measure to which the 
landlords took strong exception was the royal decree of 14 June, 1786, which 
put an end to their functioning as tithe farmers for the treasury, and or- 
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The Hungarian and Szekely Estates also reiterated their traditional griev­
ance that the Diet had not voted the taxes Transylvania was obliged to pay 
(no Diet had been called for twenty-five years), and that the new system of 
taxation violates the principle of "onus non inhaeret fundo". Turning to mili­
tary matters, the most strongly criticized was a pre-Josephine measure: the 
organization of the frontier militia. In the case of the Szekely regiments, the 
main emphasis was on the injustice of this provision: the Szekelys could not 
be obliged both to perform military service and to pay taxes. Establishing 
the Szekely frontier regiments had disrupted the legal order of the Szekely­
fold, and had led to some absurd property claims.
The Romanian frontier militia that had been organized was seen as an 
outright threat by the writers of the memorandum. It was to be feared, they 
said, that the Romanians would use their arms to disturb the peace; they 
might even ally with the Romanians of Wallachia and the Banat to turn 
against Transylvania. (In fact, the Romanian frontier regiments of the Banat 
had helped to defeat the Horea revolt; and there is absolutely no evidence 
anywhere of any joint military action having been planned in these decades 
by the Romanians of Transylvania, Wallachia and the Banat.)
Reading the above memorandum, one would expect to find elements of 
it recurring in the programme adopted by Transylvania's leaders in the 
1790s. However, the programme that was adopted at the moment when it 
seemed that real action might be taken was much more realistic in its evalu­
ation of the Josephine reforms, and showed a much greater sense of politi­
cal responsibility.
The Saxons submitted their own list of grievances at the end of 1787.
Though milder in tone than that of the other two nations, the Saxon petition 
was even more conservative in tenor.
Joseph II had the chancellor for Hungary and Transylvania express his 
displeasure with the writers of the memoranda. Nevertheless, resistance to 
his policies continued to grow, especially when in 1788 Joseph entered the 
war against the Ottoman Empire on Russia's side, and the effects of the 
mobilization (requisitioning and skirmishes along the Turkish border) be­
gan to be felt throughout Transylvania. It was not in Transylvania, how­
ever, that the Josephine order was defeated. The revolutionary unrest in the 
Austrian Netherlands, the failure of the campaigns against the Turks, the 
conflicts of interest with Prussia and domestic discontent, especially in 
Hungary, all combined to convince the emperor that his policies had been 
mistaken.
The Restitutionsedikt (Edict of Restitution) which Joseph II passed on 
his deathbed revoked a whole series of his reform decrees. How much of 
their spirit nevertheless survived the next few decades were to tell.
Feudal Reaction and Reform
The complex of events subsequent to the publication of the Restitutionsedikt 
reflected conservative attempts to restore the feudal order, as much as the 
determination of those committed to the Josephine system to salvage his
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reforms. Reform proposals that went beyond Joseph II's programme also 
made their appearance. The national movements that sprang up everywhere 
in 1790 complicated the above picture, some promoting, some impeding, 
the efforts at reform. But the framework within which all these movements 
had to find space for themselves was the pragmatism of Leopold II's central 
government, under which the empire retrogressed from enlightened abso­
lutism to Franciscan reaction.
The restoration was most easily accomplished in the case of the munici­
pal system and the Saxon institutions: the Josephine county system disinte­
grated, the regional commissions disappeared, and the Saxon University 
was revived. The Saxon position was clear: loyalty to the Habsburgs, ami­
cable relations with the nobility, and the preservation of the union of the 
Three Nations.
The Hungarian and Szekely nations had more far-reaching goals, and at 
the same time also had to deal with pressure coming both from above and 
below that stood to threaten their privileges. These two nations saw union 
with Hungary as the best means of protecting feudal rights, but there was 
also a genuine national motivation in the modern sense of the term in their 
advocacy of unification. The proposed union, however, was rejected at the 
Hungarian Diet. The central government was, by then, following a "divide 
and rule" policy, Leopold referred the question back to the Transylvanian 
Estates, and he became crowned king of Hungary without committing him­
self in principle to the union. In the meanwhile, the serfs of Transylvania 
were growing restive, for there were rumours that the nobility was deter­
mined to abolish the benefits that Joseph II's reforms had brought them.
The nobles began to arm themselves for what in some localities was seen 
as a fight against the Habsburgs, and it took the sober judiciousness of 
GyOrgy Banffy's Gubemium to keep the mutual distrust from flaring up 
into an armed clash.
When the Transylvanian Diet finally convened in December 1790, the 
Estates were most concerned to see the "constitutional forms" of govern­
ment restored. But they also confirmed in his governor's post the man who 
had, in fact, been heading the Gubemium for years, GyOrgy Banffy, Tran­
sylvania's most outstanding statesm an, and a staunch believer in the 
Josephine reforms. An opposition grouping, however, demanded that cer­
tain high government officials be called to account for the way the Estates' 
rights had been encroached upon, and the D iet dem anded that the 
Gubemium pass on to it whatever information it had on proposals and plans 
that might be detrimental to the country. Insistence on the Estates' tradi­
tional rights and the idea of ministerial responsibility are both present here.
In the matter of Transylvania's official language, the Estates took a posi­
tive stand. The Minutes of the Diet were recorded in Hungarian. The as­
sembled Estates also discussed GyOrgy Aranka's proposal for what was to 
become the first Transylvanian (and Hungarian-speaking) academic organi­
zation, the Erdelyi Magyar Nyelvmmelo Tarsasag (Transylvanian Hungar­
ian Philological Society).
The third main topic with which the Diet dealt in the first session was 
the issue of the union with Hungary. It was not only the Saxons who stood 
449  to oppose the union. The Szekelys, too, felt that union might jeopardize
their special rights, while the Protestants were reluctant to see their rights 
placed at the mercy of a Catholic majority. But before the Diet as a whole 
could discuss the question of the proposed union with Hungary, Leopold II 
had decided to split the Hungarian and Transylvanian Chancellery into two 
distinct bodies. This decision (of 25 February, 1791) effectively put off the 
matter of unification. The Transylvanian Diet, however, was not informed 
of this turn of events, and set about specifying the conditions of unification: 
the inclusion of Transylvania in the coronation oath of the king of Hungary; 
guaranteeing Transylvania's governor the right to appear at the Hungarian 
Diet; and the confirmation of Joseph II's measures — the unified Hungarian 
and Transylvanian Chancellery, and the Transylvanian-Hungarian customs 
union. Naturally, Leopold II rejected the Diet's proposal.
Finally, in early April, 1791, the Diet began discussion on the royal re­
script on administrative reorganization and on the regulation of the posi­
tion of the serfs. The legislative work that resulted has remained unparal­
leled in Transylvanian history. One hundred and sixty-two bills were sub­
mitted, and a coherent code of law and a constitution were drawn up.
Transylvania's constitutional position was specifically defined: the House 
of Habsburg ruled Transylvania as a member of the Hungarian Crown, by 
virtue of their title of king of Hungary. Transylvania could not, therefore, 
be governed as part of some other area of the Habsburg Empire.
The Diet passed thirty-seven bills on the oath of the union recognizing 
that the Estates have an equal share in legislation, and that fundamental 
rights of the Hungarian and Transylvanian Chancellery be immutable. Fur­
ther bills dealt with the Diet's rules 6f procedure; with the nobility's right to 
hold office (the non-landed nobility and the non-Saxon cives were restricted 
in the offices they could hold, and non-nobles and non-ciues were declared 
ineligible for office); and with their right to elect the high officials of the 
land (the king was to have power only to confirm the choice).
Among the laws dealing with feudal rights and obligations, there were 
laws which dealt with the rights of the serfs. The Diet was relatively moder­
ate in its approach to the free migration of the serfs. It did, in fact, declare 
that the serf was no longer bound to the soil, but made his ability to move 
conditional on strict prerequisites which were difficult to satisfy. The Diet 
also declared that the landowners had exclusive rights of ownership over 
the forests.
A law was passed which guaranteed the Hungarian language primacy 
over all the other languages in use in Transylvania declaring it to be the 
language in official use within the country itself. The Diet also called for a 
bill to ratify the plans for the Erdelyi Magyar Nyelvrmvelo Tarsasdg.
The matter of taxation was exhaustively dealt with. The Diet reiterated 
the principle that "onus non inhaeret fundo", and restored the freedom from 
taxation of a number of privileged groups — noble ecclesiastics, the land­
less nobility, and the two Szekely military strata — further of some privi­
leged administrative cadres. The Diet also declared again its exclusive right 
to determine the amount of Transylvania's yearly tax, as well as its right to 
levy and to collect it.
A number of important laws dealt with religious issues. One law speci­
fied once again the system of four received religions, and guaranteed the 450
freedom of worship to the faithful of Greek Orthodoxy, "which is already 
considered one of the tolerated religions". The Diet improved on the Patent 
of Toleration by specifying that in the case of mixed marriages, the girls 
were to be baptized in the mother's religion, the boys in the father's.
While all this work was going on, Leopold II forwarded to the Diet the 
national demands summed up in the Supplex Libellus Valachorum (Suppli­
cant Booklet of the Wallachians), the most important political document 
that Transylvania's Romanians produced in the course of the eighteenth 
century.
The Supplex Libellus Valachorum was a collective work: the moving spirits 
behind it were Ignatie Darabont, Uniate bishop of Varad, and his circle; it 
was edited in Vienna, having been written primarily by Iosif Mehesi, who 
relied for his historical documentation on Samuil Micu-KIein. The petition 
took final shape in March 1791. Its historical argumentation followed the 
theory of Daco-Romanian continuity, and as such reflected the shortcom­
ings of a great many of the "national" histories of the period, when the 
neophyte ardour of national sentiment often found expression in an invented 
glorious past. But there can be no arguing on one point of the Supplex Libellus 
Valachorum: the Romanians were the most numerous of the peoples of 
Transylvania. Accordingly, it demanded the recognition of the Romanians 
as the Fourth Nation, with rights for Romanian ecclesiastics, nobles and 
commoners equal to those enjoyed by the analogous classes of the Three 
Nations. Further, it called for the exclusive or additional use of the Roma­
nian language in municipalities and localities inhabited exclusively or pre­
dominantly by Romanians. The Supplex Libellus Valachorum sought to give 
Transylvania's Romanian population a place within the feudal order, and 
was not yet a political statement of nationalism in its modem sense. As the 
Greek Catholic and the Orthodox bishops wrote to the emperor in 1792: 
"The greatest dignity and right of a citizen of Transylvania is to take some 
part in lawmaking and in administration, and to this end to elect dietal 
representatives and government officials, and be himself elected as such". 
It occurs very rarely, however, that the Hungarians elect a Romanian to fill 
any office, "and it is this that really accounts for the bitter and protracted 
oppression of the most populous nation of Transylvania".
At about the same time as the above document y a s  framed, the Uniate 
clergy addressed a petition to the emperor which contained practically the 
same demands, but without the historical claims.
Leopold II referred both documents to the Transylvanian Diet: let the 
Diet be the one to reject them. The Supplex Libellus Valachorum, when read 
to the Diet, met with silence. The Estates had come to the realization that 
Romanian nationalism was a fact of Transylvanian political life. After dis­
cussing the matter in committee, the Diet took the stand that the Romani­
ans could not be given more than the present civic rights in the areas of the 
Hungarian and Szekely nation, for the rights of the nobility and of the libertini 
were equal, and independent of ethnic affiliation, as were the burdens borne 
by the serfs. (The Saxons postponed taking a stand.) As for religious liber­
ties, the Diet noted that the Uniates already had liberty of worship, and a 
bill was in the making to give the Orthodox church the same right. As far as 
the Diet could see, the main cause of the Romanian population's backward­
ness was the ignorance of their priests; a Standing Committee for Ecclesias­
tical Affairs was entrusted with the task of finding a way to improve mat­
ters.
The breakthrough the Romanians had hoped to achieve did not come. In 
the matter of political equality, they received the answer that was to be 
expected. As for the two Greek churches, they did, in fact, enjoy religious 
freedom. But the Three Nations were not about to admit of a fourth lacking 
a landed nobility.
The central government did a thorough job of screening the bills submitted 
by the Diet of 1790-1791. Instead of the union with Hungary, the law that 
was passed pronounced Transylvania to be essentially independent of it.
The government would not hear of legislating the immutability of the 
Estates' fundamental rights. The sovereign's prerogatives, however, were 
reiterated with an absolutistic slant. Nor was the central government in­
clined to ease the exhaustive screening of those wishing to study abroad. 
As for the law which made Hungarian the official language, its wording 
was such that subsequently it could be misinterpreted to apply to Latin. For 
all that, the government did approve some of the bills guaranteeing the 
nobility's rights. Thus, for instance, in keeping with the Restitutionsedikt, the 
old legal system was reinstated. Most of the bills the Diet submitted on 
religious matters received Vienna's approval, including the one guarantee­
ing the Orthodox faithful freedom of worship. The regular committees that 
were to elaborate on the Diet's reform proposals were placed under the 
direction of Gyorgy Banffy. He was to choose — from among those the Diet 
had nominated — the eight men who were to take part in the actual work of 
each committee an effective way of eliminating opposition.
The bills the Diet of 1790-1791 had submitted were taken up by the next 
two Diets as well, but without much more success. By 1794-1795, the Es­
tates were growing more and more impatient. At the beginning of 1794, 
some aristocrats and members of the nobility had formed the Diana Hunt­
ing Society, with a programme that foreshadowed the activities of various 
societies that were to spring up in the Reform Era: translating handbooks 
on agriculture, encouraging horse breeding, undertaking the moral educa­
tion of Transylvania's youth, and providing opportunities for social con­
tacts between the aristocracy and the nobility. The Gubemium, however, 
found the "hunting society" much too politicized for its taste. B&nffy wisely 
counselled it to dissolve before the government broke it up, and the mem­
bers listened to his advice.
By the summer of 1794, the Jacobin movement had reached Transylva­
nia from Hungary. In some counties, the opposition landowners won the 
day, and the county refused to provide new conscripts. Even those already 
conscripted were sent home, and the military aid requested by the govern­
ment was denied. Laszl6 Tiiri, chief justice of Transylvania, the most capa­
ble of the opposition's leaders, headed the group which worked out a com­
prehensive plan for the reform of the Transylvanian military: a mercenary 
peasant army of four thousand, and a noble army of the same size that was 
to rotate in monthly stints under the command of its own generals. Ttiri's 
proposal was submitted to the Diet, but the government intervened, for 
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provoke a "general conflagration", and the chief of staff received "inform a­
tion" that Tliri and the nobility had forty-eight thousand armed men at 
their disposal although Jacobins in Hungary had already been arrested by 
this time. Governor B&nffy, however, soon became convinced that no "con­
flagration" threatened Transylvania, and put an end to the matter by sim­
ply dismissing Tiiri. There were to be no Jacobin trials in Transylvania.
The proposals submitted by the standing committees set up by the 1791 
Diet are the chief indicators of the political attitude of both the Transylvani­
an nobility and of the Gubemium, for the committees worked under Gov­
ernor Banffy's direction.
Regulating the serfs' feudal services and dues continued to be a task that 
involved seemingly insurmountable obstacles. Part of the difficulty was the 
old problem of Transylvania's overpopulation. The committee finally set­
tled the size of a full holding at 3.5 to 6 holds of arable, and 1.5 to 3.5 holds of 
meadow, and required that the copyholder do 2 days of robot a week with 
a draught animal, or with a plough by way of service. For cotter, the robot 
was set at 25-35 days annually. When the Gubemium reviewed the com­
mittee's recommendations, it suggested that an entire holding be defined 
as an area of 5-7.5 holds of arable (for some regions, the suggested upper 
limit was 10 holds), and that in meadow, 2.5-6.5 holds constitute an entire 
holding. The chancellery supported the Gubemium's modifications. But the 
issue never went beyond the stage of preliminary discussion at the 1810- 
1811 Diet. Regulating the serfs' services and dues had got no farther than it 
had been in the 1770s.
The recommendations made by the various standing committees are de­
tailed enough to fill a library. Paging through them, we get a comprehensive 
picture of practically every aspect of contemporary life, including pollu­
tion, and the legal discrimination encountered by various more or less eth­
nically defined occupational groups, such as, for instance, Jewish peddlers 
and Gipsy horse traders. Every recommendation was aimed at modifying 
legislation in the direction of a more modern, less discriminative system.
The voluminous proposals made by the Committee on Economic Policy 
constituted the most comprehensive overview of the Transylvanian economy 
since 1751. Their primary goal was to increase productivity. But the central 
government could not accept a fundamental element of the committee's 
programme, the need for protectionism and for reciprocity in Transylva­
nia's ties with the Hereditary Lands.
The committee headed by Laszl6 Tiiri, by then the leader of the opposi­
tion, submitted a draft Criminal Code that was as enlightened as Joseph II's 
Code of 1787, and which, moreover, had been worked out explicitly with 
Transylvanian conditions in mind.
Another typical Enlightenment attitude was revealed in the recommen­
dation submitted by the Committee for Ecclesiastical Affairs on some mat­
ters raised by the Supplex Libellus Valachorum. The central issue was the 
question of the Romanian population's education. The Saxon position, par­
ticularly as represented by Michael Soterius, a councillor of the Gubemium, 
called for a ruthless "civilizing" campaign. There was to be strict regulation 
of Romanian habits of building and dressing; certain Saxon institutions were 
4 5 3  to be introduced into the Romanian villages; assimilation was to be forced;
and the Romanian forms of recreation were to be "reformed" — for one 
thing, outlaw ballads were to be banned. M6zes Bartha, a Uniate jurist from 
Kolozsvar and a town councillor, attributed much greater weight to educa­
tion (including some attempts at magyarization), and saw the internal re­
form of the Romanian church and the teaching of trades as being of major 
importance. The Josephine chairman of the committee, JSnos Esterh&zy, and 
Banffy himself, felt that the main emphasis should be on education, but that 
the purpose of education was to increase the number of the emperor's loyal 
subjects, rather than knowledge itself. On this view, a better educated Ro­
manian clergy was of the utmost necessity. In the end, it was Esterh^zy and 
Banffy's ideas that were submitted to the government. The point was never 
reached of treating Romanian national grievances as a political issue, of the 
Romanians' being invited to discuss their own future: the committee had 
no Romanian members. In the final analysis, it did not much matter. For by 
the time the committee's recommendations had filtered through the official 
government channels, all that remained was the proposal for setting up an 
Orthodox seminary and teachers' college.
No Diet met to submit the committee recommendations until 1810, and 
by then the political leaders of the 1790s were either too old, or no more. 
The laws that were passed in 1810-1811 were a conservative and loyal modi­
fication of the original proposals. Politically, the twenty years that followed 
practically ruled out the possibility of reform initiatives.
Up to the 1830s, it was in the cultural sphere that Transylvania's would- 
be modernizers had to try to continue what had barely started in the realm 
of politics.
Culture and Bureaucracy
No sphere of Transylvanian culture escaped the influence of contemporary 
European trends.
The philosopher and mathematician P61 Sipos was first a Kantian, and 
then, after reading Fichte and Schleiermacher, developed his own brand of 
idealism, an amalgam of Enlightenment principles and Christian morality. 
The most erudite and systematic Kantian not just in Transylvania but also 
in Hungary at the time was Samuel Koteles, professor of philosophy at the 
Calvinist colleges of Marosv£s3rhely and Nagyenyed.
In botany, it was Johann Christian Baumgarten who gained an interna­
tional recognition for the two decades of research summarized in his Enu- 
meratio Stirpium in Magno Transylvaniae Principatu praeprimis indigenarum 
(Enumeration of the Genera in the Great Principality of Transylvania espe­
cially the indigenous). From 1804, Farkas Bolyai taught at the Calvinist col­
lege at Marosvds^rhely, raising the standards of education in the natural 
sciences there to a European level.
Transylvania proved particularly receptive to certain innovations in 
medicine. Vaccination against smallpox was introduced just a year after the 
first vaccines became available, thanks in part to the efforts of Ferenc Nyulas. 
Nyulas was also an expert on the medicinal properties of Transylvania's 454
thermal springs, publishing a book on the subject in 1800. The first medical 
book in Romanian which also dealt with mineral waters was written in 1821 
by Vasile Popp. He was physician to the miners at Zalatna, and his first 
work, a doctoral dissertation, was on Romanian burial customs. Popp also 
compiled the first scholarly bibliography of Romanian literature.
These were the years when attempts were made to establish an institu­
tional framework for the country's various cultures. We have already re­
ferred to Gy orgy Aranka's raising the matter of the Transylvanian Hungar­
ian Philological Society at the 1790-1791 Diet. Although it had the Diet's 
support, the central government refused on some formal pretext to allow 
this. GyOrgy Banffy, however, provided for this functioning under an alter­
nate name of Proba Tarsasag (Testing Society). The society operated from 
1793 to 1806; most of its members were Hungarians, but the Romanian loan 
Piuariu-Moln&r also belong. The Saxon Martin Hochmeister published its 
members' articles in the Siebenbiirgische Quartalschrift (Transylvanian Quar­
terly) of (Nagy)Szeben. The society gave a great deal of support to the Hun­
garian theatre at Kolozsv&r, with a number of the members, Aranka among 
them, translating plays for it to perform. Many of the ambitious plans that 
the Hungarian society started out with were never realized: the systematic 
study of Transylvania's flora and mineral deposits, the improvement of 
education in the natural sciences, and the encouragement of the use of the 
country's natural resources. The society had also planned to set up a library 
and a museum — something along the lines of the Bruckenthal Collection, 
which had given a great boost to Saxon culture. By the early 1800s, a great 
many of the society's activities were being discontinued. Indifference, lack 
of funds, and the deterioration of the political climate combined to bring it 
to a complete standstill in 1806. The Keziratkiado Tarsasag (Manuscript Pub­
lishing Society) affiliated to the Proba Tarsasag had managed to bring out 
only a few publications.
Hungarian culture in Transylvania received its new impetus from Hun­
gary. An abettor in this was GSbor Dobrentei, the son of a Hungarian Lu­
theran minister who had settled in Transylvania to be a tutor. Encouraged 
by the great Hungarian writer, Ferenc Kazinczy, he started the Erdelyi 
Muzeum (Transylvanian Museum) in 1814. Though relatively short-lived, 
this was to become the most prestigious Hungarian literary journal of the 
age. Its success was due as much to the survival of Freemasonic traditions 
as to the fact that the Transylvanian aristocracy, isolated as they were, had 
a heightened appreciation of their vernacular — for which they were often 
quoted as an example to Hungary's aristocrats by the literary gentlemen. 
However, the nation-wide famine and the competition coming in from 
Hungary proved too much for the Erdelyi Muzeum, and it ceased publica­
tion in 1817.
It was the theatre, taken very much as a part of a social intercourse, that 
generated the most enthusiastic activity. The pioneers of Hungarian theatre
— J&nos K6tsi Patk6, Pal Jants6, J6zsef Benke — were all Protestants and 
Transylvanians, having got their start, as indeed did the Hungarian theatre, 
on the stages of the Protestant colleges. By 1821, the Hungarian National 
Players' Company (Magyar Nemzeti Jdtekszin) was operating in Kolozsv&r.
4 5 5  One of its greatest patrons was the leading oppositional politician, Mikl6s
Wesselenyi the Elder. But the theatre company also had the support of Gov­
ernor B&nffy, and his non-Hungarian wife, Jozefa Palm.
Though love of the Hungarian language stood at the centre of all this 
activity, the really significant Transylvanian scholarly achievements in lin­
guistics occurred abroad. For the government did not succeed in isolating 
the country completely. It was thus that Samuel Gyarmathy's major work, 
the Affinitas linguae hungaricae (Affinity of the Hungarian Language) ap­
peared in Gottingen, in 1799. Gyarmathy was a pioneer of comparative lin­
guistics, using vocabulary and inflectional homologies to arrive at the iden­
tification of the entire family of Finno-Ugrian languages.
Within two decades, the other great Transylvanian linguist, S&ndor KorOsi 
Csoma, had set out from Transylvania for east-central Asia in search of the 
ancient homeland of the Hungarians. What he found was Tibet, and the 
project of his life: the compilation of the first Tibetan-English dictionary.
There is less to say about Saxon culture during these decades. Cultural 
life in Szeben received a setback when the Gubemium moved to Kolozsv&r.
The contemplated Academy of Sciences was never set up. Instead, the Soci- 
etas Philohistorum (Society of the Adherents of History) was founded, and 
the publication of Transylvanian chronicles began. Of the Saxon journals, 
the Siebenbiirgische Quartalschrift appeared until 1801; the Provinzialblatter 
(Provincial Papers; 1805-1824) was its intellectual heir.
More impressive was the Romanian cultural activity of these decades.
True, its centre was outside Transylvania, in Buda and Lemberg. Micu-Klein,
£incai and Maior who were regarded and called the Transylvanian Triad 
had had their fill of the growing conservatism of the Romanian clergy, and 
of the excellent manager, Bishop Ivan Bob, who, though a patron of Roma­
nian culture, tended to discriminate against men more talented than he.
They moved to Buda, and went to work for the University Press there. As 
the leading publisher of Romanian books, it became a cultural centre for 
Moldavia and Wallachia as well, catering the wealthy boyars who wanted 
to publish either literary works or political tracts arguing their country's 
right to independence. It is indicative that after loan Piuariu-M olnir had 
tried vainly in Transylvania to set up a popular educational journal and a 
philosophical society, he made considerable profits by publishing Ortho­
dox religious literature in Buda, for sale in all the Romanian-speaking lands.
While the eclectic Samuil Micu-Klein, and the nonconformist Gheorghe 
^incai, were able to get only a fraction of their works published, Petru Maior, 
a realist, became the most prolific Romanian author of the time. It was he 
who handed down the views of the Enlightenment historians on the origins 
of Transylvania's Romanians in his Istoria pentru inceputul romanilor in Dacia.
The work deals with Transylvanian history essentially to the time of the 
Hungarian Conquest in the pragmatic, and as yet civilized, style of argu­
mentation characteristic of the age, and without looking for scapegoats for 
the way events developed. Maior's Istoria became a bible for the next gen­
eration of Romanians on both sides of the Carpathians.
Among the early Transylvanian Romanian literary works, by far the most 
outstanding was Ion Budai-Deleanu's Jiganiada. Budai-Deleanu had taken 
an active role in defending the theses of the Supplex Libellus Valachorum 
from the attacks published on it (his Widerlegung / Reputation/ is a defence 456
of the theory of Daco-Roman continuity), and he drafted the new petition 
the Romanian nation sent to the emperor in 1804. But he is best remem­
bered for the Jiganiada, a wry anti-epic about the Gipsies, who, in return for 
their help against the Turks, are offered the chance to establish their own 
state by Vlad Tepes, the dread voivode of Wallachia. Fighting they do little 
of, but as soon as the Turkish menace ease, begin arguing as to whether 
they should establish a democracy or a monarchy. They can come to no 
agreement, and anarchy returns; with the result that their chance to estab­
lish a state goes astray. A lonely, aging Transylvanian Enlightenment figure 
writing in Lemberg, Budai-Deleanu attempted to pass on to his people a 
lifetime's worth of sobering experience.
The Orthodox Romanian writers represented the "popular" element in 
Transylvanian literature. While the University Press in Buda published schol­
arly books and handbooks on agriculture and animal husbandry, the presses 
in Nagyszeben and Brass6 put out "chap books" for popular reading, writ­
ten by men like Vasile Aron and loan Barac. Even Radu Tempea, the direc­
tor of the Orthodox elementary schools, whose grammar followed the 
latinizing trend, made some concessions to his readership.
The petty cares of day-to-day survival put great strains on the Orthodox 
church as well, as pressure from the Greek Catholics mounted. To forestall 
the flare-up of religious conflict among the Romanian churches, in 1789 Aron 
Budai-Deleanu, Ion's brother, secretary of the consistory and a councillor 
of the treasury, together with Radu Tempea, recommended to Vienna a 
United Romanian church that would be Catholic in name, Orthodox in its 
rites and laws, and more autonomous in its relationship with the govern­
ment. The Gubernium rejected the proposal in view of the critical foreign 
situation, which made the prospect of any popular movement unappealing. 
The Orthodox church was defenseless against the growing strength of Greek 
Catholicism. It was partly because of this that it looked to the Romanian 
lands beyond the Carpathians in expanding the range of its educational 
activities. Piuariu-Moln^r was the one who actually visited the principali­
ties, bitterly noting that it was Moldavia and Wallachia which benefited 
from the educated Romanians' determination to leave Transylvania behind. 
In the 1810s, Gheorghe Lazar was one of these voluntary exiles, who came 
into conflict with his bishop and established a higher education in Roma­
nian excluding thereby the Orthodox Greek. This was to have such dedi­
cated followers later.
The only noteworthy political activity of the 1810s was the renewed at­
tempt to regulate feudal services and dues. The Diet of 1810-1811 did not 
really deal with the issue. But in 1813 famine lent some urgency to the mat­
ter: serfs were leaving the land in droves for the principalities, for Hungary, 
and for the less affected areas of Transylvania. On 31 December, 1813, Francis 
I called on Chancellor Samuel Teleki to submit his reform proposal, and 
two weeks later, the chancellery presented a modified version of the Hun­
garian regulations. There the matter rested, until 1817, when Francis I, on 
his visit to Transylvania, saw for himself what famine at its worst could be 
like. He called on the aging Governor Banffy to implement the reform, and 
a commission was set up for the purpose. The commission suggested ac- 
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in 1790-1791, and that the Diet be convened to do so. In the end, the Coun­
cil of State took over the matter on 17 May, 1819. For the time being, it did 
not specify the size of an entire holding, but wanted a new census taken. A 
novelty of the proposed regulation, however, was that it finally set the robot 
at the level it had been in Hungary for over fifty years: one day a week with 
a draught animal, and two days a week without. This would have meant a 
great improvement for Transylvania's serfs, though their position would 
still have been much worse than that of the Hungarian peasants, because 
they had much smaller holdings.
But the proposed regulation satisfied no one. The central government 
thought it best to call in impartial outsiders to carry the reform through, a 
group of royal commissioners headed by Antal Cziriky, vice-president of 
the Hungarian Treasury.
The county assemblies protested vehemently, gleaning their arguments 
from every possible source: from Hungarian customary law to Rousseau's 
social contract. In the fray we find some of the future leaders of Transylva­
nia's liberals: Miklbs Wessel6nyi the Younger, Ad&m Kendeffi, and others. 
For opposition to the proposed regulation of feudal relations in 1819-1820 
brought into one camp the conservatives who were determined to give no 
concessions to their serfs, and the "feudal constitutionalists", those who 
insisted on the Diet's passing whatever measures needed to be taken. The 
two groups were to diverge greatly in the decades to come: in a generation, 
the latter group would be initiating the emancipation of the serfs.
The general air of discontent did nothing to alleviate the very different 
kind of discontent among the serfs.'Peasant movements sprang up every­
where: in Doboka county, the eastern comer of Kolozs county, in KuktillS, 
and in Als6- and Fels6-Feh6r counties. At the centre of the dispute was the 
size of the holdings: the peasants demanded a new land survey, and the 
rectification of the injustices they had suffered in the previous one. Some 
wanted to join the frontier regiments, others wanted to see the proposed 
maximum two-days' robot confirmed.
II. The Reform Era 
(1830-1848)
The 1830s marked the beginning of a new phase in the history of the peo­
ples of Transylvania. Gone was the oppressive torpor of the previous dec­
ade; political and social activism was more widespread and more lively 
than perhaps ever before. Hungarian historians are wont to call this period 
of ferment the "Reform Era", indicating thereby that it was characterized 
by a commitment to liberal reforms among Hungarian politicians, who 
wanted to see the country gradually make the change from feudalism to 
capitalism, and were determined to remove the impediments to economic, 
social and political modernization. Contemporary — especially Romanian 
and Saxon — sources, however, generally refer to the period as the era of 
"national awakening", a term which focuses on perhaps the decisive ele­
ment of the value system and the view of life of the time. For these were the 
decades when among Hungarians, Romanians and Saxons alike more and 
more people dedicated themselves to wakening their respective nations from 
their passivity, convinced that there was not another moment to lose if they 
were ever to establish a free community of east-central Europe, national 
revival centred around the national language. "The nation" became a sacro­
sanct concept denoting both the social collective of native speakers of a 
particular language, and the entire complex of conscious and unconscious 
factors making for their sense of cohesion.
These national ideologies, which focused on the collective whole, inspired 
the belief that the changes involved in the ongoing process of bourgeois 
transformation would serve to bridge the existing social differences. At the 
same time, the idea that east-central and south-eastern Europe might be 
reorganized along the lines of a community of coequal, linguistically homo­
geneous nations kindled hopes of radical changes in the existing power struc­
ture and political system. Intransigent nationalism and profound idealism 
characterized the thinking of most contemporaries; more precisely, some 
admixture of these two elements, in proportions that varied with the per­
sonality involved. These were the decades when the m odern ideas of 
human rights and personal liberty become established beyond eradication, 
but concomitantly they gave birth to the ideologies that would militate 
against them.
Hungarian Liberalism and the Feudal Constitution
The first national movement to make its appearance on the Transylvanian 
political scene was that of the Hungarians.
The Transylvanian movement was an organic part of the reform move­
ment afoot in Hungary, though it had a dynamism all its own. In Hungary, 
the liberal reformists had a much stronger basis of support. For there, the 
middle nobility was much more numerous. It was this social group that 
had the greatest stake in comprehensive social and political reforms, and 
which consciously and proudly assumed the role of "middle class" which 
in western Europe had been played by the bourgeoisie. The middle nobility 
was a social formation specific to Hungary; in all of eastern Europe, there 
was no group with comparable autonomy of local self-government. For the 
municipal government of the counties was in the hands of the middle nobil­
ity. Thanks to the county system, there were as many small power centres 
in Hungary as there were counties, and these centres of local resistance to 
central government from Vienna had learned to work in concert for greater 
effectiveness.
Transylvania had no middle nobility of any great consequence, but many 
more of its aristocrats took an active role in the reform movement than 
Hungary's. So much so, that conservative detractors of the Transylvanian 
movement tried to convince the court that it was no more than some new 
machination devised by the aristocracy. In fact, the half a dozen or so aris­
tocrats with the largest properties w,ere conservative, and for the most part 
deeply in debt. Most Transylvanian aristocrats, however, had incomes hardly 
surpassing that of members of the middle nobility in Hungary. Their social 
influence, nevertheless, was all the greater. Most of them had strong family 
ties to the middle and lesser nobility who shaped the direction of county 
politics. During their education the young aristocrats forged lifelong friend­
ships with their teachers, and with the intelligentsia as such. Culture and 
education in Transylvania were becoming a social force that was to under­
mine the traditional class system.
It can hardly be a coincidence that it was during these years that the term 
"intelligentsia" acquired currency. But Transylvania never produced a clas­
sical intelligentsia, the class of politically dispossessed social critics so typi­
cal of Poland and Russia in the nineteenth century. For while the Polish 
intelligentsia could do no more than keep alive the faint spark of hope for 
national independence, and the Russian no more than indefatigably sustain 
literary protests, in Transylvania, the intelligentsia was able to enter the 
fray and take part in the struggle for modernization.
Yet, though Transylvania's feudal institutions permitted initiative, they 
fell far short of providing a framework for consistent reform. The counties 
here were much more at the mercy of the central government than in Hun­
gary. The county administrations had no right to collect taxes for their own 
purposes; it was the central government which distributed the monies avail­
able. When the time came to elect new local officials, the county assemblies 
elected a candidate from each of three received religions, but it was the 
government which selected which one of them would, in fact, hold office. 460
Still, the counties' formal autonomy permitted a large degree of organized 
resistance to the central government. At times, the county assemblies were 
attended by as many as three or four thousand people. The fact that they 
had a part in the choice of who would run the county administration and 
judiciary, and could choose their representatives to the Diets made partici­
pation in public affairs a matter of personal interest even to the consider­
able numbers of illiterate among the lesser nobility.
Structurally, the unicameral Transylvanian Diet was at an advantage over 
the Hungarian when it came to pushing through the programme of reform. 
The Regalists — drawn for the most part from among the aristocracy and, 
for the sake of balance, the lesser nobility — when they joined with the 
senior municipal officials and the members of the Gubernium, who also 
voted in the Diet, comprised a majority of 200-230 votes. The initiative, 
however, was in the hands of the county delegates (thirty-six men), prima­
rily by virtue of their psychological and moral superiority as the representa­
tives of "the people". They generally won the support of the delegates of 
the Szekely seats, as well as of the town delegates (between thirty-six and 
thirty-eight) each of whom could cast one vote (unlike in Hungary, where 
all the towns together were entitled to but one vote). As often as not, they 
also had the delegates of the Saxon seats (twenty-two votes) on their side, 
to say nothing of the fact that not all Regalists were conservative.
The central government had convoked no Diet since 1811, though by law 
it should have called one every year. This flagrant violation of the constitu­
tion had the result that when the Diet did convene, Transylvania's nobles 
joined forces against bureaucratic absolutism to a man.
The liberal nobility supported the demands of some urban and intellec­
tual personalities for the democratization of town politics, and of all repre­
sentative bodies. For the landowning nobility had moved into the towns in 
considerable numbers, and they, too, kept coming up against the bureaucra­
cy of the closed oligarchies. Kolozsvir had become a "capital city" of sorts 
after the aristocracy had built sumptuous residents there. The nobility, who 
enjoyed freedom from taxation in the countryside, paid local taxes like any 
resident of the town. Their integration was so complete that many a noble­
man acquired the rights of a burgher in his town. The town casinos were set 
up in the effort to bridge the social gap between the noblemen and the ur­
ban middle classes, and laboured to diffuse middle-class values. The role 
played by the liberal nobility in the towns, and the grudging respect of their 
rural peers, considerably enhanced the prestige of the Hungarian towns at 
a time when the nobility as a whole was losing something of its old authority.
The Transylvanian reform movement is characterized by a curious di­
chotomy. While the Liberals' political programme called only for the resto­
ration and consolidation of the old feudal constitution, there was more and 
more talk of the need to win recognition for bourgeois civil liberties. What 
they wanted was democracy for the nobility, only to be able to take the step 
to a full-fledge liberal bourgeois democracy. No one career illustrates this 
duality of Hungarian liberalism in Transylvania better than that of Baron 
Mikl6s Wesselenyi.
In the 1820s, he was the one who organized the nobility's resistance to 
the central government's efforts at regulating feudal dues and services. Ten
years later, he was one of the leaders of the reformist opposition at the 
Hungarian Diet, and it was largely thanks to his powers of persuasion that 
the Liberals made comprehensive social reform part of their programme of 
constitutional self-government. For it was Wesselenyi who was one of the 
first to advocate "m aking common cause on the basis of common inter­
ests", in other words, who wanted to convince landlords and serfs alike 
that modernization and national revival were in the interest of them both. 
W esselenyi's book, Bah'tetelekrol (On Preconceptions) — which appeared in 
1833, after a delay of two years and in Leipzig because of the censorship — 
contained proposals that were far too radical for even his liberal contempo­
raries. He recommended that a regulation, applicable nation-wide, be in­
troduced, stipulating how much a serf was to pay his lord and on what 
terms in order to become the free owner of his land, that is, to redeem, once 
and for all, the holding he lived on from its burden of services and pay­
ments in kind. And while Wesselenyi was presenting motions for thorough­
going social reform at the Hungarian Diet convened in Pozsony in 1832, in 
the same year in Transylvania he was still calling on the central government 
to redress the Estates' grievances. In other words, he was insisting that the 
feudal constitution be restored intact. His demand that the nobility's liber­
ties be respected won him enormous popularity especially in the Sz6kelyfold.
The Hungarian Liberals of Transylvania were keenly aware that they 
needed to formulate their demands with an eye on their supporters, and on 
the possibilities open to them. K&roly Szasz, the brilliant exponent of the 
opposition's policy of grievances and of the legal and historical arguments 
used to support it, had this to say: "'We can proceed only step by step. He 
who steps out of line to race ahead will not be able to move the masses, and 
will himself fall victim to his recklessness. He who stays in line, at least 
encouraging the others on, has a chance of getting his fellows to proceed a 
little faster".1
In the cultural sphere, it is relatively easy to trace the path from the En­
lightenment to liberalism, and the turning-point, too, is clear cut. S£ndor 
Boloni Farkas, who translated Goethe and Schiller, and in the 1820s still 
maintained that in compiling the first menu in Hungarian he was doing 
"m ore ... for the cause as a whole than by some theoretical work" on the 
importance of national customs,2 returned a few years later from a trip to 
the United States to score the publishing success of the decade with his 
travelogue. Until that time, America for most Transylvanians had been syn­
onymous with freedom of religion; in Boloni's book, it was hailed as the 
country of "common sense".3 His objective accounts still convey the impact 
of a political creed: "It is only liberty that can mellow man for liberty and 
culture".4
1. K. S zasz, Oskol5kr61 (On Schools). Nemzeti Tarsalkodo, 1841, 2nd semester, No. 2.
2. Letter by SAndor BolOni Farkas to J6zsef Ged<5.11 March, 1829. Cited by E. J akab,
in: BOlOni Farkas Scindor 6s kora. (Scindor BOlOni Farkas and his Epoch.)
Kereszteny Magveto, 1870, 277.
3 . S. BOlOni F arkas, Utazas tszak-Amerikaban. (Travelling in North America.) Ed­
ited and introduced by S. B enko . Bucharest 1966, 274.
4. From the diary of S. BolOni F arkas. Ibid. 51. 462
B5l5ni represented the radical, democratic trend in liberalism, a trend 
highly congenial to the Unitarian cast of mind. Though they comprised only 
10 per cent of Transylvania's Hungarians, the Unitarians' fine school sys­
tem guaranteed them considerable social mobility. At the same time, since 
the Unitarian was the lowest ranking of the received religions, Unitarians 
were often at a disadvantage when it came to jobs in the civil service. This, 
as much as the Deism implicit in their theology, made them particularly 
susceptible to rationalism and liberalism.
The Calvinists were the largest and most powerful group among the 
Hungarians of Transylvania. The contemporary reforms within the Calvin­
ist church were, thus, significant as the first experiments in modern demo­
cratic community organization. Under the new system, every head of a family 
could cast his vote for the members of the consistory, and commoners, too, 
could be chosen elders in the two-round election. The Calvinists expressly 
set out to follow the American Constitution in their organizational reforms, 
and the government watched them with apprehension, fearful that the op­
position would try to reform the Transylvanian constitution, too, in this 
spirit, if it ever acquired a majority in the Diet.
Nevertheless, central government could not ignore indefinitely the pres­
sures being put upon it especially by the Hungarians, and finally called the 
Diet to meet in the summer of 1834. Archduke Ferdinand d'Este, who was 
sent to Transylvania as royal commissioner, hastened to inform the court 
that should the nobility take arms against the central government, the Ro­
manian peasantry would turn against them in a ruthless jacquerie. Nor did 
the archduke waste any time bringing his conviction home to the reformist 
opposition. Things were no more auspicious at the Diet, where already a 
discussion of the rules of procedure raised antagonisms to such a fever pitch 
that the house was constantly under threat of dissolution. It did not take 
long for the threat to become reality. The government considered the mod­
erately liberal "doctrinaire liberal party" even more dangerous than the 
"Radicals" led by Miklos Wesselenyi. And though it was commonly be­
lieved that the Diet had been dissolved to chastize Wesselenyi for having 
dared to distribute lithographed copies of the Diet's debates, in fact the 
ruler ordered the dissolution before work of the publications had even 
reached Vienna. Chancellor Mettemich had made up his mind to institute 
exemplary reprisals against the Transylvanian reformers, in part to discour­
age those inclined to call for liberal constitutional reforms in other parts of 
the empire. Charges of treason or insubordination were brought against all 
who had taken part in the movement; Wesselenyi's case was heard by both 
the Transylvanian and Hungarian Diets, and in the end, he was sentenced 
to three years in prison. The Transylvanian nobility, for the most part, re­
acted to the court's repressive tactics with passive resistance, so much so 
that finally, the government decided on a more conciliatory tone.
In 1837, a new Diet was convened. The Estates received assurances that 
certain important elements of the feudal constitution would be respected, 
especially as regards the election of officials. Both sides seemed determined, 
for the moment, to steer clear of the most divisive issues. Nevertheless, the 
opposition won a real victory when Archduke Ferdinand, the court's can­
didate for the position of governor, failed to get the requisite number of 
463 votes, and left Transylvania, mortified.
The Hungarian Liberals' Attitude toward 
the Nationalities
In Hungary, too, the 1830s ended on a note of compromise between the 
court and the reformist opposition. Thus the unbridgeable differences be­
came less manifest for some time. Not that Vienna had abandoned bureau­
cratic absolutism; but it did make certain concessions to feudal constitu­
tionalism. The Hungarian national movement was dedicated to the idea of 
building a nation-state. Its leaders thought to ally with liberal forces through­
out the empire to transform the Habsburg lands into a confederation in 
which Transylvania would be unified with Hungary. For the Hungarian 
were haunted by the spectre of national extinction which Herder had con­
jured up at the end of the eighteenth century, haunted by the fact that they 
were kinless in the "sea of Slavs". The sense of ethnic isolation was but 
compounded by the Hungarian Liberals, who spoke of four million Hun­
garians and ten million non-Hungarians, when in fact there were five mil­
lion Hungarians, and the total population of the lands of the Hungarian 
Crown was at most twelve million. (The majority of the Hungarians lived 
in the dynamically developing heart of the Carpathian Basin, and only ten 
to twelve per cent in Transylvania, where they comprised around thirty per 
cent of the population.)
The proposed unification of Transylvania and Hungary was part and 
parcel of the Liberals' programme for the modernization of the empire as a 
whole, and certainly would have entailed considerable changes in Transylva­
nia. For Hungary was farther along the road to replacing feudal institutions 
with more equitable ones; it had a more modem legal system, with the 
peasantry enjoying some degree of legal protection; and commodity pro­
duction, too, benefited from being fewer restrictions on the market.
Unification — the details of which the Liberals proposed to leave to the 
two Diets — was conditional on the introduction of liberal reforms in Transyl­
vania, and on regulating the peasantry's services to bring them in line with 
the provisions in effect in Hungary. But it also assumed that the multi-eth- 
nic communities in both countries could be integrated into what would, 
after all, be a Magyar (Hungarian) nation-state. The Hungarian Liberals 
considered that social reform had to go hand in hand with "magyarization", 
for a multi-national country, they felt, would forever remain in thrall to 
feudal particularism and local oligarchies. The particular syllogism on which 
their programme rested ran as follows: if the Hungarian nobility were able 
to push through its programme of social and constitutional reform, the newly 
enfranchised non-Magyar peoples would prove loyal to the "Hungarian" 
nation-state, even to the point of learning the Hungarian language. For it 
was an axiom of the age that the supremacy of the national language was a 
precondition of progress. The Hungarian reformers appreciated neither the 
difficulties of learning Hungarian, nor the elemental strength of the resist­
ance with which every attempt at forced assimilation necessarily meets. 
The fact that the ethnic conflicts of previous decades were essentially class 
conflicts rooted in the feudal system that they were proposing to do away 
with, also helped fuel their illusions. And the analogies they thought to 464
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discover in studying the history of other nations only confirmed their con­
viction that civic liberties and national homogeneity were correlatives. They 
cited the example of France for what a unified people could achieve. They 
pointed to the United States as an example of the power of political rights to 
integrate people of the most varied ethnic backgrounds into the same "na­
tion", and by way of domestic examples of the same, spoke of the spontane­
ous magyarization of the non-Hungarian nobility, and of the non-Hungar­
ian lesser nobility's loyalty to the reformist cause.
In the 1830s, the demands for social reform and for magyarization ap­
peared as an organic whole. " I  spared no effort in spreading the ideals of 
democracy. ... I lived and died for the language of my native land, and I 
tried to suppress the languages of others ... and make it the sole language, 
for I wanted to make of every inhabitant [of this land] a free Hungarian", 
wrote Boloni in his diary in 1835,5 only to take a very firm stand against 
magyarization later. Wesselenyi, too, initially wanted to make their learn­
ing Hungarian a precondition of the serfs' emancipation. By the 1840s, how­
ever, seeing the political activism of the non-Magyar peoples, he warned 
against forceful magyarization on a number of occasions. The change shows 
common sense and a growing moral sensibility to values other than one's 
own. Increasingly, the Hungarian reformers came to see interference in the 
language any citizen chose to use of the private sphere as unworthy and 
unjust. However, they still insisted that Hungarian replace Latin as the offi­
cial language. "To do less would be cowardice; to demand more would be 
tyranny; either course of action would be suicide", was the way Kossuth 
put it in the Pesti Hirlap.6
There was one point in the Hungarian Liberals' programme, however, 
which from the beginning stood to promote the interests of the Romanian 
nation: their insistence on the freedom of religion. At the beginning of the 
1830s some counties were already frustrating the government's attempts to 
spread Greek Catholicism at the expense of the Greek Orthodox faith, and 
instructed their delegates to the Diet to take a stand for the legal recognition 
of the Orthodox church. Less than ten years later, the Transylvanian Diet of 
1841-1843 instructed its standing committee to prepare a bill to this effect 
and also provided for the emancipation of the Jews.
A number of the local assemblies meeting in preparation for the Diet 
voted to instruct their delegates to support the liberal aim "to do away" 
with national, religious and denominational strife. And yet, hardly had the 
Diet convened, than the Liberals submitted a bill on the use of the Hungar­
ian language which was bound to have just the opposite effect. True, the 
thrust of the action was to force the central government and the conserva­
tive Estates to recognize Hungarian as the official language of Transylvani­
an administration and legislation. The Szekely nation's and the Hungarian 
nation's municipalities had always used Hungarian in their official deal-
5. Boloni Farkas Sdndor napldja. (Diary by SSndor BOlOni Farkas.) Foreword written 
by E. J a n c s O . Bucharest 1971, 49.
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ings. But now there was a wish to make it compulsory for the counties, and 
for the Saxon seats too, to keep their church registers in Hungarian. Fur­
thermore, the bill provided that in ten years' time, Hungarian be the lan­
guage of instruction in the Greek Catholic school of Balazsfalva, and at the 
Orthodox seminary as well. This last set of provisions, however, was repu­
diated by leading Liberals as an attempt at forceful assimilation, and this, 
as well as the outcry among the Romanians and the court's reluctance to 
sanction the bill in the above form, led to the provision's being omitted 
from the second draft.
The Hungarian Liberals respected the traditional autonomous institu­
tions of the nationalities. Their proposal that these institutions correspond 
with the Hungarian municipalities and the Gubemium in Hungarian was 
meant to give expression to the country's concord. How far they were com­
mitted to safeguarding the traditional Three Nations' institutions is reflected 
in Wesselenyi's Szozat a magyar es szlav nemzetiseg iigyeben (Appeal for the 
Question of the Hungarian and the Slav Nationalities) published in 1843. 
Here, Wesselenyi, advocating the empire's reorganization as a confedera­
tion, recommends that the Slavs living in Austria be given national autonomy 
analogous to that of the Saxons of Transylvania. The Saxons, however, were 
by that time demanding an autonomy more consonant with the modern 
idea of a nation.
The bill to introduce Hungarian as Transylvania's official language gave 
rise to heated debate in the Hungarian, Romanian and Saxon press. And 
though a great many unfounded accusations were hurled on all sides, look­
ing back two decades' later, the Romanian George Bari$, had this to say 
about the "language war": "Let us concede without respect for nationality, 
that war, the war of pens, was justified, was magnanimous ... and was natu­
ral; it was human nature fighting for self-preservation.''7
The sound and fury of day-to-day power politics, however, inspired also 
quite another response: the longing for a society that knew no national dis­
tinctions, where all men were equal. We can find traces of Transylvanian 
utopianism in the 1843 Arithmetica (Arithmetic) of Farkas B61yai, the pre­
server of the eighteenth-century homo universalis idea and professor of math­
ematics at Marosv£s3rhely. His oblique references to communal property 
were taken up by his son, J&nos, the same Janos B61yai who, in 1832, had 
been the first to introduce the principles of non-Euclidean geometry in the 
"Appendix" to his father's Tentamen (Experiments). A passionate romantic, 
Janos Bdlyai was to work out a comprehensive theory of social organization 
in his "Udvtan", a set of precepts for the common weal, which took into 
account and tried to forestall the possibilities of emotional conflict among 
the members of his Utopian society, where all property was to be held in 
common. Another Transylvanian Utopian was Samuel Brassai, polyglot pro­
fessor at the Unitarian college, who had his schoolmaster expound the fol­
lowing theory in the pages of the Sunday paper supported by the Kolozsvcir 
Casino: "It is the different languages which embody, which cause, which 
aggravate and perpetuate the conflicts among the nationalities. If all man-
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kind spoke but one language, soon they would form but one people, and 
every individual would love every other as his kinsman."8
But for most of Transylvania's Liberals, the introduction of social re­
forms seemed a more feasible means of defusing national antagonisms, and 
it was on this that they concentrated their energies.
Attempts at Social Reform
The regulation of feudal services and dues was far and away the most im­
portant socio-political issue that the reformers had to take a stand on. The 
government's abortive attempts in this direction — made in the 1780s and 
then again in the 1810s — had made it clear that in reality no less was in­
volved than the abolition of feudalism: the emancipation of the serfs, and 
the introduction of modem forms of ownership. But first, it was necessary 
to establish the legal status of the existing properties: to clarify which lands 
counted as allodial, that is, were the sole property of the landowner, and 
which were held of him in villeinage, for the idea was that the serfs, once 
emancipated, were to be able to acquire these latter holdings as freeholds.
Sorting out the issues involved, however, threatened to undermine the 
existing political and economic order, to disturb the existing system of ap­
propriating the economic surplus which the peasantry produced, and to set 
in disarray the complex of shifting alliances and counter-alliances which 
the peasantry, the landowners, and the central government had forged with, 
and against, one another. The majority of Transylvania's landowners lived 
in terror of the thought of any regulation. For the peasantry had managed 
to conceal from the state tax collectors the existence of about half of the land 
actually under cultivation. Any regulation of services and dues would nec­
essarily involve a thorough survey of all the cultivable land, and would 
inevitably raise the question of how the presently concealed land was to be 
classified. If it were counted as belonging to the village, that is, as held by 
the serf who in fact cultivated it, the serfs would find themselves owing so 
much tax to the central government that a cutback in the services due the 
landlord would be necessary if they were not to go under. If, on the other 
hand, some of the newly registered land were counted as allodial, then rela­
tions between the landlords and their peasants would certainly go from 
bad to worse. It was a dilemma to which the only good solution seemed to 
be to forestall as long as possible the accurate registration of the land.
For all that, in Transylvania, unlike in Hungary, the measure of wealth 
was not the size of one's allodial land but the number of one's serfs. Yet it 
was clear to everyone that wage labour, and even share-cropping, was more 
productive than work done as robot. The difficulty was the shortage of ready 
cash. At most, the vineyards were worked for wages. To be in the position 
to oblige his serfs to undertake share-cropping or to rent out his land, the
8. S. Brassai, A z iskolamester. (The Schoolmaster.) Vasamapi Ujsag, 1 January 1843, 
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landlord had to appropriate as much land — mostly forest and pasture — 
as possible; it was this that guaranteed his hegemony within the village.
More importantly, however, the entire system of land cultivation needed 
to change. For the landlords' arable often lay scattered in dozens of strips 
around the village, cultivated, like the lands held in villeinage, according to 
the two-field or three-field system. He, like everyone else, was obliged to 
let his fallow strips of land be used for pasture. This centuries-old system 
was thought to have obvious advantages. The fallow was what guaranteed 
the livestock their grazing land. As for the land being parcelled into tiny 
strips, it gave people the feeling that everyone had some land of poor qual­
ity and some that was better, to say nothing of the fact that if a hailstorm 
destroyed the crops on one strip, they still had produce on the other strip a 
mile or so away. The two- or three-field system was so widespread that 
forty per cent of the arable lay in fallow. It was a system that permitted no 
personal initiative, but did provide the necessary degree of security. The 
difficulty was the relatively high rate of population growth — almost half a 
per cent per annum between 1786 and 1850, and one per cent between 1820 
and 1840. This kind of management virtually forced Transylvanian society 
to stagnate. The only way out, the only way to increase agriculture, was to 
start cultivating the fallow. This, however, involved keeping livestock in­
doors, which, in turn, necessitated the growing of adequate quantities of 
fodder.
The modernization of agriculture was initiated by the Saxon smallhold­
ers and the Hungarian large and medium landowners. Feudal institutions 
had remained foreign to the Saxon communities of the Sz&szfold, and thus 
the changeover to modem agriculture there stood to involve much less con­
flict than in the other parts of Transylvania.
The first step was to contract the various lands which had been seg­
mented into different strips. This of course met with resistance from the 
villagers in most places: they felt that the lord was taking the best strips of 
land for himself, as well as cutting the size of the village's pasture. But it 
was clear that the traditional system had become untenable: its economic 
usefulness was as questionable as the social assumptions on which it had 
rested. The nobility felt that "the landowner derives profit from less than a 
quarter of his lands"; at the same time, despite the positive elements of 
paternalism, he "is  no longer the guardian, but rather the extortioner of 
those under him ".9 For the landowner continued to exact his dues whatever 
the serfs might do to improve their lot — spinning, weaving, raising chick­
ens, and even gathering fruit, nuts or firewood.
A rather large proportion of the estates in Transylvania were held in 
villeinage. Most landowners tried to combine this kind of subsistence agri­
culture with producing for the market, though contemporaries complained 
that the unstable prices and the narrowness of the market made real market 
orientation impossible. And yet, in Transylvania about a fifth of the arable 
and pasture lands — an area which amounted to about half of all the lands
9. Contract concluded between Julianna Sombory and Mih&ly Ketzeli against dis­
tillation of brandy. Kack6, 6 February, 1841. OL The Archives of the Hatfaludy . 
Family, paquet 37. 4 6 o
held in villein tenure — was allodial. It was these tax-free lands of the nobil­
ity which contemporaries estimated produced over a third of the maize 
that served as the staff of life for Transylvania's peasantry. Villeinage in 
Transylvania meant primarily robot, an annual eighteen million days of un­
paid labour, fifty nine per cent of it manual, the rest using draught animals. 
This meant between two to four days of labour per family, depending on 
the size of the villein family's holding, as well as on local custom. In Transyl­
vania, both the allodial land area and the average villein holding were smaller 
than in Hungary, and yet the number of days of robot exacted was twice the 
Hungarian norm. Contemporaries were inclined to blame this on the poorer 
soil and on the more backward techniques of farming. But we must also 
keep in mind that the census of 1819-1820 on which the above estimates are 
based gives a somewhat distorted picture. The serfs confessed to smaller 
holdings than they actually had, lest their taxes be raised, and at the same 
time exaggerated the number of days they spent in robot working the lord's 
allodium. The government's purpose in the census was to lessen the serfs' 
burden of feudal services; the landowners, however, did not want to see 
the robot cut back. The more days of robot his serfs owed, the greater a lord's 
power over them: it was he who disposed over their time and energy, and 
they were dependent on his good will for days off to work their own land.
Like all feudal societies, Transylvanian society, too, rested on force, but 
backwardness set limits to the degree of the serfs' exploitation. Though serfs 
were free to migrate, what really gave them some degree of protection were 
the holy days. The Greek Orthodox church specified one hundred holy days 
of obligation; on such days, the peasants would not work their own lands, 
but would, at most, work for hire, for the saint whose day had been thus 
violated would punish the one responsible: the lord whose land one had 
worked. Open conflict between a landowner and his peasants would ensue 
only where the lord had appropriated woods, pastures or perhaps even 
arable which the village community was wont to consider its own to use. 
All in all, feudalism in Transylvania was still viable as a social system; as an 
economic system, however, it was untenable, and this was underlined by 
the relative overpopulation and Transylvania's poor showing when com­
pared to the rest of Europe.
The system permitted only a limited degree of modernization. Certain 
technologies were introduced, as were some new types of higher-yielding 
cereal crops and new breeds of horses and cattle, but this was an option 
open only to the great landowners. The smallholders — the Hungarian and 
Romanian free peasantry, and the Saxon burgher-peasants — could improve 
their lot only through working their lands yet more diligently. The only 
way the serfs could improve their "production" was to appropriate at har­
vest time some of what the new types of grains yielded on the lord's allo­
dial land.
The Liberals did not have a monopoly on wanting to see their estates 
and country prosper. Conservatives and Liberals alike joined the Erdelyi 
Gazdasagi Egylet (Transylvanian Economic Society). The difference was that 
while every Liberal was an advocate of the modern market economy, cer­
tainly not every Conservative was. Still, the main division was along ideo- 
469 logical lines: how far someone was dedicated to the idea of Transylvania's
becoming a modern nation-state. This transformation the Liberals saw as 
necessarily linked to social reform. Conditions had to be such that the small­
holder could prosper, for only this would guarantee the viability of the 
modernized great estates. The emancipation of the serfs would win them to 
the cause of modernization; and modem constitutional government would 
integrate the country into the mainstream of European development.
The more radical of the Liberals had close contacts with the cultural and 
political life of Hungary as well. Some of those who stood for election to the 
Transylvanian Diet of 1841-1843 even came from there. The reform cause 
in Transylvania was seen as inseparable from the cause of the Hungarian 
reformers, and the tactics adopted were, in many ways, the emulation of 
Kossuth's tried and tested methods. The Erdelyi Hirado (Transylvanian Cou­
rier), like Kossuth's Pesti Hirlap (Pest News), became a formidable weapon 
in the Liberals' hands in the early 1840s. A thoroughly modem example of 
committed political journalism, the Hirado kept its readers' eyes constantly 
focused on the rest of Europe, and trumpeted the slogan: "Reforms imme­
diately; union with Hungary as soon as possible". One of the journal's tac­
tical ploys was to emphasize that the government was on the side of 
"progress" — some of the Liberals actually believed this, others felt it was a 
good way of taking the wind out of the Conservatives' sails. The central 
government in Vienna, however, wanted no alliance with the Liberals. It 
was careful to avoid even the semblance of having yielded to liberal pres­
sure in any concession it made, for a reputation for "impartiality" was what 
it needed to keep its absolute hold over the masses of the nobility as well as 
the peasantry.
The regulation of feudal services and dues involved lengthy preparatory 
work. Most of the Liberals wanted to work out a comprehensive bill that 
would deal with every detail of every possible type of situation. The regula­
tion itself was to be introduced along with the regrouping and with tax 
reforms. Even those supporting it calculated that the introduction of a com­
plex measure of this kind would require about twenty years. But a great 
many people believed that there was a great deal to be said for procrasti­
nating, to say nothing of the fact that the party which stood to gain the most 
by the regulation — in the form of increased tax revenues — was the central 
government.
To make this aspect of the measure more palatable to the conservative 
majority, and to give the Diet some say in the use to which the funds were 
put, the Liberals tried to get the government to recognize again the Diet's 
traditional right to vote the taxes it could collect. However, implementation 
of this proved to be beyond their means. The other principle of the liberal 
tax reform programme was that everyone, the nobility included, should 
share in the tax burden. On the first point, it was the government that was 
intransigent; but for the second, they did not win even the Diet's support. 
The Liberals, thus, had to change tack, and they managed to push through 
bills which meant greater freedom and security for the serfs in certain mat­
ters of detail. With this, the Diet recognized the need for more thoroughgo­
ing reform "in  principle", and specified the direction that future legislation 
was to take. It was a compromise which, under the circumstances, was seen 
as a victory for the cause of reform. In fact, many Conservatives felt that the 470
Diet had gone too far, and it took all the Liberals' prestige and tactical skill 
at the local assemblies to keep the irate lesser nobility from recalling their 
"radical" dietal delegates. The Saxon delegates, though they strongly ob­
jected to the Hungarian Liberals' determination to make Hungarian the of­
ficial language, supported them in matters of social reform.
Thus it was that the Diet was able to send for approval to Vienna bills 
which had, in effect, made a chink in the nobility's armour of feudal privi­
lege. The bills confirmed the serfs in their right to migrate at will, set an 
upper limit to feudal services and dues, and guaranteed the serfs' right to 
acquire property. A bill was passed specifying that the landed nobility, too, 
was bound to participate in paying for public works projects, and this was 
seen as the first step to sharing in the tax burden as well. In some matters — 
for instance, the ability of non-nobles to hold office in the Gubernium — the 
Transylvanian Diet was ahead of the Hungarian, and wanted to create a 
precedent. But most of the legislation merely aimed at making Transylva­
nia's legal system congruent with Hungary's, in preparation for the pro­
posed union. The Diets of the "two brother homelands" were together to 
decide what elements of its independence Transylvania was to retain.
Transylvania's modernization was of vital interest to Hungary as well. 
The Hungarian reformist opposition — for instance Lajos Kossuth in his 
Pesti Hi'rlap — was, thus, happy to be able to point to the Transylvanian 
Liberals' successes, and upbraid the skeptics in Hungary: the Transylvani­
an nobility, which so many of them had held to be a retrograde force, was 
proving to be more progressive than its Hungarian counterpart. Clearly, 
Kossuth was exaggerating to make his point. But there can be no disputing 
what he gave as his reason for it: "Transylvania's present constitutional 
position is such that proceeding along the path of reform involves many 
more impediments than in Hungary. Consequently, every step taken in that 
direction deserves much more credit".10
The Revival of the Romanian National Movement
The stormy 1830s caught the Romanians of Transylvania somewhat un­
awares. For after its brief flowering under the impact of the Enlightenment, 
Romanian cultural life in Transylvania was allowed to continue only within 
the churches. The Romanian national movement necessarily lacked the or­
ganizational basis of the Hungarian movement, but its ethnic appeal was all 
the greater. And the attempts to modernize Transylvania were making a 
political category of ethnicity. It was, as we have seen, Inochentie Micu- 
Klein who first based his demands for the Romanians' political recognition 
on their absolute numerical superiority within the country, and on the fact 
that it was this Romanian majority that bore the brunt of the tax burden. 
The feudal constitutional thinking of the eighteenth century, however, could
10. L. K o s s u t h ,  Sz6zat a Reszek 6s az Uni6 irSnt Magyarhonbol. (Hymn for the Parts 
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not admit the existence of a Romanian "nation", for a nation of serfs seemed 
a contradiction in terms. The reformers working on Transylvania's mod­
ernization, however, had set the emancipation of the serfs as one of their 
major goals; and the Romanian intelligentsia was quick to point out that this 
call for social advancement also involved political claims. Transylvania's 
Romanian cultural elite set about working out a modem national ideology, 
one that would establish its right to share in political power. But once again, 
ideas and demands did not yet add up to opportunities for change.
The most progressive of Transylvania's Romanians were intellectuals who 
were not content with the opportunities available to them within the frame­
work of the churches, which had a monopoly over education. In the 1830s, 
the Greek Catholic school at Balazsfalva had expanded into a h'ceum, a jun­
ior college of sorts. With its student body of two hundred and fifty, Bal^zs- 
falva came to resemble the Hungarian college towns — Nagyenyed, Kolozs- 
v&r, Szekelyudvarhely, and Marosv&s&rhely — where about a thousand stu­
dents received their education, a great many Romanians among them. Of 
the twelve to thirteen hundred students studying at the thirteen Roman 
Catholic gymnasia of Transylvania, about a third were Romanians, as were 
about a quarter of the two hundred and fifty students at the Kolozsvar 
Hceum. Thirty of the two hundred legal apprentices working at the court of 
appeal in Marosvasarhely in 1848 were Romanian.
Though in absolute terms the number of Romanians trained in the pro­
fessions was quite small, job opportunities were even harder to come by in 
their case than in the case of the Hungarian and Saxon intelligentsia. There 
were at most thirty to forty Romanians — more precisely, officials of Roma­
nian origin — in the civil service, and they all worked in some lewly post. 
Though the number of Romanian clergymen was considerable — there were
1,400 Greek Catholic priests and 1,100 Orthodox priests — the pastoral posts 
were generally filled not by the better-educated, but by men whose fathers 
had also been priests in the area, men who were less learned, but satisfied 
with lower salaries. It is a telling circumstance that when in 1849 the Roma­
nians themselves took stock of how many of the unemployed intellectuals 
or of those holding ecclesiastical appointments would be able to hold civil 
service jobs, they found fewer than three hundred men with secondary school 
education and nearly half of these were under thirty years of age. Accord­
ing to a reliable contemporary estimate, a fifth of the "numerous Romanian 
intellectuals" found jobs in one of the professions, another fifth "after com­
pleting their legal studies" end up taking over their fathers' estates and 
living off their lands, two-fifths emigrated to the Danubian principalities, 
and one-fifth assimilated.11
Gradually, however, Romanian national consciousness began to preclude 
assimilation as an option. People who spoke Hungarian better than Roma­
nian became enthusiastic supporters of the Romanian national cause. For 
the young Romanian intellectuals of the time had even more cause to feel 
that the status quo was an affront to their human dignity than their Hungar-
11. George Barit to Samu Wass. Brass6, 10 December, 1841. Biblioteca Academiei 
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ian counterparts. The Approbata Constitutiones, the collection of the laws in 
effect in 1653, had never really been superseded, and was a daily reminder 
that they were but a "tolerated" nation. Its tone and provisions could not 
but rankle, especially in the minds of those born into serfdom. Like the 
Romanian nationalists of the eighteenth century, they found confirmation 
for their sense of personal worth in the ideology of the nation's Roman 
heritage, and this conviction predisposed them to see their own ideals and 
goals reflected in the cult of linguistic and national revival initiated by the 
Hungarian Liberals. They, too, saw BOloni's book on North America as car­
rying the message of the New World; but the message was addressed to 
them, the Romanians. True romantics, more and more Romanian intellec­
tuals turned to the unspoiled "people" as the repository of some pristine 
473 national wisdom and virtue.
The events taking place in the Danubian principalities in the 1820s con­
tributed greatly to the revival of national consciousness among Transylva­
nia's Romanians, for they raised hopes that the cultural and political aims 
of all Romanians in whatever state they lived might be co-ordinated. The 
contacts between them were constant, for starting in the 1820s, there was 
remarkable exodus of Romanian intellectuals from both Hungary and Tran­
sylvania across the Carpathians, due probably as much to the accelerated 
development of that area as to the surplus of unemployed Romanian pro­
fessionals in the Habsburg lands.
The revolution of 1821 in Wallachia led by Tudor Vladimirescu helped 
spark the Greek War of Independence, and had the result that the Porte 
never again set a Greek Phanariot to rule over either of the Danubian prin­
cipalities. The outcome of the Russo-Turkish war of 1828, a six year period 
of Russian occupation, proved a veritable blessing in disguise. The man 
appointed governor of both principalities, General Pavel Kiseliov, was an 
enlightened reformer of considerable ability, who oversaw the introduction 
of constitutional rule, though admittedly one concentrating power in the 
hands of a narrow caste of boyars. More and more of these boyars, how­
ever, came to identify with the cause of Romanian cultural revival, and 
gave it both moral and financial support. Thus, while the Transylvanian 
Romanian expatriates with their penchant for asceticism often felt ill at ease 
in the principalities with their glaring extremes of Oriental luxury and utter 
destitution, it was clear to them that this strange admixture of east and 
west provided just the cultural milieu in which they could be the most ef­
fective. It was these expatriates who were to mediate the theory of "Daco- 
Romanian" continuity, an interpretation of history that the Romanian na­
tional renaissance embraced with enthusiasm, fusing it with elements from 
the storehouse of French and German liberalism. The history of the Roma­
nians that Petru Maior published in Buda in 1812 became the bible of the 
new generation. Transylvania was seen as "the eternal refuge of the Roma­
nian nation"12 by the nationalists, and Michael the Brave (Mihai Viteazul) as 
the father of Romanian national unity.
Though the principalities had taken the lead as centres of Romanian na­
tional culture, it was nevertheless in Transylvania, in Brass6, that they pub­
lished the journal which was to do the most to foster the sense of Romanian 
solidarity: Gazeta de Transilvania and its supplement, Foaiepentru minte, both 
of which started up in 1838.
This first thoroughly modern Romanian journal catered to the catholic 
tastes of the well-informed student community at Bal&zsfalva, and was spon­
sored by the Romanian merchants of Brass6, who were at the pinnacle of 
their prosperity. The wealthiest of the Romanian merchant families had 
moved from the outlying historic Bolg&rszeg into the Saxon inner city, and 
now wanted to see the Romanian nation represented in Brass6's govern­
ment. Simultaneously, they wanted to win all of the city's Eastern mer­
chants to the Romanian national cause, and even went into publishing to 
propagate their ideals.
12. N. B a l c e s c u ,  Mersul revolutiei in istoria Romanilor. Paris 1850. Published by N. 
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It is interesting, in noting the success of the Gazeta, that the "literary" 
weekly established just a year earlier, in 1837, had attracted practically no 
readership with its translations of stories taken mostly from German jour­
nals. It was the printer, johann Gott, in Brass6, who asked George Barij: to 
be the editor of the Romanian paper he wanted to start up along with a 
number of others.
Barif, freshly returned from Bucharest and teaching at the school estab­
lished by the Romanian merchants, made the two Romanian journals of 
Brass6 an enormous success. Nearly half of the papers' readership was in 
the principalities, and annual subscriptions fluctuated between five to eight 
hundred. (Even the Bucharest papers could boast no more than three hun­
dred subscribers each for most of the 1840s.) The secret of BariJ's success 
was that he approached the problems facing the various strata of Romanian 
society from a coherent national point of view. His reports on the efforts 
being made by the Hungarian reformers were also calculated to encourage 
the Romanian national cause. Barif tried to dispel the emotional attachment 
which many Romanians felt for the Orthodox tzar by pointing out that a 
common religion was by no means a common nationality. It was in the 
Gazeta that the word nafionalitate was first introduced. Not surprisingly, the 
Russian consul in Bucharest got the paper banned from the principalities.
Romanian Political Aspirations
The Romanian intelligentsia perceived the 1841 draft bill on the introduc­
tion of Hungarian as Transylvania's official language as posing a mortal 
danger to the Romanian nation. It made little difference that what the bill 
was proposing did not change the situation of the Romanian intellectuals, 
for the proposal was to introduce Hungarian at those levels of government 
where Latin was still being used; in the proceedings of the Diet and in the 
counties, the language in use had for centuries been Hungarian. Local ad­
ministration and the lower courts functioned in the language required by 
the local circumstances: the lower-level officials communicated with the 
common people in Romanian.
The attempt to give Hungarian wider currency as the "national" lan­
guage was an affront to the Romanians' own hopes of national self-realiza- 
tion. In vain did the leading Hungarian Liberals dissociate themselves from 
any attempt at forced magyarization. The Romanians could not but see the 
proposed measures as the first steps in that direction, for these specified 
that all church registers were thenceforth to be kept in Hungarian, and 
Hungarian was to be the language of instruction at the Romanian schools in 
Balazsfalva. Though the draft bill did not take a conclusive stand on the 
matter of elementary education, it was expected that Hungarian would soon 
be made compulsory at that level as well.
Resistance to the draft bill at Balazsfalva was unanimous, and implac­
able. Its leader was the philosopher Sim ion Barnufiu, a Kantian who 
grounded his theories in natural law and liberalism, and had learned a great 
4 7 5  deal from Herder. The axiom that each individual has a natural right to
self-realization he interpreted to apply to each individual nation, and de­
fined the nation's language as organic to this process. Language was at once 
the means and the measure of culture: "In  it is rooted the character and the 
nationality of a people". Thus, language "is inseparable from our souls and 
our religion, and from everything that is most sacred and most valuable on 
earth".13 Barnufiu posited a multinational state as opposed to the Hungar­
ian ideal of a homogeneous nation-state, and saw the different national as­
pirations in cultural terms: "Culture and happiness are the chief goals of 
every one of the peoples of Transylvania; the Hungarians want to achieve 
this in a Hungarian way, the Saxons in a Saxon, the Romanians in a Roma­
nian way, each in the way natural to them. All these ways are equally right­
ful, and ones we have each been following for centuries in peace; and each 
of our various ways ties in with the high road to mankind's happiness and 
culture.''14 Barnujiu considered the attempts at magyarization morally rep­
rehensible, but spoke with approval of some Hungarian philosophers, and 
of the Diet's proposals for social reform. Bamufiu's system, like Herder's, 
was innocent of the great contradiction inherent even in cultural national­
ism. Still, the fact that he called the Romanians Trajan's colonists who kept 
vigil and were preparing for great deeds left room for dreams of national 
hegemony based on historical right, dreams which were to prove more po­
tent than Barnufiu's humanitarian ideal of a multinational state.
Transylvania's Romanians were unanimous in their repudiation of the 
draft bill on the use of the Hungarian language. When, however, the Hun­
garians withdrew those proposals which were directly prejudicial to the 
Romanians, the united political froijit gave way to a number of different 
trends. The opportunity for direct political action was open only to the bish­
ops, primarily the Greek Catholic bishop, who attended the Diet in his ca­
pacity as a Regalist. loan Lemenyi, Greek Catholic bishop of Baldzsfalva, 
chose to try cooperation with the Hungarian reformers after the petition — 
along the lines of the Supplex Libellus Valachorum — which he and the Or­
thodox bishop loan Moga had submitted to the chancellery in 1834 had 
been rebuffed. Rather than insisting on Romanian national rights globally, 
the two bishops called on the Diet to take a stand for the rights of the Roma­
nians of the predominantly Saxon Kir^lyfold (Fundus Regius), who were 
obliged to pay tithes to the Lutheran pastor, whose right to pasture land for 
their herds was being curtailed, and who were discriminated against on 
religious grounds when it came to eligibility for the town councils. (The 
Saxons, in their turn, could cite the privilege which stipulated that whoever 
worked a Saxon holding was to pay his tithes to the Lutheran church. As 
for the second point, the dispute over the use to which the land was put, 
there was no denying that the Saxon farmers paid much higher taxes than 
the Romanians, who lived off their flocks of sheep. Nor could anyone hon­
estly dispute the fact that the Romanians of the Kiralyfold generally lived 
better and enjoyed greater liberty than the Romanian serfs of the Hungar­
ian counties.)
13. S. Barnujiu, O tocmeala de rusine si o lege nedreapta. Published by Gh. Bogdan- 
Duica, Via fa fi ideile lui Simion Bamufiu. Bucharest 1924, 201, 204.
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The Hungarian reformist nobility supported the two bishops' grievances 
against the Saxons not only as a way of keeping the Saxons in check, but 
also because they were in line with their legalistic way of thinking, as well 
as with their liberal views. Bishop Lemenyi was probably perfectly sincere, 
and technically speaking, perfectly correct when he declared in the name of 
the entire Romanian nation at the 1841 Diet that, as far as the Hungarians 
were concerned, "since 1791 a Romanian, social class or person, has never 
been debarred from public office".13
Bishop Lem6nyi's decision to ally with the Hungarian Liberals had the 
support not only of the Romanians of the KirdlyfOld, but also of those Ro­
manian noblemen who hoped that the constitutional representative system 
of government would, gradually, find a means of satisfying Romanian na­
tional demands. Alexandru Bohafel, writing in the Kolozsv&r Erdelyi Hirado 
"in  the name of a number of his co-nationals" called attention to the fact 
that the Hungarian language law did not impinge on the use of the Roma­
nian language at the community level: "Since Transylvania is a Hungarian 
hom eland,... let the members of my nation use their language as befits Ro­
manians, and learn Hungarian as befits the citizens of this hom eland".16
The crucial question, of course, was who had the right to speak for the 
nation. The majority of the teachers at Bal&zsfalva strongly disapproved of 
the approach taken by Bishop Lemenyi, and demanded that a synod be 
convoked. Barnujiu, the most articulate leader of the disaffected, felt that 
the church should represent the political and cultural interests of the Roma­
nian nation. Lemenyi would not hear of a synod, and students and teachers 
alike began to rebel against church discipline. Matters came to a head dur­
ing Holy Week in 1843. Bishop Lemenyi had debarred one of the students 
from the traditional Holy Thursday washing of feet; the students retaliated 
when no one showed up for the ceremony. Bal&zsfalva was a house divided 
against itself. In the end, it was the government that restored order by force 
of arms, removing some of the rebel teachers — Barnujiu, the ringleader, 
among them — and about a dozen students, who then proceeded to make 
their way through Transylvania as martyrs to the national cause.
The Romanian press in Brass6 tried to remain objective in the face of 
events. BariJ did not approve of the campaign against Bishop Lemenyi, and 
was anxious lest the Romanians enter the labyrinth of Transylvanian poli­
tics unprepared. Barif proposed no programme; rather, he tried to give an 
accurate picture of where the various national factions stood, and encour­
aged dialogue between them. He urged the Hungarian Liberals to modera­
tion, and encouraged them to try to meet the demands of Transylvania's 
Romanians. He pointed out that the Romanians' demand for recognition as 
the "fourth nation" was fitting and just. Far from being simply a call for 
their participation in the feudal constitution, it was a national demand that
15. Protocol recorded on the Diet started on 15 November, 1841 in the royal free 
borough of Kolozsv&r attended by the Estates of the Three Noble Nations of the 
Transylvanian Grand Duchy and the Parts reannexed to it. Kolozsvcir 1841, 715.
16. By Scindor Boheczel lawyer on behalf of his associates from several nations: 
Komoly sz6 a Gazeta de TransilvSni^hoz. (Serious Word to Gazeta de Transyl-
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presumed respect for the aspirations of the other national movements in 
Transylvania, and at the same time would operate as a check on any na­
tion's aspiring to hegemony. BariJ was just as consistent in his repudiation 
of the Romanian ploy used against the Saxons: the appeal to the coequality 
of noble privilege. He spoke to all of Transylvania's peoples at once, and to 
all the factions within each nation: "W ho shall we blame for Hungarians, 
Szekelys, Saxons, Romanians, Armenians, etc. all seeing the light of day 
under the same sky, in one and the same valley, or on one and the same 
mountain, or along one and the same river? ... Why do we conjure up the 
spirits of our ancestors from their graves to frighten one another?"17
The Saxons' Awakening to their German Identity
At the Diets which were finally allowed to meet in the 1830s, the Saxons 
had taken no real independent stand of their own. At the Diet of 1834, the 
small contingent of Saxon delegates had sympathized with the goals of the 
Hungarian opposition, and had even backed some of their constitutional 
demands. By 1837, Saxon support had shifted to the government. Never­
theless, they made no objection to the bills being drafted in Hungarian, and 
agreed that Transylvania's laws should be promulgated in Hungarian as 
well as in Latin. Subsequently, however, political expediency and Saxon 
nationalism both militated against the possibility of their co-operating with 
the Hungarians.
In preparation for the Diet of 1841, the leaders of the Saxon community 
assembled in the Lutheran Consistory worked out their own stand on the 
matter of languages, which they regarded as the most important. Joseph 
Bedeus von Scharberg — whom the Diet had elected provincial high com­
missioner in charge of provisioning the army in 1837, and who was, thus, 
the highest-ranking Saxon government official of the period — proposed 
that Transylvania, as one of the Lands of the Hungarian Crown, should 
accept Hungarian as the official language of central government: "There is 
nothing new in this, for even when Transylvania was ruled by its own princes, 
affairs of state were conducted in Hungarian, and the laws were drafted in 
Hungarian".18 But the vocal majority of the Saxon leaders insisted on lin­
guistic equality on the old feudal constitutional basis of Saxons and Hun­
garians being equal in rights: they wanted to see the use of German intro­
duced on an equal footing with Hungarian.
The Saxons' insistence on their old constitutional rights was but one as­
pect of a growing movement aimed at the creation of a modern national 
political framework. More and more people wanted to see the Saxon's na­
tion status legally recognized as involving territorial autonomy and the right 
to use German as their official language. In short, more and more Saxons 
wanted to see the Kir&lyfold — the "Fundus Regius" — become a "Fundus 
Saxonum " in every sense of the term. Saxon nationalism, however, was
17. Gazeta de Transilvania, \b/27  December, 1847, No. 100.
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essentially a form of German nationalism: since the Middle Ages, only those 
of "Germ an origin" had been recognized as full-fledged members of the 
Saxon nation and this status involved undisputable economic, social and 
political advantages. This very exclusiveness made the position of the Saxons 
within Transylvanian society somewhat precarious. Their sense of isolation 
inclined them to seek an ally in the Habsburgs' authority, which was glad to 
make use of them as counterweights to the Hungarians. Thus it was that the 
majority of the Saxons, who were the chief motors of Transylvania's eco­
nomic development, in the political sphere tended to support bureaucratic 
absolutism, if not out of conviction then by default. For other Saxons, how­
ever, the sense of German nationalism was a spiritual motor that propelled 
them beyond the provincialism of the Habsburg Empire, and set them to work 
for the national future of the Saxons along liberal lines patterned on some of 
the most progressive of the intellectual and political currents taking shape.
The patrician upper class took its lead from a corps of senior officials 
who were highly versed in the law, and the whole Saxon population looked 
for leadership to the Lutheran church, and to the network of schools run by 
it. Teachers and ministers suddenly acquired a prestige comparable to what 
they had had at the time of the Reformation. At the same time, the regula­
tion of town and village self-government which the Viennese government 
had obliged the Saxons to accept in 1805 debarred teachers and ministers 
from politics and public office. Lack of job opportunities for the educated 
Saxons was a real problem. Each of the five gymnasia employed fifty to 
sixty teachers, and had student bodies of between a thousand to fifteen 
hundred students. And though many elementary school teachers were 
needed, every year between three and four hundred secondary school leavers 
continued their education, half of them aiming for careers in the church at a 
time when the two hundred and fifty Lutheran parishes could support only 
five hundred clergymen. Many highly educated Saxon clergymen and lay­
men returned from the German universities to become disseminators of 
national revival.
Most educated Saxons saw the democratization of society and the mod­
ernization of the economy as the means to national reform, though of course 
they tended to interpret these liberal ideals within the context of their own 
heritage. Enthusiastically, they discovered the ancient Saxon constitution 
to provide the formal elements of a democratic representative system; and 
enthusiastically they adopted as their democratic slogan the "unus sitpopulus" 
(the people should be one) of the Diploma Andreanum. There were even those 
who argued that the "Saxon nation" ought to be considered to include the 
German-speaking serfs living in the counties, who comprised about a fifth 
of Transylvania's Saxons. They were proud to declare that the Saxon peo­
ple were a community of industrious craftsmen, tradesmen and agricultur­
ists. On this view, serfdom as such was foreign to the SzaszfOld, for the 
Romanian and Hungarian serf villages did not form part of the nation. (The 
feudal dues and services owed by these villages, it was added, were less 
onerous than those of the serfs in the Hungarian counties of Transylvania.) 
The Saxons were also one of the first in the 1840s to propose the abolition
— with compensation — of the church tithes that weighed so heavily on the 
479 free peasant class as well.
It was the Siebenbiirger Wochenblatt (Transylvanian Weekly) founded in 
Brass6 at the end of the 1830s, as well as its literary supplements, the Blatter 
fu r Geist (Leaflets for Spirit) and Der Satellit (The Planet) that represented 
the more radical forms of social criticism. At times more than a thousand 
copies were sold. The publisher Johann GOtt was a man of erudition who 
had made his way to Transylvania from Frankfurt-am-Main, like his col­
laborators, Anton Kurz from Moravia, and Leopold Max Moltke from Prus­
sia, to escape the penury facing many an intellectual in the German states, 
and no less to escape the heavy hand of political repression. The corre­
spondents writing for the Brass6 papers from Segesv&r had become ac­
quainted with the ideas of liberalism during their student years in Berlin, 
and it was in this spirit that they launched their attack on the sluggish, 
"bew igged" administration of the bureaucrats. As the precondition of all 
reform, they demanded that public affairs indeed be conducted in public, 
and that the members of the communitate's organs and of the town coun­
cils be elected by the citizens. In a number of Saxon seats, the outraged 
establishment demanded that court action be taken against the Brass6 jour­
nals. It took the authority of the Saxon professor of jurisprudence, Josef 
Andreas Zimmerman, to convince the Nagyszeben council, for instance, 
that the Saxon journals must be permitted as much liberty as the Hungarian 
press in discussing issue of national concern.
Though initially the Brass6 papers came out strongly against the draft 
bill on the use of the Hungarian language, and in general took issue with 
the Hungarian press, soon their chief adversary was Der Siebenbiirger Bote 
(Transylvanian Messenger), which was a staunch supporter of bureaucratic 
absolutism. The press also reflected the rivalry between the two towns: the 
burghers of Brass6 wanted to see an end to Nagyszeben's hegemony. While 
the latter envisioned a "provincia cibiniensis" (Szeben Province), an autono­
mous Saxon national unit centrally directed from Nagyszeben, the Brass6 
reformers' programme for economic and political development was summed 
up in their slogan: "Kronstadt voran" (Brass6, lead on!).
Societies sprang up everywhere in the Saxon towns, uniting the like- 
minded to common action, and answering every type of interest and need.
There were industrial associations, agricultural societies, and savings soci­
eties. The Verein fu r  siebenbiirgische Landeskunde (Association for Transylva­
nian Native Knowledge), ostensibly a cultural association, and its conven­
tions became rallies in which townspeople participated as if celebrating a 
national holiday.
Perhaps the most typical of the Saxon reformers of the age was Stephan 
Ludwig Roth. He had worked in Switzerland alongside Pestalozzi as a young 
man, but his views on education published in the 1820s still met with indif­
ference. Encouraged by the example of the German youth movements of 
the post-Napoleonic era, he wanted to see physical education and singing 
introduced into the curriculum of the high school in Medgyes where he 
taught, but the conservative small town would have none of it. The 1840s 
found him a village pastor, but one who became a leader of the Saxon na­
tional movement. It cannot be said of him that he was a consistent politi­
cian. While some of his pamphlets were romantic anti-capitalist defences of 
the guild system and of the affluent free Saxon peasantry, he nevertheless 480
called for the modernization of industry and agriculture. His contribution 
to the debate on the introduction of Hungarian as the official language did 
little to clarify matters. For he attributed to the Hungarian reformers an 
extreme position which none of them had ever held, and pronounced the 
Hungarian language as such unsuitable for being a state's official language. 
He em phasized that there was no need for a language of the country 
(Landessprache), for there already was one: Romanian. Romanian, being 
spoken by the greatest number of people in Transylvania, was — as the 
Hungarian reformers, too, had often pointed out — the prime language of 
day-to-day communication among the various nationalities. Roth proposed 
that the Romanians be recognized as Transylvania's Fourth Nation, though 
he was cautious enough to publish this view only in a journal which ap­
peared in Pest. But he hastened to add that this recognition could not in­
volve territorial autonomy; rather, it would mean that the Romanians, too, 
would have one vote in the Diet, like each of the other Three Nations. (For 
Saxons were advocating a return to the system of voting by nations at the 
Diet.) In theory, Roth was a staunch advocate of national equality; but his 
concrete suggestions for the various spheres in which German, Latin and 
Hungarian should be used were of feudal character and he took care not to 
infringe the interests of the central government.
Roth's main concern was to rouse Transylvania's Saxons to a sense of 
moral responsibility for the Volkstum, the nationality, and he did much to 
raise Saxon social consciousness. The Hungarian press tended to simplify 
when accounting for the conflict between Hungarians and Saxons in terms 
of the struggle of liberalism against bureaucratic conservatism. Roth, on the 
other hand, described the Transylvanian scene in terms of trilateral rela­
tionship of mutual dependence and conflicting interests between the Saxon 
burghers, the Hungarian nobles, and the Romanian serfs, and insisted that 
it behooved the Saxon middle class to undertake the role of mediator. Roth's 
analysis ignored the fact that the Saxon burghers clung to their preroga­
tives no less desperately than the Hungarian nobles. But on the practical 
political level, inasmuch as it assigned to the Saxons the role of the historic 
middle class, it was an effective incentive to their co-operating with the 
Hungarian Liberals. The other side of the matter, of course, was that Roth 
assigned to the Saxons in the context of Hungarian-Romanian relations the 
same arbitrator role that the Hungarians arrogated to themselves in respect 
of Saxon-Rom anian affairs.
The liberal call for civil equality raised, in the minds of many Saxons, the 
spectre of the nation's fatal isolation. The problem was that the Romanians 
of the Sz6szfold were, by then, an absolute majority. But not even the Saxon 
Liberals were willing to hear of collective — national — rights for the Ro­
manian majority. The farthest that the most of them would go was to recog­
nize the right of each individual Romanian inhabitant of the Sz^szfOld to 
equal membership in the Saxon nation. The solution, according to a pam­
phlet written in 1844, was for the Romanians "to assimilate to the Saxons in 
language and culture".1"
19. J. T r a u s c h ,  Bemerkunken iiber die von siebenburgischen Bischof Basiliu Moga in Jahre 
1837 den zu Hermannstadt versammelten Landesstdnden unterlegte Bittschrift. Kron­
stadt 1844, 24.
Though the above was by no means a stand universally subscribed to, it 
does illustrate how far the idea of the "Saxon Nation" was coming to mean 
not so much a natio of the privileged, but rather the community for those 
speaking the same — German — language. More and more Saxon intellec­
tuals believed that it was their national mission to pass on to the east the 
achievements of German culture. This belief was consistent with a number 
of political attitudes. The Liberals of Germany and Hungary were allies in a 
common cause, and many Saxon Liberals hoped that this community of 
purpose would moderate Hungarian linguistic nationalism, and make co­
operation possible in Transylvania as well. Others went further. For it was 
clear that the Saxons, as the smallest ethnic group, had the most to lose by 
the national hegemony of either the Hungarians or the Romanians. It was, 
thus, among the Saxons that we find intellectuals most receptive to the idea 
that Transylvania's circumstances necessitated its transformation into a 
modern, multinational state.
The Brass6 Saxon papers often cited Switzerland or the United States as 
examples of nationally neutral federal structures which left room for na­
tional self-determination at the level of local self-government — a notion 
which was, in part, consistent with the aims of the Hungarian Liberals. Joseph 
Marlin — the first Saxon man of letters to live by his pen, though not in his 
hometown of Sz&szsebes but in Pest — had this to say to his countrymen in 
the Pesther Zeitung (Pest Newspaper): "Let everyone learn to love not only 
the Sz^szfold but Transylvania as well; let everyone work for his homeland 
and not just for his nation, and the squabbles between the nationalities of 
Transylvania will come to an end. ^nd then we'll hear no more foolish talk 
of magyarization, germanization, and even romanization".20
Real cooperation between Saxons and Hungarians took place only in the 
sphere of culture and education. Anton Kurz, editor of the M agazin fu r  
Geschichte (Magazine for History) published articles by Hungarian writers 
as well. As he wrote in his letter to the president of the Hungarian Acad­
emy of Sciences: "One can be a good German, and yet sympathize with the 
liberal aims of the Magyars, especially in the field of science, which does 
not distinguish between languages and countries".21 The sense of German 
national identity was quite compatible with Transylvanian patriotism. And 
it was a Prussian-born poet, Leopold Max Moltke, who in 1846 wrote at the 
behest of his Saxon compatriots the anthem still sung in praise of his adopted 
land:
Transylvania, you tolerant land, 
Haven safe for every faith! 
Safeguard through the centuries, 
All your sons' liberties,
May plain talk never quake.
Transylvania, dear, sweet land,
Dear land that gave us birth!
Blessed be your timeless charms , 
And may the sons of all your climes, 
With amity be girt.
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The Conservative Counter-Offensive
By the end of the Diet of 1841-1843, it became clear that the hopes the cen­
tral government might come out in support of reform had been illusory.
The government in Vienna feared that the liberal reforms being urged in 
Hungary and Transylvania alike — linked as they were to an ever more 
comprehensive programme for national and linguistic revival — would 
undermine the whole monarchy. The chief of police was even afraid that if 
the union of the two lands were to take place, "the centre of gravity of the 
monarchy would inevitably shift to Hungary".22 The court had worked out 
no alternative to the Liberals' programme. The government was reluctant 
to lend open support even to the ostensibly loyal "German element", and 
did not revive its old policy of centralization and germanization, for it mis­
trusted German nationalism almost as much as Hungarian. What encour­
agement Mettemich gave the minority nationalities in their resistance to 
Hungarian initiatives followed the traditional "divide and rule" formula.
There was, however, one political grouping that did have a comprehen­
sive programme explicitly aimed at "the solution of the Hungarian ques­
tion" which many saw as a real threat to the integrity of the empire. This 
grouping of young mostly Hungarian politicians formed the Conservative 
Party in 1846. The young Conservatives clearly saw that modernization and 
reform were inevitable. But they wanted to make certain that it was the 
landowning nobility which would reap the benefits of "embourgeoisement", 
too. As opposed to the more radical liberal programme, they stood on a 
platform of "prudent progression", that is, of gradual reform. A great many 
of the progressive Conservatives were genuinely dedicated to the cause of 
reform, and were even ready to cooperate with the Liberals on certain is­
sues. But in the quickened political life of the late 1840s, the Liberals re­
mained their chief rivals as they launched an all-out offensive to gain con­
trol of the forums of feudal constitutional representation. In this contest, 
the Conservatives of Transylvania were at a great advantage. For the vice- 
chancellor of Transylvania, Baron Samu J6sika, was one of their number, 
and he used every weapon in the arsenal of contemporary politics. With 
infinite skill, J6sika played both on the anxieties that the nobility had in 
connection with the proposed reforms, and on the fears and uncertainties 
of a central government haunted by the spectre of anarchy. In Transylva­
nia, he pretended to enjoy the confidence of the imperial government; in 
Vienna, he claimed to hold the key to the court's consolidating its hold on 
Transylvania. J6sika was able to win the majority of the nobility to his side, 
threatening some, and enticing others with what they could expect from 
the proposed unification of Hungary and Transylvania.
The central government watched J6sika's machinations with some ap­
prehension. They feared that he would give one-sided preference to the 
nobility's interests at their expense, and that the population's ability to pay 
state taxes would be further sapped by the Diet's setting a more onerous 
burden of feudal services and dues. Already, Transylvania's arrears of debt
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had quadrupled since 1830. The young Conservatives did not hesitate to 
capitalize on Vienna's fear of the unification of Hungary and Transylvania 
when this served their purpose. Thus, when a member of the Staatskonferenz 
suggested that Transylvania adopt the regulation of villein holdings and of 
robot that had been introduced in Hungary (where a holding was about 
twice the size of what it was in Transylvania, and the services due the lord 
per holding were considerably less onerous), GyOrgy Apponyi, a fellow- 
Conservative of J6sika's and the head of the Hungarian Chancellery, ar­
gued against it in terms that were bound to hit home in Vienna. "From  a 
higher point of view this is hardly advisable", he said, "for everything that 
tends to diminish or to erode the legal or de facto differences between the 
two lands ... will tend to diminish the Transylvanian nobility's antipathy to 
the union, which in that case would involve no further economic draw­
backs, but would promise definite political advantages".23
The beginning of 1846 was marked with an event that could not help but 
influence the mood of the Transylvanian Diet which was about to convene. 
In Galicia the Polish nobility staged a revolt only to find the peasantry turn 
against the "em peror's enemies" in a veritable massacre. This brutal sup­
pression of the Polish nobility's fight for independence stunned the neigh­
bouring lands. The Habsburg court was again confident and self-satisfied, 
but the Hungarian reformist opposition drew the lesson that the Hungarian 
nobility, too, might meet the fate of their Polish brethren if they did not 
soon emancipate their serfs. In Transylvania, too, the Polish events con­
jured up the phantom of a peasant revolt in the minds of the nobility of 
Kolozsv&r, until reassuring report^ came in to the Gubemium from every 
part of the country. Many people, like the leading tactician of the reformers, 
J&nos Bethlen the Elder, believed that "with a very few exceptions, the peas­
ants of Transylvania are the same as they were in 1817... their hands clasped, 
they would rather starve to death than lay even a finger on what was not 
theirs".24 But the Transylvanian nobility could not help but realize that the 
peasantry could turn into a formidable weapon in the hands of the govern­
ment.
The test of strength between Liberals and Conservatives came at the Diet 
of 1846, when the decisive matter of the regulation of feudal dues and serv­
ices was again the order of the day. J6sika had made sure that the counties 
were represented either by well-off Conservatives, or by those who were 
dependent on the government. The Regalists he had had summoned were 
all men who needed his financial support just to be able to attend the Diet.
The Liberals tried to appeal to considerations of social justice in rejecting 
the data of the land census taken by order of Count Antal Czir&ky in 1819- 
1820. They argued that the census had failed to register at least a third of 
the lands held in villeinage as such, and pleaded that "claim s based on 
custom" could not be disregarded: all land used by serfs should be classi­
fied as lands held in villeinage.
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The Liberals, however, were a minority that soon found itself isolated. 
The majority at the Diet insisted that the distorted picture given by the 
Czir^ky census should form the basis of what was to be treated as allodial 
land, and what as land held in villein tenure..
In vain did the Liberals protest in "the holy name of the people". In vain 
did the far-sighted governor, Count J6zsef Teleki, turn to the monarch, ask­
ing him to refuse to sanction a bill that involved such dire consequences for 
the peasantry. Whatever second thoughts the court might have had faded 
in the glow of the victory won over the Liberals. The court was also pleased 
by the Diet's tractability in the matter of voting recruits: it voted more new 
conscripts than it was actually asked to.
As a return gesture of goodwill, the court approved the bill the Transyl­
vanian Diet had passed on the supremacy of the Hungarian language. True, 
the bill had been revised: it introduced the use of Hungarian in the keeping 
of church registers, but only in areas where the sermon was also preached 
in Hungarian. Jbsika, who had been elected chancellor in the course of the 
Diet, once again proved an astute politician: recognizing the Saxons as a 
"nation" equal in rights with the Hungarian, he made sure that the laws 
were promulgated in an official German translation, and that German was 
accepted as the official language of the KirSlyfold, where most Saxons lived. 
J6sika's manoeuvres, however, did not win all the Saxon representatives 
over to the Conservative camp. The chancellor found himself having to re­
buke the press censor of Nagyszeben, for the Siebenbiirger Bote had reported 
that according to one of the Saxon delegates the oppositionist Liberals with 
their attempts to smooth over social conflicts, promoted the emergence of a 
free middle class within the ranks of the two brother nations.25
The Liberals, however, had to recognize that the peoples of Transylvania
— each with their own forms of social organization, their own traditions 
and own institutions — were too heterogeneous for even those committed 
to modernization and reform to consistently unite in service of the common 
cause. Having lost, in the Diet, the fight for the reduction of the serfs' bur­
dens, Transylvania's Liberals retrenched to await the next opportunity. It 
became evident that a new integration was needed for the region, one which 
would transform the rigid framework of the empire and open the road for 
national development.
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III. Revolution and the War 
of Independence 
(1848- 1849)
The spring of 1848 swept Transylvania back into the mainstream of Euro­
pean history. The "Springtime of the Nations" started as a celebration of 
solidarity in which all the burgeoning national movements took part, and 
as in all of east-central Europe, ended up as a desperate social and national 
confrontation.
What was it that led to this tragic outcome? How was it all perceived by 
those who had to take a stand for, or against the revolution? And what did 
the revolution in fact achieve? Before we can turn to these questions, we 
must take a cursory look at Transylvania's place in the east-central Euro­
pean power structure that determined its options.
Transylvanian Society in the "Springtime of the Nations"
The first unmistakeable sign of ferment was when on 3 March, Lajos Kossuth 
called for the introduction of bourgeois constitutionalism for all the lands 
of the Habsburg Monarchy at the Hungarian Diet meeting in Pozsony. Ten 
days later, the people of Vienna were up in arms, and Ferdinand I felt obliged 
to promise a constitution and constitutional government. On 15 March, the 
revolution triumphed in Pest-Buda: tens of thousands of people took to the 
streets and the army did not dare to intervene. The leaders of the radical 
youth summarized the objectives of two decades of struggle for reform in 
the twelve categorical points for the whole world to see: "W hat the Hun­
garian Nation W ants".
In the meanwhile, the Diet in Pozsony, functioning as a constitutional 
assembly, declared Hungary to be an independent constitutional monar­
chy. The king appointed as prime minister Count Lajos Batthy^ny, who 
immediately ordered the publication of the law on the emancipation of the 
serfs passed by the Diet. The proclamations appeared on 23 March, and it 
was hoped that the measure would ward of the possibility of the Habsburgs' 
being able to use the serfs to undermine the process of democratization and 
national liberation. On 11 April, the monarch gave royal sanction to the 
legislations that had been passed, among them the one providing for "the 4 8 6
absolute union with Hungary, under one government, of Transylvania, 
which belongs to the Hungarian Crown".1 The law specified that the imple­
m entation of the union would be dependent upon the approval of the 
Transylvanian Diet which was to be convened.
The Hungarian Liberals of Transylvania asked for the support of the 
Pozsony Diet as early as 19 March. On 20 March, they were still issuing a 
joint declaration with the Conservatives; on 21 March, Kolozsvar had joined 
Vienna and Pest on the road to revolution. There were enthusiastic demon­
strations by the burghers of the town with the students in the lead, and the 
town council addressed an appeal to the Gubemium calling for the convoca­
tion of the Diet and for union with Hungary, and also for radical social re­
forms: equality before the law, the emancipation of the serfs, and universal 
taxation. The other towns followed suit. The country assemblies and those 
of the seats met, many of them turning into veritable mass meetings of the 
entire population. They adopted the demands formulated by Kolozsvar, 
and threatened to send representatives to the Hungarian parliament if the 
Diet was not convened. The instructions that were worked out for the rep­
resentatives to the Diet read like revolutionary proclamations. Some of the 
municipalities, acting on their formally recognized autonomy, themselves 
introduced universal taxation. The governor, Jozsef Teleki meanwhile called 
the Diet to meet on 31 May without first securing royal consent.
The tide of revolution sweeping through Europe swept most Transyl­
vanians with it; those it did not stood overawed by its force. The Conserva­
tives, who had had the upper hand but so recently, either joined the liberal 
camp in an effort to salvage what they could, or disappeared from the po­
litical scene. Chancellor Samu Josika, a staunch conservative and an opti­
mist at heart, hoped that the revolutionary discontent of the peasantry could 
be kept from getting out of hand by the army, and with appeals to the "good 
emperor" myth; the nobility, too, he believed, would soon find its revolu­
tionary ardour dampened by considerations of class interest, and so he did 
his best to postpone measures for the emancipation of the serfs until March 
of the following year. It was at J6sika's suggestion that Ferdinand I named 
Jellacic, who was known for his unconditional loyalty to the dynasty, to the 
post of ban of Croatia.
The course of events Jellacic's infamous role in the quashing of the Hun­
garian revolution was to prove the "wisdom" of his choice. After the Transyl­
vanian Diet had approved the union with Hungary, however, Josika felt 
that things were not going quite as he had planned, and resigned. Transyl­
vania had become ungovernable with the traditional means available to 
imperial manipulation and provincial narrow-mindedness, so elementary 
were the social and national forces that had erupted.
Unexpectedly powerful was the impetus of the Romanian national move­
ment. Its goal was to build up a basis of mass support, and to work out a 
programme around which Romanians could rally. Young radical profes­
sionals, lawyers, jurists, and articled clerks went to work. Initially, they did 
not reject Transylvania's union with Hungary, but made approval condi­
tional on the recognition of the Romanian language as one of the official
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languages, and on the emancipation guaranteeing the peasantry an improved 
livelihood. It was with these provisions appended that Alexandru Papiu- 
Ilarian and Avram Iancu subscribed to the memorandum of the Hungarian 
jurists of Marosvds&rhely, and it was these provisions that formed the core 
of the petition submitted by loan Buteanu. In March yet, Simion Barnujiu 
was the only one of the leading Romanians who definitely opposed the union 
with Hungary. Barnujiu, who had started studying law in Nagyszeben at 
the age of forty, and had been a teacher of philosophy at the Bal&zsfalva 
Uceum until removed from his post by force, was categorical. "A  curse for 
all eternity on any Romanian who dares conclude arms from the union be­
fore the Romanian nation is given political recognition..." for "without na­
tional rights, even a republic is but accursed tyranny".2
As against this self-seeking nationalism, George BariJ tried to work out a 
programme that would satisfy both social and national demands, and main­
tained that a system of autonomous counties where the population's free 
use of its native language would be guaranteed was the system of govern­
ment that should be aimed at. Such attempts to find a compromise solution, 
however, were relatively soon overwhelmed by the ever stronger spirit of 
confrontation.
The peasantry erupted on the scene like some gigantic collective person­
ality, one who is as aware of his weaknesses as of his strength. It was the 
demonstrations held by the county nobility and the townsfolk that first 
alerted the peasantry to the fact that the world has changed. The emancipa­
tion of Hungary's serfs had an enormous impact. It was on the strength of 
this measure that people began to refuse to do their robot, primarily in the 
Hungarian villages. In inner Transylvania, the proclamations carried from 
one parish to the other by the young Romanian revolutionaries had the 
greatest effect. If the priest refused to read it out to the people, they simply 
forced him to do so, as in Dr&g, where the priest was compelled to read to 
the assembled villagers a proclamation written in Buda. What they regis­
tered of these proclamations was not the actual message that Transylva­
nia's union with Hungary would bring emancipation to the Transylvanian 
serfs as well, but that the day of "freedom" was at hand. As one of those 
listening to the manifesto at Dr£g made out: "The yoke of the Romanians 
has been broken; their bright sun has risen, their heaven has opened its 
gates; for from this moment on, never again shall we serve lords".3 The 
habits of thought and expectations of centuries were what came to the fore. 
Declarations of the nobility's intention to effect the emancipation at the 
county assemblies only confirmed their suspicion of the nobility, so sure 
were they that the "good emperor" had long sent out the proclamation of 
emancipation, and that the lords had concealed it. In some places people 
even claimed to know that the emperor had given the serfs the lord's de­
mesne. But primarily, the villagers went on strike, and prepared for some 
great, "redemptive" change. Their messianism was as effective as the au-
2. V. C h e r e s t e $ iu ,  A baldzsfalvi nemzeti gyules, 1848. majus 15-17. (The National Meet­
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thorities' attempts to restore political order. They went into passive resist­
ance when the Gubemium and the county authorities declared a state of 
emergency, setting up gallows at the edge of the villages and threatening to 
hang on sight the young men going about with their proclamations and 
talking of revolution. As if the heroic dispensers of justice from the folk 
tales had finally appeared, the peasants spoke of Barnufiu as "the king in 
Balizsfalva"; Avram Iancu was spoken of as the young prince. And Liszl6 
Nopcsa was remembered as king, though that conservative former foispdn 
merely exploited his Romanian descent to try to infiltrate the Romanian 
national movement, in order to be able to denounce it to Vienna all the 
more effectively. Whoever "the lords" were afraid of, the peasantry saw as 
their liberator.
The liberal nobility's attempt to rally support among the masses of the 
people was most successful in those social strata whose sliding down the 
social scale had been due to the central government's measures. They met 
with greatest success in the Szekelyfold, especially in Haromszek, where 
the population's structure of employment was more complex. The need to 
coordinate their diverse interests in order that at least some of them might 
be realized had led to a habit of concerted action. The serfs wanted to be 
the equals of the frontier guardsmen, the soldiers wanted a status equal to 
that of the landed nobility. The serfs wanted ownership of the land they 
worked as soldiers, with a gun in hand; the soldiers and the nobility, how­
ever, protected their own. The three groups competed with one another, 
but they were all protective of the representative organs which guarded 
their Szekely privileges, and in spite of all differences, had learned to work 
together in the process. It was thus that their feudal constitutionalism had 
gradually acquired liberal and democratic features. And thus it was that at 
the end of April, a number of frontier guard units heeded the instigation of 
two young lawyers and refused to obey the order of the military high com­
mand that they should march on Brasso. Instead, they swore allegiance to 
the Gubemium, and one of the small towns elected the two young lawyers 
to be their representatives at the Diet. At the end of May, at one of the mass 
assemblies, on the initiative of the border guards the robot was abolished.
Paradoxically, the key figure in all the various ongoing conflicts was King 
Ferdinand V. By no means a strong personality, Ferdinand felt tom  between 
his extended family — which tried to terrorize him into determined action 
to maintain the dynasty's absolute rule at all cost — and the Hungarian 
prime minister, who was looking for ways to reconcile Hungary's inde­
pendence with the interests of the rest of the monarchy.
It is possible to distinguish two major trends in the tactics of Transylva­
nia's politicians. One group sought to legitimize its goals by enlisting the 
support of the emperor, the other sought to give its proposed measures the 
effect of law by winning for them the royal sanction of the constitutional 
king of Hungary. What made it difficult to see clearly at times was the fact 
that these two functions were held by one and the same person: the em­
peror Ferdinand I was Ferdinand V in his capacity as king of Hungary. At 
any rate, it became evident that the social and national conflicts of Transyl­
vania were just another aspect of the more comprehensive struggle to change 
489 the very structure of the empire.
At the end of April, the Austrian government, which had come to power 
as a result of revolutionary pressure and whose jurisdiction did not, ac­
cording to the Pozsony laws, extend to Hungary, in order to establish its 
claim to being the heir of the previous central government organs, started 
considering how Austria's position as a great power might be secured at 
the expense of Hungary's independence. Initially, there were no concrete 
plans. Some members of the Austrian government were inclined to com­
promise; others, the advocates of centralized absolutism, were nothing loath 
to try a military "solution". One high-ranking officer originally from Transyl­
vania but now stationed in Vienna wrote back to some friends: "W e'll start 
restoring order by taking control of Transylvania, so as to be able to attack 
insurgent Hungary from both sides", relying also on "help" from the Ro­
manians.4 Some Austrian cabinet ministers, dreaming of expansionism in 
the Balkans, set great store by Transylvania's remaining independent of 
Hungary, for they hoped that "perhaps the Romanian nation of Transylva­
nia would be the core to which the Danubian principalities would join un­
der Austrian suzerainty."5
Initially, the leaders of Transylvania's Saxons were practically paralyzed 
by the revolution, though it was clear that no real internal social strife was 
likely, and any cause for discontent was soon remedied by a series of re­
forms. The great question as far as the Saxons were concerned was whether 
Saxon territorial autonomy could be preserved, an autonomy which guar­
anteed the Saxon leading strata regional hegemony, and which provided 
the framework within which the Sz^szfold had been able to develop in a 
way that placed it far above the surrounding regions. It was these concerns 
that led to the Saxons' seemingly contradictory response to the revolution­
ary situation: enthusiastic support for liberalization and democratization as 
a way of breaking the hold of the bureaucracy; and a no less determined 
insistence on their old institutions, and on their legendary Nation status.
The apple of discord within the Saxon community was the issue of 
whether or not to unite with Hungary. Nagyszeben had sent a declaration 
of allegiance to Vienna at the end of March, and by the end of April, the 
comes, Franz von Salmen, was organizing his supporters against the union. 
At the same time, in Brass6 and Segesvdr petitions calling for the liberaliza­
tion of political life were framed, and up on the tower of Brassb's town hall, 
the Hungarian red, white and green flag was waving. Once the journals 
entered the fray, the sides spared no energy. The Brassb papers declared 
utopistic the idea of territorial autonomy with Nagyszeben as the centre, 
and insisted that the solution was municipal self-government within the 
framework of a constitutional state with democratically elected "free insti­
tutions". They looked not to the Austrian Empire, but to a liberal Germany
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as the promise of the future, trusting that a liberal Hungary allied with 
Germany would provide for the Saxons' development as a German nation 
in the effort to keep their "natural alliance".6
A group of young Saxon Radicals proudly proclaiming their anti-union 
sentiments, along with some older Conservatives, chose their time to influ­
ence public opinion to coincide with Governor J6zsef Teleki's visit to 
Nagyszeben. It was partly due to their efforts that the papers gave their 
Saxon readers a distorted account of the event. Thus, when the governor 
stated that the use of the German language in the state administration would 
be guaranteed, the papers simply reported that Teleki had said that "the 
official language has to be Hungarian".7 By way of response, the hitherto 
peaceable citizens of Szeben put on black and yellow colours, and took to 
the streets, with soldiers marching in the lead. The anti-unionists compared 
the newly published Austrian constitution with the Hungarian constitu­
tion, to the detriment of the latter. And when the University worked out its 
draft Saxon constitution, elements of the Austrian model were adopted, to 
facilitate integration within the empire as a whole. To prevent the spread of 
discontent among the Romanians of the SzdszfOld, the University made some 
concessions to the Romanians; others went further, and promised the Ro­
manians' recognition as Transylvania's Fourth Nation in their effort to win 
the support of the Romanian movement.
In the counties of Transylvania, the peasant movement which unfolded 
as attempts were made to co-ordinate the spontaneous eruptions of local 
discontent, soon became a part of the larger Romanian national movement. 
Encouraged by the prevalence of local activism, Aron Purnnul, who taught 
philosophy at Bal£zsfalva, issued a proclamation calling on the rural deans 
to assemble at Bal^zsfalva on 30 April with one or two men from every 
village. The bishop turned to the authorities to ask them to approve the 
convocation of a national assembly, and the Gubemium set the date for 15 
May. Between thirty and forty thousand serfs made their way to Bal&zsfalva 
in the hope that their presence would further the cause dearest to their hearts: 
their emancipation.
The leaders of the Romanian national movement preparing to address 
the assembled and to influence the resolutions they would adopt were by 
no means a homogeneous group. Their views were a function of their evalu­
ation of the possibilities open to the Romanian nation given the strengths 
and weaknesses of the various forces and powers trying to establish or re­
establish their control over Transylvanian society, but all of them showed a 
sense of grave responsibility. Those who underwrote Transylvania's union 
with Hungary soon found themselves without a following. Others simply 
trimmed their sails to suit the wind, like the scholar and newspaper editor 
Timotei Cipariu, whose series of articles on the union started by pointing 
out its advantages, and ended with an exposition of its drawbacks, and 
included an article which appeared in the Wiener Zeitung (Vienna Newspa-
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per) urging that the Romanian principalities join the great family of the 
peoples of Austria.
On the other hand, Nicolae Balcescu and Ion Ghica, working on the prepa­
ration of the revolution in Wallachia, sent August Treboniu Laurian to 
Transylvania with the instruction not to break with the Hungarians; though 
taking a firm stand for Romanian rights he was to try to make the Hungar­
ians understand that their union with the Romanians was the way to save 
both nations.8 Laurian, having written a poem advocating the union, wrote 
one extolling the advantages of the Romanians becoming the Fourth Na­
tion. Barif insisted that some consensus had to be reached, and pledged to 
support whatever that would be. As for the radical youth, their desire to 
see action was only fanned by the manhunts initiated by the authorities.
Barnujiu was accepted as the authoritative voice in virtue of his reputa­
tion as the chief ideologist of Romanian liberty, and as one who had foreseen 
the inevitable conflict between the imperial government and the new Hun­
garian government as early as April. On 14 May, he addressed the assem­
bled at the church in BalSzsfalva, speaking of national sovereignty, national 
equality, and of the harmonious coexistence of all nations. These inspiring 
words of national consciousness, however, were tinged with extreme mis­
trust of the Hungarians' intentions: "Poisoned is every morsel taken from 
the table of the Hungarian liberty." While holding up Switzerland as the 
example to emulate, he accused Hungary of having cast its eyes on the 
Danubian principalities, and spoke of Hungary's vulnerability without Tran­
sylvania in the most disparaging terms: "Our homeland is a fortress which 
nature has surrounded with high w^lls; without it, the Hungarians of the 
Pannonian lowlands are as exposed to enemy attacks as the wild rabbits of 
the plains". Furthermore, "without the union, the ties between the Magyars 
of Transylvania and the Magyars of Hungary will break and the Magyars of 
Transylvania will slowly undergo a process of natural extinction."9
While the Hungarian national movement, thus, sought to establish its 
hegemony in virtue of its social superiority, the Romanian movement hoped 
to base its ascendancy on the Romanian population's superiority in num­
bers. Both groups tried to compensate for their very different inner weak­
nesses by making political gains as quickly as possible, thereby undermin­
ing the chances of the very cooperation that both of them professed to be 
their long-term goal.
In this overheated atmosphere of nationalism, human relations were sub­
ordinated to the primacy of the nation. Barnujiu was the most optimistic 
with regard to the benefits that would accrue to the individual with the 
achievement of Romanian national liberty, but considered nothing so in­
sidious as the individual's failure to subordinate his own will to the will of 
the nation. And since a considerable number of the Romanian intellectuals 
feared that the emancipation and the liberal government introduced in 
Hungary would cut into the potential support of the Romanian national 
movement, more and more of them felt that Bamufiu's arguments were the 
only ones adequate to the given situation.
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Still, there was a great deal of room for individual opinions. As opposed 
to those determined to achieve Romanian hegemony on the grounds that 
"w e've suffered long enough", Avram Iancu wanted to see a real "Spring­
time of the Nations": to see Transylvania become a federated state where 
the equality of all the national languages was guaranteed. And there could 
be no doubting the sincerity of the attempt to try for coexistence within 
their multi-ethnic state when on 15 May, the opening day of the Romanian 
national assembly, those present not only took an oath of allegiance to the 
emperor and the Romanian nation, but also swore respect for "all the na­
tions of Transylvania".10
In the spirit of Barnujiu's address, they laid claim to Romanian self-gov- 
ernment as then understood: the independent Romanian nation was de­
clared an integral constituent part of Transylvania. They demanded parlia­
mentary representation and a share in the offices of government in propor­
tion to the ratio the Romanians comprised of the entire population. They 
called for the emancipation of the serfs and for universal taxation, and — 
for the first time in the history of the Romanian national movement — for 
the abolition of the tariffs between Transylvania and the Romanian princi­
palities. As the last of their resolutions, they called upon "the nations living 
with us ... not to conduct negotiations about the union until the Romanian 
nation has become a constitutional and organized nation, one taking part in 
the discussions of the house of legislature with the right to propose motions 
and to vote".11
It was to Ferdinand I that those assembled looked to give his royal sanc­
tion to this declaration of Romanian independence, and though a delega­
tion was sent off to Kolozsvar as well, its job was simply to hand over a 
copy of the Balazsfalva petition for the Diet's information. They wanted no 
discussion to interfere with their freedom of action, or call into question the 
legitimacy of their self-government. The Romanian intelligentsia convinced 
the village population of the advantage of having Romanians in the public 
administration with arguments that were probably analogous to the ones 
adduced in a proclamation issued on the morrow of the assembly: "Let the 
Romanians have officials from among their own people at every level of 
public administration, men to whom the Romanians can turn with their 
complains if they have suffered injury, so that they might not always have 
to complain to foreigners who despise them, and will not do them justice." 
Various peasant groups, in issuing their national demands, declared: "W e 
want to be a nation: we want Romanian lords and our Romanian language."12 
All this was, at times, conjoined to invective aimed at other nationalities 
and religions, for even a poet like Andrei Muresan could write of "heathen 
oppressors... who knew no law and knew no God".13
In the aftermath of the national assembly at Balazsfalva, the Romanian 
peasantry, encouraged by the lettered men among them and the Saxons,
10. Al. P a p iu - I l a r ia n ,  Istoria Romanilor din Dacia Superiora. Sibiu 1942, 36.
11. C h e r e s t e $ iu , op. cit., 491.
12. Ibid. 510.
13. N. P o p e a , Memorialul Archiepiscopulm $i Metropolitului Andrei baron de §aguna. I.
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tried to arm in a number of places, though without any concrete plans for a 
revolt of the kind that loan Axente, Bamu Jiu's old school-mate at Bal&zsfalva, 
was urging them to in mid-April. It was more in a spirit of the "Springtime 
of the Nation" that they sought to prove their own national coming-of-age 
to the other nations of Europe by arming. For, as loan Buteanu, one of the 
framers of the Kolozsv^r petition of late March, wrote from Nagyszeben: 
"The Austrian Empire has grown very weak, and it seems on the way to 
complete disintegration. In Paris the French, in Frankfurt the Germans are 
holding national congresses; that's where the future of the European em­
pires will be decided; and that's where the decision shall be made" on the 
future of the Romanians as well. Once they come to know of our move­
ment, they are sure "to give us, too, a share of sweet liberty." And since 
Romanians and Hungarians alike were equally threatened by Pan-Slavism, 
which looked to the tzar for support, if the Hungarians "were right-minded 
men, they cold take our hand as brothers, and recognize us as a political 
nation."14 At the same time, Barnufiu declared that the three "legal nations" 
would bear the responsibility for the ensuing civil war if they did not meet 
the demands of the Balazsfalva assembly.
It added fuel to the fire that the conflicts between the Hungarian land­
lords and the Romanian serfs acquired a national tinge. The Romanian lead­
ers saw the very existence of their nation as being threatened when at the 
beginning of June, the Szekely frontier guards whom the Szeben military 
high command had sent out to Mihalyfalva shot into the crowd, and killed 
dozens of Romanian peasants who had taken possession of the lord's pas­
ture, and would not disperse. Iancu, wanted the population of the entire 
Erchegyseg to rise up in arms: if the Diet in Kolozsvar "w ill not abolish 
robot the way the Hungarian Diet had done for the peasants there, then we 
shall forcibly see to it ourselves".15 Papiu, anticipating an armed insurrec­
tion by the Serbs and Croatians, tried to organize the people of the Mez6s6g. 
After this, the Gubemium put a prohibition on the functioning of the Roma­
nian National Committee, and tried to arrest some of the more vocal lead­
ers, but all in vain. Everyone had started to arm in self-defence (multi-eth­
nic national guards had been organized in the towns, though in a short 
while the Romanias left it and formed separate units), but more and more, 
the peoples of Transylvania were inclined to turn their weapons and to use 
their energies against one another.
The Bourgeois Revolution in Transylvania
That the conflicts found no solution and seemed to be making for civil war 
had a great deal to do with the crisis engulfing the empire as a whole, and 
with the fact that the revolution simply could not come to a head. Similar
14. loan Buteanu's letter toSimion Balint. Nagyszeben, 27 May, 1848. OLGub. Trans, 
in Pol. 1848:7327.
15. Evidence from the record book of the Kozma investigating committee set up by
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signs of chronic structural weakness were evident in Hungary as well. In 
Buda, the commander-in-chief had the army shoot into the crowd; in fact a 
great many in the officer corps regarded the new Hungarian government 
with animosity. The ban of Croatia openly defied the government, and the 
Serbs wanted to declare their part of the country an independent crown 
province, which brought civil war to the south.
On 15 May, a new revolution broke out in Vienna, and this strengthened 
the Hungarian government's bargaining position on the matter of the union 
against the advocates of imperial centralization at the court. Prime Minister 
Batthyany disarmed his opponents and won the monarch with the argu­
ment that he was working in the interest of the empire as a whole. On these 
grounds, he called the Szekelys to arms as early as 19 May, with the inten­
tion of using them against the Serbs in southern Hungary. On 29 May, 
Ferdinand promised to attend the opening of Hungary's first representa­
tive parliament, and defied the Austrian government by placing the com­
mander-in-chief of Transylvania under the palatine, Archduke Stephen, who, 
as viceroy, was to work in concert with the Hungarian government until 
September. Since Commander-in-chief Puchner was also the royal commis­
sioner appointed to the Transylvanian Diet, this decision was tantamount 
to an order not to interfere with the work of legislation.
By the time the Diet assembled, there could not be much question of 
which way the vote would go on whether or not to enter into union with 
Hungary. Transylvania's Hungarian Liberals were unflagging in their zeal, 
the spirit of revolution held Kolozsvar in its grip, and the outcome of the 
Viennese revolution as much as developments abroad made the union seem 
inevitable. The Hungarians of Transylvania, with their slogan of “union or 
death" clearly believed that they were fighting for their lives, and their de­
termination was but reinforced by the conviction that union was the road to 
peaceful revolution. The Hungarians' evaluation of the national aspirations 
of the non-Magyar peoples was coloured by a growing paranoia: more and 
more they saw these as the work of a "hidden hand" and the ever more 
radical Romanian and Saxon movements were identified as instruments of 
the rallying forces of imperial centralization. There were rumours that the 
Conservatives wanted to make Transylvania into the Vendee of the 1848 
revolution.
The majority of the Saxon nation's representatives to the Diet subscribed 
to the union after a fierce debate stretching far into the night, convinced at 
last mainly by the arguments adduced by Carl Gooss of Segesv&r, which 
called attention to the advantages to be derived from Hungary's develop­
ment under a modern constitutional government, and to the fact that union, 
as the example of Germany also showed, was the way forward into the 
future. On 30 May, the Diet in Kolozsvdr which had three Romanian repre­
sentatives, unanimously passed the reunion of the "two brother homelands".
Law I of 1848, "O n the Unification of Hungary and Transylvania", pro­
vided for civil equality: "A s a consequence [of the union], just as the equal­
ity before the law of every inhabitant has been declared and put into prac­
tice in Hungary, the brother homeland, so here, too, [it] is recognized as an 
eternal and immutable principle in respect of every inhabitant of the home- 
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any past law to the contrary is declared to be null and void."16 The reunion 
of the two lands thus guaranteed Transylvania a liberal constitutional sys­
tem, but since the suffrage introduced in Hungary was inapplicable in 
Transylvania, the Kolozsv&r Diet had to pass a new suffrage bill. However, 
the further regulation of Transylvania's unique institutions they entrusted 
to the competence of the new parliament of the whole of Hungary which 
was soon to meet, and appointed a Union Committee, which was to help 
work out the bills that the ministries would be submitting for discussion.
On 6 June, the last Diet of Transylvania's Estates approved the bill on the 
emancipation of the serfs worked out by the Liberals, and specified 18 June 
as the day from which robot was no longer due. The governor, J6zsef Teleki, 
had the legislation proclaimed throughout the country before it ever re­
ceived royal sanction, as indeed the Hungarian prime minister had done in 
March. More than 160,000 families — half the population — had been re­
lieved of their feudal services and dues. The next step was to replace the 
feudal terms of land holding with the modem system of property rights, 
and the big question was who should receive land to dispose over freely as 
his own, and how much of it he should get.
It was the task of the Diet to determine what lands were to become avail­
able for ownership and their tenants freed, and which were to remain the 
landlord's property, with those living on them still liable to render him 
services in lieu of rent. But the law that was passed, a compromise solution, 
did not distinguish clearly between allodial and village land. The law did 
specify, however, that without due process of law, neither copyholders nor 
landless cotters were to be restricted in the use of the land that was "in  their 
hands". Wherever the legal status — i.e. whether it was allodial or not — of 
the land held by a cotter was not clear, he was not obliged to render serv­
ices during the time the case was being decided by the courts. In this re­
spect, the Transylvanian law was more partial to the peasantry than the 
Hungarian "m odel", due in part, perhaps to the high number of disputed 
cases that were expected to come up. On the Liberals' reckoning, the law 
provided the peasantry with possession of up to a third more arable and 
meadow area than what Czir^ky's census had projected. It is understand­
able that the nobility felt that the myth of its paternal generosity had been 
borne out as fact.
The law specified that the landowners were to be compensated by the 
state. The peasants were not compelled to pay direct financial compensa­
tion to their former lords, as they were in most of the Austrian Hereditary 
Lands, nor to compensate them by surrendering a part of their holdings, as 
in Prussia. The Transylvanian peasantry thus set out on the road to mod­
ernization relatively unencumbered, though the opportunities available to 
them — the quality of the land and the backwardness of agricultural pro­
duction — were all even worse than in Hungary. At the same time, the 
preponderance of the great estates could not be felt with the brutality char­
acteristic to many eastern European countries, which in Transylvania (in
16. Magyar torvenytar. 1540-1848. evi erdelyi torvenyek. (Hungarian Law Archives.
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case the 1847 Census came into life) would have made the conditions of the 
life of the peasants even harder.
It was to take decades for all the conflicting claims that attached to a 
great many pieces of land to be ironed out, and those who ended up with 
no property were still obliged to render services in lieu of rent. For all that, 
we must consider the emancipation of the serfs in Transylvania an impor­
tant, and relatively early, step toward the elimination of serfdom in eastern 
Europe. In Russia and the Romanian principalities, it was to be another 
fifteen years until emancipation, and even then, the power of the great land­
owners was practically unbroken. No small and middle peasantry compa­
rable in vitality to the Transylvanian could develop. The smallholder peas­
antry, considered one of the positive features of Romanian social develop­
ment, in Transylvania, was started on its way by the progressive provisions 
of the emancipation bill of 1848.
The nationality policy of the Hungarian Liberals of the last Transylvani­
an Diet continued along lines evolved in the Reform Era. In vain did some 
Romanians look to the Diet to make a grand gesture of compensation, and 
to recognize the Romanians as the Fourth Nation before the system of na­
tions as such was abolished. In vain had the Hungarian K£roly Sz^sz even 
worked out a bill which read as follows: "The Vlach Nation, which the old 
laws of the homeland placed under various restrictions and repressive meas­
ures, is hereby joyfully received by the other Nations of Transylvania within 
their brotherly circle as their equal in rights and obligations; and in place of 
the old 'Vlach' [OlSh] name for this Nation, to which memories of oppres­
sion and various kinds of indignity adhere, henceforward ... the name 'R o­
manian' is to be used."17
The Liberals, however, were both too careful and too dogmatic to accept 
such a bill. Since the matter affected Hungary's Romanians as well, they 
did not want to anticipate the decisions of the Parliament to meet in Pest. 
Instead, they merely passed a resolution rescinding "every restriction and 
subordination which, according to the laws in effect until now, have ad­
versely affected the various peoples of Transylvania, particularly the Vlachs, 
or have been prejudicial to any of the various religions."18 A bill declaring 
the Greek Orthodox church one of the "received" religions was also being 
prepared. All this, however, could not serve to calm passions half so well as 
the passing of the original bill — the one prepared by K3roly Sz&sz — might 
have. What is more, Ferdinand, in receiving the Romanian delegates sent 
by the Balazsfalva assembly, had assured them that he would try to per­
suade the Batthyciny government to satisfy their demands by legislative 
means. Again, the emperor was playing the role of "defender of the Roma­
nians", and the impact was not lost.
The majority of Transylvania's Hungarian Liberals were just as intransi­
gent when it came to the matter of the use of languages other than the offi­
cial Hungarian language at the various administrative levels in various parts
17. Published by A. M iskolczy, T&rsadalmi 6s nemzeti kerdes az utols6 erdelyi rendi 
orsz^ggyulesen. (Social and National Question at the Last Transylvanian Diet of 
the Estates.) Sz 1979, No. 5, 875.
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of the country. They were convinced that any concession would lead to the 
inundation of the Hungarians by the other nationalities, and to their de­
struction. They were so committed to the ideal of the unitary nation-state 
that Wesselenyi — seeing that the national and social tensions within the 
country were worse than ever, and that both the Austrian developments 
and the attitude of Russia augured ill for the revolution — in a letter of 18 
June to one of Hungary's ministers, suggested the possibility of a new, ter­
ritorially smaller, but ethnically homogeneous Hungarian state, or rather of 
one consisting only of citizens who were conscious of themselves as Hun­
garians. Assuming that the Romanians would want to secede from the rest 
of Transylvania and eventually unite with Romanian Moldavia and Wal- 
lachia, he thought in terms of an exchange of populations, whereby the 
Hungarians living interspersed among the Romanians would change abodes 
with Romanians "living closer to the border of the land truly inhabited by 
Hungarians". With the optimism typical of the Liberals, he assumed that 
the Saxons would want to join the Hungarians in the new Hungary. This 
"unprecedented but not implausible ... migration of peoples ... is to be real­
ized through peaceful discussions in keeping with the culture and spirit of 
the present age".19 Wesselenyi's reasonable, though impracticable, idea was 
conceived in the midst of civil war, which, however, was drawing to a close 
as the Hungarian government consolidated its position. On 10 June, Ferdi­
nand gave his royal sanction to the Transylvanian Diet's union bill. It seemed 
as if Hungary were going to slip out of the grip of the empire, and that 
Transylvania's Hungarians would not, after all, be playing the role of hos­
tage in a Hungary-wide civil war. i
Transylvania's administration and judiciary continued to function un­
der the direction of the Gubernium. The Court Chancellery of Transylva­
nia, an office responsible to the government in Vienna, was abolished; the 
Hungarian cabinet took its place. Mikl6s Vay was appointed by the Batthy&ny 
government royal commissioner to Transylvania; his circumspect modera­
tion smoothed over many a local conflict. The comprehensive regulation of 
Transylvanian affairs, of course, was something that the Pest Parliament 
was to have seen to. That is never found the time was due, in part, to the 
fact that the Hungarian government tended to base its understanding of 
Romanian national demands on the way these appeared in Hungary proper. 
There, however, though the Romanians called for the free use of their lan­
guage in schools, churches and at various levels of public administration, 
they generally were careful to steer clear of any demand for a separate po­
litical nation. It was only later that a small group of more militant Roma­
nian nationalists consisting mostly of landowners and priests swelled into 
pro-Habsburg forces demanding territorial autonomy. At the other end of 
the spectrum were the Romanian nobles of Mdramaros, who, declaring them­
selves to be Romanian-speaking "Hungarian citizens", stood firm by Hun­
gary's constitutional government.
The first demand that Hungary's Romanians made involved autonomy 
for the Romanian Orthodox church. They wanted to break free of the Ser­
19. Wesselenyi Miklos levele Klauzal Gaborhoz. (Letter by Mikl6s Wesselenyi to GSbor 
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bian church hierarchy, and, since they felt threatened by the Serbs — the 
Serbian national programme presented in May had laid claim to consider­
able areas inhabited by Romanians — they looked to the Hungarian gov­
ernment for support, especially since the constitutional guarantees enshrined 
in the Pozsony laws in many ways assured the social betterment both of the 
masses and of the Romanian intelligentsia, who identified with them. The 
discontent of the peasantry did not have the elementary force it had in 
Transylvania. The lawyer Eftimie Murgu, who had been arrested in 1845 on 
charges of Daco-Romanism and inciting to riot, was freed from prison in 
March of 1848 at the insistence of Hungarian Radicals. But when he called 
on the Romanian nation to meet in Lugos at the end of June, he had the 
government's approval. At the mass meeting, pointing to the Serbian threat, 
they asked to set up a Romanian national guard, demanded independence 
for their church from the Serbian Orthodox church, and the option of com­
municating with the authorities at all levels of public administration in Ro­
manian. The Romanians of Bihar, the KSv&r region and the Banat, however, 
for the most part tended to seek satisfaction of their more immediate na­
tional needs, and were inclined to be more receptive to what the Hungarian 
government was trying to achieve. They supported the idea of Transylva­
nia's union with Hungary enthusiastically, seeing it as a step to the integra­
tion of the Romanian people. It was the promise of integration of this kind 
that Barif was hailing in Brass6 when he wrote: "The new Hungarian and 
Transylvanian laws have done away with every law that has oppressed the 
Romanian or any other people", and that these new laws has met "every 
point [of the petition submitted by the Balazsfalva assembly], with the ex­
ception of the nationality in the strictest sense of the term ."20
In practice, however, the new constitutionalism failed to fulfil the hopes 
attached to it. When the new suffrage law was being debated in Kolozsvar, 
the Diet, fearful of Romanian preponderance, set the census requirement 
very high: in the counties, franchise was tied to an annual tax of eight silver 
florins, and all those who already had the right to vote continued to en­
joyed it. Even so, fourteen of the seventy-three electoral districts were over­
whelmingly Romanian, but only six Romanian representatives were actu­
ally elected, for the old ways of conducting elections and the old loyalties 
were still alive.
In Hungary proper, fifteen of those elected to the new parliament were 
Romanians. No wonder, then, that the Romanian intelligentsia of Transyl­
vania, which spoke for what was, after all, the majority of the population, 
felt frustrated. In the short run, liberalism proved inadequate to create a 
solution that all sides could accept as a compromise. In the long run, how­
ever, it did provide the framework within which the country's Romanian 
citizens could rise into the ranks of the middle class, and thereby set the 
stage for a confrontation between Hungarians and Romanians as equals.
For the time being, the leaders of the Transylvanian Romanian national 
movement pinned their hopes on Wallachia. The revolution had spread to 
the principality by June, and they were hoping that the provisional govern­
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ment in Bucharest would influence the Hungarian cabinet in the direction 
of a more consistent liberalism in their response to Romanian demands. 
The Hungarian government, too, they thought, would benefit from having 
Wallachia for an ally, and the precondition of that was for them to guaran­
tee the Romanians their national rights. It was this line of thought that Barif
— who was by then thoroughly disillusioned with the way things were 
going for the Romanian cause — had in mind when he wrote in his paper: 
"The fate of the Romanian nation is decided in Bucharest and Iasi, not in 
Kolozsvcir or Bal&zsfalva in Hungary".21 And it was for this reason that he 
had helped pave the way for the Wallachian revolution with various proc­
lamation calling on the people to take up arms, even promising the help of 
Transylvania's Romanians, all the while reiterating the need to build on the 
"natural alliance" between Romanians and Hungarians.
The idea of a Romanian-Hungarian alliance, and of the Danubian Con­
federation of which it was to be the core, was first proposed by the Polish 
emigres living in Paris. It was an idea that was gaining support at the same 
time as the Romanian movement for national independence and unifica­
tion, and the two currents at times reinforced, at times crossed one another. 
The idea of a Romanian state stretching from the Dniester to the Tisza was 
the dream of quite a few Romanians, especially in Wallachia, but one that 
was, perforce, confined, to the sphere of lyric poetry and conspiratorial con­
fidence. To say it out loud was to run the danger of intervention from two 
sides. The Russian foreign minister Count Nesselrode threatened Moldavia 
and Wallachia with military occupation for their governments' countenanc­
ing the Daco-Romanian movement,, and the commander-in-chief of the im­
perial troops in Transylvania watched all the clandestine movement with 
no more sympathy. Barnufiu, in his public address at Bal&zsfalva, had 
thought it prudent to speak only of a unified national culture, and had been 
careful to point out that a nation could live under the rule of a number of 
governments.
The Wallachian revolutionaries had adopted the "Danubian Confedera­
tion" ideal, and wanted to see Romanian and Hungarian national aspira­
tions mutually reinforce one another. For their goal was to establish a fed­
eral state — of what component nations was as yet undecided — capable of 
arresting the expansion of tzarist absolutism.
That their dream never had a chance was due not to any personal inad­
equacy of theirs, but to the circumstances. The Hungarian government could 
not undertake to support a cause of this kind, which had no support in 
western Europe. Batthy&ny and his government were inclined to an alli­
ance with the Danubian principalities, but the fact that the imperial frame­
work was still formally binding made this very difficult. Nor were the rep­
resentatives of the Wallachian government to the cabinet in Buda particu­
larly forthcoming in fulfilling their instructions to cooperate with the Hun­
garian government. For the time being, Wallachia's foreign policy orienta­
tion was being determined by those who wanted to see the Romanian unifi­
cation movement tie its fortune to the analogous movement for German
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unity. Alexandru Golescu, for instance, while he declared the Hungarian 
emancipation law to be the one that his countrymen should emulate, was, 
by the middle of the summer, urging the Romanians of Transylvania to ally 
with the Croatian and Saxon counter-revolutionary forces. His letters were 
intercepted, and made known to the government, and this, naturally, made 
for bad blood between the two countries. At the same time, the Wallachian 
German orientation was inclined to come to some compromise solution with 
Hungary: the same loan Maiorescu who later wrote appeals to the Frank­
furt assembly strongly disapproved of Transylvania's Romanians siding 
with the forces determined to defeat the revolution.
Still, the Romanians' antipathy could not help but grow as the shortcom­
ings of the Hungarian government's nationality policy and the tendency to 
procrastinate become ever more dominant, and as the —admittedly few — 
voices advocating expansionism became more and more shrill. For Hunga­
ry's leaders, anxious to secure their country's position as a m odem  power, 
were eagerly seeking to find its place within the concert of Europe, and 
believed that they had found it as heir to the non-Austrian parts of the 
Habsburg Empire. When it looked as if the Austrian Hereditary Lands would 
join with the German states to create a unified Germany and Hungary could 
finally consolidate its independence, her statesmen — along with a great 
many foreign observers — naively believed that the Danubian principali­
ties would want to join with Hungary of their own free will.
The inconsistencies which characterized both the Romanian and Hun­
garian foreign policies were, in part, a reflection of the extreme instability 
of the European political scene. The immanent weaknesses of both the Ro­
manian and the Hungarian revolutions, and the fact that both new systems 
tried to make their way with the menacing shadow of foreign intervention 
looming over them, did a great deal to undermine the chances of a real 
Romanian-Hungarian alliance. Though the revolution in Wallachia had no 
nationality problem to contend with, the new government was unable to 
see the matter of emancipation through to its realization. At the end of Sep­
tember, Bucharest was occupied by Turkish, and the Russian armies, and 
the revolutionary experiment came to a violent end.
The Hungarian progressives — in Transylvania as well — mourned the 
end of the Wallachian revolution as the loss of a potential ally in the revolu­
tionary cause. The lesson was not lost on them, for in the meanwhile the 
forces of counter-revolution had rallied in Hungary too, and in Transylva­
nia civil war was at hand.
Counter-Revolution and Civil War
There are three schools of thought on the causes of the civil war in Transyl­
vania. The first conceives of it in terms of the teleological "vulcano" model: 
the centuries of oppression, suffering and humiliation grew worse and all 
at once became unbearable. It was this that made the peasantry take up 
arms, for the emancipation had not delivered what it had promised, nor 
had the Romanian national demands been met. At the other pole is what 
has been called the "agitator" model: on this view, it was the machinations
of the army officers and associated d6class£s, fearful of losing whatever 
hold on society the old hierarchy still gave them, which let loose the pas­
sions that were the undoing of the revolution. Quite distinct from both these 
models — which, with their strong emotional appeal and categorical claims 
are but versions of the contemporary explanations — there is the "political" 
model based on a comparative study of the whole series of revolutions which 
broke out in 1848-1849. This political model takes social, and not national 
categories as basic, and speaks not of subjective passions but of revolutions 
and counter-revolutions and their genesis. It accounts for the collective vio­
lence which both embodied in terms of conflicts of interest and competition 
between the various power groupings, and accepts as axiomatic the state­
ment that war is only a political struggle continued by other means. What 
complicates any analysis of Transylvania's particular situation is Transyl­
vania's "m ultiple integration": it was newly integrated with Hungary, and 
was still integrated within the Habsburg Empire, and was, thus, multiply 
bound and committed at a time when everyone from serf to aristocrat was 
actively involved in politics each in his own way, and when the masses of 
the peasantry showed extraordinary political cohesion in their determina­
tion to see their utopistic expectations realized.
The counter-revolution's main strength was those army units which had 
remained loyal to the emperor, units which had won an overwhelming vic­
tory in the Italian provinces, and which had provoked a hardly insurrection 
in Prague so that reprisal might be all the more ruthless. By August, the 
conservative aristocracy and the military high command felt that the liberal 
revolutionary government had forfeited enough support for them to be able 
to restore "order". The Viennese court, however, continued in its duplicity, 
lest the planned military intervention be suspected. It was not until the be­
ginning of October that Ferdinand openly turned against the constitution 
that he had sanctioned.
Once it was evident that the Hungarian government was hemmed in on 
all sides, Jellacic, the ban of Croatia and the commander of the Croatian 
military frontier zone, volunteered to suppress the Hungarian revolution, 
and his offer was enthusiastically received by those whose voice counted at 
court. It is one of the tragedies of the history of the Danube region that his 
attack came at the very moment when the Hungarian government was at 
last willing to grant Croatia complete autonomy.
Initially, the Hungarian revolution received at least moral support from 
abroad. On hearing that Viennese troops were being deployed to aid Jellacic's 
forces, the people of Vienna took to the streets again on 6 October. Though 
the Hungarian army was able to beat back the Croatian attack, it was un­
able to succour Vienna, and the revolutionaries succumbed.
As the confrontation between Hungary and the imperial government 
headed for a show-down, the social and national conflicts in Transylvania 
grew worse and worse.
It was in the two Romanian frontier regiments that discontent was most 
rife: they formed the centres of resistance, and then provided the backbone 
of the offensive. The frontier regiments carried weight that went beyond 
their military strength. The freeman status of frontier guardsman was one 
that the serfs aspired to, though the Romanian small landowners in the 5 0 2
regiments would just as soon have done without their military obligations. 
In the same way as the Horea rebellion of 1784 had started with mass vol­
unteering for the frontier regiments, in 1848 the movement to join up was 
one of the forms that the peasantry's class struggle took. Paradoxically, of 
course, for by then serfdom as an institution had been abolished by the 
revolution. The proclamation of emancipation, however, could not in itself 
satisfy the powerful messianic expectations that would follow in its wake, 
especially since it had led, rather, to endless of conflicts between the landed 
nobility and the peasantry. The delays involved in settling the various claims 
through the courts made for mistrust and a sense of insecurity on both sides.
In vain did Imre Mik6, who had charge of the Transylvanian Gubernium, 
ask the Hungarian minister of justice, Ferenc De3k, to take steps to avert a 
crisis without delay, by appointing those commissions which, in keeping 
with the principles of Transylvanian civil law, would decide village by vil­
lage what lands the lord had a rightful claim to, and what was, by right, the 
peasantry's property. Until the committee on the union had submitted its 
detailed proposals, the hands of the minister of justice were tied.
In some 10-15 per cent of the villages in the counties, the entire popula­
tion was challenging the lord as one man. Dispute centred on those pas­
tures which the lord now arrogated to himself on grounds of its being allo­
dial land, and on the question of who controlled the forests. The position of 
the serf called "curialists", who had acquired only personal freedom by the 
emancipation because the land they lived on and worked was part of the 
lord's demesne, was another source of extreme tension. Though this group 
comprised only about 15 per cent of all villeins, a great many peasants feared 
that they, too, would be similarly dispossessed. In many places the peas­
antry refused to harvest the crops on the lord's own lands even in return for 
a share of the produce, lest their share-cropping be interpreted as a recogni­
tion of their former dependent status, and their lands be categorized as part 
of the lord's demesne. The situation became critical when time came to har­
vest the corn, and the county authorities tried to regain control of the situa­
tion by exacting the peasantry's robot arrears, and by obliging the former 
curialist serfs to go to work in the fields.
At the end of September, from one day to the next, the mass of the peas­
antry actively turned against the government. What triggered the event was 
the government order for the conscription of a national guard, the Honved 
army. Though its function was to be purely defensive, there were rumours 
in the villages that the "lords" wanted to use the conscripts against the 
emperor himself. There were instances of sabotage everywhere: the men 
went into hiding, ripped pages from the church registers to destroy the 
"evidence", and simply did not let the conscripting officers enter the vil­
lage. On 12 September, an army of two hundred soldiers sent by the revolu­
tionary government of Hungary and the men of several villages clashed in 
Aranyoslona, and dozens lay dead when the skirmish ended. The incident 
became the symbol of "popular" resistance against the backdrop of such 
aggression, the myth of the "good emperor" loomed large, and became the 
focus of a vast variety of discontents.
By the time the government put a stop to the conscriptions, it was too 
5 0 3  late: the forces of counter-revolution were channelling the discontent as they
saw fit. Events followed one another like the unfolding plot of a well-writ- 
ten play. As early as September, Commander-in-chief Puchner had noted in 
a letter to the minister of war in Vienna: "It is possible that we might have 
to influence the Romanian people — which, in respect of its strategic loca­
tion and loyalty to His Majesty is just like the Ruthenians of Galicia — in a 
way that will help us curb the Hungarian democratic forces".22
In the meanwhile, between 11 and 14 September when Jellacic crossed 
the D riva to occupy the Hungarian capital Buda, representatives of all the 
villages of the military frontier zone were called together to Orl&t and Nasz6d 
to pledge their support for the unity of the monarchy and the army. These 
meetings were taken as a signal by the Romanian peasantry, who flocked to 
volunteer for the frontier regiments. Though the high command in Nagysze- 
ben was careful to avoid anything that Hungarian public opinion might 
interpret as "provocation" until the time was ripe, Karl Urban, the lieuten­
ant colonel of Nasz6d, on returning from Vienna on 8 September acted on 
"higher" instructions and promised imperial protection for all the commu­
nities that had boycotted conscription into the Hungarian national guard. 
Priests, seminarians and law students encouraged the villages to send del­
egates to Urban for their pajura (meaning "eagle" in Romanian), a docu­
ment stamped with the Habsburgs' two-headed eagle seal, which attested 
in glowing German that the community in question was loyal to Emperor 
Ferdinand and would, in case of need, send its young men to testify to this 
with their life-blood.
Community solidarity, or perhaps more precisely, the compelling strength 
of the collectivity, was extraordinary. Those flocking to Nasz6d — some 
Hungarians among them — often dragged along with them the local land­
owner, the Calvinist priest, and the county officials. By the end of Septem­
ber, 527 villages had sworn their allegiance. On Urban's estimate, just of 
those who had arms of their own there were more than ten thousand men 
in readiness.
The Romanian national movement, which to this point had had no scope 
for action, co-operated with the imperial military authorities, but also tried 
to influence the course of events as a force in its own right. In northern Tran­
sylvania, around Nasz6d, there was little chance for this last aspiration, so 
strong was the dominance of the Austro-German officer corps. In the south, 
however, it was the Romanian officers, priests and schoolmasters who domi­
nated the scene, men who were committed to national self-government. 
Here, the military never did acquire direct control over the disaffected. 
Baldzsfalva became the gathering-point of those whose opposition to the 
Hungarian government was grounded primarily in social and national griev­
ances. loan Axente, who had spoken of the possibility of armed revolt as 
early as the spring, set out from O rlit with a few hundred followers and 
arrived at Balizsfalva with thousands. Peasants from all over Transylva­
nia, Hungarians included, were making their way to Balizsfalva, which 
from mid-September on was, for two weeks, the scene of a gigantic en­
campment, and another national assembly. The assembly demanded the
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abolition of the robot — in actual fact, only robot arrears were still being 
exacted — and of the labour service being demanded in lieu of rent for the 
land used. What is more, they declared the union with Hungary null and 
void, and pronounced the Austrian constitution valid in Transylvania as 
well. The assembled called for a provisional government composed of Ro­
manians, Saxons and Hungarians, and demanded that a Diet be convened 
to decide on Transylvania's future. "The elected representatives of the Ro­
manian people of Transylvania", with Laurian at their head, turned to the 
Viennese Parliament, requesting that Austria make its presence felt in the 
east, and guarantee the independence of the two Romanian principalities, 
so that they might "join whichever great power they trust". As for Austria, 
let it be "a  voluntary alliance of free peoples".23
The Austrian officer corps was clearly troubled by the excessive nation­
alist sentiment of the intelligentsia, but for all that, the generals at Bal^zsfalva, 
as Laurian reported, "promised everything'':24 that they would pass on the 
Romanian demands to the emperor, and that they would provide the peas­
antry with arms.
The organizers of the Balazsfalva assembly called on the people to arm 
in defence of the nation. The armed units they set up followed the Roman 
traditions that they claimed to be theirs. They divided Transylvania into 
districts called prefectura, and started to set up legione in each one under the 
command of a prefect. Going down the hierarchy of command, there were 
the ranks tribuns, centurios and decurios. The leaders assumed names such 
as Sever, Probu, and Marxian. Whenever possible, they persuaded the vil­
lagers to drill with scythes and spears under the command of some local 
veteran, in the hope that Commander-in-chief Puchner would keep his prom­
ise and send them arms and real army officers. They started setting up the 
"alarm trees", and building the fire which, when lit, would mark the start 
of the attack.
The Hungarian revolutionary government found it more and more diffi­
cult to hold its own in Transylvania. Once the villages went into explicit op­
position, the administration was paralyzed. The most it could do was send 
reports to Buda on how events were unfolding. The threat of a "bloody up­
heaval" was in the air. As one of the foispans reported about the attitude of 
the villagers to the county administration: "W here there is no opposition, 
one is terrified by the excessive obsequiousness, and a turn of phrase that 
one meets time and again: 'W e'll obey, until it turns out how things will 
g o '."25
The ominous situation gave some impetus to the attempts to satisfy some 
of the Romanians' national demands. At the end of August, Wesselenyi had 
presented a bill on the use of the Romanian language. The Romanian repre-
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sentatives of Hungary proper also called for analogous rights, emphasizing 
the need for the two nations to be allies.
In more settled times, Kossuth's warning, too, might not have fallen on 
deaf ears: "Hungarians and Vlachs shall both find a bright future in broth­
erly unity, and not if one is deceived into oppressing the other; for with 
oppression, they resort to a weapon which is likely to backfire."26
At the end of September, the committee on the union — which had 
coopted some Romanian members, Cipariu, the scholar, among them — 
finally came up with a draft bill which might have opened up a new chapter 
not only in Romanian-Hungarian relations, but also in the lives of all of 
Hungary's non-Hungarian peoples. The draft bill recognized the Romanian 
people as a collective legal person. Its basis was that "the nationality and 
language of the Romanians were recognized". In their schools and in their 
churches, it guaranteed the use of the vernacular, and provided for its use 
in the forums of county and urban government "wherever half of those 
present are Romanians". It held out the prospect that Romanian would be a 
language of command in the national guard. The draft bill specified that 
Romanians were to be given public administrative posts in some "fair pro­
portion", and declared that "all rights and privileges which accrue to the 
other citizens of the homeland, or shall be won by the legislature in the 
future, are to be shared in by the Romanians".27
The draft bill never got beyond the desk of the Speaker, so busy was 
everyone by then with organizing the revolution's defence. Still, these de­
velopments touching on the Romanians were well received by some of Tran­
sylvania's Romanian leaders. People were more optimistic, but it did not 
undermine their co-operation with the imperial army. "The emperor will 
give us everything that is our due. But you should know that the Parlia­
ment in Pest, too, has granted everything, has recognized our nationhood 
in all its manifestations", wrote Nicolae Balasescu28 at the beginning of Oc­
tober on hearing the news from Cipariu who had come from Pest. Cipariu, 
however, returning to Balazsfalva, stayed with the side that stood to win, 
and put up the black and yellow flag.
It seems that the Romanian leaders believed that their military prepara­
tions and the Croatians' arms would restrict Hungary's independence of 
action enough to intimidate the Hungarian national government into sal­
vaging what it could, and accepting the constitutional reforms that had been 
worked out in Vienna for the entire monarchy. Though its precise nature 
had never been specified, a constitutional framework of this kind, as the 
Brassd papers pointed out, based as it putatively was on some balancing act 
to keep the national aspirations of the various nations of the empire from 
overwhelming one another, would give the Romanians, too, a significant
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role in shaping their own destiny. It was on the basis of this consideration 
above all else that the Romanian leaders chose to run the risk of siding with 
the imperial military, for they must have known full well that the generals 
were no friends to constitutionalism.
The leading Saxon politicians based their decisions on their evaluation 
of the balance of forces within the empire. In the first half of September, 
when they saw that the Hungarian government was preparing for a mili­
tary confrontation, the Saxon representatives to the Hungarian Parliament
— with the exception of Elias Roth of Brass6 — renounced their mandates 
one after the other, and went home to Transylvania. They considered it a 
serious violation of their traditional rights that the draft bill submitted by 
the committee on the union proposed that the highest officials heading the 
Saxon (and Szekely) seats be appointed by the ministry in the same way as 
the foispans of the counties. They did not feel that their autonomy was suffi­
ciently guaranteed by the fact that they were to continue to elect their comes, 
that their municipal organizations and the University were to continue to 
function, and that the use of the German language was to be guaranteed in 
all the Saxon municipalities with the exception of Szdszv&ros. They were 
intransigent in insisting on their traditional privileges, in spite of the fact 
that the recent election had shown that the liberalization of municipal poli­
tics did not endanger the ascendancy of those who saw the Saxons' future 
to lie in an expressly German cultural orientation.
As far as Stephan Ludwig Roth was concerned, by the beginning of Oc­
tober the choice was clear: "1. If we stand by the Hungarians, we'll be against 
the Romanians and the empire. 2. If we stand by the Romanians, we'll be 
against the Hungarians in defense of the empire. The Hungarians and Ro­
manians are incidental. What counts is the empire, for it is on this principle 
that the newly proclaimed Austrian constitution rests." Constitutionalism, 
the sense of being German, and loyalty to the emperor — these were what 
counted even had the Hungarians "acceded to all our conditions"; but since 
"this is not the case, the decision is even more clear-cut".29
With both groups siding with the counter-revolution, the conflict between 
Saxons and Romanians became of secondary importance. Two major Saxon 
political trends emerged. One aim was to make Transylvania into a confed­
eration of four territorially autonomous nations, with equal representation 
for each of them in the federal government. It was this programme that was 
adopted at the beginning of October by the municipal assembly of Nagy- 
szeben. The other aim involved the repudiation of Transylvania's historic 
traditions, and advocated a counter-revolutionary solution: germanization 
and a strong imperial central government. Those who supported it envi­
sioned territorial autonomy in the form of the Szaszfold's becoming a unit 
of the empire completely separate from Transylvania, and subject to the 
authority only of the imperial ministry in Vienna.
The Szaszfold became the centre of counter-revolutionary military op­
erations. At the beginning of October, Puchner grouped his forces around 
the Saxon towns, ostensibly to make the Romanian population turn against
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the Hungarian government with this show of force. In fact, he was looking 
for a base of operations whence to set out on his campaign to "rescue" Tran­
sylvania from the maelstrom of civil war — that is, whence to embark on its 
conquest.
Once the regular troops were withdrawn from the counties, hostilities 
reached a fever pitch. After having experimented to no avail — as we have 
seen — with a policy of conciliation at the beginning of September, the Hun­
garian politicians of Transylvania turned to repression. They used Hungar­
ian volunteer troops and members of the national guard to try to break into 
the recalcitrant peasant communities, and summarily executed some of the 
arrested Romanian organizers of the resistance. The idea was to weaken the 
imperial army's supportive hinterland, to try to crack the live shield of peas­
ant rebels behind whom the main enemy, the army, had sheltered. But the 
Hungarians did not want to operate openly against the imperial forces until 
the latter forced the confrontation. By this time, progressive Hungarian public 
opinion saw the Romanian and Saxon nationalists co-operating with the 
Habsburg army as nothing but the tools of the reactionary forces aiming at 
the annihilation of Hungarian constitutionalism and national development. 
In the struggle against them, the Hungarians drew strength from their be­
lief that the struggle for a modern constitutional Hungary belonged in the 
mainstream of the European wars of liberation. "May our words awaken 
the conscience of the world, and if our nation must perish — which there is 
no reason to believe it will — let us die gloriously as the champions of 
European liberty", wrote the Hungarian radical paper of Kolozsv^r in mid- 
September.30 i
The Hungarian public as it prepared to defend the "nation" hoped that 
the mobilization of the Sz£kelyfold would turn the tide. The parliament 
abolished the frontier regiments in mid-September, in order to remove the 
Szekely troops from under the imperial military high command. Nine gov­
ernment commissioners were sent to the area to see that the law was car­
ried out, and to recruit volunteers. One of the commissioners, L3szlo Berzen- 
czey, the representative for Marossz6k, ignoring the disapproval expressed 
by the local Hungarian authorities, called the Szekelys to a national assem­
bly at Agyagfalva, the nation's ancestral place of assembly, "to  reclaim the 
Szekely Nation's liberties of yore". Every male of military age was to attend 
the meeting set for 16 October, on pain of forfeiting his life and property, as 
in the days long past. And attend they did, all sixty thousand of them. It 
was now Agyagfalva that became the scene of a demonstration of national 
solidarity that could not but arouse confidence in the hearts of the national 
leaders. Those who attended would have been hard put not to feel that they 
were taking part in an all-European revolutionary movement.
The Hungarian flag flew over the tribune, and on the top of the flagstaff 
was a Kossuth hat, the symbol of the assembly's identification with the cause 
of national self-defence, an answer to Kossuth's proclamation of 10 October 
calling on the Szekelys to rise as one man against the traitors. The assembly 
swore an oath to uphold constitutional monarchy, and expressed its grati-
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tude "to  Lajos Kossuth, the first great champion of Hungarian constitu­
tional liberty", as well as to the revolutionary students and intellectuals of 
Vienna, "w ho have protected not only the liberties won by the Austrian 
people, but also the constitution... of Hungary against the machinations of 
the Viennese camarilla".31
The governm ent com m issioners suggested that the m ajority of the 
Szekelys return to their homes and prepare there for the fighting that would 
surely come. Berzenczey was the only one who insisted on immediate ac­
tion, but he was outvoted. When, however, the secret order to attack that 
Latour, the Austrian minister of war, had sent to Puchner on 3 October was 
read, as were accounts of how the Hungarians of the counties were being 
molested, the majority began to waver. When it was reported — it turned 
out incorrectly — that Urban had marched against Marosv^sarhely, the as­
sembled masses were not to be put off: they would attack immediately. But 
they had not even set out when, on 18 October, Puchner's proclamation 
announced that he had temporarily taken over the government in the name 
of the emperor.
The Hungarians of Transylvania had not wanted to be the ones to take 
the step which led to the brink of civil war, and now they did not have to. 
The Szekely assembly turned to "our Saxon and Romanian brethren" in one 
of its proclamations, declaring: "W e respect your nationality, your language 
and your religion".32
The Romanians responded in kind: "Though our ideas on political rights 
and liberty do not agree, let us at least both subscribe to the principle of 
humanity. But this was not enough to counterweight the passions aroused 
by their slogan: "Annihilate those enemies who can do us harm ".33
Puchner "greatly" overestimated the forces the Hungarian government 
had at its command in Transylvania, and, for this reason, wanted to make 
sure of his superior numbers by calling the entire population to arms. He 
expected the Romanian intelligentsia to mobilize a force of 195,000 volun­
teers. To assure co-operation between the professional officer corps and the 
volunteers, he set up a Pacification Committee of Romanians and Saxons, 
headed, to avoid misunderstandings, by one of his generals.
Initially, recruitment took place without the two Romanian churches being 
officially involved, though there were quite a few priests among the activ­
ists. The two Romanian bishops, too, were expected to take a stand. The 
Greek Catholic bishop, Lemenyi stayed loyal to the Hungarian government, 
and for this reason the commander-in-chief took the thoroughly illegal step 
of removing him from office. The few canons at Bal^zsfalva who shared 
Lemenyi's views he had imprisoned. The Greek Orthodox bishop Andrei
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Saguna, on the other hand — who had recently been to Pest and had had 
Hungarian statesmen plead with him in vain to issue a pastoral letter urg­
ing his flock to peace and reconciliation — subordinated himself to Puchner's 
imperial command.
The first task that the imperial army set itself in the second half of Octo­
ber was to try to render the Hungarian national guards ineffective. While in 
strategically important southern Transylvania Puchner deployed primarily 
the regular army, north of the Nagyszeben-Arad line to Kolozsv£r he left 
the volunteers to deal with the Hungarian national guards. There were good 
political reasons for this: with Transylvania's various national groups fight­
ing against one another, it would be easy enough to present the matter as an 
outbreak of civil war. It was then that the imperial armies would come 
upon the scene full strength, and play the part of pacificator. How far this 
was indeed the plan is illustrated by the case of Gyulafehervar, where it 
was the Romanian peasantry of the surrounding districts that was mobi­
lized against the 150 national guardsmen of the town, in spite of the fact 
that Transylvania's only enormous, modem fortress lay just on the out­
skirts. And, in keeping with the scenario, after the first clash, it was the 
regular army that mediated between the Romanians and the Hungarians, 
who were obliged to disown their cause. In Kisenyed, near Nagyszeben, for 
two whole days Romanian peasants laid siege to a large manor house where 
about a hundred noblemen and their families had taken refuge. Here, the 
army did not mediate: they did nothing to stop the massacre of over a hun­
dred people. The army also left it to the Romanian peasant army to deal 
with the Hungarian national guards of the town of Zalatna and of the vil­
lages of Als6-Feher county, though it was well known that national antago­
nism in the area had been most acute for some time. Here, hundreds of 
Hungarians — many of them miners — were slain.
The Habsburg levee en masse triggered all the passions of a peasant move­
ment. It was as if the masses had been bent on destroying the entire frame­
work of their dreary life of toil, in order that they might regain some of that 
ideal state of happiness which the priests said had once been man's in Eden, 
and the like of which, they knew, many of their "betters" enjoyed now here 
on earth.
But whenever there was a village that refused to heed even the emper­
or's call to arms, like those around Kolozsv^r, where the county authorities 
had made the population swear loyalty to "the King" and the Hungarian 
government, the military high command resorted to threats and to rumours 
to get the peasantry to act. They sent out pamphlets menacing with per­
petual servitude anyone who did not report for military duty, and with the 
vengeance of the Russians anyone who did not use arms against the Hun­
garian government. Where anger and desperation were not enough, fear 
and suspicion did the job. In actions aimed at making the Hungarian na­
tional guards lay down their arms, it was almost always in the last minutes 
of what seemed like successful negotiations that someone — probably out 
of fear — pulled the trigger, both sides blaming the other for the carnage 
that ensued. Fear often lay behind the peasants' determination to wipe out 
the "enem y", so that they might not have to fear reprisal. Let there be no 











































In fact, the Szekelys were used as "bogies" much too freely. For their 
part the Sz6kely volunteers, once in action, lost much of their revolutionary 
idealism and patriotic high-mindedness. Those assembled set out in four 
groups and in four directions. Considerable numbers of tine officers let their 
troops go on a rampage either in a deliberate effort to demoralize them and 
thus undermine the revolutionary cause, or in defence of landed property, 
or just for fun. Thoroughly undisciplined and surfeited with their wanton 
brutality to the peasant population, these Sz6kely units turned and fled as 
soon as they came face to face with the imperial army.
The Sz6kely forces which set out to meet Urban initially met with more 
success, but then forfeited their glory. The unit from Csik marched through 
Marosv&s&rhely with the reverence they thought due a crusade, lighted can­
dles in hand and singing psalms. Urban's peasant volunteers they simply 
put to rout; but when they got to the little Saxon town Sz^szregen, they 
looted homes and set them on fire, losing more lives in skirmishes during 
the pillage than they had on the battlefield.
There were two occasions in 1848 when the Szekelys surprised Transyl­
vania. The first time was when, after looting Szaszregen, they came up 
against the imperial regulars just before Marosv&s&rhely, and ran when the 
first few cannons were fired; the second time was when the people of 
H&romszek held out heroically until the end of 1848.
Puchner made a serious mistake when, with victory in sight, he called on 
H&romszek to surrender unconditionally. The fear of the uncalculable served 
to cement social cohesion. Even the local military command, which had 
proven incompetent in the autumn rallied, and did a fine job under the 
supervision of the village and public meetings co-ordinated by the Radi­
cals. Puchner was quite right to complain that Haromszek "tied half my 
troops down at the most decisive moment".34 Thus, the resistance put up by 
the citizens of H&romszek was decisive in the series of initial victories that 
the Hungarian revolutionary army was able to achieve in late 1848, for the 
imperial forces stationed in Transylvania were not free to move west and 
pose a threat to central Hungary. They were not free to move westward 
even though the revolution's troops in Transylvania were ineffective every­
where else, and had to withdraw to Hungary proper without an actual bat­
tle taking place.
With the exception of H&romszek, Transylvania was under imperial mili­
tary dictatorship by the second half of November. Civil government was 
taken over by the Romanian national movement. The Romanian National 
Committee was revived in Nagyszeben, and the peasants called it the "R o­
manian Gubem ium" when they turned to the "Romanian lords" who now 
brought the decisions that affected their day-to-day lives. Inevitably, though, 
the Romanian intelligentsia was subordinated to the Austrian military. The 
commanders of the Romanian volunteer units had to take their orders from 
the career officers placed above them when it came to the execution of 
planned offensive manoeuvres. Yet, though the committee had to do Puch-
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ner's bidding without a murmur, it nevertheless set about trying to realize 
some of the goals formulated in the Balazsfalva demands. What it did not 
undertake to do, however, was to work out the principles by which the 
lord's demesne was to be distinguished from the lands held in villein ten­
ure. For this reason, no final decisions were made in any conflict involving 
land claims between a lord and his former serfs. The committee thought its 
prime task to be the organization of the country's administration. The old 
county framework was kept. The counties and the districts were headed by 
administrators appointed by Puchner, men who had greater power than 
the foispdns of yesteryear, and were mostly retired army officers of Roma­
nian origin. Immediately under them, to do the actual work, Puchner ap­
pointed one or two lettered men, either priests or lawyers. The other posts 
were elected offices, the choices in theory reflecting the national composi­
tion of the local population. In fact, however, the Romanians tended to con­
tinue the same kind of ungenerous nationality policy that they had so much 
deplored in the Hungarians, though among Romanians, too, there were those 
who did their best to be equitable.
Revolutionary Consolidation and its Contradictions
In the middle of December, the imperial forces stationed in Transylvania 
set out in the direction of Nagyvarad. The offensive, however, was stopped 
short by the newly reorganized Hungarian defence for the president of the 
Hungarian National Defence Committee, Lajos Kossuth, had appointed a 
new commander-in-chief to head the Hungarian army in Transylvania: J6zef 
Bern, a Pole who had won renown in the Polish insurrection of 1831, and 
was a "professional soldier of liberty". In October of 1848, he had been in 
charge of organizing the defence of revolutionary Vienna: it was after Vi­
enna fell that he came over to fight in Hungary. Bern mounted his counter­
attack from the direction of Nagybanya on 20 December, with an army of 
ten thousand and sixteen cannons. It had been generally thought that it 
would take an army of fifty thousand to reoccupy Transylvania, but by 
Christmas Bern and his men were in Kolozsvar. It was the first Hungarian 
victory since the end of September, when Jellacic and his army had been 
routed in Transdanubia.
With his occupation of Transylvania, Bern cut the Austrian army in two, 
and so its superiority in numbers was less overwhelming. First he liberated 
northern Transylvania, driving Urban's troops out to the Bukovina, and 
then turned against the main army under Puchner's command. From 
Kolozsvar, he moved east, to Marosvdsarhely, to mobilize the Szekelyfold. 
In an effort to cut him off, Puchner attacked, but was defeated in the first 
serious clash at Sz6kefalva on 17 January. The Hungarian army pressed on 
to Nagyszeben. At this point, however, Bern's triumphant progress was 
abruptly halted. He had suffered heavy losses and had to retrench. Of his 
six to seven thousand men, he sent the Szekelys home to return with rein­
forcements, and sent another significant contingent off toward Deva to meet 
the reinforcements expected to arrive from Hungary. The main army, thus, 
was left with about two and a half thousand men. Puchner — after clearing
his plan at the very highest level — turned for help to the Russian armies of 
occupation stationed in Wallachia. But to avoid the public embarrassment 
of such a move, he made the Romanian Committee — which was reluctant 
indeed — do the "dirty work". At the very end of December, a few mem­
bers of the committee empowered Bishop ipaguna and Gottfried Muller, a 
Saxon teacher, to ask for the tzar's protection in the name of the Romanian 
and Saxon nations. No sooner had the seven thousand strong Russian army 
arrived, Puchner inflicted heavy losses on Bern at Vfzakna. Bern's army 
greatly outnumbered, cut its way back into Hungary, all the while engaging 
in constant battles with his pursuers as well. At Deva, however, Bern was 
met by a reinforcement of three thousand men. With his army thus swelled 
to eight thousand, on 9 February Bern fought the bloodiest battle of the war 
on Transylvanian soil near Piski. In the end, the imperial troops ran out of 
ammunition, and had to withdraw. Bern did not pursue them toward Nagy- 
szeben, but ingeniously slipped through between the fortress of Gyula- 
fehervir and the Austrian main army. Once again, his goal was to establish 
contact with the Szekelyfold. And his hopes were not disappointed.
True enough, H£romsz6k was unable to keep up its resistance after the 
end of December. News of the liberation of Kolozsvar had reached the 
Szekelyfold too late; the leaders of the Hciromszek resistance made an armi­
stice with the imperial officers. But in vain had the generals and the leading 
officials of the seats taken the oath of allegiance to the emperor. At the news 
of Bern's victories, the people followed the radicals. The generals let the 
junior officers take over, the corporals and the second-lieutenants, who had 
always been the heart and soul of the resistance. By the beginning of Febru­
ary, Second-Lieutenant S&ndor G£1 had clashed with a Russian army of two 
and a half thousand. He could even have won, had he been more energeti­
cally on the offensive. The Szekely troops returning from Nagyszeben, how­
ever, were swelled by such a host of reinforcements, that they were able to 
take Medgyes. It was here that they awaited Bern, who had first to chase 
Urban back into the Bukovina before he could march against Puchner. The 
Austrian general defeated Bern at Medgyes, but he was unable to use his 
victory to advantage. When he tried to surround Bern as he was retreating 
to Segesvar, Bern, noticing what he had in mind, executed one of the most 
brilliant manoeuvres of the war: circumventing his pursuers and leaving 
them far behind, on 11 March he occupied Nagyszeben in a flash. Within 
days, he had pushed the Russian forces out of Transylvania, and then drove 
Puchner out as well. In his first, unbridled anger, Tzar Nicholas I wanted to 
send an army of fifty thousand against Transylvania, but the "doves" at 
court talked him out of it. By the middle of March, there were no regular 
imperial troops left in Transylvania capable of mounting an offensive. Only 
the castles of Gyulafeherv^r and D6va were still in Austrian hands, and 
Bern marched on to the Banat, whence, a month later, he drove out the 
reorganized Austrian forces which were using Wallachia as a base of opera­
tions against Transylvania.
In the meanwhile, two decisions had been taken concerning the fate of 
Transylvania, one in Olmiitz and one in Debrecen.
At the beginning of March, the imperial government, believing that it 


































imperial parliament, discarded the draft constitution that had been based 
on the principle of popular sovereignty, and instead, decided to decree a 
"constitution" published in the name of the sovereign for the entire empire. 
This constitution aimed at the unity of the empire above all, and restored 
Transylvania to the status of an independent crown colony. "Equality 
(Gleichberechtigung) of nationalities" was the leitmotif of the new constitu­
tion, though only the rights of the Saxon nation were expressly dealt with.
The constitution of Olmiitz left no doubt that the Habsburgs wanted no 
part of Hungarian constitutionalism, and this gave a great impetus to the 
Hungarian forces pressing for independence, especially coinciding as it did 
with a series of victories won by the Hungarian army, which was beginning 
to rid the country of imperial troops. On 14 April, the Hungarian Parlia­
ment sitting in Debrecen approved the Declaration of Independence, which 
deposed the House of Habsburg, and pronounced Hungary — including 
Transylvania — an independent constitutional state. Kossuth was elected 
goveming-president. Though the majority of the liberal representatives from 
Transylvania, as members of the "Peace Party", would rather have sought a 
compromise with the monarch, public opinion in Transylvania tended to 
approve of Kossuth's more categorical approach, convinced that it was the 
only road open to a secure future.
Political life in Transylvania after the Austrian troops were driven out 
was again regulated by the laws passed between April and June of 1848. 
Once more, the state apparatus was in the hands of plenipotentiary na­
tional commissioners. At the first sign of trouble, Kossuth sent one of his 
most loyal supporters, L&szI6 Cs^nyi, off to Transylvania. Cs&nyi contrib­
uted greatly to Bern's victories by reorganizing the administration, mobiliz­
ing the Szekelys, and providing a constant stream of conscripts.
Bern, the champion of national independence for all peoples, has often 
been contrasted with the Hungarian government commissioners who, so 
the comparison goes, stood for more narrow class interests. In fact, the Polish 
general was echoing the sentiments of Hungary's leading circles when he 
said: "The Hungarian army is fighting for the common liberty of all peo­
ples; that is why children of the most diverse nations fight within its ranks; 
it is in virtue of this that its name shall be blessed as the vanguard of Euro­
pean liberty".35
In practice, Bern usually did what he thought expedient for his army's 
readiness for battle and for mobilizing mass support. He is especially known 
for the amnesty he gave to every Transylvanian, without ever seeking the 
government's consent. He did not even want reprisal for the wanton vio­
lence of the Romanian volunteer army which, in its flight — according to 
George Barif "purely for revenge"36 — burned down Nagyenyed with its 
college and library, massacring its Hungarian population. Bern was a great 
believer in the moral impact of a general amnesty; but once he found that 
his magnanimity met with ingratitude, he wanted to punish more severely
35. Bern's proclamation addressed to the inhabitants of Nagyszeben. Nagyszeben,
12 March, 1849. Published by L. K o v a r i,  Okmanytdr... 158.
36. G. B a r i t , Parfi alese din istoria Transilvaniei pe doue sute de ani din urrnd. II.
Sibiu 1890, 416.
than the law would ever allow. When, for instance, the Romanians of Nasz6d 
went over to Urban, who was attacking from the Bukovina, Bern wanted to 
evacuate the entire rebel population, and settle Szekelys in their place. It 
took all of Cs&nyi's powers of persuasion to frustrate this fatal plan. And, in 
the Sz&szf5ld, in spite of his own amnesty, Bern played the role of executor 
of the government's (that of the Committee of National Defences) will, and 
introduced martial law.
For the fact was that the Hungarian government held the Saxons mostly 
to blame for the Romanian levee en masse and the Russian intervention, and 
had quite abandoned its good intentions of the spring of 1848. "Over-hasty 
clemency is a knife we put into the hands of our enemies so that they might 
stab us in the heart",37 declared Kossuth to Bern. According to this princi­
ple, on the orders of Cs£nyi summary courts were set up, one of which, as a 
warning to all, had Stephan Ludwig Roth executed, although the pastor 
trusting in Bern's amnesty had refused to flee the country.
Such interference with Bern's amnesty on the part of the government 
proved to be a costly mistake. It was a positive sign of political consolida­
tion, however, and an action initiated by the government, that the Saxons' 
municipal administrative system was reintroduced, and that the election of 
their officials and representatives was made more democratic.
It helped calm passions that the man elected mayor of Nagyszeben was 
Simon Schreiber, who had been the chief representative of the Saxons' cause 
at the diets of the Reform Era. It also helped restore confidence that the 
government approved the use of German as the Sz&szfold's official lan­
guage, and that Cs&nyi's lieutenant, M6zes Berde, accepted petitions writ­
ten in German. The government commissioners appointed to Brass6 and 
Nagyszeben were men who avoided punitive measures as far as possible, 
and tried to compensate the population for the unruliness of the soldiers 
stationed there. In both towns, the Saxons press started up again, that there 
was now no censorship. The intellectuals of Brass6 celebrated the triumph 
of their ideals with the revolutionary ardour so typical of the age. Anton 
Kurz had been an adjutant of Bern's. Brass6's German language paper was 
now edited by Leopold Max Moltke, who hailed Kossuth as "the president 
of the first republic of Eastern Europe", and wrote of a Hungary which 
would guarantee unlimited liberty of language to all the nations living within 
its borders.
Hungarian-Romanian Relations in the Spring 
and Summer of 1849
Hungarian-Romanian relations were a function of the attempts at revolu­
tionary consolidation and their shortcomings. While toward the Saxons the 
government adopted a policy of collective responsibility, in the counties 
resistance met with reprisal, and compliance with pardon, lords and peas-
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ants alike being subject to the full rigours of the law as far, of course, as the 
unsettled military and political circumstances permitted.
The many courts of summary justice that were set up certainly did not 
make for consolidation, nor did the establishment of free corps — ostensi­
bly to supplement the small regular army — which, in addition to helping 
to maintain order, thought it was their duty to hound down rebels and to 
restore property to its "rightful" owner, often going from village to village 
driven by the thirst for revenge. Fear of such mindless retribution, how­
ever, only strengthened the spirit of resistance among the Romanians, much 
in the same way as not so long before fear had cemented the determination 
of the people of H£romsz6k.
In the Erchegys6g, the mountains formed the fortress within whose walls 
the outlaw peasant armies could camp, and give mutual support to the 
great fortress in Gyulafeherv&r, which was also under Hungarian siege. 
This was the region whence Horea and his men had set out. The spirit of 
rebellion had been kept alive since then by the fact that here, where Eu­
rope's highest-yielding gold mines were located, the treasury restricted the 
peasantry's and the miners' use of pastures and forests precisely to con­
serve the raw materials needed in the smelting of gold. In the 1840s, a no­
blewoman, Katalin Varga, had acted on behalf of several villages in their 
litigation with their lords, and had encouraged a movement that led to peas­
ants refusing to do their robot for years. In the end, Bishop ^aguna laid a 
trap for "our lady", as the people called her, which led to her arrest. The 
Romanian resistance of 1848-1849 was led by the intelligentsia, primarily 
by Avram Iancu. The peasants called their former lawyer the "king of the 
mountains", and Iancu, too, donned peasant garb. He became the legen­
dary personification of a struggle in which, for all the dauntless determina­
tion, there were moments when people feared that the peasants themselves 
would surrender their leaders to the enemy.
The series of Hungarian military victories persuaded the Romanian depu­
ties in Debrecen to try to mediate a reconciliation between the Hungarian 
government and the rebels. They wanted to spare their people from the 
consequences of a military defeat, and hoped to gain greater might as spokes­
men of the Romanian nation. loan Dragos, a representative for Bihar, as­
sum ed the role of conciliator. He returned from his first visit to the 
Erchegyseg with reports so encouraging that Kossuth spoke of the pros­
pects of reconciliation even in Parliament. In his letter of 26 April to Dragos, 
Kossuth outlined the conditions he attached to the settlement: while Hun­
garian was to be the language of government in the country, "w e want to 
allow every language free currency and every nationality freedom to de­
velop, and, in fact, want to promote such development in the interest of 
civilization".38 Romanian was to be used freely at the municipal level, in the 
schools and in the churches, and there were good prospects for a general 
amnesty, wrote Kossuth, for all except Bishop Saguna, whom Kossuth could 
not forgive for having in January asked the Russian troops to intervene in 
Transylvania. Kossuth's conditions did not meet the Romanians' demands,
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but were a basis on which negotiations could start. (Though admittedly, 
Kossuth wanted the Erchegyseg to send not delegates to negotiate but a 
messenger bearing the news that the Romanians had decided to cast in their 
lot with Hungary and would volunteer for the Honved army.) The forms 
that the concrete discussions might take and the terms to be discussed had 
not yet been formulated to mutual satisfaction when Dragos — presenting 
a rather idealized picture of the other's inclinations to both sides — pressed 
on with his self-imposed mission.
His good intentions foundered not so much on mutual mistrust, but on 
the absence of co-ordination between the civil and the military authorities. 
By March, plans had been worked out for a concentrated attack on the 
Erchegyseg, but had been shelved by the ministry of war on the grounds 
that the "pacification" of the Romanians was a job for the Transylvanian 
authorities. Sometime after Kossuth's above-quoted letter to Dragos had 
gone off, however, through a series of coincidences, the command of the 
Hungarian troops encamped before Abrudbanya on the edge of the Erc­
hegyseg fell to Imre Hatvani, a young dilettante of a soldier dreaming of 
military glory. Thus, while Dragos's negotiations in Abrudbanya were al­
most at a stage when Kossuth's conditions would have been accepted, 
Hatvani, egged on by false rumours that the Hungarians of Abrudbanya 
were being maltreated, marched into the little town with an ill-equipped 
and poorly disciplined army of a thousand men. In vain were Dragos's 
frantic protestations: the civil war had recommenced.
Iancu managed to escape, and then surrounded with his troops the poorly- 
commanded Hungarian army. Verespatak and Abrudbanya went up in 
flames. Dragos was killed by the Romanians. Kossuth, misled by false ru­
mours, ordered that the military action be continued. There came another 
humiliating defeat at Abrudbanya; even Kossuth's order got into Roma­
nian hands. Hatvani, smarting under his ignominious failures and burning 
for revenge, had loan Buteanu executed; Petru Dobra had been killed "while 
trying to escape". That ended the lives of even the two men who had been 
hoping to get to Debrecen to negotiate. The Hungarian population of Abrud- 
b&nya, which until then had lived in peace with the Romanians, suffered 
heavy casualties. The tragedy confirmed both sides in their suspicion that 
the other had sought to ensnare it.
All this, of course, fuelled the Romanians' resistance, but also roused a 
sense of mutual responsibility. At the end of June, Iancu's answer to the 
Hungarian demands for peace contained the sentence: "In these two brother 
homelands, the Magyars cannot speak of life and of the future without the 
Romanians, nor can the Romanians without the Magyars", for "arm s will 
never decide between us".39
In the meanwhile, the Hungarian armies had been so successful that the 
Habsburgs felt obliged to turn openly to the tzar for help. The all-out offen­
sive started in the middle of June, and by July the Hungarian government 
was obliged to cede northern Hungary and Transdanubia. At this point,
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two Romanian political groupings started urging alternatives which were 
diametrically opposed.
Once the Romanian resistance movement got off the ground, the weight 
of the intelligentsia within the movement gradually diminished, while that 
of the church grew anew. At the end of 1848, Bishop Saguna was again one 
of the acknowledged leaders of the Romanian national movement, and was 
entrusted with the task of communicating the nation's wishes to the em­
peror. He went to Vienna and Olmiitz, where he co-operated with Laurian, 
Maiorescu and Barnu^iu in formulating a series of petitions to the monarch 
and the government which presented the aims of the Romanian national 
movement in a new form. There was no more talk of an independent Transyl­
vania. In February of 1849, they asked that the Romanians of the "Austrian 
provinces" might unite as an "independent nation" with their own Roma­
nian national administration. This formula managed to cover the aims of a 
number of different groupings. Bishop Spaguna suggested that the various 
nationalities might organize their national self-government on a model pat­
terned after the Orthodox church organizations. Maiorescu, on the other 
hand, believed in territorial autonomy, and saw the establishment of a "R o­
manian Austria" as the purpose of the February petition. In June of 1849, 
the intelligentsia were calling for a separate Romanian crownland. The argu­
ments advanced to support their claim reflect the tragic schizophrenia of all 
eastern European national movements: pointing to the oppression they had 
always suffered, they described their fear of the other nations' hegemony, 
but in the same breath recommended the recognition of a unified Romanian 
nation within the Austrian state as,a means of keeping the other nations in 
check.
It is an odd quirk of fate that it was exactly at this point that the Wallachian 
emigres and the leaders of revolutionary Hungary opened up new vistas to 
the peoples of Transylvania. A number of the leaders of the Wallachian 
revolution had watched the political moves of Transylvania's Romanians 
anxiously. Though the Austrian troops did their best to keep them out of 
the country, some of them did manage to get to the Erchegys£g, and had 
actively supported Dragos' attempts to effect a reconciliation. Seeing the 
enthusiasm that all Europe felt for the Hungarian War of Independence, the 
Wallachian emigres revised their earlier stand. Their self-criticism was next 
to self-flagellation, so deeply did they regret their lost opportunities: "Ah, if 
we had been a real Romanian government, the glory of liberating the world 
from slavery would be ours, and not the Hungarians': or, had we allied 
with the Hungarians, we certainly would have taken Vienna, and could 
have proclaimed general freedom. Instead, we tremble, and try to collect 
morsels off the Hungarians' table" — wrote Constantin A. Rosetti in Paris.40
The first concrete result of the feelers put out by the Romanian £migr6s 
came when Cezar Bolliac, a revolutionary poet to the quick, started up a 
paper in Brass6, the Espatriatul, in which he condemned the Transylvanian 
Romanians' political orientation in terms so vehement as to shock even those
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who shared his views, emphasizing particularly that "today in all of Eu­
rope there is but one struggle: that between liberty and tyranny: between 
the peoples and those enthroned".41
No one worked harder to try to harmonize the Romanian and the Hun­
garian ideas of national liberty than another Wallachian 6migr£, Nicolae 
Balcescu. His basic tenet was that every war of liberation consist of a number 
of successive stages. Hungary's help was to be relied on to secure the inde­
pendence of the Danubian principalities, so that at that stage the question 
of Romanian national unity might be attended to. This unity, he thought, 
was in Hungary's interest as well, for a unified Romania would assure Hun­
gary of an ally. In the meantime, the Romanians of Transylvania would have 
to stay "in  a slightly subordinate" position. Balcescu made no real criticism 
even of Bern's preparations for an attack on the Erchegyseg: "I  believe that 
all who love liberty must support the Hungarians; they are the only people 
who are armed, and they are fighting against tyrants, Russia's allies."42
"The role France played in '89, to emancipate Europe, has now fallen to 
us, and as far as I can see, we have no choice: either we play the role, or 
w e'll be laughed off the stage", so wrote L3szI6 Teleki, a Transylvanian 
oppositionist politician in the 1840s, and now the Hungarian government's 
representative to Paris, and a man with close ties to the Polish emigres. 
Speaking from experience, he stated: "W e ought to set up a system of gov­
ernment wherein the absence of national homogeneity is compensated for 
by the harmonization and equity of personal and national rights." He trusted 
that the neighbouring peoples and those within the country "would gladly 
accept Hungary as the centre of a future Danubian confederation, and its 
queen''.43 It took optimism of this kind for Kossuth finally to make up his 
mind, and at Balcescu's urging, work out his plan for a reconciliation in 
Szeged on 14 July.
The Project de Pacification did not promise territorial autonomy, but guar­
anteed the right to use Romanian as an official language in counties with a 
Romanian majority and in the national guard. Kossuth's programme coun­
tered the Austrian government's slogan for "equality for all nationalities" 
with a different one: "the free development of all the nationalities". Restric­
tions on the use of any language on grounds of raison d'etat were expressly 
specified: "the use of Hungarian as a diplomatic language" means only its 
use in Parliament, in administration and in government "to the extent that 
this is absolutely necessary to the preservation of the state". Kossuth's plan 
opened up the possibility of co-ordinating the two peoples' struggle for 
freedom. The government made a separate agreement to finance the setting 
up of a Romanian legion. "The legion will swear allegiance to Romania and 
to Hungary. It shall fight for liberty and independence, but never against 
another nationality."44
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The success of these Romanian-Hungarian negotiations encouraged the 
Hungarian government to essay a policy toward the nationalities that re­
ally was exemplary. On 28 July, the Parliament passed a motion proposed 
by the prime minister, Bertalan Szemere, and a law regulating the position 
of Hungary's non-Hungarian peoples in the spirit of the reconciliation plan. 
Szemere was right in noting that Hungary had taken a step "for which no 
government had ever set a precedent".45 The problem was only that the 
step had come too late.
The Last Days of the War of Independence 
in Transylvania
Transylvania's fate was sealed when the joint tzarist and Austrian forces 
crossed the border in mid-July 1849. Bern's troops were twice outnumbered, 
and the best he could try for was to stall the enemy's progress toward the 
Great Hungarian Plain so as to give himself time to deploy most of the 
government forces in southern Hungary, into the Tisza-Maros triangle. He 
decentralized his forces, and went to head now one, now the other unit, 
always the one which had been forced to retreat. Almost at the same time as 
the Romanian-Hungarian negotiations were concluded, Bern, with Kossuth's 
approval, attacked Moldavia, hoping to provoke a revolution. He did not. 
The Russian troops, however, only got from Brass6 to Nagyszeben in the 
space of a month, and had not dared attack either Kolozsv&r or Marosv£s&r- 
hely. At the end of July and the beginning of August Bern's troops suffered 
two grave defeats. Hungary's greatest poet, S&ndor Pet6fi, died on a Transyl­
vanian battlefield, and so did Anton Kurz. Bern played the invaders a few 
more unpleasant tricks, but then was hardly able to escape with his life. The 
troops disintegrated, and after the main Hungarian army laid down its arms 
on 13 August at Vil&gos, on 25 August the Transylvanian chiefs of staff 
surrendered in Zsib6.
The most Iancu could achieve during the great Russian advance was to 
keep his Romanians neutral. Recognizing the neutrality of the Romanians 
of the Erchegys6g, some Hungarian troops surrendered to Romanians, and 
Iancu even let some Hungarian prisoners go, much to the irritation of the 
Austrian military advisor attached to him.
It was to take the many painful disappointments of the ensuing years to 
have people in the Erchegyseg sing songs about how Iancu and Bern fought 
side by side. Disappointments, the rethinking of the lessons learned, as well 
as new opportunities were needed for the various groups committed to 
national liberty to seek solutions to the "question of Transylvania" which 
would be acceptable to all the peoples of the common homeland.
45. Circular letter by Szemere on 29 July to the government commissioners. Cited 
by Z . I. T 6 th, A  Szemere-kormany nemzetisegi politikaja. (The Nationality Policy 
of the Szemere Government.) In: Ibid., Magyarok es romanok. (Hungarians and 







































FROM THE EMPIRE 
TO CIVIC HUNGARY

I. The Era of Neo-Absolutism 
(1849- 1867)
1. The Establishment of Despotic Rule
The most serious trauma to affect the empire in the three hundred years of 
its history was followed, at the end of the summer of 1849, by a historic 
moment most favourable for the imperial court. The defeated revolutions 
had given a substantial boost to the bourgeois transformation of the economy 
and society, thereby creating the basic conditions for updating the work­
ings of the empire. After its victory over the revolutionary movements and 
the Hungarian War of Independence, and in the calm guaranteed in Europe 
by British foreign policy and Russian military power, the Viennese court, 
without too much difficulty, could begin to reorganize and consolidate its 
empire.
Reprisals and Consolidation
On 11 August, 1849, proclamations were put up in Transylvania announc­
ing the establishment of martial law, so that punishment might be meted 
out "for all deeds, aberrations and insolent crim es"1 connected with the 
Hungarian revolution.
"For a century to come there will be no revolution in Hungary, for I shall 
pull up the weeds by the roots,"2 boasted Haynau, the Austrian commander, 
in a message to Vienna. He gave detailed instructions that "every rebel 
leader... is to be hanged". "O f those who served as privates or non-commis- 
sioned officers in the revolutionary army or elsewhere, the Romanians, 
Croats and Saxons are to be sent home at once. On the other hand, the 
Hungarians, Szekelys and Poles, as well as those who belonged to the Ger­
man legion are to be enlisted as private soldiers [in the imperial arm y]."3 
Courts martial passed sentences in great number, and with great rapidity. 
In Arad, of the 475 officers charged, 231 were sentenced to death, although
1. Orders of Haynau to Lieutenant General Karl v. SchOnhals on 21 August, 1849. 
In: Az aradi vertanuk. (The Martyrs of Arad.) Collected and introduced by T. 
Katona. Budapest 1979, II, 70.
2. Haynau's letter to Lieutenant General Karl v. SchOnhals on 24 August. Ibid. 58.
3. Letter by Haynau to Ludwig v. Wohlgemuth on 21 August, 1849. Ibid. 58.
far fewer were actually executed. Some three weeks after the execution in 
Arad of thirteen generals on 6 October, General Lajos Kazinczy, the last 
commander of the Honv6d army in Transylvania, was shot. From Transyl­
vania alone, seventy-two Hungarian officers and twenty-five civilians were 
sentenced to death, and another sixty-four were sentenced to long periods 
of imprisonment.
The leaders of the Sz6kely uprising were pursued relentlessly, since they 
were blamed for the failure of the imperial forces in 1848 to attack the Hun­
garian revolution from the rear and thereby suppress it at an early stage.
On balance, however, the reprisals in Transylvania were less harsh than 
in Hungary proper. In Transylvania the revolutionary camp was smaller in 
size, and the struggle had lasted longer. As a result, most of those who 
would have borne the brunt of the punitive action had already fled the 
country.
Reprisals went hand in hand with rewards. The highest decorations were 
bestowed on Franz Salmen, comes of the Saxons, and on the Greek Ortho­
dox bishop, Andrei £aguna. Avram Iancu and some Romanian tribunes 
were presented with the Gold Cross of Merit, as were some Hungarian and 
Saxon officials. A special point was made of bestowing rare honours on 
peasants who were judged to have suffered much in the Habsburg cause, 
or to have been loyal.
The military presence constituted one side of the counter-revolution. On 
the other side, though, were the attempts at modernization and the reluc­
tant implementation of some of the revolution's demands. These were rep­
resented by the imperial government, which was partially made up of lib- 
eral-minded ministers. In place of the ideal of national freedom for each of 
the empire's peoples, the government was offering a centralized monarchy 
and, by promising a constitutionalism, it tried to obviate the demand for 
democratic liberties. Of course, the government did not turn into a reform 
administration — quite the contrary in fact. From 1851, it became positively 
rigid under the direction of Minister of Internal Affairs Alexander Bach, to 
whom the era owes its name.
The first military and civilian governor of Transylvania, Baron Ludwig 
Wohlgemuth, was sent to the south-eastern border province with secret 
instructions to eradicate its distinctive characteristics and to integrate it into 
the monarchy as a whole. The seat of the local government was again shifted 
from Kolozsvar to Nagy szeben, with the army becoming the omnipotent 
masters of the province.
Transylvania was full of burnt-down villages and hard-hit towns, and 
its population was now subject to yet another trial — a new tax system 
based on general and proportionate sharing of taxation, some novel tax 
burdens and the old services to a much larger military establishment. In the 
absence of an efficient means of supplying the troops, a great deal of carting 
service for the army burdened the people of Transylvania, especially in the 
south. A veritable hard blow on the civilian population was the billeting of 
officers and men, with no exemptions accorded to former nobles, the Saxon 
towns, or even to loyal supporters of the regime. Kossuth banknotes ceased 
to be a legal tender — causing a serious shortage of money and to top it all, 
cattle-plague spread far and wide. In order for Transylvania to recover, a 5 2 8
state subsidy would have been needed. However, there were hardly any 
funds available, and those were allocated on the basis of political consid­
erations. In 1850, because of its loyalty, the Saxon University was granted a 
loan of 1.5 million forints, to be paid back on favourable terms. On the Hun­
garian population of the Sz6kelyf0ld, however, a collective fine was im­
posed on account of their "disloyalty" in 1848-1849.
In the spring of 1851, following the unexpected death of Wohlgemuth, 
who had always remained aloof from the inhabitants of the province, the 
monarch appointed General Prince Carl zu Schwarzenberg as the new gov­
ernor of Transylvania. The prince, a scion of the most powerful aristocratic 
family in Bohemia, was a man of wide culture and was granted more power 
than his predecessor. Unlike Wohlgemuth, Schwarzenberg also maintained 
a house in Kolozsvdr, learned to speak Hungarian, often went hunting with 
the local aristocrats and paid regular visits to some of them. All this, how­
ever, did not really alter his political outlook.
The government wished to mould Transylvania into a province free of 
national and social strife, as well as of journalistic and political controver­
sies. It wanted to create a region which was stable, strictly controlled, and 
in which progressive efforts centred on unqualified allegiance to the em­
peror.
No separate conception specifically applicable to Transylvanian circum­
stances was ever worked out. Combined with the weakness of the domestic 
support, this policy meant that the development of Transylvania continued 
to be a function of conditions pertaining to the empire as a whole and to 
Hungary proper.
The Absolutist System
After the defeat of the War of Independence, the union of Hungary and 
Transylvania was, as a matter of course, declared null and void, and the 
Partium was again attached to Transylvania. The ethnic composition of the 
country was taken into account to some extent when six districts — three 
Romanian, two Hungarian and one Saxon — were formed. Each of these 
was headed by a military commander who exercised executive power and 
who issued the more important decrees. A minimum of influence was ex­
erted by the local civilian commissioners, who were subordinated to the 
imperial commissioner, Eduard Bach. However, these local commissioners 
were obliged to obtain the consent and signature of the military command­
ers even when sending their reports to Nagyszeben. The only area in which 
a different system applied was the Saxon district of Szeben. Headed by the 
Saxon comes, Franz Salmen as civilian commissioner, it was created out of 
the Kir^lyfold, which retained its self-government to some extent. The al­
dermen of the municipalities were appointed by the military governor or 
the district commanders, their official duties being performed in line with 
the dictates of the district civilian commissioner. The administration re­
quired a great number of loyal civil servants who were selected from among 
the Saxons, although many of the appointees came from the western part of
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In the towns, the police were strengthened. From 1851 onwards, Transyl­
vania also had a network of modem state organizations engaged in fighting 
crime, i.e. the military-type gendarmerie seen by contemporaries as a sym­
bol of the regime. With the establishment of the imperial police authority in 
1852, an independent political police force was created which was to con­
trol all areas of life — from tourism to the theatres. In the police and gen­
darmerie network, an important role was assigned to the host of informers 
who were active at all levels of society.
The control of cultural life also fell to the police. The setting up and op­
eration of dance halls and theatres, as well as the staging of any play, re­
quired the approval of the governor. No books could be imported into the 
country except with a licence from the governor's office. Starting a newspa­
per of any seriousness required the approval of the imperial police chief. In 
line with the principles of centralization, the operation of any economic 
association or savings bank, or of any scholarly or artistic society, was sub­
ject to the consent of the emperor himself, or at least of the minister of the 
interior.
The new tax system was based on general and proportionate sharing of 
taxation which enabled the state to acquire a share of the wealth produced.
This it did in two different ways, under an assessment rate which was made 
uniform throughout the whole country. Direct taxes were levied on land, 
houses, earnings and income, but, in addition to these, indirect taxes on 
consumption were also significant.
The first judicial organs were the courts martial themselves. In 1850, as 
part of the separation of the executiVe and the judiciary, the foundations of 
the modern judicial system in Transylvania were laid down. New rules of 
procede, the Austrian criminal code, and the Austrian civil code were in­
troduced in 1852 and 1853.
The decrees relating to internal affairs, finance and justice issued in 1853 
constituted perhaps the most important administrative measures of the 
period. The govemor-general's office which directed the crownland repre­
sented a link between the local authorities and the central government bod­
ies in Vienna. The all-powerful military and civilian governor-general, who 
acted as viceroy issued instructions on political questions but was answer- 
able to the minister of the interior.
In the summer of 1854 the administrative system was modified. Transyl­
vania was split up into ten districts instead of six, taking into account its 
existing division for taxation and the administration of justice. The military 
frontier zone was given a civilian character in 1851 when the Szekely regi­
ments were dispersed, followed by the disbanding of the two Romanian 
infantry regiments. Saxon autonomy was also abolished. The assembly of 
the University was dissolved, its judicial function was taken away, and 
Beszterce and Sz&szv£ros were detached from the Kir6lyfold.
The new neo-absolutist state organization was a big step forward when 
compared to the centuries of feudal administration and its short-lived mili­
tary counterpart. However, it had several defects which called into ques­
tion the modernity of this late Enlightenment arrangement.
For a decade Transylvania was actually governed direct from Vienna by 
foreign governor-generals acting on the basis of secret instructions. The 5 3 0
monarch had the power not only to issue laws and decrees but also to modify 
or revoke them at any moment. As a result, it was in vain that absolutism 
brought in administrative measures formulated on the basis of general Eu­
ropean practice, and that the ministries were headed by knowledgeable 
experts; in the last resort, every government measure was transitional in 
character. Even worse, the openness that is imperative for any bourgeois 
constitutional arrangement and the citizens' ability to exercise control over 
the conduct of public affairs — the formal prerequisites of participation in 
power — were entirely lacking.
2. Political Life during the Absolutist Period 
The Abolition of Saxon Autonomy
The establishment of absolutism involved a series of disappointments for 
the Saxon burghers. This was in spite of the fact that the emperor's mani­
festo of 21 December, 1848 — entitled To Our Loyal Transylvanian Saxon 
People — and the rescript addressed to the Saxon University both pledged 
to strengthen the position of the German ethnic group. However, in Vienna, 
there was an awareness that an independent Sz&szf5ld, a privileged nation­
ality were hard to reconcile with the modem system of equality of rights. 
As early as 1849, the autonomy of the Saxons began to be curbed systemati­
cally, although the Sz^szfold long remained an island of civilian rule in a 
province under military administration. The Saxons were less affected by 
the political rigour of the state of emergency, and were manifestly favoured 
in the drawing up of the new administrative system in which the Szeben 
district was expressly formed out of diverse and geographically separate 
areas.
In December 1849 the University convened to work out m odem  princi­
ples of organization and autonomy based on direct dependence on the crown. 
Many complications were caused by the fact that the Romanians were in 
the majority in the Kiralyfold, and that, through the formation of the Szeben 
district, new, purely Romanian, areas, were annexed to it, areas which the 
Saxons would gladly have done without. At the beginning of 1850, the Saxons 
summarized in five petitions their ideas on the autonomy and new admin­
istration of the Sz3szfold, but their hope of creating a "Markgrafschaft Sachsen " 
was fading fast. The governor-general of Transylvania regarded the plan 
for a Saxon crown province as an attempt to compromise the unitary char­
acter of the state, and the central government also rejected it.
After December 1851, when absolutism was openly declared, the Saxon 
comes, Franz Salmen, the spokesmen of Saxon liberties, was removed from 
his post. After this the University was deprived of its juridical rights, and in 
the autumn of 1852 the emperor issued a decree to the effect that the Saxon 
institutions were to be replaced by state offices. The old seats were split up. 
Beszterce and Szaszvaros were joined to "alien" districts, while the Roma­
nian district of Fogaras was joined onto the Szeben district. "W e were struck 
dead without sentence being passed, and were buried without cross and
candle. That was our reward for all we had done and suffered in the years 
of peril..."4 wrote Joseph Bedeus in his diary at the beginning of 1853, voic­
ing the sentiments of the Saxon civil servants and burghers.
"Even though the Saxons are dissatisfied with the influx of foreign offi­
cials, with the suspension of their guilds and their republican community 
organization, and are disenchanted with the Concordat," ran a confidential 
report of 1856, "in  their eyes all this constitutes a minor evil compared to 
the destruction of their nationhood, which would surely ensue of the coun­
try ceased to be an Austrian province."5 Clearly absolutism had achieved 
its aim: the abolition of autonomy notwithstanding, Vienna retained the 
allegiance of the Saxons who were anxious about the future of their nation.
The Repression of Romanian National Aspirations
At the end of the summer of 1849, the leaders of Romanian political life in 
Transylvania may have felt that the future of their people was assured. With 
some justice, they ranked themselves among those who had saved the em­
pire. Partly as a reward and partly out of the historical necessity following 
from the formation of bourgeois nations, they hoped that all the Romanians 
in the Austrian Empire would be organized in a separate administrative 
unit. In their eyes, the guarantees of further national development would 
have needed to include a separate (Orthodox) Romanian pontiff, a national 
leader, their own representation in Vienna and an annual Romanian na­
tional assembly.
Still, the position of the Romanian leaders was far from encouraging.
The Saxon press accused them of revolutionary intent. When their levee en 
masse was disbanded at the end of 1849, Prefect Axente was arrested, and 
later attempts were made to prosecute Avram Iancu, the "king of the moun­
tains". The governor-general even found fault with the behaviour of Bishop 
^aguna, who was well known as a man of unbending loyalty. In terms of 
the government's conservative and pragmatic approach, the Romanians "did 
not meet the conditions for self-government or self-administration because 
of low level of their political and intellectual development and the paucity 
of their trained political leaders".6 Although the new regime was prepared 
to employ almost every Romanian intellectual, by 1860 the number of Ro­
manian civil servants — as shown by B arits  data — was less than two 
hundred.
At first, the Romanian politicians, guided by Bishop £aguna, virtually 
inundated Vienna with requests and petitions. In addition, they voiced their 
grievances at minor rallies and launched petition movements. But these
4. Cited by E. Friedenfels, Joseph Bedeus von Scharberg. Beitrage zur Zeitgeschichte
Siebenbiirgens im 19. Jahrhundert. II. Wien 1877. 251.
5. I. Martius, Grossdsterreich und die Siebenburger Sachsen 1848-1859. Mtinchen
1957. 71.
6. The statement by Alexander Bach is cited by K. Hitchins, Studien zur modemen
Geschichte Transylvaniens. Klausenburg 1971. 18. 532
disciplined expressions of discontent were insufficient to make the govern­
ment take the Romanians' requests seriously. For a short while, the only 
Romanian newspaper, BariJ's Gazeta de Transilvania, was banned.
Vienna's reluctance prompted the Romanian leaders to gradual modera­
tion. The political-national demands receded, giving way to endeavours 
concerned with culture and the church. In 1853, Pope Pius IX made the 
Greek Catholic diocese at Balizsfalva an archdiocese making it independ­
ent of Esztergom. When the Greek Catholic diocese of Nagyv&rad, as well 
as the sees of Lugos and Szamosujvdr, which had just been created, were 
subordinated to the new Archdiocese of Baldzsfalva, the unified autono­
mous national church of the Romanians in Transylvania and Hungary was 
established. At the same time, the Greek Orthodox church, which had as 
many members as the Greek Catholic church, continued to be subordinated 
to the Serbian archbishop at Karlowitz. What is more, Bach would even 
have preferred to remove Bishop Andrei Saguna from Transylvania, de­
spite his being a loyal servant of the dynasty. (In fact, the bishop stayed on 
and was later made a baron for his services.)
The emperor's visit to Transylvania in 1852 was a disappointment. After 
their struggles in 1848-1849, the Romanian peasants of the Erchegyseg were 
convinced that they would win their centuries-old legal dispute with the 
treasury. They hoped that their claims on the forests — for them a means of 
livelihood — would finally receive a hearing, especially, perhaps, since the 
people of the two disbanded Romanian frontier regiments — unlike the 
Szekelys — had just been allowed to retain their woods as a "reward". Francis 
Joseph toured the picturesque Romanian regions, but made no reference to 
meeting the Romanian demands.
The Romanian were not happy with the new regime. Even those of them 
who held office bore with frustration and "a kind of stoical indifference the 
burden of absolutism which they saw as a version of equality before the 
law, but only in negative term".7
Hungarian Resistance
The establishment of neo-absolutism dealt its heaviest blow to Hungarian 
society in Transylvania. Those Hungarians who did not emigrate were re­
duced to silence. The ranks of the liberal reformers, who had been short of 
real organization even beforehand, were thinned as a result of deaths. Denes 
Kemeny died in 1849, Wesselenyi, the outstanding figure of the reform op­
position in the "tw o brother homelands" in the spring of 1850, and K&roly 
Sz&sz, the scholar-politician, in 1853. In the absence of these figures, the 
liberal camp in Transylvania lost much of its identity, and in times to come 
was obliged to adjust its political attitude to that of the Liberals in Hungary 
proper.
For a long period, it was only the right wing of the aristocracy that en­
joyed some limited scope for political action. The Transylvanian aristocrats,
7. I. Pu ĉariu, Notife despre intimplarile contemporane. Sibiu 1913, 45-46.
especially Baron Samuel J6sika, enjoyed great influence at the beginning.
Later, however, when its tentative moves toward the government were re­
buffed, and after its members were, not unreasonably, branded as reaction­
ary in the press, the conservative aristocracy also adopted an increasingly 
passive attitude.
By this time, the attitude of the liberal landed gentry was shaped by 
Ferenc Deck's passive resistance, which was seen as a blueprint for Hun­
gary as a whole. As a result, a significant part of the landed gentry was not 
just excluded from power, but also held aloof from it, frustrating the ac­
tions of the authorities as much as it could and tending to exclude their 
representatives from mostly society. The conduct of the burghers and peas­
ants was influenced by this general attitude on the part of the landed gentry 
and the intellectuals: there were a whole host of treason trials in which 
ordinary people expressed their adherence to the principles of 1848-1849 in 
simpler and often more radical terms.
For a long time the Hungarians put their faith in the resumption of the 
War of Independence, and looked forward to the reappearance in the coun­
try of the exiled Kossuth at the head of an army of liberation. Even some of 
the Romanians trusted in Bern's return to the scene.
As early as 1850, the Hungarian, Romanian and Polish exile groups took 
the view that an armed uprising would shortly break out in Transylvania.
In the summer of 1851, J6zsef Makk, a former colonel, began to organize a 
plot. The plan was that at the moment of the pan-European revolution ("Eu­
ropean explosion") which was expected to occur in 1852, the Sz£kelys, sup­
plied with weapons delivered through Moldavia, and possibly joined by 
the Romanians later on, would occupy Transylvania and then advance into 
Hungary proper. However, the preparations were discovered. At the end 
of 1851 M akk's secret residence in Bucharest was raided, and the docu­
ments that were found were passed to the Austrian authorities. After this, 
arrests were made in Transylvania, and the guerilla bands organized to 
liberate those who had been detained were rounded up. After a prolonged 
investigation, seven persons were executed and scores, including women, 
were sentenced to long periods of imprisonment.
With the crushing of the plot in the Szekelyfold, the most powerful se­
cret resistance movement in the whole of the Habsburg Empire was con­
demned to defeat. From this time onwards, the struggle against absolutism 
was possible only on a political level. Control of the resistance passed from 
the hands of the plebeian-democratic agents who had played a key role in 
the secret plot into those of the liberal landowners. Relying on the old tradi­
tions, this social class used the cultural and economic associations, and in­
directly, the whole of gentry social life, as the framework of political or­
ganization.
In Transylvania, Count Imre Mik6, who was regarded as "the Transyl­
vanian Szechenyi", took charge of masterminding operations. It was the 
donations of aristocrats won over by him, followed by those of the burgh­
ers, which saved the National Theatre in Kolozsv^r from the bankruptcy it 
faced, and which in 1855 helped establish the Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet (Transyl­
vanian Museum Association) — which was to become a real cultural cen­
tre. The Erdelyi Gazdasagi Egyesiilet (Transylvanian Economic Society) ap- 5 3 4
praised the state of agriculture and industry, organized study tours and 
exhibitions, and spread new technological know-how. These many-sided 
activities served as a partial replacement for public political action, which 
the time did not allow.
The Hungarian Exiles and War in Italy
After the Hungarian surrender in 1849, large numbers of Hungarian sol­
diers and politicians fled abroad. The exiles had learned from the revolution 
and war which followed it that without the support of the Romanians and 
Serbs they would never achieve Hungarian independence. The liberal Ro­
manians who had emigrated after the collapse of the Wallachian revolution 
and the Russo-Turkish occupation appeared to be the most likely associates. 
Though national antagonisms were hard to overcome, for the sake of win­
ning support from the western powers, negotiations were urged on all sides.
At the suggestion of the Polish, in 1850 negotiations began in Paris con­
cerning a possible Hungarian-Romanian-Serbian alliance. The Romanian 
Nicolae Balcescu outlined a plan for a "Danubian United States", ruled by a 
regional government consisting of a representative from each of the mem­
ber states and meeting now in this country, now in that, but having no 
authority over the internal affairs of those three states. The Hungarians were 
divided on this, and L3szlo Teleki and Bertalan Szemere, who recommended 
acceptance of the idea, ended up in a minority. While the Romanians in­
sisted on territorial integrity, the Hungarians tended to insist on historical 
rights and would not go beyond the provisions of the nationality law passed 
in Szeged in 1849. Count Teleki was the only one to realize that the transfor­
mation of the nationalities into nations required that the Hungarians make 
territorial concessions. But Teleki soon left Paris, while Balcescu, by then 
terminally ill, returned to his historical studies. The activity of the other 
6migr£s was limited to the reiteration of old arguments in press debates.
Kossuth, in exile in Turkey until 1851, opposed Balcescu's plan, seeing it 
as a means of detaching Transylvania from Hungary. Encouraged by the 
European Democratic Central Committee led by Mazzini, he worked out a 
draft constitution in 1851 which, addressing itself to the ethnic complexity 
of the country, suggested a dual structure. This sought to combine the po­
litical supremacy of the Hungarians, which was rooted in history, with the 
pursuit of autonomy of ethnic groups within the framework of a demo­
cratic state organization. It would provide for democratized and self-gov­
erning counties, as well as for separate social organizations for each ethnic 
group to serve both as a guarantee of their equal status and as bases of their 
cultural, religious and national life. Hungarian public opinion seemed in­
clined to accept this scheme. The Romanian emigres, however, regarded it 
as unsatisfactory on account of its failure to make mention of the detach­
ment of Transylvania from the rest of Hungary.
Despite their conflicting views, both sides were disposed to continue co­
operation and soon the international situation offered the possibility of fresh 
initiatives.
The New Terms of the Emancipation of Serfs 
and the Compensation for the Landlords
In order to maintain law and order within the country, the abolition of serf­
dom needed to be finalized, and this constituted a major political task. By 
ending the organic relationship between landowner and serf and between 
peasant holding and noble estate, the redemption of feudal services and 
dues legislated in 1848 had brought about a change of historic importance 
in production and in property relations. The great majority of the peasants, 
about 70-80 per cent, now began to operate as independent proprietors, 
with either medium-sized farms or smallholdings. However, after the revo­
lution, landowners and serfs, who were now "free citizens", were again 
caught in a conflict over the issue of the distribution of landed property 
dating from the feudal era.
Article IV of the 1848 Transylvanian Diet provided for leaving in the 
hands of peasants the land they actually used, independently of the nature 
of their title to it, and left it to subsequent legislation to determine what 
share had been held in villein tenure and would pass to them as private 
property, and what part would revert to the former landowner as his own. 
Neo-absolutism had inherited the task of implementing in detail the eman­
cipation of the serfs.
Until 1848 the forests, which covered half of Transylvania, had been used 
jointly by landowners and peasants, although formally the landowners had 
been the exclusive proprietors since 1791. Now the former landlords at­
tempted to deprive the peasants iof the right to use the woods, with the 
prime intention of re-admitting the peasants to them only in return for la­
bour or money. It was easier to agree on the use of the pastures because it 
was in the interests of the former owner to maintain the peasant's stock of 
animals which supplied traction for working his lands as well.
For use of the contested lands, the former owners — often assisted by 
the military — tried to force the peasants to perform certain services. Amidst 
much confusion over land tenure and obligations, combined with new de­
mands for the payment of various tithes, the peasants feared that "their 
lordships" were bent on restoring serfdom. In this period of semi-serfdom 
and semi-freedom, the relationship between the nobility and the peasants 
was extremely tense. In 1851, the writer Pal Gyulai observed: "The people 
are busy occupying lands, and the landowners are forced to retaliate through 
litigation; the people harbour thoughts of revenge, and the landowners live 
in fear of their lives."8
In the summer of 1854, an imperial patent was issued on the legal imple­
mentation of the emancipation of the serfs. Retaining the basic assumptions 
of the 1848 laws, it guaranteed that the state would pay compensation for 
land held in return for robot while Szekely patrimonial or demesnial serfs 
and cotters would have the option of redeeming their own services and 
dues. The edict thus distinguished between serfs who worked robot and
8 .  P. G y u l a i ,  Erdelyi utibenyomdsok. (Transylvanian Travelling Impressions.) Buda­
pest 1921, 42.
those who did not — a distinction which was unnatural in the final analysis
— with the apparent intention of using legal means to continue the bondage 
of part of the liberated peasantry (about one-third of those who had so far 
lived in a stage of dependence).
The complex and extensive work of re-regulating landed property rela­
tions was performed by "robot courts" staffed partially by officials from the 
state administration. These courts began their work in Transylvania in 1858. 
The robot courts decided all cases in which the parties concerned had been 
unable to reach an understanding. In the Szekelyfold, one in five cases at 
most was solved through peaceful compromise, whereas in the old coun­
ties the percentage was much higher. The bitterly contested cases, of which 
there were many, remained unsettled for decades.
The complex character of landed property relations in Transylvania and 
the lack of regulation before 1848 make it impossible to give a precise ac­
count of the results of the emancipation of the serfs in the period 1848-1854. 
It seems that in Transylvania and the Partium, 78 per cent of the dependent 
peasantry (that is, 175,543 plots held in socage, or some 974,846 persons) 
received emancipation with the state paying compensation to the former 
landlord. These peasants were to possess as civil property 1,616,547 holds of 
arable land and meadow. Eighty per cent of this passed into the hands of 
Romanian peasants, which opened up new vistas for national development. 
On the other hand, in the Szekelyfold the situation of the old robot peas­
antry took an extremely adverse turn: the number of peasants forced to pay 
compensation on their own or to accept the status of agricultural labourers 
was well above the national average. But on the territory of the old coun­
ties, three-quarters of the peasantry were freed with aid from the state.
The 1848 laws concerned with the emancipation of the serfs formally 
guaranteed the compensation of the former landlords: not for the land lost, 
but for the services previously enjoyed. Besides landed property, the land­
owners suffered a loss of 8.7 million days of manual robot labour, 5 million 
days of service with a cart drawn by four bullocks, and 2.5 million days of 
service with a cart — or plough — drawn by two bullocks. The view held 
by contemporaries seems apt: "In Transylvania the wealth of the landowner 
was based on the abundance of robot service."9 The 1854 Patent established 
a fund to compensate the landowner class which was capitalized at twenty 
times the value of the services performed annually by the serfs. (Its sum 
total was estimated at 70 million forints.) In the meantime, landed estates 
stagnated, with owners having to contend with shortages of both labour 
and capital. A strange situation ensued in which the landowners in many 
places looked forward to a national war of liberation (to the victory of the 
"revolutionary party") to provide a more appropriate settlement for them, 
as Hungarian peasantry at the other end of the social scale looked also to 
Kossuth providing them with more favourable emancipation terms.
Discrimination devised to weaken the Hungarian medium landowning 
class ended after 1856. However, the advance sums of compensation which 
were remitted in modest instalments after 1851 were handed out almost
9. Kolozsvdri Magyar Futar (Kolozsvar Hungarian Courier), 17 July, 1856.
exclusively in bonds whose stock exchange price fell considerably short of 
their face value at the time of issue. A great part of the compensation money 
went to pay off the debts incurred by the landlords since 1848. According to 
the best Austrian civil servant in this field until the spring of 1861 almost 
half the sums assigned by the courts had to be paid to creditors rather than 
to the landowners themselves.
The landowners were not compensated for all their losses, because it 
was genuinely impossible even to calculate exactly how much they had ben­
efited by way of services. Owing to the underdeveloped conditions and the 
rapid changes, the large and medium estates tended to decline for a while, 
and occasionally were at a lower, more rudimentary, level than the peasant 
holdings.
The Impact of the Crimean War
In 1853, a conflict developed on the borders of the empire when Tzar Nicho­
las I, as a prelude to challenging the power of Turkey in Europe, occupied 
the Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia which were Turk­
ish protectorates.
At first Vienna opted for neutrality. Later, however, having come to an 
agreement with Prussia, France, Britain and (in July 1854) with Turkey, it 
forced Russia to withdraw its troops from Moldavia and Wallachia.
The Romanian principalities, because of their nearness to the Turkish 
Empire, their sympathy for the Hungarian cause and the vacillating policy 
of their governments, offered opportunities for the Hungarian exiles to build 
up a communications and supply base there.
The clouds of the Crimean War were gathering, and a large-scale Euro­
pean conflict soon broke out. The oppressed peoples of the monarchy held 
the firm belief that in the midst of the conflagration they would achieve 
their freedom by means of an armed rebellion supported by the western 
powers. From 1853 onwards, secret organizing work began in Transylva­
nia. In the autumn of the same year, Kossuth and Dumitru Bratianu agreed 
to call on the Hungarian and Romanian peoples of the monarchy to act in 
consent, asserting than when the victory had been won, the inhabitants of 
Transylvania would decide whether they wished to live in an independent 
principality or in union with Hungary. However, these plans were frus­
trated because the western powers, entering the war on Turkey's side and 
focusing on the Crimea as a theatre for military operations, abandoned the 
idea of attacking Russia by way of the Danube. In August 1854 the princi­
palities were occupied by Austrian troops, and this put and end to any 
further preparations.
The occupation of the Romanian principalities involved tremendous fi­
nancial expense. The government called on the population, and in some 
cases actually forced it, to subscribe 500 million in a "national loan'', 13.6 
million of which was imposed on Transylvania. This money had to be paid 
by landowners in return for bonds, as well as by the wealthy Saxon burgh­
ers in the towns. 5 3 8
The Crimean War left not only Russia but also Austria the loser. A cen­
tury-old friendship between the two had come to and end. The Peace of 
Paris, concluded in 1856, prevented Austria from keeping the Romanian 
principalities under its armed control, and in the west an anti-Austrian 
Franco-Piedmontese alliance soon began to take shape.
The process of the decline of absolutism now started. In 1857, the em­
peror granted an amnesty to many political prisoners, and in 1858 several 
exiles returned to Transylvania. The improving political climate acted as a 
stimulus to cultural life and economic organization. From the autumn of 
1857 onwards, ties with Hungary were less clandestine; indeed, the Liber­
als of Kolozsv^r and Pest almost flaunted their solidarity.
3. Autocracy in Decline
The Italian War and the Actions of the Hungarian Exiles
Piedmont's participation in the Crimean War elevated it to the status of a 
European power. At the same time, it enabled it to win the support of Em­
peror Napoleon III for the cause of Italian unity, and to prepare to drive the 
Habsburgs out of Italy. A new period was also beginning in the history of 
the Hungarian emigration. Count Camillo Cavour, the Piedmontese prime 
minister, now became the main supporter of Kossuth and his associates. 
The exiles made efforts to become an independent ally of the powers chal­
lenging Austria. At the beginning of 1859 the two Romanian principalities 
elected Alexandru loan Cuza as their joint ruler. Cuza initially pursued an 
anti-Austrian policy and was also favourably disposed towards the exiles.
When in 1859 the outlines of a coalition against Austria came into sight, 
preparations were made to establish a Hungarian legion in Italy and to open 
a second front in Hungary. At the prompting of Napoleon III Gyorgy Klapka, 
a former general of the 1848 Revolution, called on Cuza to win the prince 
over as an ally. The Hungarian exiles and the Romanian prince concluded a 
military agreement supplemented by a political accord. Cuza agreed to es­
tablishing Hungarian arsenals in Moldavia, in return for which Klapka, on 
behalf of Hungary, pledged to help Cuza seize the Bukovina, to organize 
the Romanian soldiers in Transylvania into separate army units, to observe 
individual and, in the fields of religion and education, collective national 
equality, and to ensure self-government there at the local and county levels. 
In the long run, Klapka aimed to a confederation of Hungary, Serbia, 
Moldavia and Wallachia. The crucial clause concerned the future status of 
Transylvania: it was to be granted self-government if a future national as­
sembly renounced the union declared in 1848. This was the maximum con­
cession the Hungarian emigres were prepared to make on the issue of 
Transylvania.
However, the implementation of the accord was rendered possible only 
in part. During its Italian campaign of June 1859, Austria suffered major 
539 defeats at Magenta and Solferino; but the armistice was concluded well
before a popular uprising could occur in Hungary. The exiles could do noth­
ing but stop the delivery of arms. Defeat on the battlefield was regarded by 
opposition forces within the empire as the prelude of the defeat of absolut­
ism. (Refusal to pay taxes, which was in fact a political gesture, was so 
widespread that half the households of Transylvania suffered punitive meas­
ures.) The monarch was inclined to make concessions, and dismissed both 
Bach and Baron Kempen, the minister of public safety, the two main sym­
bols and agents of autocracy.
Meanwhile, a movement begun in Pest had been taken up in Transylva­
nia. The commemoration of the centenary of the writer Kazinczy by the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences was followed by memorial sessions held 
in the Transylvanian towns, with speeches which left no doubt that the fos­
tering of Hungarian literature was a form of political action. It became fash­
ionable to raise money for cultural purposes and also to study Hungarian 
literature and Hungarian public law. Towards the end of November an 
Academy delegation headed by Baron J6zsef Eotvos went to Kolozsvar to 
attend the festive inauguration of the Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet (Transylvanian 
Museum Association), and was welcomed with illuminations, a torchlight 
procession and placards which read "God Bless the Two Brother Home­
lands". At the banquet which followed this meeting, the speeches rang with 
determined opposition, and a Saxon Lutheran priest, speaking on behalf of 
the Saxons of Brass6, gave voice to his joy that the various peoples of the 
country were growing in harmony.
At the beginning of 1859, the Romanian population of southern Transyl­
vania had given a warm reception to the union of Moldavia and Wallachia 
(the creation of Romania), and clearly sympathized with Garibaldi and the 
Italians. By the end of the year, the security forces were haunted by fears of 
military co-operation between the Hungarians and the Romanians. The com­
mander of the gendarmerie reported that Avram Iancu, who had been ill 
for many years and who was under constant police surveillance, had, in 
Topanfalva, pronounced himself again prepared to serve as commander- 
in-chief, and that "the Szekelyfold, too, still lives on, and with the Szekelys 
one can conquer the whole of Europe".10 Meanwhile, agents commissioned 
by the Hungarian exiles, notably Laszlo Teleki, toured Transylvania on a 
fact-finding and organizing mission, and at the same time assessed the likely 
reactions of the Romanian population there.
Certain manifestations of the Hungarian national movement evoked a 
favourable response from both the Romanians and the Saxons. Many Ro­
manians and Saxons went along to the Kazinczy memorial services, and 
even more attended the Szechenyi requiems which mobilized the whole 
province, and many participated in the cultural events. Celebrations held 
by the Romanians and Saxons were ostentatiously attended by liberal Hun­
garian landowners, with the express aim of promoting understanding. The 
country experienced a wave of fraternization, although full agreement was 
limited to the joint condemnation of absolutism. The larger differences of 
opinion about the future continued, which was why the emigres again had
10. M. P o p e s c u , Documetite inedite privitoare la istoria Transilvaniei intre 1848-1859. 
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to address themselves to the difficult task of working out some platform for 
substantial collaboration.
In I860, the year in which Piedmont was engaged in schemes for a new 
war against the Habsburg Empire in pursuit of Italian unification, the Hun­
garian exiles concluded another agreement with Cuza. In return for their 
support for Romania's full independence from the Porte and their pledge to 
concede minority rights, they asked Cuza to back the Hungarian liberation 
movement, and to use his influence to prevent the Transylvanian Romani­
ans from opposing the Hungarian national endeavours. However, the new 
arms deliveries to Romania came to light, and under pressure from the 
great powers, the weapons were returned to Italy. For a time, Klapka, who 
called on Cuza in December, thought the cause to be lost, as did Kossuth. 
Nevertheless, on 8 January, 1861, a new accord was agreed. Essentially, the 
pact of 1859 was renewed, the difference being that now more emphasis 
was laid on the secret character of the preparations as well as on future 
Hungarian military aid to the prince of Romania.
The agreement, however, proved to be a dead letter. Cuza's position 
was gradually becoming more secure, and this made him more cautions. 
He had no desire to be at odds with Austria. In Moldavia the government 
of Kogalniceanu, which had supported the Hungarian cause, fell — due in 
no small part to its sympathy for the Kossuth emigration. The most impor­
tant factor, however, was that because of lack of support from Napoleon III, 
Piedmont felt insecure, and Cuza, in his turn, was completely paralyzed. In 
the end, French assistance failed to materialize, as did the war itself.
Exploratory talks between Cuza and the Hungarians continued for some 
years to come, as long as the exile and the home-based politicians consid­
ered the disintegration of the Habsburg Empire a possibility. But Romanian 
politicians, for their part, became increasing inclined to call for a Transylva­
nia separate from Hungary.
The Conservative Federalist Experiment: 
The October Diploma
At the prompting of the conservative aristocracy, on 20 October, 1860 Francis 
Joseph issued the so-called October Diploma "as a permanent and irrevoca­
ble law of the state" which, through the monarch's "munificence" "restored" 
the separate interior administrations of the various historic countries of the 
empire. The Hungarian and the Transylvanian court chancelleries were re­
stored. The head of the former was legally made a member of the central 
government (state ministry), which was now reshaped. Another provision 
held out the prospect of a provincial assembly devised to amend the "con­
stitution of Transylvania", and entrusted its preparation to a prospective con­
ference "m ade up of excellent men belonging to various ethnic groups, reli­
gious denominations and Estates" to be convened at a future date.11
11. Okmanytar Erdely legujabb jogtortenetehez, 1848-1865. (Document Archives to 
the Latest Legal History of Transylvania, 1848-1865.) Collected by J. S a n d o r . 
Kolozsvdr 1865, 116.
The October Diploma was not received with the degree of enthusiasm 
its sponsors had hoped for. The Austrian bourgeoisie considered it to be a 
plot of the federalist large landowners against centralization. The Hungar­
ian Liberals denied the sole right of the emperor to issue alone resolutions 
of national importance, and did not recognize the authority of any central, 
that is external, government organ or of any imperial parliament. They conti­
nued to demand the restoration of the responsible Hungarian parliamen­
tary and ministerial system established in 1848. In Transylvania, the Hun­
garian Liberals felt added repugnance towards the diploma because it con­
sidered the union achieved by the 1848 revolution null and void. "W ithout 
the union, the Hungarians of Transylvania are lost for ever; of this, even the 
lowest Hungarian peasant is convinced", was the message they conveyed 
to Pest.12
The diploma got a very different reception from the Romanian and Saxon 
burghers. Bari} was full of enthusiasm for it, commenting in his newspaper: 
"Today the emperor has declared that the Romanian nation in Transylva­
nia has come of age and is on an equal footing with the other nations." The 
autonomy of Transylvania had been guaranteed forever, and "our future 
has been placed in our own hands".13 During November, the Romanian 
intellectuals held several meetings at which they resolved, more or less, to 
pursue the implementation of their national programme of 1848. The Or­
thodox synod at Szeben called for a Transylvanian parliament made up of 
representatives of the individual nations in equal numbers, and for the equal 
status of the three languages. At some meetings, however, a call was made 
for the establishment of a Romanian, province within the empire.
The Saxon burghers demanded the restoration of the ancient Saxon rights 
and institutions and called for a situation in which the future Transylvanian 
national assembly would operate on a pre-1848 basis. Decisions on the up­
dating of the suffrage and on the issue of the union — which the majority of 
them did not support — were postponed for the time being.
On 9 December, the emperor appointed Baron Ferenc Kem£ny, the mod­
erate conservative president of the last Transylvania Diet, to take over tem­
porarily as head of the chancellery. At the same time, Count Imre Mik6 was 
nominated as president of the Gubemium, the local arm of the central gov­
ernment restored in Kolozsvar. Both in the chancellery and the Gubemium, 
Kem6ny and Mik6 set up Romanian departments to be headed by inde- 
pendently-thinking Romanian counsellors selected for the first time on the 
basis of national criteria.
The first inter-nationality meeting designed to arrange the next Transyl­
vanian Diet and to work out a draft plan for elections was called for 11 
February, 1861, in Gyulafehervar. In the selection of its members, an Estate- 
specific approach prevailed: those invited included eight Hungarian, eight 
Szekely, eight Hungarian urban, eight Saxon, and eight Romanian notables. 
The Hungarian majority embittered the stronger, anti-union wing of the 
other nationalities' politicians well in advance. Schmerling, the new pre-
12. Cited by Gy. S z a b a d ,  Forradalom es kiegyezes valasztutjan (1860-1861). (On the
Crossroads of Revolution and Compromise. 1860-1861.) Budapest 1967, 389.
13. V. N e t e a ,  Lupta romanilor din Transilvania pentru libertatea nafionala (1848-1881).
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mier (minister of state), now licensed the two Romanian prelates to con­
vene a smaller national meeting. At this a resolution was passed recogniz­
ing the October Diploma, and calling for the recognition of the Romanian 
nation as a separate political entity. The abolition of some old, injurious 
Transylvanian laws( which, as a matter of fact the union of 1848 had already 
once invalidated) was demanded, as well as a relatively broad suffrage. A 
co-ordination committee was formed, namely, the Romanian national com­
mittee headed by Bishop !paguna afforced by the Greek Catholic Archbishop 
^ulufiu. This committee was to assume great importance later on.
At the conference in Gyulafeherv^r some frank speaking took place. The 
Catholic bishop, Lajos Haynald, firmly advocated the implementation of 
the union and the 1848 laws, including the franchise in force at that time. 
For his part, Archbishop ^ulufiu insisted on the autonomy of Transylvania, 
arguing that the chances for fraternal co-existence depended on a separate 
Transylvanian Diet which would emancipate the Romanian nation and give 
it its fair share in government. Konrad Schmidt, a Saxon, expressed his sym­
pathy for the union and the 1848 laws but pressed for the convening of a 
Transylvanian Diet in order to place the rights of the nationalities, and par­
ticularly the autonomy of the Saxons, on a firm footing. The conference 
ended without any convergence of views as far as the interested parties 
were concerned. But the cause of the union had again been brought into the 
focus of political interest, and sparked off debates in the Hungarian, Roma­
nian and German press.
The Liberal Centralization of the Empire
In the meantime, the Austrian haute bourgeoisie and the central bureauc­
racy had openly turned against the October Diploma, especially because of 
the concession it granted to the provinces. The blatant nationalist festivities 
held by the Hungarians and Romanians, the refusal to pay taxes, and the 
social tensions which manifested themselves most obviously in the Roma­
nian peasantry's occupation of woods and pastures eroded the authority of 
the new establishment even before it began to operate.
In mid-December 1860, Anton von Schmerling, who intended to create 
moderate bourgeois parliamentarianism by using absolutist means, achieved 
a key position in the government.
The so-called February Patent, issued on 26 February, 1861, provided 
the whole empire with a "constitution" through a centralist re-interpreta­
tion of the October Diploma. A new type of all-imperial centralization now 
became official government policy. Hungary could send eighty-five, Transyl­
vania twenty-six and Croatia nine representatives to the three hundred and 
forty-five seat Reichsrat. But the February Patent made no mention of a gov­
ernment accountable to parliament, nor of the need for the emperor's meas­
ures to be ratified by ministers. At any time the emperor had the right to 
choose deputies to the Reichsrat directly, by-passing the various national 
assemblies. Therefore, if need be, he could govern for years in accordance 
543 with apparently liberal principles without convening the Hungarian Diet.
As was to be expected, these measures, which were seen by Francis Joseph 
and his ministers as the greatest concessions possible, aroused strong re­
sistance among Hungarian Liberals. By calling for the implementation of 
the 1848 laws, the Hungarian Diet convened in April 1861 supported the re­
establishment of a bourgeois Hungarian state which was to be entirely in­
dependent in its internal affairs. Accordingly, this Diet insisted on the elected 
representatives of Transylvania and Croatia participating in its work, some­
thing which did not, however, materialize. The ethnically mixed regions of 
the Banat, Arad, Bihar, Szatm&r and M^ramaros delegated nineteen Roma­
nian representatives to the Diet in Pest, who — unlike the majority of the 
Romanian politicians in Transylvania — attempted to base the future of the 
nationalities on a compromise with the Hungarian forces.
In order to achieve a common platform, De3k also included in his fa­
mous address to the Diet, which itemized the principles of Hungarian lib­
eral policy, the urgent need to resolve the nationalities issue. Eotvos, in 
turn, formed a parliamentary committee with twelve non-Magyar mem­
bers which made preparations for a separate nationality law. The commit­
tee put forward its proposals in August 1861. "The citizens of Hungary, 
whatever language they speak, constitute one nation politically, the unitary 
and indivisible Hungarian nation in accordance with the historic concept of 
the Hungarian state," said the draft law, and went on to declare: "Magyars, 
Slovaks, Romanians, Serbs, Germans and Ruthenians are to be considered 
as nationalities with equal rights", nationalities, which, on the basis of hu­
man rights and freedom of association, can realize their aspirations for their 
own particular nationality, without restriction.14 It provided that the town­
ships and the counties be free to use any language in conducting their offi­
cial business, permitting those with a predominantly non-Magyar popula­
tion to correspond with each other and to issue official documents in their 
own languages. In the minority proposal of the committee, Romanian rep­
resentatives Vlad and Popovici subscribed to the concept of the "political 
nation" with an amendment emphasizing the separate identity of the vari­
ous nationalities: "They are to be recognized as nations on an equal footing 
with the Magyar, and their total sum constitutes the political nation of Hun­
gary".15 Some details of their proposal anticipated a federation of the vari­
ous non-Magyar areas.
The rump Diet of 1861 was incapable of passing any law. In August of 
that year it was dissolved by the monarch because it was not prepared to 
come to an unconditional agreement with the monarch, insisting on the 
restoration of the 1848 laws as a whole.
14. Cited by Gy. S z a b a d , op. cit. 553.
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The Struggle for Local Power
As a challenge to the multi-faceted resistance in Hungary, Schmerling at­
tempted to establish, at least in Transylvania, a Diet which was ready to 
accept the new arrangement. By doing so, he hoped to reduce the impact of 
the defiant mood in Pest and to help facilitate the crushing of the Hungar­
ian opposition.
In the summer of 1861, Schmerling promised the Romanians that he would 
considerably lower the property franchise qualification. This amounted to 
guaranteeing the Romanians a majority in the Transylvanian Diet. For his 
part, Francis Joseph, when receiving a Romanian delegation, twice stressed: 
"Gentlemen, regarding the union of Transylvania and Hungary, I assure 
you that I shall never permit such a union to come about."16
In Transylvania itself, local administration from the spring of 1861 on 
assumed a dual character as a result of the conflict between Kemeny's and 
Mik6' moderate unionism and Schmerling's centralizing aspirations. For in 
the spring of 1861, the emperor had ordered the abolition of absolutist in­
ternal administration in Transylvania as well, and at the same time ordered 
that the counties, seats and royal free towns be restored and re-organized 
as units of self-government.
The tactics of Transylvania's Hungarian Liberals — approved by the op­
position in Pest and worked out in part on the advice of the exiled Kossuth
— aimed at challenging Vienna's attempts at centralization in the counties 
and in the towns. What made this a promising tack was that until 1848, 
local political power had been subordinated to the Parliament — like gen­
eral assembly of the counties and other municipalities. It was this body that 
elected and supervised local administrative officials, oversaw the opera­
tion of the courts, levied the taxes, and generally set the course of local 
political life. It was to this system that the county commissions set up in the 
spring of 1861 by the group of landowners and intellectuals rallying round 
Domokos Teleki and the younger Janos Bethlen harked back. Through the 
commissions, and the officials they elected, this group acquired a leading 
position in the political life and administration of Transylvania. From this 
position of relative strength the group called for the reinstatement of the 
1848 laws. Regarding the union as legally a fa it  accompli, the group re­
quested that the representatives of Transylvania also be invited to the Diet 
being convened in Pest at this time.
What mattered most was the extent to which these two men could reach 
a practical understanding with the Romanian intellectuals, who accepted 
most of the 1848 laws including those providing for the emancipation of the 
serfs and for embourgeoisment generally, but who — secure of the backing 
from the government circles in Vienna — stuck to the idea that Transylva­
nia should have separate status. These intellectuals called for civil rights to 
be guaranteed on a national basis and rejected not only the union but also 
the Hungarian idea of solving the nationalities issue by guaranteeing their
16. Corespondenfa lui loan Rafiu cu George Barifiu (1861-1892). Edited by K. Hitchins 
5 4 5  -  L. Maior. Cluj 1970, 51.
members individual and cultural rights. The Hungarian side consented to 
Nasz6d and Fogaras which had ethnic Romanian majorities establishing a 
Romanian administration (Fels<5-Feher and Hunyad counties were also un­
der the authority of Romanian foispdns), and also thought it advisable for 
the Romanians to have a greater say in the government of the Kir^lyfold. 
However, when it came to the counties — ancient bulwarks of Hungarian 
politics — they were inclined to admit them at most on a fifty-fifty basis. 
The county commissioners were normally recruited from those officials of 
1848 who were still alive, but a quarter of them, and a number of higher 
officials, were nominated by the foispdns from the ranks of the Romanians. 
"They are as eager to find Romanians to fill various offices," wrote the Gazeta 
Transilvaniei's correspondent in Doboka, "as they are to impress men into 
the arm y."17 The Romanian language was not only introduced into public 
life but also gained a dominant position in several regions. In Nasz6d, even 
the government commissioner, Count Gabor Bethlen, presiding over the 
statutory meeting of the municipality, made his opening address in that 
language.
The Saxon patrician bureaucrats and the Romanians who had become a 
force to reckon with in the Kiralyfold in terms of both numbers and prop­
erty became involved in a serious conflict over the issue of their participa­
tion in the new arrangement. As compared to the counties, in this region 
the Romanians were in an inferior position. Comes Salmen sought to update 
the restoration of the status quo begun in 1805, which was ever harder to 
reconcile with the idea of civil equality, by delegating a few offices to the 
Romanians. In 1861, for the first tim6 in its history, four Romanian deputies 
were admitted to the Saxon University. Soon a large delegation was asking 
Salmen to constitute the government bodies of the Kir&Iyfold from both 
Romanians and Saxons on the basis of equal representation. While in the 
counties the Romanian intellectuals could cherish the hope of receiving help 
from Vienna against the Hungarian landed class, in the Kiralyfold the Ro­
manian grievances were received with the traditional sympathy by the 
Hungarian-led Gubemium and by the court chancellor, Ferenc Kemeny. 
The Hungarian press was also anxious to back the Romanian's fight in the 
Sz^szfold.
By the autumn of 1861, the municipalities of Transylvania had been reor­
ganized. As a result, a relative political equilibrium was established be­
tween the various nationalities. However, this failed to calm social tensions. 
In the Hungarian-led counties, the Romanian militants protested against 
the hegemony of those in power, while in the Romanian-led municipalities 
Hungarian militants protested similarly, theatrically walking out of coun­
try assemblies, going into passive resistance, and sending memoranda as 
tokens of their unwillingness to accept the established power structure as 
appropriate.
It was the exiles who again came up with a comprehensive proposal for 
how these national antagonisms might be settled.
17. Foaie pentru minte, inima si literatura. 26 April, 1861. Cited by S. R e t e g a n ,  Dieta 
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The Plan for a Danubian Confederation
W ith the Hungarian's inclination towards a compromise with Austria grow­
ing stronger, and with the Emigres having had to face up to the fact that the 
Great Powers were determined to preserve the equilibrium in Europe, 
Klapka and Kossuth drew up a new blueprint for co-operation in south­
eastern Europe designed to defuse national antagonisms and to reinvigorate 
the liberation movements. The plan for a Danubian Confederation devised 
in May 1862 outlined a confederation of the "old historic states" lying be­
tween the Carpathians, the Danube, the Black Sea and the Adriatic for the 
period following a victorious war of liberation. The joint affairs of the mem­
ber states would include foreign affairs, defence, tariffs and commerce and 
these would be administrated by a federal authority, which would, in turn, 
be answerable to a federal parliament. The federal government would alter­
nately sit in Pest, Bucharest, Zagreb and Belgrade, the presidential duties 
being performed at any given time by the head of the country concerned. 
The above affairs apart, however, the executive, legislature, and judiciary 
of every member state would be entirely independent. The separate status 
of Transylvania was also considered.
This scheme of Kossuth's envisaged free national development and a 
collective great power status for the countries of the area: "They will be a 
leading, rich and powerful state numbering thirty million inhabitants and 
weighting substantially in the scales of Europe."18 It promised a solution in 
a region that was highly complex ethnically and so badly needed the co­
operative of independent nations. However, the plan was leaked out before 
the necessary preparations could be made for its publication. It evoked no 
noticeable response among the neighbouring peoples, and the majority of 
the Hungarian politicians either refused to endorse it, or, like Ferenc De&k, 
remained silent on the issue.
The Hungarian landowning class, with its great power mentality was 
determined to create in independent constitutional state that would play a 
dominant role in the region, a state in which, it claimed, history, tradition, 
and practical considerations alike predestined the Hungarians for a pre­
eminent political role. It was becoming increasingly clear, however, that 
this could be achieved only if Hungary remained integrated with Austria as 
a major power. Accordingly, the search for an appropriate status within the 
empire for a Hungary united with Transylvania constituted the central po­
litical issue of the ensuing few years.
The majority of Hungarian Liberals insisted on the union with Transyl­
vania but within this they were prepared to make compromises. De&k 
thought of handling Transylvania rather like Croatia — it would be allowed 
to hold a separate provincial Diet which would, in turn, send deputies to 
the Diet in Pest. In order to reconcile them, the Romanians would be recog-
18. L. Kossuth, Irataim az emigracziobol. (Writings in my Emigration.) Edited by I. 
Helfy. III. 1859-1860. Budapest 1882, 734. On the conception of the plan see L. 
Lukacs, Magyar politikai emigrdcio 1849-1867. (Hungarian Political Emigration 
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nized as "the Fourth Nation". On the other hand, the Hungarian Liberals in 
Transylvania feared that Deck's solution would give a tactical advantage to 
Vienna: the government would be in the position to make the union a mat­
ter of continuous debate, thereby further exacerbating conflicts between the 
nationalities.
The Provisorium and the Nagyszeben Diet
In September 1861, the monarch ordered the convening of the Transylvani­
an Diet on the basis of a property voting qualification set at eight forints 
and to include every type of direct tax — i.e., on a property tax consider­
ably lower than that applying in 1848. Chancellor Kemeny did not deem the 
monarchic principle to be compatible with the broader franchise and ten­
dered his resignation. The Gubemium headed by Mik6 protested in a lengthy 
memorandum against the calling of a separate Diet, reproaching the gov­
ernment with extending voting rights out of tactical considerations "when 
in Your Majesty's other provinces the interests of the people, especially those 
of the broad masses, have not been treated with such favour."19 Mik6 and 
his associates, backed by the officials in the counties, resolutely opposed 
the preparations, thereby incurring the anger not only of the government 
but also of the Romanian National Committee. In his own memorandum to 
the monarch, Archbishop ^ulufiu called the Gubemium anarchic and hos­
tile to the spirit of the age "because it brands Your Majesty's reign and all 
Your ordinances as unlawful."20 Finally, on 21 November, Mik6 also re­
signed.
Kemeny's and M ik6's resignations were followed by those of the leading 
Hungarian administrators. The newly-appointed foispdns were reliable sup­
porters of the government. Romanian foispans now headed Doboka and 
Ktikull<5 counties, in addition to those who retained office in Nasz6d, Fogaras,
Hunyad and Fels6-Feher counties, and the number of Romanian-led mu­
nicipalities thus rose to six.
The new chancellor of Transylvania, Count Ferenc Nadasdy — accord­
ing to Francis Joseph, the most hated Hungarian of all — set as his goal the 
disruption of the Hungarian-led counties: he needed supporters in the coun­
ties for the coming elections. The weight of the Romanians grew in the newly 
constituted county commissions and among the government officials, al­
though the Hungarian landowners and junior officials were still the major­
ity. The Hungarian towns and the Szekelyfold were the areas by and large 
retained by the Liberals. By the spring of 1863, the administrators had man­
aged to suppress resistance to a degree which at last permitted the parlia­
mentary elections to be held.
At these elections, it was not the increase in the number of voters that 
was the chief novelty but the changed make-up of the electorate. While in
19. Okmanytar Erdely legujabb jogtdrtenetehez, 1848-1865. (Document Archives to the
Latest Legal History of Transylvania, 1848-1865). Collected by J. Sandor. Kolozs-
vSr 1865, 178.
20. L. O k m o s s y ,  Tizenhet ev ... (Seventeen Years ...), 339. 548
1848 every nobleman had automatically had the franchise, now only those 
who satisfied the eight forint property qualification were eligible to vote — 
in the counties, only one nobleman in five. Traditionally, this layer had con­
stituted the chief support of the Hungarian cause, irrespective of the given 
individual's Hungarian or Romanian ethnic affiliation. The Romanians were 
placated by increasing the number of their deputies in the counties, although 
proportional representation was not introduced. (In Fogaras and Nasz6d, 
one deputy represented 10,000 people, in the Szekelyfold 14,500, and in the 
Sz^szfold 8,700.) In the counties, over half the electorate was Romanian. A 
fact regarded as encouraging by the Romanian National Committee, which 
launched a massive election campaign. It looked forward with confidence 
to the forthcoming Diet as a historic event which was to mark the emanci­
pation of the Romanian nation and given it its due share of political power.
In the elections of the summer of 1863 — for which the government is 
understood to have spent 800,000 forints on influencing an electorate of 
75,000-80,000 — 49 Romanian, 44 Hungarian and 33 Saxon candidates won 
mandates. The Hungarian liberal camp took the seats in both the Szekelyfold 
and the Hungarian towns, but suffered a disastrous defeat in the counties, 
the ancient organizational units of political life. Out of the thirty-eight depu­
ties for the counties, only two were Hungarians. The monarch invited eleven 
Regalists selected from the "men of standing" or officials of every national­
ity, in the hope that they would play the counter-balancing function per­
formed in other countries by an upper house. In the final analysis, sixty 
(later fifty-nine) Romanians, fifty-six Hungarians and forty-nine Saxons got 
the chance of participating in the Diet.
The political forces of all three nations engaged in feverish preparations 
for the opening of the Diet. The Hungarians held a two-day meeting to 
discuss how they might support the demand for separate national rights 
for the Romanians in a way consistent with their insistence on the 1848 law 
on the union and their protest in principle against the convening of this 
separate Transylvanian Diet. Their resolution, which was translated into a 
memorandum for the monarch, declared that "the very idea of a Transylva­
nian Diet was contrary to law ."21
The confidential contacts established between the Hungarian, Romanian 
and Saxon representatives — contacts spurred by the realization that there 
was strong support among the Romanians for some wide-ranging constitu­
tional settlement — similarly failed to bring results. They hardly could have. 
For the Romanian Liberals and some of the Saxons were hoping that the 
presence of the Hungarians would serve to consolidate the constitutional 
forces in the Diet. The Hungarians, however, were intent on persuading the 
former to boycott the entire event. They reiterated the promise that in the 
Diet meeting in Pest, "we shall give legal guarantees for [the realization of] 
all the national demands that you might have".22 The viewpoints could not 
be reconciled. As a result, the Hungarian representatives, and all the Hun­
garian Regalists except three, stayed away from the Diet.
21. Abbreviated records of the conference see OSZK Archive of Manuscripts, Fol.
Hung. 1430. l-3 f.
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The Hungarian boycott undermined the hopes the Centralists had at­
tached to the Transylvanian Diet. With the Hungarians refusing to take part, 
the Diet did not represent all three nations of Transylvania. Moreover, thirty- 
six out of the fifty-nine Romanian representatives were bureaucrats, and 
fifteen were clergymen; and of the thirty-three elected Saxon representa­
tives, twenty-two were, officials, as were half of the Regalists. The number 
of truly independent representatives — for example, the Saxon Maager and 
the Romanian Barif — numbered around ten. In this form the Diet was to 
be exactly what Schmerling had intended: a congress of dependent bureau­
crats, a strictly controlled and passive body. This was the first, and the last, 
Transylvanian Diet at which the Romanians were represented as a nation­
ality, and indeed, formed a majority.
The Transylvanian Diet opened on 15 July, 1863. The royal commissioner,
Governor Lieutenant General Crenneville, clad in Hungarian gala dress, 
read the monarch's address to an assembly at which no Hungarians were 
present. The address promised the restoration of the old constitutional rights, 
as well as the formation of a representative system based on equality before 
the law. It called on the deputies to pass the October Diploma and the Febru­
ary Patent and to declare that Transylvania's 1848 union with Hungary was 
null and void. The government invalidated the mandates of the Hungarian 
deputies, called new elections in their electoral districts, and appointed new 
Regalists to take the place of those who had stayed away. At the elections in 
August, the same Hungarian deputies as before were victorious in their old 
districts; then, having demonstrated the strength of their support, they for­
mally renounced their seats. N£dasdy attempted a third election in October 
1863, a fourth one in May 1864, and a fifth election in August 1864 in an 
effort to break the resistance of the Hungarian districts, but to no avail.
With the nomination of new Regalists, he managed to win over all of eleven 
Hungarians. Even the government, however, did not attempt to present 
these eleven men as the representatives of the Transylvanian Hungarians.
Meanwhile, the Diet had discarded the proposal made by the majority of 
the Saxons — who were supporters of imperial centralization — for the 
formation of four separate national regions which, even so, would not have 
been homogeneous in terms of ethnicity. No one considered this suggestion 
to be liberal; in several counties, it would also have totally prevented the 
Romanians' numerical predominance from finding expression. A minority 
of the Saxons were liberal unionists, for instance, Franz Brennberg who, 
after taking a stand for the union at the Diet, resigned his seat. On the other 
hand, Franz Trauschenfels, while maintaining his pro-union views, contrib­
uted to the work of the Diet, and was, in fact, the one to present the commit­
tee motion recommending equal rights for the Romanians. (The Hungarian 
Liberals wished to leave the choice of their official language to the discre­
tion of the counties and townships, but wanted Hungarian to be the only 
language used by the government and the Diet. However, Count Domokos 
Teleki, a politician of some standing, thought that with time Romanian might 
become the official language of Transylvania.)
A government proposal which was passed made Hungarian, Romanian 
and German the official languages, but provided for the regulation by de­
cree of the language to be used in legislation and by the higher authorities, 5 5 0
as well as in correspondence with the central government bodies. The pur­
pose was to remove defining the official state language from the compe­
tence of the deputies. During the discussions, a heated debate developed 
between the Romanians and the Saxons, who wanted only a gradual intro­
duction of the equality of all Transylvania's languages. Though it was not 
until the beginning of 1865 that the monarch gave the royal assent to the 
law, the government passed it to the Gubemium in Kolozsvdr for imple­
mentation as early as the end of 1863.
With the grant of equal rights to the Romanian religions and with the 
language measures, the political emancipation of the Romanian nation was 
formally accomplished. However, at this time there was little chance of its 
actual realization. It was unlikely to constitute a lasting settlement because 
of opposition from Transylvania's Hungarians, the oldest political force in 
the country and the one with the greatest potential, as well as strong allies 
in the rest of Hungary. It was the misfortune of Romanian society at the 
time that the most it could produce was a body of clerical and bureaucrat 
intellectuals, a group unable by itself to form an efficient political force. To 
redress the imbalance, BariJ and several of his associates at the Diet advo­
cated modern constitutionalism, thus adopting a part of the policy of the 
Hungarian Liberals. From 1861 onwards, loan Rajiu had been warning his 
associates not to commit themselves fully to the Schmerling government 
and suggested seeking ties with the Hungarian politicians.
Following the passage of the first laws, public opinion grew even more 
hostile to the Diet. It was strongly suspected that Schmerling's underlying 
purpose was to force Hungary into the Reichsrat. The conviction grew that 
the government was simply playing with the Nagyszeben Diet. Certainly, 
there was no lack of evidence to support this view. V ice-chancellor 
Reichenstein always had with him the royal rescript which empowered him 
to dissolve the Diet at any time. The man named president of the Diet was 
Gusztdv Groisz, a Hungarian Conservative, who had obtained the fewest 
votes of the six candidates for the post. And when necessary, a majority 
was simply overturned in a new vote. At the prompting of the monarch, 
twenty-six deputies (thirteen Romanians and thirteen Saxons) were selected 
without delay for' the Reichsrat. They duly appeared in Vienna, but were 
unable to achieve anything: the section of the state budget dealing with 
Transylvania was passed without modification. The Austrian representa­
tives, for their part, regarded them as yes-men of the government.
In May 1864, the Nagyszeben Diet reconvened. The interim regulation 
applied in 1863 was presented as a draft suffrage bill. The reorganization of 
the judiciary, and Rafiu's proposals on the use of the forests, on the emanci­
pation of the serfs in the SzekelyfOld, and on the distribution of the pasture 
lands — which the Liberals described as communistic — were never really 
dealt with. At the end of October, the session was adjourned, never to be 
reconvened. For in the course of 1865, the political situation changed out of 
all recognition. The laws that had been given royal sanction, only six in 
number, were of no significance: not only were they opposed by the Hun­
garian policy-makers, but, because he had never taken the coronation oath, 
were not even binding on the monarch. If the Diet had any lasting effect, it 
was that it helped accelerate the development of Saxon, and especially Ro­
manian, national consciousness and political education.
The Termination of the Provisional Government, 
and the Kolozsv&r Diet
Though the policy pursued by Schmerling had been unable to break the 
resistance of the Hungarian Liberals, it did manage to soften some of them 
up. The protracted period of absolutism did not bring economic advance­
ment for the landed class. A role in public life also required money, and it 
had had to finance the administration of the whole Mik6 era virtually on its 
own. With the exact ownership and the precise legal status of so much of 
their land unclarified, nobles could not get credit; and for lack of invest­
ment, these estates were rapidly losing their value. According to the well- 
informed Romanian commander of Fogaras, the entire land of Transylva­
nia could have been bought for a few million forints. The need to find a way 
out strengthened the group of those who were prepared to negotiate with 
the court.
In the spring of 1865, the famous "Easter article" of Ferenc De&k launched 
negotiations for a compromise. D eik  averred that Hungarian interests and 
the 1848 laws could be reconciled with the "stable existence of the empire", 
emphasizing one of the key demands of the Hungarian Liberals, namely 
that constitutional government had to be introduced also in the Austrian 
half of the empire. In the course of the exploratory talks edging towards a 
compromise, on 26 June, 1865, Zichy, the Hungarian chancellor, and Na- 
dasdy, the Transylvanian chancellor, were forced to resign — the latter be­
ing replaced by Count Ferenc Haller, a cavalry general. The key figure of 
the old regime, Schmerling, was also turned out of office, to be succeeded 
by Count Belcredi. Vienna finally agreed to the restoration of the union. 
Francis Joseph now summoned comes Konrad Schmidt and Saguna, since 
1864 autonomous archbishop of the Greek Orthodox Romanians of Hun­
gary and Transylvania. He informed them of his intention of reaching a 
compromise, and promised to honour the national rights of the non-Magyars, 
provided that the Saxons and the Romanians were able to accommodate 
themselves to the new situation.
The monarch called a new Diet to Kolozsv£r for 19 November, 1865. Its 
"sole and exclusive subject" was the renegotiation of the "Article I of 1848 
dealing with the union of Hungary and Transylvania". The administrative 
system was restored such that the corporate bodies formed in 1861 began to 
operate again as previously composed.
The property qualification for the new elections was set on the basis of 
the suffrages of 1791 and 1848, and was considerably higher than that ap­
plying in 1863. But despite raising the property qualification, estimates (in 
the absence of exact data) suggest that a few thousand more people were 
eligible to vote than in 1863. This is explained by the fact that members of 
the small nobility, who had been reduced to peasant status economically, 
were again eligible to vote on the basis of their "old rights". These people 
formed the reserve of the Hungarian political forces.
The new turn of events and the new suffrage were a blow to the Roma­
nian intellectuals. The Romanian vice-president of the Gubemium judged 
that this experiment, too, would be short-lived, and that the Romanians 552
had merely to wait for it to fail. He encouraged Archbishop Sulufiu and his 
associates to resist. Following the recent example of the Hungarians, the 
Romanians did attempt a boycott of the election, but failed to co-ordinate 
their actions. At the last moment, Barif and his supporters opted for partici­
pation in the elections. The Saxon University opposed the new measures, 
but was nevertheless willing to attend the Diet. It also accepted the union, 
"given advance legal state guarantees of the Saxon nationality's municipal 
constitution."
At the November elections, the monarch's support for the union had con­
siderable psychological impact, and the changes in the franchise, which cut 
back the number of the Romanian electors, were not without their effects. 
There were now just fourteen elected Romanian deputies — and, in addi­
tion, thirty-four Romanian Regalists — who either opposed the union or 
who stipulated stringent conditions for it. The fifty-nine elected deputies of 
the Hungarians — and the one hundred and thirty-seven Hungarian Re­
galists — dwarfed the Romanians and the thirty elected Saxon deputies 
(plus twenty Saxon Regalists). Even discounting the Regalists, the Union­
ists were in a majority.
On 19 November, 1865, Baron Ferenc Kem£ny, who had presided over 
the 1848 Diet, opened the assembly which, predictably, neither of the two 
major political forces in the country regarded as a real Diet. The Romanians 
considered it to have been illegally convened, and called for the continua­
tion of the Nagyszeben Diet. Even the majority of the Hungarian repre­
sentatives considered it to be a national meeting whose sole task was the 
confirmation and revival of the union of 1848. The inter-nationality recon­
ciliation talks held in advance of it produced no results, and the Diet's work 
began with only thirty-two of the forty-eight Romanian deputies actually 
taking part. The sittings of the Diet abounded in fine speeches, the deputies 
putting their cases for and against the union, reiterating the arguments de­
veloped between 1848 and 1865. Over Saguna's and Maager's objections, 
and in spite of the twenty-nine Romanian and twenty-six Saxon votes against 
it, the Diet adopted the Hungarian pro-union resolution, which secured 
one hundred and sixty-six votes (including four Romanian and eight Saxon). 
The motion adopted described the union as necessary — firstly on the basis 
of historical rights and secondly on grounds of the great power position of 
the empire, which required the restoration of the integrity of the Hungarian 
state. This was a vital issue for Transylvania also, argued the resolution, 
referring to the backward economy of the country, its general impoverish­
ment and its inability to pay taxes. Material prosperity, it said, could be 
expected from such "a lawful and natural unification of interests and unit­
ing of forces". On the issue of equal rights for the non-Hungarians, it de­
clared that the monarch's "paternal heart and the recognized liberalism of 
Hungarian legislation" afforded sufficient guarantee that the interests of 
the denominations and of the nationalities would be met on the basis of 
civil equality.23
23. Erdelyi Hi'rlap (Transylvanian Newspaper), 28 December, 1865; L. Okm O ssy , 
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Appended to the resolution was a Romanian minority statement submit­
ted by Archbishop Saguna, which called for a Diet to be convened in line 
with the 1863 prescription so that the Romanians could discuss the union 
on the basis of a fairer suffrage. One of the dissenting opinions from the 
Saxons which was also appended made the acceptance of the union de­
pendent on the guaranteeing of the special rights of the various nationali­
ties. The sittings were adjourned pending the response of the monarch to 
the Representations, although after Francis Joseph's speech at the opening 
of the Diet in Pest this action was but a mere formality.
On 10 January, 1866, a royal rescript was read out which "perm itted" 
Transylvania to send deputies to the Diet in Pest, but which suggested that 
the implementation of the union was dependent on the full conclusion of an 
Austro-Hungarian compromise. In addition, it stipulated that the "right­
ful" claims of the nationalities and denominations should be met in ad­
vance. For the Saxons and Romanians, this seemed to be very little: while 
the Hungarian Liberals judged the declaration of the conditions to be no 
more than a bit of one-upmanship. However, they did not voice their oppo­
sition, and the union Diet in Kolozsv&r ended with the statement: "W e have 
made great progress towards the realization of our final goal.
With this, the separateness of Transylvania came to an end. It had been 
achieved not only through pressure from the Hungarian political forces there, 
but was also recognized to be an indispensable prerequisite for the success 
of negotiations on the more comprehensive compromise aimed at consoli­
dating the empire. The Hungarian liberal camp, the strongest political force 
in Transylvania, had had an important part to play in this agreement, and 
had managed to prevent Transylvania from being "consolidated" as a sepa­
rate unit at the expense of Hungary proper and in the line with imperial 
centralist schemes.
The restoration of the union made it possible for Transylvania to be in­
volved in the capitalist transformation of the monarchy not just as a modest 
border province but as an integral part of its socially and politically more 
advanced mother-country. As such, it was now in the mainstream of Euro­
pean economic development.
The future was to show exactly to what extent the union facilitated the 
cultural and political development of the nationalities, and how far they 
were able to close the economic and social gap which had historical roots 
and had been a source of tension for so long.
II. Population and Economy 
in the Age of Capitalism
1. Population
Population Growth and Mobility
During the six decades between the revolution of 1848-1849 and 1914, the 
population of Transylvania grew by about 750,000, or 40 per cent. This de­
mographic increase occurred within an area of 58,000 square kilometres, 
some minor modifications having been made to the frontiers of historic 
Transylvania proper by the administrative reform which united Transylva­
nia with Hungary in 1876. Two-thirds of this population increase occurred 
in the three decades preceding the First World War. The annual increase is 
presumed to have been about 8 per thousand head of population between
Table 3. The growth of the population of Transylvania (1850-1910)
Transylvania and 
the Partium 
(1102 □  mile, 
60,700 sq km)
Transylvania between 
the old boundaries 
(998 □ mile, 
54,948 sq km)
Transylvania between 
the 1876 boundaries 
(57,804 sq km)
Year the present average the present average the present average
civilian yearly civilian yearly civilian yearly
population growth, population growth, population growth,
in absolute % 0 in absolute %o in absolute % 0
numbers numbers numbers
1850 2,073,737 1,856,000 1,900,000
1857 2,172,748 6.7 1,926,797
1869 2,393,206 8.1 2.101.72 7 7.3 2,152,805





1850-1910 +758,159 (39.9 %) 5.6
1869-1910 +505,354 (23.5 %) 5.2
1880-1910 +574,111 (27.5 %) 8.1
1839 and 1845; it was 6.2 per thousand head of population between 1851 
and 1857, rising steadily in the 1860s, a rise which was, however, followed 
by a sharp decline. This decline resulted from the last mediaeval-type de­
mographic disaster to sweep the region: the cholera epidemic that reached 
Transylvania in 1873. Whereas Hungary recovered from this disaster within 
three years, it took Transylvania until the early 1880s to resume its earlier 
rate of population increase.
While, as a rule, the so-called Industrial Age was ushered in by a demo­
graphic boom, in Hungary — and even more in Transylvania — the popu­
lation increased in a long drawn-out process. There were even counties which 
reported a surplus of deaths over births during the great cholera epidemic 
and for years after it. In Csik and Nagy-KiikullS counties for example, a low 
birthrate combined with emigration led to an actual decrease of the popula­
tion from 1869 on, and the counties of Brass6, H^romszek, Udvarhely and 
Fogaras lost 6 to 7 per cent of their natural population increase due to the 
same two factors. Throughout the whole period, the rate of population 
growth in Transylvania remained below the average for Hungary as a whole.
Demographically, Transylvania was clearly a part of Hungary's eastern 
region, characterized by early marriages as compared to other regions, with 
the average age of those marrying, however, showing a rising trend through­
out the period. A massive higher population growth rate bloc comprising 
Szatm&r, Bihar, M^ramaros and Szolnok-Doboka counties contrasted sharp­
ly with the zone immediately south of it westward from Beszterce through 
Hunyad as far as Baranya where fertility was decidedly low. Historians 
have yet to account for this. Areas with rapidly growing populations lay in 
the central part of Transylvania, in the roughly rectangular area between 
Kolozsvdr, Marosv^sarhely, Segesv&r and Szciszsebes. It was in this central 
part, too, that population density was the highest, reaching 50 to 80 per 
square kilometre by 1890, whereas the average for the whole territory east 
of the Kir31yh3g6 was 39.32 in the same year, only reaching 46.3 even in 
1910. The fertility index was particularly low among the Romanians of south­
ern Transylvania. Much as in the Transdanubian part of Hungary, among 
the Transylvanian Saxons restrictive birth control was widespread. A one- 
or two-child family model was commonly adopted, in order to prevent the 
splitting up of smallholdings.
In respect of its high birth and death rates, early marriages and high 
fertility, Hungary's demographic structure conforms to the eastern Euro­
pean model, whereas the other feature, the early adoption of restrictive birth 
control methods, bears a certain resemblance to the western European model. 
A lower fertility index, greater life expectancy and a relatively low mortal­
ity rate, then, imparted to Transylvania a distinct position within the demo­
graphic structure of the whole of Hungary.
It was in this 1849-1914 period that a public health care network was 
established and became a serious factor in shaping demographic trends. 
Although some improvement in medical care was discernible from as early 
as 1850, no major advance took place until the end of the century. As early 
as the 1850s and 1860s there were "national hospitals" at Kolozsvar and 
Marosvas^rhely, and there were sixteen other hospitals as well. With the 
introduction of vaccination in 1887, smallpox — previously a formidable 556
scourge — was virtually eliminated. A public health law passed in 1876 
spelled out the health care duties of the state, as well as of the county and 
village authorities. It also provided for the supervision of health standards 
in public institutions. Towns and the more populous villages were obliged 
by law to employ doctors, while the district doctor cared for patients in the 
smaller villages. Treatment was free for the poorest. Medical care and hos­
pital services improved substantially as a result of these measures. Whereas 
in 1893 there were just twenty-nine hospitals with 1,900 beds, by 1913 there 
were fifty-six hospitals with 5,645 beds. According to the 1910 (the last pre- 
1914) Census data, 3,001 persons were employed in the public health sec­
tor, of whom 545 were doctors and 523 pharmacists. Twenty-two per cent 
of all health workers and 13 per cent of the doctors were ethnic Romanians. 
For every 100,000 inhabitants, there were twenty-nine physicians, sixty-two 
midwives and 191 hospital beds. Naturally, health conditions varied enor­
mously from town to country, as well as from region to region. The number 
of deaths recorded as due to accidents was around 500 per annum at the 
time. The number of suicides was around 300 per annum — three times the 
figure of fifty years before, and the comparable statistics for H3romsz6k 
county were staggering. One hundred cases of murder were reported an­
nually, with the counties of H^romszek and Hunyad heading the list in this 
respect. In sharp contrast to the earlier figures, however, the number of 
murder cases had halved since the mid-nineteenth century, a reflection of 
the tempering effects of civilization.
In the first period of the Industrial Age, unnatural death took its heaviest 
toll during the First World War. According to the official statistics alone, by 
the end of 1917 already 24 per thousand of Transylvania's population had 
been killed at the front, with the figure being 37 per thousand among the 
Szekelys. Those born in 1895 and 1896 were the hardest hit: around 20 per 
cent of these young men became casualties. There was a rising mortality 
rate among civilians — with the Romanian offensive of August 1916, Transyl­
vania effectively became a combat zone — and a distinct fall in the birth 
rate (by 55-58 per cent).
A famine following a natural disaster or poor harvest had an adverse 
effect not only on peoples' livelihood, on their sheer survival, but also on 
reproduction. This was in spite of the fact that the authorities increasingly 
felt that it was their duty to provide relief for disaster-stricken areas. Public 
readiness to provide aid took some of the pain out of the famine of 1864- 
1865. By the turn of the century, the distribution of free grain in villages 
affected by a poor harvest had become accepted government policy. After 
this there were no more serious famines, but malnutrition caused by the 
substitution of maize for wheat bread as the staple diet frequently caused 
pellagra among the village people. The inhabitants of Brass6, Fogaras and 
Haromszek counties were the relatively best fed. In the 1880s, the annual 
amount spent on food was 65 forints per head, which approximated to Hun­
gary's national average. All the same, the Transylvanians were on shorter 
commons, generally speaking. Although fruit consumption was high, it 
hardly made up for the other deficiencies of their diet. Hard liquor con­
sumption reached alarming levels; Kis-Kiikulld county led the statistics with 
5 5 7  an annual consumption of forty-one litres per capita.
The turn of the century saw an upsurge in the geographical mobility of 
the population, although even it the pre-1867 days people from Transylva­
nia — both ethnic Romanians and Szekely men and unmarried women — 
had regularly gone to Romania in search of work. In the late 1870s, the 
official records mentioned a figure of 40,000 "Hungarian subjects" living in 
Romania. Between 1880 and 1900, the number of migrants there was roughly
70.000, about one-third of them being Sz6kelys. Between 1900 and 1914, 
these were followed by another 80,000. Official statistics, of course, do not 
take account of those crossing the long Carpathian frontier in secret, a fron­
tier that was unguarded by any modem standards. Nor should we forget 
that most migrants sought temporary jobs, rather than permanent residence, 
in Romania. This accounts for the low proportion of children among the 
emigrants as well as for the relatively high proportion of those over fifty 
years of age. In 1913 — the last complete year of peace — over 200,000 
Hungarian-born people, including non-Transylvanians, lived in the King­
dom of Romania.
From 1900 on, with the gradual shift of the European emigration zone 
from west to east, the overseas emigration fever reached Transylvania.
Within a period of fifteen years, 95,000 emigrants left the region for America 
and another 10,000 for Germany. The mountainous area between the Olt, 
the Maros, and the Kis-KiikiillS and Nagy-Kiikull<3 rivers became a verita­
ble centre of emigration. Transylvanian emigrants flocked in ever-growing 
numbers to the steel mills and mines of Pennsylvania and to the factories of 
Ohio, New York and New Jersey.
Within Transylvania, population movements occurred on a smaller scale 
than in the rest of Hungary. A mere 18 per cent of Transylvania's inhabit­
ants had permanent residence away from their birthplace, whereas the per­
centage was nearly double this in Transdanubia. But mobility did intensify 
in Transylvania at the turn of the century. Although the number of villages 
remained unchanged, the population of the existing ones was slowly grow­
ing. There were a little over 100 villages with populations of more than
2.000, while the number of villages with fewer than 1,000 inhabitants was 
over 1,800. A typical Transylvanian village had a population of between 
500 and 1,000 inhabitants. Regional peculiarities and historical heritage con­
tinued to shape the character of villages. In the Erchegyseg, for instance, 
there were so-called "scattered settlements" each of which stretched end­
lessly through the landscape. By contrast, Hosszufalu, a village in the vicin­
ity of Brass6, was, by the turn of the century, contiguous with three other 
village communities engaged in handicrafts and was practically of urban 
character. Meanwhile, large, sprawling villages such as Romanian-inhab­
ited Szelistye and Resin^r prospered on transhumant sheep farming and 
related activities. It might have been this very traditionalism — together 
with the pull of nearby industrial Nagyszeben — that thwarted the urbani­
zation process here. Hungarian-inhabited Torock6 was also denied the pos­
sibility of growth, owing to the decline of the small ironworks there.
Urbanization was undoubted the factor behind internal migrations. The 
twenty-seven communities that were legally considered towns in the early 
1900s rapidly expanded in size and increased their populations between 
1850 and 1910, the total number of their inhabitants rising from 149,471 to 5 5 8
324,955. Naturally, the real increase in the urban population far exceeded 
this, as a further 50,000 or more people lived at this time in industrial or 
mining communities such as Petrozseny and Lup6ny, which, as regards the 
degree of their urbanization, were on a par with any small Transylvanian 
town. From the 1890s on, just as in Upper Hungary and Transdanubia, half 
of the inhabitants of major towns earned their living in industry and com­
merce, and about half of them had been recent in-migrants. The Transylva­
nian towns, as regards both their appearance and the occupational distri­
bution of their citizens, followed the general central European model of 
urban development.
Transylvanian urbanization had received its first great impetus in the 
two decades following the 1848 revolution, but then growth abated, and for 
twenty years hardly any increase in the urban population was recorded. 
After 1890, however, another 100,000 people were added by the march of 
capitalist development. The Hungarian cities and towns which bordered 
on Transylvania proper — M&ramarossziget, Szatm&rn6meti, Nagyv&rad, 
Arad and Temesv&r — made great progress on the road to urbanization 
and exercised a pull on the rural population from all directions. On the 
other hand, Brasso and the urbanized Nagyszeben showed a moderate but 
steady increase, while smaller towns such as Vizakna or Abrudbdnya stag­
nated because of the decline of mining there; the population of the latter 
even fell. The typical Transylvanian small town was characterized by tradi­
tionalism and slower structural development. Urbanization could not over­
come regional discrepancies inherited from the past. In 1910,12.7 per cent 
of Transylvania's population were already town dwellers. This was, how­
ever, the Transylvanian average: the ratio was 7.3 in the Szekelyfold, but 
was as high as 22.1 in the former Kir&lyfold.
Ten years after the 1867 Compromise, administrative modernization was 
thought to require an overhaul of the legal status of the thirty royal free 
towns. Twenty-two of them were classified as towns and only two, Kolozsvdr 
and Marosv&sarhely, were accorded municipal rights in conformity with 
their earlier status. Kolozsv&r was a good example of the rapid progress 
that was possible: by 1867 this "capital of Transylvania" had caught up 
with Brass6, hitherto the largest city in that region. During the next four 
decades, it far outdistanced its rivals with a further 122 per cent population 
increase. Although, by and large, the town still retained its earlier appear­
ance, the development of its infrastructure and public utilities, set it on an 
unmistakable course of metropolitan progress.
The Ethnic and Denominational Composition 
of the Population
As far as churches and denominations were concerned, Transylvania con­
tinued to be a very mixed region — more so than any other part of Europe. 
Capitalist transformation did not fundamentally alter this situation: no less 
than before, church and religion were factors which decisively shaped cul­
tural and political attitudes, and, even more, the reproductive behaviour of 
millions of people.
The Greek Orthodox church could claim the most followers. The Greek 
Catholics came second, numbering nearly as many believers, primarily 
among the ethnic Romanians of northern Transylvania. The former four 
"received religions" — the Roman Catholic, the Reformed (i.e. Calvinist), 
the Evangelical (i.e. Lutheran), and the Unitarian churches provided spir­
itual leadership for the Hungarian and Saxon populations. The Saxons were 
predominantly Lutherans and the Szekelys partly Catholics and partly Cal­
vinists. The majority of the Hungarian community as a whole (including 
the Szekelys) was Calvinist throughout the period. The members of the tiny 
Unitarian church were also Hungarians. According to the 1850 statistics, 
there were only a few thousand practising Jews. The Jewish community 
was more substantial in the adjacent Hungarian towns of Arad, Temesv^r 
and Nagyv&rad than in Transylvania proper: in 1869, they made up 11.34 
per cent of Arad's population and 22.43 per cent of Nagyv&rad's. In Transyl­
vania the number of Jews approached that of the Unitarians by 1910.
Denominationally, the towns were often isolated from the surrounding 
countryside, a fact that becomes clear if we compare the proportional weight 
of the various denominations within the overall population with their re­
spective weights in the urban population. The Roman Catholic church 
claimed 13.3 per cent of the whole population of Transylvania, but 25.9 per 
cent of the townspeople. The respective overall population/town popula­
tion percentages were 14.7/23.4 per cent for the Calvinists, 9.0/16.1 for the 
Lutherans, 2.6/2.4 for the Unitarians, and 2.1/6.3 for the Jews. In sharp 
contrast, 30.3 per cent of the overall population and only 15 per cent of all 
urban dwellers belonged to the Greek Orthodox church. The discrepancy 
was greater still for the Greek Catholics who made up 28.0 per cent of the 
overall population but only 11.6 per cent of the town dwellers.
Population growth varied somewhat according to denomination. As early 
as the years 1851-1857, the net increase among the Lutherans (who were 
mostly Saxons) had fallen to 1.2 per thousand per annum. The rate of an­
nual increase was 6.6 per thousand among the Unitarians, 7.1 per thousand 
among the Calvinists, 9.1 per thousand among the Roman Catholics, 6.8 per 
thousand among the Orthodox and 5.7 per thousand among the Greek Catho­
lics. Subsequently these trends did not fundamentally change. Throughout 
the period, the Roman Catholics and the Calvinists showed the greatest net 
increase — surpassed only by that of the small Jewish community — and 
the Greek Orthodox church showed the lowest. Only the fertility index of 
the German peasantry of the Banat — which was the least prolific of all — 
fell short of this.
Inter-denominational barriers were substantial though by no means im­
penetrable. Towards the end of the century, an annual average of 2,000-
3,000 mixed marriages took place, which amounted to more than 10 per 
cent of all marriages registered. Certainly, these inter-denominational mar­
riages tended to be within the same ethnic group, which explains why mixed 
marriages between Calvinists and Roman Catholics were so common. The 
assimilation of the growing number of Jews did not necessarily entail their 
conversion to Christianity. With very few exceptions, the Jews became in­
creasingly magyarized: 44.73 per cent in the 1880 Census and 64 per cent in 
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More than six decades of socio-economic transformation brought no major 
changes in the relative proportions of the ethnic groups in Transylvania. 
The 1850 Census gave a figure of 26 per cent for the proportion of Hungar­
ians in Transylvania's population, a figure subsequently corrected to 28.2. 
This latter estimate, though closer to the mark, can only be accepted as the 
lowest possible figure.. Prudently, the first Hungarian census after the Com­
promise of 1867 carried out in 1869, did not inquire into the nationality of 
those questioned. As a result we cannot but rely on the contemporary stat­
istician Karoly Keleti's calculations which showed an ethnic distribution of 
31 per cent Hungarians, 58 per cent Romanians and 11 per cent Germans. 
From 1880 on, in the decennial censuses, citizens were regularly asked their 
mother tongue, though not their nationality. Arguably, these statistics may 
have been one-sided or manipulated. However, it is known that the Statisz- 
tikai Hivatal (Statistical Office) genuinely aimed at accuracy and, in the 1900 
and 1910 censuses especially, it made strenuous efforts to exclude any dis­
tortion of the statistical data in favour of the Hungarian element.
Throughout the period under review, the size of every ethnic group in­
creased steadily, with the partial exception, perhaps, of the Saxons, whose 
population began to stagnate well before the First World War. In Transyl­
vania — just as in the Habsburg Empire as a whole — it was the Hungarian 
community whose proportion increased most rapidly. The Hungarians in­
creased their numbers by 287,740, or 45.63 per cent, which meant that by 
1910 they made up more than 34 per cent of the total population of Transyl­
vania proper. One of the reasons for this runaway growth was the higher 
rate of natural increase among the Hungarians. As already seen, the regions 
of lower fertility were those regions predominantly inhabited by Romani­
ans or Saxons. The relatively low rate of increase among the followers of 
the Greek Orthodox church was also a confirmation of the Romanians' de­
mographic position. It was only on the eve of the First World War that a 
counterbalancing trend began. The natural population increase of all ethnic 
Romanians living in the Kingdom of Hungary was 5.8 per cent between 
1896 and 1900, and 10 per cent between 1909 and 1912. Nor were the na­
tionalities hit by emigration equally: many more Romanians than Hungar­
ians emigrated. According to official data, 130,000 ethnic Romanians left 
Transylvania between 1899 and 1913. On the eve of the First World War, 
the Romanian nationality came very close to taking the lead over the Slovaks 
and ethnic Germans their proportionate share in emigration from Hungary 
as a whole.
Assimilation, too, albeit to a moderate extent, added to the numbers of 
the Hungarian population. In Transylvania proper, as everywhere else in 
the Kingdom of Hungary, the Jews were rapidly magyarizing. This course 
was also followed by the Armenian community as well as by the sprinkling 
of Czechs, Poles and Italians, a few thousand in all, who were drawn by the 
industrial development to this easternmost comer of the monarchy.
This was the key day of the evolution of nationalism, when ethnic as­
similation would turn from a simple demographic or social phenomenon 
into a burning political issue. The fact that Transylvania looked like a patch­
work quilt of different ethnic groups was an added reason for each nation­




















































































from a distance of one hundred years, it can reasonably be concluded that 
no assimilation to speak of, took place among the Romanians and the Saxons. 
Even in the Sz6kelyf0ld, the Romanian element was growing in absolute 
numbers, although here part of the Romanian increase was inevitably lost 
to magyarization. Also, a certain degree of ethnic Romanian expansion was 
already discernible elsewhere: by the early 1900, the Romanians had be­
came an absolute majority in the Kuktill<3 region and their proportion was 
rapidly increasing in several counties. Most of the Romanians lived in mas­
sive ethnic blocs; their religious affiliation, their culture and social structure 
were quite different from those of the Saxons and the Hungarians. These 
constituted reasonably effective barriers to assimilation.
With capitalist progress centering on the towns and given the strong 
Hungarian character and overwhelmingly Hungarian population of most 
towns, the towns were held commonly by contemporaries to be the "m elt­
ing pots of magyarization". Over 90 per cent of the inhabitants in Kolozsvcir, 
a big city, as well as of Felvinc, a small town, spoke Hungarian, as did over 
80 per cent of the population of Des, Torda and Sz^szregen. Within a dec­
ade (1880-1990) the proportion of Hungarians had increased from 37.5 to 
46.9 per cent in D6va and from 35.3 to 42.6 per cent in Gyulafeherv^r. Yet 
there were clear limits to the assimilating capacity of the towns. During the 
same years, for example, the percentage of Hungarians in the town of 
Nagyenyed decreased from 77.5 to 71. The rural masses, by far the majority 
of the population, were hardly, if at all, affected by assimilation. The low 
level of state authority and intervention was itself a guarantee that the mas­
sive ethnic blocs would be left int&ct. Hungarian historians now put at a 
maximum of 100,000 the net loss of the ethnic Romanian community due to 
assimilation in the whole Kingdom of Hungary between 1850 and 1910.
The multi-ethnic character of historic Transylvania was a reality to be 
felt in all walks of life, a fact clearly reflected in the low level of the knowl­
edge of Hungarian throughout the fifty years of dualism. In 1880, there 
were 109,190 non-Hungarians (7.57 per cent of the non-Hungarian popula­
tion) who declared that they knew Hungarian; in 1910, the figure was again 
only 266,863 (15.2 per cent of the non-Hungarian total). These statistics tell 
of an era never to return: the happy days of yore, when millions of people 
could go about their daily business without ever bothering to learn the offi­
cial language of the state.
2. Economy
The Transition to Capitalism
The revolution of 1848 forms the great watershed in nineteenth-century 
Hungarian history; the subsequent period saw the disintegration of the feu­
dal economic system, its gradual replacement by a capitalist economy and 
the emergence of the basic class structure of the new socio-economic forma­
tion. For decades to come, though, the new formation presented itself as a 
structured unity of divergent modes of production, with the new, capitalist 
model gradually gaining the upper hand. Within fifty years, the whole of 
Hungary became an integral part of the capitalist world economy.
Transylvania was, at the outset, one of the monarchy's most backward 
regions: the marketing of agricultural products was sporadic before 1848, 
the general level of culture, industrial development and urbanization was 
markedly lower than in the territories lying to the west of it. Until as late as 
1868, the three main railway lines stretching from the west had their ter­
mini outside Transylvania proper: in Nagyv&rad, Arad and Temesv&r.
The pioneers of the new credit financing were the savings banks in the 
Saxon towns of Nagyszeben and Brassd. Yet it was not until 1854 that the 
National Bank of Austria began discounting bills in Brassd. In 1857, Vien­
na's Creditanstalt opened a branch in that town, and another credit institu­
tion, of a modest size, was founded in Kolozsv^r in 1865. Financial life re­
ceived a new stimulus in the wake of the Compromise, and especially at the 
end of the century. In 1873 there were twenty credit banks and savings 
banks in Transylvania, in 1894 eighty-five, in 1909 two hundred and twenty- 
three. The number of credit associations was by then 497, with around 110,000 
members. The total amount of mortgages secured against landed property 
was well over 100 million crowns. The rate of increase in the value of loans 
for municipal and community services and public utility projects was higher 
than the Hungarian national average.
In agriculture the rotation system still prevailed. Branches of intensive 
cultivation, such as cereal crop and vegetable growing, fruit production, viti­
culture, and haymaking accounted for 43.7 per cent of total agricultural 
production in 1869, little more than in Croatia. Wage-labourers were greatly 
outnumbered by peasant farmers cultivating their own lands. As late as 
1872, only 38 steam engines were employed in agriculture in the whole of 
Transylvania, about half the number used in a single Transdanubian county.
In the industrial sector, Transylvania seems to have made up lost ground, 
partly at least, between 1857-1869 and seems to have approached the aver­
age all-Hungarian level. The proportion of independent tradesmen and in­
dustrial employees in the population grew at a faster rate than in the rest of 
the Kingdom of Hungary. In 1867,3.7 per cent of Transylvania's population 
belonged to these categories. Even before the union with Hungary, though, 
mechanical power was employed in the iron and metal industries, in the 
milling industry and in distilling. This, however, amounted to about one- 
tenth of the mechanical power used in other regions, for instance, in Trans- 
danubia.
Throughout the period there existed an imbalance between the labour 
supply and the increasing demands of the manufacturing industry. The 
demand for labour outstripped the supply of both skilled and semi-skilled 
industrial workers. The day labourer, on the other hand, often had a hard 
time finding employment.
In education, which was the key factor in creating a modern labour force, 
progress was retarded. Even among males, the literacy rate was as low as
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21.7 per cent in 1869, and 56.7 per cent of those over 6 years of age were 
totally illiterate. Fifty-nine out of every 100 children of school age never 
actually went to school and it was not until the turn of the century that this 
figure fell to 30 per cent.
The modernization of agriculture followed the emancipation of the serfs 
and the abolition of feudal duties only after a long delay. The big estates — 
although evidently destined to be the agents of modernization — preserved 
their non-profit oriented, non-entrepreneurial qualities, while cumulative 
handicaps, for example, widespread illiteracy, clinging to obsolete meth­
ods, general backwardness and, above all, the diminutive size of their plots, 
prevented the peasant farmers from turning their holdings into viable com­
mercial concerns. Peasant farmers who were lucky enough to accumulate a 
substantial amount of money would therefore purchase more land, rather 
than machinery. The great majority of artisans remained untouched by the 
more modern business spirit and earned their living in the old way, by 
meeting the traditional demands of their traditional clients.
During the early 1850s the state, which had played so crucial a role in the 
initial phase of industrialization, soon gave up its own experiments in in­
troducing new technology, and even sold off some of the state plants. It was 
only later, under the dualist system, that state participation re-emerged and 
the government played a greater part in the task of technological moderni­
zation. Foreign capital, too, which was present from the 1880s and began 
experimenting in introducing new technologies, had an important role. 
Nevertheless, right up to the end of the century factories and mining areas 
were places apart, pockets of industry in a rural world which still invari­
ably adhered to traditional values and antiquated social relations. True, 
even in the 1850s, the highly proficient small-scale industry of the Saxon 
towns could boast several mechanized workshops, modem by the stand­
ards of the day. But, more often than not, foreign engineers and mechanics 
from distant lands were required for starting a new iron foundry or sinking 
a new pit, as well as for the operation and reconstruction of these — even 
though some of these industrial sites had a centuries-long history.
Following the Compromise and the union with Hungary, Transylvania 
shared in the benefits which accrued from Hungary's relatively more ad­
vanced level of development as compared to the other economies of east- 
central Europe. More foreign capital was injected into the economy to fi­
nance the establishment of a banking system, the construction of the rail­
ways, and the establishment or modernization of industries. Domestic Hun­
garian capital, to be sure, was present from the very start (as was Transyl­
vanian capital, although on a smaller scale). In the new century, particu­
larly after 1910, Transylvanian capital accumulation came to play a more 
substantial part in restructuring the economy, primarily through industri­
alization.
For the Transylvanian region, the way out of economic backwardness 
inevitably required a new type of integration into the national market. The 
creation of an up-to-date communications system was essential both to ag­
ricultural reorganization and to the establishment of a manufacturing in­
dustry.
The Establishment of a Communication Network
The trying task of reconstructing the roads of mountainous Transylvania, a 
region strewn with every sort of natural obstacle, had begun back in the 
1850s. The strategic interests of the Habsburg Empire decided which major 
roads would be repaired and developed into imperial highways or Reich- 
strassen, and which direction these roads would take — roads which, ac­
cording to contemporary accounts, had theretofore hardly been worthy of 
the name. By 1860, Transylvania had 230 miles of truly improved roads.
The second phase of road improvement began in 1890. Before the cen­
tury ended, there were 753 kilometres of paved state road on stone founda­
tions in Transylvania and 1,250 kilometres of secondary state road. The 4,204 
kilometre-long network of municipal roads had also been greatly improved 
by this time. It was the maintenance of rural parish roads, accomplished 
through local effort, that lagged behind most: around 1900, half of these 
roads, a network 7,126 kilometres long was still unimproved.
The telegraph was introduced in Transylvania in 1853. Within a few years, 
the wires stretched over large areas, greatly improving business possibili­
ties and private communication alike. In the year 1914, 558 telegraph sta­
tions were in operation. In the 1880s the first telephone lines were installed. 
By the early 1890s, a so-called municipal telephone network had been es­
tablished in several counties, dense enough to allow for a private telephone 
service. Town telephone exchanges were built in Kolozsvar, Brass6, Nagysze­
ben and Marosvds&rhely, and what is more, from 1910 onwards reconstruc­
tion work began on these. In 1914, 6,525 telephone "stations" were func­
tioning in Transylvania, which, measured in units per given area, even puts 
the province above the national average.
Railway construction within the territory of Transylvania began in ear­
nest after the 1867 Compromise.
To be more precise, surveying work for the section of line between Nagy- 
vdrad and Kolozsvar had begun as early as 1848. However, protracted and 
bitter wrangling had then ensued between rival interest groups as to which 
of the two railways projected should be given priority: an Arad-Gyulafeher- 
v&r-Nagyszeben line or a Nagyv^rad-Kolozsv^r-Brass6 line — a crucial 
issue indeed, as this would determine Transylvania's main transport ar­
tery, very probably for good. Representatives of the Hungarian landed gen­
try and spokesmen for the citizens of Brass6 — which was then by far the 
most developed town in the province — took a joint stand for the latter 
project, while the citizens of Nagyszeben — who were of less moment in 
the financial world but more influential politically as the Gubernium was 
located in their town, understandably favoured the former, Arad-Gyula- 
fehervcir-Nagyszeben, scheme.
Then, in 1867, the Elso Erdelyi Vasut (First Transylvania Railway) with 
the backing of the Rothschilds, began construction work on the Arad-Gyula- 
feherv^r section, thus ending the debate. This was completed by December 
1868 and inaugurated as a Christmas present to the two towns. The Keleti 
Vasut Tarsasdg (Eastern Railway Company) began work on the Kolozsvar 
5 6 7  railway line in 1868, with the involvement of Britain's Waring Brothers and
the Anglo-Austrian Bank. The Nagyv&rad-Kolozsv&r section was opened 
in 1870; the builders then proceeded to construct a line which cut across 
Transylvania. By 1871 the railway reached Marosv&sarhely and in the sum­
mer of 1873 the first train arrived in Brass6, crowning the achievement. It 
was this railway, 633 kilometres long when fully built and the product of 
the labour of well over 20,000 workers — that finally ended Transylvania's 
isolation. It was this line which linked the major towns, one after another, to 
the economy of the Dual Monarchy and which provided the grain of the 
Mezoseg and the salt of Torda, Parajd and Marosujvar with better access to 
the national market of the monarchy. At Tovis junction, the Eastern Rail­
way linked up with the First Transylvanian, the railway company which 
conveyed the coal of the Zsil Valley and the iron ore of Hunyad to custom­
ers in other parts of the monarchy.
In 1876 the Eastern Railway passed into state ownership and in 1884, the 
First Transylvanian Railway was also nationalized. Henceforth the MAV, 
or Magyar Allamvasutak (Hungarian State Railways), controlled all the main 
railway lines of Transylvania. In 1879, two rail links with Romania were 
established, followed by a third in 1895.
The construction of this railway system was an important and near-he- 
roic chapter in the story of Transylvania's modernization. Overcoming the 
challenges of an unspeakably difficult terrain which required many bridges 
and viaducts to be built and long tunnels to be driven, with the workers 
frequently exposed to the hazards of landslides, gorges and water, was a 
remarkable achievement of civil engineering. The transport system thus cre­
ated left its stamp on Transylvania's modernizing economy and was greatly 
to determine its future. At the outbreak of the First World War the 2,384 
kilometres of Transylvania's railways comprised 11 per cent of Hungary's 
total railway network, with 6.7 kilometres of railway per 100 square kilo­
metres and 1.02 kilometres for every thousand inhabitants. Although this 
fell short of the national Hungarian average density, it was well above gen­
eral eastern European standards.
The Economic Policy of the State
Throughout this period of more than half a century, the liberal school held 
sway in the field of economics. The principles of laissezfaire and free trade 
were universally held to be the levers of progress for Hungary, and conse­
quently for Transylvania also, once the two were bound by a unity of inter­
ests. According to these tenets, direct state intervention was unwarranted; 
instead the best the state could do to help the capitalist economy was to 
clear internal and external obstacles out of the way of business and then 
leave it alone.
However, theory was frequently at variance with political practice. In 
1850, under absolutist rule, a decree abolished the century-old customs bar­
rier between Hungary and the Austrian half of the empire. However, the 
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the interests of Austrian and Bohemian manufacturers and were — in the 
opinion of contemporary economists — unfavourable from the point of view 
of Hungarian industry and even Hungarian agriculture. But a more serious 
problem lay elsewhere: in unstable government as well as in the fact that 
native Austrian capital was insufficient to satisfy the credit demands of the 
"eastern provinces", while the absolutist regime could not provide the po­
litical guarantees foreign creditors required as a precondition of any major 
capital investment.
Economic policy underwent a radical change in the wake of the Com­
promise of 1867. The political consolidation of the monarchy opened up 
new economic vistas for the Hungarian government which now took office 
after eighteen years of absolutism. The new government seized the oppor­
tunities open to it, embarking on an economic policy that primarily had 
specific Hungarian national interest in view. New legislation instituted con­
stitutional liberalism, thereby providing foreign investors with the long- 
awaited guarantees. Their new confidence now led them to move capital 
into the country at an unprecedented rate. The government also contrib­
uted to the material development of the country to no small extent. The 
construction of part of the railway system was government-financed. The 
government fostered the establishment of modem credit facilities and vo­
cational training institutions, and itself often engaged in entrepreneurial 
activity. The legislature, meanwhile, regulated business in detail, provid­
ing the legal framework for a modernizing economy.
Hungary and Transylvania united economically under absolutism, and 
following the Compromise politically, were now in a better position to ad­
vance their interests against those of the more industrialized western half 
of the monarchy. The very fact that Austria and Hungary, each of which 
had a different economic structure, constituted a single customs union gave 
rise to many controversies both between the Austrian and the Hungarian 
leading establishments and concerning the Dual Monarchy's foreign trade 
relations. Conducting a mutually agreed commercial and customs policy 
inevitably involved compromises. All of this had a direct bearing on Transyl­
vania, as was amply illustrated by the case of commercial relations with 
Romania.
The Romanian principalities had, for long, been a good market for the 
manufactured goods of the Habsburg Empire as well as for Transylvanian 
handicrafts. In return, they exported various commodities to Transylvania, 
m ainly foodstuffs and other agricultural products needed by southern 
Transylvanian craftsmen. From the 1850s on, however, these Transylvani­
an craftsmen faced formidable competition at home from Austrian and Bo­
hemian manufactured goods, and a still more formidable competition abroad 
from British and French products that were being dumped on the market 
by way of cheap water transport. To overcome the crisis, the Transylvanian 
business community attempted to promote exports and to increase their 
volume by whatever means possible. Before long, its members were clam­
ouring for state intervention to ensure their privileged position in the prin­
cipalities or to recover at least some of the ground they had lost in that
market. Urged by their entreaties, the minister of commerce tried to con­
clude a trade agreement with Romania in 1869.
In 1875, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy did indeed arrive at a free trade 
agreement with Romania — a country still formally part of the Ottoman 
Empire. This effectively meant that, first among the great powers, the mon­
archy recognized Romania's independent sovereign status in advance. Such 
a valuable diplomatic gesture had its price — in the form of commercial 
concessions. Although the export of grain from Romania to Austria-Hun- 
gary was exempt from duty, this was not the case for livestock exports. The 
tariff on the latter was contingent upon the tariff that Germany was to im­
pose on livestock imports from Austria-Hungary. Romania, moreover, had 
to shelve some of its more ambitious plans to protect its domestic industry 
and open its markets to manufactured goods from Austria-Hungary.
In the space of five years, the monarchy trebled its exports to Romania. 
In the meantime, expectations of a yet more dynamic increase in Romanian 
imports to the monarchy were disappointed, as Germany soon closed its 
borders to Austro-Hungarian livestock on the pretext of health regulations. 
Austria was then obliged to follow suit and, from 1877, to impose restric­
tions on imports from Romania (and Russia), using the same pretext. After 
1882, small numbers of sheep and pigs were occasionally admitted here 
and there, but the legal importation of cattle stopped altogether. Subse­
quently when the commercial treaty expired, Bucharest withdrew the pref­
erences on imports from Austria-Hungary, to which the latter retaliated by 
imposing a 30 per cent punitive tariff on all imports from Romania.
The ensuing tariff war, which lasted from 1886 to 1893, reduced Roma­
nian imports to a minimum. In the final analysis, however, this policy cost 
the monarchy equally dearly: exports to Romania dwindled, and Austria- 
Hungary's towering presence in that market was gone for good. Transylva­
nian small-scale manufacturers, with their simple products (timber, wooden 
articles, certain kinds of textiles, earthenware and glassware) suited for the 
most part to the peasant customer, were to suffer most from this: "A ll along 
we knew it was only a matter of time before our products would be squeezed 
out of the market; even so, we found ourselves in that predicament sooner 
than we had expected, because of the wrecking of the Romanian trade agree­
m ent"1 wrote the Kezdiv^sarhely tradesmen's association.
At the 1886 conference of the Erdelyi Kereskedelmi Egylet (Transylvanian 
Commercial Association), a joint Saxon and Hungarian scheme was drawn 
up to find a way out of the recession. The scheme was comprehensive, and 
called for a wide range of remedies, from export bounties and government 
orders for the domestic industry to the organization of co-operative socie­
ties and railway development. These suggestions were listened to by the 
government, which rallied round to help. State contracts were given to manu­
facturers and tradesmen in the eastern border areas. New markets were 
discovered inside the monarchy, for example in the Bukovina, and outside
1. Petition of 15 June, 1886. OL FOldmi2vel6s-, Ipar- 6s Kereskedelemtigyi Minisz-
t6rium iratai. (National Archives. Documents of the Ministry of Agriculture, In- _ _ _  
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it, for instance in Bulgaria, to compensate for the fall of sales in established 
ones. These measures were coupled with tariff preferences and tax relief.
The effects of the customs war accelerated the decay of certain tradi­
tional industries. Subsequently, though, trade relations were renegotiated 
and restored by a new commercial treaty in 1893, which enabled Austro- 
Hungarian manufactures partly to recover the ground they had lost in the 
Romanian market. Some of the now medium-sized textile workshops in the 
Saxon towns, which offered quality products, managed to re-enter that 
market too. Other small-scale Transylvanian industries and handicrafts were 
not so fortunate.
From the 1880s, domestic industries were heavily supported by the gov­
ernment: first through tax concessions and interest-free loans, then, increas­
ingly, in the form of direct subsidies. After 1907 the government was in a 
position to spend lavishly on industrial development. Transylvanian busi­
nessmen — irrespective of their nationality, Hungarian, Romanian or other
— received substantial sums, particularly in the Brasso area.
In spite of its limited means, the government also made an important 
contribution to the improvement of the state of agriculture. The effects on 
agriculture of such activities as, on the one hand, the establishment of model 
farms and breeding centres, the improvement of livestock, the organization 
and extension of vocational training and, on the other, a macro-level agrar­
ian policy are well known. In order to secure higher profits from the land, 
the big landowners in the government forced through a series of protective 
agrarian tariff measures by means of which Hungary (and to a lesser extent, 
Galicia) obtained a virtual monopoly in the entire agricultural market of the 
monarchy. Necessarily, by the turn of the century, this policy had come to 
offset the downward pressure on prices caused by a more competitive in­
ternational commodity market, and even caused an upward trend: after 
1906 this monopoly engineered a rise of about 30 per cent in agricultural 
prices within the monarchy. It was largely the situation thus created that 
made profitable farming a possibility in Transylvania, in view of the back­
wardness and underdevelopment agriculture in the province. For the shrewd 
Saxons, who had enjoyed a head start, this meant no less than an approxi­
mation to the standards of efficiency achieved by Transdanubian agricul­
ture, which was the best in the whole of Hungary. For the more numerous 
Hungarian and Romanian peasants this protectionism meant security: a 
modest but adequate living.
Isolated regional actions to alleviate poverty, occasional small grants and 
tax relief were the government's initial steps in the field of social policy 
towards the village poor — strictly within the framework of economical 
liberalism. The first major undertaking came with the economic rehabilita­
tion programme in forty-four villages of the Nasz6d area, a former military 
district of ethnic Romanian frontier guards. From 1890 the government took 
over for proper management more than 200,000 holds of communal forest 
in this region, creating the Forest Directorate of Beszterce for this very pur­
pose. Railways were built in the district; a model dairy farm and model 
sheep farm set up; and village tax arrears, which had built up over many 
years, were written off. Forestry management was supervised by elected 
representatives from the villages. The net income from the forests — some
several hundred thousand crowns annually — was allocated primarily for 
the villagers' cultural purposes, while about 60,000 holds of forest were for 
the owners, i.e. the villages, to use as they thought fit. All this contributed 
much to the revival of the Nasz6d region, a secluded Romanian micro-world.
At the same time, the government displayed a chronic inability to tackle 
the Szekely question, the most serious problem of the day. An alarmingly 
large number of Szekelys had been reduced to zseller (cotter) status by the 
emancipation of serfs and the abolition of the military frontier zone. The 
shrinking of common pastures and forest deprived them of their earnings 
from grazing animals and from timber-cutting, from which most of the poor 
among them had previously derived a living, at a time when there was no 
alternative source of income in sight. Here the negative effects of capitalist 
transformation were cumulative. Traditional handicrafts were now exposed 
to irresistible competition from cheap manufactured goods produced on a 
mass scale — especially after the main railway lines had been built. This 
was a painful process, full of human tragedies, and in the course of it many 
a small business was ruined. The trade war with Romania after 1886 was to 
accelerate the process.
News of the Szekelys' large-scale emigration to Romania in their search 
for work, as well as of never returning "tem porary" migrants drew the 
attention of the Hungarian public to the Szekelys' plight. There were re­
peated attempts on the part of the central authorities to lure more coach­
men, agricultural labourers and housemaids from the Sz6kelyf0ld to the 
Hungarian heartland. At the end of the century, the Ministry of Commerce 
launched its Action for Szekely Industry, with the aim of rallying support 
for the cottage and other small-scale industries of the region, and to pro­
mote training in industrial skills.
In 1902, the Szekely Kongresszus (Szekely Congress) at Tusn&d held jointly 
by government and opposition, expressly called for state intervention to 
cure the ills of the region. Accordingly, in the same year a new programme 
of state assistance was initiated to improve the conditions in the four Szekely 
counties. With the help of the Ministry of Agriculture, hundreds of farm­
ers's associations sprang up, and practical farming courses were organized. 
Also, from 1905 visits were organized to agricultural schools, to Saxon farms, 
to vegetable farms around Kecskemet and to state-run stock-improvement 
centres. Instruction in cottage industry practices, free legal advice, and public 
library services were to serve the purposes of enlightenment. The most fruit­
ful results came in the raising of stock for breeding and in the improvement 
of pastures, that is, in enterprises for which local conditions were generally 
favourable.
Subsequently, in response to the requests coming from several counties, 
the scope of the "Szekely Action" was gradually extended. Although it bore 
no spectacular results at the time, it did have its significance for long-term 
development. The programme, could serve as a substitute organizational 
framework for the assertion of local interests, something that was unable to 
evolve organically at the level of village society.
Agriculture in Transition
Most of Transylvania was hillside pasture and woodlands, but there was 
also extensive crop cultivation in the river valleys, and this was to be of 
great significance in the future structural development of agriculture.
In the course of the three decades after 1848, the old feudal ties between 
manorial land and peasant land were broken or transformed beyond all 
recognition. The overhaul of the old system, brought in with the land re­
form, was not, however, an unmixed blessing. At the outset, this seemed 
more to add to the existing ills of agriculture than to cure them. "In  our 
present world a purely agricultural nation is like a one-legged man. Our 
agriculture is ailing, so even the one leg we have is crippled,"2 wrote a lib­
eral politician in 1865. In the same way, the introduction of a modem tax 
system after 1850 did nothing to encourage production but much to pro­
mote pauperization, since the per capita tax to be paid in the region was 
higher than in vastly more developed Transdanubia. In the early 1860s the 
amount paid in the form of both direct and indirect taxes by the "proprie­
tors" on an estimated 13-15 million forint surplus from the land was esti­
mated at 12 million forints. Accordingly, most contemporaries took the view 
that even the richest and thriftiest of citizens would eventually be ruined by 
such heavy taxation, and were making worrying calculations as to when 
Transylvania's taxpayers would finally default.
It was peculiar to the transition period that grain could not, as a rule, be 
profitably grown on what remained of the landlords' estates, for the costs 
of production on arable land were now four times as high as they had been 
before 1848. By comparison, the peasant farm enjoyed — and long retained
— an advantage over the estate as a producer for the market, thanks to its 
existing stock and equipment as well as to the unsparing efforts of the peas­
ant and his family to increase productivity. To cope with the difficulties 
caused by the shortage of labour and the chronic scarcity of credit, a prac­
tice began to take root whereby peasants cultivated the landlords' estates 
on a crop-sharing basis, and another whereby they used the land in return 
for labour, or performed labour in return for concessions in grazing or for­
estry. In the early 1870s, amid more favourable price conditions and with 
credit becoming more plentiful, mechanization began on the estates, a proc­
ess that was to continue throughout the period, although with repeated 
lapses. This would compensate the gentlefolk for the fact that most of the 
draught animal stock continued to remain in the peasants' hands.
Grains — primarily wheat and maize — were the main crops to be grown 
on the peasant farms, which accounted for roughly two-thirds of the culti­
vable land area, using an improved version of the three-field system, but 
the two-field system was also still employed in the rough terrain of the 
mountainous areas. In the 1860s, a switch to new technology began to take 
place on the peasant farms. The iron plough made its appearance in Transyl­
vania — although in 1872 there were still very few to be found — and be-
2 . [D. T e l e k i], Siebenburgen und die osterreichische Regienmg in den letzten vier Jahren
1860-1864. Leipzig 1865,141.
came common by the turn of the century. By then, however, many farmers 
had been compelled by soil erosion in the mountain districts to switch back 
to their old wooden ploughs. In the Saxon territory, seed drills increasingly 
came into use, as a growing proportion of land came to be planted with 
need crops. The drift of agricultural progress was not without its oddities, 
one being that mechanical harvesting was introduced a decade before the 
scythe replaced the sickle.
Thus, all over Transylvania, by the turn of the century the agricultural 
techniques inherited from past centuries were on the way out. Farm equip­
ment had changed considerably, the continued use of certain old imple­
ments notwithstanding. A combination of factors, such as the improvement 
of farm implements, the introduction of western breeds of cattle and, above 
all, the impact of the market precipitated the quick demise of the crop-fal- 
low cultivation cycle.
The progress brought about in agriculture by the abandonment of the 
field system in some areas, or by the improvement of the cycle in others, as 
well as by the enclosure (which was partly achieved in the period under dis­
cussion) was of truly historic importance. Whereas back in the 1850s 40 per 
cent of all arable land in Transylvania was left fallow, the figure had fallen 
to 20 per cent by 1910. In Brass6 county, the amount left fallow even dropped 
below 5 per cent. In other words, the amount of land cultivated in Transyl­
vania increased from 2,163,067 holds in 1857 to 2,741,642 holds in 1910.
In the 1840s maize was still the main crop, and was grown on twice the 
area of land used for producing wheat. Oats were the third most popular 
crop, followed by rye and then barley. Maize, which provided comparably 
high yields, was cultivated chiefly by the Romanian peasants (together with 
vegetables which were gaining prominence as cash crops), while rye was 
the staple favoured by the Saxons, principally around Brass6. Oats were 
sown everywhere, for this was the cereal best accustomed to the harsh 
Transylvanian climate. By the turn of the century, the areas of land sown 
with maize and wheat respectively were about the same.
In the grain-producing counties the amount of land sown with wheat 
was comparable to the Hungarian average although most of it was inferior 
spring-wheat quality and lower yielding. In years of bumper or richer than 
average harvests, Transylvania was self-sufficient in grain. In ordinary years, 
however, it depended on imports from Romania and from the Great Hun­
garian Plain. In the second half of the period under review, grain was im­
ported exclusively from the latter. When maize was imported, this was 
mostly purchased from Romania.
Some industrial crops such as flax and hemp for various types of cloth 
had long been of importance to cottage industry. The production of sugar 
beet began to achieve prominence towards the end of the century, after two 
big sugar factories had been established. Although this crop was grown on 
a mere 0.42 per cent of the cultivable area of Transylvania, in Brass6 county, 
where yields were high, it was cultivated quite widely.
Growing urbanization gave rise to intensive vegetable production in the 
environs of major towns, like the villages of Aranyosszek, which sold their 
produce in the town of Torda and Host&t and in the M6c area. The "carrot 
country" around Marosvasarhely produced parsley, onions and watermel- 5 7 4
ons on the alluvial soil of the Nyarad River Valley. Thanks to a longstand­
ing tradition of skill in their cultivation, certain crops, such as potatoes and 
cabbages, produced generally greater yields in Transylvania than in the rest 
of Hungary. Around 1848 viticulture accounted for about 0.5 per cent of 
Transylvania's total cultivated area, although included in this were renowned 
wine-growing regions with centuries-old traditions, for example, the re­
gion along the Ktikiill<5 rivers and the vicinities of Nagyenyed and Gyulafe- 
herv^r. Here, too, however, the area given over to vineyards began to di­
minish from the early 1880s onwards. In 1889 phylloxera ravaged 10,000 
holds out of an already reduced area of 38,000 holds. In subsequent years, a 
whole series of wine-producing districts all over the country were affected 
by the disease. The government fostered recovery by distributing cheap 
new vines and copper sulphate to the growers, and by giving tax relief.
Plum trees were to be found everywhere in Transylvania, and plums 
were the most common fruit in the province, representing two-thirds of all 
the fruit grown. It was in the last three decades of the nineteenth century 
that fruit production began to be established on a larger scale; the statistics 
put the number of fruit trees at eleven million at the end of the century. At 
this time conditions for the marketing of fruits improved greatly and Transyl­
vanian apples even found their way to the Stuttgart cider-apple market, 
where Hungarian apples made up 30 per cent of all sales.
Transylvania was endowed with excellent natural conditions for forestry. 
More than half of the utilizable land was forested — there were 3.5 million 
holds of woodlands. After the land reform of 1848, the former seignorial 
landlords lost a larger proportion of their arable land than they did forest. 
Even so, approximately one-half of the forest land remained in the hands of 
the peasantry as common or communal property, yielding a substantial in­
come to the villages. We cannot as yet ascertain the position of this property 
(1.2 million holds of villages-owned forests, with other common forests of 
unknown extent) in the structure of peasant farming. Nevertheless, some 
idea of its significance is given by the fact that at the turn of the century
210,000 cattle and no fewer than 300,000 sheep grazed in these forests.
In the state-owned forests, the primitive practice of simple forest clear­
ance had for some time been replaced by more systematic woodland man­
agement. The forest legislation of 1858 — and especially of 1879 and 1898 — 
facilitated the government's attempts to assume responsibility for forestry 
management, which is a long-term business, requiring as much patience 
and care as expertise. After the turn of the century, the state also managed 
the forests of the counties and the villages.
Not all of the change was the government's doing. Well-capitalized com­
panies established large-scale timber production in the wooded districts. 
The timber trade had become an enormous business. It was no wonder that 
often the rural population of entire regions became dependent on such firms 
for their livelihood, as was the case in the Szekelyfold where half of the 
population lived from the forests in one way or another. For all the grab 
and sway of these mammoth companies, however, a substantial proportion 
of the common forests were retained by the locals, and many of the locally- 
operated sawmills also remained in business throughout the period. It was 
5 7 5  largely on the basis of these that a thriving rural wood-working industry
grew up, an industry which produced a variety of wooden articles, ranging 
from timber beams through stringle roof tiles and barrels to wooden spoons
— products for which Transylvania was famous throughout the monarchy.
Transylvania was also ideally suited for animal husbandry. The physical 
features and natural endowments of the country carried in themselves the 
promise of an eastern version of Switzerland. Towards the end of the nine­
teenth century, the common pastures amounted to about 780,000 holds or 
56 per cent of the total grazing area.
Sheep farming was a central activity, and for centuries had been the 
mainstay of a large section of the population. Indeed, animal husbandry 
was the activity traditionally assigned to the province in the Habsburg 
Monarchy's division of labour. This was particularly true of the Romanians 
in southern Transylvania. As mentioned earlier, traditional Romanian sheep 
farming sustained the thriving village communities of Szelistye and Resin&r 
in Szeben county, places where development was visible, and which also 
constituted a vast reservoir on which the Romanian intelligentsia could draw.
The archaic traditional practice of transhumance was now gradually dis­
appearing with the advent of the new age. Before 1848, well over a million 
sheep, together with a smaller number of cattle and horses, were driven 
every year through the Carpathian passes to the Lower Danube, to Wallachia 
and the Dobrudja for the winter season. Yet, as early as the 1850s, these 
huge flocks of sheep had dwindled to less than half their former size. The 
numbers of the drovers dwindled also, although not so quickly — to 10,000 
by 1879, down from about the 20,000-25,000 of thirty years before. Many 
left Transylvania for good, choosing to settle in the Dobrudja. Although the 
days of transhumance seemed numbered, a steady demand for wool as 
well as for mutton and milk products was to ensure the survival of this 
archaic way of stock keeping. For a long time it continued to exist side by 
side with market production, but as a subsidiary activity.
In this respect the characteristic trend in Transylvania did not quite con­
form to that in Hungary generally, which showed a steady decrease in the 
sheep stock from around 1860 onwards. In Transylvania the number of sheep 
also declined for a while, yet this was followed by a dramatic increase after 
the turn of the century. Over 90 per cent of the sheep were kept by small 
holders and dwarfholders.
The old-style practice of all-year grazing cattle in the open air was losing 
ground — literally so, since with the decline of the traditional agricultural 
system the fallow was shrinking and part of the common pasture land was 
being ploughed up. The old system of agriculture was slower to break down 
in Transylvania than in central or western Hungary, but the improvement 
of the cattle stock — through the introduction of foreign breeds — occurred 
at an equally unhurried pace.
By the middle of the 1850s the price of cattle had gone up considerably, 
and (disregarding a brief period of decline in the 1880s) continued to rise 
moderately throughout the period. After the first railway connections to 
Transylvania had been established, a large number of cattle and pigs were 
sent to Pest. However, as early as 1868, the cattle population was decreas­
ing perceptibly. The only practicable way of arresting this process was the 
introduction of new stock. This was the course of action embarked upon by 5 7 6
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the Saxon agricultural association, with government assistance, in the 1870s. 
The breeds imported from Austria and Switzerland were superior in many 
respects to the indigenous varieties. They grew faster and were heavier than 
the latter, and the dairy cows yielded more milk — some 1,000 litres more 
per animal per annum — than the native Transylvanian breeds. And yet the 
rate of naturalization of the new breeds in Transylvania lagged consider­
ably behind the Hungarian average. The principal reason for this was that 
the Transylvanians specialized in breeding draught oxen, and the native 
Transylvanian stock produced draught animals which were far superior to 
the western breeds and which were also ten times more resistant to disease. 
Subsequently the Ministry of Agriculture designated the Szekelyfold, to­
gether with Nagy-Kiikull6 and Also-Feher counties, as an area for the pres­
ervation of the native Transylvanian cattle stock, and also introduced sev­
eral measures to provide for the improvement of this stock.
Under the joint influence of the administrative measures, market research, 
and positive traditions, cattle breeding in Transylvania underwent a course 
of thorough modernization, which, at the same time, was not detrimental 
to the diversity of the stock. The buffalo also continued in use and even 
became more popular. At the end of the period under discussion, the Transyl­
vanian region as a whole was one of lower livestock density. But the size of 
the stock kept on the peasant farms and pastures was larger in Transylva­
nia than the Hungarian average. In Fogaras county the number of animals 
per thousand inhabitants was 678.2; one of the highest ratios in Europe.
The size of the horse stock was markedly less subject to market condi­
tions and business considerations than was the case with other kinds of 
livestock as horses were bred on the large- and medium-sized estates also 
for reason of prestige. Nor did the volume of the contracts from the army, 
the biggest purchaser of horses, follow the fluctuations of the market. Fur­
thermore, with the coming of the railway age, traffic on the roads servicing 
the railways became heavier, which was even to increase the demand for 
horse-drawn carriages. All this created favourable circumstances for the 
steady increase of the horse stock, an increase which came to a halt only 
when the century ended. Two major state enterprises, the Fogaras stud farm 
(founded after the Compromise) which specialized in breeding Lippizaners, 
and the Kolozstorda stud farm, set up to foster the Transylvanian breed, 
played a part in improving the horse stock.
The regional distribution of the animal stock shows certain distinctive 
characteristics. The greatest part of the stock of cattle, horses, and pigs be­
longed to the Saxons. Sheep rearing was a virtual Romanian monopoly. The 
Romanian-inhabited areas had a proportionally greater share of the live­
stock than the Hungarian parts. The cows of the Romanians were for the 
most part better milkers, whereas the cattle of the Hungarians on average 
were heavier.
Throughout the period under discussion, more than 80 per cent of the 
animal stock remained in peasant hands. The medium-sized estates kept 
about half as many cattle, and the large estates around one-third as many, 
as did their counterparts in Transdanubia. By contrast, the average number 
of cattle raised on farms of between five and twenty holds in size was higher 
5 7 7  than the Transdanubian average. At the same time, when it came to market
sales, the prices of livestock raised on estates were on an average 30 per 
cent higher than those charged by the peasants for their stock. As regards 
the quality of the stock, the judgement of the market clearly favoured the 
manorial estates, an advantage the latter did not fail to exploit. It was pre­
cisely in safeguarding and improving the quality of stock that the gentry 
estate made its contribution to the animal husbandry of Transylvania, while 
the maintenance of the greater part of the livestock fell to the peasantry on 
common pasture lands that continued to shrink in size.
The Modernization of Industry and Mining
It was the requirements of the Habsburg Monarchy's unified customs area, 
established in 1850, and the underdevelopment of Hungary, with its short­
age of capital and its generally low level of domestic capital accumulation 
that basically determ ined the prospects for industrial developm ent in 
Transylvania. Progress in this field was to be conditional on the influx of 
foreign capital and on state participation in investments, although for the 
most part the foundations were laid by local enterprises, old and new. The 
industries of the province were based on mining or, generally speaking, on 
the exploitation of the raw materials to be found locally.
Until very late, the Transylvanian mines supplied around one-half of the 
Habsburg Empire's total rock-salt production, and together with the M&ra- 
maros salt-mines to the north, wer^ a rich and important source of revenue 
for the treasury, the salt trade being state monopoly. After 1867 it was pri­
marily the salt works of Marosujv&r that underwent modernization; here 
provisions were made, towards the end of the century, for the processing of 
waste salt by the chemical industry.
Although its mediaeval heyday was long past, after 1850 gold mining in 
Transylvania still accounted for two-thirds of the gold produced in the 
Habsburg Empire. Apart from the treasury, a fair cross-section of society — 
including aristocrats, burghers and peasants alike — had mines or shares in 
mines in this region, which contained the most valuable gold deposits in 
Europe. The most famous corporate mine owned by a syndicate of landown­
ers was the "Rudai 12 apostol” (Twelve Apostles of Ruda), where 400 miners 
produced 46.3 kilograms of gold in the year 1864. The treasury mines yielded 
one-third of the total amount of gold produced in the 1880s. The mine at 
Orla employed 400 miners, the one at Nagy&g, 880. It was around this time 
that Transylvania's mineral wealth began to attract foreign capital on a larger 
scale, a development which signalled the revival of private mining enter­
prises, for which (with few exceptions) business was slack. A number of 
German, British, Belgian and French financial institutions, ranging from the 
Deutsche Bank to the Credit Lyonnais, entered the mining business by way of 
several home-based companies. Having taken over the Twelve Apostles 
mine, Harcort AG of Gotha augmented it by building an ore-processing plant 
which ranked first in Europe. Henceforth this mine produced around a half 
of the gold mined in Hungary. There was to be no question of a gold rush in 
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siderably not only in Transylvania, but also in the treasury-operated mines 
around neighbouring Nagybanya. British and German mineral experts and 
technicians came, and the opening of new pits was preceded by systematic 
prospecting. The smelting works operated by the Central Mine Inspector­
ate at Zalatna processed the ore taken there from the dwarf-sized private 
gold mines — an annual amount of 3,000 metric tonnes before the First 
World War. The bullion was then minted as coins at the KOrmocbanya mint 
in Upper Hungary.
Compared to the production of gold, and even of silver — which was of 
markedly less significance — copper mining was truly negligible. This was 
in spite of repeated efforts in the field by several joint-stock companies, 
efforts going back to as early as 1858. Here, as with lead production, busi­
ness was ruined partly by the fall in the price of metals on the European 
market. At the end of the century, the utilization by the chemical industry 
of the non-ferrous metal ores began on a large scale.
Coal mining got off to a slow and unimpressive start, only to exhibit an 
ever more spectacular development later on. Bohemian coal, too, was trans­
ported to the region on the railways coming from the West. Then in the 
neighbouring province of the Banat the Austrian National Railway Com­
pany (STEG), in which the French had a majority holding, increased the 
mining of the local anthracite coal and related iron production to an enor­
mous degree, and coal-production there reached a figure of 100,000 metric 
tonnes annually as early as 1860. After 1857, in Transylvania proper, the 
exploitation began of the abundant deposits of the first grade lignite in the 
Zsil Valley as a result of co-operation between the state and the Brassoi 
Bdnya- es Kohomu Rt. (Brass6 Mining and Metal Works Co.). In the 1880s 
the annual production of the Zsil Valley reached 200,000 metric tons. At the 
turn of the century, this mining area was already dominated by two other 
joint-stock companies: the Salgotarjani Koszenbdnya Rt. (Salgotarjan Coal 
Mining Co.) and the Urikdny-Zsilvdlgyi Koszenbdnya Rt. (Urikany-Zsil Val­
ley Coal Mining Co.), a joint Franco-Hungarian enterprise. Under their man­
agement, the mines were operated at a very high technological level, and 
the amount of coal extracted here peaked at 2.5 million metric tons in 1913. 
Skilled mineworkers came flocking in from distant lands: Czechs, Poles, 
and Germans. Large mining communities quickly developed, with the usual 
service facilities. Tiny little hamlets, like Petrozseny and Lupeny, grew into 
veritable towns, which was just as well, considering that 14,000 people were 
employed in mining alone.
Apart from the Zsil Basin, collieries were also to be found in Egeresfalva, 
developed first with local Transylvanian capital, then with Belgo-Hungar- 
ian capital. There was also a colliery at Keresztenyfalva opened by Saxon 
entrepreneurs, and one at Kopecb^nya in the Szekelyfold, worked by a com­
pany set up in 1872 by a group of aristocrats.
The iron industry amounted at the beginning of the period to a number 
of shabby smelting works widely scattered and operated at almost mediae­
val levels of technology. Furthermore, their production was uneven, with 
frequent breakdowns. Only the state iron works were capable of more con- 
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As in the coal industry, progress in the iron and steel industries started 
in the Banat. From 1862 onwards, the Resica and Bogs&n works of the afore­
mentioned STEG company developed into a smelting centre which was to 
be unrivalled in Hungary for a long time to come. In Transylvania, mean­
while, the Brassb Mining and Smelting Company bought out the old iron- 
smelting works one by one starting in 1856, modernized them, and in 1867 
was producing as much pig iron as the state works. In 1872 the company 
ordered two up-to-date blast furnaces to be built at Kal£n by Belgian engi­
neers. This promising trend petered out towards the end of the century, 
when the company went bankrupt before being resuscitated in 1898 with 
German, Austrian and Hungarian capital under the new name of the Kalani 
Banya- es Kohomu Rt. (Kal&n Mining and Smelting Co.).
In 1867, the treasury had five old-type blast-furnaces in Transylvania, all 
of them in a state of dilapidation. The Hungarian Parliament strongly op­
posed the use of government money to modernize these and, as a result, no 
major investment in this field took place until much later. After 1884, sev­
eral new iron-smelting plants were built by the state in Hunyad, and it was 
here in 1895 that Hungary's largest blast-furnace was erected to produce a 
projected 40,000 metric tons of iron annually. The state's iron and steel works 
at Kudzsir likewise came to be modernized in the 1880s. Thereafter the com­
bined output of the Kalan company and the state plants amounted to al­
most the entire iron production of Transylvania. At the other end of the 
spectrum, the old peasant foundries as in the Torock6 area gradually passed 
out of existence, while the enterprising medium-sized private venture at 
SzentkeresztMnya managed to hold out, producing articles ranging from 
threshing machines to hoes and spades.
In the engineering industry, out of the dozens of artisan workshops, few 
managed to expand into a large-scale factory. No such fortune came the 
way of the engineer Peter Rajka, an innovative builder of quality agricul­
tural machinery who was compelled to sell his own workshop, in Kolozsvar, 
to an entrepreneur. In 1874 this workshop produced the first steam engine 
built in Transylvania; yet even then there was no chance for it of developing 
into a large-scale firm. Among the medium-scale enterprises at the end of 
the century, the Rieger Machine Works of Nagyszeben stood out, with its 
extremely diverse range of products. In this branch of industry should be 
included the MAV railway engineering workshops which were assuming 
considerable dimensions at Kolozsvar and Piski-telep. Machine-building in 
the strict sense of the term forged ahead more convincingly in the adjacent 
region of the Banat. Here again it was the STEG company at Resica that 
established machine-manufacturing on a really imposing scale, building in 
1872 the first railway locomotives made in Hungary. Another industrial 
plant not far from Transylvania, the Weitzer Carriage and Waggon Works 
in Arad, expanded steadily from the turn of the century. Next to it was 
established, with French participation a pioneering plant, which produced 
motor cars after 1909 and then, during the First World War, even engines 
for aeroplanes.
The chemical industry was a latecomer in Hungary. Both in Transylva­
nia and the Banat, though, oil refineries were set up as early as the 1850s, 
the oil being imported from Romania (after the end of the century from 5 8 0
G alicia and Russia). Some sulphuric acid was produced in Brass6 and 
Zalatna. In 1894 a soda factory was established at Marosujvdr followed by 
another in Torda; their productive capacity was large enough to satisfy 
dom estic demand completely. In 1909, the natural gas reserves of the 
Mezdseg were discovered. After failure to attract British or American capi­
tal to fund their exploitation, the Magyar Foldgaz Rt. (Hungarian Gas Co.) — 
founded in 1915 — was set up with German capital. By this time gas pipe­
lines were already in operation; in 1918, thirty-eight wells were functioning 
in the gas fields.
In the Saxon towns, the textile industry grew up organically on the an­
cient foundations of the small artisan workshops. Favourable factors, for 
example, their established positions in both the home (Transylvanian) and 
the Romanian markets and then government subsidies in later, harder, days 
enabled some clothiers in Nagyszeben and Brass6, notably Scherg and 
Leonhardt, to adjust, and to transform their businesses into large-scale com­
mercial enterprises, and even to earn a reputation for their woollen and 
linen products. Some cotton cloth production also took root in the region.
Food processing in Transylvania proved to be an excellent means of capital 
accumulation, although it was nothing like as widespread as in the rest of 
Hungary. A series of large distilleries were established in the towns along 
Transylvania's western border, from Nagyvarad in the north to Lugos in 
the south. But in Transylvania proper, too, commercial distilleries were set 
up as early as 1849. One such plant was founded by Elek Sigmond in 
Kolozsvar, in 1851. Indicative of the development at one distillery, Jeremies 
Baruch's in Marosv5s£rhely, was the fact that the first Transylvanian-made 
steam engine was installed there, in 1874. The distilling business was a sure 
profit-maker, and for the most part entrepreneurs invested the money made 
there in other branches of industry, for example, milling. In 1878, 125 dis­
tilleries producing industrial alcohol operated in Transylvania, with the larg­
est of them mainly processing maize imported from Romania. The two larg­
est producers were the Saxon Czell family and the Sigmond family; the 
other distilleries came nowhere near the size of those of the Banat. An im­
portant subsidiary source of profit for the distillers was the fattening of beef 
cattle, many of which were then sold either in the Hungarian heartland or 
in Vienna. The brewing industry began to expand towards the end of the 
century. Besides the smaller breweries there were two — one in Torda and 
one in Marosv5s£rhely — which expanded to produce 120,000 hectolitres 
of beer annually.
In the all-important flour-milling industry, the big modern mills were 
located primarily in Pest and on the edge of the Great Hungarian Plain, and 
had been set up with capital accumulated through trade. Accordingly, while 
in the year 1873 as many as thirty steam-driven mills were in operation in 
Arad, Bihar and Szatm^r counties, only four are known to have existed in 
Transylvania at this time. The distiller Elek Sigmond founded a steam-driven 
mill in Kolozsvdr in 1853 and Jeremies Baruch built another mill in Maros- 
vSsirhely in 1855. The latter was still of the old, water-powered type but 
was to undergo much subsequent development and even to generate power 
to light the city streets decades later. The number of water-driven mills 
long continued to rise: between 1850 and 1890 no fewer than 1,525 such
mills were built. Even as late as 1895 out of a total of 5,236 flour mills in 
Transylvania, only 88 were steam-powered. The close of the century saw 
rapid modernization. Between 1881 and 1906 109 steam-driven mills were 
constructed and at the latter date the Transylvanian mills helped pioneer 
the use of internal-combustion engines in the industry. On the other hand, 
however, many timber-built rustic watermills continued in existence. At 
this time, 1,031 such mills were in operation in Hunyad county alone.
After 1849, sugar production experienced a decline in Transylvania, as 
well as in the rest of Hungary. However, after decades of flagging business, 
government intervention in the form of tax and freight concessions helped 
resuscitate the industry, and in 1889 the Magyar Cukoripari Rt. (Hungarian 
Sugar Industry Co.) established a large factory at Brass6-Botfalu. In 1912 
this plant employed 1,218 workers and produced 145,000 quintals of sugar. 
Another sugar refinery was set up in Marosvas^rhely in 1893 by some aris­
tocrats. The capital for the enterprise was raised partly by borrowing from 
the government and partly by selling shares to the growers, who then paid 
for them in sugar beet. In 1912 the factory employed 405 workers and pro­
duced 47,000 quintals, some of which was exported to Britain, Italy, and 
Egypt, among other countries.
Other branches of the food-processing industry — not counting the two 
state-run tobacco factories — were largely confined to the Saxon districts. 
There were salami factories in the towns of Nagyszeben, Brass6, Beszterce, 
Medgyes and Szentagota. Canning factories operated in Des and Deva. The 
largest dairy products plant was established in Nagyszeben in 1902.
The wood-processing industry hps been left to the end, not least because
— strange as it may seem in view of the scale of wood production — it 
never assumed sizeable dimensions. The logs floated down the Maros River 
were processed at Szeged, but timber was also floated down the Olt and the 
Zsil rivers to Romania. The railways were the first really big consumers of 
wood, with the mining industry close behind. Later the mines became the 
largest single consumer: on the eve of the First World War the Petrozseny 
coal mines alone used some 100,000 cubic metres of timber for pit props. 
Sawmills were set up at every logging site, but only a few furniture and 
other woodworking factories existed. By contrast, as has been mentioned 
before, the rural sawmills employed a whole string of timber-working com­
munities, especially on the edges of mountainous areas. Here were pro­
duced, among other things, boards and wooden roof tiles, for the town 
market. The best hand-made timber beams came from Zetelaka, in the 
Hargita. At Bedecs, meanwhile, they specialized in the large-scale manu­
facture of pre-fabricated timber cottages. When the customer had seen the 
house and placed an order it was taken to pieces, taken to his place of resi­
dence and reassembled there. At the beginning of the century dozens of 
houses, huts and barns were to be found at any given time on Bedecs vil­
lage green, waiting to be dismantled and taken away to some distant place 
which had been previously ravaged by fire.
Almost the whole of Transylvania's material development reflects a dual 
reality. The industrial age came rushing in, introducing as it did the most 
up-to-date manufacturing technologies. Alongside these, however, the tra­
ditional occupations and crafts survived — from gold-digging to woodwork­ 582
ing and charcoal-burning — in which the old, archaic methods were still 
employed. The network of small workshops can be regarded only as consti­
tuting an outworker system, which was of great importance.
3. Cultural Life and the Ethnic Communities
Intellectual ad cultural life in the nineteenth century was dominated by lib­
eral nationalism. While it is true that the nationality issue, which flared up 
after the 1848 Revolution and the subsequent civil war in Transylvania, ended 
the alliance of liberalism and nationalism, and that the two ideologies repeat­
edly clashed in the political arena later on, their earlier unity continued to be 
preserved in the popular mind. The intellectual and cultural life of the fifty 
years following the revolution was basically determined by the generation 
whose members had lived through that historic time, mostly as active par­
ticipants in the events which had decisively influenced their characters.
In the promotion and organization of the nationalities, the fostering of 
national culture and the education of the people were regarded as the prin­
cipal objectives. In Transylvania where the three nationalities with diverse 
cultural traditions co-existed, the balance of power was most delicate. The 
intellectuals of each nationality felt that their own ethnic group was in im­
minent threat of linguistic dissolution and cultural domination by the oth­
ers. The anxiety for the future of the nationality, as well as the prospect of 
its eventual ascent, led these intellectuals to be endlessly involved in cul­
tural activity.
In fact, Transylvania's separate cultural life had ended even before its 
territorial separation was effected, firstly in 1848 and then again in 1867. 
Gradually the region's local cultures were dissolving in broader national 
cultures. Under the absolutist, and especially the dualist, regime this proc­
ess accelerated: Hungarian intellectual life in Transylvania became sub­
merged in that Of the mother country, while Romanian culture became irre­
versibly linked to that of the Romanians in the Danubian principalities. Of 
course, this process of fusion did not occur uniformly, as Hungarian and 
Romanian nation-states emerged under different political conditions. Also, 
the Carpathians had served as an effective natural barrier for a very long 
time, and all through the nineteenth century the cultural level of the Roma­
nian state remained below that of Hungary. This explains how with Transyl­
vanian Romanians regional literature could flourish as in the Banat or in Bi­
har, while the same could not be said in the case of Hungarian literature. In 
this period only the Saxons maintained a traditionally independent local cul­
ture — despite their ongoing exchange of ideas with Germany, and despite 
the fact that Saxon intellectuals identified themselves with Germany proper, 
and regarded themselves as the advance guard of the German nation.
During this period, therefore, one can speak of a separate Transylvanian 
culture only in connection with the Saxon population; in the Romanians' 
case such a culture existed only in a limited sense, while the Hungarian 
population had no separate culture after 1867. For this reason a brief sum­
mary only will be given of Romanian and Saxon cultural life in this chapter.
The Various Societies and their Programmes
Under the neo-absolutist regime mobilization of civil society proceeded along 
avenues opened up during the Reform Age. All three nationalities estab­
lished their own scientific and cultural "societies" which, beside doing valu­
able work in the field of science, indirectly served national and political 
purposes.
The Saxon Verein fiir  Siebenbiirgische Landeskunde (Association of Transyl­
vanian Native Knowledge ) was established as early as 1840. From this de­
veloped the Siebenbiirgischer Verein fiir  Naturwissenschaften (Transylvanian 
Association of Natural Sciences) shortly after 1849. The Siebenbiirgisclier Verein 
was active not only in its parent organization but also in the Bruckenthal 
Library and in the grammar schools, addressing itself to ethnography and 
history as well as to zoology, botany and the mineralogy of the Carpathians.
The leading Saxon scholars were all trained at German universities, and 
were vanguards in their professions. (The strong German connection partly 
explains why, with the exception of a few personal contacts, these research­
ers never built up close connections with their Hungarian colleagues.) To 
list all the achievements of the scholarly bodies supported and organized 
by the Verein would be impossible here. Instead, we shall content ourselves 
with mentioning only two — Georg Daniel Teutsch's series of studies enti­
tled Geschichte der Siebenbiirger Sachsen (History of the Transylvanian Saxons) 
which were based on original sources and which gave the first comprehen­
sive account of Saxon history when their publication began in 1852, and the 
Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbiirgen (Archives for the 
History of the Germans in Transylvania), a series which is still regarded as 
basic source material. Several other cultural associations also existed. The 
best known of these was the Karpaten-Verein (Carpathians Association), 
founded in 1881, which distinguished itself in the fields of tourism and wild­
life protection.
The Saxon schoolmasters — whose political weight during this period 
increased at the expense of that of the jurists — considered scholarly re­
search to be an integral part of their job. (Incidentally, such thinking is still 
very much alive among the Saxons.) At this time literacy was already highly 
valued among Transylvania's Saxon population.
Following the revival of and old idea and inspired by the Saxon exam­
ple, the Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet (Transylvanian Museum Association) was 
founded as an institution to serve the Hungarians. Count Imre Mik6 donated 
ten holds of land (1 hold = 1.42 English acres) and a villa in Kolozsv&r for the 
association and it was he who worked out its constitution and obtained 
Vienna's approval. The inaugural meeting was held in 1857, although offi­
cial permission was only granted in 1859. The association's first president 
was Mik6 himself, who thought that "our society can be a practical work­
shop of self-government". The Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet began as an exclusively 
Hungarian-language scholarly society with its exhibits coming from the 
collections and donations of aristocrats, intellectuals and members of the 
middle class. Its funds also came from donations, the largest being the 10,000 
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ature academy had a range of interests covering everything from history to 
natural sciences, and eventually became the largest scientific body in Transyl­
vania. It had a huge collection of antiques and several thousand deeds and 
manuscripts, to which a valuable collection of 1848 material was later added. 
Its natural sciences section provided valuable help in scientific research, 
and its yearbook Erdelyi Muzeum (Transylvanian Museum), which was ed­
ited by the polymath Samuel Brassai, enjoyed considerable popularity.
We have already seen, in the section dealing with the political history of 
the neo-absolutist period, that the setting up of foundations and organiza­
tions was then still regarded as a political act. In the more liberated atmos­
phere of the 1860s, and especially after the Compromise of 1867 and Hun­
gary's subsequent union with Transylvania, the Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet lost 
a great deal of its political significance, although its scientific standing re­
mained. The founding of the University of Kolozsv^r in 1872 brought a new 
turn in the history of the Muzeum Egylet: its collections were loaned to the 
university and the custodians of each collection became university profes­
sors in their respective fields. After this the Muzeum Egylet was always closely 
linked with the university, but without surrendering its independence. Con­
siderable changes in the next century when touring conferences and the 
popularizing lectures were organized regularly. Its publications included 
some valuable scientific works.
The best-known Hungarian cultural society, EMKE, was established in 
1885. This organization, which for a time voiced strong political views, will 
be discussed in a later chapter.
In Romanian circles the idea of establishing an academy or a linguistics 
society had been mooted as early as 1852. The foundation of the Hungarian 
Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet provided further impetus and finally, in 1861, the 
Asociafiunea transilvana pentru literatura romana si cultura poporului roman 
(Literary and Cultural Society of the Romanian People of Transylvania), 
abbreviated to ASTRA — was set up in Nagyszeben. The society, while also 
having a natural sciences section, was primarily interested in history, litera­
ture and linguistics. Putting aside all religious differences, it often united 
intellectuals who had previously been opponents. Although its first presi­
dent, Baron £aguna, was a leading ecclesiastic, it had a religiously impartial 
secretary in the person of Bari}. In the years immediately after its creation 
ASTRA's significance spread beyond Transylvania's borders; no such insti­
tution existed in Romania at this time and as a result ASTRA also func­
tioned as the Romanian Academy for some years.
ASTRA was less wealthy than the Hungarian Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet or 
the Saxon Verein, although it even received donations from Romanian intel­
lectuals living beyond the Carpathians. It should be mentioned that, in ad­
dition to the contributions of the clergy and the middle classes, the generos­
ity of the peasantry was also required to launch the society; for example, 
the village communities agreed to deliver a certain amount of corn in sup­
port of ASTRA for five consecutive years. The society's importance did not 
wane following the Compromise; the Romanian population of Transylva­
nia carried on its political struggle for national emancipation, and — irre­
spective of its temporary setbacks — ASTRA continued to play an impor- 
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the territorial organization of the deaneries. After 1868, however, ASTRA 
set up its own regional bodies and, after 1895, it extended its operations 
beyond the historical lands of Transylvania to cover Bihar and the Banat. 
The first Romanian encyclopedia was published at the turn of the century 
by the flourishing society: this contained some 38,000 entries, half of which 
were written by authors in Romania. The ASTRA Museum, the building 
which, in addition to a museum, also housed an office, a library and a thea­
tre, was built in Nagyszeben in 1905. The society published popular books 
and also organized lectures for the peasants, for whom it established sev­
eral small public libraries. The ASTRA rallies held before the war seemed 
more like mass demonstrations. If the Hungarian Muzeum Egylet distin­
guished itself in the field of scholarship, then the Romanian society's princi­
pal achievements where in public enlightenment. In the last two decades of 
the period under discussion ASTRA served as a substitute for a Romanian 
education ministry in Transylvania.
Close co-operation between the three great societies was never achieved, 
although initially each society felt obliged to invite honorary members to 
represent the other two nationalities, and some contact always existed be­
tween the scholars in the course of their work. However, people were still 
preoccupied with building up their nationality institutions and with the 
process of national integration or the "nationality struggle", so the need to 
foster connections with the parallel organizations of the other nationalities 
was inevitably accorded lower priority.
From time to time the total submergence of the Hungarian and the Ro­
manian nationalities in the culture of the "mother nations" resulted, during 
the second half of the century, in an exodus of intellectuals to Pest and 
Bucharest respectively. Budapest, which in the meantime had grown into a 
large metropolis, drew artists and scholars almost like a magnet. Many 
Romanian intellectuals were eager to move to Bucharest, also. Among them 
were ethnic Romanians who resented the political discrimination and who 
had come into conflict with the state, but there were also those who had 
made successful careers in Hungary. Victor Babes of the Banat, the author 
of the first bacteriology textbook in Hungary and a highly esteemed profes­
sor at the University of Budapest who corresponded with such eminent 
scientists as Pasteur, Koch and Wirchow, moved to Bucharest at the invita­
tion of the Romanian government in 1886. His brother, a chemist, also emi­
grated to Romania, as did George Crainiceanu, the acclaimed eye-specialist 
who wrote several treatises on the subject both in German and in Hungar­
ian. Their example shows that in an age of national awareness creative in­
tellectuals could only work to their full capacity in their own national envi­
ronment. Of course, there were exceptions, for example, the poet-publicist 




The school systems of the three Transylvanian nationalities did not enjoy an 
equal start. Each nationality had different traditions, economic power and 
attitudes towards culture. These differences were compounded by the state, 
which interfered in the development of the school systems for its own pur­
poses. At the beginning of our period all schools were church-owned and in 
this there would be no major change for the next fifty years.
The history of the Hungarian schools in Transylvania has still to be writ­
ten, and at present we do not even possess reliable data concerning the 
number of schools in operation during the whole of this period. In 1851 949 
schools were Hungarian out of a total of 2,146 such institutions. (There were 
1,436 Romanian and 273 German schools — the rest were bilingual.) Of the
113,000 Hungarian children of school age only 47,000 actually attended 
school, with perhaps half of them turning up for classes on a regular basis. 
Among the Saxon population almost four out of five children of school age 
attended school. A considerable number of parents — especially those liv­
ing in the villages — regarded the educational authorities as hostile. A sur­
vey conducted in 1870 by the Ministry of Religion and Public Education 
revealed the distressing fact that very often even well-to-do families tried 
to have their children exempted from schooling.
Besides its general backwardness, another feature of the Hungarian school 
system in Transylvania was its denominational variety. The Unitarians were 
regarded as the most concerned when it came to education, or at least it 
was they who had the best record for school attendance. The Calvinists 
came next, closely followed by the Catholics. One cannot, of course, draw 
conclusions about educational standards from these observations, since they 
differed greatly from region to region, and even from school to school. One 
thing was certain, though: in the Hungarian schools it was the Catholic teach­
ers who were the best paid.
After the Compromise, the Hungarian schools enjoyed preferential treat­
ment from the state. This was partly to protect scattered Hungarian com­
munities, but mostly to promote the use of the Hungarian language among 
the non-Hungarian population. The government's school-building pro­
gramme and the occasional grants made by the churches undoubtedly ad­
vanced the cause of education conducted in Hungarian. At the turn of the 
century there were 797 schools in the Szekely counties, and at this time 
these alone had twice the number of pupils attending Hungarian schools in 
the whole of Transylvania shortly after the Compromise.
The neo-absolutist regime modernized and standardized secondary edu­
cation, and the dualist state showed a willingness to build new grammar 
schools and training colleges. The old and prestigious grammar schools and 
colleges continued to preserve their reputations. The grammar schools of 
Kolozsv&r, Nagyenyed and Marosvds^rhely were all nationally acclaimed 
institutions, and the Piarist grammar school at Kolozsv^r, together with 
some others, always had a large number of Romanian students. Endre Ady 
was not the only famous pupil of the Reformed gymnasium at Zilah: Iuliu 
Maniu, one of the great Romanian statesmen of the twentieth century also
5 8 7  studied there.
The Hungarian educational system in Transylvania was not complete 
until the Francis Joseph University was set up in Kolozsvar in 1872. This 
was based on a now abolished law school and institute of surgery, and on 
the Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet. Initially the university faced serious difficulties, 
but the quality of its staff and increasing support from the government helped 
to turn it into a renowned centre of learning and scholarship by the turn of 
the century. With the foundation of the university, Kolozsvar became an 
established educational centre where, by 1914, a quarter of the population 
was made up by students and teachers.
The Saxon school system showed a rate of progress which was impres­
sive even by European standards, and not just when compared to educa­
tional developments in the Carpathian Basin generally.
Although the Saxon grammar schools were modernized under the neo­
absolutist regime in line with the wishes of the government, unlike the 
Nagyszeben law school they were not transferred to the state. As early as 
1850 the resources of the University were used to establish an independent 
fund to provide school subsidies, which guaranteed continued functioning 
of the school system. By 1869 80 per cent of Saxon children of school age 
attended school, an attendance rate very much greater than that which could 
be claimed by the Hungarians and the Romanians. The affluence and the 
commitment of the Saxons enabled them to hold out against the dualist 
government's magyarization attempts in the classroom; the Saxons were 
careful to accept only those government subsidies which did not jeopardize 
the autonomy of their schools. (Between 1907 and 1910 the Saxon settle­
ments spent 1.3 million crowns on building schools, and, of the banks, the 
Hermannstadter Sparkasse alone gave more than 2.6 million crowns up to 
1912 for so-called "charitable" causes — mostly educational.) In 1907 the 
University set up another, 18 million crowns, fund from the sales of its for­
ests, which, together with the increasingly substantial government subsi­
dies after 1910, was sufficient to cover the expenses incurred through the 
timely renovation of their grammar schools. The teachers in these schools 
had mostly studied in German universities, and many also carried out sci­
entific work. Hermann Oberth was perhaps the most famous example: a 
scientist who had conducted experiments since childhood, after 1918 went 
on to become one of the founders of astronautics. .
By the end of the era illiteracy was eradicated among the Saxons; they 
had at least one school in every village and a total of about 700 well-paid 
teachers. By contemporary standards the secondary and grammar schools 
and the four colleges and two teacher training colleges amply met the edu­
cational needs of the 220,000-strong Saxon population. The fact that nearly 
a quarter of the students in the Saxon grammar schools were either Roma­
nian or Hungarian by nationality indicates the high level of teaching in these 
institutions, and the esteem in which they were held.
The poor state of the Romanian school system was felt as a painful real­
ity and a national grievance by the Romanian intelligentsia and the entire 
Romanian population of Transylvania and Hungary throughout the period.
Before 1848 the Romanians of the Greek Orthodox faith did not possess 
a single grammar school, while the grammar school at Balazsfalva was in­
capable of meeting the demands of even the Greek Catholic population. 5 8 8
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Although in the 1850s the establishment of eighteen Romanian grammar 
schools was thought necessary in order to eliminate cultural backwardness, 
only two were actually founded during the neo-absolutist years: one by the 
Orthodox church authorities in Brassd in 1850, the other in Nasz6d from a 
special fund in 1863. The elementary schools (no reliable information exists 
on their number in this period) were also run by the two churches. The 
subjects taught there included Romanian grammar and German language, 
with Romanian history being added later.
Eotvos's Education Act of 1868 made school attendance compulsory — 
at the time of the Compromise one year earlier only 28-33 per cent of Ro­
manians actually attended — while also giving schools the freedom of in­
struction. As a result, a large number of schools were founded, both by the 
churches and the villages. Although in the poorer areas the state was le­
gally obliged to set up elementary schools — in which the language of tui­
tion had to be that of the local pupils —, for a long time this duty was not 
taken very seriously, even in the Hungarian regions. (In the Romanian re­
gions it was founded by the government.) In this way the village schools 
remained in the hands of the churches, with the priest serving as "head­
m aster", the rural dean as superintendent, and the archdiocese as the high­
est educational authority. Although the government published educational 
guidelines and a journal and Eotvos even had a Romanian teachers' train­
ing college set up in D6va in 1868, apart from overseeing a few minimal 
requirements of the profession, education was basically left in the hands of 
the church authorities and the townships. The teaching of Hungarian 
was not yet compulsory in the Romanian elementary schools, and Ro­
manian textbooks used in Transylvania were much sought after in Roma­
nia itself.
One can look back on the decade following 1868 as a period of great 
development in the history of the Romanian school system. By 1879 there 
were 2,755 Romanian elementary schools in Hungary, but then the progress 
came to a halt. This coincided with the beginning of the magyarization policy 
already mentioned in connection with the political history of the period. 
The teaching of Hungarian was made compulsory in non-Hungarian el­
ementary schools in 1879, and the state was eager to close down schools 
graded inadequate in order to replace them with Hungarian or bilingual 
ones. The poorest villages were only too glad to shed the burden of sup­
porting a school, which made the government's efforts to control the schools 
all the more successful. All this caused Romanian education to stagnate, 
and at the turn of the century the rate of illiteracy among the Romanian 
population was higher than among the Hungarians or Saxons. (In Szolnok- 
Doboka county only 20.8 per cent of the population could read and write, 
but the situation was not much better in Kolozs and Hunyad counties, ei­
ther.) Many Romanian schools were closed, while others were forced to 
accept government grants (with the consequent loss of their independence) 
when the "Lex Apponyi" was passed, which raised the salary of every teacher 
by law. This could only mean one thing: that the teaching of Hungarian 
became more intensive. In 1904 government records showed 2,433 purely 
Romanian and 407 bilingual schools; by 1913 their sum total was only 2,170. 
(On the other hand, the Romanian churches seemed to know of more schools:
their records give a total of 2,665 institutions, with 3,350 teachers receiving 
government subsidy.)
The impoverished condition of the Romanian community coupled with 
the governments' school policy of magyarization led to the unfortunate situ­
ation whereby the churches were unable to build up the Romanian school 
system any further. The government subsidies given to the two churches 
for educational purposes (3 million crowns in 1914) were only enough to 
maintain the existing network. As a result 10-20 per cent of Romanian pu­
pils (33 per cent according to other calculations) were forced to attend Hun­
garian or German schools, while the percentage of Romanian children who 
never went to school (39.2 per cent) surpassed even the Hungarian figure.
In the dualist age there were five Romanian gymnasia. This was partly 
because the churches did not have the resources to build more, and partly 
because the government put obstacles in the way, as in Karansebes. Official 
school policy placed special emphasis on magyarization. The government 
set up Hungarian grammar schools in the non-Hungarian regions for ex­
ample in Nagyszeben, Fogaras, Karansebes and Cravica, and while their 
purpose was allegedly to protect the minority Hungarians of those commu­
nities, they also served to educate pupils from the other nationalities. In the 
academic year 1911-1912 1,913 Romanian pupils attended Romanian sec­
ondary schools, while 4,256 attended Hungarian and German ones as there 
were only five state-run schools which taught Romanian. The extent to which 
secondary education was considered a political issue during this time is 
best shown by the periodic prosecution of teachers and pupils at Romanian 
grammar schools charged with "unpatriotic conduct". The Romanian gram­
mar school at Belenyes was magyarized on such a pretext. There were other 
issues, too, such as the debate on Romania's subsidy of Brass6's Romanian 
grammar school at the turn of the century, or Istv&n Tisza's negotiations 
with the leaders of the Romanian National Party, whose principal demand 
was the establishment of additional Romanian secondary schools.
The Romanian presence in higher education was, again, relatively small.
Beside the three Greek Orthodox and four Greek Catholic seminaries there 
were six Romanian teacher training colleges which altogether accepted some 
400 students a year before the First World War. No Romanian academy of 
law was established, in spite of the strong pressure exerted by the genera­
tion of 1848. Romanians wishing to continue their studies enrolled at uni­
versities in Budapest, Vienna, Graz or in Germany. A Chair of Romanian 
was set up at the University of Budapest in 1862, and its first head, Alexandru 
Roman kept his position until 1897, despite prosecution and conviction for 
alleged press offences. Romanian demands that the University of Kolozsvar 
be made bilingual were rejected, and the petitioners had to settle for the 
creation of a Chair of Romanian there. Grigore Silasi the man appointed to 
head it, was forced into retirement for political reasons and his successor,
Grigore Moldovan was widely regarded as a renegade for his strong oppo­
sition to the Romanian National Party. The two Hungarian universities and 
the academies of law had around 600-700 Romanian students before the 
First World War.
The nationality associations, banks and foundations provided valuable 
help for the Romanian students. Besides the churches, the Gozsdu Founda- 5 9 0
tion, established in 1871, was the most important, paying out a total of more 
than 1 million crowns in grants to some 3,000 students before the end of the 
First World War. Grants were also given by the Nasz6d, Kar&nsebes, and 
ASTRA funds, and, quite often, by private individuals.
The Changing World of Sciences
In the Reform Era Hungarian scientific life in Transylvania was closely linked 
to that of Hungary. In the age of neo-absolutism — as we have already seen 
in the case of Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet — science had a direct national-politi- 
cal purpose. After the Compromise, Transylvania's separate scientific life 
ended for good. Even the work of the various local archaeological and his­
torical societies tended to link up with national research generally.
The foundation of the University of Kolozsvar proved to be a momen­
tous event, and had repercussions well outside Transylvania. It was also a 
watershed in the history of Hungarian scholarship. Although Samuel Brassai, 
the great debater and the last of the polymaths', remained active in a number 
of fields, the following decades were marked by the emergence of the spe­
cialists.
L£szl6 K6v£ri, a historian of the 1848 generation, wrote a six-volume 
political history of Transylvania, with his account of events in Transylvania 
in the period 1848-1849 being published in 1861. Sandor Szilagyi's compre­
hensive work on cultural history is closer to modem concepts, however. 
The archivist Elek Jakab also wrote about 1848-1849 and published an ex­
cellent work on the history of Kolozsvar. By that time, though, source pub­
lication had gained considerably in importance, thanks to Imre M ik6's se­
ries entitled Erdelyi tortenelmi adatok (Transylvanian Historical Facts). The 
best-known edition of sources was published by Szilagyi under the title 
Erdelyi orszaggyulesi emlekek (1540-1699) (Records of Transylvanian Diets, 
1540-1699) in twenty-one volumes. The next century saw works on local 
history, and all showed the influence of Bal&zs Orban's monumental work 
A Szekelyfold lei'rdsa (A Description of the Szekelyfold), which was published 
in Budapest between 1868 and 1873. Despite the general trend towards spe­
cialization, history and politics continued to be dealt with together; this 
was best illustrated in the work of Benedek Jancso Szabadsagharczunk es a 
dakoroman torekvesek (1896) (Our Fight for Freedom and Daco-Romanian 
Ambitions).
In the field of the natural sciences the university was most successful in 
producing eminent figures. The magnificent university library, the second 
largest public library in the country, was built after the turn of the century, 
and laboratories and other ancillary facilities also underwent substantial 
development. Individuals worthy of note here are the philosopher Karoly 
Bohm; the zoologists Geza Entz and Istvan Apathy (the latter was short­
listed for the Nobel Prize); Professor Ferenc Veress, who made revolution­
ary discoveries in colour photography; Lajos Martin, who undertook theo­
retical work in aeronautics; and the geologist Gyula Szadeczky-Kardoss. 
The work of Hugo Meltzl might also be mentioned as a curiosity: it was he
who called Nietzsche's attention to PetSfi's poetry and who, together with 
Brassai, brought out the Osszehasonlito Irodalomtorteneti Lapok (Comparative 
Literary Gazette), an internationally acclaimed journal of comparative lit­
erature published after 1877 in twelve languages.
Individual perseverance and sacrifice played a large part in the develop­
ment of Romanian scientific life, since the organizational and institutional 
infrastructure was completely lacking in Transylvania, and since even in 
Romania this began to be established only in the 1880s.
Among the Romanians historiography, a typically "national" branch of 
scholarship, contained two basic strands during this period. The first com­
prised those general works written after the 1850s which attempted to sub­
stantiate Romanian claims to the region by uncovering the eventful and 
heroic national past (August Treboniu Laurian, Alexandru Papiu-Ilarian). 
The second consisted of publications presenting source material, the basis 
of all serious historical investigation, and commenced at roughly at the same 
time. A fine contemporary synthesis was Barif's three-volume Pdrfi alese din 
istoria Transilvaniei pe 200 de ani in urmd (Selected Papers from Transylva­
nia's Last Two Hundred Years' History), which was published in Nagy- 
szeben between 1889 and 1891, and which also marked the end of an era. 
Later studies dealt with shorter periods, or simply looked at the history of 
either smaller regions, historical personalities, or the churches and the 
schools. In the meantime the number of source publications increased. Schol­
arship and day-to-day politics were never, of course, separate even for those 
who had studied at the University of Budapest, and in any event the ongo­
ing national and political struggle1 would not have made this possible.Tt is 
very revealing that Teodor V. Pacajian's eight-volume Cartea de aur, sau 
luptele nafionale ale romanilor de sub corona ungard (Golden Book or the Na­
tional Struggles of the Romanians Living under the Hungarian Crown), 
which deals with political history, was also a source publication aimed at 
serving the immediate goals of the Romanian national movement.
In the development of Romanian linguistics Transylvania still played an 
important, although gradually decreasing, role during the second half of 
the century. Timotei Cipariu, the erudite canon of Bal&zsfalva, continued 
the traditions of Micu-Klein, Jpincai and Maior in the Reform Era. It was he 
who published the first philological magazine which, besides dealing with 
etymology and phonetics, also pressed for the introduction of a Latin-based 
written style: a style which, incidentally, was very different from the spo­
ken language. The big change came in the 1860s when the Transylvanian 
Romanian press exchanged the Cyrillic script for the Latin. Naturally, these 
attempts to remove the non-Latin elements from the Romanian language 
also found favour with certain individuals beyond the Carpathians: the 
Bucharest Academy endorsed the changes, although the excesses in the re­
form were only done away with after decades of debate.
After the Compromise Transylvania's Romanian scholars and scientists 
could be divided into three categories: those who emigrated to Romania, 
either before or after completing their education (for example, loan Bogdan 
who founded Romanian slavistics); those who elected to work in Budapest 
after completing their studies at Hungarian or foreign universities (for ex­
ample Victor Babes, G. Alexici); and those — a growing number — who
found jobs in the Romanian schools in Transylvania after graduation and 
who pursued research work with the help of ASTRA or the churches. 
Professionals, such as the aeroplane constructor Aurel Vlaicu, who be­
came known beyond the border of both states, were the exception rather 
than the rule.
Literature and the Arts
During the period from 1849 until the outbreak of the First World War the 
underlying orientation of literature and the arts gradually moved away from 
idealized subjects reflecting national aspirations to what is now referred to 
as modernism. Thanks to the advances in schooling, a wider section of the 
middle class and even the better-educated peasantry were able to enjoy 
literature and the arts, not just the privileged for among the nobility and the 
intelligentsia. (Naturally, here the terms "literature" as "the arts" embrace 
popular, and not just high, culture.) Lack of space prevents detailed discus­
sion of the complex interrelations manifasted in art and literature and of 
the cultural needs of the various social groups. Accordingly, we must con­
tent ourselves with an outline of developments in this field.
In the first decades of the period in question Romanian literature in 
Transylvania still maintained close links with its immediate geographical 
surroundings, and with Pest-Buda which was also one of the centres of 
Romanian intellectual life. Beside the short-lived cultural magazines and 
anthologies published in the Banat, Bihar and Pest, it was B arits newspa­
per Foaie pentru minte, inima literatura (Leaves of the Mind, the Soul and 
Literature) and, more importantly, Iosif Vulcan's Familia which provided 
opportunities for those with literary aspirations. The former was published 
in Brass6; the latter was founded in Pest in 1865, before moving it to Nagy- 
varad in 1880. Vulcan still was a classic proponent of the programme of 
national revival. He was a literary organizer, a newspaper editor and a folk­
lorist, who in addition, also wrote poems, short stories, plays and even a 
novel, and he maintained excellent contacts with the Pest intellectual scene. 
Vulcan was also a member of both the Kisfaludy Society and the Bucharest 
academy. He deserves special credit for regularly publishing Hungarian 
literature translated into Romanian, and it was he who published the first 
poems of the greatest Romanian classical poet Mihai Eminescu. Beside the 
newspapers, there were also almanacs to provide reading matter for the 
wider public.
Before the appearance of the fin-de-siecle generation there was no really 
important Transylvanian Romanian writer. The poetry of Andrei Muresanu 
had come to blossom by 1849 and had become a part of Romanian culture 
generally. For quite a while the historic past remained the principal motif in 
the poems of Muresanu's Transylvanian followers. The writers, the literati, 
and the journalists of the age all considered the discovery and the publica­
tion of Romanian folk literature to be a national duty. Atanasie Marienescu 
was the first to publish a collection of Romanian folk songs, and this ap­
peared in 1859.
The polemics which developed between Romanian and the Hungarian 
scholars in the course of their folklore research was typical of the age. The 
Unitarian bishop and poet J&nos Kriza published his collection of Szekely 
folk poems — entitled Vadrozsak (Wild Roses) in 1863. It was attacked in 
Fovdrosi Lapok  by the otherwise-excellent Iulian Grozescu, who claimed that 
the poems "Kdmuves Kelemen" and "MoIn£r Anna" were merely transla­
tions of Romanian folk ballads. The long debate which came to be known as 
the "V adr6zsa-trial" finally established the existence of distant interactions 
and parallel development in the history of the two folk cultures. It also 
helped to generate interest in Romanian folk poetry among the Hungarian 
literati. With the assistance of Grozescu and Vulcan the first anthology of 
Romanian folk poetry translated into Hungarian was published in 1870. Ion 
Pop Refeganul, an author of short stories noted for his excellent transla­
tions of Hungarian literature, made an outstanding contribution to the study 
of folk poetry. He collected several thousand folk songs and ballads, which 
were then studied scientifically by Grigore Silasi and Grigore Moldovan, 
professors at the University of Kolozsvar.
By the end of the century the progress towards the national integration 
of the Romanians both in Transylvania and Hungary also manifested itself 
in works of literature. Although the short stories and the novels of the real­
ist writer loan Slavici — who also founded the Nagyszeben Tribuna — de­
scribed life in Transylvania's Romanian villages, his activity as a writer was 
entirely associated with Bucharest. The poet George Cosbuc began his ca­
reer with Tribuna, although — like Brass6's Stefan Octavian Iosif — he soon 
moved across the Carpathians to assist in the revival of Romanian poetry.
At the beginning of the new century the Hungarian capital once more 
began to feature substantially in the political and intellectual life of the Ro­
manians. The career of the poet Octavian Goga, who had originally come 
from the Szeben region, blossomed while he was in Budapest working for 
the literary journal Luceafarul (established in 1902). The profile of this publi­
cation was very much determined by Goga's personality. His first poems 
were also published in it. The contributors to the journal articulated a new, 
nationally and politically committed populist feeling. loan Agirbiceanu, an 
excellent writer of prose, also began his career with Luceafarul. For Goga the 
discovery of Hungarian poetry, and especially the poetry of Endre Ady, the 
most important Hungarian poet of the age, were great experiences. The two 
poets were on good terms until their friendship came to an abrupt end in 
1914. In 1906, four years after being launched, Luceafarul transferred to 
Nagyszeben. Goga moved there too, using his considerable talents in the 
service of the Romanian national movement.
Naszdd's Liviu Rebreanu began his career as a short story writer in what 
could only be described as a distinctly Hungarian environment. (Initially 
he even attempted to write in Hungarian.) The former army officer settled 
in Romania in 1908 and became a great novelist there after the First World 
War. The career of the poet and writer Emil Isac, who maintained close 
contacts with the progressive forces in Hungary and who was drawn to the 
Social Democrats, ran a different course. Isac, whose poems already fea­
tured working-class people, continued to stand by his Hungarian friends 
despite wartime nationalist fervour. The fact that it was he who took the 594
last good quality photograph of the mortally ill Endre Ady in the moments 
of historic Hungary's disintegration could well be regarded as symbolic...
Those Saxon writers and poets who embarked on the discovery of folk 
poetry, or those who tried to educate the public through historically in­
spired poems, short stories and plays, all regarded their work as serving 
national goals. Viktor Kastner, a well-known poet of the age, wrote his stan­
zas in Saxon dialect, thus establishing a new literary style. Friedrich Wilhelm 
Schuster, on the other hand, regarded Saxon culture as part of German cul­
ture generally, as his poems clearly show. Michael Albert's traditional po­
ems were intended for the edification of the public. In the last third of the 
century, however, political poetry was on the decline even in Saxon litera­
ture. During the first decades of the period the historical short story, play 
and novel constituted the characteristic genre. Examples were Traugott 
Teutsch's D ie Burger von Kronstadt (The Burgers of Brass6, 1865), which 
looked back to the seventeenth century, or his major work written later en­
titled Schwarzburg  (1852), which described the internal struggle in Transyl­
vania during the fourteenth century. After the Compromise the Saxon writ­
ers were still concerned with the struggle for national survival, as they had 
done earlier. This was also the central theme of Traugott Teutsch's Johannes 
H onterus (1898), considered by many to be his finest play. Historical sub­
jects continued to dominate Saxon literature, especially drama, even though 
there were times when this was not so evident. Writers kept returning to 
the themes of the settlement of the Saxons in Transylvania and their early 
history in the region, indicating the continuing preoccupation of the Saxon 
intelligentsia with the endurance of this small ethnic group.
In the changing world of the fin -de-siecle  and in the wake of the new 
movements in art a more modem literature emerged which concentrated 
more on the present. The best known representatives of this literature were 
Oskar Wittstock and Adolf Menschendorfer, the second of whom founded 
the modern literary and art journal Die Karpathen  (The Carpathians) in 
1907. As well as their work, a colourful literature grew up in both prose and 
in verse which described rural life, often in local dialects. The propagation 
of these dialects was a part of national integration and therefore did not 
undermine the strong Saxon attachment to German culture as a whole.
Even before 1848 Pest had undoubtedly been the centre of Transylva­
nia's Hungarian literary life. Although the novelist Mikl6s J6sika did not 
return from exile, in his novels and short stories he remained true to his 
Transylvanian past. Zsigmond Kemeny (who also took up residence in Pest) 
built his strongly psychological novels around Transylvanian themes. It was 
also in Pest that the one-time Transylvanian poet Pal Gyulai, who belonged 
to the 1848 generation, became a great literary critic and one of the leaders 
of intellectual life. For a long time D&niel D6zsa was almost the only Hun­
garian writer and poet living in Transylvania, and he frequently turned to 
the Szekely past for material.
There were renewed efforts to organize regional centres of literary and 
scientific activities in the period following the Compromise. The Kem eny  
Zsigm ond Tarsasdg  (Zsigmond Kemeny Society) was established by the Prot­
estant pastor and writer Lajos Tolnai in Marosv£s5rhely in 1876. After a 
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lack of interest but in 1896, under the presidency of Istv&n Petelei, a writer 
of short stories and a determined advocate of decentralization, it made some 
kind of recovery. Before the First World War its members included Farkas 
Gyalui, S^ndor M3rki, KSroly Sz&sz and L5szl6 Ravasz. The Erdelyi Irodalmi 
Tarsasag (Transylvanian Literary Society) was founded in Kolozsv£r in 1888.
For a long period Count G£za Kun, an outstanding orientalist, was its presi­
dent, while the core of the society comprised the politicians J6zsef Sdndor 
and Mikl6s Bartha, the scientists K6v&ri and Brassai and the writers Istv&n 
Petelei and Elek Benedek. The society's journal, Erdelyi Lapok (Transylvani­
an Journal), was edited by Mikl6s B&nffy in 1912.
Before the First World War Transylvania provided a market for more 
than one-third of all books published in Hungary but — as Elemer Jancs6 
has pointed out — it was never able to produce a wide-ranging and self- 
sufficient literary culture of its own.
At the present stage of research, history has very little to say about the 
fine arts in Transylvania during this period. The leading figures — Mikl6s 
BaraMs and Karoly Szathm&ry Papp — both left Transylvania quite early 
in life. Bertalan Szekely the Younger probably did execute a portrait of Gov­
ernor Carl zu Schwarzenberg in Nagyszeben sometime in the 1850s, but it 
was in Hungary proper that he became one of the finest historicist painters.
Jen<3 Gy&rfas, a Szekely, remained in Transylvania and still became nation­
ally famous, despite the fact that his best pictures were the least known to 
his contemporaries. Ferenc Veress, some of whose photographs have been 
included in the present book, gained international recognition for helping 
to lay the technical foundations of this new art form. In general, the work of 
the region's Hungarian artists at this time is still hardly known and the only 
thing we can state with certainty is that there was no outstanding Transyl­
vanian art in the period.
It was in Nagybanya, not far from the Transylvanian border, that Simon 
Holl6sy founded his famous school of painting in 1896. It broke with the 
traditions of the academicism of Munich and became an important work­
shop of Hungarian impressionism, attracting much interest from distant 
countries. The well-known pioneers of modem Hungarian painting — Karoly 
Ferenczy, Istv&n Reti, and Bela Ivanyi Griinwald — all became important 
painters there, although it was in Budapest that they eventually achieved 
recognition and success.
Immediately after 1848 it was non-Transylvanian Germans who took the 
lead in Saxon fine arts for a while, people such as Theodor Glatz and Theodor 
B. Sockl. In the 1880s, however, a new generation left the secondary schools 
and achieved renown at the first Nagyszeben art exhibition, held in 1887.
Members of this generation had been studying in Budapest, Munich and 
Italy. Robert Wellmann, Karl Ziegler and Fritz Schullerus are the best-known 
representatives; the last painted large pictures about the Saxon past in the 
style of the academicist painters. Arthur Coulin was a pioneer of modern 
Saxon painting and also the art designer of the journal Die Karpathen. After 
the outbreak of the First World War the supremacy of naturalism began to 
wane in Saxon painting also.
Janos Mattis Teutsch was an unusual Transylvanian artist who spent all 
his life hovering between international recognition and total oblivion. At 596
the time he was the region's most modern painter, and is claimed by both 
Hungarian and Saxon art history. The son of a Szekely father, he was brought 
up in a Saxon family. M6ttis Teutsch's talents first appeared while he was at 
Brass6's wood industry school, where he learned wood carving. He after­
wards went on to Munich and Budapest to study and started with academist 
style sculpting. As a painter Teutsch initially produced traditional portraits 
and landscapes, but later became one of the first representatives of expres­
sionist and abstract painting in Hungary. Mdttis Teutsch lived on and off in 
his home town, Brass6, working as a teacher.
Som e of the Romanian artists elected to work abroad (for example, 
Constantin Lecca); others, like Misu Pop, worked both at home and abroad. 
Pop sprang from a family of icon-painters in Fogaras and painted churches 
and portraits in the Biedermeier style. (Almost every important Romanian 
personality of the 1848 generation sat for him.) Of the Romanian painters 
working in the Banat, the best known were Nicolae Popescu, who was clearly 
influenced by Bertalan Szekely and the Viennese painters; the very talented 
Constantin Daniel, who painted several historical paintings; and loan Zaicu, 
the church- and portrait-painter.
Octavian Smighelschi belonged to the turn-of-the-century generation and 
was a close friend of the Saxon Coulin. Together they painted Nagyszeben's 
Orthodox church and went to study in Italy. Smighelschi was known to 
contemporaries not only for his Byzantine-style work in churches but also 
for his portraits and landscapes.
The Transylvanian sculptors were mostly content to fashion busts and 
small sculptures. When the erection of large and expensive bronze sculp­
tures began at the end of the century, it was usually artists from outside 
Transylvania who were commissioned. The statue of Honterus in Brasso 
was made by a Berlin sculptor in 1898 and the sculpture of Georg Daniel 
Teutsch, the bishop and historian, was the work of an artist from Stuttgart. 
The Teutsch statue was unveiled in Nagyszeben in 1899. The equestrian 
statue of King Matthias in Kolozsv£r (1902) and the statue of Wessel6nyi in 
Zilah (1902) were both executed by J&nos Fadrusz.
Transylvania's architecture was dominated by the styles which were 
generally popular in the age. As the painter and art historian J6zsef Bir6 put 
it: "Architecture also followed the fashion set by Budapest; the new styles 
from neo-Gothic to art nouveau were superimposed on the traditional ur­
ban landscape." But the new century did bring at least some changes. In the 
same way that Bart6k and Kodaly sought the roots of Hungarian folk music 
in Transylvania, a separate branch of the art nouveau style, as represented 
by the works of Ede Thoroczkai Wigand, Dezs6 Zrumeczky and, above all, 
Kdroly K6s, drew on the architectural heritage of the Kalotaszeg and the 
Szekelys. Accordingly, there developed a "popular" style of architecture 
which manifested itself in a small number of private and public buildings in 
Transylvania and in Hungary proper as well. These buildings, examples of 
the vanished architecture of Transylvania, can still be seen in Hungary.
The new endeavours in literature and art, which were opposed to the 
nationalist-populist movement at the beginning of the century, mostly found 
adherents along the western border of historic Transylvania, in the "bor- 
5 9 7  derland" zone stretching from Nagybanya to Temesvdr, where the under­
currents have not yet been studied in any detail. It was Nagyv&rad, more 
than any other place, which became the stronghold of the bourgeois radical 
(and socialist) movement which developed in the face of the officially-ac­
cepted traditional literature and which came to be symbolized by the poet 
Endre Ady.
III. Political Life and the Nationality 
Issue in the Age of Dualism 
(1867- 1918)
1. The Dualist System
The Restoration of Constitutionalism and of the Union
After the negotiations that started in 1865 and the monarchy's defeat in the 
Austro-Prussian War, the Compromise of 1867 was agreed. This transformed 
the Habsburg Empire into a constitutional dual monarchy. Austria and 
Hungary were to conduct their internal affairs separately and independ­
ently, while there was to be a joint apparatus, strongly influenced by the 
monarch, to handle foreign policy and military matters.
The Compromise ended Transylvania's 300 year-long separate history, 
since one of the basic conditions for the agreement on the Hungarian side 
had been the complete restoration of the union between Hungary and 
Transylvania legislated in 1848. The monarch's rescript 20 June, 1867 for­
mally dissolved the Diet at Kolozsvar while another rescript annulled the 
resolutions that had been passed by the Nagyszeben provincial assembly.
On 8 March, the Hungarian government formed by Count Gyula And- 
r&ssy was granted full powers by the Parliament to run Transylvania's af­
fairs. Man6 Pechy, afoispan  from Hungary, was put in charge of the Guber­
nium, which survived for the time being, with the title of royal commis­
sioner. His duties also included reporting on the nationality movements.
The government was in no hurry to restore the union completely, if only 
because — in the words of one of its critics within the Hungarian opposi­
tion — "it wanted to deal carefully with Transylvania on account of the 
nationalities issue".1 For example, the government annulled the decision of 
some county assemblies to allow their meetings to be conducted in Hungar­
ian only. The royal commission used German in its communications with 
the Saxon seats and Romanian in its dealings with Fogaras, Nasz6d and 
H&tszeg, and the government was asked to follow suit. In connection with 
posts in the county administrations, the minister of the interior ordered 
that "in  view of the different religions and nationalities, at least three, and 
at most five, suitable persons should be put forward for every elected of­
fice".2 The government hoped to secure the — at least partial — co-opera­
tion of the leading figures of each nationality. Eotvos called on George Barif, 
the most respected figure in the Romanian opposition, to accept — without
1. Magyar Polgar (Hungarian Citizen), 2 September, 1868.
2. Torvenyek es hivatalos rendeletek gyujtemenye. (Collection of Laws and Official 
5 9 9  Orders). Edited by B. OkrOs. Pest 1868, 207.
abandoning his principles — the position of ministerial advisor with re­
sponsibility "for directing the education of Romanian youth".3 These ges­
tures, as well as the deliberate slowing down of the process of unification, 
showed that the government, faced with administrative problems as well 
as protests from the Hungarian counties which opposed the Compromise, 
did not wish to create a political climate in Transylvania that was wholly 
unacceptable to the Saxon and the Romanians.
A district law (Law XLIII of 1868) provided for the detailed regulation of 
the union. This again declared the principle of equal civil and political rights, 
as well as the abolition of all earlier privileges specific to a given nation. At 
the same time, the legal equality of the various churches was confirmed 
anew, and their autonomy guaranteed. The Gubemium was finally done 
away with and from now on the kiralybnos of the Sz6kely and the Saxon 
ispdn were appointed on the basis of governmental recommendation. The 
Saxon University was allowed to continue for the time being, although its 
juridical powers were taken away. A whole list of laws dating from the 
period of absolutism continued to apply, since the government did not want 
to subject Transylvania to Hungarian legislation before the planned general 
reform of the legal code had taken place. In this way Transylvania contin­
ued to constitute a separate legal area for some time to come. New laws 
gradually reduced the differences, but the complete elimination of dispari­
ties was never really achieved. This duality resulted in politicians claiming 
that the conditions in Transylvania were in some ways more modem than 
those in Hungary proper, and, at the same time, also less liberal.
The up-to-date Austrian Civil Code and the Mining Law of 1854 remained 
in force, although, naturally, some amendments were made. In Transylva­
nia (and in Croatia, too) the government kept the centrally-controlled gen­
darmerie, which was more modem than the system of local pandurs em­
ployed in the rest of Hungary. In the decision to keep the gendarmerie, the 
need to be able to put a brake on the nationality movements definitely also 
played a part. Anti-liberal press regulations were also preserved until 
changes took place in 1871. This was done in order that "the freedom of the 
press, as guaranteed by the institution of trial by jury, be also extended to 
Transylvania".4 Six "not guilty" votes from the twelve jurors were enough 
to dismiss charges of press offences and this measure undoubtedly helped 
to curb the arbitrariness of the authorities.
Liberal Legislation and Patriarchal Power
In the new political situation the liberal leaders of Hungary could not re­
solve the contradiction between their old ideal — a unitary nation-state —
3. Letter by J&nos G&l to G. Bari} on 25 May, 1867. In: George Barif magyar levelezese. 
(Hungarian Correspondance of George Bari{.) Edited by I. C h i n d r i ^  — F. KovAcs.
Bucharest 1975,103.
4. Az igazs5gtigyi 6s beltigyminiszter 1498/1871. sz. rendelete. (No. 1498/1871 Order
of the Ministry of Justice and Internal Affairs.) In: Rendeletek Tara 1871,183, 207. 600
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and the reality of the country as it was, that is a land of several nationalities. 
The national ideology built on historical rights formulated — on the basis of 
the principles of the unity of the country and the equality of political rights
— the concept of a "unitary political nation", which incorporated every 
nationality. It recognized the distinctness and cultural-linguistic autonomy 
of these nationalities only insofar as they did not threaten the historically- 
established hegemony of the Hungarians. But the Liberals did not have, 
within this conception, a detailed policy for dealing with the nationalities. 
Since conflicts connected with the nationalities had flared up again during 
the decade when absolutism was waning, the granting of the nationalities' 
demands was regarded by the Hungarians as a "concession" rather than as 
a reform task — although what counted as a "concession" always depended 
on the actual balance of political power at any one time.
The liberal elite — Ferenc De&k, Jozsef EotvOs, and Lajos Mocs^ry — 
hoped to solve the problems of the nationalities not only through the grant­
ing of civil liberties but also by creating an administrative system based on 
self-government. It was probably Mocs£ry who went furthest when he openly 
acknowledged that Hungary was a "polyglot state", and that the only way 
to hold it together was to ensure the possibility of free development for 
each of the country's nationalities, in the hope that these would opt to pre­
serve the old union. Eotvds, who thought the question through several times 
on a theoretical level, wrote in his diary in connection with the Transylvani­
an problem that he was willing to go so far as accepting the idea of a con­
federation, even a republican one: "I would, however, consider it both ben­
eficial and fortunate if, by contenting ourselves with dualism for a while, 
we could buy a little time to enable the Hungarian people to become more 
mature in every respect — but especially culturally — so that it can fulfil 
the great mission that lies ahead of it."5 EotvOs saw that while a strong 
Hungary was a necessity for all the peoples of the Carpathian Basin, it was 
not possible to transform it into a pure nation-state. He was also of the 
opinion that the "fair" political and cultural demands of the awakening 
nationalities should be satisfied, and that they should be given more free­
dom than they could hope to achieve in the neighbouring countries. The 
more sceptical Deak advocated a fair nationality policy on the basis of lib­
eral principles and a more realistic assessment of the situation. He wanted 
the Hungary of 1867 to be a state above nations, working for every indi­
vidual — although with the hegemony of the Hungarians preserved.
The nationalities law (Law XLIV of 1868), even in the amended form in 
which it was finally passed, was an important liberal achievement. Its birth 
was preceded by long debates in various committees, the nationalities de­
manding independent political and cultural institutions and the organiza­
tion of the counties on a nationality basis — in other words, a federation —, 
and the Hungarians defending the primacy of the state and the existing 
Hungarian hegemony in the counties. The final wording of the law reflected 
Deck's skill at compromise. It guaranteed the right of every citizen to speak 
in his own language at local and municipal meetings. Citizens were also
5. J. EOtvos, Vallomasok es gondolatok. Eotvds Jozsef muvei. (Confessions and Thoughts.
Works of J6zsef EOtvos.) Edited by M. B e n y e i . Budapest 1977, 624.
permitted to hand in petitions, even to the central government, in their 
mother tongue, and they were entitled to receive an answer in the same 
language. People could speak their own language in the lower courts of law 
and, in the higher courts, they were entitled to hear the judgment also in 
their mother tongue. Communes, churches, the church authorities and the 
township and church schools enjoyed complete freedom to use the language 
of their choice. The government was required to provide education in the 
mother tongue of a community "up to the point where higher academic 
education begins" and was also obliged to find "suitable persons" from 
among the members of the nationalities to fill high positions in the legal 
apparatus and the administration.
Although the law primarily concentrated on full personal liberty, it also 
proclaimed certain collective rights. One of its most important sections per­
mitted the formation of associations, societies and funds "for the promo­
tion of languages, art, science, economy, industry and trade".6 This section 
allowed the nationalities to create, wholly independently of the government, 
financial bases for their organizations, thereby assuring them some degree 
of independence and stability in an ever-changing political climate.
But the Hungarian drive for hegemony (which was supported by the 
greater part of the ruling class), together with the nationalities' attitude of 
protest and rejection, sealed the fate of the nationalities law. A majority in 
the government party tried to implement the bare minimum of the political 
concessions granted in the nationalities law, using the nationalities' rejec­
tion of it as an excuse, and utilizing the lack of legal sanctions in the statute 
in order to do this. Several laws were passed in the following decades which 
contradicted the spirit of the nationalities law. Eotvos and De&k approached 
the nationalities issue with tact, but with the consolidation of dualism and 
the deaths of the great liberal leaders the more impatient elements in the 
landowning class became the decisive force in political life: their national­
ism far exceeded their liberalism on the nationalities issue. Gusztdv Beksics, 
the liberal publicist, later summed up the policy of this group: "A  unitary 
and indivisible state, a unitary and indivisible nation: this is our point of 
departure, the goal of our endeavours, and the regulating principle of our 
actions. This is the categorical imperative to which all our reforms are sub­
ordinated."7
The strengthening of the unitary state and the declining political power 
of the nationalities eventually led to a strange situation. By the end of the 
dualist period, the nationalities, who had earlier found the nationalities law 
inadequate and who had therefore condemned it, were demanding that it 
be observed. On the other hand, the Hungarian nationalists who had passed 
the law, denigrated it as a piece of unworkable legislation, created by "the 
nation in an irresponsible moment"8 of dangerous leniency. In this way the 
liberal law, which was remarkable even by European standards, was never 
fully enforced.
6. Magyar torvenytar. (Hungarian Body of Laws.) 1836-1868. Budapest 1896, 490.
7. G. B e k s ic s ,  Kemeny Zsigmond, a forradalom s a kiegyezes. (Zsigmond Kem6ny, the
Revolution and the Compromise.) Budapest 18832, 333.
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Map 23. The administrative division of Transylvania in the age of dualism (1913)
The complicated and much-criticized electoral system, which had addi­
tional complexities in Transylvania, was to a great degree responsible for 
the facility with which political rights were restricted.
Throughout the period the franchise was determined by the laws passed 
in 1848. The abolition of feudal privileges was in effect achieved merely by 
extending the circle of the privileged: beside the nobility and the burghers, 
who retained the right to vote, those with the appropriate property or edu­
cation (engineers, doctors of medicine, lawyers, priests, teachers, etc.) also 
acquired the suffrage. In a country of variegated natural endowments and 
widely differing levels of economic development, the minimum wealth 
6 0 3  needed to qualify for the franchise was calculated in such a way as to en-
sure that the affluent locals in every district were granted it. In Hungary 
proper the right to vote in villages was conditional on ownership of at least 
one-quarter of a holding. For town dwellers the possession of a shop, fac­
tory or better-type house was necessary, or in the case of craftsmen, the 
employment of a journeyman. In Transylvania the property qualification in 
the villages was the payment of eight forints in direct taxation, nearly half 
as much again as in Hungary.
In 1874, a legal amendment slightly extended the franchise in Transylva­
nia when the village intelligentsia was given the vote. However, the number 
of electors declined for some time to come because in other respects the 
property qualifications were raised across the country. The law completely 
excluded the broad layer of workers, day-labourers and hands hired by the 
week from the ranks of those who could realistically hope to acquire the 
vote. The Transylvanian electorate numbered between 75,000 and 87,000 
throughout the period. Initially two-third of these electors voted on the ba­
sis of "ancient right" while only 10,000 people qualified in 1848 to do so on 
account of their property, and even in 1869 this number barely reached 
25,000. The electoral law passed in 1913 (but never implemented) would 
have improved the situation in Transylvania, although it would only have 
doubled the size of the electorate there — to 150,000.
Usually more electors were to be found in the Hungarian areas than in 
the Romanian ones. Of all male adults, 25 per cent of the Saxons, 20 per cent 
of the Hungarians and only 9 per cent of the Romanians were eligible to 
vote. (There was no such discrepancy in Hungary proper.) The towns had 
more voters proportionally than did the countryside and this, again, fa­
voured the Hungarians and the Saxons. It was this electoral system that 
provoked the Romanian intellectuals to declare that they were "humiliated 
in the most unfair way possible".9
But the whole electoral system was much more complicated than one 
simply designed to exclude the Romanian population while favouring the 
Saxons and the Hungarians. The records of the 1904 election, which is the 
most reliably documented one, show that, except for the SzekelyfOld and 
the counties of Kolozs and Torda-Aranyos, voters with Romanian as their 
mother tongue were everywhere in the majority in the rural areas, as they 
were in Hungary in the counties of Szilagy, Maramaros, Arad, Temes, and 
Krass6-Szoreny. In Hunyad county, which was Romanian in character, a 
single delegate represented half as many people as in the Szekely counties 
of Udvarhely, H3romsz6k and Csi'k. Many Hungarians thought that "the 
electoral system favours the Romanians, but they don't make use of it".10 
The explanation for all this lies in the fact that the pro-independence oppo­
sition hostile to the given dualist system found it easy to attract voters in 
the Hungarian areas, while in the Romanian ones the Hungarian voters
9. Emlekirat. A  romAn v51aszt6k k6pviselSinek 1881. <§vi mSjus ho 12-et<51 14-6ig 
tartott egyetemes 6rtekezlete meghagySsdb61 szerkesztette 6s k0zz6teszi a kiktil- 
dOtt bizottsAg. (Memoires. Universal Meeting of Representatives of Romanian 
Electors Held in 12-14 May, 1881 and Made Public by the Delegation.) Nagysze- 
ben 1882, 87.
1 0 . L. U [ r m o s s y ] ,  A z  ol&h kerd6s. II. (The Vlach Question.) Ellenzek, 5  October, 1 8 9 4 . 604
supported the government, their attitude also influencing the Romanians 
there. At the same time, the village population regarded both the elections 
and the system of parliamentary representation primarily as the business of 
the gentry. Given the level of political consciousness among the population, 
one can see how the Romanian electoral districts could remain strongholds 
of the government party until the turn of the century. The restrictive Transyl­
vanian franchise survived primarily for this reason and became an "all-too- 
important building block"11 of the state, as Count Szapary put it to King 
Carol I of Romania in 1892.
The electoral system provided one of the principal supports of dualism. 
It guarded parliamentary constitutionalism against any new absolutist ex­
periment coming from Vienna, while the limited franchise forming part of 
it guaranteed that, though the emerging democratic social and national 
movements could not be eliminated altogether, at least the dualist regime 
and the hegemony of the ruling classes would not be challenged at the higher 
political level.
At the beginning of the seventies one section of the Hungarian pro-inde­
pendence opposition still saw a potential ally in the nationalities which were 
equally hostile to dualism, and attempted to gain their support by offering 
to extend their rights. The government, too, made efforts to placate the na­
tionalities by offering them a compromise. But the efforts of Prime Minister 
Lonyay — as we shall see later — met with failure in 1872. Dualism was 
consolidated in 1875 with the merger between the centre-left opposition 
and the government party, a merger which created a the large Liberdlis Part 
(Liberal Party) under the leadership of K&lm&n Tisza.
With this merger, the clear majority of Hungarian landowners gave up 
their opposition and accommodated themselves to the dualist regime. But 
through an odd sort of compensation mechanism, the abandonment of par­
liamentary resistance was accompanied by an upsurge of impatience to­
wards the nationalities. The tactful handling of the ethnic question was 
gradually dropped, and Kalman Tisza, who served as prime minister for 
fifteen years, became the "oppressor of the nationalities", even though he 
had defended certain of the nationalities' rights on several earlier occasions. 
Besides the magyarization of public life, the policy was introduced of try­
ing to utilize the education system to the same end.
For a few years after the Compromise the administration still thought it 
natural that those speaking the same language but living in different states 
should be able to give financial support to one another's cultural projects 
across the borders, even in the form of government subsidies. The Ministry 
of Culture, for example, had forwarded the modest sums sent by the Roma­
nian government to aid the Romanians of Transylvania. In 1875, however, 
the schools and churches were forbidden to accept foreign subsidy. In 1879, 
against the wishes of the king, legislation was pushed through Parliament
11. Report by the German ambassador in Bucharest on 3 February, 1892 on the dis­
cussion between Carol I and SzapSry. Edited by T. P a v e l ,  Mifcarea romdnilor 
pentru unitatea nafionala $i diplomafia puterilor centrale 1878-1895. Timisoara 
1979, 259.
which made the Hungarian language a compulsory subject in every elemen­
tary school. Paradoxically, this was motivated not by nationalism, but by 
reasons of parliamentary strategy. Nevertheless, it violated the school- 
boards' sovereign right to decide the languages to be taught. Still, the more 
respectable circles within the ruling class hoped to achieve magyarization 
not through the school system, but through a peaceful evolution of fifty to 
one hundred years. They only wanted to speed up this process by interfer­
ing with school autonomy or, which was also frequently case, by restricting 
the activities of the nationalities' politicians.
During the reform of the county system in 1876-1877, the traditional 
autonomy of the Kir&lyfold was ended and the Saxon and Szekely seats 
were incorporated in a uniform county system. Fifteen counties were estab­
lished in the territory of historic Transylvania. These were named in such a 
way as to preserve their historical traditions as far as possible (Szolnok- 
Doboka, M aros-Torda, etc.). At the head of each county there was the gov­
ernment's representative, the appoin ted  foispan, while thealispan, his deputy 
and in charge of the county's administration, was elected by the county 
assembly for a period of six years. Another elected official, the szolgabiro, 
ruled supreme in the ridings, controlling the agencies of both the central 
and the county's own government. The period was characterized by a de­
cline of county autonomy, although the county assembly remained, besides 
the Parliament, the only constitutionally-guaranteed forum in which ques­
tions of national politics could be raised. Half of the members in the county 
assembly were elected, with the other half being made up from the so-called 
"virilists", the top taxpayers. The cfeation of this latter category guaranteed 
the participation of the new bourgeoisie — in a blatantly anti-liberal fash­
ion. In any case, the circle of the virilists was quite large. In less prosperous 
Transylvania all those who paid taxes of around one hundred forints were 
included in it. In Hungary proper the figure was twice this.
The communes and villages had no political rights, as they were entirely 
controlled by the county administration. Here, too, half of the village's rep­
resentatives had to come from among the top taxpayers, the virilists. Nev­
ertheless, the broad village suffrage extended to every independent male 
resident in the village, aged twenty or more, and holding land.
Naturally, the situation was much more up-to-date in the towns, and the 
government's policy of deliberately encouraging the bourgeoisie helped a 
great deal in this.
Quite often Romanian or Saxon majorities were to be found in the vari­
ous lower representative bodies, and there were also many Romanians and 
Saxons in the county administration, although the percentage of Romani­
ans and Saxons who occupied key positions was falling rapidly. The prac­
tice whereby nationality districts could be administered by officials who 
did not speak the language of the local people and who knew very little 
about their culture and traditions began to emerge during Prime Minister 
K ilm an Tisza's long term of office. The Saxon burghers held out every­
where, especially in Szeben county where the official language remained 
German almost until the end of the dualist era. At the same time, by the 
turn of the century, the Romanians had been very definitely driven out of 
county politics as a result of both official magyarization and their own pas- 6 0 6
sivity in Parliament. In several places (for example, Brass6 county and 
M aros-Torda county) they even failed to gain representation in the county 
assemblies, and elsewhere they constituted a modest but valued minority. 
Only in Beszterce-Naszod and Hunyad, as well as in Krass6-Szoreny and 
M iram aros counties did the Romanians remain in a strong position. Here 
the authorities were forced to make concessions, as the smooth running of 
the administration — or, to use a contemporary phrase, "the survival of the 
Hungarian nation" — could only be guaranteed by repeatedly coming to 
agreement with them.
The Attitude of the Hungarians
Naturally, the separate political history of Transylvania's Hungarians ended 
with the new regime, as those involved in politics were entirely submerged 
in the great parliamentary parties. While nobody denied that special inter­
ests existed, emphasizing them was for a long time considered inappropri­
ate, and was branded as particularism by those who shaped public opinion. 
The institution which attempted to fill the roles of both provincial assembly 
and local arm of the Hungarian government could only be established in a 
roundabout way, riding on the predominant nationalist sentiment. This in­
stitution which was, thus, not at all what is claimed to be, was called the 
Erdelyreszi Magyar Kozmuvelodesi Egyesiilet (the Magyar Cultural Associa­
tion of Transylvania), or EMKE, for short. [Another such institution was the 
Erdelyi Gazdasagi Egylet (Transylvanian Economic Association).] "Though 
we have lost our primary, political function (from the principality period), 
there remains the more rewarding one — the improvement of the material 
and cultural level of the people through communal and individual efforts,"12 
wrote the Kolozsvari Kozlony (Kolozsv&r Gazette).
The EMKE began its official work for the propagation of Hungarian cul­
ture and the Hungarian language — as well as for the cultural development 
of the smaller, more scattered, Hungarian settlements — in the spring of 
1885. In keeping with the convention of the time, the organization invited 
an aristocrat to be its chairman in the person of Count Gdbor Bethlen, a 
former Garibaldist, who later, as foispan  of Kis-KiikiillS county, persuaded 
the county assembly to vote an additional 2 per cent county tax (10,000 
forints) for the purposes of the EMKE. The heads of other counties tried to 
follow his example, provoking an enormous public outburst among Roma­
nian and Saxon intellectuals. The fostering of the small, dispersed, Hungar­
ian settlements was a very sensitive issue in the ethnically mixed country. 
The attempts to "re-magyarize" a few smaller settlements which had been
— or were thought to have been — "romanianized" deeply offended the 
Romanian population, as did the paragraph in the EMKE's founding docu-
12. Cited from the 29 August, 1884 issue of the Kolozsvari Kozlony. In: Az EMKE 
megalapitdsa es negyedszdzados mukodese 1885-1910. (The Founding of the EMKE  
607 and its Activity during a Quarter of a Century 1885-1910.) Kolozsvar 1910, 78.
ment which urged the Romanians "not only to speak Hungarian but also to 
regard themselves as Hungarians".13
The whole history of the EMKE is characterized by what was a very 
typical phenomenon at that time: the contrast between the blustering patri­
otism of the speech making, and the modesty of the deeds that the realities 
permitted. While people wished to make up for the "neglect of centuries" 
through magyarization, so that "the ethnographic mass of Sz6kelys might 
be linked through appropriate methods of public education to the great sea 
of Hungarians on the Great Hungarian Plain", the money available for the 
realization of their plans came from charity balls, collections and modest 
donations. It is very revealing that with his 20,000 forint donation in 1888, a 
non-Transylvanian landowner became the "first great founding member" 
until finally Count Kocs&rd Kun left an estate of 2,190 holds to the associa­
tion to help the relocation of Szekelys. However, instead of Szekely settlers, 
a Szekely agricultural school was set up on the property, largely financed 
by the Ministry of Agriculture and, ultimately, remaining under the latter's 
control. Like the resettlement of the Szekelys, magyarization, too, came to 
nothing.
The actual work done by the EMKE began with annual grants of be­
tween 50 and 150 forints to support destitute priests and teachers in the scat­
tered Hungarian settlements. It continued with the founding of nearly 300 
schools, more than 200 public libraries and a certain number of nurseries.
In the economic sphere, the EMKE obtained considerable government 
orders for the owners of small industrial enterprises seriously affected, af­
ter 1886, by the tariff war between Austria-Hungary and Romania. The 
association promoted Transylvanian products, and its leaders organized 
exhibitions, wrote memoirs and encouraged tourism. From the beginning it 
was one of the EMKE's principal projects to establish a big agricultural credit 
bank in Kolozsv&r, but this was set up too late, because of the lack of gov­
ernment support. Hence, instead of creating a bank to rescue landowners, 
the EMKE acted as a mediator in land deals and credit transactions and 
pressed for the creation of a credit association. The EMKE also played a 
part in the establishment of a chamber of trade and commerce in Maros- 
vasarhely (1891) to protect the interests of the Szekelys, and in the founding 
of the Erdelyi Iparpdrtolo Szdvetseg (Transylvanian Association for the Sup­
port of Industry).
The Saxon and Romanian bourgeoisie regarded all this with suspicion, 
although they soon discovered that the activities of the EMKE posed a threat 
neither to the culture of the nationalities nor to their ethnicity. In spite of the 
EM KE's growing wealth and numerous grants, its significance began to 
wane after the turn of the century. Its Hungarian critics tried to steer it 
towards the promotion of economic growth. "If EMKE does not hasten to 
the aid of the economy with all its resources... then its four million crowns 
will only be enough to buy a wreath for the grave of Hungarian Transylva­
nia,14 wrote an economics journal two years before the outbreak of the First 
World War.
13. Ibid. 80.
14. The 1893-1894 Annual Report by EMKE. EMKE trtesito, 20 May, 1894. 608
But at the turn of the century, the Hungarian political leaders of Transyl­
vania were not concerned, with future dangers. Instead, they settled down 
comfortably with the dualist regime, which, with its economic prosperity 
and its building up of the state administration, swept along even those who 
had earlier been unhappy with the country's semi-dependence on Austria. 
Just as Transylvanian politicians were present in the main political forums 
of the country and sometimes formed Transylvanian lobbies even within 
the parties, in the same way the entire intelligentsia was also focused on 
Budapest. Publicists and writers favoured the capital's newspapers, and 
the Transylvanians formed a powerful group within the Academy. Only 
the Szekely problem became a national issue: the unfavourable economic 
conditions in the Szekelyfold and the resulting emigration from the area 
continued to haunt the nation's conscience, even if no appropriate meas­
ures were available in the given situation to alleviate the problem. In spite 
of the local difficulties, the public at large approved of the strong centrali­
zation, saying that "only a strongly centralized administration could serve 
the interests of Szekely and Saxon survival".15
A peculiar version of the bourgeois state came into existence with the 
implementation of the dualist arrangement. Being sufficiently liberal and 
modem  to permit the accumulation and importation of capital as well as 
the encouragement of enterprise, it was acceptable to the bourgeoisie, even 
though this class received very little political power to match its growing 
economic weight. The regime preserved enough of the traditional institu­
tions and of the feudal mentality and methods to maintain the political in­
fluence of the landowning class — and of its supporters in the intelligentsia
— which, although it had initiated the bourgeois transformation, gradual­
ly lost control of the process. For this reason, the system as a whole was 
acceptable to the traditional ruling class as well. From the conflicting inter­
ests, a sem i-m odern political-adm inistrative governm ental structure 
emerged, in which the state could not expect its citizens to identify with the 
regime and had to be content with their acceptance of it as a reality.
In the context of the contemporary international situation, the Compro­
mise of 1867 immobilized Hungary as a whole. With the chance to settle the 
nationality problem in a radically different way now completely gone, the 
territorial integrity of the state and the retention of Transylvania became 
the cornerstones of policy. But the preservation of historic Hungary was 
associated with the leadership of the gentry, something which the bour­
geois sections of Hungarian society accepted in good faith, in the same way 
as they accepted Francis Joseph's empire as guaranteeing their security. A 
quarter of a century after the Compromise this rational acceptance had be­
come an immutable dogma. Apart from one or two clear-sighted individu­
als (it would be more appropriate to regard them merely as people with 
good intuition), nobody reckoned with the possibility that the monarchy 
would break up, and historic Hungary with it. Even the Hungarians of 
Transylvania, who in general were more sensitive to these dangers, kept 
dismissing their recurring fear of losing their country. The newspapers al-
15. Report by the German ambassador in Vienna on 9 April, 1890. PA AA Bonn.
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temated between articles concerning the successes of magyarization and 
reports on the "progress ahead of the nationalities", while the government, 
again out of party political considerations, treated as classified all Statisti­
cal Office information which suggested that in the Hungarian-Romanian 
language war conducted in the mixed population areas, "the Hungarians 
had suffered serious defeat all along the line" by the turn of the century.
The dualist regime was a trap: it provided a sense of security for the 
Hungarian ruling classes, while at the same time blinding them to the dan­
gers threatening not only themselves but also historic Hungary.
2. The Crisis of Accommodation in the Saxon 
and Romanian National Movements
The Saxons' Position in the Dualist System
For the 200,000 Saxon inhabitants of Transylvania, whose leading layer of 
intellectuals and officials feared for their privileged position under dual­
ism, adaptation to the new system was easier than it was for the Romani­
ans, although certain problems remained.
The government implemented the switch over to the new system with 
the support of the so-called Neusachsen ("New Saxons"), the bourgeois pro­
fessional stratum seeking to assimilate, and, in addition, also used certain 
administrative means. It appointed a new Saxon comes in the person of Moritz 
Conrad as early as February 1867, and blocked the convening of the Uni­
versity, where there would have been an anti-union majority. Though the 
law of 1868, which confirmed the union mentioned the Saxons' right to self- 
government, the incorporation of the Kir^lyfold into the bourgeois state 
began the following year.
In 1869, with the help of the new electoral law issued by decree, the 
University was composed in such a way that the eighteen new Saxons sup­
ported by four Romanians and one Hungarian could outvote the twenty- 
one old Saxons. Accordingly, the representative worked out a proposal for 
the reorganization of the Sz^szfold along the lines of the county system in a 
manner acceptable to the government. The two Saxon factions formally 
merged in 1872, and in the Saxon National Programme issued at a meeting 
at Medgyes on 11 May, they accepted dualism by acknowledging the Hun­
garian unitary state, provided it did not promote centralism. They acknowl­
edged the legitimacy of the Hungarian state language, provided that the 
possibilities for using the nationality languages were extended, and sub­
scribed to the more modern electoral system, provided that it did not lead 
to the preponderance of the "immature masses". Their much-qualified con­
sent had its price, and this was the preservation of the Kir^lyfold in the 
form of a distinctly independent county.
The ancient Saxon institutions came under pressure from above as a re­
sult of the centralist aspirations of the modem state, and from below as a 
result of the emancipation of the Romanian masses whose representatives
wished to fill lower and middle positions in public life. The strongest inter­
est group wanted good — in reality, acceptable — relations with the gov­
ernment, and this explains why Saxon representatives joined the De&k party, 
even though Andr^ssy clearly indicated to the influential Bishop Teutsch in 
1870 that his fellow ministers were irritated by the Saxon privileges.
Since the Romanians were also urging the dismemberment of the Kirdly- 
fold, saying that the old system left no room for the exercise of their politi­
cal rights, the Tisza government, after repeated consultation, passed the 
Law XII of 1876, which dismembered the Kiralyfold for a third time, this 
time for good. The political and administrative functions of the University 
were abolished, and it was transformed into an enormously wealthy foun­
dation for the support of schools. The end of its nearly 700 years of au­
tonomy was felt very acutely by the Saxon bourgeoisie, but did not result in 
what the old Saxons had feared — namely, "the obliteration of the Saxons 
from the face of the Earth". The language of administration remained Ger­
man in the Saxon areas, and the University continued to be a rich and influ­
ential institution. In questions of finance the dualist government was con­
sistently liberal; it only prescribed that, in line with the idea of equal rights, 
the University should also spend money on the cultural projects of the non- 
Saxon, primarily Romanian, population. The constitution of the Saxons Lu­
theran church continued unchanged, and served as one of the bastions of 
national and cultural autonomy. In reality, the loss was limited to Saxon 
privileges, with the Saxon themselves remaining in a strong position until 
the very end of the period.
The foispans of the new counties were either new Saxons or Hungarian 
aristocrats. Representatives of the latter group, including such people as 
Count Gabor Bethlen in the two KiikullS counties or Baron Dezs6 Banffy in 
Beszterce, pursued a policy of harsh magyarization. The situation was dif­
ferent in the Brass6 county. Here greater understanding existed between 
the Saxon and the government. This was partly because Brass6 was a more 
progressive county and, as such, it was the bastion of the new Saxons. Nev­
ertheless, the Tisza era was, by and large, characterized by continual con­
frontation between the government and the Saxons. Both the Saxon depu­
ties and the church protested against the Education Law of 1879, which 
made Hungarian a compulsory subject in every elementary school, although 
eventually the Saxon opposition was able to secure a reduction in the mini­
mum number of Hungarian lessons per week. In the early 1880s, from the 
time of its conception onwards, the Saxon opposed a law regulating sec­
ondary education, a law which also obliged the would-be teachers to pass 
their final examination in Hungarian. But as it turned out, the excessive 
apprehension concerning the 1883 legislation was unfounded. Saxon sec­
ondary education shifted away from the humanities and towards the sci­
ences, while at the same time becoming more uniform. Those studying for a 
teaching diploma did not, in general, suffer academically from spending a 
year at a Hungarian university. Government control of secondary educa­
tion remained within the limits of professionalism.
In its struggle to maintain its position, the Saxon bourgeoisie received 
considerable moral support from the German intelligentsia and press, which 
denounced the Hungarian government's efforts both to reduce the Saxon'
autonomy and to step up their magyarization. The German universities al­
ready played a decisive role in the replenishment of the Saxon intelligentsia 
and clergy, and the Franco-Prussian War increased the pro-German sym­
pathies of the Saxons and thus strengthened the appeal of the pan-German 
ideology. All this, however, offered very little in the way of direct political 
advantage. Chancellor Bismarck resolutely opposed German nationalist 
aspirations in Hungary: "W e set such great political store by the strength­
ening of the Hungarian Empire and its unity that our sentimental desires in 
this respect must take second place". Most of the support for the Saxons 
came from various associations in Germany.
After a while, a noticeable restructuring began to take place within the 
ranks of the Saxon bourgeoisie. The old guild-master stratum declined, with 
quite a few of its members becoming the owners of prosperous medium­
sized factories. Though the merchant population grew substantially, there 
were great individual differences in wealth. Of the traditional bureaucracy, 
large sections became impoverished, and the significance and hegemony of 
the bureaucracy as a whole weakened. At the same time the new, rising 
bourgeoisie — the lawyers, teachers and doctors — grew in importance 
and consequently the defence of the outdated particularism of the nation 
had to give way to the forces of economic and cultural development. This 
change was the result of capitalist transformation and, as such, it allowed 
the Sachsische Volkspartei (Saxon Popular Party), established in 1876, to seek 
a compromise, even if the party as a whole joined the opposition and its 
representatives voted against the government throughout the 1880s. A new 
agreement was born with the fall) in 1890, of Kalm&n Tisza, the symbol of 
enmity. New foispans were appointed to head the so-called Saxon counties
— for example, the Saxons' long-time champion, Gustav Thalmann, was 
put in charge of Szeben — and careers in the administration were opened to 
the Saxon intelligentsia, without pressure to give up their national identity. 
In the counties an increasing number of officials were either Saxons or were 
sympathetic towards them. The Saxons' small and medium-size industries 
were given a substantial share of the government subsidies. It is very re­
vealing that the same Count Gyula Szap&ry whom the Saxon bourgeoisie 
had earlier wanted to prosecute as the minister responsible for the termina­
tion of Saxon administrative autonomy was the one to reach agreement 
with them when he became prime minister.
The 700 member Sachsentag held in Nagyszeben on 17 June, 1890 adopted 
a modification of its earlier political programme: it accepted dualism, the 
idea of a "unitary Hungarian nation-state", the Nationalities Law of 1868, 
but demanded equal opportunities for the Saxon intelligentsia to partici­
pate effectively in the implementation of the government's work. Great 
emphasis was given to the Saxon demand for a say in the running of the 
economy — the peasant economy and industry, especially manufacturing 
industry. On the basis of the new programme, the Saxon deputies joined 
the government party en bloc. Although future relations between the Saxon 
MPs and the government were not without tension, the former continued 
to support the government throughout the period, while official policy to­
wards them remained moderate and conciliatory.
The opposition, the so-called "Green Saxon", movement launched in the 
1890s, intended to provide leadership for every German in Hungary, but 
was unable to secure a majority even in the Saxon heartland. The govern­
ment rewarded the moderate "Black Saxons" by regularly granting their 
churches state subsidies. Also, in the years immediately preceding the out­
break of the First World War, government financial assistance enabled the 
Saxons to rebuild five of their secondary schools.
The integration of the Saxon bourgeoisie into the dualist system is a good 
illustration of the possibilities and limitations of the nationality policy pur­
sued by successive governments in Budapest. As long as the political lead­
ership of a national minority genuinely accepted dualism (and helped to 
get it accepted by those it represented), and acquiesced in a few, mostly 
superficial, magyarization measures the government subsidized their reli­
gious and cultural institutions, tolerated their representatives in key posi­
tions of middle- and lower-level politics, allowed them to shape their towns 
and provinces in their own likeness and to represent a separate strand within 
the state. Such compromises, however, could only be arrived at by the po­
litical leadership of a nationality which already possessed an elaborate net­
work of institutions and secure positions.
Romanian Politics: The Road to Passive Resistance
The Compromise of 1867 dealt a very heavy blow to the Romanian national 
movement. Shortly before it was concluded, the autonomy of Transylvania 
had seemed secure for the foreseeable future, and even if the Romanians 
there had been fearful, they had also hoped that they could gradually achieve 
political preponderance within the Grand Principality. The union, however, 
robbed them of this prospect. What they were given instead — constitu­
tionalism and the disappearance of the legal distinction between the Roma­
nians of Transylvania and those of Hungary — did not strike them as a 
change for the better.
The tendency which advocated passivity as a weapon against the Hun­
garian Parliament and which saw the sole guarantee of the Romanians' ex­
istence as a nation in the preservation of a separate Transylvania emerged 
as early as the elections to the coronation Parliament which met in 1867. On 
the Hungarian side, however, there was no longer any need to make con­
cessions. When delegates finally approached Deak with their demands on 3 
June, 1867, he could only tell them that it was too late, and that autonomy 
was already out of the question. The only thing he could promise them was 
fully equal political rights.
On his first fact-finding tour, the government commissioner appointed 
to administer the abolition of Transylvania's separate status was met by a 
number of Romanian intellectuals who protested ceremonially against the 
Compromise. He, of course, recommended that they accept the fa it  accom­
pli, and refused the request of the bishop of Bal&zsfalva to convene a Roma­
nian national assembly. However, there was no legal obstacle to prevent a
gathering at Kolozsv&r, under the auspices of the ASTRA, the Romanian 
cultural society that was once again flourishing. Even the government com­
missioner was present at the first meeting and at the concert which fol­
lowed it. This assembly adopted a policy that was to remain in force for 
some time: to wait until the dualist experiment collapsed, and, in the mean­
time, to use every opportunity to protest against both the union and the 
Compromise. This was followed by the Pronunciamentum of Bal£zsfalva in 
the spring of 1868, which adopted a stand calling for an autonomous Transyl­
vania, a separate Parliament, and the sanctioning of the legislation passed 
by the Nagyszeben Diet in 1863-1864. Initially the government wanted to 
prosecute the authors of this declaration, along with the newspaper editors 
who published it, but the grand legal battle — which some people hoped 
would rally European public opinion behind the Romanian cause — never 
took place, as the government thought is wiser to stop the proceeding.
During the debate on the Nationalities Law of 1868, the Romanian politi­
cians of Hungary, together with the Serbian deputies, tabled a counter­
proposal. The Mocsonyi-Miletic plan, as it became known, regarded each 
nationality of Hungary as a separate nation, and accordingly, wished to 
give each of them a separate political-administrative body, though it con­
ceded the need for all of Hungary to form some kind of territorial and po­
litical unit. However, even Lajos Mocsary, the most liberal of politicians 
could not adopt it, and the Hungarian opposition, led by Daniel Ir&nyi, was 
only prepared to make tactical concessions. The Romanian demand for Tran­
sylvania's autonomy was once again rejected by De&k in the debate on the 
legislation regulating the union of'Transylvania and Hungary.
Lack of success increased the influence of those who advocated passiv­
ity in Parliament. While Transylvania's Romanians went into passive re­
sistance, the Romanian political leaders in Hungary proper continued to 
advocate active oppositionist politics. On the basis of their own, different, 
historical experience, they hoped to secure their national rights in spite of 
the government, but still within the framework of the unitary Hungarian 
state. This occasionally enabled them to co-operate tactically with the Hun­
garian parties. The Romanians of Transylvania, with their initial choice of 
passive resistance, soon found there was no way out of it. Beside the dete­
rioration of the political situation, internal divisions and lack of organiza­
tion also pushed the Romanian intelligentsia towards passivity.
Not that there were no Romanians to warn of the pitfalls of political 
passivity. The Szerdahely conference convened in March 1869, was pre­
sided over by a layman, Elie Macelariu, who was also a member of parlia­
ment. At the meeting a number of political activists warned of the possible 
dangers: passivity was tantamount to abdication of the intelligentsia's re­
sponsibilities towards the people; it would result in the peasant masses com­
ing under the influence of other political forces; and, by eschewing Parlia­
ment, the Romanians were renouncing an important public platform. Of 
the roughly 300 participants, however, only four voted for an active politi­
cal line, because, once again, Archbishop !?aguna did not wish to lead his 
followers into a confrontation with the other side. The overwhelming ma­
jority enthusiastically supported Canon Micu-Moldovan's call for passiv­
ity: "Twenty or thirty years in the life of a nation is the mere twinkling of an
eye. But we all know that we are living in an enlightened century, in the 
nineteenth century, when it would be madness to think that the empire of 
injustice could endure for decades..."16 The participants adopted the memo­
randum which he had submitted to the sovereign in 1866, at the time of the 
campaign to stop the Compromise, and which denounced the union and 
objected to several of the 1848 laws. A committee of twenty-five was given 
the task of launching the Partidul National Roman din Transilvania (Roma­
nian National Party of Transylvania). The government responded by dis­
solving the committee on the grounds that it was anti-constitutional; in fact 
the authorities recognized no parties which were organized on the basis of 
national exclusiveness.
The Romanian party operated in the borderland of legality: from time to 
time it was prohibited, although the government never tried seriously to 
enforce the ban. This state of affairs characterized the greater part of the 
dualist period. The boycott organized by the Romanian voters had a con­
siderable effect on the elections of 1869. As a result of it, the Romanians 
were represented in Parliament by fifteen "Hungarian" (National Party) 
deputies and eight from the government party. The deputies, who formed 
a separate faction, actively participated in the work of the Parliament and 
often spoke out in support of Romanian political and cultural interests, de­
manding universal suffrage, the extension of press freedom and improve­
ments in the administration.
Evading the government's prohibition, the Transylvanian advocates of 
passivity formed a six-man deputation at Torda in the beginning of 1870. 
This was to lead the political resistance being organized in the county as­
semblies instead of in Parliament. In 1872, during his visit to Transylvania, 
Prime Minister Menyhert L6nyay asked the leaders of this resistance to sub­
mit their demands. Their memorandum made the acceptance of the dualist 
system conditional on a new administrative division of Transylvania along 
ethnic lines, the recognition of Romanian as an official language, a more 
democratic electoral system and the appointment of a number of Romanian 
officials. The coercive elections of 1872 were generally characterized by 
Romanian abstention in Transylvania, although the Romanians of Hungary 
proper also suffered a painful setback. The two leading personalities, the 
landowner Alexandru Mocsonyi and the intellectual Vincenjiu Babes were 
also defeated. Seeing the activists' latest failure, Archbishop £aguna retired 
completely from public life and, embittered by the decline and the accom­
panying dissension, died the following year. With his death, the Romanian 
nationalist movement was essentially freed from the tutelage of the clergy.
The Romanian intelligentsia of Hungary, who had become more reso­
lute in the aftermath of Romania's independence struggle of 1877-1878, 
gained considerably in political maturity during the struggle against the 
Education Act of 1879 (devised by Trefort) which encroached upon the rights 
of the nationalities' school boards. After organizing preparatory meetings 
and sounding out government officials both in Budapest and in Bucharest, 
they held a conference in Nagyszeben on 13 May, 1881, with the participa-
16. Cited by V. N e t e a ,  Lupta romanilor din Transilvania pentru unitatea nafionala 
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tion of one hundred and seventeen delegates from Transylvania and thirty 
four from Hungary proper. The meeting decided that passive resistance 
would be continued in Transylvania, while active opposition would be or­
ganized in Hungary's Romanian regions. Also, the founding of a united 
Romanian National Party was declared, and Partenie Cosma, the talented 
lawyer of the Albina Bank, was elected as its president. The programme of 
the united party primarily listed the old demands, with autonomy for 
Transylvania as the paramount objective. "The Romanian nation can never, 
under any circumstances, be reconciled"17 to the dualist regime, they wrote 
in 1882 in a memorandum which summed up their grievances and which 
was published in several languages with the help of the Romanian govern­
ment. This dignified but introspective programme — which left very little 
room for tactical manoeuvring — remained the charter of the Romanian 
national movement right up to 1905.
The policy of passivity was based on the initially widespread and quite 
justifiable opinion, one especially prominent in Austria, that dualism was 
merely a temporary experiment that would only last for a few years. How­
ever, the system built on the Compromise became consolidated in the early 
1870s, as all attempts to transform it failed. Under the circumstances, the 
"passivist" political line generally adopted after 1867 changed from an ini­
tial tactical miscalculation into a basic strategic error. Instead of obstructing 
government policy, which aimed at the slow but thorough magyarization 
of the administration and the establishment of a new institutional structure, 
the policy of passivity, with its boycotts and solemn protestations achieved 
the very opposite of what it intended. The deliberate shunning of Parlia­
ment in a country in which virtually the whole of political life was concen­
trated there proved to be a self-restriction with far-reaching consequences. 
The Romanian electorate, for want of its own candidates, voted for the gov­
ernment's nominees, while the Romanian opposition enjoyed the lasting 
support of only one or two thousand intellectuals.
The Romanians of Transylvania and 
the Kingdom of Romania
Naturally, the people of Romania regarded the Romanian population of 
Hungary with interest and brotherly affection. In the Romania of the 1860s 
and the 1870s, a period dominated by the struggle for independence, it was 
primarily the intelligentsia and the university students who took up the 
case of the Romanians of Transylvania, although some gestures were also 
made by successive governments in Bucharest.
The Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, during which the faltering Russian 
offensive was revived as a result of Romanian assistance, greatly improved 
the standing of the Romanian state, especially since victory was finally 
achieved by placing the Russian army under the command of Carol, prince
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of Romania. Many young Romanians left Transylvania to join the Roma­
nian army, causing the monarchy, which was officially neutral in the con­
flict, considerable diplomatic embarrassment. Enthusiastic movements 
started among Hungary's Romanian population: people collected money, 
clothing and medical supplies for the Romanian army. The upsurge of Ro­
manian fervour caused grave concern to the Tisza government, which was 
well aware of the recurring belief that it was only a matter of time before 
Transylvania would be annexed by Romania. The government restricted 
these collections, although it did not attempt to prevent them completely. 
There were also a number of Saxons and Hungarians among the contribu­
tors, illustrating the kind of political-psychological schizophrenia with which 
the Hungarian public responded to the war. Transylvania's Hungarian popu­
lation also regarded the liberation struggles of the Turkish-ruled peoples as 
a positive development, although at the same time it feared the consequences 
of growing Russian influence in the Balkans. In line with liberal public opin­
ion in Europe, sympathy with the Turkish cause finally won the day. This 
sentiment provided the emotional background for the last romantic conspi­
racy in Hungary. Its Transylvanian organizers, G&bor Ugron, Bal&zs Orb£n 
and Miklos Bartha, all members of the Fuggetlensegi Part (Independence 
Party), attempted to recruit several hundred Szekelys to form a private le­
gion. Their aim was to cut the Russians' sole supply line to the Balkans by 
blowing up one of the bridges on the Szeret River in Moldavia. The plot 
was probably financed with money from England. A few Romanian intel­
lectuals were already considering a counter-strike, when Tisza apprehended 
the organizers. Six hundred rifles were seized and the matter then closed.
With Romanian independence achieved there was an upsurge in roman­
tic nationalist feeling beyond the Carpathians. So-called Daco-Romanian 
calendars and maps became increasingly popular, showing the Romanian 
population between the Black Sea and the Tisza River as one continuous 
bloc. A growing number of articles discussing the Transylvanian situation 
appeared in the Bucharest newspapers, some of which were written in 
Transylvania itself. In Bucharest a number of allegedly independent organi­
zations were founded — for example, the Transylvania Society (1867) and 
the Carpafi Society (1882) — which took up the cause of their fellow Roma­
nians across the border. The leaders of the last mentioned body worked on 
plans for an uprising in Transylvania as early as 1882. Its emissaries trav­
elled the length and breadth of Transylvania, planning to smuggle in proc­
lamations that called for an insurrection and the establishment of the Grand- 
Romanian state. In 1885 they called on the population of Romania to raise 
the irredentist flag, and also made a passionate appeal to the Romanians 
living in Hungary to begin an armed revolt.
Not only did these enthusiastic schemes of a few individuals lack popu­
lar backing, but international political developments also militated against 
them. The Kingdom of Romania sought the support of both Germany and 
Austria-Hungary to offset Russian influence in the region. Romania joined 
the Triple Alliance by signing a secret agreement with the monarchy in 1883. 
In addition, Bucharest always distanced itself from agitation against the 
monarchy, without ever formally committing itself to stifling such agita­
tion. The Romanian government gave a certain amount of moral and finan-
cial support to the Romanian population of Hungary for their cultural and 
national projects but at the same time placed the Carpafi Society under its 
control. The irredentist conspiracy in 1885 was crushed, and its six organiz­
ers expelled from the country. Using diplomatic means, Vienna partly sup­
pressed, partly tempered and, after realizing its harmlessness, partly acqui­
esced in a moderate Romanian unionist movement from the early 1880s 
onwards.
In the meantime, the situation and the future fate of the Romanians of 
Transylvania had become an intricate party political issue in Romania. As a 
result, Vienna was unable to use its full influence as a great power in con­
nection with the Transylvanian question without endangering its fragile 
alliance with Romania and bringing down the government in Bucharest. 
On the other hand, successive Romanian governments tried to induce the 
leaders of the monarchy to follow a nationalities policy more favourable to 
the Romanians of Transylvania, pointing both to their own precarious do­
mestic position over the nationalities issue and to their status as loyal allies. 
These efforts found little favour in Vienna, but occasionally more in Berlin.
The act of joining the Triple Alliance cleared the way for the Bucharest 
government to intervene officially on matters of Romanian national devel­
opment in Transylvania. Precisely at a time when it seemed that the monar­
chy's apparatus of neutralization, which was designed to silence Romania 
on the Transylvanian question, was working, Romania's role in interna­
tional politics began to increase, and so, consequently, did its influence on 
the future of the Romanian population of Transylvania.
The Memorandum Movement
Tribuna, a modem Romanian daily newspaper was first published in Nagy- 
szeben in 1884. Under the direction of loan Slavici, a Transylvanian writer 
who had just returned from Romania, and drawing on the talents of a group 
of young intellectuals, it delivered the fiercest attacks yet on the govern­
ment, and especially on the emphatically moderate Romanian National Party 
recently founded by the archbishop of Szeben, which unconditionally ac­
cepted the union and the Compromise. In one and a half years this party 
disintegrated, or, as the Tribuna ironically put it, "died of moderation".18
The new movement was not satisfied with the old liberal methods, which 
were more or less limited to protests and cultural projects, and was deter­
mined to incorporate the everyday problems of a wider public into its policy 
of national grievances. Modem bourgeois journalism was brought to the Ro­
manian population of Transylvania by the Tribuna, as was shown in its hard­
hitting criticism of every departure from its own adopted views and its ener­
getic style, which was similar to that of the great Bucharest or Budapest 
papers. While initially it called attention to the need to create "a modus
18. Cited by S. B(r6, Az erdelyi rom£n 6rtelmiseg eszmeviWga a XIX. szdzadban.
(The World of Ideas of the Transylvanian Romanian Intelligentsia in the Nine­
teenth Century.) In: MR II, 173. 6 1 8
vivendi, acceptable both to us and to our fellow citizens of other nationali­
ties",19 less than six months later it could write: "If the maintenance of Ro­
manian ethnicity is not possible within the Hungarian state... then our only 
course of action in pursuit of liberation remains the elimination of this Hun­
garian state, as well as the struggle to achieve this. To ally ourselves with 
the enemies of the Magyar ethnic group appears to us to be an organic 
necessity".20
The new movement tried to find new grounds for a Romanian national 
identity. It proudly proclaimed the cultural union of the Romanians on both 
sides of the Carpathians and presented Romanian foreign policy towards 
Hungary as a party political issue in Bucharest. This led to several confron­
tations, but also lent a new driving force to the ossified movement at home.
Members of the Tribunist youth movement procured the positions of 
vice-president and secretary within the Romanian National Party and forced 
it to carry out its earlier resolutions, as well as to present a long memoran­
dum to the monarch, listing the collective political grievances of the Roma­
nians living within the Hungarian state. The campaigners now received 
support from Bucharest: the Liga Culturala (Cultural League), a society for 
the promotion of Romanian cultural unity, was founded in 1891. The Liga 
subsequently established branches in Paris, Berlin and Antwerp to carry 
out international propaganda work. The Liberal Party, which was led by 
Dimitrie A. Sturdza and which formed the opposition in Bucharest, discov­
ered in the nationality issue the perfect means of bringing down the gov­
ernment — a tactic similar to that employed in the Hungarian Parliament. 
Accordingly, the Liberal Party was able to use the Romanian movement of 
Transylvania as a weapon of party politics. It supported, and very soon 
even took over, the running of the Liga, which was the publisher of a memo­
randum of the Romanian university students issued in 1891. The leaflet was 
addressed to western youth and the Europe of the future, and was pub­
lished in 15,000 copies in Romanian, French, German and Italian. After a 
short introduction relating the history of the Romanian people and its place 
in European development, it listed the national-cultural grievances of the 
Romanian population of Transylvania since 1867. After official prompting, 
Hungarian university students replied in the form of an apologia, which was 
prepared with the help of professor Grigore Moldovan, a Romanian sup­
porter of the ruling party in Kolozsvdr. This, in turn, provoked a response 
from Aurel C. Popovici, a medical student writing on behalf of the Roma­
nian students of Hungary. Popovici's article was published in Nagyszeben 
in 1892, and led to legal proceedings. A court in Kolozsvar found its author 
guilty of incitement, but Popovici fled the country to escape sentence.
In evaluating the effects of the pamphlets war, Rafiu, the future party 
leader, declared: "Our complaints, now widely known in Europe, are heeded 
by all nations; they are judged as real and legitimate complaints and, ac­
cordingly, it is no fault of ours if European public opinion has come to the
19. Cited by I. Slavici, Sbuciumari politice la romani din Ungaria. Bucharest 1911,
23, and Romanii din regatul ungar $i politico maghiara. Bucharest 1892, 33.
20. Tribuna, 25 September, 1884. MR II. 171.
realization that something is rotten in this state."21 The immediate submis­
sion of the great Memorandum was now decided on.
The circumstances certainly favoured a memorandum campaign. There 
was a government crisis and election fever in Hungary. Germany, in con­
trast to the leading circles of the monarchy, envisaged an important role for 
Romania in the Balkans and tried to put pressure on Budapest by asking it 
to make concessions in its policy toward the nationalities. This was the time 
when the idea of a "conditional alliance" was bom  in Bucharest, that is 
making the Romanian alliance conditional on the better treatment of the 
Romanian population in Hungary. In January 1892, King Carol held discus­
sions in Budapest with Count Szapary, the Hungarian prime minister, ask­
ing him to extend the franchise in Transylvania and to halt linguistic ma- 
gyarization and the administrative attacks on cultural institutions. Szap&ry 
was unwilling to concede the first demand and, because of the opposition, 
was afraid to give ground on the latter. The prime minister's "non possumus" 
was also confirmed by Francis Joseph. Finally, Carol himself consented to 
the action of the memorandists, and informed those working on its formu­
lation of his support.
The basic contradiction in the opposition stance is apparent throughout 
the lengthy document. While basically scouting the legitimacy of the Com­
promise, of the union, of the nationalities law, in short, of the whole system, 
elsewhere it demands the observance of the various laws. The abolition of a 
separate Transylvania was "nothing less than the open repudiation of the 
Romanian people".22 It condemned the Law XLIV of 1868 because, "except 
for its name, the whole statute contains nothing of the glorious ideal of 
equality", and, with the introduction of the notion of the political nation, it 
committed a blatant assault on the existence of the non-Hungarians. The 
Memorandum  also spoke out against the more restricted franchise in Transyl­
vania and the electoral infringements there, because these prevented the 
Transylvanian public from being properly represented. It also criticized the 
harsher censorship in Transylvania and the practice of putting journalists 
on trial. As opposed to the period between 1848 and 1866, which was con­
sidered to be an emancipatory phase, the objective of the 1867 system was 
"to take back everything that we had been given by the unitary monarchy". 
The Memorandum  on the one hand denounced magyarization in the schools, 
the compulsory Hungarian lessons, the lack of Romanian universities and 
state secondary schools, on the other the method of allocating state subsidy 
for Romanian priests which encroached on the church's autonomy. It claimed 
that the regime hardly employed any Romanian officials and prosecuted 
the intellectuals, and therefore "they are forced to conclude that they are 
regarded as foreigners in their own country". There was no freedom of 
assembly or association for the Romanians, and the societies aiming at 
magyarization injured them in their national identity: "W e are challenged 
and brazenly humiliated every day".
The message of the Memorandum, what set its very tone, was that "after 
twenty-five years of constitutional existence we confront each other with
21. Cited by Unirea Transilvaniei cu Romania. Edited by I. P o p e s c u - P u t u r i  — A.
D e a c . 2nd ed. Bucharest 1972, 208.
22. Published by G.G. K f.m h n y , I rat ok ... (Documents...). I, 827. 620
more hostility than ever before", and that the Romanians "can no longer 
trust either the Budapest Parliament or the Hungarian governm ent". A 
breakthrough could be expected only as a result of the "natural mediation" 
of the sovereign, so that "the system of government should be changed 
legally by involving the appropriate bodies".
The Memorandum  was taken to Vienna by a 237-strong delegation in May 
of 1892, on the eve of the celebrations to mark the twenty-fifth anniversary 
of dualism. The king, however, complying with the wishes of the govern­
ment, declined to receive the delegation, and as a result its president, Rafiu, 
left the Memorandum  with the cabinet office in a sealed envelope. From there 
the unopened envelope was sent to Budapest, whence the Hungarian cabi­
net posted it back to the address of its "sender", Rafiu. The first attempt, 
therefore, ended in failure.
It was the Hungarian government and the nationalist mood of the Hun­
garian public which came to the rescue of the Romanian leadership. "W e 
never did anything so stupid that the Hungarians did not retort by doing 
something even more stupid",23 recalled a self-critical Romanian politician. 
Protesters damaged Ra^iu's house in Torda, which caused an enormous 
public outcry in Romania. The Memorandum, which was circulated also 
through the Liga Culturala, had been published in 11,000 Romanian-language 
copies and in 2,000 copies in other languages. After a certain amount of 
vacillation, the government finally gave in to the nationalist pressure. In 
May 1893, it ordered the public prosecutor in Kolozsvar to start proceed­
ings against Rafiu and those party leaders who stood by the document.
The Liga Culturala had organized rallies in Romania, stepped up its 
propaganda in western Europe and raised money to help the banned Tribuna 
to publish again. At the same time, in Bucharest, the liberal opposition at­
tempted to exploit the situation to bring down the conservative administra­
tion, which they accused of betraying the Romanians of Transylvania. Stur- 
dza, head of the Bucharest Liberal Party, proposed that the entire national 
committee should leave Hungary in order to escape prosecution and should 
establish its headquarters in Romania "to give the struggle a European sig­
nificance".24 The party leaders, however, realized that Sturdza's sole aim 
was to topple the conservative government: "W hat would the peasantry, 
which knows nothing of the complications of foreign policy, say if its lead­
ers turned their back on them to revel in honours in Romania, while poor, 
ordinary people went to prison?"25 In November Rafiu travelled to Bucha­
rest where he was assured, both by the government and by the king, that 
the Hungarians would soon grant concessions. On hearing this, he immedi­
ately left for Pest, but all he received there were promises of future im­
provements, while the Hungarian government demanded that the Romani­
ans abandon their 1881 programme. The discussions ended without result. 
Meanwhile, the pros and cons of the controversial issue of whether to go
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into emigration or to stay and fight were discussed at length in the Roma­
nian press, causing internal chaos and compounding the earlier conflicts. It 
was this that was behind the later view that "Sturdza demoralized us more 
thoroughly in one year, than the Hungarian government did in fifty".26
The Memorandum  trial opened in Kolozsv&r on 7 May, 1894. Both sides 
prepared to put on a great performance, and Slovak and Serbian lawyers 
were also invited to represent the accused. In order to present a united 
front, mandatory formulae had been worked out for both the defence law­
yers and the defendants. Rajiu and his companions were feted at a number 
of railway stations on the way to the trial, and telegrams of approval and 
support came flooding in. In the first few days, more than 3,000 — accord­
ing to other sources, 25,000 — Romanian sympathizers marched through 
the town where substantial military forces stood by. Also, several sympa­
thy rallies were held in the countryside and these began to worry the au­
thorities. The trial proceeded very slowly and much time was needed just 
to decide what language should be used in the recording of evidence. While 
the accused were granted the use of their mother tongue, the court obliged 
the lawyers to speak in Hungarian.
Only partially did the defendants succeed in turning what was techni­
cally a simple press offence into an occasion for a major political polemic, 
which was their underlying strategy. They were unable to initiate an in- 
depth debate on the Memorandum  as a "dissertation on history and civil 
law". After the deliberately restrained indictment from the public prosecu­
tor, Rajiu read out an impressive plea on behalf of the accused, a plea which 
had been written by the secretary 'of the party and a liberal politician from 
Bucharest. Rafiu claimed that he had been sent to Vienna by the entire Ro­
manian people in order to procure the king's support for the protection of 
their much-abused rights. In reality the case was about "the hundred year 
old dispute between the Hungarian and the Romanian nations" in which 
"the court of the civilized world... some day will judge you more severely 
than it has done up to now. Condemning us in a spirit of intolerance and a 
fanatical racism unknown in Europe can only prove to the world that the 
Hungarians represent a jarring sound in the concert of civilization".27
At the end of the seventeen day long trial, the jury found the great ma­
jority of the accused guilty as charged, while acquitting four others.The 
court — against the advice of the judge who appealed for a new trial — 
wanted to condemn the whole spirit of the Memorandum  and the accused as 
well, thereby satisfying both the Hungarian nationalists, and the desire for 
confrontation of the Romanian National Committee. The sentences were 
extremely severe. Fifteen people were sent to gaol for between two months 
and two and a half years, while Secretary Lucaciu, allegedly the chief or­
ganizer of the Memorandum, was given — despite the recommendations of 
both the judge and the prosecutor — the maximum punishment: five years 
in prison.
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3. New Tendencies at the Turn of the Century
Changes in Government Policy 
at the Turn of the Century
It was a Transylvanian politician, Baron Dezsfi Banffy, who formed the gov­
ernment which took office in early 1895. While in earlier years, as foispdn  of 
several Transylvanian counties, B&nffy had made himself hated by the Ro­
manian and Saxon intelligentsia, as an advocate of ruthless magyarization, 
who combined patriarchal oppression with police methods. Even his Hun­
garian contemporaries referred to him as the "Pasha of Doboka (county)". 
Banffy firmly believed that, instead of chafing against the Compromise, 
Hungary should join forces with Austria, with the dynasty, in the fight 
against the nationalities, and that every effort should be made to accelerate 
the magyarization process. In other words, he was offering Hungarian na­
tionalist public opinion a more militant chauvinism to compensate it for 
compliance with Vienna.
In his nationality policy, Banffy discarded the previous practice of trying 
to achieve magyarization by legislative rather than confrontational means, 
and brought an institutional and bureaucratic approach to the handling of 
the nationalities issue. His aim was to gather information about the cultural 
and political life of the non-Hungarian nationalities and, on the basis of 
this, systematically to realize, in every area and at every instance, those 
nationalist objectives which earlier Hungarian governments had pursued 
only haphazardly and sporadically.
The first step in this direction was the creation of a nationalities depart­
ment within the prime minister's office, the control of which Bdnffy kept for 
himself. It was a part of his shrewd tactics that he allowed the Serbian, 
Slovak and Romanian nationalities to organize a joint conference in Buda­
pest on 10 August, 1895. This conference passed a resolution backing the 
territorial integrity of Hungary, but at the same time listed the grievances 
of the nationalities and urged the political recognition of the pluralistic char­
acter of the country, and the introduction of autonomy for the nationalities 
on the basis of the county system. By forming a co-ordinating committee 
these three nationalities wanted to give a common direction to their strug­
gle. However, as the government had hoped, nothing much came from this 
co-operation in the end, except for a few meetings, some correspondence 
and a joint protest against the Millennial Celebrations of 1896. The confer­
ence hold in Budapest attested to the growing importance of the capital, for 
all nationalities.
The Romanian nationalist movement was at a low ebb due to an internal 
crisis. The excitement generated by the Memorandum trial, which for a time 
had caused tempers to flare on both sides, quickly subsided. Those con­
victed in the trial and still in captivity were pardoned in 1895. In any case, 
the Hungarian nationalists had grown weary of the trials and of the inevita­
ble "fabrication of martyrs" that ensued. In Romania the Liberal Party, which 
had always exercised the stronger influence on the Transylvanian move-
ment, now took power and its leader, Sturdza, in a declaration of loyalty to 
the monarchy, repudiated his earlier views. He announced that Austria- 
Hungary "as it stands, is of vital importance to the European balance of 
power" and to the security of the Romanian state, and that the cessation of 
"every misunderstanding and quarrel" between the Hungarians and the 
Romanians was therefore desirable. He practically ended Bucharest's (offi­
cially secret but in fact widely-known) aid to the Romanian churches and 
schools of Transylvania, which meant the loss of 150,000-200,000 crowns in 
annual subsidy for these institutions. Only the Greek Orthodox grammar 
school in Brass6 and its related institutions continued to be financed from 
the Romanian capital, because in this case B£nffy was prepared to make an 
exception and to allow the aid (admittedly channelled through Budapest) 
even though there was no doubt about its being against the law. Because it 
received money from Romania, the prestigious grammar school did not 
need to accept financial support from the Hungarian government, and as a 
result escaped the effective control of Budapest.
The government attempted to attack the schools from two separate di­
rections. It tried to coax churches and villages into accepting government 
subsidy, as it was only with difficulty that these could pay the legally-pre- 
scribed minimum teacher's salary. The Romanians, who felt their cultural 
autonomy to be threatened, resorted to various counter-measures: their 
teachers either turned down the higher salary or they accepted paper in­
creases from the church. In response, Bdnffy ordered the counties to collect 
from the communities maintaining schools the sums necessary for the sal­
ary increases and, by imposing on them a higher "culture-tax" (which in 
Arad, for example, amounted to between 70-100 per cent of the property 
tax) forced all teachers concerned to apply for state assistance. This experi­
ment also backfired on the government: the church authorities did, finally, 
levy the tax for the salary increases, but the politically unpopular task of 
collecting it fell to the administration. As for the creation of a body to super­
vise the finances of the two Romanian churches, this was a plan which was 
impossible to implement.
Law IV of 1898, which was designed to deal with place-names, was con­
sidered to be a magyarizing measure typical of this period. It stated that 
every settlement could only have one official name, and caused outrage 
among the Romanians and Saxons since it meant that only the Hungarian 
equivalent of a place-name could appear on any official document or sign­
board. And yet, in school books and school documents, the nationalities' 
own designations could also be included, and any form of a place-name, or 
indeed any language, could be used in the press and in business.
Nevertheless, the coercive nationalities policy of the B&nffy government 
was more bark than bite. It was unable to affect the Saxons, and even the 
Romanian leaders could recover from their persecution in a year or two.
B&nffy was also frustrated in his ultimate scheme, since he was unable to 
unite the discordant forces of Hungarian politics under the banner of perse­
cuting the nationalities and the Socialists. The parliamentary opposition ac­
cused Banffy of selling out the nation's rights to Austria, and finally brought 
down his government in February 1899. His fall also sealed the fate of the 
Sturdza cabinet, as it turned out that Banffy and Sturdza were in complete 624
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agreement on questions concerning the Romanians of Transylvania. This 
was something that the Romanian public was not prepared to tolerate.
K&lm&n Szell, B&nffy's successor as prime minister, decided to do away 
with his predecessor's methods. He promised the country a return to prin­
cipled administrative methods in the spirit of De£k and Eotvos, under the 
banner of "Right, Law, and Justice". With a reinforced government party 
behind him, Sz611 was able to hold free elections in 1901. At this point the 
nationalities realized that the conditions for their return to the Parliament 
had greatly improved. The elimination of the nationalities department — a 
decision justified on foreign policy grounds as well — and the phasing out of 
the petty police methods also helped to reassure the Romanian opposition.
By the end of the nineteenth century the handling of the nationalities 
issue was more than just another police responsibility. Even though its sat­
isfactory solution was not given a very high priority, it ranked among the 
daily political worries of every government, and required a great deal of 
professionalism on the part of the administration.
But something else was taking place at this time which was of great im­
portance for the Transylvanian Hungarians. Measures indirectly support­
ive of the Hungarian ethnic group were introduced. Plans were drawn up 
for the improvement of Transylvania's banking facilities and for the expan­
sion of the co-operative movement, and as we have seen there were prepa­
rations for the implementation of a socially- and nationally-oriented reset­
tlement policy. The most important achievement was the Szekely Congress 
at Tusn&d in 1902, which presented a complex, government-backed pro­
gramme for the development of the Szekely fold. Later on the Romanians 
also appealed for similar government grants to boost their own depressed 
areas.
Hopes for a Settlement Fade. 
Renewed Romanian Activity
Traditional Romanian politics reached their zenith with the Memorandum  
movement. This provided moral gratification for the organizers of the move­
ment and for those who sympathized with them, but did nothing to rem­
edy grievances and offered no prospects for the future. It took years before 
the National Party was able to adjust its profile to the changing political 
situation and meet the new demands of a transforming Romanian intelli­
gentsia and bourgeoisie.
The lack of prospects revealed itself in a crisis which began at a time 
when the party leaders convicted in the Memorandum trial were still in prison. 
A struggle broke out between the party leadership and the more radical 
Tribunist youth, which in 1896 spread to Emigre circles in Bucharest, fur­
ther increasing the ideological confusion.
Political circles in Romania were the first to point out the need for a new 
programme. The Tribunists, together with the Liberal Party in Romania, 
worked out the details of the programme which emphasized the need for a 
modus vivendi between the Romanian population of Transylvania and the
Hungarian government. According to the new policy, the party was to aban­
don its passive approach, and once it was back in Parliament was to reach 
an agreement with the government: the demand for Transylvanian autonomy 
was to be dropped in return for an electoral system more favourable to the 
Romanian population. (This was the programme which every Hungarian 
government had promoted all along as an initial basis for negotiations.) The 
Tribunists launched a new paper in 1897, the Tribuna Poporului (People's 
Tribune), this time in Hungary proper rather than in Transylvania. They 
established the paper's editorial offices in Arad, where thiere had always 
been Romanian representation in county politics opposed to the idea of 
passive resistance, and where the paper could rely on considerable support 
from the better-off peasantry. Although only fifteen per cent of the popula­
tion of Arad was Romanian, it had the largest Romanian urban community 
after Brass6, with a Romanian bishop, a Romanian seminary and the sec­
ond largest Romanian bank, the Victoria.
But the renewal of political activity could not stem from the leaders in 
Arad, who were far too progressive and who were deeply committed to the 
Liberals of Romania. It was the financially independent and politically un­
committed new social stratum, the modern bourgeois layer of the Roma­
nian middle class, which took over the Arad programme and restyled it to 
fit the traditions of the party. loan Mihu, a landowner and bank director, 
announced the revision of the 1881 programme in a new paper, the Libertatea 
(Liberty), in 1902. The new programme accepted dualism, abandoned the 
demand for Transylvanian autonomy, and outlined a more detailed nation­
alities policy and a new social welfare policy. A young lawyer, Iuliu Maniu, 
worked out the details of an action plan which called for grass roots politi­
cal organization in the countryside, active participation in county politics 
and a m odem  propaganda campaign in the press. In the summer of 1903, 
Aurel Vlad managed to get himself elected in Hunyad county as a National 
Party deputy without as much as a mention of the demand for autonomy.
While the Hungarians had misgivings about the appointment of Count 
Istvan Tisza as prime minister in the autumn of 1903, the Romanians and 
Saxons pinned high hopes to the appointment of a man thought to be a 
loyal supporter of the court. Istvan Tisza had attached great significance to 
the Romanian question from the very beginning of his political career, and 
accepted the fact that the Romanian population of Hungary had unbreak­
able links with their kinsfolk living in the sovereign Kingdom of Romania. 
In the interest of strengthening the multinational state (and Austria-Hun- 
gary in general), Tisza pressed for a settlement with the Romanians, who 
constituted the largest national minority within the country. In his inaugu­
ral address as prime minister, he stated that "to  won and to strengthen the 
trust and the sympathy of the country's non-Hungarian speaking citizens" 
was an important national task. He also attempted to detach those moder­
ate Rom anians who were w illing to co-operate from the "dangerous 
subversives"28 in the national movement. Tisza quickly reached an agree-
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ment with the Saxon leaders who subsequently returned to the government 
party. The left-wing Romanian activists in Arad saw in the prime minister's 
statements a justification of their policy and gave further signs of their readi­
ness to negotiate. The following declaration was printed in their newspa­
per: "W e accept the unity of the Hungarian state without conditions and 
without equivocation; we are ready to shed our blood and risk our prop­
erty for the political unity and the unimpaired territorial integrity of the 
Hungarian state, as long as this state guarantees, by means of strong and 
reputable institutions, the freedom of our development along the lines of 
our national and ethnic character. We do this in the firm belief that a stable 
Habsburg state in central Europe provides a stronger guarantee of our Ro­
manian national existence than would a Romania which incorporated all 
the Romanians of Dacia Traiana in the absence of a Habsburg state. This is 
our response to the statements of Count Istv^n Tisza."29 The greater part of 
the Romanian party leadership, however, did not place much trust in Tisza, 
who in actual fact considered the ending of an unprecedented parliamen­
tary crisis to be his main task, and who, as a result, was soon forced to make 
concessions to the pro-independence opposition. In this way it was pre­
cisely the Tisza government which, instead of exploring the possibilities for 
some kind of truce, ended up making plans to take control of the nationali­
ties' schools. The nationalities unanimously protested against the proposal, 
which was submitted by Albert Berzeviczy, the minister of education, in 
October 1904. On the other hand, the Hungarian opposition which pressed 
for even stricter government control, also found the same proposal unsatis­
factory. In the course of his parliamentary crusade Tisza finally withdrew 
all his proposed legislation for tactical reasons.
From the point of view of the Romanian movement, the importance of 
the first Tisza administration must be judged by its gestures which indi­
cated moderation and foreshadowed the conciliatory policies of the second 
decade of the century. Tisza instructed his foispans to involve the Romanian 
population in the political and social life of the counties as much as possi­
ble. He practically ended press trials, permitted Romanian intellectuals to 
conduct protests against the Berzeviczy scheme, and handed over to ASTRA, 
the Nagyszeben cultural association, funds previously confiscated by B^nffy 
(together with the interest that had accrued). This money had been illegally 
collected to pay for a statue to commemorate Avram Iancu. After a long 
intermission, meetings with prominent Romanians were again considered. 
In the meantime, however, the parliamentary opposition was able to form a 
united front against Tisza and soon managed to topple his government.
On the eve of the elections of January 1905, and following a break of 
eleven years, the Romanian National Party held a conference in Nagyszeben. 
Instead of Transylvanian autonomy, the new programme pushed through 
by the younger generation demanded "the acknowledgment of the state- 
creating political character of the Romanian people and the assurance of the 
latter's ethnic and constitutional development through legal institutions". 
Other demands included the observance of the nationalities law of 1868, 
self-government for administrative districts defined to coincide with the
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various linguistic areas, and the introduction of universal manhood suf­
frage and the secret ballot together with some social welfare measures.
The new, constitutional phase of the Romanian national movement got 
off to an ominous start: only eight parliamentary seats were secured in­
stead of the forty that had been hoped for, in spite of the fact that the ad­
ministration's pressure on the electorate had been less intense than on pre­
vious occasions. The movement failed to become a sizeable parliamentary 
grouping.
The 1905 elections did more than just cause the fall of Tisza. For the first 
time in four decades the greater part of the electorate voted for the opposi­
tion, in the hope that it would further ease the country's links with Austria 
and help Hungary to advance on the road to full independence. With the 
electoral victory of the so-called 'Coalition', the nationalities' search for a 
satisfactory settlement reached a new stage.
The Coalition Period and Vienna's Last Experiment: 
The Workshop of Francis Ferdinand
The monarch, fearing for the unity of the empire, did not permit the leaders 
of the victorious oppositionist Coalition — Count Albert Apponyi, Count 
Gyula Andr&ssy the Younger and Ferenc Kossuth, the son of Lajos Kossuth
— to form a government. Instead, he instructed Baron G6za Fejerv&ry to 
form an extra-parliamentary administration. The new minister of the inte­
rior, J6zsef Krist6ffy, vexed the Hungarian supremacists and the Coalition, 
which jealously protected the political power of the landed class, with his 
plan for the introduction of universal suffrage. He did this in the hope that 
the Coalition leaders would renounce their demands for an independent 
Hungarian tariff area, a Hungarian central bank and the use of Hungarian 
as the language of command in the joint army's Hungarian regiments in 
return for the government's abandonment of the universal suffrage scheme.
The Saxons greeted the idea of an electoral reform with reservations, al­
though the Romanian leaders welcomed it wholeheartedly, considering that 
it represented the granting of an old democratic demand. It seemed that the 
king was finally siding with the nationalities. But Krist6ffy, unlike Tisza, 
would not even permit the Romanians to hold a national conference: he did 
not want his government, which was already under constant attack from 
the opposition for its antinationalism, to be exposed to charges of weak­
ness. In a further development, the minister of education simply issued a 
decree ordering that, in state schools, religion should henceforth be taught 
in Hungarian and not in the language of the respective denominations. Still, 
in contrast to the coalition parties which launched a noisy and theatrical but
— except in one part of the Sz6kelyf0ld — completely ineffective campaign 
of "national resistance" in Transylvania, the Romanian leaders urged their 
followers to pay all their taxes and to complete their term in the army — in 
short, to serve the dynasty.
In the end the monarch managed to tame the opposition Coalition, and 
Sandor Wekerle, a loyal adherent to the Compromise, was able to form a 628
government with strictly "fixed directives" in the spring of 1906. This caused 
some concern among the Romanians, who, after the end of the century, 
regarded the Independence Party as their principal enemy and as the "cham ­
pions of Hungarian chauvinism". However, the new government leaders 
invited the two Romanian bishops and a few Romanian politicians to a con­
fidential meeting. Although nothing came of the proposed co-operation in 
the elections because of the resistance put up by the counties, nevertheless 
eighteen Romanian deputies won parliamentary seats in the 1906 elections. 
Most of them, together with their Serbian and Slovak counterparts, actively 
participated in the work of the Parliament. Beside airing their national griev­
ances, from time to time they also spoke out in the interests of the peas­
antry.
In its methods, the nationality policy of the Coalition period showed simi­
larities to that of the B^nffy era: the concessions to Vienna were balanced by 
the hard line adopted on the nationalities issue, only this time the adminis­
tration was having to deal with much stronger nationalist movements. In 
any event, the Coalition programme was inspired by the vision of building 
a "Hungarian nation-state". All these factors together helped to bring about 
frequent trials for press offences, as well as a new wave of pamphlets dis­
cussing whether or not the Romanians were actually oppressed. This policy 
resulted in an education law which made use of the earlier Berzeviczy plan 
and which became known as the "Lex Apponyi".
According to Law XXVII of 1907, the salaries of teachers in both commu­
nity and church schools were to be raised. For this purpose, the govern­
ment offered to give state subsidy to the communities and churches main­
taining the schools, provided that a list of strict conditions were complied 
with. The schools were now supposed to give "an impeccably patriotic civic 
education" to their pupils, which in part was to be ensured by the more 
intensive teaching of Hungarian literature and the Hungarian language, as 
well as by lessons on the constitution. This was how cultural policy intended 
to change the fact that about 40 per cent of the country's population could 
not speak the official language of the state. There was another heavy-handed 
measure that later proved to be the source of frequent confrontations. Ac­
cording to this, Hungarian was to be the language of instruction in all the 
schools where half of the pupils were Hungarian, while in schools where 
Hungarian pupils comprised 20 per cent or more of the total, teaching in 
Hungarian had to be provided for them. All this was supplemented by regu­
lations which magyarized outward appearances: every school had to dis­
play the Hungarian coat of arms as well as the name of the school in Hun­
garian. In addition, on every public holiday the Hungarian state flag had to 
be flown, official forms printed in Hungarian had to be used, and pictures 
showing scenes from Hungarian history had to be exhibited in every class­
room. The Saxons and the Romanians protested at this.
In the nationalistic atmosphere which existed at the time the law was 
being drafted, there was no worthwhile response to the attempt made by 
the Bourgeois Radicals, who appeared on the scene at the turn of the cen­
tury and were the most progressive section of the Hungarian bourgeoisie, 
to enlist the nationalities' parties as allies of the Hungarian democratic move- 
629 ment. The leader of the Radicals, the scholar-politician Oszk^r J3szi, coura-
geously stood up for the nationalities, as did the Social Democratic Party 
which was the sole organizer of the Hungarian and non-Hungarian prole­
tariat. The Bourgeois Radicals forged some personal links with certain rep­
resentatives of the Romanian National Party, but never really managed to 
achieve close co-operation. On the Romanian side, the socialist movement 
was viewed with varying degrees of hostility: the Romanians tried to learn 
from the organizational methods of the Socialists and sometimes even con­
sidered the idea of an alliance. Nevertheless, among Romanian nationalists 
there was a fear that the Socialists would undermine the influence of the 
clergy over the poorer Romanian peasants.
In what constituted a difficult situation, the offer of an alliance came 
from exactly the place the Romanian intelligentsia had always hoped that it 
would: from Vienna. However, it was not the aging monarch who was be­
hind this, but the heir to the throne, the archduke Francis Ferdinand. After 
1906 a secret "W orkshop" came into being around him, one which worked 
out a new state policy very much opposed to the Hungarians, who were 
considered to be enemies of the dynasty.
Whereas the Transylvanian Saxons did not establish contacts with the 
archduke. From the autumn of 1906, Alexandru Vaida-Voevod, a Roma­
nian doctor of medicine by profession who was also a parliamentary deputy, 
prepared reports for the Workshop using an assumed name. In February 
1907, Francis Ferdinand granted Vaida-Voevod his first audience, after the 
latter had delivered a speech in the Parliament in which he had declared his 
loyalty to the dynasty and criticized "Hungarian separatism". This meeting 
was held secretly, as was the one to which Canon Augustin Bunea and Miron 
E. Cristea, a future bishop, were invited, and whose purpose was to clarify 
the views of the two Romanian churches.
It was around this time that Aurel C. Popovici, an exile living in Vienna, 
worked out a plan for a federal Grand Austria in his book Die Vereinigten 
Staaten von Grossdsterreich (The United States of Grand Austria). In this 
the various ethnic regions, rather than the historic territories, would be given 
the kind of autonomy which the member states of the United States of 
America then enjoyed. According to this scheme, all the Romanians living 
in historic Hungary would be grouped together in one unit (with a separate 
region being created for the Szekelys), and the plan also made provisions 
for the Kingdom of Romania to join the Habsburg Empire. As the strength­
ening of the dynasty was also among the objectives of the plan, the Work­
shop recruited Popovici, even though the archduke did not accept the lat­
ter's proposal — he approved none of the programmes in its entirety — and 
later gave orders for the plan to be revised in a conservative spirit.
The Romanian participants in the Workshop looked to the prospective 
monarch to end Hungarian hegemony and to extend the nationalities' rights. 
They knew his hostility towards dualism and his animosity towards the 
whole of Hungarian society. ("All Hungarians, be they ministers, princes, 
cardinals, burghers, peasants, hussars of domestic servants, are revolution­
aries and scum ,"30 he wrote in 1904.) They knew that, in order to bring
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down the Coalition government, Francis Ferdinand's aim was to "turn all 
the nationalities loose on the Hungarians", and that he hoped to achieve 
this through the introduction of universal suffrage. Vaida and his support­
ers offered the assistance of the Romanian party in the fight against the 
Coalition. In this way they secured Francis Ferdinand's acceptance of their 
national movement, and this association undoubtedly helped improve their 
political standing.
The Last Experiment of Budapest: Istvan Tisza's 
Negotiations with the Romanian National Party
The fall of the Coalition government and the appointment of Count K^roly 
Khuen-Hederviry as prime minister in January 1910 proved to be a water­
shed in the political history of dualism. In order to solve the continuing 
political crisis, a new government party, loyal to the spirit of the Compro­
mise, was formed by uniting the entire spectrum of the country's conserva­
tive forces.
Transylvania's Hungarian population grew also disgusted with the Coa­
lition. For their part, the nationalities considered the new government's 
members to be faithful followers of the court and, realizing that the arch­
duke expected the administration to implement his policies, allowed their 
hopes to be raised even higher. The government was very careful to keep 
these hopes alive. It abruptly suspended the sentences of a whole list of 
political prisoners, dropped a number of the press trials it had inherited, 
and tacitly permitted the use of the Romanian tricolour. The Supreme Court 
announced that the public singing of the song Desteaptd-te romine (Roma­
nian, awake) which was tantamount to a national anthem was not prohib­
ited, and Apponyi's educational policies were placed under review.
The first measures of the new government found a favourable reception 
with the Tribuna group in Arad. The members of the latter realized that 
Khuen-Hedervary would need the nationalities' support in his fight against 
the Hungarian pro-independence opposition. They were also urged by the 
Liberal Party in Bucharest to press for a "fair settlement" and immediately 
started to organize a campaign. The leaders of the national committee 
(Comitetul National) regarded the latest changes with anticipation, and Khuen 
assured them that the government did not intend to crush the nationalities 
in the elections. It is claimed that the Romanians promised to support the 
government in sixty constituencies, for which the government offered sub­
stantial electoral subsidies in return, subsidies amounting to 60,000-100,000 
crowns in some cases.
The leader of the Bucharest Liberals, loan I.C. Bratianu, also sent a con­
siderable sum to the Romanian party, whose members, in addition, could 
rely on Khuen-Hederv&ry's good will, the support of Francis Ferdinand, 
and the backing of Karl Lueger and his Viennese Christian Socialists. The 
party put up thirty-three candidates in thirty-seven constituencies, but in­
ternal cohesion was lacking. The cautious words of the level-headed Maniu 
fell on deaf ears when he told the voters of Alvinc: "I beg you not to listen to
those malicious rumours which suggest, with special reference to us former 
Romanian deputies, that we have made some kind of a deal with the new 
governm ent..."31
The 1910 election — especially in the Hungarian areas — was one of the 
most coercive ever. The ruling Nemzeti Munkapart (Party of National Work) 
which had been founded by Istv^n Tisza, wanted a victory that would si­
multaneously annihilate a number of different parliamentary opponents, 
among them the nationalities, in order to block the emergence of a strong 
parliamentary grouping which supported Francis Ferdinand. The changing 
attitude of the public, who had been disappointed in the jingoistic national­
ism of the Coalition, contributed to the fact that the Party of National Work 
scored a great victory. Tisza declared to a gathering of trusted supporters 
that he was now ready for the archduke.
Only five of the Romanian candidates won seats, three of them in con­
stituencies where there was no other candidate. By contrast, nine Roma­
nian delegates were returned to the Parliament on the government ticket. 
There was such surprise at the outcome of the election that people did not 
even attribute it to governmental interference: "Two seats at most were lost 
due to electoral malpractice, since in a number of places our candidates 
failed to win thousands of Romanian votes,"32 wrote one of the most mod­
erate Romanian newspapers. The press organ of the Archdiocese of Nagy­
szeben, which had adopted a stand for compromise with the government, 
described the election in terms of the Romanian nation's having turned away 
from a programme which stood absolutely no chance of success.
Count Istv&n Tisza, the Hungarian ruling classes' "m an of Providence", 
had come out in favour of an agreement between the Hungarians and the 
Romanians even before the elections. His speech had been warmly received 
by the Romanian press, and Bal&zsfalva's Unirea (Associate) had instantly 
compared him to DeSk as the refuge of the nationalities. In July, Tisza re­
peated his view in Parliament. The Romanian National Committee accepted 
this as a basis for negotiations, and endorsed the idea that loan Mihu, a man 
of great wealth who had already played a part in the party's decision to 
return to active politics, should begin negotiations with Tisza. Abandoning 
his former policies, Tisza immediately acquiesced in the continuing exist­
ence of the separate Romanian party and agreed both to the inclusion of its 
leaders in further talks, and to the ratification by a Romanian national con­
ference of any future agreement. The party leadership drafted the party's 
demands, deciding on a "m ore moderate" line in Parliament and promis­
ing to prepare a new party manifesto.
The political, economic and cultural demands of the Romanian National 
Party were sent to Tisza in the form of a memorandum in the autumn of 
1910. The demands, which took the form of twenty-three points, included 
the extension of the franchise, the assurance of fifty electoral districts, the 
systematic use of Romanian as an official language, the establishment of a 
minimum number of positions for Romanian officials, the setting up of three 
new Romanian dioceses, the revision of the "Lex Apponyi", an increase in
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government subsidies for Romanian cultural projects, the founding of three 
Romanian grammar schools and the extension of the "Szekely Action" to 
Romanian areas in order to promote economic development there. In re­
turn, the party promised to accept the Compromise of 1867, but did not 
undertake to support government policy. Tisza (and Khuen) regarded this 
as unacceptable, but considered it as a basis for negotiations. The Roma­
nian party sent a delegation to the talks but its members were unable to 
reach agreement among themselves. Maniu and Vlad were not even willing 
to admit the legality of the status quo and Mihu, who had become embit­
tered as a result of the disunity and the multiplying demands, decided to 
resign. The various factions paralyzed the negotiations with their counter­
proposals, and the suspicion — by no means groundless — was growing 
within the government circles that the Romanian leaders were not masters 
in their own house. The speedy elimination of factionalism became a matter 
of sheer political survival.
The strongest faction, the Tribunist movement of Arad, included Octavian 
Goga, a poet of considerable renown who had become popular on both 
sides of the Carpathians through his Luceafarul (Evening Star) and J a r  a 
Noastra (Our Country) literary-political magazines, which he had launched 
in Budapest in 1902. In a series of incisive articles, Goga attacked the na­
tional committee for the lost election and urged the committee's revitaliza­
tion. His followers, the "youth of steel" wanted a popular movement which 
rejected all alien — Hungarian or Jewish-Hungarian — influences. They 
developed a political concept founded on messianism, religious mysticism 
and conservative anti-capitalism but which also exhibited democratic over­
tones, as well as the influence of contemporary sociology and Hungarian 
bourgeois radicalism.
The Romanian party leadership first attempted to bargain, then de­
nounced factionalism, and finally set up an official party newspaper, again 
based in Arad. From early 1911 Romanul (Romanian) was published, with 
an ex-Tribunist, Vasile Goldis, as its editor. The new paper had only one 
objective: to smash the Tribunist movement. The war in the newspapers, 
which often involved personal attacks, gradually developed into a real-life 
inquisition, to the great delight of the Hungarian journalists commenting 
on it. In the end the crisis was resolved from the Romanian capital. In March 
1912, Constantin Stere, a man well-placed within Bucharest liberal circles, 
turned up in Arad and abolished th eTribuna through a series of harsh meas­
ures. The newspaper and its assets passed into the possession of the com­
mittee. Later, it was merged with Romanul. The twenty-five year history of 
the Tribuna movement thus ended. Although the more democratic wing 
lost out, the committee gained room to manoeuvre, while its capacity to 
compromise also increased.
Romanian public life in Transylvania was revitalized, partly due to the 
continuing internal struggle. After 1910 one political mass meeting followed 
another and the societies once again flourished, thanks in good measure to 
donations from Vasile Stroescu, a previously unknown Bessarabian land­
owner. (These were worth at least 500,000 crowns in the three years begin­
ning in 1909.) The celebrations commemorating ASTRA's fiftieth anniver­
sary turned into a vast Pan-Romanian political demonstration, during which
Aurel Vlaicu, the talented Transylvanian aviator, played a symbolic part by 
attempting to fly across the Carpathians.
The second round of negotiations between the governing National Work 
Party and the Romanians of Transylvania began partly because of prompt­
ing from Bucharest. In January 1913 Teodor Mihali, Iuliu Maniu and Valeriu 
Braniste handed over the party's demands, which were now listed in the 
form of eleven points. On the advice of Francis Ferdinand, however, these 
were worded in such a way that any potential agreement based on them 
"would appear as though the Hungarians were violating it and therefore, 
could be considered null and void".33 The document demanded the teach­
ing of the Romanian language at every level in state and community schools, 
the introduction of Romanian in the administration and in the courts, unre­
stricted freedom of assembly and freedom of the press, and, finally, pro­
portional representation in the Parliament. Tisza's response was deliber­
ately cautions, and there is no doubt that the spectacular escalation of the 
demands had something to do with this. His reaction was limited to ad­
dressing easily manageable religious and administrative grievances and to 
giving some undertakings in connection with economic policy. The Roma­
nian decision to break off the talks was supported by Francis Ferdinand.
The third round of negotiations began in the autumn of 1913, at a time of 
serious international tension following the Treaty of Bucharest which con­
cluded the Second Balkan War. Tisza, who was prime minister at the time, 
renewed the talks with the three delegates who — conscious of the support 
they enjoyed both from a stronger Romania and from Francis Ferdinand — 
added to their earlier list of demands. For his part, however, Tisza made 
greater concessions. He promised to guarantee the right to use one's mother 
tongue both in writing and in speech in the administration and at the lower 
levels of the judiciary, to oblige administrators to pass an examination in 
the language of the region where they worked, and to extend the teaching 
of Romanian. He also promised a public Romanian secondary school, in­
creased state subsidies to the Romanians (which then stood at seven million 
crowns), and finally, to give the Romanians nearly thirty constituencies. He 
was also willing to "reconsider" the Lex Aponyi. But Tisza's conditions were 
equally severe. He wanted the Romanian party to abandon its programme 
based on the old grievances, to accept without reservation the existing form 
of government, to accept the Compromise as a long term solution, and to 
fashion its policy in compliance with it. In this way, Tisza hoped to settle 
the Romanian question once and for all.
The Romanian party faced a serious dilemma. Its leaders could not have 
doubted the sincerity of Tisza's intentions. Bucharest wanted an agreement, 
and Vienna also pressed for some kind of a settlement, while the Romanian 
bourgeoisie wished to reach an understanding with the government in or­
der to carry on with its business in a normal fashion. The Romanian party 
would have accepted Tisza's offer had he not demanded from them the 
acceptance of dualism, or as they put it, a declaration of surrender. The 
narrow leading stratum of the party wanted the agreement but was afraid
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of the consequences, and also wanted to stay in opposition. Its dilemma 
was made even more serious by Francis Ferdinand who promised to assign 
a major role to the Romanians after his succession which seemed more and 
more imminent with every day that passed. This partly explains the con­
tinuing extension of Romanian demands, which peaked in 1913 with the 
request for a Romanian minister without portfolio and two Romanian state 
secretaries. After this the Hungarian prime minister made further conces­
sions. Seeing Francis Ferdinand's intentions, Tisza tactically dropped his 
last demand: he no longer attempted to have the Compromise accepted as 
final by the Romanians and ceased to insist on a "declaration of surrender". 
In this way he managed to lay the responsibility for failure squarely on the 
shoulders of the Romanians. There was nothing left for the Belvedere to do 
but come out in its true colours. In December 1913 the view of Francis 
Ferdinand and his adherents was still that "an agreement must be m ade".34 
In January 1914, however, the heir-apparent already revealed that he had 
agreed to the negotiations only after much hesitation and under the pres­
sure of the international situation: "I am basically against an agreement, 
because it would involve the danger of our Romanians being drawn into 
the anti-dynastic Hungarian camp, which would involve very grave future 
consequences from my point of view."35 The word was sent out that it was 
not at all necessary to come to an agreement, something which the vacillat­
ing Romanian National Committee was pleased to hear. The committee made 
the following declaration at its meeting of 17 February, 1914: Tisza's offer 
was "unsuitable for preventing, even temporarily, conflict between the Ro­
manians and the governmental policy of the Hungarian state"36
If until 1913 it had been the Romanian politicians who had been the ones 
pressing for an agreement with the Hungarian government, now it was 
only the aging King Carol who urged this. Tisza, too, could see that failure 
would probably result. He wrote to Mihali: "It is painful to admit, but I 
now have little hope that our goal will be accomplished. Still, I am happy to 
see that you, too, think there has been substantial progress and conver­
gence."37
In early 1914 a last attempt was made to integrate the Romanians — 
including, this time, those who advocated separatism — into Hungarian 
political life on the basis of the existing balance of power within the dualist 
system. Unlike a similar experiment with the Saxons, this attempt too ended 
in failure.
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The official Hungarian-Romanian negotiations took place over the heads 
of Transylvania's Hungarian politicians, as the Transylvanian question had 
long ceased to be merely a power struggle between the Hungarians and 
Romanians living in the region. Apparently the conduct and the views of 
these Hungarian politicians were shaped by their anxieties, which grew 
substantially after 1913, when in the wake of the Treaty of Bucharest, Ro­
mania became a power to be reckoned with in south-eastern Europe. Al­
though Hungarian politicians knew that the Romanian problem had to be 
addressed again, they failed to come up with an up-to-date conception of 
how this could be done. Most of them thought that even Tisza's concessions 
had gone too far, as the speeches of Count Istvdn Bethlen and Zolt&n Desy 
revealed in the course of the unusually cultivated parliamentary debate held 
in late 1913 and early 1914. The former preferred the policy of flat rejection, 
while the latter considered that a profound general democratization in it­
self would be the best way to resolve the problem.
The Social Democratic Party, which formed the optimistic wing of the 
progressive forces in Hungary, and especially the Bourgeois Radicals, felt 
the urgency of settling the nationalities issue more than most did, but could 
not manage to build on the talks. The Socialists, in line with the thinking of 
the time, saw in the negotiations a struggle between progressivism and re­
action. From this they had a presentiment of the emergence of a conserva­
tive bloc extending from Tisza himself to the nationalities' parties. The bour­
geois Radicals held somewhat similar views. Jaszi alone attempted to ad­
dress the question as a problem of non-linear development.
In early 1914, many still believed that an agreement — more probably 
without the much-criticized Tisza than with him — was imminent. The out­
break of the First World War, however, was to produce a completely new 
situation.
4. The First World War 
The First Years of the War
During the political crisis which followed Francis Ferdinand's assassina­
tion in Sarajevo, it was the Hungarian prime minister who alone opposed 
the war against Serbia. The fear of a possible attack on Transylvania great­
ly influenced his views. Tisza regarded the Kingdom of Romania as an en­
emy from the outset. He thought that Hungary could not start a war "when 
we have already practically lost Romania, without getting any compensa­
tion''.38 But even Tisza's resistance was worn down by pressure from Ber­
lin, once the Germans had guaranteed Romania's neutrality and once the 
general staff had promised to strengthen Transylvania's borders and to send 
reinforcements there.
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On 26 July, 1914, a state of emergency was declared throughout the zone 
from Serbia to Galicia, and hence throughout the whole of Transylvania. 
Border-crossing was limited, and so was freedom of assembly and the ad­
ministrative authority of the counties. Trial by jury was suspended and a 
speeded-up criminal procedure brought in. Censorship of the press was 
introduced in the country generally which enabled the authorities to make 
checks on private correspondence, telegraph traffic and telephone conver­
sations. Horses and motor vehicles were requisitioned by the army and 
mass conscription began. The Kingdom of Romania, which was formally 
allied to Austria-Hungary, remained neutral at the beginning of the world 
conflagration and by all sensible reckoning, it was in Romania's interest to 
preserve its military forces intact for as long as possible. However, even at 
the beginning of the war the Entente and the Central Powers were compet­
ing for Bucharest's support, and in this way Transylvania suddenly found 
itself among the bargaining chips of international diplomacy.
Those Romanian politicians who feared tzarist Russia, and therefore gravi­
tated towards the Central Powers, attempted to pressurize the Budapest 
government through both Vienna and Berlin. They suggested an autono­
mous Transylvania, as well as the transfer of a part of the Bukovina (in the 
Kingdom of Romania). In this way they hoped to ensure that Romania sided 
with the Central Powers. The German ambassador in Bucharest learned 
from King Carol that Russia had promised to give Transylvania to Roma­
nia, together with an assurance that it would obtain the consent of Great 
Britain and France for this. The Germans now increased the pressure on 
Tisza, and the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, personally asked 
him to make concessions to the country's Romanians. Tisza's view, how­
ever, was that Romania's attitude would depend solely on the outcome of 
fighting on the battlefield: victory for the Central Powers would render any 
concessions unnecessary, and these would be worthless in the event of de­
feat. Not everyone shared the prime minister's views: initially it was not 
realized that only the conservative politicians in Bucharest wished Roma­
nia to enter the fighting on the side of the Central Powers while all Bratianu 
had in mind in return for the Austro-Hungarian concessions was tempo­
rary Romanian neutrality. (According to the Russo-Romanian pact signed 
on 1 October, 1914, Russia had already promised to give Romania Transyl­
vania and Southern Bukovina, on condition that Romania would remain 
neutral.) Under pressure from all sides Tisza finally agreed to making sub­
stantial concessions at the crown council held on 12 September. On the fol­
lowing day he summoned the leaders of the Romanian party and promised 
to extend language rights, to revise Apponyi's education act and to create 
more Romanian constituencies — provided that "the entire Romanian race" 
stood by Austria-Hungary. Vaida agreed to this but Maniu remained so 
evasive that Tisza had to break off the talk.
Political circles in Bucharest and Berlin hinted at a package deal consist­
ing of the appointment of a separate Romanian minister, a few Romanian 
foispans, a complete Romanian school system and forty Romanian constitu­
encies. The plan was outlined during a meeting between Bucharest's am­
bassadors to Austria-Hungary and Germany on the one side, and Vaida, 
637 Vlad and Goldis on the other, after the diplomats had convinced them-
selves that the latter were "unquestionably loyal to the emperor".39 By this 
time the German foreign ministry was well acquainted with the history of 
the Romanian demands in Transylvania, and was also familiar with the 
comprehensive records of Tisza's pre-war negotiations with the Romani­
ans. "The responsibility for the hostility of the Romanian public towards us 
lies with Hungary, and in the end Count Tisza will have to make conces­
sions, while there is still time,"40 opined the German ambassador to Bucha­
rest, expressing a view which was in complete harmony with that of the 
German chancellor. But by a moderate extension of the pre-war conces­
sions Tisza only wanted to keep the leading Romanian circles in suspense: 
he tried to delay their arrival at a decision in the hope that Hungarian policy 
might be able to circumvent the whole problem without making substantial 
sacrifices.
Correspondence between the prime m inister and the archbishop of 
Nagyszeben was published on 8 November, 1914. It revealed that Tisza had 
promised to extend the rights of the nationalities as early as September, 
while acknowledging the loyalty of the Hungarian state's Romanian sub­
jects and their heroism in the war effort. The press trials were dropped, the 
Romanians convicted of political crimes were granted amnesty and the use 
of the Romanian national flag was allowed. These measures made little 
impression on Romania, but sufficed to outrage Hungarian nationalists. In 
an interview given to the magazine Az Ujsdg (The News) Maniu appealed 
to Tisza for more details on the institutional guarantees of Romanian na­
tional rights. It is a fact that the position of the Romanians of Transylvania 
was relatively good as a consequence of the diplomatic efforts to win over 
Romania itself. In addition to the measures outlined, after the end of 1914 
the government was very careful not to provoke Romanian public opinion. 
Romanul, the newspaper of the Romanian National Party, was effectively 
kept alive by the government, as its editors had wanted to cease publication 
in late 1914 on account of the censorship which was then in force.
The relationship between the Central Powers and Romania became tenser 
in the course of 1915. German pressure was strong when the military situa­
tion worsened for the Central Powers, but it was equally intense when they 
scored successes on the eastern front: they badly needed Romania's mili­
tary strength. Mathias Erzberger, a special envoy from Berlin, travelled to 
Budapest and Vienna in May and June 1915. He had discussions with the 
Romanian leaders in Hungary, and even touched upon the reorganization 
of the monarchy on federal lines. Tisza, of course, would have none of this: 
in fact he personally visited the German capital in June to reject these pro­
posals and to obstruct any experimentation.
The temporary improvement of the military situation and Bulgaria's en­
try into the war (on 1 October, 1915) eased somewhat the Hungarian gov­
ernment's problems. The Romanian newspapers were rebuked for not com­
menting on the various declarations of loyalty. Maniu, the staunchest fig­
ure in the opposition, was sent to the front and the police were given special 
powers. Finally, in March 1917, Romanul was also suspended.
39. Telegraphic report of 18 October, 1914 by Bussche, German embassador in Bu­
charest. PA AA Bonn. Osterreich 104, Bd. 13, A 2720.
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Romania's Attempt to Occupy Transylvania
Austria-Hungary's military failures during the summer of 1916 moved the 
Bucharest government to consider joining the war. In a memorandum, Tisza 
asked the king to concentrate a deterrent force along the Transylvanian bor­
der. He also wanted to secure Germany's help, and in return, was willing to 
renounce the monarchy's territorial demands in connection with Poland. 
The Germ an, Austro-H ungarian, Bulgarian and Turkish general staffs 
agreed to launch a joint counter-offensive against Romania should this be­
come necessary.
Believing the military defeat of the Central Powers to be imminent, the 
Romanian government succumbed to continuing French pressure and joined 
the Entente in a secret pact signed in Bucharest on 17 August 1916. The 
Entente undertook to support Romania by launching new offensives on the 
Salonican and Galician fronts, and also by sending war supplies. Much was 
expected from Romania's joining the hostilities, in return for which it was 
to receive parts of the Bukovina, the whole of the Banat and historical 
Transylvania together with further territories lying to the west, roughly 
extending to the line of the Tisza River but not including the Debrecen and 
Orosh£za areas. During one of the last crown councils Prime M inister 
Bratianu asked: "W ho knows whether there will ever be a moment so fa­
vourable in the centuries to com e?"41 On Sunday, 27 August, Romania's 
declaration of war on the monarchy was handed over in Vienna, and the 
troops of King Ferdinand, Carol I's successor, advanced across the Car­
pathian passes during the night.
Hungary's Transylvanian borders were guarded almost entirely by gen­
darmes: the troops posted there earlier had long been sent to the Russian 
front. The authorities began the evacuation of the threatened zone on the 
first day of the attack: the population was called upon to evacuate the areas 
beyond the Maros River, which above all affected the Hungarian and Saxon 
town dwellers and the inhabitants of the Szekely fold. The refugees num­
bered well over 200,000.
The Romanian attack shocked the people of Hungary, even though no 
one really doubted that the invaders would be driven back. The Romanian 
national movement also found itself in a precarious situation. While the 
party made no official comment, it agreed to its leaders' publicly swearing 
allegiance to the monarchy and denouncing the Romanian attack. At this 
time it seemed that Transylvania's Romanian population had less sympa­
thy with the invading troops than the Romanian and Hungarian official 
circles had anticipated. According to King Ferdinand, "even the Romani­
ans of Transylvania treated them as enemies",42 and the professor-politi- 
cian Nicolae Iorga noted that "not one word of greeting could be heard 
from them when the Romanian army crossed the border in 1916". These
41. Cited by V. A t a n a s iu  — A. Io r d a c h e ,  Romania in primul razboi mondial. Bucharest
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extreme generalizations, of course, resulted from bitterness. There were 
many who cheered the Romanian troops, believing that national union would 
now ensue. But the majority of the Romanian population remained aloof. In 
spite of his complaints about the intelligentsia, thefoispan  of Szeben county 
pointed out in a confidential summary report on the Romanian invasion 
that the behaviour of the Romanian population was "satisfactory for the 
most part".43
According to the Romanian plan of operations, the 400,000 strong army 
should have reached the Maros River within a few days, so that it could 
afterwards invade the open plains of the Tisz&ntul from two separate direc­
tions. Although on the Hungarian side there were only some 70,000 men 
even after the arrival of the first reinforcements, the offensive proceeded 
quite slowly. Although Romanian troops marched into an evacuated Brass6 
on 30 August, and then occupied the greater part of the Szekelyfold, they 
afterwards captured only Petrozseny and Orsova, deciding not to occupy 
Nagyszeben, even though it had been evacuated. In the meantime the army 
of Field Marshal von Mackensen scored a victory over the Romanian forces 
along the Bulgarian border. This forced the Romanian military leadership 
to halt the invasion of Transylvania in mid-September and to put its forces 
on the defensive.
The Central Powers concentrated the First Austro-Hungarian (defensive) 
Army at Marosvasarhely, and the Ninth German (offensive) Army along 
the southern section of the Maros River. The latter was hastily assembled 
from various German and Austro-Hungarian units posted on different fronts. 
Falkenhayn, the recently dismissed German chief of general staff, led this 
army to victory against the Romanian forces in the Battle of Nagyszeben on 
26-28 September, following this up with another success at Brass6 on 7-9 
October. Afterwards the First Army, under the command of General Arz (a 
Transylvanian Saxon), inflicted another defeat on the enemy, south-east of 
M arosvasarhely. The Romanian withdrawal now began. The retreating 
troops took hostages with them, but a significant part of the Romanian in­
telligentsia of the southern border region fled the country of its own accord. 
In some cases whole parish councils left with the Romanian forces. In mid- 
November, after heavy fighting in the Carpathians, the forces of the Central 
Powers reached the Oltenian plains and on 6 December, following further 
battles, they entered Bucharest.
Romania's losses in the 1916 campaign amounted to more than 100,000 
casualties and 150,000 prisoners of war. The army was reorganized with 
the help of the French military mission under General Berthelot, and in 
June 1917 it managed to prevent the overrunning of Moldavia. Neverthe­
less, two-thirds of Romania (including the richest part of the country) came 
under German and Austro-Hungarian occupation, and two years accumu­
lated agricultural produce fell into enemy hands.
After the Russian revolution Romania was left without direct support 
and, despite its obligations to the Entente, signed a separate peace with the
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Central Powers in the spring of 1918. In accordance with its terms, Roma­
nia's entire economy passed into German and Austro-Hungarian control 
and its army was forced to demobilize. A narrow strip of land, between 
two and ten kilometres wide and with a population of 23,000, was annexed 
to Hungary on the pretext of a "strategic border correction", and Romania 
lost almost the whole of the Dobrudja. At the same time, it was allowed to 
keep Bessarabia which it had seized from Soviet Russia in January 1918.
The Measures Following the Fighting
After driving out the enemy, the government made spectacular gestures in 
order to reassure the Hungarian and Saxon population of Transylvania. In 
early November 1916 Archduke Charles (the new heir to the throne) and 
the king of Bavaria both visited Transylvania, while the German emperor 
made a ceremonial visit the following autumn. State and community assist­
ance came flooding in. At the same time — and mostly to salve the admin­
istration's guilty conscience for leaving Transylvania almost completely 
unprotected — the civilian, and especially the military, authorities intro­
duced harsh retaliatory measures against the Romanian population. Intern­
ments, arrests and trials followed one another, irrespective of the fact that 
hundreds of thousands of Romanians had fought valiantly on the monar­
chy's side. In the autumn of 1917 the minister of the interior admitted to the 
internment of 825 persons, although the Romanians knew of more than 1,000 
such cases.
When the Tisza government was replaced in the middle of 1917, Count 
Albert Apponyi, the new minister of religion and public education, em­
barked on the establishment of a so-called "culture zone" along the Roma­
nian border, in which all Romanian denominational schools were to be taken 
over by the government, except for about fifteen to eighteen institutions 
which were to be left with the Romanian Orthodox church on account of 
their illustrious past. According to the plan 1,600 state elementary schools 
and 800 nurseries were to be created within four or five years. A permanent 
supervisor was assigned to every Romanian teacher training college. By 
June 1918 all forms of state subsidy had been stopped to 477 teachers em­
ployed in 311 Romanian church schools. Only developments in the autumn 
of 1918 cut short these changes.
In 1917, the Wekerle government issued a decree which restricted prop­
erty transactions in Transylvania (and in Upper Hungary). The new law 
did not explicitly exclude the Romanian peasants from buying land, but 
through administrative means, made this very difficult. Its aim was also to 
prevent the Romanian bourgeoisie from purchasing land in the villages.
The military operations following the Romanian attack caused some se­
rious damage (especially in the Szekelyfold), but this came nowhere near 
the devastation which occurred on the western and eastern fronts. With 
some help from the government, Transylvania recovered relatively quickly 
from the consequences of the chaos and destruction. Industry was still pros­
pering, although there were serious problems with steel production, coal
production and transport. A number of companies and credit institutions
— among them the Romanian Economul — increased their capital signifi­
cantly. In 1917 alone, nineteen new joint-stock companies were formed and 
in Transylvania proper the total capital increase was nearly 33 million 
crowns. There had not been such an abundance of money since 1911. New 
branches of industry developed, for example, gas utilization, the chemical 
plan at Dicsdszentmarton and bauxite mining in Bihar.
It was the peasants who bore the brunt of the war. The consequences of 
requisitioning and the shortage of labour weighed most heavily on them, as 
did the burden of conscription. Yields, the area of land cultivated, and the 
number of livestock were all declining. The system of requisitioning intro­
duced in 1917 left to the producers just ten to twelve kilograms of grain per 
family member, and any surplus left over from sowing was taken away 
then. Periods of acute hunger, if not quite the kind of organized famine 
experienced in Germany, did occur, primarily among the urban population 
but also in the villages. The soup-kitchens which were set up could do very 
little to help the very poor.
Because of the food shortages and also the decline in real wages, work­
ers' protests became frequent after 1916. As is well known, these struggles 
coincided both with peace movements provoked by the growing war wea­
riness and with the onset of political crisis. In May 1916 there was a series of 
strikes in the Zsil Valley coal mines, prompting retaliatory arrests and pros­
ecutions. The Russian revolution in February 1917 gave the working-class 
movement a boost. In early May, there were workers' demonstrations in 
Kolozsv&r, Brass6, Arad and Temesv&r. The railway employees and the 
miners organized a new wave of strikes. By 1918 even the fear of reprisals 
was not enough to stop the masses. Their demands everywhere were for 
the improvement of living standards, universal suffrage and peace. The 
power of the trade unions with these movements suddenly became sub­
stantial.
Because of the danger of an internal explosion, it soon became very ur­
gent to end hostilities. However, the crisis spread with such speed that there 
was no time for the government to save the situation through a rapid con­
clusion of peace.
IV. Revolutions and National Movements 
after the Collapse of the Monarchy 
( 1 9 1 8 - 1 9 1 9 )
The Michaelmas Daisy Revolution
The triumph of the October revolution in Russia in 1917 radically changed 
political relations in east-central Europe. While a strong Russia existed, the 
Habsburg Empire had had a historical mission: to preserve the European 
balance of power. With the downfall of tsarist Russia and the decline of 
Germ any's military might, however, the monarchy lost its former impor­
tance. The future of the empire, and that of its 50 million inhabitants, be­
came an open question.
The proclamation issued on 2 November by Russia's Council of Com­
missars called on the peoples of the monarchy to effect the unity of the 
proletariat and outlined the prospect of a vast, united revolutionary front. 
The bourgeoisie, on the other hand, wished to split up the empire on the 
basis of the Wilsonian version of national self-determination, and also to 
block the emergence of such a large proletarian unit.
The Entente spent much time deliberating the fate of the monarchy. French 
politicians preferred the complete dismemberment of the Habsburg Em­
pire, while the British and the Americans initially thought that its preserva­
tion would be more useful. In the spring of 1918 it seemed that the Entente 
did not consider the 1916 secret agreement with Bucharest to be still valid
— if for no other reason than Romania's separate peace with the Central 
Powers. However, by the time autumn set in, the British and the French 
prime ministers had promised the "council for Romanian unity" their sup­
port for the union of all Romanians. By contrast, President Wilson, in his 
reply of 18 October to the monarchy's peace offer, only attached impor­
tance to granting the Czech and South Slav demands and did not even men­
tion the Romanians.
The early autumn of 1918 marked the beginning of intense political ac­
tivity. In the Reichsrat in Vienna the Romanians of the Bukovina demanded 
their separate state within the monarchy, and the Romanians of Transylva­
nia did the same in Budapest. Following their meeting on 12 October, the 
members of the national committee informed the press th a t"... they would 
announce that the Romanian population of Hungary had no intention of 
seceding" and the "they only want the right to self-determination on the
basis of Wilson's Fourteen Points".1 In Parliament, Vaida-Voevod demanded 
"com plete national freedom" for the Romanians.
The majority of Transylvania's Hungarian politicians insisted on pre­
serving the old state unity and any concessions they were willing to make 
were purely administrative (the appointment of a Romanian minister, for 
example) or concerned the use of the Romanian language. "Naturally, ced­
ing counties [to Romania] is out of the question, but it is also pointless to 
talk about the division of Hungary into self-governing units".2
Karolyi and J£szi (who represented some sort of a shadow cabinet) had 
their first discussions with the delegates of the Romanian national commit­
tee on 18 October. K&rolyi suggested a plebiscite to settle the future of 
Transylvania. The committee first of all wanted K&rolyi's assurance that a 
future government headed by him would allow them to convene a Pan- 
Romanian national meeting. At the Budapest Social Democratic Congress 
held on 13 October, the Romanian delegate announced that "it is in our 
interest to support Hungary's struggle for democratization, since once we 
have won the rights due to us in this country, we shall not lose them even if 
we are annexed to another".3 At the same time, serious reservations were 
also voiced about the Romanian National Party.
The Hungarian National Council, the body created as a result of an agree­
ment between the Radical Party, the Social Democrats and the Independ­
ence Party, issued a proclamation on 26 October. In this it declared that the 
national minorities were to be granted self-determination as suggested in 
W ilson's Fourteen Points, and without delay — "in the hope that these ele­
ments will place Hungary's territorial integrity... on more secure founda­
tions".4 Also, a Transylvanian Committee of the Hungarian National Coun­
cil was formed, with Istv&n Ap&thy, the rector of the University of Kolozsvar 
and a scholar of European renown, being elected as its chairman, although 
his nationalism had long been a source of irritation to the Romanian intelli­
gentsia. Jen6 Janovics, a member of the Radical Party and a theatre and film 
director, became a deputy chairman, as did the Social Democrat Sandor 
Vincze.
Concurrently with the October revolution in Budapest and following the 
example of their Hungarian brothers, the Romanian Social Democrats es­
tablished links with the Romanian National Party and pressed for the set­
ting up of a Romanian national council. This was achieved in Budapest as 
early as 31 October. The National Party imposed the condition that only 
those Social Democrats should be delegated who "will not obstruct the pas­
sage of resolutions" by opposing the nationalist trend.
During the day of the bourgeois democratic revolution there was also 
unrest in Transylvania, culminating in serious demonstrations in Kolozsvar
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on 30-31 October. Political prisoners were released and censorship was abol­
ished.
The K&rolyi government, which the revolution helped to power on 1 
November, immediately released the remaining internees, lifted the restric­
tions on those newspapers which had been banned, ended the sequestra­
tion of the property of those convicted, reopened all the nationalities' schools, 
consulted the nationalities over the appointment of new foispans, comple­
mented the general political amnesty with a general military pardon and 
announced a relief programme for the Transylvanian counties.
An independent workers' and soldiers' council was form ed first in 
TemesvSr, and then in the Zsil Valley, and there were revolutionary move­
ments in Szeben, Bihar and Szilagy counties.
The actions of the workers and the soldiers in the first days of November 
resulted in the disintegration of the remaining army units. Accordingly, the 
most effective means of control, the army, for all practical purposes ceased 
to exist. In several places, for example, in Kolozsvar and Arad, the Social De­
mocratic Party relied on the organized workers to maintain law and order.
The revolution in Budapest and a series of working class protests in the 
provinces stirred up the villages, already charged with social discontent, 
while tens of thousands of exhausted, but revolutionized, soldiers who re­
turned from the front in early November provided the main body of those 
determined to effect change. On 6 November, thefoispdn  of Krass6-Szoreny 
county reported: "The unbridled masses, which initially consisted of sol­
diers only, gradually won the whole population of the villages to their own 
purposes and turned on everyone whom they saw as an enemy because 
they were well-off... One cannot even say that this was aimed against any 
particular nationality, as looting has been reported also in villages inhab­
ited entirely by Romanians."5
A number of estates and government properties were attacked, and the 
furniture in a number of mansions and looted storehouses smashed. The 
violence of the peasantry was most intense in the more developed areas — 
in Arad, Temes, Krass6-Szoreny and, to some extent, Bihar and Kolozs coun­
ties. "... In all the ridings of Kolozs county, almost without exception, bol­
shevism, the distribution of land, either implemented or under prepara­
tion, and the violation of property have raised their heads,"6 ran one official 
report. The unrest did not have a nationalist character. Sentences such as 
"Rom anian priests and notaries were expelled here, as were Hungarians in 
the purely Hungarian Great Hungarian Plain," or "quite frequently Roma­
nians and Hungarians went on the rampage together" occur regularly in 
the reports.7 Nor did the Romanian peasantry spare the property of its "ow n 
leaders". Romanians attacked the 3,000 hold estate of Gheorge Pop, the ag­
ing Romanian party leader, in the same way that they attacked the lands of 
the Mocsonyis or of the Greek Catholic Diocese of Nagyvarad. At Nagyilonda
5. OL Nemzetisegi Ugyek Miniszteriuma (National Archives. Ministry of Nation­
ality Affairs), 1918. Vol. IX, 27.
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the wealthy landowner, Mihali, fired on the Romanian peasants, in defence 
of his life — or more likely — his property.
The government proved powerless against popular movements. The 
gendarmerie, which was not large enough even for its everyday duties, was 
confined to the centre of population in order to protect the lives of its mem­
bers. Realizing the gravity of the situation, the government looked to the 
national councils for help. As soon as the revolution broke out a joint Hun- 
garian-Rom anian-Saxon appeal had been issued in Transylvania calling on 
all its peoples to establish contacts with each other in order to protect life 
and property. As a result of the meeting between Aurel Vlad, loan Erdelyi 
and Rudolf Schuller representing the non-Hungarian peoples of Transylva­
nia on one side and Oszk£r J&szi on the other, the minister of public educa­
tion abolished the short-lived "cultural zone". As J&szi also noted, how­
ever, that "first, we conferred about the ways of maintaining law and order 
in the Transylvanian regions. On this question, there was complete agree­
ment between us."8
Encouraged by the central government and the local authorities, coun­
cils were formed even in places where such bodies had not been organized 
spontaneously. Both the more conservative and the more radical councils 
used national slogans to calm the social unrest. The Romanian councils, as 
well as the government, were afraid of losing their reputation and influence 
as a result of possible violent clashes between the nationalities.
The Hungarian bourgeoisie was dissatisfied with the weakness of the 
central government and demanded that "if necessary, the government should 
not hesitate to impose martial law. This measure, when introduced against 
criminals who threaten the safety of property, is not inconsistent with social 
liberty".9 Quite a number of people fell victim to mob violence and to the 
reprisals which followed it. Earlier historiography exploited the two best- 
known instances to instigate nationalist animosity. On 6 November, the 
peasants raided a few (closed) shops in Facs&d and even volleys fired by 
the gendarmerie were unable to disperse the mob. Looters then broke into 
the grain storehouses and into a shop belonging to a co-operative society. 
An aeroplane arrived from Arad and dropped bombs on the crowd: it was 
claimed that 104 people lost their lives. The Arad newspapers found it reas­
suring to know that thereafter aircraft were constantly patrolling the skies. 
Italian prisoners of war together with Romanian peasants ransacked a saw­
mill and the castle at J6sikafalva. A few days later the troop recruited pri­
vately by the owner's brother captured and executed about twenty peas­
ants and burned their bodies. The joint committee of the Kolozsv&r Roma­
nian and Hungarian national councils found the vigilantes still on the scene 
on 12 November and, naturally enough, condemned the action.
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The Emergence of the Romanian Bourgeoisie's 
Power Base
The revolution and the mass movements broke the back of the old order. 
Those who for decades had blocked the Romanian National Party's rise to 
power were mostly displaced or driven away, thus providing the opportu­
nity for the party to try for political supremacy.
The Karolyi government treated the Romanian bourgeoisie in a funda­
mentally democratic way: it could hardly do otherwise. The government in 
Budapest "not only allowed the Romanians to organize national councils 
and militia, but even encouraged them to do so, since the government re­
garded these as autonomous organizations which were, nevertheless, part 
of the state apparatus".10 The government also allocated considerable sums 
to the Romanian national guards. The Romanian militiamen contributed to 
the restoration of order, and by mid-November they undoubtedly consti­
tuted the most reliable policing force.
Initially the relationship between the Hungarian authorities and the Ro­
manian councils was friendly. The growing strength of the republican move­
ment and the continuing radicalization of Hungarian society seem to have 
helped to speed up the emancipation of the Romanian bourgeoisie. "A s far 
as we Romanians are concerned, we can only regard it [i.e. the revolution] 
as a national catastrophe. We must use every opportunity to give this revo­
lution a national character," wrote their main newspaper, also stressing that 
"the Romanian National Council was not born of revolution." "... No one 
should expect us to follow the example of Budapest and become republi­
cans, enemies of the dynasty, or revolutionaries. We have not been such up 
to now, and have no reason to become such in the futu re." "W e shall go our 
separate way [...] taking care to avoid the fate of Budapest, for we do not 
wish to be taken where we do not want to go, nor to arrive where we do not 
want to be."11
The Central Romanian National Council, which in the meantime had 
moved from Budapest to Arad, now attempted to organize a larger inde­
pendent armed force. The central officers' and soldiers' council was based 
in Vienna, where with about 100 officers, Maniu formed the Romanian sol­
diers' council. This represented an infantry regiment of 5,000 Romanians 
from the monarchy and further soldiers in Wiener-Neustadt. The aim of the 
Vienna project was to reorganize into new units those Romanian soldiers 
who were returning from the front in their thousands and to send them 
back to Transylvania. In this way the Romanian National Council would 
have acquired what at the time was an enormous military force of roughly
50,000 men, which could have altered the balance not only between Buda­
pest and Arad, but perhaps even between Bucharest and Arad, with un­
foreseeable results. A certain number of soldiers did arrive back in Transyl­
vania, but the Serbian high command, which was still worried about the
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uncertain future of the Banat, thought it wiser to demobilize the well- 
equipped Prague Romanian Legion, which was returning in a roundabout 
way from Bohemia. With this, the hopes for an independent Romanian army 
disintegrated.
The so-called "Lansing-message" was published after the outbreak of 
the revolution, on 5 November. This revealed that the American president 
"sympathized with the idea of national unity for all Romanians everywhere. 
The USA will not miss the opportunity to exert its influence at the appro­
priate time to help the Romanian people to satisfy their legitimate political 
and territorial demands".12 By now all the victorious powers supported Ro­
mania's territorial claims, which meant that Transylvania's union with Ro­
mania was going to be achieved through the use of force. Even Berlin sent a 
message to the Romanian government on 9 November, saying that "it would 
show sympathy towards Romania's claims on Transylvania", provided that 
Mackensen's army was not molested as it withdrew from Romanian soil.
The new circumstances prompted the Romanian politicians of Transyl­
vania to act. They wanted to speed up the impending process and, also, to 
reinforce their own positions in such a way that they would be able to de­
fend as well as to increase their independence in any new situation. On 9 
November, the Romanian National Council in Arad sent an "ultim atum " to 
Budapest in which it called on the "government of the Hungarian National 
Council" to transfer the control of eastern Hungary. In giving its reasons, 
besides stressing the right to self-determination, the council deliberately 
emphasized the need to protect life and property in the area. Besides his­
toric Transylvania, the disputed area included Toronto, Temes, Krass6- 
Szoreny, Arad, Bihar, Szilagy, Szatmar and Maramaros counties, as well as 
the "Romanian areas of Csan&d, Bekes and Ugocsa".13 The Romanian Na­
tional Council wished to assume power on the basis of complete legal con­
tinuity, and asked the government, of its own accord, to make over to it 
every institution and authority and also to inform the public in a proclama­
tion about the new state of affairs.
The Hungarian government discussed the memorandum at an extended 
cabinet meeting. Even the strongly nationalist Ap&thy and Count Istv&n 
Bethlen accepted the proposal of Oszk^r J^szi the nationalities minister, 
who wanted to negotiate with the Romanians over the Transylvanian prob­
lem, and who wished to solve it through the creation of a Swiss-type con­
federation of cantons. The Hungarian public expected much from Jaszi's 
trip to Arad, even though the Transylvanian newspapers sounded the alarm 
as early as 9 November that parts of Transylvania would be evacuated. If 
these negotiations were successful then "w e could avert Transylvania's an­
nexation to Romania, and also, besides protecting our territorial integrity 
against the Czechs, we could lay the foundation for a federal state".14 Thus 
ran the optimistic message emanating from government circles.
12. B. J a n c s 6 ,  A roman irredentista mozgalmak tortenete. (The History of the Roma­
nian Irredentist Movements.) Budapest 1920,123.
13. See the letter of the Romanian National Council, OL Nemzetis<§gi Ugyek Mi-
niszt6riuma. 1918. Vol. IX, 240.
14. Magyarorszdg (Hungary), 12 November, 1918. 648
On 13 November, the Hungarian delegation arrived in Arad with mem­
bers of the Saxon and Swabian national councils. Jdszi told the journalists: 
"The stand we are taking is such that if the Romanians are serious about 
wanting place, they cannot very well not have it".15
Because of the Romanian protests, the representatives of Transylvania's 
non-Romanian councils could only attend the negotiations as observers, even 
though, according to J&szi's figures, of the 6.8 million inhabitants in the 
territories demanded only approximately 2.9 million were Romanian by 
nationality. This restriction already showed that the Romanian leaders took 
a one-sided view of the right to self-determination.
In Arad, Jaszi submitted the plan of the new democratic state for a fed­
eral system. He offered self-determination and full governmental powers 
to all the territories where Romanians lived in solid blocks or where they 
were in an absolute majority. The Romanians could also send representa­
tives to the peace negotiations. J&szi's proposal, if accepted, would have 
significantly reduced the Romanian territorial demands. He singled out the 
Orsova-Elesd-ZiIah-Vis6 Valley line as the western boundary of the area 
he was prepared to hand over for organization on the Swiss pattern. In 
addition, J&szi wished to create an elaborate system for the government of 
isolated ethnic regions, a system reflecting Transylvania's national com­
plexities. In Jaszi's plan the Szekelyfold and the Kolozsvar area would have 
been Hungarian "islands", and the regions of Petrozseny, Vajdahunyad, 
Resica and Lugos would have all be given Hungarian autonomy. At the 
same time, three Romanian regions would have been set up deep inside the 
Hungarian territories. Jaszi completed his offer with the suggestion that an 
international body should check the Statistical Office's figures on the ethnic 
breakdown of the area by conducting investigations on the spot. He prom­
ised to allocate places to Romanian politicians in the government and wanted 
to set up joint committees to handle common affairs. All this rightly aroused 
the suspicion in the Romanian leaders that J3szi in fact wanted to present 
the peace negotiators with a fa it accompli. The Romanians themselves were 
looking for a solution elsewhere.
The next day news came that on 13 November, K&rolyi and Franchet 
d'Esperey had signed an armistice convention in Belgrade. According to 
this, the Budapest government was left in charge of the administration of 
the whole of Hungary, although Entente troops were permitted to advance 
up to the line of the Maros River. The Hungarian delegation was encour­
aged by the news, although the course of the negotiations was unaffected 
by it. Jaszi was told that his offer was rejected. The Romanian leaders found 
that the "provisional solutions" in no way guaranteed the restoration of 
order and the safety of life and property in the territories demanded by 
them. After repeated and futile attempts at bargaining, J5szi asked what the 
Romanians really wanted. Complete secession was Maniu's answer.
The talks had failed. It was quite clear that the Kirolyi government had 
sincerely wished to settle the nationalities issue in a democratic way. Al­
though it wanted to preserve the country's integrity, it planned to do this
15. J. K o m a r o m i , Jaszi Aradon. (Jaszi at Arad.) Uj Magyar Szemle (New Hungarian 
649 Review), 1920, No. 1, 27-35.
on a completely new federal basis. It could not, however, agree to the total 
secession of substantial parts of the country.
The Romanian leaders left the final decision to the army of the Romanian 
state and the peace negotiators. They abstained from a quick and unilateral 
proclamation of a take-over since that "would cause enormous confusion 
among the peoples of Hungary and this confusion might serve to upset an 
already fragile order".16 The gradual take-over began without this.
The Romanian National Assembly at Gyulafehevar
Negotiations were still going on in Arad when Maniu sent a memorandum 
to Paris in which, contrary to the spirit of the Belgrade armistice conven­
tion, he requested permission for the Romanian army to cross the Maros 
River. He also invited the Romanian government to intervene in Transylva­
nia and convinced King Ferdinand that his troops would find there suffi­
cient food, clothing and boots — in short, everything except resistance — 
and that their advance would not be challenged. With this the question of 
military intervention was settled.
In a proclamation addressed to the "peoples of the world", on 20 No­
vember the Romanian National Council declared a sovereign state as its 
ultimate goal. It also announced that the government opposes "the brute 
force of the oppressive state" with the just claims of the Romanian nation.17 
The next day, anticipating the intentions of the Romanian government, the 
council published another manifesto which called on the Romanian popu­
lation to hold a national assembly. The same manifesto also contained the 
proclamation of the chief of the Romanian general staff made on the occa­
sion of his troops' entering Transylvania. In a confidential circular the na­
tional committee called on the local councils in as many communities as 
possible "to  proclaim their unconditional accession to the Kingdom of Ro­
mania under the rule of the present dynasty". The committee even enclosed 
a sample proclamation with the added comment that the communities should 
make their own proclamations in a number of copies: the Romanian diplo­
mats going to the peace negotiations would also be needing some.
"In  this way a plebiscite can probably be avoided",18 ran the circular, 
summing up the aim of the action. Rather than try to prevent the Romanian 
national assembly, the government even ordered the Hungarian State Rail­
ways to lay on special trains to take the Romanians to Gyulafehervcir on 1 
December.
This meeting posed a lot of problems for the Romanian Social Demo­
crats. The left took a clear stand: "W e will be united with Romania, but we
16. Aradi Hirlap, 15 November, 1918.
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must impose certain conditions. [She] must be ready to move with the times 
and expel the tyrants, and the people of Romania, who would then be liber­
ated as we are now, should shake hands and let us create a great, free and 
democratic country. We need longer neither the boyars, nor the symbol of 
their power (the king)."19 The right-wing Socialists also thought that "the 
national assembly should solemnly declare that it would preserve the au­
tonomy of free Transylvania until the sorry conditions which presently pre­
vail in Romania have changed".20 Finally, a compromise was agreed: the 
right-wing Socialists renounced republican propaganda, while the National 
Party would accept a slower implementation of the union and would guar­
antee democratic reforms. Even prominent bourgeois politicians contem­
plated the idea of an autonomous Transylvania within Romania.
After reconciling the various views, a select committee drafted the plan 
for a new resolution on 30 November. This draft made no mention of the 
institution of the monarchy and put into writing such democratic principles 
as universal suffrage and the secret ballot, unqualified freedom of assem­
bly, freedom of conscience and freedom of the press, agrarian reform and 
the extension of the workers' political rights. The III. section of the resolu­
tion dealt with the national minorities: "Complete national freedom for the 
peoples jointly inhabiting. All peoples have the right to their own education 
and government in their own language, with their own administration, and 
by individuals chosen from among themselves."21 This indicated that the 
Romanian leaders had learned from their earlier minority status to promise 
wider freedom to Transylvania's Hungarians and Saxons than those granted 
to the Romanian population under the dualist Hungarian state.
On 1 December, 1918, the 1,228 delegates at the Gyulafeherv^r assembly 
accepted the union with Romania with the comment that "our specific insti­
tutions necessitate the preservation of a temporary autonomy which by no 
means alters the fact of the unconditional union".22 The assembly elected a 
Grand National Council with 200 members, which also included thirty So­
cial Democrats, besides the bishops, prominent members of the intelligent­
sia and a select group of wealthy burghers who became automatically mem­
bers.
The great rally took place in the field by the castle where the resolution 
was read out to a large number of peasants and a smaller group of workers. 
The audience — 100,000 strong according to Romanian tradition — listened 
with unequivocal enthusiasm and ardour. The progressive tone of the basic 
principles was encouraging.
The Grand National Council appointed the fifteen members of the Gov­
erning Council — including two Socialists — and sent a telegram of obei­
sance and a delegation to Bucharest, the latter for the ceremonial presenta­
tion of the resolution proclaiming the union. On 24 December a law was
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enacted in the Romanian capital which declared that "the territories speci­
fied in the resolution of the assembly held in Gyulafeherv&r on 1 December, 
1918 have once and for all been united with the Kingdom of Romania".23 
Only the local administration was left in the hands of the Governing Coun­
cil, which, in turn, was allocated three important places in the Bucharest 
government.
The form which the establishment of Romanian unity took seriously di­
vided the progressive forces of Romanian society. For the next few years 
the left wing of the bourgeoisie was completely overawed by seeing its great­
est hopes fulfilled in the shape of a Grand Romania. The right wing of the 
Social Democratic Party supported national unity in the hope that it would 
help the integration of the working class movement into Romanian political 
life and strengthen the party. By contrast, from the very beginning the par­
ty's left wing — which then gradually split up into Centrists and Commu­
nists — would not agree to close co-operation with the right wing and the 
Nationalists. Its members formed the "internationalist faction of the Roma­
nian Socialists" and conducted an earnest propaganda campaign along the 
eastern edge of the Great Hungarian Plain, as well as among the Romanian 
workers living around Budapest. The left wing convened a congress of the 
"Romanian Internationalist Socialists of Austria, Hungary and Transylva­
nia" in Budapest on 31 December. The congress "spoke out against the 
Gyulafehervar resolution proclaiming union with the Kingdom of Roma­
nia" 24 It reserved the right of the Romanians of Hungary, Transylvania and 
the Banat to form an independent state after each nationality had held a 
plebiscite. This movement followed in the internationalist tradition which 
the Romanians had established as early as the spring of 1918, in co-opera­
tion with the Hungarian prisoners of war who returned from Russia during 
the first few months of Soviet rule.
In January 1919, the minority right wing of the Romanian Social Demo­
crats held a conference of their own in Nagyszeben. Those who had taken 
part in the left-wing conference in Budapest — in other words, the repre­
sentatives of the workers of large factories — were banned from this gath­
ering. The conference announced the forming of the Social Democratic Party 
of Transylvania and the Banat.
The majority of the organized industrial workers in Transylvania con­
sisted of Hungarians and Saxons. Naturally, they considered their histori­
cal mission to be the creation of a democratic and socialist-type society, 
rather than union with Romania.
The End of Hungarian Rule in Transylvania
The Hungarians of Transylvania were unable to accept the fact that a 
millennial state organism could vanish within weeks, or that they were des­
tined to constitute a minority in an economically and socially more back­
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ward foreign country. In bourgeois circles either a feeling of helplessness 
prevailed or, alternately, frenzied panic. Besides the Hungarian national 
councils, in late November a Szekely National Council was formed first in 
Marosvas^rhely, then in Kolozsv&r. This sometimes emphasized the need 
to preserve existing territorial integrity, and at other times stressed the im­
portance of Hungarian autonomy, a reflection of the uncertainty of the times. 
The Hungarian government also vacillated between its maximum pro­
gramme — a federal state recognizing the autonomy of the nationalities — 
and the minimum programme which admitted that complete secession could 
not be prevented and aimed to secure, in a peaceful way, the national rights 
of the Hungarians. The government did not regard the Gyulafehervar reso­
lution as fully legitimate. The establishment of a Transylvanian military force 
now began, the core of which was a unit organized in Kolozsvar and known 
as the Szekely Kiilom'tmeny (Szekely Detachment). This force would have 
been sufficient to halt the Romanian advance at the demarcation line. Such 
a move, however, would have caused unforeseeable international implica­
tions and, as a result, the government did not dare defend itself. It was also 
impossible to divine Paris's intentions, as the overmighty French generals 
in Belgrade and Bucharest and the officers of the Entente mission in Buda­
pest only added to the confusion with their often inconsistent acts and state­
ments. In the first days of December, for instance, General Henri Berthelot, 
the commander of the French Eastern Army, gave permission for Roma­
nian troops to cross the demarcation line between Arad and Maramarossziget 
and to occupy eight towns. The Hungarian government, however, was in­
formed of this decision only weeks later.
The government appointed Professor Ap&thy as general government 
commissioner of eastern Hungary on 8 December. From the very next day 
he directed the administration of the continually diminishing territories from 
his headquarters in Kolozsvar. It was around about this time that the Ro­
manian Governing Council in Nagyszeben, which considered itself the pro­
visional government of Transylvania, began its actual work.
Naturally, the Hungarian councils of Transylvania thought that the prin­
ciple of self-determination would also be valid for the Hungarians, and 
wished to give expression to their view at a mass meeting in Kolozsvar on 
22 December. General Mosoiu, the commander of the Romanian army in 
Transylvania, protested against the planned mass meeting and threatened 
to break it up with artillery fire. Nevertheless, a large crowd of about 40,000 
people carrying national flags and red flags gathered in Kolozsv&r's main 
square. Among them were representatives of the Romanian Socialists and 
the Swabians of the Banat who, like the Saxons, wished to remain within 
the Hungarian state for the time being. As one would expect at such a meet­
ing, the speeches covered various different subjects, from the preservation 
of the unity of the state to the protection of the rights of the proletariat. The 
resolution submitted by the Hungarian Socialists and passed by the meet­
ing declared that, on the basis of the principle of self-determination, "w e 
wish to live in a commonwealth with the Hungarian People's Republic. It is 
within the framework of a unified and intact Hungary that we demand 
complete equality of rights, freedom and self-determination for all the na­
tions inhabiting this land".25 The following day the Royal Romanian Army 
marched into Kolozsv^r.
The general government commission remained in position even after the 
Hungarian troops had pulled out of Kolozsv6r, so that the appearance of 
legal continuity could be maintained. The Romanian command introduced 
a state of siege, as well as internment, censorship and corporal punishment. 
All political organizations were banned and freedom of assembly and even 
the freedom to travel were suspended. The persecution of the left began, 
and this involved the use of very heavy-handed methods in certain areas. 
Later Ap&thy him self, the government commissioner, was arrested on 
charges of spreading bolshevik propaganda.
After the occupation of Kolozsvir the slow advance of the Romanian 
troops continued, "justified" by national objectives, the Entente's endorse­
ment and the struggle against bolshevism. By 22 January, the Romanian 
troops had reached the M&ramarossziget-Csucsa-Z£m line. With this King 
Ferdinand's army took possession of historic Transylvania without a fight.
During the day when the monarchy was disintegrating before their eyes, 
the representatives of the Saxon and Swabian bourgeoisie definitely saw 
their future within the Hungarian state. However, when Grand Romania 
began to take shape, they were forced to adapt to the new circumstances. 
Following the Romanian assembly at Gyulafehervar, they demanded self- 
determination, autonomy for the 212 townships of the Saxon territories 
(Munizipium Sachsenland), and the creation of autonomous national units in 
Transylvania along the lines of Jaszi's proposals.
Yielding to the wishes of Bucharest, and also to those of certain French 
political circles, the Romanian Governing Council representing Romania's 
authority in Transylvania sought to reach an agreement with the Saxon in­
telligentsia. As a result, the Saxons accepted the new political situation and, 
at the meeting of the Saxon National Council held in Medgyes on 8 January, 
1919, they announced that Transylvania's Saxon population, in hopes of 
guarantees of their own national autonomy, also supported the union be­
tween Transylvania and Romania. They delivered their resolution to Maniu, 
the chairman of the Governing Council, who assured them that the "na­
tional rights of the industrious Saxon people would be protected and re­
spected".26
In the Banat, where there was a strong determination to establish a local 
republic within Hungary, neither the Swabian nor the Hungarian workers 
wanted union with Romania. On 2 December, in Temesvar, they proclaimed 
the autonomy of the Banat under the leadership of the socialist Dr. Otto 
Roth. The K&rolyi government, acting together with the German national 
council, worked out the details of an autonomous territorial arrangement 
for the area, which was now represented in the Budapest cabinet by Johann 
Junker. The arrival of Serbian troops in Temesvar put an end to this experi­
ment.
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After mid-December a new wave of Socialist movements emerged in 
Transylvania, this time behind the lines of the army of occupation. The in­
habitants of the Romanian villages were suddenly gripped by fear that the 
promised distribution of land would not take place. The miners' councils in 
the Zsil Valley wanted to form a separate workers' republic. The reviving 
m iners' movements sometimes led to shooting between its members and 
the Romanian army. Joining the miners, on 23 January, the railway workers 
(who were mostly Hungarian), organized a general strike, with postal work­
ers, printers, civil servants and some factory workers also joining the in­
dustrial action.
The proletariat had lost all respect for the remnants of the old state appa­
ratus, the new and largely bourgeois national councils. But the workers 
were no more in awe of the Romanian army; nor did they regard it as their 
main opponent. This attitude, which was new in historical terms, confused 
the bourgeoisie. The Hungarian bourgeoisie vacillated between regarding 
the proletariat as the last possible crusaders of territorial integrity, and sus­
pecting them of being Socialists one and all, cynical traitors to the national 
interest. At the same time, the proletariat was seen by the Romanian mili­
tary intelligence as a political force embodying the combined menace of 
bolshevism and Hungarian nationalism; they overlooked the fact that is 
was only the Communist Party which had completely renounced the tradi­
tional principle of territorial integrity. Slowly discarding the old political 
values, the best of the proletariat marched, together with Budapest, towards 
the creation of a new society, towards a Socialist revolution.
Parallel with the new revolutionary upswing, and almost by way of coun­
tering it, the building up of the new Romanian state began. The Romanian 
army started to disarm the national guard and, more importantly, the work­
ers' armed units as early as January 1919. In the middle of the month the 
Romanian Governing Council rejected a proposal from Kolozsvar's Hun­
garian intelligentsia that the administration remain Hungarian in the areas 
inhabited by Hungarians, while in the Romanian regions, of course, con­
tinuing to be Romanian.
On 24 January, the Governing Council reinstated the old (Hungarian) 
laws and authorities, but ended the self-government of the counties and the 
communities. It appointed Romanian prefects to head the counties, and these 
officials required the earlier administrators and state employees to swear 
an oath of allegiance to King Ferdinand. The Romanian national councils 
were also disbanded, creating the strange situation wherein such councils 
existed only in territories controlled by the Hungarian army.
Since the Entente did not comply with any of the earlier agreements and 
since the Romanian troops continued to press forward, the Hungarian gov­
ernment considered the possibility of armed resistance. On 2 March, Karolyi 
announced that "if, in contradiction with the Wilsonian principles, as well 
as with the self-determination of peoples and the idea of a negotiated peace, 
the Paris Peace Conference decides on Hungary's dismemberment, then, as 
a final resort, we will liberate this country even by force of arm s".27
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Yielding to Romanian pressure, the Paris Peace Conference passed a reso­
lution concerning yet another shift of the Hungarian-Romanian demarca­
tion line, which in fact amounted to further territorial concessions. It ad­
judged the resolution proposed handing over to the Romanian troops a 
strip of territory containing the towns of Szatmarn£meti, Nagyv&rad and 
Arad while also establishing a neutral zone to the west of this, to include 
both Debrecen and Szeged. (In addition, the Hungarian administration in 
this neutral area would be placed under French control.) It was in this way 
that Paris wished to secure the rear of the Romanian army, which France 
planned to use against Soviet Russia, and also to protect the Temesv&r- 
Szatmar-Csap railway line, to which great importance was attached on ac­
count of sending war materia to Poland.
The so-called "Vyx Note" which contained these territorial demands and 
which was handed over on 20 March, 1919, was unacceptable to the Hun­
garian government. The peace conference had not appreciated the policy of 
co-operation with the Entente which the government had so far pursued. 
With the hope of an acceptable peace treaty gone, Karolyi and his govern­
ment resigned. The coalition between the pro-Entente democratic bourgeoisie 
and the moderate Social Democrats had ended in moral and political bank­
ruptcy.
The Socialist Alternative: The Republic of Councils
r
The Republic of Councils was proclaimed in Budapest on 21 March, 1919.
Inspired by the events in Russia, it was the world's second proletarian state 
and promised a historic turning point in the lives of the nations inhabiting 
the Danubian Basin. The Communists, who had already acquired experi­
ence during the Russian revolution, merged with the left wing of the Social 
Democrats to form the Socialist Party. The acknowledged leader of this party, 
and also of the Revolutionary Governing Council, was B61a Kun, commis­
sar for foreign affairs and a man who had grown up in the Kolozsvar work­
ers' movement.
The Republic of Councils represented both a new foreign policy and a 
new political line towards the nationalities. It openly distanced itself from 
the nationalities policy of the democratic K&rolyi regime, and while it did 
not champion the cause of territorial integrity, it was not prepared to hand 
over large parts of the country to the armies of the neighbouring states, 
which by now were blatantly serving the objectives of the imperialist pow­
ers. The new government rejected the Vyx Note. In its first proclamations it 
called for the liberation of the country's mines and food producing areas 
and also promised to fight "against the Romanian boyars", thereby inviting 
support from the Romanian proletariat. The leaders of the Republic of Coun­
cils firmly believed that the revolutionary working class movement could 
abolish national frontiers and create a united and international state. A pre­
requisite of this was the "brotherly alliance of the workers, a federal repub­
lic". Every nationality was required by law to form a national council. The 
Germans and the Ruthenians were given full national self-government, and 
the use of every language, both in writing and in speech, was permitted in 656
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the administration. The constitution declared: "The Republic of Councils is 
a free alliance of free peoples."
By the time the new government assumed power the whole of historic 
Transylvania was under the rule by the Royal Romanian Army and the 
Romanian Governing Council at Nagyszeben. The present state of research 
does not enable us to assess the influence of this dictatorship of the prole­
tariat on the inhabitants of Transylvania or to estimate how profound its 
repercussions were. We know that after December 1918 the influence of the 
Communists was increasing there, that many Romanian soldiers deserted 
in order to join the Hungarian Red Army; and that quite a few of the future 
leaders of the Transylvanian working class movement fought in this army. 
Another indication of the mood which then prevailed is the fact that the 
railway workers began a general strike in the first days of April. In Nagy­
varad, Nagykdroly and Szatm^memeti, which were not yet under Roma­
nian occupation, as well as in several villages, directories were formed to 
run the administration, and local organizations of the new party were cre­
ated. Within a week several workers' battalions were organized in Nagy- 
v&rad for the Hungarian Red Army, which was then in the process of being 
formed. When in early April the elections to the councils were held, 42 per 
cent of the area's population turned out to vote, roughly the same figure as 
in Budapest.
The political situation was different in the countryside. In the majority of 
the Romanian villages the Romanian Communist faction operating from 
Nagyvarad could not effect a swing to the left, although it carried out syste­
matic propaganda work even in areas occupied by the Romanian army. A 
large number of the roughly 500,000 Romanians who still lived under Hun­
garian rule remained aloof from, or even showed hostility towards, the new 
government, which for them was mostly represented by town-dwelling 
agitators or by the presence of the Szekely Detachment (renamed Szekely 
Division).
The Entente Powers, though not fully agreed on many issues, regarded 
the Republic of Councils with utmost hostility from the very beginning. 
Nevertheless, the Republic of Councils, through its resolute approach, 
achieved greater international recognition than had the K&rolyi regime. Bela 
Kun's proposal to resolve the border issue on the basis of real self-determi­
nation for the peoples was handed to the Great Powers in a memorandum 
on 24 March. General Smuts travelled to Budapest as the delegate of the 
Peace Conference and proposed a demarcation line which was somewhat 
more favourable than the one outlined in the Vyx Note. This proposal would 
not have delivered the towns of Nagyvarad and Szatmarnemeti into the 
hands of the Romanian military command, although, under the pretext of 
demilitarization, these cities would also have been effectively taken out of 
the Republic of Council's control. Referring to the principles set out in the 
Belgrade armistice convention, Kun's counter-proposal requested a still more 
favourable solution. More importantly, Kun suggested that the representa­
tives of Hungary and the neighbouring countries should be summoned to 
discuss among themselves the border disputes and future forms of eco­
nomic co-operation. The conciliatory British and American political line, 
657  however, gave way to the more militant French view.
On 15 April, the Romanians, using substantial military forces, launched 
an offensive along the entire Hungarian-Romanian demarcation line. Their 
main thrust was directed against the Szekely Division which was deployed 
along a front of 130 kilometres. Quite apart from being the largest Hungar­
ian fighting unit with 649 officers and 12,000 men, this was also the only 
reasonably equipped and combat-ready military force in existence at the 
time the Republic of Councils was proclaimed. From the outset its officers 
were, for the most part, apolitical that is "counter-revolutionaries" in the 
given historical situation and the politicians influencing them were also of a 
similar persuasion. There was mutual distrust between the new political 
leadership and the division. Szatmar and Nagyv&rad had to be abandoned, 
followed, on 23 April, by Debrecen. At first the Szekely Division resisted 
the Romanians as it fell back, suffering heavy casualties in the process, but 
then broke off contact with Budapest. On 26 April, its leaders surrendered 
to a Romanian cavalry division agreeing to lay down their arms and even 
submit to internment in exchange for the release of relatives detained by 
the Romanian army.
On 27 April, the French also made a move and occupied Mak6 and H6d- 
mez6vasarhely. Czechoslovak troops also advanced and linked up with the 
Romanian army. In a desperate attempt to buy time, on 30 April B61a Kun 
telegraphed first to Wilson and then to the governments of Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia and Romania, unconditionally agreeing to "all the territorial 
and national claims" of the neighbouring countries. By early May the Ro­
manian army had reached the Tisza River, and, using measures of extreme 
ruthlessness, restored the traditional class system everywhere it went.
The front line now stabilized and although the Romanian general staff 
urged the Entente Powers to launch another attack, it did not want to run 
risks of its own. The peace conference, however, would not permit any fur­
ther advance, and the situation became deadlocked. Soviet Russia — the 
Republic of Councils' only ally — greatly contributed to this last develop­
ment by preparing a large-scale attack along the Dniester River in order to 
ease the pressure on the Hungarian revolution.
On 30 May the Hungarian Red Army launched an offensive on the Czech 
front, in the direction of Kassa. Influenced by its initial successes, the peace 
conference at first showed a willingness to invite Hungary to the peace talks. 
On 14 June Clemenceau announced the final borders — which were identi­
cal to those defined back in March — in the form of a dictate, although he 
also promised to have the Romanian troops pulled back form the Tisza 
River as soon as Budapest withdrew its forces from the newly-occupied 
north-eastern territories. In his reply Kun explained the absurdity of the 
proposed borders, although he did not reject them outright. The withdrawal 
of the Red Army from the above territories did take place, but the Bratianu 
government was dissatisfied with the new borders, as these were less fa­
vourable to Bucharest than those promised in the secret pact of 1916. Ac­
cordingly, the Romanians refused to pull back. On 20 June the Hungarian 
Red Army launched an offensive to liberate those areas east of the Tisza 
which the peace conference had returned to Hungary. After initial gains the 
greatly outnumbered Hungarian troops were forced to retreat. After cross­
ing the Tisza River on 30 July, the Romanian army advanced on Budapest. 
The Hungarian Red Army disintegrated and the Revolutionary Governing 
Council resigned. Thus ended the overt experiment for a new world and a 
new type of society in which national conflicts and border disputes would 
assume peripheral importance in the lives of the peoples inhabiting the Dan­
ube Basin.
Counter-Revolution and the Treaty of Trianon
The Romanian army marched into Budapest on 4 August, although the 
Entente Powers condemned the move. Two days later the temporary trade- 
union government was toppled and a counter-revolutionary cabinet was 
formed which was almost entirely controlled by the Romanian military com­
mand. This, too, was unable to consolidate its power and create an inde­
pendent army, as the army of occupation made this impossible. After re­
ceiving an ultimatum from the peace conference in mid-November, the Ro­
manian army finally withdrew from Budapest and the area between the 
Danube and Tisza rivers. Admiral Horthy's "national army" now entered 
the capital. This strongly counter-revolutionary and originally insignificant 
fighting force (it consisted of only a few hundred men in the days of the 
Republic of Councils) was under French protection. The Hungarian peace 
treaty was concluded with the same counter-revolutionary regime held to 
power by the Entente.
The Hungarian peace delegation led by Count Albert Apponyi travelled 
to Paris in January 1920. It had been invited by the victors not to conduct 
negotiations but to accept peace terms which had already been decided. 
The conference allowed Apponyi merely to deliver an address on 16 Janu­
ary concerning Hungary's citation and the Hungarian government's posi­
tion. Apponyi summed up all the arguments which the Hungarian peace 
planning committee had worked out under the direction primarily of Count 
P&l Teleki. He attempted to persuade the victors that the borders marked 
out were consonant neither with self-determination nor with the ethnic prin­
ciple, and that there simply was no just easy to implement the latter in the 
Carpathian Basin. Apponyi stressed the economic unity of the old Hungary 
and presented compelling arguments in favour of preserving this unity in 
areas ranging from transport and water management to the migration of 
labour and the interdependence of the various parts of the country.
On the issue of Transylvania, the Hungarian delegation submitted a sepa­
rate proposal in several different versions: it should either be an autono­
mous province within Hungary's borders or a completely independent, 
Swiss-type, neutral country which guaranteed the equilibrium between the 
various nationalities. The delegation hoped to secure the nationalists' rights 
within Transylvania by setting up three autonomous administrative areas 
of basically homogeneous ethnic composition and one of thoroughly mixed 
ethnic composition. Finally, the Hungarian delegation requested that a plebi­
scite be held in Transylvania, and indeed in all the disputed territories, de­
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daring that "w e accept in advance the outcome of the plebiscite, whatever 
it may be".28
All the proposals of the Hungarian delegation were turned down. The 
Millerand letter, the official reply, made the point that the slightest change 
would render the whole system nonsensical, implicitly admitting that a cer­
tain unfairness and fragility was built into the settlement.
The Hungarian-Romanian border, which came about from a compro­
mise between the Great Powers, was left unchanged. Romania gained con­
siderably less than it had been promised in 1916, but more than had been 
suggested by the American and the Italian politicians. On 4 June, 1920 the 
peace document was signed in the Trianon palace. With this 102,093 square 
kilometres of territory (Transylvania proper together with the eastern edge 
of the Great Hungarian Plain) which amounted to 31.7 per cent of old Hun­
gary, were transferred to Romania. That means that by international law 
Romania acquired 5,257,476 inhabitants (of whom 1,704,852 were Hungar­
ians and 559,824 were Germans), some 25.2 per cent of Hungary's former 
population. Another period had come to an end in the history of the peo­
ples of Transylvania.
The annexationist peace treaty, which also involved a serious violation 
of the national principle, was condemned equally by the revisionist bour­
geoisie of the defeated countries and by the international working class 
movement.
By wanting to replace the anachronistic Habsburg Monarchy with more 
up-to-date arrangements, the Entente politicians had created tensions in 
the Danube Basin which were far greater than those existing before the world 
conflagration, and which delivered the new successor states into the hands 
of the Great Powers. This also had a decisive impact on the history of Transyl­
vania, which was now incorporated into Romania.
28. Speech by Albert Apponyi at the peace conference on 16 January, 1920. In: A 
magyar beketargyalasok. Jelentes a magyar bekekuldottseg mukodeserol. (Hungarian 
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The history of Transylvania since 1918 is part of the history of Romania, 
and needs to be analyzed in terms of the development of Romania as a 
whole. The very concept of "Transylvania" was redefined after the war. 
The territories which are today called Transylvania — territories which, 
under the terms of the 1920 Treaty of Trianon, Romania annexed from what 
had been Habsburg Hungary — include not only historic Transylvania, but 
as we indicated in the Preface also the very different areas lying to the west 
of the Erchegys£g, and also a part of the Banat.
In the new context we give an outline of the main trends of the changes 
until 1945 trying to present the complexity of the international and internal 
situation.
From 1918 onwards, Romania opted for an Anglo-French orientation in 
her foreign policy, and for this reason became a founding member of the 
"Little Entente" (Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugoslavia), created to pre­
serve the status quo established by the peace treaties in central and eastern 
Europe. The main objective of Romanian foreign policy was to ensure terri­
torial integrity, and different governments subordinated domestic policy
— and within it, nationality policy — to this. The Soviet Union did not 
recognize the peace treaties concluded after the First World War and never 
renounced Bessarabia. In addition, Bulgaria did not accept Romania's an­
nexation of Southern Dobrudja. The Hungarians, for their part, took cogni­
zance of the Trianon peace terms, but made no secret of the fact that their 
aim was to have them changed. Hungary's claims concerning Transylva­
nia posed no immediate threat to Romania, since, initially, not a single 
Great Power supported them. However, with time this situation changed. 
In 1927, Hungary succeeded in breaking out of what amounted to complete 
isolation when fascist Italy, itself dissatisfied with the Paris peace system, 
officially adopted a position which supported Hungarian border revision 
demands. The practical significance of this was small, but it nevertheless 
strengthened the hope of Hungarian revisionists that a radical change in 
European power relations would, in fact, transform the territorial status 
quo. This hope was further boosted when fascism came to power in Ger­
many, and Hitler also demanded the re-examination of the peace treaties.
The treaties which concluded the First World War thus had a decisive 
effect on relations between Hungary and Romania, and on the fate of their 
respective peoples. The borders that had been established did not take into 
account the right of peoples to self-determination, and did not pay much 
attention to the population's ethnic composition either. Accordingly, rival 
power blocs inevitably formed, one which aimed either to preserve the sta­
tus quo or to change it.
Internal Situation of the New Romania
Between the two world wars, Romania was a backward agrarian country. 
This is well illustrated by the fact that in 1930, 78.7 per cent of its active 
population worked in agriculture, and only 6.7 per cent in industry. In agri­
culture dwarfholdings and small farms predominated, and after the land 
reform, which was implemented in 1921, their preponderance increased. In 
industry and commerce, the large proportion of small enterprises was con­
spicuous. Oil extraction and coal mining together with iron and steel pro­
duction characterized economic development in the longer run, as did, to 
some extent, the development of the machine-building industry. Besides 
Romanian capital, French, Belgian, German and, to a lesser degree, in 
Transylvania, Hungarian capital had a stake in the larger industrial enter­
prises, as well as in the banks.
As was typical in eastern Europe at this time, Romania's social structure 
bore the marks of economic underdevelopment. This meant that the peas­
antry constituted the majority of the population, and broad sections of it 
lived in traditional, backward circumstances; standards of living were ex­
traordinarily low. The working class, which was comparatively undevel­
oped, lived in a geographically limited area, and was concentrated in only a 
few branches of industry. Small businessmen, small traders and white col­
lar workers made up the equivalent of a bourgeoisie. The state was directed 
by representatives of big business and the large landowners.
As to the form of government, Romania was a constitutional monarchy, 
within which a multiple system based on parliamentary elections operated 
until 1938. However, because of the backwardness of socio-economic de­
velopment, constitutionalism was of limited effectiveness. For most of the 
1920s it was the Partidul National Liberal (National Liberal Party) that was in 
power, supported primarily by big business in Bucharest. The Liberals were 
led, with short intervals, by the Bratinau family,1 and used every opportu­
nity afforded by the corruption rampant in Romania public life to imple­
ment the modernizing economic policy which it had proclaimed to the na­
tion. A great part of the Transylvanian Romanian bourgeoisie and intelli­
gentsia supported Iuliu Maniu's National Party. In 1926 this united with
1. Ion C. Bratianu was five times prime minister serving in 1909-1911,1913-1918, 
1918-1919,1922-1926, and in 1927. He was succeeded in this post by his brother, 
Vintila (prime minister 1927-1928).
the Smallholder's Party, which drew its support from the lower middle- 
class elements beyond the Carpathians. This merger produced the second 
largest grouping in the country, the Partidul Nafional Jaranese (National Peas­
ant Party). Advocating democracy built on the primacy of the peasantry, 
the National Peasant Party became the Liberals' main rival. Nevertheless, 
after coming to power in 1928 it was unable to fulfil its promises of a healthier 
public life and "clean" government — to the disappointment of many sec­
tions of the population and its own leaders. This undermined popular sup­
port for the party.
In opposition to the essentially right-wing policies of governments by 
1920-1921 a workers' movement existed which operated independently in 
all provinces and which maintained its regional framework throughout the 
period. The Partidul Comunist Roman (Romanian Communist Party) was 
founded in 1921, but three years later, in 1924, it was declared illegal and 
forced underground. However, in spite of the functioning legitimate Partidul 
Socialdemocrat (Social Democratic Party) the Communists were able to bring 
the majority of trade unions under their control, carrying on their activity 
in organizations such as the Blocul Muncitoresc-Javanese (Town and Village 
Workers Bloc), which recruited two-thirds of its supporters from Transyl­
vania. Among the Romanian Communist Party's members and leaders were 
numerous Hungarian workers and intellectuals, many of whom had par­
ticipated in the workers' movement before 1918 or in the struggles of the 
Hungarian Republic of Councils. In 1924, the third congress of the party 
declared the right of the peoples to self-determination even if this involved 
secession, and proclaimed that, with the combining of different provinces, 
Romania "had changed from being a national state into being a multina­
tional one".2 From this it concluded that especially great emphasis was to 
be placed on the strengthening of relations between the workers of different 
nationalities. The party later rescinded this decision, but to the very end the 
demand for a democratic solution to the nationality question characterized 
its policy: the class struggle required a united working class, and the divi­
sive nationality issue could not be allowed to sap its strength.
The Communists took the lead in coordinating the struggle of workers 
of different nationalities against the adverse consequences of the world eco­
nomic crisis. The biggest such action — the 1929 strike of the Lupeny coal 
miners against dismissals and wage reductions — was crushed by special 
forces in a clash which claimed the lives of at least thirty people. Among the 
victims were a significant number of Hungarians. [There were Hungarians 
on the "other side" as well: capitalists from Hungary held positions on the 
board of directors of the Societatea Anomima Petrosam (Petrozseny Mining 
Company), and a number of Hungarians held shares in the Zsil Valley mines.] 
The Gyimes Valley peasants' movement in 1934 was similarly directed by 
the Communists, as were the strikes for higher pay — which continued for 
many weeks — in Kolozsvar's Dermata leather factory in 1935, and in the 
Arad textile factory the following year. In these struggles a new unity was
6 6 7 2. Documente din istoria Partidului din Romania 1923-1928. II. Bucharest 1953, 258.
forged between Hungarian and Romanian workers. In the atmosphere of 
nationalist hatred which then existed this was unique, and was to exercise 
considerable influence on the future.
The new nationalist wave gained strength in Romania in the 1930s. Its 
main vehicle was a Fascist movement which originated in Moldavia in the 
1920s; in this, Romania was a lot ahead of the rest of Europe. Made up of 
many strands, and centred around Corneliu Zelea Codreanu's Garda de 
Tier (Iron Guard) founded in 1930, Romanian fascism battened on the Great 
Depression, and grew powerful. The Iron Guard made political capital out 
of the crisis and out of the backwardness of the peasantry, which was not 
only exploited by gentry society but was also neglected by it. It also drew 
on the hatred for aliens and the deep antipathy felt by young populist intel­
lectuals against the immorality of party conflicts and bourgeois public life. 
The international situation favoured its consolidation, as did the advance 
of nazism in Germany. In addition to fascism's well-known social dema­
gogy, the movement also exploited the penchant for mysticism to which 
many Greek Orthodox believers in Transylvania, too, were prey. The move­
ment proclaimed that a more just and more moral world was in the mak­
ing, while in practice it introduced murder as the means of settling scores 
with its political opponents.
It was the workers' movement that took the strongest and most consist­
ent stand against the Iron Guard. Intellectuals of all nationalities strove to­
gether with the Communists and the Social Democrats, but were unable to 
build a bulwark against the spreading of fascism.
In the elections of December 1937, a tactical coalition between the Iron 
Guard, under Codreanu, and the National Peasant Party emerged victori­
ous. Confronted by fascism both at home and abroad, the Romanian ruling 
class established a right-wing dictatorship. It attempted to build a system 
on the personal rule of King Carol II, and a national sentiment adjusted to 
it. At the beginning of 1938, the government led by Octavian Goga was dis­
missed and a referendum held on the draft of a new, corporative-type con­
stitution, which was to sanction the new system. The referendum was held 
amidst a veritable state of siege: out of the 4.3 million voters, only 5,483 
people dared to vote against the constitution, most of them in Transylva­
nia. All parties and organizations were dissolved; legislation was entrusted 
to various so-called interest representations in place of the traditional na­
tional representative body; and rightist military commanders were appointed 
to the public administration. The Trontul Renasterii Nafionale (Front of Na­
tional Revival) was declared the sole political party, and the nationalities' 
organizations also fell under its control. Carol II's experiment — a peculiar 
alloy of fascism, nationalism, partial civil rights and administrative and eco­
nomic modernization — did enjoy some support. For want of a better alter­
native, it was accepted also by those middle class Transylvanian Romani­
ans who agreed with the drastic measures being taken for the liquidation of 
the Iron Guard, and who thought that the new system would strengthen 
Romania in its fight against Hungarian revisionist ambitions, which were 
becoming ever stronger by this time.
Economic Circumstances
The western territories granted to Romania under the Treaty of Trianon 
constituted 34.8 per cent (102,000 sq km) of the total territory of the country 
and contained 30.7 per cent (in 1930, 5,548,000 people) of its population. In 
1930, 76.6 per cent of the active population of these areas worked in agricul­
ture, 9.6 per cent in industry, 4.7 per cent in commerce and 9.1 per cent in 
other branches. Forests covered one-third of this territory. Grain was pro­
duced on 76.6 per cent of its arable land, fodder on 9 per cent, root crops on 
4.5 per cent, and crops for industrial use on a little over 2 per cent. In the 
1930s, one hectare of land yielded an average of 9 quintals of wheat or 11 
quintals of maize. In 1935 the area contained 35 per cent of Romania's cattle 
and 44 per cent of its stock of pigs, as well as 24 per cent of its sheep. As a 
result of better technology and more careful cultivation, agricultural pro­
duction in Transylvania was higher than in other parts of Romania (in 1938, 
44.8 per cent of all tractors and 42.6 per cent of all threshing machines were 
to be found in Transylvania, which contained only 24.5 per cent of all the 
arable land in Romania).
In mining, the extraction of salt, coal and non-ferrous metals continued. 
The mining of iron ore flourished, and especially the exploitation of Tran­
sylvania's natural gas reserves. In the vicinity of the coal and iron ore mines, 
iron and steel production continued to develop, and in the areas where salt 
and natural gas were extracted the chemical industry prospered. In many 
places, the building materials industry forged ahead. Paper manufacturing 
and such traditional industries as the food industry, the leather industry, 
the textile industry, the ceramics industry, the glass industry and the tim­
ber industry also expanded. Manufacturing industry was concentrated in 
the traditional industrial zones: in the plants of Resica, Arad, Temesv&r, 
Brass6, Kolozsvar and Nagyv&rad, and in the factories and foundries of the 
Hunyad region. In 1937, Transylvania's factories provided 38.6 per cent of 
Romania's total production. The industrial production of the whole coun­
try, after a period of serious crisis, approximately doubled in the fifteen 
years from the middle of the 1920s. In the Transylvanian territories, the 
increase — at only 60 per cent — was more modest. This can be explained 
largely in terms of lack of capital and the absence of state support, and 
partly in terms of a higher initial level.
Between 1921 and 1938, the capital invested in enterprises in Romania as 
a whole increased from 16 billion lei to 61 billions. A great deal of this was 
foreign capital, which grew from 10.8 billion lei in 1921 to 38.9 billions by 
1938: from 67.5 per cent to 63.8 of all investments.
Examination of the larger branches of production from the point of view 
of property relations reveals that in Transylvania small-scale private own­
ership was the rule. The 3,500,000 hectares of arable land were divided 
among 1,164,000 owners. Of these, 1,007,000 persons had properties of less 
than five hectares, 105,000 had properties of between five and ten hectares, 
and 53,000 had holdings larger than this. In 1930, the total number of indus­
trial and commercial enterprises was 96,611, and 362,125 people worked in 
these. In 1937, there were 1,691 big industrial plants which employed a total 
6 6 9  of 130,000 workers, almost twice as many as in 1919.
The country's settlement structure, reflecting its level of economic de­
velopment and the population's occupational division was largely agrarian 
in character. In Transylvania in 1930,82.7 per cent of the population lived in 
villages, and only 17.3 per cent (958,998) in towns. More than half of the 
population lived in small settlements of under 2,000 people. Officially, there 
were forty-nine towns but, of these, only six had more than 50,000 inhabit­
ants. W ith the development of industrialization, bureaucracy and services 
the urban population had increased by 285,000 since 1910; the village popu­
lation stagnated during these twenty years.
The villages were still for the most part geared to self-sufficiency, and 
only the most essential industrial products were obtained from traders. With 
the exception of the priest, the teacher, the shopkeeper and perhaps one or 
two independent skilled workers, the inhabitants of any given village were, 
for the most part, tillers of the land. Among these would be a few well-to- 
do farmers with the rest being smallholders of dwarfholders, or agricul­
tural labourers.
The bulk of the town population was made up of artisans and craftsmen, 
traders, salaried workers and, to a lesser degree, intellectuals, but in many 
places there were also considerable numbers of farmers who supplied the 
market with vegetables, fruit and small livestock. The working class was 
concentrated in a few large industrial centres and towns. Village and small­
town society was organized very much on a hierarchical basis, and pre­
served the attitudes and ways of life prevalent in the nineteenth century.
Romanians in Predominant Situation
Besides the differences in cultural heritage and level of economic develop­
ment, it was mainly its ethnic composition that set Transylvania apart from 
the rest of Romania. According to the 1930 Census, the nationality composi­
tion of Romania was as follows: 71.9 per cent Romanians; 7.9 per cent Hun­
garians; 4.1 per cent Germans; 4 per cent Jews; 3.2 per cent Ruthenians; 2.3 
per cent Russians; 2 per cent Bulgarians; and 4.6 per cent "others". Accord­
ing to the census figures giving the division of Transylvania's population 
by nationality, out of a population of 5,548,363 57.8 per cent were Romani­
ans, 24.4 per cent were Hungarians, 9.8 per cent were Germans, 3.2 per cent 
were Jewish; and 4.8 per cent were of some other nationality. This census 
distinguished between ethnic affiliation and mother tongue, and accord­
ingly presented the Jewish — and Gipsy — ethnic groups separately, even 
if their members spoke Hungarian as their mother tongue. (According to 
the 1910 Census — on the basis of mother tongue — 53.8 per cent of Tran­
sylvania's population were Romanians, 31.6 per cent Hungarians, 9.8 per 
cent Germans, and 4.8 per cent "others".)
The change of regime favoured the Romanians, from both the economic 
and the cultural points of view. According to the official statistics, up to 1 
June, 1927, in Transylvania 212,803 Romanians, 45,628 Hungarians, 15,934 
Saxons and Swabians, and 6,314 persons of other nationality had benefited 
from the measures introduced by the 1921 Land Reform Law. The state, by 6 7 0
means of its tax and credit policies, did its best to assist small farmers who 
were getting into debt with the banks, but technology was so backward that 
there was no increase in agricultural productivity. Smallholders and dwarf- 
holders lived poorly, and the lot of the peasantry of all nationalities contin­
ued to remain a major social problem.
The state, through economic and administrative means alike, supported 
those Transylvanian traders, artisans and craftsmen who were of Roma­
nian origin, but in spite of this, the size of this group did not increase sig­
nificantly. Transylvania's Albina Bank became one of Romania's great fi­
nancial institutions; in Kolozsvar the Banca Centrala was set up to develop 
Transylvanian commerce and industry, and the Banca Agrara to provide 
finance for agriculture. However, the development of Transylvanian credit 
facilities ground to a halt in the face of competition from the Bucharest banks.
The change of regime especially favoured the employees and the intelli­
gentsia, because the state and the cultural apparatus expanded, and be­
cause many Hungarians had either moved to Hungary or had lost their 
posts. However, the opportunities available to the Transylvanian Romani­
ans were restricted by the large number of arrivals from old Romania, and 
this soon became a source of conflict.
Differences in culture and ways of life also contributed to antagonisms. 
In old Romania, that is the Regat, the overwhelming majority of people 
were Greek Orthodox. In Transylvania, however, the Romanians belonged 
to two different churches which earlier had enjoyed equal status. (In 1930, 
1.9 million Romanians declared themselves to be Greek Orthodox and 1.4 
million Greek Catholic.) Romania considered the Greek Orthodox faith to 
be the state religion, but ensured "rights of priority" to the Greek Catholic 
church over the other (non-Romanian) denominations. Both the Greek Or­
thodox and the Greek Catholic churches received significant state subsi­
dies, but in spite of this the Greek Orthodox church, with organization of 
new parishes and building of new churches, enjoyed the advantage. With 
the nationalization of the Romanian network of church schools, the Greek 
Catholics lost their characteristic, traditional institutions, and therefore the 
opportunity to preserve through their education of the young a continuity 
stretching back to the eighteenth century, and a cultural inheritance which 
lined them both to Rome and to Vienna.
Since the peasantry provided the social base of Romanian national poli­
tics in Transylvania, here the Romanian ruling class reacted to the problems 
of the villages more sensitively than did its counterparts in the Regat. Dif­
ferences existed between Romania and Transylvania also in respect of eco­
nomic traditions and traditions of public administration. A very different 
set of moral norms developed in public life, and there were different cus­
toms with regard to everyday living.
Tradition, economic and cultural values, and differences in lifestyle — 
all these explain why a great many of the Romanians of Transylvania sup­
ported the programme proclaimed by Iuliu Maniu's Romanian National 
Party which explicitly espoused Transylvania's special interests. As early 
as 26 December, 1920 the Kolozsvar newspaper Patna took a stand against 
those coming from the Regat, that is from the old kingdom: "Transylvania 
is regarded and treated like a colony". In 1922 the National Party boycotted
even the coronation ceremony. When Maniu head of the National Peasant 
Party which had its counterpart in the Regat, finally came to power, his 
government was unable to advance Transylvania's special interests. Even 
the half measures the party took with a view to protecting the peasants' 
interests backfired in the wake of the economic crisis. By allowing the sale 
of land, it made it easier for small peasants to lose what land they possessed 
and the co-operative societies and people's banks that had been set up be­
came the instruments for the exploitation of the poor.
In the 1920s, while Maniu was calling for a certain degree of self-govern­
ment for Transylvania, other Transylvanian Romanians, for example the 
grouping led by the poet Octavian Goga, proclaimed the need for strong 
centralization in the face of attempts to gain autonomy. At the same time, 
the territorial revisionist ambitions of the Hungarian ruling class served to 
strengthen the appeal of the unitary state idea even among those Romani­
ans who condemned the corrupt rule of the parties and who would have 
liked to see Transylvania's particularist standpoint asserted.
The postwar changes brought evident cultural and educational benefits 
to the Romanian population. In Transylvania in 1910, half of the population 
was unable to read and write, and the majority of these people lived in 
counties inhabited by Romanians. (In Hunyad, Als6-Feher, Kolozs, Szil&gy 
and M&ramaros counties the number of illiterates constituted two-thirds of 
the adult population.) With the nationalization of the schools, the extension 
of the school network and the growing number of teaching personnel, con­
ditions for education improved. By 1930, the proportion of those able to 
read and write had grown to 67.4 per cent in the villages. In Kolozs, Hunyad,
Szil£gy, Bihar, Torda and M£ramaros counties the illiteracy rate in the vil­
lages was still between 37.4 per cent and 68.6 per cent. The decisive major­
ity of those able to read and write had only completed four classes of el­
ementary school.
Secondary education expanded and became more differentiated, and this 
facilitated an increase in the number of Romanian intellectuals and profes­
sional people. For the most part, the intelligentsia was educated at the well- 
equipped University of Kolozsvar, which operated in the Romanian lan­
guage from 1919 on. In 1921 in Temesv&r a technical college was estab­
lished, and this later grew into a university.
A more differentiated Romanian intelligentsia came into existence, one 
which was composed not just of schoolteachers and clergymen, but also of 
doctors, engineers and members of other professions. The fact that a signifi­
cant part of the intelligentsia had originated in the villages, mainly from 
among the children of well-to-do peasants, served as confirmation for the 
belief that there was an opportunity for social advancement, and to share in 
the exercise of political power. In such circumstances, the decisive majority 
of the new Romanian intelligentsia supported the ruling class; very few of 
them identified with the workers' movement. The nationalism of the intel­
ligentsia was coloured by populism, which had characterized Romanian 
culture since the nineteenth century, and which primarily manifested itself 
in the promotion of folk art and in lofty talk about a mythicized peasantry.
It was this trend in Transylvanian Romanian culture that was developed 
by Lucian Blaga, who in his poetry sought answers to the great questions of 6 7 2
life, and who in his studies — drawing on German Lebensphilosophie and 
Romanian folk poetry — painted a mythical picture of the destiny and char­
acter of his people. The distinguished journal, Gandirea (Thought), was the 
m ain m outhpiece of this literary and cultural trend, w hich served to 
strengthen the spirit of Romanian nationalism. The prose, too, focused on 
the world of the Romanian village; Liviu Rebreanu and Ion Agirbiceanu 
portrayed the Transylvanian Romanian peasantry partly in an idyllic envi­
ronment, but also recalled the tragedies of everyday life and the peasant­
ry's struggles against the Hungarian ruling class, against "M agyar rule".
At the University of Kolozsvar, scholarship concentrated mainly on the 
national problem, and archaeologists, historians, linguists and ethnogra­
phers there expended a great amount of energy on proving the theory of 
Daco-Roman continuity, and on studying the Transylvanian Romanian na­
tional and social movements, together with folklore and folk art. In response 
to the needs of the economy, Romanian natural science also became estab­
lished, and was taught by outstanding scholars at the University of Ko­
lozsvar.
Sufferings of the Hungarians
The GyulafehervSr resolution, which declared the union of Transylvania 
with Romania, had been intended by the leaders of the Transylvanian Ro­
manians to be also a charter of liberties for the various nationalities. To 
quote: "There is to be full national liberty for the country's various peoples. 
Every nation has the right to education, government, and justice in its own 
mother tongue, with its own administrative arm drawn from its own ranks. 
In the legislative bodies and in the national administration every nation has 
the right to representation in proportion to its share in the population."3 
The resolution reflected the spirit of bourgeois democracy in political and 
social questions, and prompted hopes that the same spirit would inform 
the government's treatment of the minorities.
In an international agreement of 1919, Romania undertook to honour 
minority rights. The convention on the minorities guaranteed to non-Ro­
manians equal rights, the free use of their languages, and their own educa­
tion facilities. For the Saxons and Szekelys, it held out the prospect of some 
cultural autonomy, and it authorized the nationalities to turn to the League 
of Nations for the redress of their grievances. In principle, equal rights for 
the non-Romanian population were confirmed by the 1923 Constitution, 
but this same constitution also declared the country to be a "Rom anian na­
tion-state", and did not enact the important pledges of the Gyulafehervar 
resolution. Throughout the inter-war years, there was a great discrepancy 
between political practice and constitutional provisions, and this greatly 
circumscribed the possibilities for co-operation between the majority popu­
lation and the minorities.
The 1930 Census in Transylvania — on the basis of mother tongue — put 
the number of Hungarians at 1,400,712. According to some estimates, 200,000
3 . I. M ik6 ,  Huszonket ev. (Twenty-two Years.) Budapest 1 9 4 1 ,  2 6 5 .
(according to other sources, 300,000) Hungarians — mainly intellectuals 
and employees — had "repatriated" after 1918, or in other words, had left 
Transylvania and settled in Hungary. More then one-third of those remain­
ing lived in the Szekelyfold, approximately one-quarter in the Transylvani­
an towns, and almost one-quarter along the western border with Hungary.
Table 6. The distribution of the population of Transylvania 
according to mother tongue and nationality on the basis 
of the 1910 Hungarian and the 1930 Romanian Census
1910 1930 1910 1930
according according to according according to
Population to mother mother nation- to mother mother nation­
tongue tongue ality tongue tongue ality
1000s 1000s % %
Romanians 2830 3233 3208 53.8 58.2 57.8
Hungarians 1664 1481 1353 31.6 26.7 24.4
Germans 516 541 544 9.8 9.8 9.8
Jews/Yiddish 49* 111 179 0.9 2.0 3.2
Gipsies 60 44 109 1.2 0.8 2.0
Others 144 138 155 2.7 2.5 2.8
Total 5263 5548 5548 100.0 100.0 100.0
* Calculated data
Sources: For the 1910 Census data, set: M. Stat. Kozlemenyek. Uj Sorozat, 42. kOtet 
(Hungarian Statistical Bulletin, New Series, Vol. 42.); E. J a k a b f f y ,  Erdely 
Statisztikdja (Transylvania in Statistics), (Lugos 1923); for the 1930 Census fig­
ures, see: Recensdmantul general al populafiei din 29 Decembrie 1930. II (Bucharest 
1938), 1-180.
The composition of Transylvania's Hungarian society in terms of occu­
pation and social structure was traditionally more complicated than that of 
the Romanian. As compared to the population as a whole, the Hungarian 
population was less agricultural in character: farming provided a liveli­
hood for only 58 per cent of its members. Nearly 20 per cent of the Hungar­
ians earned their living from mining and industrial occupations, and 7.8 
per cent from the commerce, credit and transport sectors. On the other hand, 
at 2.5 per cent, the proportion of those living from the proceeds of occa­
sional work (for the most part as day-labourers) was comparatively high.
The situation of the Hungarians in Romania during the inter-war years 
deteriorated partly because of certain detrimental socio-economic develop­
ments and partly because of discriminatory nationality policies. The back­
wardness of industrial development afflicted the Hungarian-inhabited ar­
eas, mainly the Szekelyfold. It was the Hungarians who were the most likely 
to work in industry, or as independent skilled workers, tradesmen and trad­
ers, and who were, thus, the hardest hit by the Depression. Although the 
1921 land reform did benefit the Hungarian peasantry in some places, it did 
not do much for the Hungarian agrarian proletariat. The reform, which 674
reflected marked discrimination against the nationalities, was implemented 
primarily at the expense of the large and medium Hungarian landowners, 
but also seriously hit the Hungarian churches and villages. While the lands 
of the Romanian churches were augmented, more than 314,000 holds of land 
were taken away from the Hungarian churches, which had traditionally 
used the income mainly for cultural and educational purposes.
The economic discrimination manifested itself in the fact that in the 
Szekely counties, people paid more tax than in the regions which had Ro­
manian majorities. The situation of Hungarian artisans, craftsmen and trad­
ers was made more difficult not only by taxation but also by the refusal, or 
even the discontinuation, of credit. The Hungarian banks did not receive 
the same support from the Romanian National Bank as the others, and there­
fore were only able to provide limited funds. At the same time these banks, 
influenced by inflexible business considerations, did not help the hard- 
pressed Hungarian peasantry, even within the limits of the real possibilities 
open to them.
The natural resources of the Szekelyfold counties did not favour agricul­
ture, and since there was scarcely any industry there, many of the young 
people were obliged to migrate to the Regat (the destination, according to 
estimates, of about one hundred thousand Transylvanian Hungarians dur­
ing this time). Others were driven to seek work in the Transylvanian towns, 
a large number of them finding employment as servants. The economic cri­
sis boosted emigration as well — the number of emigrants to the West, and 
mainly to the United States, can be estimated at a minimum of fifty thousand.
A part of the aristocracy left Transylvania, but those of its members re­
maining there — in spite of loss of property — were able to play a role in 
public life on account on their contacts in Hungary and in leading Roma­
nian circles. A good many of the middle landowners sank into poverty, 
their children trying their luck in the towns, or emigrating. In 1919, many 
civil servants refused to take the oath of loyalty to the new regime, and 
were discharged. Later, civil servants were dismissed for not knowing Ro­
manian, and even postal workers and railwaymen were given notice to quit 
on these grounds. In the middle class and among the intelligentsia, there 
were many who lived in uncertainty because the new regime was not pre­
pared to recognise them as Romanian citizens. In the 1930s the so-called 
numerus valachicus was enforced even by private companies: the idea was 
that the management and the majority of the employees were to be Roma- 
nian-speaking.
Everything was done to make the Romanian language predominant. In 
areas where there was a Hungarian majority, place-names and street names 
were not allowed to be written up in Hungarian; signboards in two lan­
guages were first taxed, and finally banned. After 1921, court cases were 
heard only in Romanian, and those appearing before the court who did not 
know Romanian had to speak through an interpreter. All official petitions 
had to be drawn up in the language of the state. In public places inscrip­
tions appeared announcing that "Only Romanian may be spoken". New 
Romanian settlements were established, especially along the western bor­
der and in the Szekelyfold, although these did not result in any great ethnic 
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nationalists insisted that these people were in actual fact magyarized Ro­
manians, and that the campaign was merely an attempt to "re-romanianize" 
them. After 1924, the authorities tried to speed up the romanianization of 
the Szekelyfold, whose population was totally Hungarian by mother tongue, 
and of the ethnically mixed strip of territory along the western border (where 
there was also a Hungarian majority) by creating a so-called "culture-zone". 
The zone extended over ten counties in these areas; the declared aim was to 
make Romanian education more intensive. The teachers from the Regat who 
were appointed to the state schools in this zone received 50 per cent higher 
salaries than their peers, and a ten hectare resettlement plot. School was 
intended, in other words, to be the main means of assimilation.
After 1919, education carried on in the Hungarian language was, in prac­
tice, confined to denominational schools, and more than 1,000 state schools 
in which the language of instruction had been Hungarian were abolished. 
In the academic year 1930-31, 483 Hungarian-language elementary schools 
were maintained by the Reformed (Calvinist) church, 297 by the Catholic 
church, 36 by the Unitarian church and 6 by the Lutheran church — all with­
out government subsidy. These schools were attended by 76,255 pupils, 
57.6 per cent of the Hungarians of school age. In principle, the rest should 
have attended Hungarian-language state schools or the Hungarian-language 
stream in Romanian schools, but the number of these decreased continually: 
by 1934-35, for example, their number had already fallen to 112, with the 
number of children enrolled being 11,484. It was characteristic that in coun­
ties such as Csfk and Szatmar, there was not a single state school with a Hun­
garian-language stream. It followed from this that a significant percent­
age of Hungarian children had to attend schools in which the language 
of instruction was Romanian. In the Szekelyfold, children were obliged to 
attend Romanian-Ianguage schools if their name was interpreted as indi­
cating Romanian origin. The language of instruction in state kindergar­
tens — at least according to official statistics — was everywhere Romanian. 
The number of Hungarian denominational kindergartens in this period was 
eighteen.
In secondary education the situation was even worse. In the academic 
year 1930-1931, there operated twenty-three Hungarian-language denomi­
national higher elementary schools, seventeen Uceums (secondary schools 
for girls), seven teacher-training institutions, four higher commercial schools 
and four agricultural winter schools, all of which had been deprived of 
their endowment. This was a more or less 50 per cent reduction compared 
to the situation in 1918, when just the denominational Hungarian-language 
secondary schools numbered 116. Some of the denominational secondary 
schools could grant valid certificates only if the Romanian school authori­
ties gave their approval. In the period from 1930 to 1935,2,609 young Hun­
garians studied in institutions declared private schools. In addition to this, 
3,645 attended secondary schools in which the language of instruction was 
Romanian.
The "private education law" introduced in 1925 required not only that 
Romanian be taught in the schools, but also that history, geography and 
civics should be taught in Romanian. Those finishing at the Uceums had to 
6 7 7  take their final examinations in Romanian and were examined by commit-
tees consisting of Romanian teachers from other schools. The result was 
that the majority of the Hungarian candidates failed.
One grave consequence of this truncated school system was that it failed 
to provide for the education of workers for industry and trade. There were 
scarcely any Hungarian-language vocational schools, and there were few 
places for young Hungarians in Romanian schools of this type at the very 
time that jobs in trade and commerce were becoming the careers of the 
future. Skilled worker education was carried on in the factories and small 
workshops, although from 1927 apprentices were allowed to be instructed 
only in Romanian.
Those few Hungarians who did manage to graduate from secondary 
school encountered many difficulties when they attempted to pursue their 
studies further. An official prohibition had caused the failure of an attempt 
to establish a Hungarian university of all denominations. The number of 
Hungarian students at Romanian universities fell continually: in 1933-1934 
it stood at 1,443; by 1937-1938, it was just 878. Every year about 2,500 stu­
dents were admitted to Kolozsvar's Romanian university: on average, there 
were 300 Hungarians, but few of these were able to complete their studies.
In the first ten inter-war years, a total of 304 Hungarians received degrees,
6 -7  per cent of all the graduates. The opportunities for Hungarians to join 
the ranks of the intelligentsia were effectively cut off, and the 200 or so 
young people who studied at universities or colleges in Hungary did not all 
return to Transylvania. Among the Hungarian university graduates, the lot 
of teachers was the most difficult. They could find employment only in 
denominational schools for a modest salary, and their tenure was condi­
tional on their passing various examinations.
Hungarian-language schooling deteriorated in the 1930s because, as a 
result of the worsened economic situation, many Hungarian pupils were 
unable to pay the high fees charged in the denominational schools. Many 
parents yielded to the pressure of circumstances and sent their children to 
the state schools. The discriminatory measures were so obvious that when 
in 1938 the royal dictatorship worked out its own minority statute, it made 
significant concessions to the demands of the minorities in the field of edu­
cation — without, of course, being able to provide for their implementation.
Because most institutions of Hungarian-language education — and, it 
should be added, of Hungarian-language culture — existed within a de­
nominational framework, the role of the churches increased in the life of the 
minorities. Priests, especially young priests, did much to spread Hungarian 
culture by way of the church associations, in spite of harassment from the 
authorities.
Post-Trianon Romania placed restrictions on Hungarian-language pub­
lishing as well. It was not until the middle of the 1920s that the Hungarian 
press in Transylvania was allowed to publish again, and fill the gap left by 
the Budapest newspapers, which for years were proscribed by the censor­
ship. True, the circulation figures were not high — with the exception of the 
Brassoi Nepujsdg (Brass6 People's Daily), which sold as many as 50,000 cop­
ies per issue. Press trials and the continually renewed state of emergency 
curtailed the freedom of the minority press, which, in addition to the con­
servative trends, was also the forum of the Liberals. A number of Hungar- 6 7 8
ian journals were published. In 1921, the literary journal Pdsztortuz (Camp­
fire) was started, and in 1928 the Erdelyi Helikon (Transylvanian Helicon) 
appeared, which helped the work of the Erdelyi Szepmives Ceh (Transyl­
vanian Craftsmen's Guild) founded in 1924. In 1926, Korunk (Our Times), a 
social science and literary journal, was established. This was Marxist in spirit 
and consciously European in its horizons.
Of Transylvania's artistic institutions, the activity of the Hungarian theatre 
at Kolozsv&r deserves special mention for its staging of works by Transyl­
vanian Hungarian writers. Since their cultural institutions were restricted 
in their activities, many amateur theatrical troupes and music ensembles 
cropped up among the Hungarians during these years.
In rallying the Hungarian men of letters, Karoly K6s, Aladar Kuncz, 
Sandor Remenyik, Janos Kemeny and Count Mikl6s Banffy took the lead. In 
the 1930s, some outstanding new talents made their appearance in Transyl­
vanian Hungarian literature: Aron Tam&si, Istvan Asztalos and S&ndor Kacs6 
in prose, and Lajos Aprily and Jen6 Dsida in poetry. This Hungarian litera­
ture set itself the task of self-examination, and of strengthening the self- 
awareness of the Hungarians. Its goal was to confirm its readers in their 
determination to adhere to their language, homeland, and values.
Of the Hungarian intellectuals, many became advocates of "Transyl- 
vanism ", a movement founded in an interpretation of history which saw 
Transylvania and the Hungarians of Transylvania as entrusted with the 
special role of finding the means to the reconciliation of the peoples living 
together in the new state. These were the decades of growing sensitivity to 
social problems, and writers and sociologists alike gave their accounts of 
the lot of the Szekelys, and of the social conflicts that beset Transylvanian 
urban life. There were also, of course, writers who painted idyllic pictures 
of peasant life, which conjured up the mystical, mythical world of folk­
tales.
One of the challenges facing Hungarian intellectuals was to acquaint them­
selves with Romanian literature and to introduce it to the Hungarian-speak­
ing public. The effort led to co-operation with certain Romanian writers, 
among them Octavian Goga, Emil Isac, and Victor Eftimiu. Many Hungar­
ian writers became mediators between the Romanian and the Hungarian 
literary world. A number of populist writers in Hungary — for instance, 
Laszl6 Nemeth — took a lively interest in the "minority's lot" and sought 
contacts with Transylvanian Hungarian writers, and through them, with 
Romanian writers, too. Attempts were also made to promote collaboration 
between Hungarian and Saxon writers, with members of the Klingsor circle, 
for example. But these attempts to reach out to one another were not enough 
for a real change, and in the atmosphere of rampant nationalism all efforts 
at establishing lasting co-operation necessarily failed.
The opportunities open to Transylvania's Hungarian scholars were very 
limited, and only a few individuals actually engaged in research. There was 
hardly an institution in which such work was possible, and there was no 
university. The activity of the Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet (Transylvanian Mu­
seum Association) was limited to the publication of scholarly findings, and 
to encouraging historical research, principally on the common Rom anian- 
679 Hungarian past.
Literature served political and ideological purposes under the circum­
stances: it nurtured national self-consciousness, and gave direction to cul­
ture and education. Up to the mid-1930s, the intelligentsia were happy to 
relinquish the main political arena to aristocratic and bourgeois circles, con­
vinced that both their traditions and financial position made them more 
suited to the task.
Once the Treaty of Trianon had decided Transylvania's legal status, the 
conservative Hungarian political leaders declared their loyalty while pledg­
ing themselves to a policy of protecting minority rights. At this time they 
did not consider the founding of a political party. The democratically minded 
artist-architect, Karoly K6s, organized a People's Party at B&nffyhunyad in 
the June 1921, but this was unable to attain national significance. After vari­
ous attempts on the part of both democrats and aristocrats to form a party, 
at the end of 1922 a more permanent organization, the Orszdgos Magyar Part 
(National Hungarian Party) was set up. This party was directed in a con­
servative spirit by representatives of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie, but 
enjoyed a firm base in that national grievances were common to all social 
layers.
In 1923, the party concluded an agreement with the poet Octavian Goga, 
who had negotiated on behalf of General Averescu's Partidul Poporului (Peo­
ple's Party). This agreement promised a certain autonomy to the Hungar­
ian churches, the right of the denominational schools to issue certificates, 
fewer restrictions on other Hungarian-language cultural institutions, and 
the wider use of Hungarian in the administration of justice and in commu­
nities which were at least 25 per cei?t Hungarian populated — provided the 
two parties fought the elections jointly and were victorious. The National 
Hungarian Party later renounced this agreement, and in 1926 made a simi­
lar one with the Liberal Party, which it considered to be stronger. After­
wards it returned to its alliance with the People's Party, later forging links 
with the German minority and then again with the Liberals. Agreements of 
this type ensured the election of a few Hungarian parliamentary deputies, 
in spite of an electoral system which was weighted against the small par­
ties. However, successive governments did not keep their promises, and in 
practice the lot of the Hungarians was not improved as a result of this pact 
policy. Modest steps towards the democratization of the country brought a 
certain improvement — the temporary lifting of the state of siege and the 
cleaner elections held by the Maniu government in 1928 (in which the Na­
tional Hungarian Party took third place), but even these worthwhile devel­
opments were swept away by the general political dislocation and shift to 
the right which followed in the wake of the Depression.
The National Hungarian Party and the groups it supported from time to 
time attempted, on the basis of the 1919 minority protection agreement, to 
turn to the League of Nations — mainly with property violation and educa­
tion grievances. Once presented for arbitration to the League, however, such 
grievances naturally became political issues for the Romanian government, 
which accordingly did everything it could to prove the groundlessness of 
the complaints, alluding, among other things, to the fact that the German 
minority was "satisfied with its lot", and that it did not seek outside help. 
With the exception of certain compromises over property, which mainly 680
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favoured landowners who had emigrated to Hungary, the League of Na­
tions was unable to protect minority rights. Attempts which sought to en­
list the help of the Vatican for the redress of the Catholic church's griev­
ances were similarly unsuccessful. All this showed that, even given the pos­
sibility of international supervision, the minority protection system did not 
work effectively.
Among the Hungarians, the main spokesmen for social progress were 
the Communists, who played an active part in the Partidul Communist din 
Romania (Romanian Party of Communists) and in organizations which main­
tained contact with it. The struggle against nationalism and increasing ex­
ploitation was helped by the Magyar Dolgozok Orszdgos Szovetsege (MADOSZ, 
Hungarian Workers' National Association) which was established in 1934 
with the assistance of Communists in opposition to the Hungarian Party. 
The MADOSZ sought a solution to the nationality question as part of a prog­
ressive economic and social policy and of general democratization. Not only 
the Romanian Communists worked together with the MADOSZ, but so did 
certain representative Social Democrats and the radical Frontul Plugarilor 
(Ploughmen's Front), which began in Hunyad county and grew into a na­
tional movement under the leadership of Petru Groza.
In 1937, at the initiative of the Communists and other democratic intel­
lectuals, the V&s6rhely Meeting took place, intended by the Transylvanian 
Hungarians to be an event of epoch-making significance. It was opened by 
the writer Aron Tamasi and adopted as its aims the fight against fascism, 
co-operation with Romanian democratic forces, and the establishment of a 
people's front — declaring that for the historically interdependent Roma­
nian and Hungarian peoples, voluntary "brotherly union" represented the 
only solution. The meeting had great effect on the progressive Romanian 
intelligentsia, and on intellectual life in Hungary as well.
In 1938, after the dissolution of the parties and the official establishment 
of the corporative state the Magyar Nepkozosseg (Hungarian People's Com­
munity) was set up under the leadership of Count Mikl6s BSnffy, its pur­
pose being to provide cultural and socio-economic representation for the 
Hungarians. Discussions began about a new minority statute, which prom­
ised greater latitude for cultural institutions and the churches, especially in 
education. Given the continuing national oppression and the ever more cha­
otic state of domestic politics by this time, the majority of Transylvanian 
Hungarians regarded such attempts at negotiating with scepticism, and 
looked to external factors for the improvement of their lot. The numbers of 
those — Hungarians and Romanians — who sought the common future of 
their people in a united front against fascism dwindled daily.
German Seaking Ways
There were 543,852 Germans living in the western territories annexed by 
Romania according to the 1930 Census. One block of Germans lived in the 
former Saxon districts between the Maros River and the Carpathians, and 
another, bigger group — the Swabians — in the Banat, around Temesvar.
On 8 January, 1919 the representatives of the Transylvanian Saxons had 
declared that they would join the Kingdom of Romania, and welcomed the 
nationality programme of the Gyulafeherv&r resolution as one whose reali­
zation would create the preconditions under which their accession could 
take place. A few months later the Swabians of the Banat made a similar 
declaration.
The reason for all this should be sought primarily in the fact that the 
conflicts between the German bourgeoisie and the Hungarian ruling class 
had intensified during the war years, and the Germans hoped to achieve a 
more favourable position in the new state. Their willing adherence brought 
the Germans certain advantages over the Hungarians. They could continue 
their economic activities freely, could remain in public service in consider­
able numbers, had a good chance of getting their representatives elected to 
parliament, had greater educational and cultural opportunities, and their 
schools — unlike the Hungarian schools — received regular government 
subsidies. However, the Germans soon realized that the Romanian govern­
ment would not keep to the promises made at Gyulafehervar, nor to the 
international convention on the minorities. The land reform deprived the 
German Lutheran church of the greater part of its property, some 55 per 
cent. In 1937, the remaining property was divided between the Lutheran 
church and the Romanian cultural organization Asezamantul Cultural Mihai 
Viteazul (Cultural Foundation M.V.)
According to the statistics, the agricultural sector provided the liveli­
hood of 54.1 per cent of the Germans, this proportion being somewhat higher 
among the Swabians of the Banat. Twenty-four per cent of Germans earned 
a living in industry and mining, and 7.2 per cent in commerce, banking and 
transportation. In commerce, banking and transportation the number both 
Jews and Hungarians exceeded the Germans, although the latter not signifi­
cantly. Among those employed in education, the proportion of Germans was 
the highest; while of those earning a livelihood through casual labour the 
proportion of Germans was almost as favourable as that of the Romanians.
German peasants in Romania for the most part used modern farming 
techniques, and this ensured their prosperity. However, as measures were 
introduced to benefit the Romanian peasantry, the German peasants found 
themselves at a disadvantage, and this caused a great deal of bitterness 
among them. German artisans, craftsmen, tradesmen and traders had to 
work ever harder to compensate for the restrictions placed on their access 
to credit.
In matters of culture and education, Transylvania's Germans relied to a 
large extent on the Lutheran church, which maintained contacts in Ger­
many, and which was, thus, able to finance denominational education and 
provide for the cultural needs of the Lutheran community. The Kulturamt 
(Culture Office), the organization headed by Richard Csaki, the journal 
Ostland, and Klingsor, the literary journal edited by Heinrich Zillich, all did 
a great deal to foster German culture during these years. Transylvanian 
Saxon literature had a special quality all its own, as can be seen in the works 
of writers such as Adolf Meschendorfer, Erwin W ittstock and Heinrich 
Zillich. The social science journal Siebenburgische Vierteljahrschrift edited by 
Karl Kurt Klein, was read outside Transylvania as well.
A decisive change as compared to the previous era was the ending of the 
traditional political separateness of Saxons and Swabians. Organizationally 
the two groups united, and Saxon consciousness gave way to a conscious­
ness of all Germans which found expression in the name given their party, 
and in the names of their institutions and newspapers. The German Party, 
which stood for bourgeois constitutionalism, was influential in the 1920s 
and from time to time co-operated with the Hungarian Party, though it was 
more prone to enter into coalitions with the government party, and by so 
doing to ensure its position in parliament. (For a time, one of its members, 
Rudolf Brandsch, held the post of state secretary for minorities.)
Many German workers participated in the workers' movement, and quite 
a few were active in the illegal Romanian Communist Party. The Depres­
sion, the systematic discrimination against the nationalities, and Hitler's 
coming to power in Germany boosted the influence of national socialism in 
Romania, especially among young people. After 1935, the Hitlerists gained 
control of the German wing of the national revival movement, and bound 
the fate of Romania's German minority to Germany, going so far as to sub­
ordinate its interests to the foreign policy objectives of the Reich. The Ro­
manian ruling class, especially after 1938, endeavoured to play into their 
hands, hoping that they would act as mediators in the assertion of the new 
Romanian foreign policy, which had suddenly shifted from the Anglo-French 
alliance towards Hitler's Germany. Certain segments of Romania's Ger­
man bourgeoisie was opposed to Hitler — as were the liberal patricians led 
by the Lutheran bishop Victor Glondys — but they were isolated in the 
general move to the right.
The Second World War and the Divided Transylvania
Within the space of a few years, the change in power relations in central 
and eastern Europe that followed the Nazi take-over of power brought both 
Hungary and Romania under the hegemony of the Reich. The Hungarian 
ruling class, albeit with certain reservations, supported the fascist powers, 
and in doing so strengthened its own position. In 1938, with the agreement 
of the Little Entente, Hungary acquired the right to equality of armaments, 
although this was not so much a concession as a recognition of the new 
international situation. The Little Entente had grown weak, and, with the 
dismemberment of Czechoslovakia in 1938-1939, it collapsed altogether.
It was this new international climate that led Romania to drop its up-to- 
then exclusively Anglo-French orientation, and to switch to a policy of bal­
ancing between its earlier supporters and Berlin. A paradoxical situation 
ensued: Hungary was laying claim to German help in support of its revi­
sionist plans at the same time as Romania was attempting to defuse Hun­
garian ambitions by trying to enlist Germany to support its cause. In March
1939, a German-Romanian economic agreement gave Romania a breathing 
space. Budapest, seeing that it could not count on German assistance, worked 
out a new plan: it would consider launching a war of its own against Roma­
nia at an opportune moment. The project very much overestimated Hun-
garian military strength, and the domestic troubles of the neighbouring coun­
try. In the autumn of 1939, Ribbentrop made it known that Germany would 
not tolerate an attack on Romania, and Italy, too, warned the Hungarian 
government against such a move. The Western Powers also disapproved of 
the proposed military action. In February 1940, the Teleki government 
dropped the military plan, and at the same time informed London and Paris 
of its decision.
The spring of 1940 was, for Hungary, a time of Germanophile neutrality.
When Budapest got word of the Germans' plan for a possible seizure of the 
Romanian oilfields, it put out feelers in London as to whether or not it should 
allow German troops passage through the country. On receiving a negative 
answer from the British, Teleki decided on the maintainance of armed neu­
trality. However, the German offensive in the West created a new situation.
For the Hungarian government, reconsideration of the Transylvanian issue 
was again becoming urgent, the more so as it was becoming clear that Ro­
mania would soon officially align itself with Germany. On 1 July, 1940 the 
Romanian government renounced the British guarantees and published a 
statement declaring its about-turn in foreign policy. Directly after this, the , 
king appointed a pro-German government, in which the leaders of the Iron 
Guard were also given posts. Already on 27 June, however, the Hungarian 
government had decided on military steps to press its territorial demands.
In July, Hitler called in Prime Minister P&l Teleki, and announced that he 
would take the "settlem ent" of the Transylvanian question into his own 
hands. The Fiihrer was principally looking for a solution which would suit 
his preparations for war against the Soviet Union, and which would guar­
antee him Romanian crude oil, Hungarian wheat, and the railway networks 
of both countries for the conflict in the East. He persuaded Romania to be­
gin talks with Hungary about handing back the Transylvanian territories.
At the Hungarian-Romanian negotiations at Tumu Severin on 16 ,19 , and 
21 August, even the basic principles could not be agree: the Hungarian ne­
gotiating team wanted the handing over of substantial territories, while the 
Romanians — perhaps with the aim of gaining time — proposed an ex­
change of populations. The Hungarian government now once again consid­
ered an independent military move, but Bucharest (according to some 
sources) raised the idea of arbitration by Berlin — a move Hitler had al­
ready been considering. On 27 August, Hitler chose among the border vari­
ants that had been worked out by German experts for the division of Transyl­
vania, and then summoned representatives of the Hungarian and the Ro­
manian governments to Vienna. After some hesitation, the Hungarians ac­
cepted the arbitration decision, as did the Romanian Crown Council, by a 
two-thirds majority.
The second Vienna Award, proclaimed by the Germans and Italians on 
30 August, 1940, gave to Hungary the northern and eastern parts of Transyl­
vania (43,492 sq km), leaving the rest in Romanian hands. The award was 
based neither on ethnic nor on any particular economic considerations, but 
was, in fact, the implementation of the "divide and rule" principle. From 
the ethnic point of view, it meant that, with northern Transylvania, Hun­
gary acquired another 1,344,000 inhabitants whose mother tongue was Hun­
garian, 1,069,000 whose mother tongue was Romanian and 45,000 whose 684
mother tongue was German, comprising 52.1, 41.5 and 1.8 per cent respec­
tively of Northern Transylvania's population according to the disputable 
1941 Census data.4 Among the counties given to Hungary were also some 
with Romanian majorities — for example, Beszterce-Nasz6d and Mara- 
maros. The capriciously defined border now dividing Transylvania split in 
two what had been an economically integrated whole. Towns were cut off 
from their traditional hinterlands and staggering transportation difficulties 
were created. (For example, no Hungarian railway link existed between 
Budapest and the Szekelyfold.)
Politically the award meant that Hungary and Romania became Hitler's 
playthings: German policy made the future fate of Transylvania dependent 
on the two countries' participation in the anti-Soviet war. Budapest hoped 
to retain the territory gained through German favour; Bucharest, on the 
other hand, hoped to recover the same region by the same means. Although 
Prime Minister Teleki proclaimed Hungary's attitude to the Romanians to 
be one of "brotherly understanding and co-operation in a spirit of peace", 
this was rendered an empty phrase by government and administrative 
measures that only compounded tensions and increased national animos­
ity. Goaded on by their loss, Romanian nationalists vented their frustration 
on the Hungarian population of Southern Transylvania. A veritable exodus 
of Hungarians was the result. Some 100,000-150,000 Hungarians from South­
ern Transylvania fled either to Northern Transylvania or to Hungary to 
escape discriminatory measures, imprisonment, and other denials of rights.
In their turn, about one hundred thousand Romanians — mainly civil 
servants and intellectuals — fled southwards from Northern Transylvania, 
away from Hungarian rule which was establishing itself there. The number 
of Romanian refugees reached more than two hundred thousand by 1944. 
The Hungarian army, which marched into Northern Transylvania at the 
beginning of September 1940, encountered no resistance; nevertheless, many 
incidents took place. These included serious atrocities at Ipp and Ordogkut, 
where a company of soldiers murdered many Romanian inhabitants. The 
military administration compromised the policy of the Teleki government, 
expelling even those Romanian intellectuals whom the prime m inister 
wanted to invite as parliamentary representatives. The memorandum sub­
mitted by the Transylvanian Hungarian representatives to Parliament, which 
made a plea for equal rights and protection for the Romanians, fell on deaf 
ears. Policies of so-called "reciprocity" now began, in which expulsion was 
matched by expulsion, internment by interment, and school closure by school 
closure. The German-Italian military commissions, which examined com­
plaints on both sides, condemned both governments, which answered with 
loud protestations but with no measures aiming at redress.
4. Z .  F o g a r a s i ,  A nepess^g anyanyelvi, nemzetisegi es vall^si megoszl&sa torveny- 
hatosagonkent 1941-ben. (The Municipal Division of the Population According 
to Mother Tongue, Nationality and Religion in 1941.) Magyar Statisztikai Szemle 
(Hungarian Statistical Bulletin), 1944. I. Iff. — Romanian statistics say that the 
number of Romanians was 1,171,000 (49.1 per cent), that of the Hungarians
912,000 (38.2 per cent). Analele Institulului Statistic al Romaniei. I. Bucharest 1942, 
340ff.
Northern Transylvania
The economic situation in Northern Transylvania was basically one of war­
time exploitation. The goal was to utilize to the utmost the natural resources 
and forests there, and to this end, certain industrial development also took 
place. The development of transportation, and especially the establishment 
of links between the Szekelyfold and the other parts of Transylvania, was a 
major problem.
Amidst the generally worsened living conditions, national discrimina­
tion exacerbated the situation of the predominantly peasant Romanian popu­
lation. Many Romanian men of military age were called up for labour serv­
ice, and many families lost their breadwinners. In the face of the economic 
difficulties, the Plugarul (Plough) co-operative network — the important 
economic organization belonging to the Romanians of Northern Transylva­
nia — could only extend modest assistance. In areas with a Romanian ma­
jority, Romanian-language elementary schools (there were 1,345 of them) 
were able to function, but Hungarians was made a compulsory subject. At 
secondary school level, only fourteen Romanian-language schools, or schools 
with a Romanian-language stream, continued to operate. For some time, 
only one Romanian newspaper, the Kolozsv&r Tribuna Ardealului (Tran­
sylvanian Tribune), appeared, and even later the number of Romanian pe­
riodical publications allowed was just four. The Romanian churches be­
came more active in cultural affairs and education, in spite of the fact that 
some priests were subject to harassment.
At county level, relatively few Romanians were elected to, or involved 
in, local government, although more were to be found in the leaderships of 
villages. They had no special representatives in the Budapest Parliament, 
and only Iuliu Hossu, a Greek Catholic bishop, had a seat in the Upper 
House. The Romanian National Commonality led by Emil Hafieganu and 
Aurel Socol — which was refused formal recognition by the authorities — 
was the only political organization which both Budapest and Bucharest ac­
cepted as the body representing the interest of Northern Transylvania's Ro­
manians.
Initially, it seemed that in Northern Transylvania the second Vienna 
Award had created a favourable situation for the Hungarians. It soon turned 
out, however, that only a narrow section really benefited. Former landown­
ers challenged the 1921 land reform, and filed a whole host of lawsuits, 
most of them against Romanian peasants. As a result, in many places land­
owners were able to recover their estates, or a part of them. Certain advan­
tages accrued to Hungarian capitalists, and even to traders and independ­
ent artisans, craftsmen, and tradesmen, who could now obtain credit and in 
places make new investments. The change also benefited the Hungarian 
intellectuals, who were again appointed to government posts and govern­
ment jobs after so many years of penury. However, the position of the peas­
antry and the working class did not alter: in the initial period of economic 
changeover, many were unemployed. Especially difficult was the position 
of the Szekelys, whose accustomed commuting, migratory and work possi­
bilities were now restricted, along with their markets, and the new admin­
istration was scarcely able to compensate for this. 6 8 6
For the Hungarians, the second Vienna Award brought real liberation 
only in the fields of language use and of culture and education. Hungarian- 
language state elementary schools wee again established, and the network 
of secondary schools in which Hungarian was the language of instruction 
expanded. A Hungarian university again operated in Kolozsvar, and the 
Erdelyi Tudomanyos Intezet (Transylvanian Institute of Sciences) was set up 
to promote scholarly activity. At the same time, some of the verve of artistic 
and intellectual life was lost with the discouragement of socialist and the 
more radical bourgeois democratic trends. The best of Transylvania's writers 
grew ever more vocal in their criticism of this state of affairs as the war wore 
on. It was clear that the national question was inseparable from the issue of 
social progress, and that, despite its advantages, the division of Transylva­
nia had not solved the nationality problem. New solution would have to be 
found for Romanians and Hungarians to be able to co-exist. Some Transylva­
nian Hungarian intellectuals sought links with left-wing circles in Budapest, 
the populist writers, the Social Democratic Party and the Communists.
By late summer of 1940, employees and civil servants from Hungary 
were flooding into Northern Transylvania. Transylvanian Hungarians took 
exception not only to this attempt at wholesale take-over, but also to the 
chauvinist spirit with which the immigrants, and especially the initial two- 
month military administration, was imbued. The locals were offended by 
the newcomers' conservative political thinking, their gentry attitudes, their 
wire-pulling and mainly by their determination to wrest compensation for 
Trianon, which took the form of rapid enrichment at any cost. In the midst 
of the deteriorating wartime economic circumstances, the arrogant, con­
ceited behaviour of public administration officials, and especially of mem­
bers of the officer corps, was especially hard to bear.
The military administration shut down the left-wing press. It quickly 
banned almost all progressively-minded political organizations, and soon 
began to persecute left wingers generally, primarily the Communists. The 
sole legal working-class organization, the Social Democratic Party, was ex­
posed to constant harassment and surveillance. This was also true for the 
trade unions, which, with some success, took up the fight against the dis­
missal of Romanian industrial workers also.
After the second Vienna Award, representatives to the Hungarian Par­
liament from Transylvania, together with some Transylvanian members of 
the Upper House, formed the Erdelyi Part (Transylvanian Party). This sup­
ported the government but also attempted to protect the special interests of 
the area — with little success. The party did not identify itself fully with the 
prevailing policy; it rejected some of the more inhuman manifestations of 
fascism as for example, the more conspicuous and violent forms of anti- 
Semitism, and tried to adopt a more progressive standpoint on social ques­
tions. Nevertheless, this did not mean that the party rejected the main fea­
tures of the ruling circles' conservatism and nationalism. Hungarian na­
tionalism was greatly strengthened by the awareness that the Transylvani­
an question was far from having been settled. In the interests of Transylva­
nia, during the last years of the war not only the Hungarian left wing but 
also a part of the ruling class sought the possibility of common action with 
6 8 7  the Romanians against Hitler's Germany.
The modest number of Germans in northern Transylvania automatically 
became members of the German Volksgruppe in Hungary, an organization 
which, however, was not give as wide sphere of authority as its counterpart 
in Romania. Among other things, the Lutheran church was able to keep its 
denominational schools. In 1942, the German and Hungarian governments 
agreed that the Waffen SS could recruit from among Hungary's Germans. 
Although joining up was voluntary, the Volksgruppe took good care to exert 
adequate pressure on Germans in Hungary, and therefore on Transylvani­
an Germans, too.
Southern Transylvania
A few days after the second Vienna Award, General Ion Antonescu took 
power in Romania and King Carol II abdicated in favour of his son. Ruling 
as conducator (leader) alongside King Michael I, Antonescu at first had the 
support of the Iron Guard. But soon he found it impossible to govern a state 
in which another state effectively exist. The Iron Guard's attempted coup of 
21 January, 1941 was suppressed in a day or so, and Antonescu took Roma­
nia into the war against the Soviet Union, hoping to acquire Bessarabia and 
territories beyond the Dniester — and also to recover Northern Transylva­
nia. This was one of the reasons why he ordered substantial forces to the 
eastern front; the twelve divisions initially sent had grown to twenty-five 
by 1944. Nazi Germany also played on these hopes, especially with the start, 
in 1942-1943, of Prime Minister Mikl6s Kallay's "see-saw policy", based on 
taking whatever opportunity presented itself to get Hungary out of the war. 
Hungary was becoming unreliable as far as the Germans were concerned. 
Prior to his occupation of the country in March 1944, Hitler declared: "G er­
many does not consider it expedient to continue to function as a power 
guaranteeing the Vienna Award."5
The war hit Romania's population very hard, but nationalism in South­
ern Transylvania further inflamed by the loss of the northern areas, forced 
back the progressive forces, and strengthened the position of fascism. On 
the Transylvanian issue Romanian fascism was supported by former ad­
herents of bourgeois democracy and also by a good part of the intelligent­
sia, which regarded the Vienna Award as unjust. In such circumstances it 
was easy to enlist all forces in education, in the press, and even in scholar­
ship in the service of nationalist propaganda.
In southern Transylvania, economic conditions deteriorated with Roma­
nia's involvement in the war, but certain branches of industry did develop. 
The war naturally also afflicted the Romanians of the area, but their eco­
nomic situation did not deteriorate as much as that of the local Hungarians. 
The Vienna Award had left some 500,000 Hungarians in southern Transyl­
vania (about a fifth of them, as we have seen, fled north or to Hungary). 
Many of those who stayed were called up for labour service, others were
5. Hitler hatvannyolc targyalasa 1939-1944. (Sixty Eight Negotiations of Hitler 1939-
1944.) II. Selected and annotated by Gy. Ranki. Budapest 1983, 268. 688
interned or simply thrown into prison. Their cultural activities became more 
restricted; only the Erdelyi Gazdasagi Egylet (Transylvanian Economic Asso­
ciation) continued to provide some kind of organizational framework. 
Elem6r Gy&rf&s, P&l Szcisz and Bishop Aron M£rton, who together led the 
Hungarian community, tried disparately to mediate between Bucharest and 
Budapest to mitigate the growing pressure on the nationalities on both sides 
of the border.
After the Vienna Award, the overwhelming majority of Romanian Ger­
mans, some five hundred thousand people, found themselves in Southern 
Transylvania. In November 1940, the Romanian government signed an agree­
ment with Germany in which it recognized the special economic and politi­
cal rights of the German Volksgruppe, and also gave it control of the German 
denominational schools. With this the battle which had continued for years 
between the Hitlerists and the bourgeois democratic groups among the 
Germans was unequivocally decided in favour of the former. Only within 
the church did some opportunity remain, if not for opposition, then at least 
for attempts to preserve moral values, as, for example, in hindering the 
introduction of new pagan customs. In 1943, the two countries signed an 
agreement according to which Romanian Germans could be enlisted in the 
German army. Some sixty to seventy thousand Romanian Germans became 
members of the Waffen SS, and about fifteen thousand others worked for 
the German war machine.
The Extermination of the Jewish Population
Fascist policy was accompanied by anti-Semitism on both sides of the bor­
der. The 1941 Census in Northern Transylvania placed on file 153,333 per­
sons of Jewish religion, against whom strict discriminatory measures were 
enforced. After the German occupation of Hungary, on 19 March, 1944, the 
Jewish population of northern Transylvania was deported, despite the pro­
tests of progressive intellectuals and church leaders. No exact statistical 
data is available concerning the number of those deported. According to 
various sources, the Hungarian authorities sent 110,000-130,000 people from 
Northern Transylvania to German concentration camps, and it is calculated 
that some 90,000-100,000 of them died there.6 (Of the more than 400,000 
who were deported from the entire territory of Hungary at this time, 320,000 
lost their lives.) In Southern Transylvania, the Antonescu governm ent 
stripped Jewish inhabitants of all their rights, but their deportation — al­
though planned — did not take place. (Romanian anti-Semitism claimed its 
victims primarily in Moldavia, Bessarabia, and the territories beyond the
6. Data concerning the serious loss of lives among the Jewish community are still 
extremely diverse. See the figures referred to in I. S kmlyen, Demogrifiai viselked6s
— n6pesed6si politika. (Demographical Behaviour — Demographical Politics.) 
A Het (The Week), 3 September, 1982; T. Stark , Magyarorszag mdsodik vildghaborus 
embervesztesege. (Casualities of Hungary During the Second World War.) Buda­
pest 1989, 46; M. C arp, Cartea neagra. III. Bucharest 1947, 13, 31; R. L. B raham , 
689 The Politics o f  Genocide. The Holocaust in Hungary. I-II. New York 1981.
Dniester River. According to estimates, in these territories 280,000-300,000 
Jews were exterminated.)
Transylvania's Jewish inhabitants on both sides of the north-south di­
vide were Hungarian by mother tongue and felt themselves to be a part of 
Hungarian culture. As far as their occupation was concerned most of them 
worked in commerce and as independent tradesmen and craftsmen (in 1930 
in whole Transylvania 67.1 per cent of the Jewish population, but in North­
ern Transylvania 9.2 per cent of the Jews were engaged in agriculture, too). 
A significant number of Jews were members of the intelligentsia, and had 
made substantial contributions to Hungarian culture, many of them partici­
pating in working-class and other progressive movements.
Fight against Fascism
The second Vienna Award was condemned by Communist in Hungary and 
Romania alike as something which hindered the common fight against fas­
cism and which did not serve the true interests of the Hungarian and Ro­
manian peoples. The Communist Party of Hungary declared: "W ith the 
unfortunate Vienna Award a border has been drawn through the middle of 
Transylvania, and a centuries-old economic and cultural unit has been di­
vided in two. The German National Socialists, with the help of Hungarian 
and Romanian reactionaries, have stolen the liberty and independence of 
both countries, and the peoples of(Transylvania are free neither in the one 
part nor in the other."7 Of the Transylvanian Hungarian Communists, many 
gave their lives to awaken Hungarian society to this realization. With the 
agreement of the Romanian and Hungarian parties, they worked out a policy 
corrected for the new conditions and sent a delegation to Moscow for the 
international coordination of the common struggle. The actions taken by 
the Hungarian authorities against them in 1941 and 1943 were unable to put 
an end to their dedicated organizational and propaganda work, and with 
the setting up of the Bekepdrt (Peace Party), their influence also reached bour­
geois circles.
Hungary's withdrawal from the war was nowhere urged so much or so 
openly as in Transylvania, and from 1943 the leaders of the Transylvanian 
Party also joined in the demand. When it became clear that the fascist pow­
ers had lost the war, the Transylvanian politicians encouraged the Buda­
pest government to conduct negotiations. However, the nearness of the 
German army, bad relations with the neighbouring countries, fear of com­
munism and not least the desire to retain Northern Transylvania paralyzed 
the capacity for action. When, in 1943, the Hungarian government sent Count 
Mikl6s B&nffy to Bucharest to meet with the Romanian opposition, it turned 
out that there, too, people knew what kind of hellish game Hitler had drawn 
them into. Nevertheless, mutual mistrust and differences in views were too 
great for them to turn jointly against nazi Germany.
7. D. C satari, Magyar-roman kapcsolatok. (Hunearian-Romanian Relations.) Buda­
pest 1958, 166-167.
The Communists, co-operating with other progressive forces, played an 
important role in preparing for Romania's withdrawal from the German 
alliance, and — in agreement with the king and the bourgeois opposition — 
organized the overthrow of the fascist dictatorship. Militarily, the opportu­
nity for this was provided by the advance of the Soviet army, which in 
August 1944 had broken through the front at Iasi, and was advancing to­
wards the Romanian capital. It was this situation that was exploited by the 
Bucharest uprising on 23 August, which turned the Romanian army against 
the German forces, and at the same time brought Romania into the anti- 
Hitler coalition.
After this, the Romanian army took part at the side of the Soviet army in 
the liberation of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, suffering heavy casualties 
and losing about 160,000 men (of whom more than 40,000 fell in Hungary).
Once More in Romania
The armistice agreement concluded with the Soviet Union on 12 Septem­
ber, 1944, stated: "The Allied governments consider the decision of the Vi­
enna Award relating to Transylvania to be null and void, and agree that, 
conditional upon ratification in the peace treaty, Transylvania, or the greater 
part of it, will be given back to Romania, and that with this end in view, 
Soviet troops will participate with Romania in joint operations against Ger­
many and Hungary."8 In October 1944, after the defeat of a senseless Ger- 
man-Hungarian attack against Southern Transylvania — Romanian troops 
advanced into Northern Transylvania alongside the Soviet army. The Hun­
garian government's own attempt to pull out of the war on 15 October failed, 
and, as a result, the opportunity was lost for Hungary's military forces to 
turn against Hitler's Germany.
The coalition government that was formed in Bucharest after 23 August, 
1944 with General Sanatescu at its head comprised besides the so-called 
historic parties, not only the Communists but also the Social Democrats. It 
was principally the National Peasant Party which was determined to avenge 
the injury that Romanian national feeling had sustained as a result of the 
second Vienna Award. When, in accordance with the armistice agreement, 
the Romanian administration again took over Northern Transylvania, the 
population fell victim to the bloody atrocities of the Maniu Guard in some 
villages of the Szekelyfold, mainly in Sz&razajta and Szentdomokos, and 
elsewhere, too, as in Egeres, near Kolozsv£r, and in Bihar. The Romanian 
police and gendarmerie arrested and interned tens of thousands of people, 
especially refugees but also left-wing Hungarians. As a result, at the begin­
ning of November 1944, the Allied Control Commission removed the Ro­
manian administration from Northern Transylvania, and only in March 1945,
8. D. C satari, Forgoszelben. Magyar-roman viszony 1940-1945. (In Whirlwind. Hun- 
garian-Romanian Relation, 1940-1945.) Budapest 1968, 430; 23 August, 1944. 
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after the formation of the Groza government, was it allowed to come back. 
In the four month transitional period, it was the Romanian and Hungarian 
Communists — the latter's mass backing being provided by the local and 
county organizations grouped together into the newly founded Magyar Nepi 
Szdvetseg (Hungarian People's League) — who organized and directed po­
litical life and reconstruction work in Northern Transylvania.
The Romanian public administration returned when the government of 
Petru Groza, the founder of the Frontul Plugarilor (Ploughers' Front) prom­
ised to guarantee internal order and nationality rights. The assembly con­
vened at Kolozsv^r on 13 March, 1945 — at which Andrei Vishinsky, the 
Soviet deputy foreign minister, took part as Allied representative — sent a 
telegram to Stalin. This expressed "Northern Transylvania's deep gratitude 
for being placed under Romanian administration" and assured the Soviet 
leader that the Romanian authorities would "do everything to maintain 
peace and order behind the front, and would ensure that the rights and 
duties of the peoples living together prevailed".9
On 10 February, 1947, the peace treaty deciding Romania's new borders 
was signed in Paris. Passing over the alternative possibility mentioned in 
the armistice agreement, and taking into account the sacrifices Romania 
had made in the struggle against the fascist powers, the peace treaty re­
turned the whole of Transylvania to Romania and accordingly restored the 
Romanian-Hungarian border drawn in 1920. The treaty left the Soviet Un­
ion in possession of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, and Bulgaria in 
possession of Southern Dobrudja.
Transylvania's post-1918 history has been one of constant hardship. Wars 
and radical changes of systems of government have influenced its economic 
and social circumstances, and have determined the relationship of its vari­
ous peoples and cultures one to another. There can be no doubt that Roma­
nians, Hungarians and Germans alike have and equal stake in the economic, 
social and cultural development of Transylvania, and that such develop­
ment must involve modernization, democracy, and respect for the equality
— and uniqueness — of each national group.
Transylvania is unique in east-central Europe in respect of its ethnic and 
cultural plurality. Its future will influence the future of the whole region, 
and will determine the prospects for co-operation between Romania and 
Hungary — something that neither country can well afford to forego.
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Part One — Transylvania in Prehistoric 
and Ancient Times
I. Prehistory and Antiquity
The monographs and papers dealing with the prehistory and ancient history of 
Transylvania, as well as the region's history during the Great Migrations are ar­
ranged in thematic order in the series started by J. B a n n e r  and carried on by I. 
J a k a b f f y ,  A K0z6p-Dunamedence r6g6szeti bibliogr&fiSja / An Archaeological Bibli­
ography of the Central Danubian Basin/ (Budapest 1954-1981).
A complete collection of classical sources on Dacia and the Dacian people are 
found in the volumes Izvoare privind istoria Romaniei I-II (Bucharest 1964-1970). 
For the Roman inscriptions of non-Dacian origin see A. DobO, Inscriptiones...
There are useful overviews in D.M. P ip p id i (ed.), Dicjionar de istorie veche a 
Romaniei (Bucharest 1976) and in G. B. F e d o r o v  — L. L. P o l e v o y ,  Archaeologiya 
Rumini (Moscow 1973).
1. The Prehistory of Dacia
The study of Transylvanian prehistory dates from the nineteenth century, although 
its antecedents go back even earlier. The archaeological and numismatic collection 
of the Bethlen College of Nagyenyed was founded in 1726. AVSL was first pub­
lished in 1845 and the Erdelyi Muzeum /Transylvanian Museum/ appeared in 1876. 
After 1899, when the University of Kolozsvar offered its first archaeology courses, a 
series of Hungarian and Saxon archaeological excavations took place which threw 
more light on the history of the region. The first truly comprehensive Romanian 
work is I. N e s t o r , Bericht der ROmisch-Germanischen Kommission des Deutschen 
Archaologischen Instituts (Frankfurt a/M. — Mainz — Berlin 1933). Further useful 
books are: D. B e r c iu ,  Romania before Burebista (London 1967); E. C o n d u r a c h i — C .  
D a ic o v ic iu ,  Rumanien. Archeologia Mundi (Genf 1972). A basic, albeit somewhat 
outdated, work is C . D a ic o v ic iu  (ed.),Istoria Rominiei I. (Bucuresti 1960).
There has been only one work in response to the three-volume Erdely tOrt6nete 
/A History of Transylvania/ since its publication: A. V u l p e , Die Geto-Daker. Ge- 
699 schichte eines Jahrtausends vor Burebista (Dacia 31,1987).
2. The Dacian Kingdom
A monographic treatment of the period can be found in H. D a ic o v ic iu ,  Dacia de la 
Burebista la cucerirea romana (Cluj 1972). See also: C . D a ic o v ic iu , Dakien und Rom 
in der Prinzipatzeit (ANRW 11:6,1977) and I. H. C r i^a n , Burebista and his Time (Bu­
charest 1978). The most recent work is G. V e k o n y , Ddkok, r6maiak, romSnok /Da­
cians, Romans, Romanians/ (Budapest 1989).
3. The Roman Province of Dacia
A bibliography of works dealing with the history and archaeology of Dacia during 
the Roman period is to be found in the above-mentioned A Kozep-Dunamedence 
r6g6szeti bibliogr&fi&ja /The Archaeological Bibliography of the Central Danubian 
Basin/, by B a n n e r  and J a k a b f f y .
An earlier but still useful summary of the history, culture and archaeology of the 
region is C. D a ic o v ic iu ,  La Transylvanie dans 1'Antiquity (Bucharest 1938); in Ger­
man: Siebenblirgen im Altertum (Bucharest 1943). There are brief accounts of the 
province's history in the exhibition catalogue ROmer in Rumanien: Ausstellung des 
ROmisch-Germanischen Museums, Ktiln und des Historischen Museums Cluj (Kfiln 
1969). The Tabula Imperii Romani volumes provide information (and further read­
ing) concerning the topographical investigations on a site by site basis: TIR L-34, 
Aquincum-Sarmizegetusa-Sirmium (Budapest 1968); TIR L-35, Romula-Durostoru- 
Tomis (Bucharest 1969); TIR K-34, Naissus-Dyrrhachion-Scupi-Serdica-Thessa- 
lonike (Ljubljana 1976). The inscriptions are published continuously in the volumes 
Inscriptiones Daciae Romanae (Bucharest since 1975).
For a new approach and ample literature on the conquest and social structure of 
the province readers are referred to K. S t r o b e l , Untersuchungen zu den Dakerkriegen 
Trajans. Studien zur Geschichte des mittleren Donauraumes in der hohen Kaiserzeit 
(Bonn 1984), Antiquitas, Reihe 1, Abhandlungen zur Alten Geschichte 33. On the 
proconsuls and the public administration: A. S t e in ,  Die Reichsbeamten von Dazien 
(Budapest 1944); B. E. T h o m a s s o n , Laterculi praesidium Moesia, Dacia, Thracia 
(Gothoburgi Westrogotorum 1977).
Defence questions are dealt with in: N. G u d e a ,  Der Limes Dakiens und die 
Verteidigung der obermoesischen Donaulinie von Traianus bis Aurelian (ANRW 
11:6, 1977). Like most Romanian authors and quite without substantiation, G u d e a  
considers the Tisza and Maros rivers to be the borders of the province.
Important accounts on mining: S. Mro2ek, Aspects sociaux et administratifs des 
mines d'or romaines de Dacie (Apulum 7,1968); S. MroZek, Die Goldbergwerke im 
rOmischen Dazien (ANRW 11:6,1977). H.-Ch. Noeske, Studien zur Verwaltung und 
BevOlkerung der dakischen Goldbergwerke in rOmischen Zeit (Bonner Jahrbiicher 
177, 1977). For a brief summary concerning money transactions: J. W inkler, Der 
Mlinzumlauf (ROmer in Rumanien, KOln, 1969, 57-60). On the coin treasures of 
Dacia: D. P r o t a s e ,  Les tresors mon6taires de la Dacie romaine (Congresso Inter­
nationale di Numismatica. Atti, Roma 1965, III). On the coin treasures of the north­
ern Balkans: B. Gerov, Die Einfalle der Nordvolker (ANRW 11:6,1977).
For the wars in the Danubian region during the Severus age: J. Fitz, A Military 
History of Pannonia from the Marcomann Wars to the Death of Alexander Severus,
180-235 (Acta Arch. Hung. 14,1962); A. B o d o r , Imparatul Caracalla in Dacia (in: In 
memoriam Constantini Daicoviciu, Cluj 1974).
On the urbanization of the province: F. V it t in c h o f f , Der Bedeutung der Legions- 
lager fur die Entwicklung der rOmischen Stadte an der Donau und in Dakien (Studien 700
zur europaischen Vor- und Frlihgeschichte, H. Jankuhn gewidmet. Neumtinster
1968); H. W o l f , Miscellanea Dacica. II (AMN 13,1976).
For the language and the ethnic composition of the inhabitants: D . D e t s c h e w ,  Die 
Thrakischen Sprachreste (Vienna 1957); 1.1. Russu, Die Sprache der Thrako-Daker 
(Bucharest 1969). The names were collected by A. K e r £n y i : A dSciai szem61ynevek 
/Dacian Personal Names/ (Budapest 1941). A later analysis: 1.1. Russu, L'Ono- 
mastique de la Dacie romaine (L'Onomastique Latin. Colloques Internationaux du 
CNRS, No. 554, Paris 1977, 353-363).
There is only one work dealing with the religious life of the province: L. W. 
J o n e s , The Cults of Dacia (Classical Philology, 9,1929). A short summary can be found 
in: 1.1. Russu, Die Kulte in der rOmischer Dobrudscha (In: ROmer in Rumanien, n.p.
1969).
On the political history of the third century: C. D a ic o v ic iu ,  Einige Probleme der 
Provinz Dazien wahrend des 3. Jahrhunderts (Studii Classice, 6, 1965). The date of 
the withdrawal from Dacia is only certain as within the reign of Aurelian: A. B o d o r , 
Imparatul si parasirea Daciei (SUBB-H 17,1972).
From the sizeable bibliography on the population's continued presence, assumed 
by the Romanian authors: D. P r o t a s e , Der Forschungsstand zur Kontinuitat der 
bodenstandigen BevOlkerung im rOmischen Dazien (ANRW 11:6, 1977); J. H o r e d t , 
Siebenbtirgen in spatrOmischer Zeit (Bucharest 1982). For a review of the latter:
E. T O t h ,  Zur frlihen VOlkerwanderungszeit von Siebenbtirgen (Acta Arch. Hung., 
37,1985).
II. From Dacia to Transylvania.
The Period of the Great Migrations (271-895)
A new monograph on the age, K. Horedt, Frtihmittelalter..., discusses the period 
covered by the present volume in this and the next chapter. The monograph is di­
vided into three main parts: Germanische Zeit (7-58), Slawische Zeit (59-110) and 
Ungarische Zeit (111-192) — the last of which runs parallel to the next chapter of 
the present work. On a number of points Horedt's conclusions agree with those of 
our contributors, or at least show similarities. On the other hand, we disagree with 
him fundamentally in the assessment of certain important periods (Goths, Avars). 
There is a shorter treatise on the subject by the same author: Das frfihmittelalterliche 
.... A basic archaeological source is always J. Hampel, Alterthtimer des friihen 
Mittelalters in Ungam I—III (Braunschweig 1905). For the eastern context of the Great 
Migrations of the Eurasian peoples see K. Czegl6dy, From East to West. The Age of 
the Nomadic Migrations in Eurasia (AEMA 3,1983), and Cs. Balint, Die Archaologie 
der Steppe (Wien — KOln 1989). To the Hun period: I. B6na, Das Hunnenreich (Stutt­
gart 1991). Archaeological and historical views which approach the subject from 
the hypothesis of Daco-Roman continuity: M. Rusu, Bodenstandige und Wander- 
vOlker im Gebiet Rumaniens: 3-9. Jahrhundert (AMN 17,1980) and D. Protase, Die 
dakisch-rOmische BevOlkerung nOrdlich der Donau in der Periode von Aurelian bis 
zu den Slawen (7. Jh) im Lichte der aktuellen Dokumente (in: Die VOlker Stidosteuro- 
pas im 6. bis 8. Jahrhundert. Stidosteuropa Forschungen 17, Berlin, 1987).
An archaeological overview of the latest Roman, Dacian Carp and Gothic age 
(one which the author would surely write differently today) is: K. Horedt, Sieben­
btirgen in spatrOmischer Zeit (Bucharest 1982). For the Carps and the Septer cem­
etery: G. Marinescu — N. Mirojiu, Die karpische Nekropole von ^opteriu (Dacia 31,
1987). On the third-fourth-century history of the Goths: L. Schmidt, Geschichte der 
deutschen Stamme. Die Ostgermanen (Munich 1941). E. A. Thompson, The Visigoths 
in the Time of Ulfila (Oxford 1966), and H. Wolfram, Geschichte der Goten (Munich
1979). A thorough critique of the latter with respect to the Goths of Dacia can be 
found in I. B 6 n a ,  Bemerkungen zu einer neuen historisch-archaologischen Bear- 
beitung der Visigotenzeit in Dazien (Acta Arch. Hung. 33,1981). A work which should 
be treated with considerable scepticism, especially with regard to archaeology is
H. S. Burns, A History of the Ostrogoths (Bloomington 1984). See also E. K. Chrysos, 
Gothia romana. Zur Rechtslage der Westgoten im 4. Jh. (Dacoromania 1,1973). Ma­
rosszentanna: I. KovAcs, Cimetifere de l'6poque de la migration des peuples & 
Marosszentanna (Dolg. ENM3,1912); idem., Station pr6historique de Marosv£s5rhely 
(Dolg. ENM 6,1915); E. Beninger, Ein westgotisches Brandgrab von Maros-Lekencze 
(Mannus 30, 1938). For the chronology and history of the termination of the 
Marosszentanna culture, see Z. Szekely, Der Fund von Tekerfipatak (Kom. Csik) 
(FA 5,1945).
On the archaeological homogeneity of the Visigoth culture within and beyond 
Dacia: Gh. D ia c o n u , Das Graberfeld von Mogosani (Dacia 13,1969); idem., Ober die 
Fibel mit halbkreisfOrmiger Kopfplatte und rautenfOrmigen FuG aus Dacien (Dacia
17, 1973); idem., Uber die scheibengedrehte Keramik in der Sintana de Mures- 
Tschemyahow-Kultur (Dacia 14, 1979).
Of the authors who have attempted to question the Goths' settlement in Dacia:
B. M it r e a ,  Die Goten an den unteren Donau — einige Probleme in I I I .-IV. Jahrhundert 
and I . Io n i j a , Probleme der Sintana de Mures-Cemjachov-Kultur auf dem Gebiete 
Rumaniens (both in U. H a g b e r g  [ed.], Studia Gotica. Stockholm 1972). The Dacian 
'conclusions' drawn by the last author contradict his work which analyzes the Gothic 
cemeteries outside Transylvania: Chronologie der Sintana de Mures-Cemjachov- 
Kultur (in: Peregrinatio Gothica. L6dz 1986). The latest and quite impartial Scandi­
navian analysis of the Marosszentanna culture is irreconcilable with these views: 
U. N a s m a n  (in: Jemalderens Stammesamfund. Aarhus 1988).
Comprehensive works on the fourth and fifth century German finds in the Cen­
tral and Lower Danube region: V. Bierbrauer, Zur chronologischen, soziologischen 
und regionalen Gliederung des ostgermanischen Fundstoffes des 5. Jahrhundert in 
Siidosteuropa — with an internal chronology of the cemetery of Marosszentanna
— and R. Harhoiu, Das norddonaulandischen Gebiet im 5. Jahrhundert und sein 
Beziehungen zum spatromischen Kaiserreich, accompanied by a list of the finds 
and sites. Both in: H. Wolfram — F. Daim (eds), Die VOlker an der mittleren und 
unteren Donau in funften und sechsten Jahrhundert. Vienna 1980).
On the Gepids and the Huns of the Hunnish age (in addition to the examples 
already quoted) I. N e s t o r , Zur Geschichte Siebenbtirgens in IV. Jh. u. Z. (Dacia 19, 
1975); N . F e t t ic h , Der zweite Schatz von Szil£gysomly6 (Arch. Hung. VIII, 1932);
D. P r o t a s e ,  Ein Grab aus dem V. Jh. aus Cepari (Dacia 4,1961); T. Rosu, Hunnen- 
zeitliche Funde aus Oradea (Dacia 9,1965).
Mojgrad's princely grave and treasure from the Hun period, which was repeat­
edly mentioned by N. F e t t ic h  and K. H o r e d t ,  must be struck out of the literature, 
since they are nothing other than modem fakes: I. B 6 n a , Ober die Falschungen des 
Goldschatzes von Moigrad (Publicationes Museorum Com. Veszpremiensis 18,1986). 
Neither could the silver plated fibula presented by K. H o r e d t  (Frtihmittelalter... 
Abb. 7,2) and presented with "Karlsburg" excavation site originate in Transylvania, 
according to the evidence of 1879 and the information of 1884.
On the history of the Gepids, besides L. S c h m id t ' s  book Die Ostgermanen see:
H. S e v in ,  Die Gepiden (Munich 1955); W. P o h l ,  Die Gepiden und die Gentes an der 
mittleren Donau nach der Zerfall des Attilareiches (in: Die VOlker an der mittleren 
und unteren Donau im ftinften und sechsten Jahrhundert. Vienna 1980). For a brief 
historical and archaeological summary, see I. B 6 n a ,  The Dawn of the Dark Ages. 
The Gepids and the Lombards in the Carpathian Basin (Budapest 1976); idem., 
Ungarns VOlker im 5. und 6. Jahrhundert (in: Germanen, Hunnen und Awaren. 
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Das I. gepidische KOnigsgrab von Apahida: N. F in a l y  -  P. H u n f a l v y , Fund von 
Apahida (Ungarische Revue, 1890); N. F e t t ic h ,  La trouvaille de tombe princi£re 
hunnique k Szeged-Nagyszeks6s (Arch. Hung., XXXIV, 1953).
On the Gepid royal grave at Apahida I I ,  see: K. H o r e d t  -  D. P r o t a s e ,  Das zweite 
FUrstengrab von Apahida (Germania 50, 1972). On the Szamosfalva treasure: Ein 
vfilkerwanderungszeitlicher Schatzfund aus Cluj-Someseni (Germania 48, 1970).
D. C s a l l a n y  sums up Gepid archaeological finds up to the end of the 1950s in: 
Archaologische Denkmaler derGepiden im Mitteldonaubecken (454-568 u. Z.) (Arch. 
Hung., XXXVIII, 1961).
A summary of Gepid finds in Transylvania can be found in K. H o r e d t ,  Zur 
Geschichte der Gepiden in Siebenbtirgen (in: idem., Untersuchungen zur Frtihge- 
schichte Siebenburgens. Bucharest 1958). On the earliest Gepid graves in Transylva­
nia: idem., Die Polyederohrringe des 5.-6. Jh. u. Z. aus der SR Rumanien (ZA 13, 
1979). For the archaeological chronology of the period: idem., Der Ostliche 
Reihengraberkreis in Siebenburgen (Dacia 21,1977). A critique of the last mentioned 
work can be found in: I. B 6 n a , Gepiden in Siebenbtirgen — Gepiden an der Theifi 
(Acta Arch. Hung., 31,1979).
Mez6b£nd: I. KovAcs, Les fouillages de MezdbSnd (Dolg. ENM 4,1913).
Gepid graves and treasures: M. Roska, Das gepidische Grabfeld von Veresmort- 
Marosveresmart (Germania 18,1934); M. C o m $a ,  -  D. I g n a t , Graber aus dem 6. Jh. 
in Medias (Dacia 15,1971); I. Glodariu, Ein Grab aus dem 5. Jahrhundert in Slimnic 
(Germania 52,1974); D. Popescu, Das gepidische Graberfeld von Moresti (Dacia 18,
1974); M. Rusu, Pontische Gtirtelschnallen mit Adlerkopf (Dacia 3,1969).
Monograph on the settlement and cemetery at Malomfalva: K. H o r e d t ,  Moresti. 
Grabungen in einer vor- und frtihgeschichtlichen Siedlung in Siebenbtirgen (Bu­
charest 1979).
The latest comprehensive monograph on Avar history is: W. P o h l ,  Die Awaren. 
Ein Steppenvolk in Mitteleuropa, 567-822 n. Chr. (Mtinich 1988). On the historical 
background of the relations between the Avars and the Slavs: W.H. F r it z e ,  Zur 
Bedeutung der Awaren ftir die slawische Ausdehnungsbewegung im frtihen 
M ittelalter (in: Studien zur Vttlkerwanderungszeit im Ostlichen Mitteleuropa. 
Marburg/ Lahn, 1980). Their short history recorded in archaeology is in: I. B 6 n a , 
Die Awaren. Ein asiatisches Reitervolk an der mittleren Donau (in: Awaren in 
Europa. Frankfurt a/M. -  Niimberg 1985); idem., Die Geschichte der Awaren im 
Lichte der archaologischen Quellen (in: Studi della XXXV. Settimana "Popoli delle 
Steppe: Unni, Avari, Ungari". Spoleto 1988).
For a register of Avar archaeological sites up to the mid-1950s: D. C s a l l a n y , 
Archaologische Denkmaler der Awarenzeit in Mitteleuropa (Budapest 1956). In a 
forthcoming new register mention is made of more than 2000 Avar sites, almost 
twice as many as in the earlier volume.
Comprehensive works on Avar archaeological sites in Transylvania are: K. 
H o r e d t , Das Awarenproblem in Rumanien (Studijne Zvesti 16, 1968); in addition: 
idem., Friihmittelalter...; M. C o m ^a , Slawen und Awaren auf rumanischen Boden 
(in: Die VOlker Slidosteuropas im 6.-8. Jahrhunderts. Berlin 1987).
On the Gepid-Avar cemetery at Marosnagylak: M. Rusu, The Prefeudal Cem­
etery of Noslac Vlth-VIIth Centuries (Dacia 6,1962). On the historical and archaeo­
logical problems of the age, arguing for Daco-Roman continuity: idem., Avars, Slavs, 
Romanic population in the 6th-8th centuries (RAPMP 1975).
On Slavic immigration in general: I. N e s t o r ,  L'etablissement des Slaves en 
Roumanie (Dacia 5,1961). An attempt to minimize the importance of the Slav popu­
lation is evident in: M. Rusu, Aspects des relations entre la Romania orientale et les 
Slaves (RRH 19,1980) and idem., Les populations du groupe turc, les Slaves et les 
autochtones du bassin carpato-danubien aux VIe-IX ' si&cles (RRH 21,1981). By con­
trast, the early Slav occupation of the whole of modern-day Romania has lately
been assumed by the Polish author M. P arczewski, Nejstarsza faza kultury wczesno- 
slowianskie. Die alteste Phase der frtihslawischen Kultur (Krak6w 1988). P arczewski 
also admits the presence of the Avars in Transylvania.
On Slavic archaeological finds in Transylvania: Z. S z ek e ly , Die frtihesten 
slawischen Siedlungen in Siebenburgen (Slavia Antiqua 17,1970); idem., L'aspect de 
la culture matferielle des VIII'-X' sifecles dans la sudest de la Transylvanie (in: Les 
questions fondamentales du peuplement du bassin des Carpathes du VIII' au X' 
si&cle. Budapest 1972); K. H oredt, Die Brandgraberfelder der Media^-Gruppe aus 
dem 7.-9. Jh. in Siebenbtirgen (ZA 10,1976); idem., with the same title (in: Rapports 
du IIP Congr&s International d'Arch^ologie Slave I. Bratislava 1979); T h . N agler, 
Vorbericht liber die Untersuchungen im Hammersdorfer Graberfeld (FVLK14,1971, 
N o . 1).
The summary of the 2nd cemetery at BarSthely: E. Z a h aria , La population 
roumaine en Transylvanie aux VII'-VIII' si£cles. Le cimeti6re No. 2 de Bratei (Bu­
charest 1977).
On Szilcigynagyfalu: J. H ampel, Alterthiimer... ibid. Further excavations: M. C om â, 
Kurganniy mogilnik s truposozheniem v Nushfaleu (Dacia 3, 1959); eadem., 
Vostochniye elementi v pogrebalnom obryade kurgarmikh mogilnikov v Nushfaleu
i Somesheni (in: Drevnaya Rus i Slavyane. Moscow 1978); M. M acrea , Slavyanskiy 
mogilnik v Somesheni (Dacia 2,1958).
On the history of the Bulgar conquest of Transylvania: V. G yuzelev , Forschungen 
zur Geschichte Bulgariens im Mittelalter (Miscellanea Bulgarica 3, Vienna 1986).
For a summary of Bulgar rule in Romania and associated archaeological finds: 
M. C om â , Die bulgarische Herrschaft nOrdlich der Donau wahrend des IX. und X. 
Jh. (Dacia 4,1960); eadem., La civilisation balcano-danubienne (IX'-XI* si^cles) sur 
la territoire de la R. P. Roumanie (Dacia 7,1963). In her more recent works she has 
revised her earlier views. '
On the Bulgar cemetery of Maroskama: K. H oredt, Die Ansiedlung von Blandiana 
(Dacia 10, 1966). A critique and correct evaluation is to be found in: I. F odor, Die 
Bulgaren in den ungarischen Landem wahrend der Ansiedlungsperiode der Ungam 
(MBIO VI, 1984).
For the Danubian Bulgar parallels, crucial to the Bulgar culture in Transylvania, 
see Z. N. V azarova, Slawen und Protobulgaren (Sofia 1976).
Part Two — Transylvania in the Mediaeval 
Hungarian Kingdom (895-1526)
I. The Hungarian-Slav Period (895-1172)
Source documents: the laws of the kings of the House of Arp5d are found in vol. I of
D. Markijs (ed.), Corpus Iuris Hungarici (Budapest 1899); a collection of narrative 
sources: SRH, and Gombos, Catalogus ...; the Byzantine Greek sources: FBHH and 
Gy. Moravcsik, Byzantinoturcica I—II (Berlin 1958), and Constantin Porphyrogennetos 
(DAI); official documents: I. S zentp£tery, Regesta regum stirpis Arpadianae critico- 
diplomatica. I (Budapest 1923), and the relevant Romanian publications: DRH 
Transilvania I and IX. Of the later narrative sources, Anonymus is the most impor­
tant, but on certain questions J. T hur6 czy, Chronica Hungarorum (Augsburg 1488; 
facsimile edition: Budapest 1986); and A. Bonfini, Rerum Hungaricarum decades... 
(Leipzig 1936).
An essential work is Gy. G y o r f f y ,  Geographia...; and Gy. K r i s t 6  — F. M a k k  — L. 
S z e g fO , Adatok korai helyneveink ismeretehez — Donnees A la connaissance des 
toponymes hongrois anciens. I—II (Szeged 1973-1974); O.G. B o l s h a k o v  — A.L. 
M o n g a i t  (eds), Putyeshestviye Abu Hamida Gamati v Vostochnuyu i Centralnuyu 
Yevropu (1131-1153) (Moscow 1971); O. G 6 r k a  (ed.), Anonymi Descriptio Europae 
Orientalis (Cracoviae 1916).
Studies on the early Hungarian sources: C. A. M a c a r t n e y , Studies on the Early 
Hungarian Historical Sources (Budapest 1940); idem., The Mediaeval Hungarian 
Historians. A Critical and Analytical Guide (Cambridge 1953).
In connection with this chapter the volume I of the three-volume Erdely tortenete 
should be mentioned of which the part dealing with settlement archaeology during 
the Hungarian Conquest and the founding of the state was written by myself, while 
the section on the history after 895, based on written sources, was the work of L. 
Makkai, whose basic ideas are at variance with the overall concept of the book. 
There are further important comprehensive works: Gy. Pauler, A magyar nemzet 
t<5rt6nete az Arpadh3zi kirSlyok alatt /A History of the Hungarian Nation during 
the Reign of the House of ArpSd Kings/ (Budapest 1899, reprint: 1984); £t. Pascu, 
Voievodatul...; the relevant chapters of RAPMP: M. Rusu, The Autochthonous Popu­
lation and the Hungarians on the Territory of Transylvania in the 9 th -llth  Centu­
ries; Gy. Gyorffy, IstvSn kirSly 6s mtlve /King Stephen and his Accomplishment/ 
(Budapest 1977); K. Bakay, A magyar Sllamalapltas /The Foundation of the Hun­
garian State/ (Budapest 1978); F. Makk, Magyarorszdg a 12. szSzadban /Hungary 
in the Twelth Century/ (Budapest 1986); Gy. Krist6, Levedi tfirzsszOvets6get<51 Szent 
Istvan allamSig /From the Levedi Tribal Alliance to the State of St. Stephen/ (Buda­
pest 1980); idem., Tanulmanyok az Arpad-korr61 /Studies on the Arpad Age/ (Bu­
dapest 1983); idem., A vSrmegy6k kialakuldsa MagyarorszSgon /The Emergence of 
the Counties in Hungary/ (Budapest 1988); idem., A 10. sz&zadi Erdely politikai 
t0rtenet6hez /To the Political History of Tenth-Century Transylvania/ (Sz 1988).
An archaeological-historical summary of the period following the Hungarian 
Conquest according to the Saxon view: K. H o r e d t , FrOhmittelalter...; idem., Das 
frtihmittelalterliche...; for brief French, English and German reviews of the period 
and Hungarian history: L. M u s s e t , Les invasions: le second assaut contre l'Europe 
chr6tienne (VIIe-XIe si£cles) (Paris 1971); C. A. M a c a r t n e y , Hungary, a Short His­
tory (Edinburgh 1962); idem., Geschichte Ungams (Stuttgart -  Berlin -  Kfiln -  Mainz 
1971).
The theory of the ninth- and tenth-century "Romanian feudal state", based on 
the absolute authenticity of Anonymus, was established decades ago: B. C a m p in e , 
Le probl6me de l'apparition des Etats, feodaux roumains (in: Nouvelles Etudes 
d'Histoire. Bucharest 1955). Since then the theory has not changed essentially: S t . 
S t e f An f .s c u ,  Les premieres formations 6tatiques sur le territoire de la Roumanie 
(.Dacoromania 1, 1973); M. Rusu, La population autochtone et les Hongrois sur le 
territoire de la Transylvanie aux IXe-XI' si^cles. Congressus Quartus Intemationalis 
Fenno-Ugristarum. II (Budapest 1980); idem., Frtihformen der Staatsentwicklung 
in Rumanien. Betrachtungen zur sozialokonomischen und politischen Lage (ZA 18,
1984); £ t . O l t e a n u , State Formations on the Territory of Romania and the Process of 
their Unification in the Ninth-Fourteenth Centuries (in: RAPMP); idem., Rumanische 
politische Strukturen im 9.-11. Jahrhundert (in: Interaktionen der mitteleuropaischen 
Slawen und anderen Ethnika im 6.-10. Jahrhundert. Nitra 1984).
A similarly desperate attempt — based exclusively on the Gestas of Anonymus 
and the late thirteenth-century Simon of Kfza -  is the hypothesis concerning the 
existence of two separate and independent Hungarian states in the tenth century: 
the Pannon state of "Hetumoger" and the Transylvanian state of "Onogur", as put 
forward by I. Boba, in his work entitled, Transylvania and Hungary: From the Times 
of Almos and ArpSd to the Times of King Stephen (in: Festschrift A.T. Szabo -  Zs.
Jako). Anonymus is the primary source of L. M a k k a i ' s  latest summary, Politische 
Geschichte Siebenburgens im 10. Jahrhundert, also published in Festschrift A.T. Szabo
-  Zs. Jako. This work, which looks beyond the 1986 edition of Erdely tortenete, 
matches and combines the names of people mentioned in the Gesta with place- 
names and puts them in the context of the (unfortunately, all to scarce) extant con­
temporary documents, hence outlining a new and continuous history of the period.
The evolution of the critiques of A n o n y m u s  and the latest view on the later's 
work is to be found in: G y . G y o r f f y , Formation d'Etats au IXC sifecle suivant les 
"Gesta Hungarorum" du Notaire Anonyme (in: Nouvelles Etudes Historiques. Bu­
dapest 1965); idem., Abfassungszeit, Autorschaft und Glaubwurdigkeit der Gesta 
Hungarorum des Anonymen Notars (Acta Ant. Hung., 20, 1972). Another funda­
mentally important book is: M. G y On i, Les Volochs des Annales primitives de Kiev 
(Etudes Slaves et Roumaines 2,1949).
The Hungarian Conquest and the incursion: C.A. Macartney, The Magyars in 
the Ninth Century (Cambridge 1968); A. Bartha, Hungarian Society in the 9th and 
10th Centuries (Budapest 1975); G y . G y o r f f y ,  The Original Landtaking of the Hun­
garians (Budapest 1975); idem., Landnahme, Ansiedlung und Streifztige der Ungam 
(AH 31,1985); I. F o d o r ,  Der grofie Wanderung der Ungam vom Ural nach Pannonien 
(Budapest 1982); K. MesterhAzy, Die landnahmenden ungarischen Stamme (Acta 
Arch. Hung., 30, 1978); R. L O t t i c h ,  Ungamzlige in Europa im 10. Jh. (Berlin 1910, 
reprint: 1965); G. Fasoli, Le incursioni ungare in Europa nel secolo X (Firenze 1945); 
Sz. D e  V a ja y ,  Der Eintritt des ungarischen Stammebundes in die europaischen 
Geschichte (862-933) (Mainz 1968); M. Schulze, Untersuchungen zu den Ungarn- 
einfallen nach Mittel-, West- und Sudeuropa (899-955 n. Chr.) (Jahrbuch des R0- 
misch-Germanischen Zentralmuseums, 31, 1984); Th . Bogyai, Ungarnziige gegen 
und ftir Byzanz (Ural-Altaische Jahrbticher, 8, 1988).
On the Byzantine connections: F. D o u g e r ,  Ungarn in der byzantinischen Reichs- 
politik (Archivum Europae Centro-Orientalis 8, Budapest 1942); G y . M o r a v c s ik , Die 
byzantinische Kultur und das mittelalterliche Ungam (Berlin 1956); idem., Studia 
Byzantina (Budapest 1967); idem., Byzantinum and the Magyars (Budapest 1970); 
G y . G y o r f f y ,  Zur Geschichte der Eroberung Ochrids durch Basileos II. Actes du XIIe 
Congrts International d'Etudes Byzantines II (Belgrade 1964); idem., R61e de Byzance 
dans la conversion des Hongrois. Cultus et cognitio (Warszawa 1976); G y . S z e k e l y , 
La Hongrie et Byzance aux Xe-XIIe si&cles (AH 13,1967); N. O ik o n o m id e s , A propos 
des relations ecclesiastiques entre Byzance et la Hongrie au XIe si6cle: le metropolite 
de Turquie (in: Revue des Etudes Sud-Est Europ6ennes 9, 1971); F. M a k k ,  Der 
ungarische Staat und Byzanz in der heimischen Forschung des letzten Jahrzehntes 
(Acta Ant. et Arch., 23,1981); G y . K r is tO , Ajtony and Vidin (Studia Turco-Hungarica 
V, 1981); F. M a k k ,  The Arp&ds and the Comneni. Political Relations between Hun­
gary and Byzantinum in the 12th Century (Budapest 1989).
Hungarian archaeological finds from the age of the Conquest: I. D ie n f s ,  Die 
Ungam um die Zeit der Landnahme (Budapest 1972); idem., The Hungarians cross 
the Carpathians (Budapest 1972); K. B a k a y , Archaologische Studien zur Frage der 
ungarischen Staatsgrtindung (Acta Arch. Hung., 19,1967); J. Giesler, Untersuchungen 
zur Chronologie der Bijelo Brdo-Kultur. Ein Beitrag zur Archaologie des 10. und 11. 
Jahrhunderts im Karpatenbecken (Praehistorische Zeitschrift 56, 1981). A compre­
hensive critique of the last-mentioned work is to be found in: L. KovAcs, Uber die 
Datierung der Grabfunde des 10. Jahrhundters in Ungam anhand der Arbeit von J. 
Giesler (Acta Arch. Hung. 37,1985). Tenth- and eleventh-century Hungarian objects 
and customs in the Carpathian Basin: Cs. BAlint, Les tombes k chaval chez les 
Hongrois aux IX'-XI' si&cles (AEMA 2,1982), and A. Kiss, Studien zur Archaologie 
der Ungam im 10. und 11. Jahrhundert (in: Die Bayern und ihre Nachbam. Vienna
1985); L. KovAcs, Mtinzen aus der ungarischen Landnahmezeit (Budapest 1989).
On the Hungarian archaeological finds from the age of the Conquest: 1. KovAcs, 
Der landnahmzeitliche Friedhof von Kolozsv&r-Zapolya-Gasse (K0zlem6nyek az 
Erdelyi Nemzeti Muzeum Erem- 6s Regis6gt£r3b61 /Papers from the Numismatic 
and Antiquarian Archives of the Transylvanian National Museum/ 2. (Kolozsvdr 
1942); K. H o r e d t , Die Metallfunde des 10.—11. Jahrhunderts aus Siebenbtirgen (in: 
idem., Untersuchungen zur Frtihgeschichte Siebenburgens. Bucharest 1958). On the 
(B) cemetery of the Hungarian conquerors in Maroskama: K. H o r e d t ,  Die Ansiedlung 
von Blandiana (Dacia 10,1966). Concerning its definite Hungarian origin, see I. F o d o r , 
Die Bulgaren in den ungarischen Landem (MBlO VI/1984/2).
Hungarian settlements, and state apparatus in the tenth and elevent centuries: 
Gy. GyOrffy, Autour de l'Etat des semi-nomades: Les cas de la Hongrie (EHH 1,
1975); idem., Systeme des residences d'hiver et d'et6 chez les nomades et les chefs 
hongrois au Xe sidcle (AEMA 1,1976). Pages 80-83 contain a critique by I. BOna on 
the interpretation of the Doboka archaeological excavations; I. K n ie z s a , Ungams 
VOlkerschaften im XI. Jahrhundert (Archivum Enropae Centro-Orientalis, 4 ,1938) from 
which long passages have been quoted; G. Schramm, Eroberer und Eingesessene. 
Geographische Lehnnahmen als Zeugen der Geschichte Slidosteuropas im ersten 
Jahrtausend n. Chr. (Stuttgart 1981); G. H aller, Comitatus Bihariensis. Die histori- 
schen Ortsnamen von Ungam Bd. 20. (Munich 1983).
On St. Stephen (I): I. B o g y a y , Stephanus rex. (Vienna -  Munich 1976); J. SzOcs, 
KOnig Stephan in der Sicht der modernen ungarischen Geschichtsforschung (Siidost- 
Forschungen, 31,1972); G y . G yOrffy , KOnig Stephan der Heilige (Budapest 1988).
For the Hungarian population, economy and society in the eleventh and the 
twelth centuries, seeGY. G yOrffy, Zur Frage der Herkunft der ungarischen Dienstleute 
(Studia Slavica Acad. Sc. Hung., 2 2 , 1976); I.G. B o l l a , Das Dienstvolk der koniglichen 
und kirchlichen Gtiter zur Zeit des frtihen Feudalismus (A USB 17,1978); G y . G yOr ffy , 
Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft der Ungarn um die Jahrtausendwende (Graz -  Koln 
1983); J .  J a g a m a s , Beitrage zur Dialektfrage der ungarischen Volksmusik in Ru- 
manien. Studia Memoriae Belae Bart6k Sacra (Budapest 1956); L. Benko, A magyarsag 
erdelyi megteleped^se a helyn6vanyag 6s a nyelvj£r4st0rt6net ttikrfiben /The Hun­
garian Settlement of Transylvania in the Light of the Place-Names and the Etymol­
ogy of Dialects/ Uj Erdelyi Muzeum, 1,1990 and Magyar Muzeum, 1,1991.
For early Arp5d age settlements, ecclesiastical relics, objects of art, and border 
defence, see: Gy. GyOrffy, Die Entstehung der ungarischen Burgorganisation (Acta 
Arch. Hung., 28, 1976); M. Rusu, Castrum, urbs, civitas. Transylvanische Burgen 
und "Stadte" des 9. bis 13. Jahrhunderts. Berichte liber den II. Internationalen 
Kongress ftir Slawische Archaologie. Ill (Berlin 1973); K. Horedt, Moresti. Bd. 2. Gra- 
bungen in einer mittelalterlichen Siedlung in Siebenbtirgen (Bonn 1984), a thorough 
critique of the book is to be found in I. BOna, Arpadenzeitliche DOrfer, Kirche und 
Friedhof am Marosflufi (Acta Arch. Hung., 37, 1985); R. Popa, Streisingeorgiu. Ein 
Zeugnis rumanischer Geschichte des 11-14. Jahrhunderts im SUden Transilvaniens 
(Dacia 20,1976) — an excellent publication on an excellent excavation, although it 
contains no Romanian finds predating the thirteenth century. The earliest Roma­
nian data concerning the H&tszeg region are from the thirteenth century, compare: 
idem., La inceputurile evului mediu romanesc. Tara Hajegului (Bucharest 1988). 
The idea that Transyvania was ruled by the Pechenegs and the Cumans in the tenth- 
twelfth centuries is entirely without foundation: M. Rusu, Quelques remarques d'orde 
archeologique et historique sur les places fortes transylvaniens des IXe-XIIe si6cles. 
Actes du VIP Congr&s International des Sciences Pr6historiques et Protohistoriques 
2 (Prague 1971).
On the Benedictine monasteries: L. CsOka, Geschichte des benediktinischen 
Monchstums in Ungam (Munich 1980).
On the earliest religious buildings and graves in Transylvania: G. E n t z ,  Die 
707 Baukunst Transilvaniens im 11.-13. Jahrhundert (Acta Hist. Art. 14,1968); R. H e ite l ,
ArchSologische Beitrage zu den romanischen Baudenkmalern aus SUdsiebenbOrgen. 
I—II (Revue Roumaine d'Histoire de VArt 9,1972 and 12,1975). The only excavation of 
the main square of Kolozsvar which was ever published is: I. M e r i ,  Asat&s a kolozs­
vari ffit£ren, 1943 /Excavation on the Main Square of Kolozsvar, in 1943/ (Buda­
pest 1986). For the origins of the two earliest towns, incorporating some untenable 
assumptions, see K. H o r e d t , Die Anfange von Karlsburg (Alba Iulia) und Klau- 
senburg (Cluj-Napoca) in Siebenbtirgen. Stadtkemforschung (KOln -  Vienna 1987).
For a detailed description and summary of all the clay-pot finds from the ArpSd 
A g e : M .T a k a c s , Die arpadenzeitliche Tonkessel im Karpatenbecken (Budapest 1986). 
In order to avoid any misunderstanding, the majority of the sites mark villages 
which were deserted during the Mongol invasion of 1241-1242 and our map should 
b e  interpreted with this in mind.
On border defence in the Arp^d Age: H. G o c k e n ja n , HilfsvOlker und Grenz- 
wachter im mittelalterlichen Ungarn (Wiesbaden 1972); Z. S z e k e l y , Beitrage zur 
Szekler-Frage in Stid-Ost Transilvaniens (Crisia, 4, 1974). Archaeological evidences 
on the origin of the Szekelys: I. BOn a  (Korunk, 11/12,1991).
For a modem review of Hungarian coin issues: L. H u sz a r : Mtinzkatalog Ungarns 
von 1000 bis heute (Budapest — Munich 1959).
The style and age of the eleventh-century Gyulafeh6rv£r tympanum was deter­
mined by E. M a ro si (Athleta Patriae, Budapest 1980).
On the history of the Romanian (Vlach) people in the Balkans during the six­
teenth-twelfth centuries: G. S c h r a m m , Die Katastrophe des 6. bis 8. Jahrhunderts 
und die Entstehung des rumanischen Volkes (Stidosteuropa-Jahrbuch 17,1987); M. 
Gy6ni, L'oeuvre de Kekaumenos source de l'histoire roumaine (RHC24,1945); idem., 
Skylitzes et les Valaques (RHC 25,1947).
In connection with the age under discussion, there exists a book by ^t . P a sc u , 
entitled Was ist Siebenbtirgen? (Cluj-JMapoca 1983). This has been published in sev­
eral languages but can, at best, only be regarded as a political pamphlet. Neverthe­
less, one cannot ignore the figures supplied by the author in order to prove to the 
laymen the impossibility of Romanian immigration. H e  fails to mention that even 
today 34 per cent of Transylvania's territory is woodland, and that this figure must 
have been higher the further we go back in time. We know that arable only amounted 
to 20 per cent of Transylvania's territory in 1865. Between 271 and 1170 the area 
covered by uninhabited mountainous regions and woodlands could well have 
reached 90 per cent at times. It follows from the above that in the early Middle Ages 
Transylvania's population could be estimated at 100,000, at most, although gener­
ally it was below this figure (see K. H o r e d t ,  Das Frtihmittelalteriche...). £ t . P a sc u , 
on the other hand, puts the population of Transylvania at 550,000 before 1241, a 
figure which rises to 1,400,000 by 1500 and to 1,800,000 by 1550 in his account. In 
fact, the first of these figures equals the government estimates of 1710, while the 
latter two equal and even surpass the findings of the first census taken in 1786 
(1,560,000). At all times, P a sc u  considers 65 per cent of the population, blown up to 
five to ten times its actual size and projected back into the Middle Ages, to be of 
Romanian nationality, even though the percentage of the Romanian population only 
reached 57.8 per cent in the official census of 1930. (In the 1910 Census the figure 
was 53 per cent.) P a sc u ' s  Romanians could not, indeed, have migrated by the mil­
lion, given that in the early Middle Ages nowhere in Europe did a million people 
exist within a territory the size of Transylvania. In order to back up his figures, 
P a sc u  agrees completely with the American historian J o h n  M a t le y  in that "the theory 
of a mass-exodus from Dacia followed by a mass-settlement of the territory from 
the regions south of the Danube is a phantasmagory which does not stand even as 
a hypothesis, since there is not a single historical source supporting it". This does 
not, however, alter the fact that the "unscientific" theory of an "uninhabited" Transyl­
vania was not put forward by any serious historian or archaeologist, other than
themselves: in fact, quite the opposite was true. Any American historian who for­
gets that not a single white man lived on the American continent before modem 
times must be a very biased and prejudiced person.
P a sc u  offers only one admissible mediaeval source on the subject of Transylva­
nia's population to prove the consistent Romanian majority of 65 per cent, and this 
is the papal tithe register from the years 1332-1337.
y>T. P a s c u , Die mittelalterlichen Dorfsiedlungen in Siebenbiirgen bis 1400 (in: 
Nouvelles Etudes d'Histoire. Bucharest 1960,135-148). He draws an incorrect con­
clusion from the figures published, namely, that out of the 2,600 settlements re­
corded in Transylvania before 1400, only 1,100 had Catholic (i.e., Hungarian and 
Saxon) parish and, therefore, the remaining 1,500 settlements must have been in­
habited by Orthodox Romanian population. P a sc u  ignores the fact that, almost with­
out exception usually more than one village belonged to each parish. He has al­
ready been taken to task for this by G y . G yOrffy ,  in: Zur Frage der demographi- 
schen Wertung der papstlichen Zahntlisten (EHH Budapest, 1980, 61-85), who 
pointed out that, using P a sc u ' s  method, one could claim that around 60 per cent of 
mediaeval Polish villages had an Orthodox Romanian population. The thorough 
examination of the archdeaconries of Pata and Heves within the Archdiocese of 
Eger amounts to a very pointed scholarly repudiation of P a sc u ' s  theory. The exami­
nation reveals that the ratio between the parishes listed in the papal tithe registers 
and the missing, although, on the evidence of other official documents, already 
existing villages (filia) in the archdeaconries situated in the middle of divided Hun­
gary's purely Catholic region was generally 1:3, and occasionally 1:4 or 1:1. ( J .G y . 
S za b6 ,  in: Tanulm&nyok Gy0ngy0sr61 /Studies on GyOngyos/ (GyOngyOs 1984,41- 
64) .Therefore, the fact that only a portion of the villages appeared in the papal tithe 
registers was a national phenomenon, rather than a specifically Transylvanian 
"Catholic-Orthodox relation".
II. The Emergence of the Estates (1172-1526)
The documentary sources of Transylvanian history between the Hungarian Con­
quest and the military disaster of MoMcs (895-1526) are found in publications of 
national, county, civic, religious and family collections, a large section of which is 
listed in I. Lukinich, Les Editions de sources de l'histoire hongroise 1854-1930 (Bu­
dapest 1931). A comprehensive collection of the deeds written before 1360 in those 
parts of historic Hungary later annexed to Romania (Transylvania included), and 
which originated from various books of reference and, to a lesser extent, from ar­
chives, is found in DRH Transilvania. However, this book only gives the Romanian 
translations of the already-published deeds (or extracts from them), and the origi­
nal Latin text is only provided in case of the previously unpublished deeds. Accord­
ingly, the use of the general Hungarian and, more importantly, the Transylvanian 
archives is recommended. Of the latter archives the most important are: G. D. Teutsch
— Fr. Firnhaber, Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte SiebenbUrgens (Vienna 1957) — up 
to 1301; F.R. Zimmermann — C. Werner — G. M O l l e r  — G. GOndisch, Urkundenbuch 
zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbiirgen. 1I-V (Hermannstadt -  Bucharest 
1892-1975) — until 1457; K. Szab6  — L. Szadeczky — S. Barabas (eds), Szekely 
oklevtltcir /Szekely Archives/. I—VIII (Budapest 1872-1934) — 1211-1776; A. Fekete
— L. N a g y  — L. M a k k a i ,  Documenta historiam Valachorum in Hungaria illustrantia 
(Budapest 1941) — until 1400.
The collection of Hungarian narrative sources dealing with the period ending in 
1301: SRH II; non-Hungarian sources: G o m b o s ,  Catalogus...; the Hungarian chroni- 
709 cles dealing with the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were completed and pub­
lished by J. T h u r6 c z y ,  Chronica Hungarorum (Augsburg 1488, facsimile edition:
Budapest 1986) and A. B o n f in i, Rerum hungaricarum decades... (Basel 1568, Ger­
man translation: Ungarische Chronica. Frankfurt a/M. 1581).
On the settlement and the coexistence of the Transylvanian nations: E. M A l yu sz ,
Erd61y 6s nfepei /Transylvania and its Peoples/ (Budapest 1943); MR; I. M o g a , Les 
Roumains de Transylvanie au moyen age (Sibiu 1944); L. D e m en y  (ed.), A magyar 
nemzetis6g t0rt6nete 6s testv6ri egyiittmuked6se a rom^n nemzettel /The History 
of the Hungarian Nationality and its Brotherly Co-operation with the Romanian 
Nation/. II (Bucharest 1976); B. P u k An sz k y , Erdelyi szAszok6s magyarok /The Saxons 
and the Hungarians of Transylvania/ (P6cs 1943); Tn. N a g l er , Die Ansiedlung der 
siebenburger Sachsen (Bucharest 1979).
The most important works on the ancient history of the Romanian nation are: L.
T a m a s , R6maiak, romSnok 6s oldhok D&cia Trajan&ban /Romans, Romanians and 
Vlachs in Dacia Traiana/ (Budapest 1936). A critique is to be found in: G h . B rAt ia n u ,
Une 6nigme et un miracle historique: le peuple roumain (Bucharest 1937); C.
D a ic o v ic iu  — M. P e tr o v ic i — G. ^ tefa n ,  La formation du peuple roumain et de sa 
langue (Bucharest 1961); A. D u  N a y , The Early History of the Rumanian Language 
(Lake Bluff 1977). On the Romanian people of the Balkans see the major theses of 
the synthesis prepared using several essays from M. G yOn i, A rom&n t0rt6net biz&nci 
forr^sai /Byzantine Sources of Romanian History/ (MTA I Oszt. Kozl. /Publica­
tions of Department I of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences/, 1954); S. D r a g o m ir ,
Vlahii din nordul Peninsulei Balcanice in evul mediu (Bucharest 1959). For the Ro­
manian shepherds' vocabulary and its spread: I.L R u ssu , Etnogeneza Romanilor 
(Bucharest 1981); L. FO l d e s  (ed.), Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur (Budapest 1969);
G. S c f ir a m m , Frtihe Schicksale der Rumaner (Zeitschrift fur Balkanologie, 1985-1987).
The latter was regarded as a touchstone in the present volume. On the Romanian 
population of Cumania and early southern Transylvania: L. M a k k a i, A milk6i (kun) 
pusp5ks6g 6s n6pei /The Cuman Dioctese of Milk6 and its Peoples/ (Debrecen 1936);
G y . G y Or f f y , Adatok a rom&nok XIII. sz&zadi tOrt6net6hez 6s a rom in  &llam 
kezdeteihez /Facts Concerning the Thirteenth-Century Romanian History and the 
Beginning of the Romanian State/ (Sz 1964).
Earlier works on the formation of the Transylvanian counties are: K. T a g An y i, 
Szolnok-Doboka vSrmegye ter(ilet6nek t0rt6nete /The History of Szolnok-Doboka 
County/ (in: Szolnok-Doboka vSrmegye monographiija / A Monograph on Szol­
nok-Doboka County/). I (D6s 1901); E m m a  Ic z k o v its , Az erd61yi Feh6r megye a k(j- 
z6pkorban /Transylvania's Feh6r County in the Middle Ages/ (Budapest 1939);
E v a  H. B a lAz s , Kolozs megye kialakulSsa /The Formation of Kolozs County/ (Bu­
dapest 1939); D. C s An k i,  Magyarorsz^g tijrt6nelmi fOldrajza a Hunyadiak kor^ban 
/The Historical Topography of Hungary in the Age of the Hunyadi Family/. V 
(Budapest 1913) — Hunyad including its Romanian districts and the settlements of 
Kolozs, Torda and Ktikttll<5; on the basis of the complete source material, up to the 
1330s: Gy. G y o r f f y , Geographia... — Beszterce, Brass6, Doboka, Feh6r, Fogaras,
Hunyad, Kolozs, Ktiklill6; for the eastern Hungarian Romanian self-governing com­
munities outside Transylvania: F. P e st y , A szttr6ny v^rmegyei hajdani ol5h kertiletek 
/The Old Vlach Districts of Sz0r6ny County/ (Budapest 1876); V. B e la y ,  Miramaros 
megye tSrsadalma 6s nemzetis6ge a megye betelepul6set<51 a XVIII. szSzad v6g6ig 
/The Society and Peoples of M^ramaros County from the Settlement of the County 
until the End of the Eighteenth Century/ (Budapest 1943).
Fundamentally important on the large estates of mediaeval Transylvania (modi­
fied in the present text to incorporate the findings of the latest research): ]. K a rAc so n y i,
Magyar nemzets6gek a XIV. szSzad k0zep6ig /Hungarian Clans up to the Middle 
of the Fourteenth Century/. I—III (Budapest 1900-1901); on the nobility and the peas­
antry: E. M A l y u sz , Az erd61yi magyar tarsadalom a koz6pkorban /Hungarian Soci­
ety in Transylvania in the Middle Ages/ (Budapest 1988). The Voivodate of Transyl- 710
vania is presented as a separate, although not quite an independent, Romanian coun­
try; a third Romanian voivodate in fact by £t. Pascu, in Voievodatul... According to 
the latter the Romanian majority in Transylvania's population during the Middle 
Ages is explained by the late formation of feudal bonds in the Romanian-inhabited, 
mountainous regions, which in turn meant that the names of these villages were 
only mentioned in deeds after 1350. Of course, the Sz6kely and Saxon villages, which 
had never been in feudal bond, were mentioned in deeds before 1350, and this con­
tradicts Pascu's argument. Pascu states that large-scale and forcible reduction to 
serfdom of Transylvania's Romanian population took place in the middle of the 
fourteenth century — thus precipitating a series of national uprisings among the 
Romanian people — but this has been repudiated by another Romanian author, M. 
Holban, Din cronica relajiilor romano-ungare in secolele XIII-XIV (Bucharest 1981, 
245), who has pointed out that the social conflicts in question had no ethnic aspects. 
On the late thirteenth-century anarchy: Gy. Krist6, Kun L&szl6 6s Erdely /Ladislas 
the Cuman and Transylvania/ (Valosag, 1978, No. 11). On the Szekely and Saxon 
nobility: Gy. Gyorffy, Geographia ... and G.E. MOller, Die Graven des siebenbur- 
gischen Sachsenlandes. Festschrift Teutsch (Hermannstadt 1931). On Romanesque 
culture in Transylvania: G. Entz, Die Baukunst Transilvaniens im 11.-13. Jahrhundert 
(Acta Hist. Art. 14,1968); idem., A gyulafeh6rv£ri szekesegyhSz /The Gyulafehervar 
Cathedral/ (Budapest 1958); J. Temesvary, Erdely kozepkori ptispokei /The Bishops 
of Transylvania in the Middle Ages/ (Kolozsvar 1922); Gy. Gy6rffy, Gyulafehervar 
kezdetei /The Beginnings of Gyulafehervar/ (Sz 1983); on the enoblement of the 
Romanian kenezes and voivodes, see the section dealing with the literature concern­
ing the Romanian districts and also: £t. Pascu, Rolul cnezilor din Transilvania in 
lupta antiotomana a lui Iancu de Hunedoara (Studii $i Cercetari de lstorie, 1957).
On th e  Turkish th r e a t :  G. G u n d isc h , D ie  Turkeneinfalle in Siebenbtirgen bis z u r  
M i t t e  d e s  15. J h s  (Jahrbiicher fiir  Geschichte Osteuropas, II, 1937); G y . S z e k e l y , A  
h u s z i t iz m u s  es a  m a g y a r  n e p  /The Hussites and th e  Hungarian P e o p le /  (Sz 1956); 
L. D e m e n y , P a r a s z t f e lk e l f e  Erdelyben 1437-1438 /The P e a s a n t  Uprising in Transyl­
vania, 1437-1438/ (Budapest 1987); L . E lek es , Hunyadi (Budapest 1952); C. M u re$a n , 
Iancu d e  H u n e d o a r a  (Bucharest 1968); f o r  s u m m a r ie s  o f  th e  l a t e s t  l i t e r a t u r e  o n  
Hunyadi: G. B a r t a , NSndorfehervSr 1456 (Budapest 1983); K a t a l in  K is f a l u d y , 
Matthias Rex (Budapest 1983). On th e  c i t ie s :  P. N ie d e r m a ie r , Siebenbiirgische Stadte 
(Bucharest 1979); O. M eltzl ,  A z  erdelyi s z ^ s z o k  ip a r a  6 s  kereskedelme a  XIV. 6 s  XV. 
sz&zadban /The Industry and C o m m e r c e  o f  th e  Transylvanian Saxons in th e  Four­
teenth and Fifteenth C e n tu r ie s /  (Sz 1892); L. M a k k a i, TSrsadalom es n e m z e t is e g  a 
k o z 6 p k o r i  K o lo z s v ^ r o n  / S o c ie ty  and N a tio n a l i ty  in  Medieval K o lo z s v a r /  (Kolozsvari 
Szetnle, 1943); ^t . P a sc u / Mestesugurile din Transilvania pina in s e c o lu l  a l  XVI-lea 
(Bucharest,1954); Z s . P . P a c h , M a g y a r o r s z a g  6 s  a l e v a n te i  kereskedelem a  XIV-XVII. 
szcizadban /Hungary and Levantine Trade in the Fourteenth to Seventeenth Centu­
ries/ (Budapest 1986). For th e  S z 6 k e ly  liberation movements: L. S z a d e c z k y -K a r d o ss , 
A  s z 6 k e ly  nemzet tOrt6nete 6s alkotmSnya /The History and the Constitution of the 
Szekely Nation/ (Budapest 1927); on the uprising led by D6zsa: G. B a r t a , Keresztesek 
Sldott n6pe /The Blessed Crusader People/ (Budapest 1977).
On Gothic and Renaissance art in Transylvania, and Romanian education in the 
Middle Ages: E. M a r o si, (ed.), MagyarorszSgi muv6szet 1300-1470 kortil / Art in 
Hungary around 1300-1470/. I—II (Budapest 1987); S. T o n k , Erd61yiek egyetemjarfsa 
a k0z6pkorban /The University Attendence of Transylvanians in the Middle Ages/ 
(Bucharest 1979); Fr. P a l l , Contribujii la problema locurilor de adeverire din 
Transilvania medievala (Studii de lstorie Medie, 1957); J o l a n  B a l o g h ,  Merton 6s 
GyOrgy kolozsvari szobrSszok /Merton and Gytirgy, Kolozsvar Sculptors/ (Ko- 
lozsv^r 1934); idem., Az erd61yi renaissance /The Transylvanian Renaissance/ 
(Kolozsvar 1943); V. D r Ag u j , Arta gotica in Romania (Bucharest 1979); G. E n t z , 
Mittelalterliche rumanische Holzkirchen in Siebenbtirgen (in: Omagiu Oprescu, 
Bucharest 1961); M. P a c u ra riu , Isotria bisericii... I (Sibiu 1962).
Part Three — The Principality of Transylvania
I. The Emergence of the Principality and its First Crises 
(1526-1606)
For the most important documents of the period: EOE I-V; several volumes of the 
series Documente privatoare la istoria romanilor (E. H u rm u za k i, ed., Bucharest, from 
1877— with various other editors later); the Szekely Oklev6ltc»r /'Szekely Archives/.
I—VIII (Budapest 1872-1934); R. Gooss, Osterreichische Staatsvertrage. I. Ftirstentum 
Siebenbtlrgen (Vienna 1911); Documente privatoare la istoria Ardealului, Moldovei 
si Tarii Romanesti I—VII. E. V e r e ss  (ed.) (Bucharest 1929-1934); the volumes of ETA;
E. V e r e ss , Bathory Istvcin erdfelyi fejedelem 6s lengyel kirdly levelez6se /The Corre­
spondence of Istv&n B&thory, Prince of Transylvania and King of Poland/. I—II 
(KolozsvSr 1944); idem., Bathory Istv&n kirSly lev61vSMsa az erdelyi korm&nnyal 
1581-1585 /King Istv&n Bathory's Correspondence with the Transylvanian Gov­
ernment, 1581-1585/ (MHH-D 42, Budapest 1948); idem., Alfonso Carillo levelez6se 
/Alfonso Carillo's Correspondence/ (MHH-D 32, 41, Budapest 1906 and 1943);
L  Lukacs (ed.), Monumenta Historica Societatis Jesu, Monumenta Antiqua Hun- 
garica. I-III (Rome 1969-1981).
The most important narrative sources are: N. Istvanffy, Historiarum de rebus 
Ungaricis libri XXXIV (Colonia Agrippina 1622); F. Bethlen, Historia de rebus Tran- 
sylvanicis I-VI (Cibinum 1782-1793); DFGS; J. M. Brutus, Ungaricarum rerum libri,
1490-1552 (MHH-S12-14, Pest 1863 — Budapest 1876); SzamoskOzy Istv&n t0rt6neti 
maradv^nyai /The Historical Fragments of Istv&n SzamoskOzy/ (MHH-S 21, 28-
30, Budapest 1876-1880); F. F o r g a c h , De statu rei publicae Hungaricae 1542-1572 
(MHH-S 16, Budapest 1886). A useful selection is given (with a Hungarian transla­
tion of all the passages quoted) in the series L. Cs. S za b6  — L. M a kk a i (eds), Erdely 
orOksege /The Transylvanian Heritage/. I-X (Budapest 1942). There is no contem­
porary Romanian narrative source.
Regarding annals history, the introductions by S . S zil a g y i,  to the relevant vol­
umes of EOE are still fundamental. On account of their uncommon subject matter, 
special attention is due to: I. L u k in ic h ,  Erd61y... /Transylvania .../. This has been 
summed up in French by Z. I. T 6 t h , Biographie d'une frontiSre. La formation du 
"Partium" (RHC 24,1946); Zs. T r6 c sa n y i, Erd61y kOzponti kormSnyzata 1540-1690 
/The Central Administration of Transylvania, 1540-1690/ (Budapest 1980); idem.,
Az erdelyi fejedelems6g kordnak orsz3ggyul6sei. Adal6kok az erdelyi rendisSg 
t0rt6net6hez /Dietal Sessions in the Principality of Transylvania. Further Data Con­
cerning the History of the Transylvanian Estates/ (Budapest 1976).
The most important works on the various periods are: L. B a rd o ssy ,  Magyar politika 
a mohacsi v£sz ut£n /Hungarian Politics after the Defeat of Mohcics / (Budapest 
1944) — one must not, of course, give attention to the book's political considera­
tions; G. B a r t a , A Sztambulba vezetfi ut /The Road to Istanbul/ (Budapest 1983); F.
S z a k a l y , Remarques sur l'armSe de Iovan Tchemi (AH 24,1978); and the Gritti biog­
raphy, also written by F. S z a k a ly , VesztOhely az ut por&ban / Execution on the Road/
(Budapest 1986); V.L. Bourilly, Antonio Rincon et la politique orientale de Fran­
cois Ier (Revue H istoriquell3 ,1913); R. Gooss, Die Siebenbiirger Sachsen in der Planung 
der deutschen Siidostpolitik (Vienna 1940); R. Constantinescu, Moldova si Transil- 
vania in vremea lui Petru Rares, 1527-1546 (Bucharest 1978); the introduction to the 
new archives by M. Berindei — G. Vfinstein, L'Empire ottoman et les pays roumains 
1544-1545. (Paris -  Cambridge 1987) also contains a useful historical survey; E. Veress,
Izabella kir&lyn6 /Queen Izabella/ (Budapest 1901); on Friar George and the cir­
cumstances of his death: G. B a r t a , Vajon ki6 az orszSg? /To Whom does the Coun- 712
try Belong?/ (Budapest 1988); the collection of essays entitled „Sz6kely felkeles..." 
/The Szekely Uprising.../ examines the entire century; similarly, the collection of 
Polish and Hungarian essays discussing the life of Istv£n Bathory has remained an 
essential work: Etienne Bathory, roi de Pologne, prince de Transylvanie (Krak6w 
1935).
On economic and social relations vitally important are: D. P r o d a n ,  Iobagia in 
Transilvania in secolul al XVI. lea. I—III (Bucharest 1967-1968); M. S z e n t g yOr g y i, 
JobbSgyterhek... /Serf duties.../; there are important partial studies in L. K e l e m e n , 
Ekv... (Kelemen Memorial Volume) and in the above-mentioned "Szekely felkelfe..." 
collection of essays: Studien zur Geschichte der deutschen Nationalitat und ihrer 
VerbrUderung mit der rumanischen Nation (Bucharest 1976).
On the Reformation in Transylvania: L. B in d er , Grundlagen und Formen der 
Toleranz in Siebenbtirgen bis zur Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts (KOln -  Vienna 1976); 
G. W e b e r  — R. W e be r  (eds), Luther und Siebenbtirgen (KOln -  Vienna 1985); L. 
M a k k a i, Etat des ordres et theocratie calviniste au XVIe sifecle dans l'Europe centro- 
orientale (Budapest 1975); A. P ir n At , Die Ideologic der Siebenbtirger Antitrinitarier 
in der 1570er Jahren (Budapest 1961); R. D a n ,  Mathias Vehe-Glirius and Radical 
Reformation (Budapest 1982); M. B a lAz s , A z  erdelyi antitrinitarizmus az 1950-es 
6vek vegen / Antitrinitarianism in Transylvania at the End of the 1950s/ (Budapest
1988); on the Romanian Orthodox religion see: M. PAc u r a r iu , Bisericii... I. He con­
siders Eftimie, who was appointed in 1571, to be the first bishop of Gyulafeherv£r; 
although earlier historians believed him to be a deputy bishop.
For other aspects of cultural history: J. H o r v At h ,  A reformSci6 jegyeben /In the 
Spirit of the Reformation/ (Budapest 1953); and T. K l a n ic za y  (ed.), A magyar iro- 
dalom tortenete / A History of Hungarian Literature/ (Budapest 1964); A. D a n k a n it s ,
XVI. szdzadi olvasmSnyok /Sixteenth-Century Reader/ (Bucharest 1974); several 
studies from the earlier-mentioned L. Kelemen, Ekv....; 0 .  Sz. B a r l a y ,  Romon virag 
/Flowers on the Ruins/ (Budapest 1986); P .P . P a n a it e sc u , Inceputurile scrisului in 
limba romflna. Studii si Cercetari de Bibliologie (Bucharest 1963); Zs. J a k 6 ,  Ir&s, 
kOnyv... /Writing, Book.../.
Demographic data on the Saxons — using the reliable information of the earlier 
literature — is given by I. B akAc s  — J. K o va csic s,  Magyarorsz^g t0rt6neti demogrSfiSja 
/The Historical Demography of Hungary/ (Budapest 1963). E. W a g n e r ' s  independ­
ent approximation (Wtistungen in den Sieben Sttihle als Folge der Tiirkeneinfalle 
des 15. Jahrhunderts, FVLK 21,1978) overestimates the extent of the early Turkish 
devastations. We have been obliged to estimate the size of the Szekely population 
from the 25,000-30,000 strong Szekely contingents participating in the military cam­
paigns of the late sixteenth century.
I. S za b6  counted approximately 31,000 royal tax units (portas) in the seven coun­
ties before the fifteenth century (this is also in K o v a c sic s) and about 1,750 settle­
ments, including those of the Fogaras region, which means that using the factors 
generally accepted for the fifteenth century, the population can be estimated at 350,000 
in this period and at 450,000 at the end of the sixteenth century. Actually, by the end 
of the fifteenth century there were only 1,400 settlements in the seven counties. 
Assuming a certain growth, the number of settlements at the end of the sixteenth 
century can be put at approximately 1,600. Accordingly, our previous estimate needs 
to be revised downwards a little to around 400,000, otherwise we would arrive at 
abnormally high population figures for the individual settlements. (An average 
population of 250 per settlement can only be accepted if a population of several 
thousands is assumed for the towns and market-towns.) Since the population of the 
Partium was a relative estimate (the number of portas in the mid-fifteenth century 
in the seven counties was approximately 23,000; in the Partiufn it was around 17,000 
713 — see V. B irO, A fejedelmi hatalom... /Princely Power.../: 24, 40 and 56 and I.
L u k in ic h ,  Erdely... /Transylvania.../: 134,141,146 and 160), the relevant final figure 
should be reduced from 350,000 to 300,000.
To a small extent these corrections have a bearing on estimates of the strengths 
of the various nationalities. Of the settlements of the seven counties 550 were defi­
nitely tithe-paying, i.e., Hungarian or Saxon towns and villages; Zs. J a k6 ,  Adatok a 
d£zsma fejedelemkori adminisztr£ci6j5hoz /Data about the Administration of the 
Tithes in the Age of the Principality/ (Kolozsv&r 1945). After taking into account 
the exemptions and the usual inaccuracies of contemporary administration, this 
figure can be amended to 650-700. On average, the population of Romanian settle­
ments was one-third of the population of Hungarian and Saxon villages (Zs. J a k6 ,  Bi­
har megye a torOk puszti'tSs el6tt /Bihar County before the Turkish Devastations/. 
Budapest 1940,187); L. M a k k a i, Szolnok-Doboka megye magyarsSgSnak pusztulSsa 
a XVII. sz^zad elej6n /The Decline of the Hungarian Population of Szolnok-Doboka 
County in the Early Seventeenth Century/ (Kolozsv&r 1942, 31). Taking ethnic dif­
fusion (mostly Romanians settling in Catholic villages) and the "unconstrained" 
shepherds into account, in the three-volume Erdely tortenete a small Hungarian 
majority was estimated: 240,000 Hungarians, as opposed to the 200,000 Romanians 
in Transylvania and 170,000 Hungarians as opposed to 110,000 Romanians in the 
Partium. The corrections mentioned earlier have been incorporated into the ratios 
given in this volume.
So far no detailed study has appeared on the Fifteen Years War. The last work 
dealing with the role of Transylvania in this conflict was written by L. N a g y ,  Erdely 
a 15 6ves h&boruban /Transylvania in the Fifteen Years War/ (Sz 116,1982). Hun­
garian and Romanian historians take a very different view of Mihai Viteazul. The 
most important of the earlier works on the subject by L. S za d ec z k y ,  Erdely 6s MiMly 
vajda /Transylvania and Voivode Mihai/ (Temesvdr, 1893) depicted him as a con­
quering and pillaging barbarian, while the best Romanian study so far P.P. Pa- 
n a it e sc u , Mihai Viteazul (Bucharest 19^6) regards him as one of the heroes of Roma­
nian national history. L. D hmkny' s  book A szekelyek 6s MiMly vajda /The Sz6kelys 
and Voivode Mihai/ (Bucharest 1977) is much nearer to the historical truth, while 
the latest Romanian summary by £ t . O l te a n u , Les pays roumains d l'6poque de 
Michel le Brave (Bucharest 1977) describes him as the wilful pioneer of an idea bom 
a couple of centuries later: the idea of the "unification" of the three Romanian terri­
tories.
An earlier work, K. B e n d a , Bocskai IstvSn /Istv^n Bocskai/ (Budapest 1942) and 
a relatively new book L. N a g y , Bocskai Istv&n a hadak 616n /IstvSn Bocskai/ (Buda­
pest 1981) deserve special mention from among the sizeable corpus of literature on 
the Bocskai insurrection.
II. The Golden Age of the Principality (1606-1660)
The following source publications have been used regularly in the writing of this 
chapter: EOE V-X; N. Iorga (ed.), Documente privitoare la istoria romanilor (Vol. 
XV al colecjiei Hurmuzaki. Partea II. 1601-1825, Bucharest 1913); Erd61yorsz&g 
tfirt6neti tSra /Historical Documents of Transylvania/. II (publ. by J. Kem£ny and I. 
Nagyajtai Kovacs, KolozsvSr 1845); ETA I-IV; A. Szilady — S. Szilagyi (eds), TOrOk- 
magyar-kori ^llamokm^nytSr /Collection of State Documents from the Turkish- 
Hungarian Era/. I—III (Pest 1868-1870); L. Szadeczky (ed.), Szekely oklev61t3r /Sz6- 
kely Archives/. VI (Kolozsv&r 1897); and DFGS III. The following can also be seen 
as source publication: I. Katona, Historia critica XXIX-XXXIII, and J. v o n  Hammer- 
Purgstall, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches VI-VIII (Pest 1830-1832). Most of 
the sources in the publications are in Latin. 714
Works referred to when writing the chapter are: D. O g g ,  Europe in the Seven­
teenth Century (London 1952); K. Uhlirz — M. Uhlirz, Handbuch der Geschichte 
Osterreichs und seiner Nachbarlander. II (Graz 1927); C.J. Friedrich, The Age of the 
Baroque 1610-1660 (Stuttgart 1954); Th. Schieder (ed.), Handbuch der europaischen 
Geschichte. Ill (Stuttgart 1971); R. Mandrou, Des humanistes aux hommes de sci­
ences (Paris 1973). C.M. Cipolla (ed.), The Fontana Economic History of Europe. 
The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries (London 1974); R. J. W. E v a n s ,  The Mak­
ing of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550-1700 (Oxford 1979); the relevant chapters of 
GDGR I; I. Lukinich, Erd61y... /Transylvania .../; I. M o g a , Die wirtschaftliche 
Entwicklung SiebenbUrgens I (Bucharest 1943); L. GAldi — L. M a k k a i (eds), Ge­
schichte der Rumanen (Budapest 1942).
The principal sources and the most important literature, in sub-title order: S. 
Goldenberg, Le climat et l'histoire (RRH1974). The data on taxation are taken from 
EOE and from V. Bir6, A fejedelmi hatalom... On the devastations and the demo­
graphic changes in general, see: L. Makkai, Szolnok-Doboka megye magyarsiginak 
pusztuiasa a XVII. szdzad elej6n /The Decline of the Hungarian Population of 
Szolnok-Doboka County in the Early Seventeenth Century/ (Kolozsvar 1942); K. 
Albrich, Die Bewohner Hermannstadts im Jahr 1657 (AVSL 1883); the various vol­
umes of Quellen zur Geschichte der Stadt Brass6.1-VII (Kronstadt -  Brass6 1886- 
1918); F. Kramer, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Stadt Bistritz in den Jahren 1600-1603 
(AVSL 1874). The latest works on the Szekely censuses are: L. DemEny — J. Pataki, 
Mihaly vajda 6s a szekelyek /Voivode Mihai and the Szekelys/ (Bucharest 1978). 
On the Saxon censuses: G. Muller, Die sachsische Nationsuniversitat (SUBB-H1973). 
On genealogy: I. Nagy, Magyarorszag csaladai /The Families of Hungary/. I—XII 
(Pest 1857-1865); On the data of the serfs: Zs. Jak6, A gyalui vartartom&ny urbariumai 
/Socage on the Lands of Gyalu Castle/ (Budapest 1944); D. Prodan, Urbariile {arii 
Fagarasului 1 ,1601-1630 (Bucharest 1970).
The historical works are: S . S z il a g y i, BSthory Gabor fejedelem tftrtenete /The 
Story of Prince Gabor Bathory/ (Pest 1867); Zs. T r6 c sa n y i, Rak6czi Zsigmond. Egy 
dinasztia sziiletese /Zsigmond Rak6czi. The Birth of a Dynasty/ (DMt 1978); K. 
B e n d a , Der Haiduckenaufstand in Ungarn und das Erstarken der Stande in der 
Habsburger Monarchie (1607-1608) (in: S. B a lo g h  — G y . E m b er , etc. eds, Nouvelles 
Etudes Historiques... Budapest 1965); I. RAcz, A  hajduk a XVII. szazadban /Haiducks 
in the Seventeenth Century/ (Debrecen 1969); A. G in d el y ,  Rudolf und seine Zeit. II. 
1600-1612 (Prague 1868); Hidv6gi Mik6 Ferenc hist6riaja /The Story of Ferenc 
Hidvegi M ik6/ (MHH-S 7) and Mihaly Weiss (DFGS, Neue Folge), and GyOrgy 
Krauss (Fontes Rerum Austriacarum. I. Scriptores 3.); G y . S z e g fO, Bethlen Gabor 
(Budapest 1929); L. D e m en y , Bethlen Gabor 6s kora /The Life and Age of Gabor 
Bethlen/ (Bucharest 1982). On Bethlen see the material of the conference organized 
on the occasion of the 400th anniversary of his birth (Sz 1980); L. N a g y , Sok dolgot 
pr6baia Bethlen Gabor /Much was Accomplished by Gabor Bethlen/ (Budapest 
1981); Zs. T r6 c sa n y i, A z  erdelyi fejedelemseg koranak orszSggyul^sei /Dietal Ses­
sions in the Principality of Transylvania/ (Budapest 1976). For the names of those 
participating in these sessions, see: R. Gooss, Osterreichische Staatsvertrage. I (Vi­
enna 1911, 454-456, 608-609). On taxation: V . B ir6 ,  A  fejedelmi hatalom...; V era  
M r a z , Bethlen Gabor gazdasagpolitikaja /The Economic Policy of Gabor Bethlen/ 
(S z  1953). The tax figures are taken from EOE. For the power structure: Zs. T r6 c sa n y i, 
Erdely kOzponti kormanyzata /The Central Administration of Transylvania/ (Bu­
dapest 1980). Comprehensive works on the absolutism in the east are: Zs. P. P a c h , 
Egyetemes torteneti bevezetfi /Introduction to World History/ (in: A g n e s  R. V a rk o n yi 
/ed./, Magyarorszag tortenete, 3 /The History of Hungary, 3/, Budapest 1985).
On the international situation: P . C e r n o v o d ea n u , England and the Question of 
Free Trade in the Black Sea in the 17th Century (RRH 1967); C . V. W e d g w o o d , The 
715 Thirty Years War (London 1968); J. V. P o l isen sk y ,  The Thirty Years War (London
1971). On those representing the allied powers at the Porte: A. Ipolyi, Rimay Janos 
dllamiratai 6s levelez6se / The State Documents and Correspondence of Janos Rimay/ 
(Budapest 1887). On Bethlen's Hungarian campaign by authors other than those 
participating: M. Depner, Das Ftirstentum Siebenblirgen im Kampf gegen Habsburg 
(Stuttgart 1938); L. N a g y , Bethlen Gabor a ftiggetlen Magyarorszag6rt /Gabor Bethlen 
for an Independent Hungary/ (n. p. 1969). The Dietal papers of Bethlen in the EOE; 
I. Katona, Historia critica... XXX; T. B o r so s , V&s5rhelyt<51 a F6nyes PortSig /From 
VSsSrhely to the Splendid Porte/ (Publ. by L. Kocziany, Bucharest 1972); A. Gindely, 
Okmcinyt&r Bethlen Gabor uralkodAsa t0rtenet6hez /Collection of Documents Re­
lating to the Reign of Gabor Bethlen/ (Budapest 1890); L. Ovary, Oklev61tar Bethlen 
G ibor diplomciciai osszek0ttet6sei t0rtenet6hez /Collection of Documents Relating 
to the History of Gcibor Bethlen's Diplomatic Connections, 1620-1626/ (Budapest 
1886); B . Radvanszky, Udvartartas 6s szdmad&skOnyvek. I. Bethlen Gabor udvar- 
tartasa /The Household and the Accounts. I. The Household of Gabor Bethlen/ 
(Budapest 1888); F. Krones, Katharina v. Brandenburg Preussen als Ftirstin Sieben- 
btirgens (Zeitschrift fu r Allgemeine Geschichte, 1884).
On the age of Ferenc Rak6czi I: J. B e th le n ,  Commentarii de rebus Transsilvanicis 
ab obitu Gabrielis Bethlenii triginta quatuor annis gestis. I-II (Vienna 1779-1780); ]. 
R e iz n e r , A CsdszSr-fele fels6magyarorsz£gi 1631-1632-ik 6vi p6riazadas okmany- 
tara /The Collection of Documents Relating to the Peasant Revolt of 1631-1632, 
Led by Csaszar in Upper Hungary/ (T0rt6nelmi Tar, 1887-1888); L. M a k k a i,  I. Ra- 
k6czi GyOrgy birtokainak gazdasagi iratai, 1631-1648 /The Accounts of the Estate 
of GyOrgy Rak6czi 1 ,1631-1648/ (Budapest 1954); S . S z i la g y i  (ed.), A k6t Rak6czi 
GyOrgy fejedelem csaiadi levelez6se /The Private Correspondence of the Two 
Princes, GyOrgy Rak6czi I and II/ (MHH-D 24, 1875); S. S z ilA g y i (ed.), Levelek 6s 
okiratok I. Rak6czi GyOrgy keleti 0sszek0ttet6seinek tOrtenetehez /The Correspond­
ence and Documents Relating to the Eastern Connections of GyOrgy Rak6czi 1/ 
(Budapest 1883); A. B e k e  — S . B a r a b a s  (eds), I. Rak6czi GyOrgy 6s a Porta /GyOrgy 
Rak6czi I and the Porte/ (Budapest 1888).
On the general tendencies of progress: Zs. P . P a c h ,  A nyugat-eurOpai 6s a magyar 
agrarfejl<5d6s a XV-XVII. szdzadban /Agrarian Development in Western Europe 
and Hungary in the fifteenth-sixteenth Centuries/ (Budapest 1963); idem., A kelet- 
europai "Gutswirtschaft" problematikajahoz /On the Issue of the Eastern Euro­
pean "Gutswirtschaft"/ (Agrdrtdrteneti Szemle, 1979); M. S z e n t g y Orc.y i ,  Jobbagy- 
terhek... /Serf Duties.../.
On the ruling class during the late sixteenth century: Zs. J a k6 ,  Adatok a d6zsma 
fejedelmiseg-kori adminisztraci6jahoz /Facts Pertaining to the Administration of 
Tithes during the Age of the Principality/ (Kolozsvar 1945); Sz6kely felkel6s... 
/Szekely Uprising.../, collection of studies; D. P r o d a n , Bojaren und "Vecini" des 
Landes Fogarasch im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert (Bucharest 1967).
On architecture and life-style: J. Fabricius-Dancu, Siebenblirgisch-sachsische 
Bauernburgen und Wehrkirchen in Rumanien (Gundelsheim 1978); Margit B. Nagy, 
Reneszansz 6s barokk Erd61yben /Renaissance and Baroque in Transylvania/ (Bu­
charest 1970); eadem., Varak, kast61yok, udvarhazak, ahogy a r6giek lattak /For­
tresses, Castles and Manors, As the Old Saw them/ (Bucharest 1973); J. Kovats 
(ed.), Magyar reformatus templomok I-II /Hungarian Protestant Churches/. I-II 
(Budapest 1942); J. Troester, Das alte und neue Dacia (Ntlmberg 1666). The pictures 
of the costumes worn in Transylvania are published in Archeologiai trtesi'to, 1908.
Culture, literature: T . K l a n ic za y  (ed.), A magyar irodalom tOrt6nete I-II /A His­
tory of Hungarian Literature/. I-II (Budapest 1963-1964); T. K l a n ic z a y , A magyar 
kesdreneszansz probl6mai. Reneszansz 6s barokk /The Problems of the Hungarian 
High Renaissance. Renaissance and Baroque/ (Budapest 1961); Zs. J a k6 ,  Iras, kOnyv... 
/Writing, Book.../; M. T a r n 6 c , Erd61y muvel<5d6se Bethlen 6s a k6t Rak6czi GyOrgy 
koraban /Culture in Transylvania during the Time of Gabor Bethlen and the Two
Princes, Gytirgy RSk6czi I and II/ (Budapest 1978); J. Pokoly, Az erd6lyi reformatus 
egyh&z tOrtenete /The History of the Transylvanian Protestant Church/. II (Buda­
pest 1904); Fr. Teutsch, Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Siebenburgen. II 
(Hermannstadt 1922); M. Szab6, Erd61yi diSkok ktilfOldi egyetemjdr^sa a XVI-XVII. 
szdzadban /Students from Transylvania at Foreign Universities in the 16th-17th 
Centuries/ (Muv. T. II.); G. D. Teutsch, Die Synodalverhandlungen der Evangelischen 
Landeskirche in Siebenburgen (Hermannstadt 1882); J. S. Klein, Nachrichten von 
den Lebensumstanden und Schriften evangelischer Prediger. I—II (Buda 1709); D. M. 
Pippidi (ed.), Dicjionar de istorie veche a Romaniei (Bucharest 1976); J. Szigeti, Az 616 
Ap^czai Csere Jinos (1625-1659) /The Living Janos Ap^czai Csere/ (in: Ap^czai 
Csere J5nos vSlogatott munkSi. /Collected Works of J&nos ApSczai Csere/. I (Bu­
charest 1965); S. Benko, A helyzettudat... /Awareness/ (39-44); E. Stere, Gindirea 
etica in Franja secolului al XVI-lea (Bucharest 1972). The author put the publica­
tions of the contemporary Transylvanian literature together on the basis of the se­
ries Regi Magyar Konyvtar /Old Hungarian Library/. L. Toppeltinus, Origines et 
occasus Transylvanorum (Lugdunii Batavorum 1667). R. Dan, Humanizmus, refor­
m e d , antitrinitarizmus 6s a h6ber nyelv Magyarorszdgon /Humanism, Reforma­
tion, Anti-Trinitarianism and the Hebrew Language in Hungary/ (Budapest 1973).
On the age of Ferenc RSk6czi II and the contemporary international situation: 
C. Gollner, Gheorghe R£k6czi II. /Domnitori si voievozi ai (arilor romane/. 9 (Bu­
charest 1977); Erd61y 6s az 6szak-keleti haboru /Transylvania and the North-East 
War/ (Publ. by S. SzilAgyi, Budapest 1890-1891); V. Golobutskiy, Diplomaticheskaya 
istoria osvoboditelnoy voyni ukraynskovo naroda /1648-1654/ (Kiev 1962); S. Go- 
ransson, Den europeiska Konfessionspolitikens upplflsning 1654-1660 (Stockholm 
n. d.); T. Gemil, La Moldavie dans les trait6s de paix turco-polonais du XVII' si6cle 
(1621-1672) (RRH 1973); L. Df.m£ny — P. Cernovodeanu, Relajiile politice ale Angliei 
cu Moldva, Tara Romaneasca si Transilvania in sec. XV-XVIII (Bucharest 1974); 
C. Rezachevici, Les relations politiques et militaires entre la Valachie et la Transylva- 
nie au d6but du XVII' si6cle (RRH 1972); N. Nistor, Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen 
Stidsiebenbtirgen und der Walachei wahrend des 15.-17. Jh. (FVLK 14, 1971);
A. Hattmann, Aspekte des Kulturaustausches (Siebenblirgisches Archiv. A VSL1975). 
On the Hungarian hopes: T. Klaniczay, Zrlnyi Mikl6s (Budapest 1967); Katalin Peter, 
A magyar romlasnak sz^zadaban /In the Century of Hungary's Decline/ (Buda­
pest 1979); On the Polish campaign: Polska w okresie drugiej wojny polnocnej 1655- 
1660. I-IV (Warszawa 1957).
III. The End of Turkish Rule in Transylvania and 
the Reunification of Hungary (1660-1711)
The first comprehensive study of the history and the political, economic, social and 
cultural developments of the Transylvanian principality's last fifty years based on 
wide-scale research of Hungarian, Austrian, Romanian and Czechoslovakian ar­
chives, together with a detailed list of the sources and a bibliography are found in: 
A g n e s  R. V a r k o n y i,  Erd61yi v41toz£sok. Az Erd6lyi Fejedelems6g a tOrOk kiuz6senek 
korSban /The Transylvanian Changes. The Principality of Transylvania in the Time 
of the Turkish Retreat 1660-1711/ (Budapest 1984).
The principality's part in the wars against the Turks in 1663 and 1664: D. A n g y a l ,  
Erd61y politikai 5sszekottet6sei Angli&val /Political Connections between Transylva­
nia and England/ (Sz 1900); S. M A rk i, Cromwell 6s Erd61y /Cromwell and Transyl­
vania/ (Erdelyi Miizeum, 1901); J. B e th le n ,  Rerum Transylvanicarum, libri Quatuor 
(Cibini 1663);. A g n e s  R. V A rk on y i, Gcibor Bethlen and Transylvania under the Rak6czis
at the European Peace Negotiations, 1648-1714 (in: Festschrift A.I. Szabo -  Zs. Jako); 
idem., The Principatus Transylvania and the Genezis of the Anti-Turkish Alliance 
(EHH 1985); G. Perjes, Zrinyi Mikl6s 6s kora /The Life and Age of Mikl6s Zrinyi/ 
(Budapest 1895). — On the balance of power and the period of Transylvanian-French 
alliance: Zs. Tr6csanyi, Teleki Mihaly, Erd61y 6s a kuruc mozgalom 1690-ig /MihSly 
Teleki, Transylvania and the Kuruc Movement before 1690/ (Budapest 1972); L. 
Benczedi, Rendis6g, abs2olutizmus 6s centraliz£ci6 a XVII. szSzadv6gi Magyaror- 
szSgon, 1664-1685 /The Estates, Absolutism and Centralization in Late 17th Cen­
tury Hungary, 1664-1685/ (Budapest 1980); V. B o c is i t ,  Acta conjurationem Petri a 
Zrinio et Francisci de Frankopan, nec non Francisci Nctdasdy illustrantia (1663- 
1671) (Zagreb 1888); J. B S r a n g e r ,  A francia-magyar kapcsolatok a Wessel6nyi- 
Osszeesk(iv6s idej6n (1664-1668) /Franco-Hungarian Connections at the Time of 
the Wessel6nyi Conspiracy, 1664-1668/ (TSz 1967); D. Kosary, Frangais en Hongrie 
(RHC 24, 1946); I. H u d i ja ,  Repertoire des documents concemant les n6gociations 
diplomatiques entre la France et la Transylvanie au XVII' si6cle (1636-1638) (Paris 
1926); I. HuditA, Histoire des relations diplomatiques entre la France et la Transylvanie 
au XVII' si6cle, 1635-1685 (Paris 1927).
On Transylvania's position and politics at the time of the Turkish retreat: M . 
P h ilip p i, Die Zeit des Ubergangs von der ttirkischen zur Osterreichischen Herrschaft, 
1683-1711 (GDGR); A. M a g y a r i ,  Lupta marii nobilimi ardelene pentru pastrarea 
pozijiilor sale economice £i politice in perioada consolidarii Habsburgilor in 
Transilvania, 1685-1699 (SUBB-H 1971); B. S z a d e c z k y , Erdely visszacsatolSsdnak 
tiJrtenete, 1683-1686 /The Reunion with Transylvania/ (Erdelyi Muzeum, 1901); B. 
K o p e cz i, Staadtsrason und Christliche Solidaritat (Budapest 1983). A surviving copy 
of the document concerning the Transylvanian-Habsburg alliance: London, Public 
Record Office SP 103/10, 440-441. fol.; general summary: F. S z a k a ly ,  Hungaria 
Eliberata (Budapest 1986).
From the enormous literature written on the reign of Ferenc R3k6czi II, prince of 
Transylvania: A. Magyari, A R&k6czi-szabadsSgharc t&rsadalmi felt6teleinek 
kialakul^sa Erd61yben /The Development of the Social Conditions of the R3k6czi 
War of Independence in Transylvania/, and P. Cernovodeanu, A havasalfOldi 6s 
moldvai vezet<5 korok magatarWsa a kuruc felkel6ssel szemben /The Attitude of 
the Leading Circles of Wallachia and Moldavia towards the Kuruc Uprising/, both 
in: RT; D. Pop, Pintea Viteazul. Cele dintii documente (Familia, 1934); I. Bankuti, Az 
Erd61yi Consilium leveleskOnyve 6s iratai 1705, 1707-1710 /The Correspondence 
Book and the Documents of the Transylvanian Council/ (Budapest 1985); V. C s u ta k ,  
H&romsz6k felkel6se a R&k6czi-szabads£gharc idej6n /The Uprising of Hdromsz6k 
during the R&k6czi War of Independence/ (SepsiszentgyOrgy 1907); Zs. Tr6csanyi, 
Erd61y korm^nyzata II. R5k6czi Ferenc korAban /The Transylvanian Government 
in the Age of Ferenc Rak6czi II/ (Leveltari Kozlemenyek, 1955); Agnes R. Varkonyi, A 
RSk6czi-szabadsagharc kibontakozdsa Erd6lyben /The Unfolding of the Rdk6czi 
War of Independence in Transylvania/ (Sz 1954); idem., "Ad Pacem Universalem". 
The International Antecedents of the Peace of SzatmSr (EHH 1980); B. KOpeczi, La 
France et la Hongrie au d6but du XVIII' siecle (Budapest 1971).
On the changes in the population: B. J a n c s 6 ,  A z  erd61yi rom£ns3g legr6gibb hiteles 
statisztik^ja /The Oldest Reliable Statistics Concerning the Romanians Living in 
Transylvania/ (Sz 1990); Zs. J a k 6 ,  Ujkori rom^n teleplil6sek Erd6lyben 6s a 
Partiumban /Modem Romanian Settlements in Transylvania and Partium/ (MR I);
C. G o l l n e r ,  Sein und Leistungen der Siebenbiirger Sachsen im 15. und 16. Jahr- 
hundert (Sibiu -  Hermannstadt 1980); E. W a g n e r ,  Ungam (Csangonen) in der Moldau 
und in der Bukovina im Spiegel neuerer rumanischer Quelleneditionen (Zeitschrift 
fiir  Siebenbiirgischer Quelleneditionen, KOln -  Vienna 1980).
On the economy: L. H u s z a r ,  Az erd61yi p6nzver6s tttrt6nete /The History of Coin 
Minting in Transylvania/ (in: B. J a n c s 6  /ed./, A tfirt6neti Erd61y /The Historical
Transylvania/ Budapest 1936); J. Buza, A z  oroszlanos tall6rok £rfolyama 6s szerepe 
MagyarorszSg penzforgalmSban /The Value and Role of the "Lion" Thallers in Hun­
gary's Monetary History/ (NK 1983); S. Takats, Ktilkereskedelmi mozgalmak ha- 
zdnkban I. Lip6t alatt /Foreign Trade Movements in Hungary during the Reign of 
Lip6t I/; idem., K6t vilSgkereskedelmi cikktlnk a XVIII. sz&zadban /Two Hungar­
ian Commodities on the World Market in the 18th Century/ (MGSz, 1899, 1903); 
J. Pataki, A csfki vashamor a XVII. szazad mdsodik feleben /The Iron Harness of 
Csfk in the Second Half of the 17th Century/ (Csfkszereda 1971); M. Szentgyorgyi, 
Jobb&gyterhek... /Serf Duties.../; Zs. Jak6, A gyulai v&rtartomany urb&riumai /The 
Tithes of the Estate of Gyula Castle/ (Kolozsvar 1945); D. Prodan, Urbariile Jarii 
Fagarasului (Bucharest 1970); Zs. Jak6, A z  erdelyi papfrmalmok feudalizmus-kori 
tcirt6net6nek v&zlata /The Historical Outline of the Paper Mills in the Feudalist Age/ 
(SUBB-H 2, 1962-1964); A . Kulcsar, Az erdelyi s6iigy I. Apafi MihSly korSban 
/Transylvanian Salt Trading at the Time of Mihgly Apafi 1/ (Memoria Rerum I, 
Budapest 1988, manuscript); V. B ir 6 ,  Erd61y XVI-XVII. sz^zadi kereskedelmerSl 
/On Transylvanian Trading in the 16th-17th Centuries/ (in: L. Kelemen, Ekv...); 
F. Jickeu, Der Handel der Siebenbtirger Sachsen in seiner geschichtlichen Entwicklung 
(AVSL 1913); S. Goldenberg — M.P. Dan, Marchands balkaniques et levantins dans 
le commerce de la Transylvanie aux XVIe et XVIIs si^cles. I. Congr&s International 
d'Etudes Balkaniques et Sud-Est Europeennes III (Sofia 1969).
On society: A.T. S z a b 6 , Kolozsvar telepiilese a XIX. szazad v6g6ig /Kolozsvar, 
before the End of the 19th Century/ (Kolozsvar 1946); K. K6s, N6p61et 6s 
n6phagyomSny /Folk Life and Folk Traditions/ (Bucharest 1972, the chapter enti­
tled Arucsere n6prajza /The Folklore of Trading/); the relevant chapters of GDGR; 
P. P. Domokos, H^romszek 6s Csfk v£rmegye ad6tigyi Osszei'rSsa 1703-ban /Tax 
Lists of Haromszek and Csfk Counties in 1703/ (TanulmSnyok a TOrteneti Statisz- 
tika KOr6b<51 /Studies in Historical Statistics/ Budapest,1959); Maria SzentgyOrgyi, 
K6v&r vid6k6nek tSrsadalma /Society in the K6vSr Region/ (Budapest 1972); I. Imreh, 
A rendtart6 sz6kely falu /The Disciplined Sz6kely Village/ (Bucharest 1973); A. 
Magyari, A parasztsdg helyzete, Habsburg-ellenes 6s antifeuddlis harca a XVII. szazad 
fordul6j£n /The Condition of the Peasantry and its Fight against the Habsburgs 
and Feudalism at the Turn of the 17th Century/ (SUBB-H 1,1961); V. Bir6, Altorjai 
Apor Istvcin 6s kora /The Life and Times of IstvSn Altorjai Apor/ (Cluj 1935);
F. Dear, Uzoni B61di Pdl, 1621-1679 (Budapest 1887); I. Lukinich, A bethleni gr6f 
Bethlen csalSd tortenete /The History of the Count Bethlen Family of Bethlen/ (Bu­
dapest 1927); I. Lazar, Erd61y fSisp^njai 1540-1711 /The foispans of Transylvania 
1540-1711/ (Sz 1887-1889); E. Karlovszky, Erd61y iparosai az 1702.6vi ved6vamokr61 
/Transylvanian Tradesmen on the Protective Tariffs of the Year 1702/ (MGSz 1897); 
I. Sinkovics, Esterhizy Pal nddor 6s az erd61yiek kereskedelmi t£rsas£ga /Palatine 
Pal Eszterhcizy and the Transylvanian Trade Society/ (Annals of the B6csi Magyar 
TOrt6neti Intezet /Hungarian Historical Institute of Vienna/, 1935); Bethlen Mikl6s 
levelei /The Correspondence of Mikl6s Bethlen/ (Collected and prepared for pub­
lications by M. Jankovich, Budapest 1987); I. Wessel£nyi, Sanyaru vilSg /Miserable 
Life/. I—II (Publ. by A. Magyari — L. Demeny, Bucharest 1983,1985).
On culture: S. B e n k o , SzSzadokat egybekotfi eml6kezet /Memory bridging the 
centuries/ (in: idem., A  helyzettudat.../ITie Awareness.../); I.Craciun — G.G undisch
— S. J a k 6 ,  Cultura in Transilvania (in: Istoria Rominiei III, Bucharest 1964); Margit
B . Nagy, Virak, kast61yok, udvarhfizak /Fortresses, Castles and Manors/ (Bucha­
rest 1973);Zs. J a k 6 ,  A z  otthon 6s muv6szete a XVI-XVII. sz^zadi Kolozsvaron. Szem- 
pontok a reneszSnszkori muvel6d6stink kutat£s3hoz /The Home and the Art of 
Home-making in Kolozsvar in the 16th and 17th Centuries. Some Aspects of the 
Study of Hungarian Culture during the Renaissance Age/ (in: L. Kelemen, Ekv...);
F. Papai Pariz, B6kess6get magamnak 6s m&soknak /Peace for Myself and Others/ 
719 (Introduction and notes: G. Nagy, Bucharest 1977); J . A p a c z a i Csere, Magyar Encyklo-
pedia /Hungarian Encyclopedia/ (Ed. and introduction by J. Szigeti, Bucharest 1977); 
J. Spiellmann, A kozj6 szolgalat&ban /In the Service of Public Welfare/ (Bucharest
1976); B. KOpeczi, A kartezianusok politikSja Magyarorsz^gon 6s Erd61yben a XVII. 
szSzadban 6s a XVIII. sz^zad elej6n /The Politics of the Cartesians in Hungary and 
Transylvania in the 17th and Early 18th Centuries/ (in: idem., Fuggetlens6g 6s haladAs 
/Independence and Progress/ (Budapest 1977); Emma Bartoniek, Fejezetek a XVI- 
XVII. szdzadi magyarorszSgi t0rt6netfr3s t0rt6net6b61 /Chapters from the Histo­
riography of the 16th-17th Century Hungary/ (Prepared for publication by Mrs. 
Zs. Rito6k, Budapest 1975); Gy. SzekfO, A szSsz t0rt6netirAs /Saxon Historiography/ 
(Magyarsdgtudomdny, 1943); M. Szab6, Erd61yi diSkok ktilfOldi egyetemj^rSsa a XVI-
XVII. sz^zadban /Students from Transylvania at Foreign Universities in the 16th- 
17th Centuries/ (in: Muv. T. II); G. Henk van de Graef, A n6metalf{jldi akad6mi^k 6s 
az erd61yi protestantizmus a XVIII. szdzadban, 1690-1795 /Academies in the Neth­
erlands and Protestantism in Transylvania in the 18th Century, 1690-1795/ (n. p. 
1979); Fr. Teutsch, Geschichte der evangelischen Kirche in Siebenburgen. II (Her- 
mannstadt 1922); H. Jekeli, Quellen zur Geschichte des Pietismus in Siebenbtirgen 
(Mediasch 1922); Miszt6tfalusi Kis Mikl6s 6s kOre. Az erd61yi F6niks. Miszt6tfalusi 
Kis Mikl6s or0ks6ge /Mikl6s Miszt6tfalusi Kis and His Circle. The Transylvanian 
Phoenix. The Heritage of Mikl6s Miszt6tfalusi Kis/ (Introduction by Zs. Jak6, Bu­
charest 1974); N. Draganu, Mihai Halici (Contribute la istoria culturala romaneasca 
din sec. XVII) (Bucharest 1928); B. Kelemen, loan Zobora 6s a puritanizmus /loan 
Zobora and Puritanism/; J. Nagy, A magyar-sz&sz nyelvi 6rintkez6s kutates&nak 
eredm6nyei 6s jOvendfi feladatai / The Results and Future Tasks of Research into the 
Linguistic Contact between the Hungarian and the Saxon Population/ (Both in: 
Muv. T. I.); £t. Pascu, O schifa a istoriei politice si bisericesti transilvane dela sfarsitul 
sec. al XVII-lea (Cluj-Kolozsv&r 1947); Z. I. T 6th , Az erd61yi rom&n nacionalizmus 
els<5 6vsz&zada, 1697-1792 /The First Century of Romanian Nationalism in Transyl­
vania, 1697-1792/ (Budapest 1946); L. 'Szadeczky, Apafi Mih&ly udvartart&sa /The 
Court of Mih&ly Apafi/ (Budapest 1911); Szal^rdi J^nos siralmas magyar kr6nik^ja 
/The Miserable Hungarian Chronicle of Jcinos SzaUrdi/ (Publ., introduction, notes 
by F. Szakaly, Budapest 1980); Zs. JakO — I. Juhasz, Nagyenyedi didkok (1662-1848) 
/The Students of Nagyenyed, 1662-1848/ (Bucharest 1979); Zs. Jak6, IrSs, kOnyv... 
/Writing, Book.../; Maria Kocsi — L. Csomor, Festett butorok a Sz6kelyf0ld0n 
/Painted Furniture in Szekely fold/ (Budapest 1982); K. K6s — Judit Szentimrey -  J. 
N a g y , Szilagysagi magyar n6pmuv6szet /Hungarian Folk Art in the SzilSgy Re­
gion/ (Bucharest 1974); C. Prut, Fantasticul in arta populara romaneasca (Bucha­
rest 1972); G. Galavics, A R£k6czi-szabads3gharc 6s az egykoru k6pz6muv6szet 
/The RAk6czi War of Independence and Contemporary Art/ (RT); T. Esze, A 
kolozsvdri p6nzverdihSz II. R£k6czi Ferenc korSban, 1703-1705 /The Mint of 
Kolozsv^r in the Age of Ferenc RSk6czi II, 1703-1705/ (NK 194); Margit S. Sardi, 
Petr6czy Kata Szid6nia k0lt6szete /The Poetry of Kata Szid6nia Petr6czy/ (Buda­
pest 1976); P. M i k 6 ,  N6i magyar lev61stilus a XVII. szSzadban /The Hungarian 
Women's Style of Letter-writing in the 17th Century/ (Sz6kelyudvarhely 1896); O. L. 
Cosma, Hronicul muzicii romanesji (Bucharest 1973); G. Brandsch, Die Musik unter 
den Sachsen (in: Bilder aus der Kulturgeschichte der Siebenbtirger Sachsen, publ. 
by Fr. Teutsch, Hermannstadt 1928); The essays of B. Bart6k: Sz6kely balladSk; 
N6pzen6nk 6s a szomsz6d n6pek n6pzeneje; A hunyadi romin n6p zenedialektusa; 
Rom&n n6pzene /Sz6kely Ballads; The Folk Music of the Hungarians and the Neigh­
bouring Nations; The Musical Dialect of the Romanian People of Hunyad; Roma­
nian Folk Music/ (in: Bart6k B61a OsszegyujtOtt l'r&sai /Collected Writings of B61a 
Bart6k/, publ. by A. Szollosy, Budapest 1966).
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Part Four— Transylvania under the Habsburg 
Empire
I. The Long Eighteenth Century (1711-1830)
From the early 18th century onwards all the official documents of the administra­
tion can be found and researched in the OrszSgos LeveMr /National Archives/. 
We tried to investigate these papers more thoroughly than has ever been done be­
fore. A book which incorporates all this material, while also outlining the history of 
the Transylvanian administration is: Zs. T r 6 c s a n y i ,  Erdelyi korm£nyhat6s&gi 
leveltarak /Government Archives of Transylvania/ (Budapest 1973). On the work­
ings of the Transylvanian state apparatus: R. K u ts c h e r a ,  Landtag und Gubemium 
in Siebenbtirgen, 1688-1869 (KOln -  Vienna 1985).
In spite of the wealth of available sources, there have been no monographs writ­
ten on Transylvania's adjustment to the system of east-central European migration. 
The polemic which had been very much alive between the two world wars was 
closed (without being able to argue the amply illustrated points of view published 
in the two volumes of MR), in: D. P r o d a n ,  Les migrations des Roumains au-delA des 
Carpathes au XVIII' sifecle (Sibiu 1945). The migration to Transylvania is implied in: 
A. C a m a r ia n o - C io r a n ,  Rapoartele inedite ale capucheielor lui Constantin Mavro- 
cordat (Studii 1961), and M. C . V la d ,  Colonizarea rurala in Tara Romanesca si Mol­
dova (Secolele XV-XVIII) (Bucharest 1973). The presently available numerical data 
is reinterpreted in a carefully written manuscript by: R.K. N y a r a d y , Erd61y nepese- 
d£stort6nete /The Demographic History of Transylvania/ (The Archives of the His­
torical Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences).
A brief overview of the agriculture and the agrarian population of Transylvania: 
J. Berlasz, Az erdelyi jobbSgysig gazdasSgi helyzete a XVIII. sz&zadban /The Eco­
nomic Situation of the Serfs of Transylvania in the 18th Century/ (Budapest 1959);
I. Imreh — E. Csetri, Az 5rutermel6s fokoz6d&sa az erdelyi mez<5gazdas3gban a 
feudalizmus bomlasanak idej6n /The Rising Production of Goods in Transylvanian 
Agriculture at the Time of the Decline of Feudalism/ (SUBB-H, 1962); L. Botezan — 
M. Ro^ca-Rosen, Contribufii la problema premizelor sociale ale miscarilor revolu- 
(ionare de la 1848 pe teritoriul Jarii noastre (AM N1965); E. Csetri — I. Imreh, Erdely 
vSltoz6 tSrsadalma 1767-1821 /The Changing Society of Transylvania 1767-1821/ 
(Bucharest 1980). On the management of the estates: Zs. Jak6, A magyarpataki 6s 
kalini hamuzsfrhuta tortenete /The History of the Potash Foundries of Magyarpatak 
and Kalin/ (Bucharest 1956); S. Benk6 — E. Csetri — I. Imreh, Tanulm^nyok az 
erdelyi kapitalizmus kezdeteirfil /Studies on Early Capitalism in Transylvania/ 
(Bucharest 1956); I. Imreh, Majorsagi gazdSlkodas a Szekelyfoldon a feudalizmus 
idejen /Manorial Management in Szekelyfold during Feudalism/ (Bucharest 1956); 
M. R o ^ c a -R o s e n , Veniturile si cheltuielile banesti ale domeniului Bonfidei 1780-1820 
{SUBB-H 1971).
Further Hungarian additions to the large literature of transhumance: A. V e r e s s , 
Pastoritul ardelenilor in Moldova si Tara Romanesca (pina la 1821) (Academia 
Romana, Memoriile Sectiunii Istorice, Seria III, Tom. VII, Mem. 6,1927); L. F o ld e s , 
Quellen zur Transhumance in Siebenburgen-Walachei aus der ersten Halfte des 19. 
Jahrhunderts (in: Viehwirtschaft und Hirtenkultur. Ed. L. F o ld e s ,  Budapest 1969).
On the economic policies of the Habsburg Monarchy: F. E c k h a r t ,  A becsi udvar 
gazdas^gpolitikdja Maria Terezia korSban /The Economic Policy of the Viennese 
Court in the Age of Maria Theresia/ (Budapest 1922); K. M O lle r ,  Siebenbtirgische 
Wirtschaftspolitik unter Maria Theresia (Munich 1961).
On the merchant groups: E. L im o n a  -  D . L im o n a , Negustori bucuresteni la sfirsitul 
veacului al XVIlI-lea (Studii 1960); A. M isk o i.cz y , A brass6i romin levantei keres- 
kedfipolgSrsdg kelet-nyugati k0zvetft<5 szerepe, 1780-1860 /The Mediating Role 
Between East and West of the Romanian Levantine Merchants of Brass6, 1780— 
1860/ (Budapest 1987).
The monographs following up the Romanian national movements of the 18th 
and 19th centuries: Z. I. T 6 t h ,  Az erd61yi romSn nacionalizmus elsfi szdzada 1697- 
1792 /The First Century of Romanian Nationalism in Transylvania 1697-1792/ (Bu­
dapest 1946); L. B l a g a ,  Gindirea romaneasca in Transilvania in secolul al XVIII-lea 
(Bucharest 1966); D. P r o d a n , Supplex Libellus Valachorum. I-IH (Cluj 1948; Bucha­
rest 1967,1984); K. H itc h in s ,  The Rumanian National Movement in Transylvania, 
1780-1849 (Cambridge, Mass. 1969); E. T u rc z y n s k i, Konfession und Nation (Dtis- 
seldorf 1976); I. L u n g u , ^coala ardeleana (Bucharest 1978); K. H itc h in s ,  Consjiinta 
nationala si acjiune politica la romanii din Transilvania, 1700-1868 (Cluj 1987).
On social movements: C. G o u .n e r ,  Die Siebenbtirgische Militargrenze (Munich 
1974); D. P r o d a n ,  Rascoala lui Horea. I—II (Bucharest 1984).
Researchers studying the Hungarian Enlightenment in Transylvania were 
successesful in discovering new sources in the field of cultural history: E. Ja n c s 6 ,  
Az Erdelyi Magyar Nyelvmuvelfi T&rsas^g iratai /The Papers of the Hungarian 
Linguistic Society of Transylvania/ (Bucharest 1955); J .  H a jO s, Koteles Samuel (Bu­
charest 1969); S . K o v a s z n a i,  A z  6sz igaz utjSn /On the True Track of Mind/ (Ed. L. 
K O cziA ny, Bucharest 1970); S . F o g a r a s i ,  Marosvdsirhely 6s GOttinga /Marosvisirhely 
and Gottingen/ (Ed. I. Ju h a s z , Bucharest 1974); J .  S p ie lm a n n , A k6zj6 szolgSlatSban 
/In the Service of Public Welfare/ (Bucharest 1976); S . B e n k 6 , A helyzettudat... 
/Awareness.../.
Praiseworthy Romanian monographies on schooling: N. A lb u , Istoria inva}a- 
mintului romanesc din Transilvania pinS la 1800 (Blaj 1944); idem., Istoria scolilor 
romanesti din Transilvania intre 1800-1867 (Bucharest 1971); The Hungarian re­
search into cultural history have been interrupted, the latest important results can 
be found in: Zs. J a k 6  — I. J u h a s z ,  Nagyenyedi dicikok 1662-1848 /Students of 
Nagyenyed 1662-1848/ (Bucharest 1979) and Muv. T.
The reformist tendencies of Hungarian nobility have been reinterpreted by Zs. 
T rO c s a n y i, Kiserletek teljes katonai uralom letrehozAs^ra Erdelyben, 1732-1739/At­
tempts to Establish a Military Dictatorship in Transylvania, 1732-1739/ (Sz 1983/5).
On the early liberalism and its preliminaries: E. J a n c s 6 ,  A felvil5gosod^st61 a 
romantikdig /From Enlightenment to Romanticism/ (Bucharest 1966); S. B e n k o , 
Sorsform^lo 6rtelem /Mind Over Destiny/ (Bucharest 1971); Z. R o h o n y i, A magyar 
romantika kezdetei /Early Hungarian Romanticism/ (Bucharest 1975); E. C s e tr i ,  
K6r0si Csoma S&ndor (Bucharest 1984).
On the cultural interactions: E. V e re ss , A budai Egyetemi Nyomda kiadvinyainak 
dokumentumai /Documents Concerning the Publications of the Printing-House in 
Buda/ (Ed. S. D o m o k o s , Budapest 1982); K. KOliA  K6t irodalom mesgy<§j6n /On the 
Borderland of Two Literatures/ (Bucharest 1984).
It is a sad reflection on Transylvanian historiography that recent studies of the 
archives in connection with the daily life of the Saxon population, whose economic 
and cultural life was at a high level both by Transylvanian and east-central Euro­
pean standards, do not exist. The quoted synthesis by T e u ts c h  is still the best on the 
subject.
II. The Reform Era (1830-1848)
In spite of their subjective nature, the memoirs and the studies based on personal 
experiences continue to be indispensable in the correct assessment of the bourgeois
transformation, the national movements and the bourgeois revolution: P . G y u la i  
(ed.), Kemeny Zsigmond tanulmSnyai /The Studies of Zsigmond Kemeny/ ( Buda­
pest 1870); J. P A lf fy , Magyarorsz&gi 6s erdelyi urak /The Nobility of Hungary and 
Transylvania. 1-11/ (Ed. A.T. SzabO , Kolozsv&r 1939); F . G y u la i  (ed.), Mez<5k0vesdi 
Ujfalvy S£ndor eml6kiratai /The Memoirs of Sdndor MezfikOvesdi Ujfalvy/ 
(Kolozsvar 1941); L. K ov A ry , Erd61y t0rt6nete 1848-1849-ben /The History of Transyl­
vania in 1848-1849/ (Pest 1861); E. Ja k a b , SzabadsSgharczunk tOrt6net6hez /To the 
History of our War of Independence/ (Budapest 1881); A. P a p iu - I la r ia n ,  Istoria 
romSnilor din Dacia Superiore, I—II (Vienna 1852); G . B a r i t ,  Parji alese...; E. 
F r ie d e n fe ls ,  Joseph Bedeus von Scharberg, I—II (Vienna 1876-1877).
It was first of all in the field of social history where the Romanian historians of 
Hungarian nationality produced the results which were necessary to clear the way 
towards a synthesis: I. Im reh , Erdelyi hetkoznapok, 1750-1850 /Life in Transylva­
nia, 1750-1850/ (Bucharest 1979); idem., A t0rv6nyhoz6 szekely falu /The Legislat­
ing Szekely Village/ (Bucharest 1983); A. E g y ed , VSros, civiliz5ci6 /Town, Civiliza­
tion/ (Bucharest 1981).
The analyses of biographies have a fundamental bearing on the various interre­
lations existing between social and political development: Gh. I. Bogdan-DuicA, Viata 
si ideile lui Simion Bamujiu (Bucharest 1924); idem., Ion Barac (Bucharest 1933); G. 
Kiss — S. Turnowszky (eds), K&roly Szisz  (Bucharest 1955); A. Antal, Mih&ly Szent- 
iv^ni (Bucharest 1958); J. Marlin, Ausgewahlte Schriften (Introduction by A. Con- 
nerth, Bucharest 1958); O. Folberth, Der Prozess Stephan Ludwig Roth (Graz -  KOln 
1959); Zs. TrOcsAnyi, Wessel6nyi Mikl6s (Budapest 1965); S. BenkS, B61yai JSnos 
vallom^sai /The Confessions of JSnos B61yai/ (Bucharest 1968); Kem6ny Zsigmond 
napl6ja /The Diary of Zsigmond Kem6ny/ (Introduction by S. Benk6, Bucharest 
1966); Gy. Barla, Kem6ny Zsigmond f(5bb eszm6i 1849 el<5tt /The Most Important 
Ideas of Zsigmond Kem6ny before 1849/ (Budapest 1970); I. MikO, Az utols6 erdelyi 
polihisztor /The Last Polymath of Transylvania/ (Bucharest 1970); M. Kroner, 
Stephan Ludwig Roth (Cluj 1974); S. Boloni Farkas, Journey in North America, 1831 
(Ed. A. Kadarkay, Oxford, Calif. 1978); A. Antal — J. FaragO — A.T. SzabO, Kriza 
J5nos (Kolozsvar 1971); Varga Katalin pere /The Trial of Katalin Varga/ (Introduc­
tion by A. Kiss, Bucharest 1979); M. Praznovszky (ed.), Teleki and his Age. Dis- 
cussiones Neogradienses (Salg6tarj&n 1987).
The largest source publications: L. R o t h ,  Geschammelte Schriften und Briefe (Ed.
O. F o l b e r t h ,  I-VII, Berlin, 1964-1970); £ t .  P a s c u  (ed.), George Bari} si contemporanii 
sai. I-VII (Bucharest 1973-1976).
The inherent logic of the Hungarian national aspirations, the relationship formed 
with other nations and the various ways of bringing about national unity are analyzed 
in: Gy. S z e g fO  (ed.), Iratok a magyar dllamnyelv kerdes6nek tort6netehez /Docu­
ments Pertaining to the History of the Hungarian State's Official Language/ (Buda­
pest 1926); M. A s z t a lo s ,  Kossuth Lajos kora 6s az erd61yi k6rdes /The Age of Lajos 
Kossuth and the Transylvanian Issue/ (Budapest 1928); E. A r a tO , A  magyarorszdgi 
nemzetisegek nemzeti ideol6gi5ja /The National Ideology of the Nationalities Liv­
ing in Hungary/ (Budapest 1983); Gy. S z a b a d , Kossuth politikai pdly^ja /The Politi­
cal Career of Kossuth/ (Budapest 1977); J. V a r g a ,  Helyet keresfi Magyarorszag 
/Hungary in Search of a Place under the Sun/ (Budapest 1982); A. M is k o lc z y ,  TSrsa- 
dalom, nemzetis6g 6s ellenz6kis6g k6rd6sei az erd61yi magyar reformmozgalomban, 
1830-1843 /The Issues of Society, Nationality and the Oppositional Politics in the 
Hungarian Reformist Movement of Transylvania, 1830-1843/ (S z  1983/5); Gy. 
S z a b a d , N6zetek Magyarorszcig 6s Erd61y Sllamjogi viszony&nak rendez6s6r61 a 
polgdri italakulds korSban /Views on the Settling of the Constitutional Relation­
ships between Hungary and Transylvania in the Age of the Bourgeois Transforma­
tion/ (in the TEt volume).
A comprehensive view of the Romanian national movement is given in: G. Em. 
M a r i c a  — I. H a j6 s  — C . M a r e  — C . Rusu, Ideologia generajiei romane de la 1848 din 
Transilvania (Bucharest 1968); L. G y £ m a n t, Miscarea na|ionala a romanilor din 
Transilvania, 1790-1848 (Bucharest 1986).
The relationship between Transylvania's Romanian population and the Roma­
nians living over the other side of the Carpathians is analyzed in depth in: P . C o r ­
n e a ,  Originile romantismului romanesc (Bucharest 1872); O. P a p a d im a , Ipostaze ale 
iluminismului romanesc (Bucharest 1976); A l .  N ic o le s c u ,  Individualitatea limbii 
romane intre limbile romanice. II (Bucharest 1978); K. B o c h m a n n , Das politisch- 
soziale Wortschatz des Rumanischen von 1821 bis 1850 (Berlin 1970); V. G e o r g e s c u , 
Istoria ideilor politice romane^ti, 1369-1878 (Munich 1987).
III. Revolution and the War of Independence (1848-1849)
After the politically motivated attempts of the contemporary historians, the sys­
tematic source publication of the archive material associated with the events of 1848- 
1849 only began relatively late, and then was left unfinished: S. D r a g o m ir ,  Studii si 
documente privitoare la revolujia romanilor din Transilvania in anii 1848-49.1—III 
(Sibiu 1944). Contradicting the genre and the aims of the authors, the sources are 
selected quite onesidedly at times in: ^ t. P a s c u  — V. C h e re s te s iu  (eds), Revolujia de 
la 1848-1849 din Transilvania. I (Bucharest 1977); £ t .  P a s c u  — V. C h e re s te s iu  (eds), 
Documente privind revolujia de la 1848 in Jarile romane. C . Transilvania. II (Bucha­
rest 1979); III (Ed. £ t .  P a s c u , Bucharest 1982).
On the importance and dynamics of the peasant movements: Zs. T r6 c s A n y i, A z  
erdelyi paraszts&g tOrtenete, 1790-1848 /The History of the Transylvanian Peas­
antry, 1790-1848/ (Budapest 1956); E. A r a t 6 ,  Die Bauernbewegungen und der 
Nationalismus in Ungam im FrUhling und Sommer 1848 (AUSB 1967,1977); 1848. 
Arcok, eszm6k, tettek /1848. Faces, Ideas, Actions/ (Bucharest 1974).
The events of the spring and summer of 1848 are discussed professionally and 
with the legitimate assertion of the bourgois nationalist view of the Romanian peo­
ple in: S. D r a g o m ir , Studii si documente privitoare la revolujia romanilor din Tran­
silvania in anii 1848-1849, V (Cluj 1946). An attempt to overcome the one-sided 
nationalist approach: V. C h e re s te s iu , A bal&zsfalvi nemzeti gyulas, 1848. mSjus 15- 
17 /The National Diet of Bal^zsfalva, 15-17 May, 1848/ (Bucharest 1967).
The only modem regional monography: A. E g y ed , H&romsz6k, 1848-1849 (Bu­
charest 1978). The best biography: S. D ra g o m ir , Avram Iancu (Bucharest 1965).
Greater emphasis is placed on Hungarian history, Hungarian-Romanian rela­
tions and the Hungarian government's nationality policy I. Z. T 6th , Balcescu Mikl6s 
61ete /The Life of Mikl6s Balcescu/ (Budapest 1958); idem., Magyarok 6s romSnok 
/Hungarians and Romanians/ (Budapest 1980); Gy. S p ira , A nemzetis6gi k6rdes a 
negyvennyolcas forradalom MagyarorszSgSn /The Nationality Issue in Hungary 
during the 1848 Revolution/ (Budapest 1980); A. M is k o lc z y , Rumanian-Hungarian 
Attempts at Reconciliation in the Spring of 1849 in Transylvania (AUSB 1981).
On the historical role played by the Saxons: C. G o l l n f r ,  Die Siebenbtirger Sachsen 
in den Revolutionjahren 1848-1849 (Bucharest 1967); Z. S a rk O z y , A z  erdelyi sziszok 
1848-49-ben /The Saxons of Transylvania in 1848-49/ (Budapest 1974).
Much has been written on the casualties of the civil war, although an accurate 
picture cannot be given because of the biased nature of the sources.
Only the "victims of Hungarian terrorism" were complied by the Austrian mili­
tary government. The list was completed on a village-by-village basis and gave a 
total of 6112 victims. Of the people standing trial in the Hungarian martial law 
courts, at least 449 persons (769, at the most) were executed on officers' orders with­
out a formal sentence. 31 persons were hanged and 709 were shot after occupying 
various settlements; 2,871 people died in other ways. In the course of the military 
clashes 1,283 civilians lost their lives. The same 6112 persons in a different break­
down: 5680 men, 363 women and 69 children. Broken down into nationalities: 5405 
Romanians, 310 Saxons, 304 Hungarians and 93 people of other nationalities. In 
their propaganda the Romanian contemporaries put the number of Romanian 
casualities at around 40,000. Accepting this figure, 100,000 Hungarian casualities 
are mentioned in: I. S t e r c a  IpULLrpu, Din istoria Munjilor Apunseni (Gazeta Transil- 
vaniei, 1891, No. 18). In his book, Handbuch der Landeskunde Siebenbtirgens, E. A. 
B ie lz ,  who knew both the above-mentioned Austrian survey and the demographic 
circumstances of the age, estimated the "unnatural" loss of lives of 1848-1849 at 
18,000, also including in this figure the victims of the typhoid epidemic which owed 
its spread to the war situation. The psychological damage and shock had even graver 
consequences than the physical devastation and losses.
Part Five — From the Empire to Civic Hungary
I. The Era of Neo-Absolutism (1849-1867)
There is a colourful account of public life, based on contemporary experiences and 
newspaper articles in: L. U rm ossy , Tizenhet ev... /Seventeen Years.../. Still one of 
the most fundamentally important books is: G . B a r i t ,  Parji alese...; A. B e rz e v icz y , 
Az abszolutizmus kora MagyarorszSgon, 1849-1865 /The Absolutist Age in Hun­
gary). I-V (Budapest 1922-1937); J. R e d lic h , Das Osterreichische Staats- und Reich- 
problem. II (Leipzig 1926); Later-day works: R. A. Kann, Das Nationalitatenproblem 
der Habsburgermonarchie. I—II (Graz -  Koln 19642); A. W a n d r u s z k a  — P. U r b a n it s c h  
(eds), Die Habsburgermonarchie 1849-1918, III (Vienna 1980); C. G O l l n e r ,  Die 
Siebenbtirger Sachsen in den Jahren 1848-1918 (Bucharest 1967).
In addition to the above publications, there are further books on the absolutist 
administration: A fold megOsztilt. Eml6kiratok, napl6k az abszolutizmus (Bach) 
kor£b61 /The Earth H a s  Turned White. Memoirs and Diaries from the Absolutist 
(Bach) Age/. I—II (Selected by G y . T 6 t h ,  Budapest 1985); Hundert Jahre sachsischer 
Kampfe ( H e r m a n n s t a d t  1896); B. H a r m - H in r ic h ,  Der Osterreichische Neoabso- 
lutismus (Gottingen 1978); J. G rim m , Die politische Verwaltung im Grossfiirstenthum 
Siebenbtirgen. I—III (H e r m a n n s ta d t  1854-1857); idem., Carl F t ir s t  zu Schwarzenberg, 
Gouvemeur von Siebenbtirgen. Ein Gedenkblatt (Vienna 1861); E. F r ie d e n fe ls ,  Joseph 
Bedeus von Scharberg. Beitrage zur Zeitgeschichte Siebenbtirgens im 19. Jahrhundert. 
I—II (Vienna 1876-1877); C. G o l l n e r ,  Die Siebenbtirgische Militargrenze (Munich 
1974); O. F o lb e r t h ,  Minister Thun und die Siebenbtirger Sachsen (in: Jahrbuch fur 
Geschichte des Protestantismus in Osterreich, 1964); K. H it c h in s ,  Studien zur 
modemen Geschichte Transsilvaniens (Klausenburg 1971); M. P o p e scu , Documente 
inedite privitoare la istoria Transilvaniei intre 1848-1859 (Bucharest 1929). In this 
chapter Saxon history was first of all based on the book GrossOsterreich und 
Siebenbtirger Sachsen 1848-1859 (Munich 1957) by F r .  T e u ts c h  and I. M a r t iu s .
On the question of the Romanian nationalist movements: G. B a r i t ,  Parji alese...
III. Source publication: T. V. P A cA tia n , Cartea de Aur sau luptele politice-nafionale 
ale romanilor de sub corona ungara. I-IV (Sibiu 1902-1915). See also: K. H itc h in s ,  
Andreiu ^aguna and the Rumanians of Transylvania during the Decade of Absolut­
ism, 1849-1859 (Stidostforschungen, 25,1966); I. P u ^ ca r iu , Notice despre intimplarile 
contemporane (Sibiu 1913); V. N e t e a ,  Lupta romanilor din Transilvania pentru 
libertates najionala 1848-1881 (Bucharest 1974).
On Hungarian emigration and resistance: L. UrmOssy, Tizenh6t 6v... /Seventeen 
Years.../; A. Berzeviczy, Az abszolutizmus kora /The Age of Absolutism/, already 
listed; N. Veress, A magyar emigratio a Keleten /Hungarian Emigration in the East/
I-II (Budapest 1879); F. DeAk, Fogs^gom tOrtenete /The Story of My Captivity/ 
(Publ. by J. KovAcs, Bucharest 1972); L. Lukacs, Magyar ftiggetlens6gi 6s alkotmAnyos 
mozgalmak, 1849-1867 /Hungarian Movements for Independence and Constitu­
tion, 1849-1867/ (Budapest 1955); Sz6kely v6rtanuk /Sz6kely Martyrs/, 1854, with 
an introductory study by D. Karolyi (Bucharest 1975), and L. LukAcs, Magyar politikai 
emigrdci61849-1867 / Hungarian Political Emigration, 1849-1867/ (Budapest 1984);
E. KovAcs, A Kossuth-emigr6ci6 6s az eur6pai szabadsSgmozgalmak /The Kossuth 
Emigration and the European Liberation Movements/ (Budapest 1967); Gy. Szabad, 
Kossuth politikai pSly^ja ismert 6s ismeretlen megnyilatkozSsai ttikr6ben /The Po­
litical Career of Kossuth in the Light of Both the Well-known and the Unfamiliar of 
His Actions/ (Budapest 1977); K. B. Borsi, EgyUtt vagy ktllOn utakon. A Kossuth- 
emigr^ci6 6s a romin nemzeti mozgalom kapcsolatSnak t<5rt6net6hez /Following 
the Same Road or Going it Alone. To the History of the relationship between the 
Kossuth Emigration and the Romanian National Movement/ (Budapest 1984).
Official facts concerning the liberation of the serfs: J. G rim m , Das Urbarialwesen 
in SiebenbUrgen (Vienna 1863); analyses: A. E g y e d , A paraszts&g Erd61yben a 
szazadfordul6n. Tcirsadalom- 6s agr&rtorteneti Sttekintes /The Peasantry in Transyl­
vania at the Turn of Century. A Social and Agrarian Historical Overview/ (Bucha­
rest 1975); J. KovAcs, Desfiinjarea rela^iilor feudale in Transilvania (Cluj 1973).
On the Crimean War: D. JA n ossy , Die ungarische Emigration und der Krieg im 
Orient (Budapest 1939); on the effects of the war in Italy in 1859: the above-men­
tioned works by L . L u k A cs; and E. KovAcs, A Kossuth-emigr&ci6 /The Kossuth Emi­
gration/; G y . S z a b a d , Forradalom 6s kiegyez6s vSlaszutjSn 1860-61 /At the Cross­
road of Revolution and Compromise 1860-61/ (Budapest 1967).
On the events following 1860 see the above-mentioned book, Forradalom 6s 
kiegyez6s... /At the Cross-road.../ by Gy. S z a b a d ; E v a  S o m o g y i, A birodalmi centra- 
Iiz&ci6t61 a dualizmusig. Az osztr£k-n6met liberalisok utja a kiegyez6shez /From 
Imperial Centralism to Dualism. The Road of the Austrian-German Liberals to the 
Compromise/ (Budapest 1976). Of the sources, we refer to: J. S A n d o r , Okm&nytSr 
Erd61y legujabb jogt0rt6nelm6hez, 1848-1865 / An Archive for the Latest Legal His­
tory of Transylvania/ (Kolozsvar 1965); Die Protokolle des Osterreichischen Minister- 
rates 1848-1867. Abt. V. Die Ministerien Erzherzog Rainer und Mensdorff (Bd. 1. 7. 
2.1861 -  30. 4.1861, Bearb. von S t .  M a l f £ r ,  Vienna 1981).
On the subject of the 1863-1864 Provincial Diet of Nagyszeben: D. T e le k i ,  Sieben- 
burgen und die Osterreichische Regierung in der letzten vier Jahren 1860-1864 (Leip­
zig 1865); L. O rm O ssy, Tizenh6t 6v... /Seventeen Years.:./; G. B a r i t ,  Parfi alese... II; 
the already quoted book, P u ^ c a r iu , Notice... I; From the studies: M . M e s t e r ,  A z  
autonom Erd61y 6s a rom£n nemzeti k0vetel6sek az 1863-64. 6vi nagyszebeni 
orsztiggyul6sen /The Autonomous Transylvania and the Romanian National De­
mands of the 1863-64 Diet of Nagyszeben/ (Budapest 1936); S. R e t e g a n ,  Dieta 
romaneasca a Transilvanei 1863-1864 (Cluj-Napoca 1979).
On the Diet of Kolozsvar: Die Protokolle des Osterreichischen Ministerrates 1848- 
1867. Abt. VI. Das Ministerium Belcredi (Bd. 1.27.7.1865 -  7.4.1866. Bearb. von H. 
B r e t t n e r - M e s s le r ,  Vienna 1973); K. H itc h in s  — L. M a io r ,  Corespondenja lui loan 
Ra{iu cu George Barijiu 1861-1892 (Cluj 1970).
II. Population and Economy in the Age of Capitalism
A modern synthesis on the social and economic changes in Transylvania which 
followed the events of 1848 has not been written to date. Here we list only a small 
portion of the abundant literature.
On the issue of demography: Tafeln zur Statistik der Osterreichischen Monarchic 
(Neue Folge I-V, 1849-1865, Vienna 1856-1868); the volumes of Mitteilungen aus 
dem Gebiete der Statistik (Vienna 1853, 1867); after 1867, the Magyar Statisztikai 
fivkOnyv /Hungarian Statistical Yearbook/ and the Magyar Statisztikai KOzle- 
menyek /Hungarian Statistical Publications/. See also E. Ja k a b ffy , Erd61y statisztikfija 
/Statistics of Transylvania/ (Lugos 1923) for information on the end of the period 
in question.
Important facts are published in E. W a g n e r ,  Historisch-statistisches Orsts- 
namenbuch fur Siebenburgen (Koln -  Vienna 1977), in R. K. NyArAdi's statistical 
analysis, Erdely nepesed6st0rt6nete /The Demographic History of Transylvania/ 
(manuscript) and in P. B a lo g h ,  Fajn6pess6gi viszonyaink az Erd61yi r6szek kdjrtil az 
1890-1900 6vekben /The Racial Make-up of the Transylvanian Areas in the Years
1890-1900/ (Kolozsv&r 1904). See also: A. KovAcs, A nyelvismeret, mint a nemzetisegi 
statisztika ellen6rz6je /Language Proficiency, As the Verification of National Sta­
tistics/ (Magyar Statisztikai Szemle, 1928).
On urbanization: Istoria Clujului (Ed. £ t .  P a s c u , Cluj, 1974); G. T h ir r in g ,  A magyar 
v^rosok statisztikai frvkflnyve, I /Statistical Yearbook of the Hungarian Towns/ 
(Budapest 1912); P. Sucru, Clasele noastre sociale (Turda 1930); idem., Propriatatea 
agrara in Ardeal (Cluj 1931); P. S. F r a n k , Gegenwart und Zukunft der Siebenbtirger 
Sachsen. Eine volkwirtschaftliche Studie (Hermannstadt 1892).
On the working class: A. E g y ed  — L. V a jd a  — I. C i c a l a ,  MunkAs- 6s paraszt- 
mozgalmak Erd61yben, 1905-1907 /Working-class and Peasant Movements in 
Transylvania, 1905-1907/ (Bucharest 1961); L. V a jd a ,  Erd61yi bSny^k, koh6k, 
emberek, szazadok /Transylvanian Mines, Foundries, People and Centuries/ (Bu­
charest 1981).
On the preconditions of economic progress: Die Habsburgmonarchie 1848-
1918.1. A. B r u s a t t i  (ed.), Die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung (Vienna 1973); L. K a t u s ,  
Economic Growth in Hungary During the Age of Dualism 1867-1913 (Socio-Eco- 
nomic Researches on the History of East Central Europe. Ed. E. P am l£:ny i, Budapest
1970).
On Hungary's tariff union with Austria: K. M. F in k , Die Osterreichisch-Ungarische 
Monarchie als Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (Munich 1968).
On the railway: B. L u kA cs, A Magyar Keleti Vasut /The Eastern Railway of Hun­
gary/ (Kolozsv^r 1870); E. F. T a n d le r ,  Die industrielle Entwicklung Siebenbtirgens 
(Kronstadt 1909).
On the growth of the agriculture: the volumes Uj Folyam /New Year/ and Uj 
Sorozat /New Series/ of the Magyar Statisztikai EvkOnyv /Hungarian Statistical 
Yearbook/ and the Magyar Statisztikai KOzlemenyek /Hungarian Statistical Publi­
cations/. G y . B f .n d a , Statisztikai adatok a magyar mezfigazdsSg t0rt6net6hez, 1767- 
1867 /Statistical Facts about Hungarian Agriculture/ (Budapest 1973).
On the changes in agriculture: A. V o rO s, A magyar mez<5gazdas£g a kapitalista 
atalakul^s utjan /Hungarian Agriculture on the Road towards Capitalist Transfor­
mation/ (in: P. G u n s t  — T. H o ffm a n n  /eds/, A magyar mezfigazdasSg a XIX-XX. 
szSzadban /Hungarian Agriculture in the 19th-20th Centuries/ Budapest 1976); 
MagyarorszSg t0rt6nete. 6 / A History of Hungary. 6/; A. E g y ed , A paraszts&g E r - 
delyben a szazadfordulon /The Peasantry in Transylvania at the Turn of the Cen­
tury/; K . K 6 s , N6pelet, nephagyom^ny /Folk Life, Folk Traditions/ (Bucharest 1970);
727 Die Agrarfrage in der Osterreichisch-Ungarischen Monarchie 1900-1918 (Bucharest
1965); Sz6kely Kongresszus /Szekely Congress/ (published by Orszdgos GazdasS- 
gi Egyestilet /National Agricultural Union/ Budapest 1902); L. T o k a ji ,  Elad6 orszdg 
/ A Country for Sale/ (Kolozsv&r 1913). On animal husbandry: J. E b e r , A fajok harca 
Erdelyben /The Contest of Races in Transylvania/ (Budapest 1905); I. H in tz ,  Das 
wandernde Siebenbtirgen (Kronstadt 1876); L. F O ld es (ed.), Viehzucht und Hirten- 
leben in Ostmitteleuropa (Budapest 1961); B. E n esei D O rn e r, Az erdelyi sziszok mez6- 
gazdasaga /The Agriculture of the Saxons of Transylvania/ (Gy6r 1911). On shared 
ownership of the land: J. V e n c z e l ,  Az erdelyi rom^n fflldbirtokreform /The Roma­
nian Land Reforms in Transylvania/ (Kolozsv^r 1942).
On the development of mining and metallurgy: the already cited book by L. 
V a jd a ,  Erd61yi bciny^k, koh6k... /Transylvanian Mines, Foundries.../; on the indus­
try: beside the already quoted work by E. F. T a n d le r ,  Industria si bogajiile naturale 
din Ardeal ji Banat (Cluj 1927); TBCM, and Technikai fejl6d6sunk tort6nete 1867- 
1927 /The History of Our Technical Development 1867-1927/ (Budapest 19292).
Our brief account about the political function of culture in different national 
societies is based on the synthesis mentioned in the introduction, and: M . A s z t a lo s  
(ed.), A  tOrt&neti Erd61y /The Historical Transylvania/ (Budapest 1937); G y . B is z t r a y
— T. A . S z a b 6  — L. T a m a s  (eds), Erd61y magyar egyeteme /The Hungarian Univer­
sity of Transylvania/ (Kolozsvcir 1941); E. M a ly u s z  (ed.), Erd61y 6s n6pei /Transyl­
vania and its Nations/ (Budapest 1941); L. M a k k a i  — L. G a ld i  (eds), A  rom&nok 
tftrtenete /The History of the Romanians/ (Budapest 1941).
On cultural societies: P. Erdelyi (ed.), Emlekkonyv az Erdelyi Muzeum Egyestilet 
f61szcizados tinnepere 1859-1909 / Album for the Fifty Years Anniversary of the 
Transylvanian Museum Society 1859-1909/ (KolozsvSr 1909-1942); V e r i t a s  [Antal 
Huszir], A magyarorszcigi rominok egyhcizi, iskolai, k0zmuveld>d6si, kfizgazdasSgi 
int6zmenyeinek 6s mozgalmainak ismertet6se /The Representation of Religions, 
School, Public Educational and Economic Institutions and Movements of the Ro­
manians of Hungary/ (Budapest 1908). From the wide but unorganized literature 
of the school system: N. Albu, Istoria scolilor romanesti din Transilvania intre 1800- 
1876 (Bucharest 1971); O. Ghibu, ^coala romaneasca din Transilvania §i Ungaria 
(Bucharest 1915); Piroska Magyari, A magyarorszcigi rom^nok iskolatigye /The 
Educational Affairs of the Romanians in Hungary/ (Szeged 1936); S. Bir6, Kisebb- 
s6gben 6s tObbs6gben /In Minority and in Majority/ (Bern 1989).
Besides the historical summaries on Transylvanian Hungarian literature: I. S o t e r  
(ed.),A magyar irodalom t«rt6nete /A History of Hungarian Literature/. IV-V (Bu­
dapest 1965). On Romanian literary life: I. B r e a z u , Povestitori ardeleni si banafeni 
pina la unire (Cluj 1937); idem., Literature Transilvaniei (n. p. 1944); idem., La 
Transylvanie (Bucharest 1938). On Saxon literature: C. G o lu m er — J. W i t t s t o c k  (eds), 
Die Literatur der Siebenbtirger Sachsen in den Jahren 1849-1918 (Bucharest 1979).
Gives a summary of painting, sculpting and architecture: J .  B ir 6 ,  Erd61y muv6szete 
/Transylvanian Art/ (Budapest 1989); on Romanian aspects: G. O p r e s c u , Pictura 
romaneasca in sec. al XlX-lea (Bucharest 1937); I. F r u n z e t t i ,  Pictori banajeni din 
secolul al XlX-lea (Bucharest 1957).
A detailed resume concerning each field of Saxon culture: C. G O l ln e r  (ed.), Die 
Siebenbtirger Sachsen in den Jahren 1848-1918 (Koln — Vienna 1988), which also 
gives a wide bibliography. Further views and datas can be found in the still useful 
works of: B. P u k a n sz k y , Erd61yi sz^szok 6s magyarok /Transylvanian Saxons and 
Hungarians/ (Pecs 1943); and G y . SzekfO , A sz&sz t0rt6netfr£s /The Saxon Historio­
graphy/ in: Allam 6s nemzet /State and Nation/ (Budapest 1942).
III. Political Life and the Nationality Issue in the Age 
of Dualism (1867-1918)
From the enormous literature on the history of the period of "compromise" we can 
only mention the most important works. From the early literature: G . G r a t z ,  A 
dualizmus kora. I—II /The Age of Dual Monarchy/ (Budapest 1934); N. I o r g a ,  Istoria 
romanilor X: intregitorii (Bucharest 1939). Of the polemical works, the following 
set the highest standard: La Transylvanie (Bucharest 1938); J. D e 6 r  (ed.), Erd61y 
/Transylvania/ published by Magyar Tortenelmi Tarsulat /Hungarian Historical 
Society/ (Budapest 1940); E. L u k in ic h  (ed.), Die siebenbtirgische Frage (Budapest 
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1985, pp. 215-230, fig. 1)
11. The princely palace of Bel6nyesszentmikl6s, eleventh- 
twelfth centuries (After R. P o p a  — N. C h id o ^ a n  — A. 
L u k a c s , O resedin|a feudala din secolele XI-XII la Sinni- 
colau de Beiuj. Revista muzeelor f i ’ monumentelor. Monu- 
mente istorice fi de arta, 15/2,1984, pp. 21-34, figs 3, 7)
Chronology
Part One —Transylvania in Prehistoric 
and Ancient Times
6th-4th centuries B.C.: Transylvania is inhabited by the Agathyrsi, the first Transyl­
vanian nation known by name.
3rd-2nd centuries B.C.: Celtic rule in Transylvania.
2nd century B.C.: The beginning of Dacian rule.
1st century B.C.: Burebista unites the Dacian tribes; Dacian settlements in Transyl­
vania.
Circa 44 B.C.: The assassination of Burebista, the Dacian king.
10 B.C.: The Romans hew a cliff road into the rockface at the Iron Gate.
85-86, winter: Oppius Sabinus, the governor of Moesia, is killed in a surprise attack 
by the Dacians.
86: Cornelius Fuscus, a Roman commander, crosses the Danube and advances suc­
cessfully on Dacian soil. Fuscus is defeated by Decebal, the Dacian king, and 
is killed.
88: A Roman general, Tettius Julianus scores a victory over the Dacians at the Tapae 
Pass. Roman-Dacian alliance.
102: Emperor Trajan's first campaign against the Kingdom of Dacia.
105-106: The second Dacian war. Trajan occupies Sarmizegethusa, Decebal com­
mits suicide. Dacia becomes a Roman province.
117-138: Reign of Emperor Hadrian.
118-124: New territorial divisions of Dacia: Dacia Inferior, Superior, Porolissensis.
167-170: New administrative divisions: Dacia Apulensis, Malvensis, Porolissensis.
167-180: War on the Dacian frontier with peoples living outside the empire, such as
the Marcomanns, Vandals and Sarmatians.
193-211: Reign of Septimius Severus.
From 235: Goth incursions ravage the province of Dacia.
245-248: The empire abandones the defensive line beyond the Olt River (Limes 
Transalutanus).
269: Emperor Claudius II's victory over the Goths at Naissus.
271: Emperor Aurelian orders the evacuation of Dacia. Its inhabitants are settled 
south of the Danube where a new province, Dacia Ripensis, is formed. Dacia 
comes under Gothic rule.
From 291: Visigoths in alliance with the Taifali defend the earlier Dacia against the 
Vandals and Gepids.
332, 18 February: The Visigoth king, Ariaric attacks the Sarmatians from the Maros 
Valley, but suffers catastrophic defeat.
Circa 335: The Visigoth king Geberic drives the army of Visumar, the Vandal king, 
from the Maros Valley.
369: The army of the Visigoth king, Athanaric withdraws to the southern Carpathians 
from the army of the emperor Valens.
376: Athanaric's army is defeated by the Huns at the Dniester. The king retreats to 
Transylvania (Caucaland), the Visigoth population flees onto Roman terri­
tory led by King Fritigem.
End o f 380: Athanaric and his escort seeks refuge in Constantinople.
408: The Hun prince Uldin destroys the Roman counterforts along the Lower Dan­
ube up to the Iron Gate.
412: The Huns occupy Wallachia under the leadership of Prince Uldin.
424: The superior commander, Ruga moves the centre of Hunnish rule on territory 
east of the Tisza River. Hun dominion over Transylvania.
435-445: The second in command, Attila has his centre in Wallachia.
445-453: Attila becomes the king of kings of the Huns.
455: Ardaric, the Gepid king, and his allied forces defeat the Huns.
455-474: The Gepids occupy all the earlier Hun territories down to the Lower Dan­
ube. Gepid settlements in Transylvania.
539-551: The provinces Moesia Prima and Dacia Ripensis are under Gepid rule.
567: The Avars, in alliance with the Langobards, wipe off the Gepids. The Avars 
settle in Transylvania.
680: The settling down of Bulgar Turks (Proto-Bulgarians) on the territory of present- 
day Bulgaria.
From 700: Twenty-five Slav tribes live on the territory of the former province of 
Dacia.
802-803: Krum, the khan of the Bulgars launches a military campaign against the 
eastern part of the Avar Empire.
818-824: Fleeing from the Bulgarians, the Slav Timocani and Abodriti move to 
Dacia, north of the Danube and apk for the help of the Franks.
From 827: The Bulgar khan, Omurtag fights against the Franks and Slavs.
832: A peace-treaty signed with the Carolingian Empire secures the Bulgarians' 
conquests. Transylvania comes under Bulgarian rule.
838: The Hungarians appear at the Lower Danube.
862; The first Hungarian campaign against the Carolingian Empire.
881: The Hungarians and Kabars press ahead to the vicinity of Venia (Vienna).
892: The eastern Frankish king, Amulf asks Vladimir, the Bulgarian khan, not to 
deliver salt to the Moravians; this is the first reference to the Transylvanian 
salt mines and salt trade.
894: Arpdd and KurszSn, the leaders of the Hungarian tribes, enter into alliance 
with the Byzantine against the Bulgars. The Hungarian army attacks Bul­
garia.
895: Bulgarian-Pecheneg counter-attack against the Hungarians. The Hungarian 
tribes flee to Transylvania via the Carpathians.
Part Two — Transylvania in the Mediaeval 
Hungarian Kingdom
895-900: The land of the Hungarians extends from the line of the Garam and Dan­
ube rivers to "Dacia" in the east in the Carpathian Basin.
900: The Hungarians occupy Pannonia and Moravia east of the Morva River.
934: First Hungarian attack against Byzantium.
943: Renewed Hungarian attack against Byzantium, which leads to a peace of five 
years.
948: The horka Bultchu and Termatchu of the Arpdd dynasty arrive in Constantino­
ple. Bultchu embraces Christianity and obtains the title of patrikios, and 
Termatchu obtains the title of friend. The supreme commander of the Hun­
garians is Fajsz, who also rules over Transylvania.
953-954: The gyula, the second prince of the Hungarians arrives in Constantinople 
and receives the title of patrikios. He returns with the missionary bishop Hiero- 
theus.
955-971: Taksony is the supreme commander of the Hungarians. He also reigns 
over Transylvania.
970: The Hungarians are defeated at Arcadiupolis; end of the Hungarian attacks 
against Byzantium.
971: The army of Emperor Ionnas Tzimisces conquers eastern Bulgaria. The south­
ern bank of the Lower Danube becomes a Byzantine province (thema).
After 971: The gyula shifts his seat to Transylvania.
927-997: G6za is the ruling prince of the Hungarians.
973, 23 March: The ruling prince G6za and his Bulgarian allies send an embassy to 
Emperor Otto I. Hungarian politics opens towards the West.
976: The Bulgarians drive away the Byzantines from the bank of the Lower Dan­
ube. The second gyula of Transylvania marries off his daughter Sharolt to the 
ruling prince G6za and acknowledges his supremacy.
977: Probable date of birth of Vajk (the later Saint Stephen), son of G6za and Sharolt.
From the 980s onwards: The rule of Prokuj, the third gyula, brother of Sharolt in 
Transylvania.
997-1038: Reign of (Saint) Stephen I.
2002: Emperor Basil II occupies Vidin and restores Byzantine supremacy at the 
Lower Danube.
1003: (Saint) Stephen I removes his uncle, the third Transylvanian gyula, who was 
seeking the help of Byzantium. He is carried to Esztergom with his family. 
Stephen integrates Transylvania into his kingdom.
1009: Foundation of the Diocese of Gyulafeh6rvir.
Between 1010 and 1015: Csandd, King Stephen's general defeats and kills Ajtony, the 
lord of Marosvar, and ally of Basil II. Marosvdr is renamed as Csanddvdr.
1030: King Stephen sets up the dioceses of Bihar and Maros (Csanid), the latter one 
is headed by Gerald (Gerhardt). Queen Gizella donates the Transylvanian 
villages Lopath (Magyar-Lapdd) and Obon (Abony) to the Abbey of Ba- 
konyb^l.
1048-1060: Dux Bela rules over the eastern part of Hungary, his headquarters is at 
Bihar.
1064-1074: Dux G6za (Magnus) rules over eastern Hungary with headquarters at 
Bihar.
1067: First mention of the Szalacs route along which the Transylvanian salt is trans­
ported.
1068: The army of the Pecheneg tribe Jula led by Dux Osul devastates Transylvania 
and the Bihar region. King Solomon and Prince Geza utterly destroy his army 
at the bank of the Saj6, at the "Kyrie eleis" (Kerles) Hill.
1071: Franco is bishop of Gyulafehervdr (episcopus Bellegradiensis).
1075: The Abbey of Garamszentbenedek gets half of the salt tax in the neighbour­
hood of Tordavdr, at the Aranyos River.
1075-1077: Ladislas is dux of Bihar.
1083, 25 July: Gerald, bishop of Csandd is canonised.
1091: Campaign of Kapoltch, the Cuman leader in Transylvania and Bihar. King 
(Saint) Ladislas I defeats him.
1092: Ladislas I donates the Transylvanian salt cutters and transporters to the Ab- 
747 bey of Bakonybel. This is the first Transylvanian list of personal names. King
Ladislas lays the foundations of Nagyv^rad, where a chapter is established. 
At the same time he sets up the Benedictine Abbey of Kolozsmonostor in 
Transylvania.
1093-1095: Coloman is bishop of Bihar.
Before 1095: The construction of the new episcopal church is started in Gyulafeh6rvcir.
1095-1106: Prince Almos is the last dux of Bihar.
From 1111: The new title of the bishop of Gyulafeh6rv5r is “ultrasilvanus", that is 
the bishop of Transylvania.
1138: B61a II has the property donated by Prince Almos to the Abbey of DOmOs 
listed.
1150: The army of the Byzantine emperor Manuel I is defeated in the Banat.
Before 1162: G6za II settles German (mostly Saxon) knights and peasants from the 
Rhine and Moselle regions in Transylvania, in the locality of Nagyszeben and 
the Olt Valley. Earlier Szfekelys had inhabited these territories. German set­
tlers continue to arrive for centuries.
1166: Two Byzantine attacks against Transylvania.
1192: Bela III lays the foundations of the Provostship of Nagyszeben.
1199: First mention of the voivode of Transylvania.
Around 1200: Presumably there is a region of Romanian frontier guards in the South­
ern Carpathians.
1211: Andrew I cedes the Barcas£g to the Order of the Teutonic Knights.
1222: First mention of the Transylvanian Romanians in a diploma by Andrew II.
1224: Andrew II's charter (the Andreanum) is issued to the Transylvanian Ger­
mans.
1225, spring: Andrew II expels the Order of the Teutonic Knights from the BarcasSg.
1226: Andrew II's son, Prince Bela takes over the government of Transylvania.
1241, April: The Mongols devastate and subjugate Transylvania.
1257: B61a IV divides his kingdom between himself and IstvSn, the junior king and 
duke of Transylvania, who rules over the eastern part of the country.
1263: The entire Transylvania is under the control of the voivodes, the ispans of the 
seven royal counties are subordinated to the voivode.
1285: Renewed Mongol attack against Transylvania, the Mongols are defeated.
Late 13th -  early 14th centuries: The increasingly independent voivodes govern 
Transylvania as their private property.
1316: Charles Robert restores royal power in Transylvania by force.
1316, 23 August: Kolozsv&r is granted the rank of free royal city.
1324: Charles Robert restores the judicial authority of the voivodes of Transylvania, 
divides the province of Szeben into districts and appoints a royal judge of 
Szeben. The Transylvanian nobility acquire a similar position to that of the 
Hungarian ones by their exemption from taxation.
1334: Voivode Bogdan arrives in Transylvania with a large number of Romanian 
settlers. Romanians keep on coming during the entire course of the 14th cen­
tury.
Mid-14th century: Guilds are organized in Transylvania.
1351, 16 December: Louis I grants the right to national trade to the inhabitants of 
Nagyszombat, which is later on extended over the territory of Dalmatia and 
Poland as well.
1357, 28 November: Zalatna is granted the rights of a mining city.
2368, 20 January: The voivode of Wallachia exempts the merchants of Brass6 from 
the levy called 'thirtieth'.
2 369, 18 December: The king grants Brass6 a staple right over goods coming from 
the West.
1374: The compilation of the statutes of the Chapter of VArad is completed.
1376, 9 November: Renewal of the rules of Saxon guilds (19 guilds, 25 branches of 
industry).
1378: Nagyszeben is granted staple right.
1391, 28 April: King Sigismund's decree confirms the freedom of movement of the 
Transylvanian serfs.
1394, autumn: First Turkish incursions into Transylvania.
1396, july: Sigismund's crusade against the Turks. August: The Transylvanian 
voivode, Stibor heads a campaign to Wallachia. 28 September: King Sigismund 
is defeated at Nicopolis.
From 1400: Transylvanian students regularly study at the University of Cracow.
1409, 18 October: King Sigismund donates the castle and manor of Hunyad to Vajk, 
the son of Sorba of Romanian descent, the father of JSnos Hunyadi.
1420, September: Turkish victory at the Iron Gate over the army of the Transylvani­
an voivode, Mikl6s CsSky.
1437, March-December: Peasant revolt in Transylvania under the leadership of Antal
Budai Nagy. 16 September: Union of the Three Nations (the Hungarian no­
bility, the Szekelys and the Saxons) at KSpolna; December: At Kolozsmonostor 
the army of the nobility defeats the peasants.
1438, 2 February: The Union of the Three Nations is renewed at Torda.
1441, February -  1446, 6 ]une: J&nos Hunyadi is appointed voivode of Transylvania 
by King Wladislas I.
1442: The library of the Nagyszeben parish has 138 volumes.
1458: Revolt of the Saxons of Beszterce against their landlord, Governor Mih&ly 
Szildgyi.
1467, August-September: The alliance of the Three Nations against King Matthias I. 
The military uprising is suppressed.
1468, 28 September: Matthias I extends Brasso's staple right over goods coming 
from the Romanian voivodeships.
1469, 25 September: The king permits the Saxons to freely elect and depose their 
own chief justices, with the exception of the chief justice of Szeben.
1473, 9 December: Matthias I issues a new decree in which the Szekelys' existing 
social stratification is recognized and exempts them from the payment of 
taxes.
Around 1477: The construction of the Black Church of Brass6.
1479, 13 October: The Turkish and Wallachian armies raiding Transylvania suffer a 
devastating defeat at Keny6rmez6.
1489, 14 February: Matthias orders the use of the weights and measures of the Saxon 
seats at Transylvanian markets.
1495: According to a modern estimate, based on the number of households, the 
population of Transylvania was 450,000 people, out of which 60 per cent 
were Hungarians, 24 per cent Romanians and 16 per cent Saxons.
1506, summer: Outbreak of a Szekely revolt against an extraordinary tax levied 
because of the birth of the heir to the throne. The revolt is suppressed.
1510, 10 November - 1526, 10 November: Jcinos Szapolyai is voivode of Transylvania.
1511: The Saxons of Segesvdr revolt against the leaders of the town, and the com­
mon Szekelys against the Szekely primors.
1514, early ]uly: The revolting peasants, under the leadership of the Szekely GyOrgy 
D6zsa, appear at the Transylvanian frontier. 15 July: The army of the nobil­
ity under the leadership of Voivode J&nos Szapolyai defeats the peasants at 
TemesvSr.
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Part Three — The Principality of Transylvania
1526: After the defeat of Hungarians at the Battle of Moh&cs and the death of King 
Louis II (29 August), J&nos Szapolyai is elected king by the Diet in Szekes- 
fehervcir on 10 November. 17 December: Ferdinand of Habsburg is pronounced 
king of Hungary by the Diet in Pozsony.
1527: The struggle of the two kings against each other begins. July: German mer­
cenary troops cross the Hungarian border. 27 September: Ferdinand's gen­
eral, Count Nicolaus Salm defeats Szapolyai's army at Tokaj. King John I 
asks the sultan for support.
1538, 24 February: John signs the Peace of Vdrad: the division of the country is done
in keeping with the actual power relations up to the death of John I. After­
wards his part of the country would be inherited by the House of Habsburg.
1539, 2 March: King John marries Isabella, a Polish royal princess.
1540, 22 July: Death of John I soon after the birth of his son, John Sigismund.
1541, 29 August: Sultan Suleiman occupies Buda. Isabella moves to Transylvania, 
given to her by the sultan, together with her son, John Sigismund and the 
royal court. 18 October: The first common Diet of the three Transylvanian 
nations and the counties in the regions east of the Tisza River in Debrecen. 29 
December: Agreement between the envoys of Isabella and Ferdinand at Gyalu 
on the unification of the country and on the transfer of Transylvania to 
Habsburg hands.
1542, 20 January: The Diet of Transylvania nominates George Martinuzzi governor 
of Transylvania. In the summer Isabella and Friar George shift their seat to 
GyulafehervAr. 20 December: The Diet of Torda rejects the agreement of Gyalu 
and acknowledges John Sigismund as "elected king".
2543: Transylvania pays 10,000 florins, the first tribute to the Turks.
1544, August: Transylvanian Diet at Torda with the participation of the eastern 
Hungarian counties. This is the beginning of common Diets.
1549, 8 September: A new agreement between the envoys of Friar George and Fer­
dinand I at Nyirb&tor on the acknowledgement of Habsburg rule over Transyl­
vania; Ferdinand promises military help against the Turks.
1550: The printing press of Kolozsvar, owned by GyOrgy Hoffgreff and GSspar 
Heltai, begins to work.
1551, June-August: Isabella and John II (Sigismund) leave Transylvania, occupied 
by the imperial mercenaries under Giovanni Battista Castaldo's command. 
October: Turkish punitive campaign against Lippa and Temesvir. 16 Decem­
ber: Castaldo has Friar George assassinated.
1552, summer: The Turks occupy Lippa, TemesvAr and Lugos, thus the defence of 
Transylvania against the Turks collapses.
1556, autumn: Isabella and John II return to Transylvania.
1559, 15 November: Death of Isabella.
1565: The beginnings of legislation in Hungarian language in Transylvania.
1566, summer: With the siege and occupation of the fortresses of Gyula, Vilagos and 
Jen<5, the Turks eliminate the last bastions of Habsburg royal authority in the 
regions east of the Tisza.
1568, January: The Diet of Torda declares the freedom of religious practice of the 
four accepted denominations (Catholic, Lutheran, Calvinist, Unitarian).
1570, 16 August: Agreement between John II and Maximilian I at Speyer (ratified 
on 10 March, 1571): the emperor acknowledges John's principality. Should 
he die without an heir the territory of his principality would revert to the 
House of Habsburg.
1571, 14 March: Death of John II. 25 May: The Transylvanian Diet elects Istv&n 
Bathory prince.
1575, 10 July: Istvan Bathory's victory at Kerel<5szentpai over the troops of the pre­
tender G&spcir Bekes. 15 December: Istvan Bathory is elected king of Poland.
From 1575: The tribute to be paid by Transylvania to the Turks is 15,000 florins.
1581,12 May: Istvan Bathory founds the (short-lived) University of Kolozsvar. May: 
The Diet elects Zsigmond Bathory voivode, who would become prince later 
on.
1586, 13 December: Death of Istvan Bathory, prince of Transylvania and king of 
Poland.
1588, 8 December: Zsigmond Bathory is elected prince. The Diet expels the Jesuits 
from the country.
1591, spring: The Jesuits return to Transylvania.
1593, September, 1594, February: Zsigmond Bathory's proposal of alliance to Em­
peror Rudolph about joining the Holy League; the Transylvanian Diet refuses 
to accept the alliance (the prince resigns for the first time, then returns).
1594, August: Zsigmond Bathory eradicates the pro-Ottoman opposition; the Diet 
thus intimidated, breaks off its contacts with the Turks. 5 October: The Transyl­
vanian prince, Zsigmond Bathory, the voivode of Wallachia, Mihai Viteazul, 
and the voivode of Moldavia join the Holy League.
1595, 28 January: Istvan Bocskai, captain of Varad signs the alliance with Emperor 
Rudolph in Prague. June-October: The fortresses of Lippa, Arad, Vilagos and 
Jen6 are re-captured from the Turks. 29 October: After the liberation of Tir- 
goviste and Bucharest, Istvan Bocskai, Zsigmond Bathory and Mihai Viteazul 
defeat the Turks at Giurgiu.
1596, February: The nobility suppresses the beginning revolt of the common Szekelys.
1598, April: After Zsigmond Bathory' abdication, the principality is taken over by 
Rudolph I's commissioners. 20 August: Bathory secretly returns and takes 
possession of the country.
1599, March: Zsigmond Bathory's third resignation, the Diet elects Andras Bathory 
prince. 28 October: Mihai Viteazul's victory over Andras Bathory's army at 
Sellenberk; the voivode becomes imperial governor.
1600, 18 September: The united imperial and Transylvanian armies defeat Voivode 
Mihai at Miriszl6. 20 September: General Basta's imperial soldiers begin pil­
laging Transylvania.
1601, 3 August: Zsigmond Bathory, who returns once more, assisted by Voivode 
Mihai, is defeated by the armies of General Basta at Goroszld.
1602, 20 January: Rudolph I appoints General Basta as commander-in-chief of the 
united imperial troops in Transylvania. 26 July: Zsigmond Bathory leaves 
Transylvania for good.
1603, March-July: M6zes Szekely, Zsigmond's former commander, takes over Tran­
sylvania with the sultan's appointment and Turkish military support. 
17 July: M6zes Szekely suffers defeat and falls in a battle fought against the 
Wallachian army at Brass6.
1604, 15 October: The victory of Istvan Bocskai and the haiduks over the imperial 
captain Barbiano at Almosd. Bocskai's uprising begins, as a first attempt to 
unite the two parts of the country.
1605, 21 February: Istvan Bocskai is elected prince of Hungary by the Transylvanian 
Diet.
1606, 23 June: The Peace of Vienna between Bocskai and the representatives of the 
Hungarian Estates, and the commissioners of Rudolph I: it redressed the 
grievances of the nobility of the kingdom, acknowledged Bocskai's rule and 
that of his male descendants in Transylvania, in the eastern Hungarian coun­
ties and in the three counties of Upper Hungary (Ugocsa, Bereg, Szatmar). 29 
December: Death of Bocskai.
1607, 12 February : Zsigmond Rak6czi is elected prince of Transylvania by the Diet.
2608, 6 February: Alliance between the restless haiduks and Gabor Bathory. 7 March:
Gabor Bathory becomes prince of Transylvania.
1610, 20-21 March: Istvan Kendi's unsuccessful plot against the prince. 11 Decem­
ber: Gabor Bathory occupies Szeben, the Saxon capital and makes the town 
his seat.
1611, January-February: In a successful campaign against Wallachia, Gabor Bathory 
installes himself as prince of Wallachia, but the sultan commands him to go 
home. June-October: Zsigmond ForgAch, captain of Kassa and the discon­
tented haiduks rise against the prince.
1612, summer: Bathory's envoy to the Porte, Andr&s Ghiczy returns to Transylvania 
with his own appointment by the sultan. 22 September: Gabor Bethlen goes 
to Turkish exile.
1623, September-October: Gabor Bethlen returns to Transylvania with Turkish troops.
23 October: He is elected prince by the Transylvanian Diet. 27 October: Assas­
sination of Gabor Bathory.
2625, 6 May: Agreement of Gabor Bethlen with Matthias II: the king acknowledges 
Transylvania's right to the election of the prince, Bethlen acknowledges Tran­
sylvania's allegiance to the Hungarian crown, and the secret clause envisages 
joint action against the Turks.
2626, June: Bethlen hands over the fortress of Lippa to the Turks.
2629, 27 August: Gabor Bethlen starts his campaign against Ferdinand II (with the 
support of the Porte, after he has contacted the Bohemian Estates): entry into 
the Thirty Years' War. 24 October: The occupation of Pozsony. 27 November:
Bethlen reaches the gates of Vienna.
2620, 25 August: The House of Habsburg is dethroned and Bethlen is elected king of 
Hungary by the Hungarian Diet.
2622, 32 December: The commissioners of Gabor Bethlen and Ferdinand II sign the 
Peace of Nikolsburg: Bethlen renounces his title of king of Hungary. In re­
turn he was granted rule over seven counties (Szatmar, Szabolcs, Ugocsa,
Bereg, Zemplen, Borsod, Abauj) in Upper Hungary.
2622: Foundation of the College of Gyulafehervar. The prince settles Moravian 
brethren (Habans) expelled from Moravia.
2623, 14 August: Bethlen's new campaign against Ferdinand II.
2624, 2 April: The Peace of Vienna between Bethlen and Ferdinand II: the renewal 
of the Peace of Nikolsburg with slight modifications.
2626, 25 August: Bethlen's third Hungarian campaign. 20 December: The Peace of 
Pozsony is concluded between Bethlen and Ferdinand II, based on the Peace 
of Nikolsburg.
2629, 25 November: Death of Gabor Bethlen. His successor is his widow, Katherine
of Brandenburg.
2630, 2 December: GyOrgy Rak6czi I is elected prince by the Diet of Transylvania.
2636, October: Rak6czi's victory at Szalonta over the Turks.
2643, 26 April: In alliance with Queen Christina of Sweden, the prince enters the 
anti-Habsburg alliance.
2644, 2 February: The prince's campaign begins against Ferdinand II. 22 March:
Kassa is captured. April: Rak6czi's army pushes as far as the valley of the 
Vag River.
1645, 28 May: The Transylvanian troops occupy Nagyszombat. 13 July: The troops 
are united with Torstenson's army near Brno. 23 December: The Peace of 
Linz concluded between GyOrgy Rak6czi I and Ferdinand III: freedom of 
religion in the Kingdom of Hungary and the seven counties (as of 31 Decem­
ber, 1621) would be retained by Rak6czi, together with several fortresses.
1648, 11 October: Death of GyOrgy Rak6czi I. His successor is his son, GyOrgy Ra-
k6czi II. ' 7 5 2
1650: In alliance with the voivode of Wallachia, Gyorgy R3k6czi II expels the voivode 
of Moldavia. J&nos ApSczai Csere begins his activities at Gyulafeherv^r.
1653: The collection of Transylvanian acts, the Approbatae Constitutiones Regni Tran- 
sylvaniae is published at Virad.
1657, 6 January: GyOrgy R&k6czi II sets out for a military campaign against Poland 
after having entered into alliance with Charles X of Sweden. April: After the 
capture of Cracow, the Swedish and Transylvanian troops are united. 9 July: 
Warsaw falls. The prince, left by his allies, accepts the conditions of peace set 
by the Poles, and departs. 31 July: The main Transylvanian army, under 
Commander-in-chief JSnos Kemeny, is defeated and taken prisoner by the 
Tatars.
1658: Punitive expedition of the Turks in Transylvania. United attack of Grand 
Vizier Mehmed KOprOlti's army and the Tatars, who had devastated the prin­
cipality from Gyulafeh6rv3r to KolozsvSr. 24 September: The grand vizier 
appoints Akos Barcsay prince. 7 October: The Diet recognizes Barcsay as the 
new prince of Transylvania.
1659-1660: The struggles of Barcsay, Gyorgy Rak6czi II, J&nos Kemeny, who re­
turned from captivity, and the Turks against one another destroy the princi­
pality.
1660, May: New Turkish punitive expedition against Rdk6czi. 7 June: R6k6czi dies 
from wounds received in a battle near SzSszfenes against the pasha of Buda, 
Ahmed Seide. 17 August: The Turks occupy V&rad and annex a large part of 
the Partium to the Turkish-occupied part of the country. 31 December: Prince 
Akos Barcsay resigns.
1661, 7 January: J5nos Kemeny is elected prince by the Transylvanian Diet. June- 
November: Turkish troops occupy Transylvania. 14 September: The Turkish 
commander calls the Diet and makes Mihily Apafi elected prince.
1662, 23 January: JSnos Kemeny is defeated by the Turks and is killed in a clash near
Nagysz6116s.
1663, 20 September: Mih&ly Apafi I joins the grand vizier's army fighting in Hun­
gary after repeated commands.
1665: In the spirit of the Peace of Vasv&r between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans 
(1664), the imperial army leaves Transylvania and the fortresses that had been 
occupied since 1661.
1667, 24 May: Apafi orders the setting up of a Romanian school and printing press 
from the incomes of the Romanian bishop of Gyulafeherv^r.
1667-1670: Apafi, though he planned a campaign against the Habsburgs, obeys the 
Porte and denies help from the baronial conspirators of the kingdom.
1677, 27 May: Treaty of alliance between the envoys of Mihaly Apafi I and of Louis 
XIV and the exiles of Hungary, signed in Warsaw.
1679, Late July: Prince Apafi appoints Imre ThOkOly commander-in-chief of the 
army of the exiles.
1680: One or two thousand Armenian merchants and artisans migrate to Transyl­
vania from Moldavia.
1681, August-September: Prince Apafi goes to Hungary upon the order of the sul­
tan, where the Transylvanian army is united with ThokOly's troops and with 
the army of the pasha of VSrad.
1682, August-September: The Transylvanian army is again fighting in the Hungar­
ian front under the command of Apafi.
1683, 22 August: Grand Vizier Kara Mustapha, besieging Vienna, orders Apafi to 
defend the bridge over the Danube at Gyflr. 9 October: The retreating Turk­
ish army suffers its first defeat in Hungary at Pdrkiny: the liberation of Hun­
gary begins. 31 October: The Transylvanian troops return home.
1685, 24 October: The Transylvanian Diet rejects Leopold I's appeal to join the anti- 
Turkish alliance. From November the imperial troops fighting in Hungary are 
commanded to move to the western and northern counties of Transylvania 
for winter quarter
1686, 28 June: Treaty bet' n Leopold I and Mihaly Apafi, though advantageous to 
Transylvania, yet unrealized: Leopold would take over the defence of Transyl- 
vania, but the independence of the principality would remain intact, Transyl­
vania would financially support the anti-Turkish campaign.
2687, October: Prince Charles of Lorraine marches into Transylvania. 27 October: 
Agreement of Balcizsfalva: the imperial troops would spend the winter in 
twelve Transylvanian fortresses, and the principality would pay 700,000 gold 
florins for transportation.
1688, 9-10 May: Declaration of Fogaras: Prince Apafi and the representatives of the 
Transylvanian Estates declare Leopold (and his descendants) the principali­
ty's hereditary ruler.
1690, 15 April: Death of Mihaly Apafi I. His son, Mihaly Apafi II, elected as his 
successor in 1691, is only a nominal prince. 8 June: The sultan appoints Imre 
Thokoly prince. 21 August: ThOkOly defeats Emperor Leopold's Transylva­
nian army with the help of Turkish and Tatar troops at Zemyest. 16 October: 
Leopold I issues the Diploma Leopoldinum in Vienna, which regulates the sta­
tus of Transylvania: it maintains self-government by the prince and the Es­
tates, delegates an elected regent to the minor prince, guarantees the freedom 
of religion, and specifies the taxes. 25 October: After having suffered re­
peated defeats, ThokOly flees to Wallachia.
1692, 5 June: General Heisler recaptures Varad from the Ottomans.
1696, 29 April: Leopold I appoints General Rabutin de Bussy military commander 
of Transylvania. 1 June: Mihaly Apafi II is interned to Vienna by Leopold I 
who grants him the title of imperial prince with pension.
1699, 26 January: Peace of Karlowitz between the Holy League and the Porte: Transyl­
vania is attached to the central government of the Habsburg Empire. 16 
February: Leopold I approves in an imperial patent the establishment of the 
Romanian Greek Catholic church (movements for the union had been going 
on since 1697): he guarantees the legal equality of Greek Catholic and Roman 
Catholic priests.
1701, 19 March: The Second Diploma Leopoldinum corroborates the union of the 
church.
1703: The first successes of the War of Independence of Ferenc R&k6czi II, which 
broke out in May.
1704, 8 July: Ferenc R£k<3czi II is elected prince by the Diet of Transylvania in Gyula-
feh6rvdr.
1705, 5 May: Joseph I accedes to the throne. 11 November: R ik6czi's kuruc troops
suffer defeat from the imperial army at the Zsib6 Pass.
1706, 6 March: The Sz6ch6ny Diet rules the unification of the Kingdom of Hungary 
and the Principality of Transylvania.
1707, 5 April: Secession from the House of Habsburg is declared by the Diet of 
Transylvania. Ferenc R£k6czi II is regarded as monarch invested with full 
general authority. October: The imperial troops under the command of Gen­
eral Rabutin occupy Transylvania.
1711,29 April: The Peace of SzatmSr is signed, a compromise between the Habsburgs 
and the Estates. 14 November: After the fall of the R£k6czi War of Independ­
ence the Transylvanian Diet swears allegiance to Charles III.
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Part Four — Transylvania under the Habsburg 
Empire
1712-1713: The distribution of the Transylvanian population according to an offi­
cial estimate: 47 per cent Hungarians, 34 per cent Romanians, 19 per cent 
Saxons.
1713, 31 March: Charles III restores the Gubemium with its seat at Szeben.
1717, August: The last incursion of the Tatars into Transylvania.
1717-1720: The Black Death decimates the population of Transylvania.
1718, 21 July: Peace of Passarowitz between Charles III and Ahmed III: the remain­
ing parts of Hungary are also liberated.
1723, 19 February: The Pragmatica Sanctio is passed by the Transylvanian Diet.
1735: Inochentie Micu-Klein, the Greek Catholic bishop, who took office in 1729, 
argues for the first time with the concept of the Daco-Roman continuity when 
he demands the political contribution of Romanians.
1737-1738: Catastrophic cattle-plague.
1744, 6 July: The synod of BalSzsfalva, summoned by Bishop Micu-Klein, becomes 
the first national meeting of Romanians. 21 August: At the Transylvanian 
Diet the Estates accept the abrogation of their right to elect a prince, enact the 
Pragmatica Sanctio and repeal the anti-Catholic laws. 9 December: Bishop 
Micu-Klein flees to Rome from the investigation ordered by Maria Theresa.
1747: The first Romanian printing press at BalSzsfalva.
1749: The foundation of the first Freemasonic lodge in Brass6.
1751, 13 September: The central administration of Transylvanian affairs is taken 
over by the Transylvanian Court Chancellery in Vienna.
1752, 21 August: The Transylvanian Diet strictly limits study tours abroad.
1754, 12 August: A new system of taxation based on the legal status and wealth of 
the taxpayer (further developed in 1763 and 1769) is introduced.
1758, summer: The court decides the appointment of a Transylvanian Orthodox 
bishop.
1759: The Orthodox Decree on Tolerance is the posterior acknowledgement of ab­
staining from the union of churches.
1762, 14 June: The organization of the Szekely frontier regiments begins upon the 
order of General Buccow, commander-in-chief of Transylvania. By the au­
tumn Szekely resistance becomes general.
1764, 7 January: The imperial troops slaughter many hundred Sz6kelys who pro­
tested against enlistment into the frontier guard. 8 October: The unrest in­
duces Maria Theresa to regulate the legal status of the frontier guard.
1765, 2 November: Maria Theresa declares Transylvania to be a grand duchy.
1769, 11 November: Certain points: the extent of robot is set as a first attempt to
regulate the feudal conditions.
1781,16 May: Norma Regia: Joseph II places every aspect of education in Transylva­
nia under the Gubemium.
1782, 27 May: Joseph II unites the Hungarian and the Transylvanian Court Chan­
cellery. The first lending library is opened at Szeben.
1783, 16 July: Joseph II's decree on the rights of serfs. 26 November: New adminis­
trative divisions: ten counties (eleven from 1784); the organization of the Three 
Nations is abolished. At the end of the year the first Transylvanian newspaper, 
the Saxon Siebenburger Zeitung is published.
1784, 11 May: Joseph II's decree on languages: up to 1790 the Gubemium would 
issue its orders in two languages. 27 August: The complete abolition of tax
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revolt under the leadership of Horea and Cloaca. 7-2 2 December: The impe­
rial army defeats the peasants in two battles.
1785, 1 August: Joseph II's decree restoring the free movement of serfs. Decree on 
schools.
1786: According to the first comprehensive census the population of Transylvania 
is 1,560,000. 30 November: Law courts are set up in the new administrative 
districts.
1787: The introduction of the imperial Criminal Code in Transylvania. The repre­
sentatives of the Estates of the Three Nations present their memoranda con­
taining their grievances to Joseph II.
2 790: The Gubemium moves from Nagyszeben to Kolozsvar.
2792, 25 February: Leopold II again separates the Hungarian Court Chancellery 
from the Transylvanian in Vienna. 11 March: The Romanian bishops present 
the document entitled Supplex Libellus Valachorum to the emperor, asking for 
the acknowledgement of Romanians as the Fourth Nation.
2792, 22 August: After two years of negotiations the Transylvanian Diet passes the 
bills on the relationship between king and Diet, and on safeguarding the rights 
of the Estates. The founding of a permanent theatrical company in Kolozsvar.
1796, 16 May: Royal decree on treating the Greek Orthodox religion as an acknowl­
edged denomination.
From 1797: The University Press of Buda prints textbooks and books of common 
interest in Romanian as well.
1798: Count Samuel Teleki opens his library at Marosv&sSrhely to the public.
1819, 17 May: Emperor Francis I orders the regulation of robot in Transylvania.
1821, 21 March: The first permanent Hungarian theatre opens in Kolozsvar (Hun­
garian National Players' Company).
1832: Jcinos Bolyai's Appendix, the first non-Euclidean geometry is published in 
Marosv£scirhely.
1834, 24 May -  1835, 6 February: The first reform Diet in Transylvania.
1835, 4 March: The treason trial of Count Mikl6s Wessel6nyi begins at the Royal 
Court of Appeal.
2836, 2 May: The monarch gives his royal assent to the bill of the Hungarian Diet on 
the annexation of the Partium to Hungary (implementation is delayed until
1848).
1847, 31 October: The king gives his royal assent to the bill of the Hungarian Diet on
the introduction of Hungarian as the official language and on the regulation 
of the robot.
1848, 20 March: The Transylvanian Hungarian Liberals and Conservatives join the 
revolution of Pest by a declaration of programme: they demand civic reforms 
and union with Hungary. 11 April: Royal consent to the legislations of the 
Pozsony Diet, including the one on the union with Hungary. 25 May: Roma­
nian rally at BaUzsfalva, demanding political representation, civic rights and 
the acknowledgement of Romanians as a nation. 30 May -  18 July: The last 
Diet of the Transylvanian Estates declares the union of Transylvania and 
Hungary and the liberation of serfs. 26 September: Romanian national rally 
at Bal&zsfalva: it refutes the union and calls the Romanians to take to arms. 
Early October: Commander-in-chief Puchner concentrates the imperial troops 
on Saxon territory, thus making it the base of counter-revolution. 26 October: 
The national meeting of the armed Szekelys at Agyagfalva stands for the de­
fence of the revolution. 18 October: Commander-in-chief Puchner takes over 
supreme authority in Transylvania in the name of the emperor. 2 7 November: 
Puchner occupies Kolozsvar. 29 November: Kossuth appoints Jozef Bern com- 
mander-in-chief of the Hungarian army in Transylvania. 2 December: After
the abdication of Ferdinand V Francis Joseph I accedes to the throne. 22 
December: Bern reoccupies Kolozsvar.
1849, 13 January: Bern liberates Marosv&s&rhely. 24 January: Puchner asks for mili­
tary aid from the Russian armies of occupation stationed in Wallachia.
4 February: Puchner and the Russians win a battle against Bern at Vfzakna. 
9 February: Bern defeats the imperial troops near Piski. 4 March: The im­
posed imperial constitution of Olmtitz again declares Transylvania to be an 
"independent" crown colony. 11 March: Bern occupies Nagyszeben. 15-20 
March: The imperial and Russian armies retreat to Wallachia. 14 April: The 
Declaration of Independece pronounces the complete state sovereignty of 
Hungary united with Transylvania and deposes the House of Habsburg.
5 May: Upon Kossuth's appointment loan Drago? begins peace negotiations 
with Avram Iancu, the leader of the Romanian rebels in the Erchegys6g. As 
the fightings flare up anew, the attempt at an agreement fails. 11 May: De­
spite the amnesty announced by Bern, a political leader of the Saxons, Pastor 
Stephan Ludwig Roth is sentenced to death and executed. 28 May: Negotia­
tions begin between Kossuth and the Wallachian politician, Nicolae Balcescu. 
19 June: The tsarist troops, invited to help by Francis Joseph, arrive in Transyl­
vania. 14 July: Kossuth and Balcescu work out their plan for a reconciliation.
28 July: A law on regulating the position of Hungary's non-Hungarian peo­
ples is passed in Szeged. 30 July: Bern is defeated in a battle at Segesv^r. 6 
August: Bern suffers a decisive defeat from the Russians at Nagycsur, his 
Transylvanian army falls apart. 13 August: The main Hungarian army lays 
down its arms at VilSgos. October: General Baron Haynau's decree on in­
terim administration: Transylvania and the Partium are again detached from 
Hungary and divided into six "districts".
Part Five — From the Empire to Civic Hungary
1849, 20 October: Introduction of the land tax register and of the temporary land 
tax.
1850, 1 October: Development of the organizations of police, of the judiciary and of 
financial administration.
1851, 12 May: According to the new territorial division of administration, Transyl­
vania consists of 5 districts and 35 areas. July: Anti-Habsburg movement in 
the Sz6kelyf0ld. 4 July: Introduction of a new juridical organization.
1852, 27 October: State offices replace the Saxon offices.
1853, 19 January: Transformation of the administration of Transylvania, regulation 
of the relations between the governorship and the governing organs in Vi­
enna. 10 February: Introduction of the Austrian system of customs. 20 April: 
Transylvania is linked to the telegraph network.
1854, 10 March: Execution of the leaders of the secret movement in the Szekely fold. 
21 June: Imperial message on the detailed implementation of the liberation of 
serfs. 30 November: The state of siege is withdrawn.
1857, 15 November: The Szeged-Temesvcir railway line is opened. 17 November: 
The courts of robot are set up.
1858, 25 October: The Szolnok-Arad railway line is opened.
1859, 29 March: Military agreement between the ex-general Klapka, representing 
the Hungarian emigration, and the Romanian prince, Alexandru Ion Cuza 
(renewed on 8 January, 1861). 23 November: Founding session of the Erdelyi
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1860, 20 October: The October Diploma orders the renewal of the Transylvanian Court
Chancellery at the court. 10 December: Count Imre Mik6 is appointed to 
head the Gubemium set up anew.
1861, 13-16 January: Romanian meeting in Nagyszeben. 11-12 February: Confer­
ence of Hungarian, Romanian and Saxon representatives in Gyulafeh6rv3r 
on the preparation of a Diet. 26 February: The February Patent orders Transyl­
vania to send 26 representatives to the 343-member Reichsrat of Vienna. 23 
April: Abolition of the governorship located in Nagyszeben. 6 September: 
The constitution of the Romanian Association of Public Culture, the ASTRA 
is approved. November: With the resignation of Chancellor Ferenc Kem6ny 
and Governor Imre Mik6, the period of the provisional government begins in 
Transylvania as well.
1862, 18 May: Lajos Kossuth publishes his plan of the Danube Confederation of the 
"old historic states".
1863, 15 July: Opening of the Diet of Nagyszeben, where no Hungarian representa­
tives participate. The Romanian Greek Orthodox church is made equal, Hun­
garian, German and Romanian are declared to be the official languages of 
Transylvania.
1865, 19 November: Opening of the KolozsvSr Diet (Hungarians are in majority). 
Resolution on the renewal of the union of Transylvania and Hungary.
1866, 10 January: The monarch permits Transylvania to send representatives to the 
Pest Diet.
1867, 29 May: The Hungarian House of Representatives passes Law XII of 1867, 
which reintroduces the union of Transylvania beyond the Austro-Hungarian 
Compromise.
1868, 15 May: The Romanian declaration of BalSzsfalva (Pronunciamentum) stands 
an autonomous Transylvania. 5-6 December: Royal consent to the law on 
popular schools (which also declares education in the mother tongue), Law 
XLIII of 1868 providing for the detailed regulation of the union with Transyl­
vania, and Law XLIV of 1868 on the equality of national minorities. 22 De­
cember: The Arad-Gyulafehervar railway line is opened.
1869, 7-8 March: The meeting of Romanians at Szerdahely declares passivity in 
Parliament and the establishment of the Transylvanian Romanian National 
Party.
1872, 11 May: The Saxon National Programme accepts the system of dualism, pro­
vided it does not promote centralism. 12 October: The University of Kolozsvdr 
is founded. The Albina Bank (Romanian) of Nagyszeben is set up.
1873: The last major epidemic of cholera on the territory of the Hungarian state. 
1 June: The Segesv&r-Kolozsv£r railway line is opened. (Thus the construc­
tion of the Eastern Railway is completed.)
1876, 2 April: Law XII of 1876 eliminates the administrative separation of the 
Kir&lyfOld. 19 June: Law XXXIII of 1876 merges the Saxon and Szekely seats 
into the system of counties. 22 October: The Saxon Popular Party is estab­
lished.
1878, 20 May: The Temesvar-Orsova railway line is opened.
1879, 22 May: Law XVIII of 1879 introduces Hungarian language as a subject to be 
taught in each popular school.
1880: 119 steam-powered and 1224 other threshers operate in Transylvania.
1881: Founding of the united Romanian National Party.
1882: Establishment of the Carpaji Society in Bucharest with the objective of giving 
cultural and political support to the Transylvanian Romanians.
1883, 23 May: Law XXX of 1883 (Law on secondary schools) confirms Hungarian 
language as a compulsory subject in secondary schools. — Romania joins the 
Triple Alliance.
1884, 26 April: The radical Romanian daily, the Tribuna is published from Nagy­
szeben. — Electric lights in Temesv&r. — The first modem blast-furnace in 
Vajdahunyad.
1885,12 April: The Magyar Cultural Association of Transylvania (EMKE) is formed 
in Kolozsvar.
1889: Beginnings of the regulation of the Lower Danube and the Iron Gate.
1890, 17 June: The Sachsentag of Nagyszeben accepts dualism and the idea of a 
"unitary Hungarian nation-state"; the Saxon representatives join the govern­
ing party.
1891, 24 January: The Liga Culturala, fighting for intellectual unity of all Romanians, 
is founded in Bucharest. 8 May: The Kolozsvar organization of the Social 
Democratic Party is established.
1892, 28 May: The delegates of the Transylvanian Romanians present their Memo­
randum, containing their grievances, to the monarch in Vienna.
1894, 7-25 May: Trial of the propagators and authors of the Memorandum in 
Kolozsvar.
1895, 10 August: Budapest congress of the representatives of the national move­
ments of Serbians, Slovaks and Romanians living in Hungary.
1898, 15 February: Law IV of 1898 states that every settlement can only have one 
official form of name.
1901: The first permanent movie in Brass6.
1904, 24 April: The gendarme shoot at the demonstrating peasants at Elesd in Bihar 
county.
1905, 10 January: The Nagyszeben conference of the Romanian National Party de­
cides for the renewal of parliamentary activity. 5-6 December: First congress 
of the Romanian section of Social Democrats at Lugos.
1907, 2 June: Law XXVII of 1907 ("Lex Apponyi") extends state control and the 
teaching of Hungarian language at village and church schools.
1909: The car factory starts production at Arad.
1910, 1-10 June: The parties of nationalities suffer a major defeat at the parliamen­
tary elections. — During the course of the year negotiations begin between 
the leaders of the Romanian national movement and the government politi­
cians.
1912, March: The party paper Romanul, founded in 1911, merges with the daily 
Tribuna published at Arad.
1913, January and autumn: Renewed negotiations between Count Istv&n Tisza (prime
minister since 10 June, 1913) and the Romanian politicians.
1914, 17 February: Tisza's offers are rejected by the Romanian National Committee, 
the negotiations break off. 28 July: The monarchy declares war on Serbia in 
the wake of the Sarajevo attempt. 3 August: Romania's declaration of neu­
trality. 14 October: Russian troops temporarily occupy M&ramarossziget.
1916, 17 August: The secret pact of the Entente and Romania, signed in Bucharest, 
promises practically the entire region east of the Tisza River to Romania. 27 
August: Romania declares war on the monarchy, its troops cross the state 
border beyond the Carpathians. September: The Romanian troops reach the 
Brass6-Petrozseny-Turnu Severin line. Late September -  October: The troops 
of the Central Powers squeeze out the Romanian army from Transylvania 
and occupy Bucharest on 6 December.
1918, 7 May: The Central Powers and Romania sign the Peace of Bucharest. 30-31 
October: Victory of the revolution in Budapest. 31 October: The Romanian 
National Council is formed by Social Democrats and National Party mem­
bers in Budapest. 9 November: The Romanian Council demands in an ultima­
tum the transfer of governing authority over the 26 eastern counties. 13 No­
vember: The signing of an armistice convention in Belgrade: the Entente troops
may march up to the line of the Maros River. 13-14 November: Unsuccessful 
talks in Arad between the Hungarian government and the representatives of 
the Romanian National Council. 21 November: The Romanian army starts to 
march into Transylvania. 1-2 December: The Gyulafeh6rv6r mass rally of 
Transylvanian Romanians declares unity with Romania, promises rights to 
the "co-existing national minorities", elects the Grand National Council, and 
the so-called Governing Council is set up. 24 December: The Romanian army 
marches into Kolozsvdr.
1919, 22 January: The Romanian troops occupy the entire territory of historical 
Transylvania. 20 March: The Vix Memorandum demands the handing over 
of the Szatmdr-Arad line and its neighbourhood from the Hungarian gov­
ernment to the Romanians. The Kdrolyi government resigns and the Repub­
lic of Councils is proclaimed. 16 April: Beginning of the offensive of the 
Romanian troops. 1 May: The Romanian army reaches the Tisza River. 
25 July: The counter-offensive of the Hungarian Red Army soon collapses.
4 August: The Romanian army marches into Budapest. 14-16 November: The 
Romanian army withdraws to the region east of the Tisza upon the order of 
the Peace Conference. 9 December: The Entente signs the treaty on the protec­
tion of national minorities with Romania.
1920, 10 April: The activities of the Transylvanian Romanian governing council are 
wound up. 4 June: The Hungarian peace document is signed in the Trianon 
palace of Versailles: Transylvania proper and the eastern edge of the Great 
Hungarian Plain are transferred to Romania. 27-26 August: The Parliament 
of Bucharest ratifies the Peace of Trianon. 23-28 October: General strike, as a 
consequence of which the state of emergency is reintroduced.
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Part Six — Transylvania since 1918
1921, 11 January: The government makes Romanian compulsory at the law courts.
5 June: Foundation of the Hungarian People's Party in Bdnffyhunyad, the 
beginnings of the political activity of Transylvanian Hungarians. 23 July: 
Act on land reform: 212,803 Romanians, 45,628 Hungarians and 15,934 Ger­
mans are given land; the Hungarian churches lose 85 per cent of their landed 
property.
1922, 5 February: Leaders of the Hungarian public life decide upon participation in
the parliamentary elections. 22 February: The National Hungarian Party is 
formed in Kolozsvdr. 25 October: Ferdinand I is- crowned king of Grand 
Romania in Gyulafehervar. 28 December: The National Hungarian Party is 
formed by the merger of parties organized earlier, with Baron Samuel J6sika 
as its first chairman.
2923, 28 March: The new constitution enters into force. 25 September: Decree on 
compulsory bilingual teaching in the schools maintained by the religious 
denominations. 23 October: Averescu's People's Party and the Hungarian 
Party reach a pact at Csucsa.
2924, 2 January: A language exam in Romanian is compulsory for the officials of 
minorities. 26 July: The stipulations of the law on popular schools strictly 
limit minority education.
2925, 22 December: The law on private education qualifies the schools run by the 
churches as private ones; five subjects have to be taught in Romanian.
1926,17-20 February: The Hungarian Party co-operates with the Liberal Party at the 
local elections. 27 March: Parliament passes the new law on elections. 22 
April: An election agreement between the Averescu-govemment and the Hun­
garian Party: the party acquires 15 seats for MPs and 12 seats for senators in 
the new Parliament. 20 June: Romanian-French treaty on friendship and 
military co-operation. 16 September: The Romanian-Italian treaty on friend­
ship and co-operation is signed in Rome. 10 October: The National Peasant 
Party is formed by the merger of the Transylvanian Romanian National Party 
and the Peasant Party of old Romania proper. 12 November: New church 
constitution of the Saxon Evangelical church.
1927, 7-9 May: The social democratic organizations of the different provinces are 
united in the national Social Democratic Party. 24 June: Foundation of the 
Michael Archangel Legion, which later on becomes the well-known extreme 
rightist movement called Iron Guard. 20 July: Death of King Ferdinand I; a 
council of regents exercises the rights of the ruler in the name of the minor 
Michael I.
1928, 6 May: The mass rally of Gyulafeh6rv£r, organized by the National Peasant 
Party demonstrates against the liberal government. 10 November: A National 
Peasant Party government is formed under I. Maniu. 12 December: The gov­
erning party wins 78 per cent of the votes in the elections, the Hungarian 
Party becomes the second strongest party of Parliament.
1929, 2-5 April: The TemesvSr congress of leftist trade unions; the authorities dis­
perse the united trade unions. 20-22 March: The alliance of the countries of 
the Little Entente is corroborated at the Belgrade conference. 5 -9  August: 
Miners' strike at Lupeny. Its suppression demanded more than thirty vic­
tims.
1930, 4 April: End of the National Peasant Party government. N. Iorga's govern­
ment of experts governs up to 6 June, 1932. April: Rudolf Brandsch is the 
secretary of state for minority affairs (up to 1932). 6 June: Prince Carol, who 
resigned from his heirship in 1926, returns to the country and the Parliament 
acclaims him as king on 8 June.
1932, 5 April: Foundation of the Kolozsv&r Museum of Ethnography. 19 April: The
law on the conversion of agricultural debt reduces the burden of peasants 
struck by the Depression. 6 June: A National Peasant Party government is 
again formed under the leadership of A. Vaida-Voevod.
1933, 8 January: The Ploughmen's Front of Petru Groza holds its statutory meeting.
1-5 October: The last Sachsentag in Nagyszeben: the majority supports the so- 
called movement for renewal. 14 November: A Liberal Party government is 
formed by I. G. Duca; the Liberals govern for four years. 30 December: As the 
Iron Guard assassinated the prime minister, the government introduces a 
state of emergency and censorship all over the country.
1934, August: A leftist organization, called the Hungarian Workers National Asso­
ciation (MADOSZ), is formed.
2936, 27 March: With the regulation of the use of language in municipal, village and 
county councils, only Romanian can be spoken at the council meetings.
1937, 2-4 October: The Vdsirhely Meeting of the Hungarian youth pledges itself for 
democracy, social justice and Hungarian-Romanian friendship. 20 December: 
Defeat of the governing Liberal Party at the elections. The king appoints a 
right wing government headed by Octavian Goga.
2938, 20 February: Introduction of royal dictatorship. 27 February: The new consti­
tution enters into force. 30 March: Dissolution of political parties. 4 August: 
A Commission for Minority Affairs is set up. A resolution of the council of 
ministers ("Statute of Minorities") promises the fulfilment of the cultural and 
administrative demands of minorities.
2939, 22 February: The Hungarian People's Community under the chairmanship of 
Count Mikl6s Banffy is set up in Kolozsvar, to provide cultural and socio­
economic representation for the Hungarians in Romania. 23 March: Com­
prehensive German-Romanian economic agreement. 15 April: England and 
France guarantee Romania's integrity. 16 December: The only political party 
which is allowed to operate is the newly formed and official Front of Na­
tional Revival.
1940, 26 June: Soviet ultimatum to Romania, under which Bessarabia and Southern
Bukovina are annexed by the Soviet Union. 4 July: A pro-German govern­
ment is formed by I. Gigurtu. 16-24 August: Unsuccessful Hungarian-Ro- 
manian talks about the Hungarian demands concerning Transylvania, in 
TumuSeverin. 30 August: The Second Vienna Award: Northern Transylva­
nia is returned to Hungary by the resolution of a German-Italian arbitration 
committee. Agreement with Germany on the rights of ethnic groups. 4 Sep­
tember: Romania becomes a "national legionary state" under the leadership 
of General Ion Antonescu, with the participation of the Iron Guard in gov­
ernment. Michael I becomes king instead of his father, Carol II.
1941, 22 and 26 June: Romania and Hungary enter the war against the Soviet Union.
1944, 17 March: Secret negotiations begin between Romania and the Allied Powers 
in Cairo, where the demand and the possibility of returning Northern Transyl­
vania to Romania is raised. 19 March: Hungary is occupied by the German 
army. May: The Jews of Northern Transylvania are deported. 14 June: The 
court and the opposition reach a secret agreement on organizing the exit of 
Romania from the war. 23 August: Decisive turn in Romania: Antonescu 
and his government are detained, war is declared on Germany on 24 August.
5 September: German-Hungarian attack (against Southern Transylvania), 
which soon collapses. 12 September: Romania and the Allies sign an armi­
stice agreement in Moscow; the Soviet and Romanian troops march into North­
ern Transylvania. 11 October: Kolozsvar is occupied, and the whole of North­
ern Transylvania is taken by 25 October. Many Transylvanian Saxons run away 
with the German troops. 11 November: The Allied Control Commission re­
moves the new Romanian administration from Northern Transylvania, the 
local left wing organizes a civilian administration separate from the Soviet 
military one.
1945, 12 January: The Germans are deported to the Soviet Union to work on the 
reconstruction of the country. 6 March: Petru Groza's coalition government 
is formed. 9 March: Moscow consents to the transfer of the administration of 
Northern Transylvania to the Romanian public administration.
1947,10 February: Peace treaty between Romania and the Allied Powers is signed in 
Paris; the Second Vienna Award is internationally annulled. 30 December: 




—> see k. king
0 non-existent place M Macedonia
n integrated place min. minister
A Austria MO Moldavia
archb. archbishop P Poland
B Belgium pr. prince
b. bishop prcess princess
BG Bulgaria pr. min. prime minister
BH Bosnia-Herzegovina R Romania
BO Bohemia Rom. Roman
Byz. Byzantine RU Russia
c. county S Serbia
chanc. chancellor SL Slovakia
CR Croatia SLO Slovenia
dyn. dynasty SP Spain
emp. emperor SW Switzerland
F France SWE Sweden
G Germany T Turkey
gov. governor Trans. Transylvania,
GR Greece Transylvanian
H Holland U Ukraina
Hung. Hungarian V. voivode
I Italy vice-v. vice-voivode
The Index contains the place-names in the form mentioned in the text. German 
and Romanian names are also given for the Hungarian place-names, when they 
exist. References used for the Index were the following: Helysegnevtar (Official Gaz­
etteer of Hungary), Budapest 1913; C. Suciu: Dicfionar istoric al localitafilor din 
Transilvania, Bucharest 1967, and the work of E. Wagner: Historisch-statistisches 
Ortsnamenbuch fiir Siebenburgen, Koln -  Wien 1977. The Index does not contain names 
of rivers, mountains, passes, etc., furthermore, the name of Hungary as a historical 
land. Hungary and England are not referred to at the place-names. Places with 
identical or similar names are distinguished by indicating the names of present 
Hungarian counties or former counties in Hungary before 1918. The place-names 
in italics are non existing or not in use.
Aba, S4muel, k. of Hungary (1041-1044)
141
Abaujvir (Abaujvdr, c.) 158-159 
Abaujvar, c. 145, 254, 259 
Abony (Obon) (Feh6r, c.; 0) 146 
Abrudbanya (Gross-Schlatten; Abrud;
R) 232, 238, 386, 443-444, 519, 559 
Absolon, Daniel 365-366 
Absolutism 317, 425, 431,446,464,479-
480, 500
Bureaucratic ~ 461, 479 
Centralised ~ 446, 490 
Enlightened ~ 435, 440-441 ->■ also 
Neoabsolutism 
Abu Hamid al-Gamati 143 
Academy
Gyulafehervar -  287, 344
Jesuit -  in Kolozsvar 425-426, 436-
437
Saxon Lutheran -  345 
Academy of Sciences 426,456, 609 
Berlin -  436 
Bucharest -  592-593 
Hung. -  482, 540 
Achaia 39
Acsi (Bihar, c.; 0) 118 
Actium 21-22
Adorjan, royal notary, b. of Trans. 212 
Adrianople (Edime; T) 254, 259, 313 
Ady, Endre 587, 594-595, 598 
Africa 36-37, 56 
Agirbiceanu, loan 594, 673 
Agmand, Hung, chieftain 201 
Agyagfalva (-; Lutifa; R) 237, 508-509, 
50931
Ahdname of the Ottoman sultans 298, 
417
Aisis (Furluk; Firliug; R) 41 
Ajton (-; Ajtony; R) 35 
A jtony (Achtum /O htum , Atthon), 
Hung, chieftain 126-128,137,154,167 
Akakia, Roger du Fresne 365 
Akaszt6 (Bacs-Kiskun, c.) 59 
Alard, gereb of Vi'zakna 182 
Alaric I, Visigothic k. 78 
Alavivus, Gothic chieftain 75 
Alba (Civitas Alba; Alba Iulia) -*■ Gyula- 
feh6rvar
Alba Ultrasilvana (Transilvana) -» Gyu- 
lafehervar 
Albert (Habsburg), k. of Hungary (1437- 
1439) 226-227 
Albert, Michael 595 
Alboin, k. of the Lombards 92
Albumus Maior 36 - *  also Verespatak 
Alexander, the Great, k. of Macedonia 
15-16, 410 
Alexandra loan Cuza -*■ Cuza 
Alexandru Moruzi Mavrocordat -*■ Mav- 
rocordat 
Alexandru Odobescu (R) 70 
Alexici, G. 592
Algy6gy (Germisara; Gergersdorf; Geo- 
agiu; R) 172 
Ali, pasha of Buda 305, 311 
Ali, pasha of Temesvar 357, 359-360 
Alliance
Anti-Habsburg -  331 
Franco-Piedmontese -  539 
Franco-Trans. -  363, 365 
Habsburg-Russian (1746) -  429 
Almaker6k (Malmkrog; Malincrav; R)
240
Almas —► Varalmas
Almaszeg (-; Voivozi; R) 169
Almos, Hung, duke 115
Almos, pr. of Hungary 142-143,155,171,
212
Almosd (Bihar, c.) 298 
Almus (Lom; BG) 187 
Alpar -» Tiszaalpar
Alpar6t (Szolnok-Doboka, c.; Babolna;
Albrecht; Bobilna; R) 225 
Alparvar -> Tiszaalpar 
Als6csematon (-; Cematu de Jos; R) 169,
171,173
Als6-Feh6r, c. 458, 505, 510, 577, 672 
Als6komana (-; Comana de Jos; R) 99 -» 
also Komana 
Als6kosaiy->- Kusaly 
Als6tatarlaka (Tartaria; -;Tartaria; R) 5- 
6,103 
Als6torja -»  Torja 
Alsted, Johannes 346 
Altaich (G) 126,144 
Altland 180,182,212 
Alvema, Bartolomeo de 217 
Alvinc (Unter-Winz; Winzendorf; Vin- 
}ul de Jos; R) 137,160, 257, 286, 388 
Ames, Wilhelm (Amesius Wilhelmus)
346
Amhat, courier 260 
Ammianus Marcellinus, Rom. historian 
73
Ampelum 36, 42 ~* also Zalatna 
Amsterdam (H) 378, 404-405, 409 
Anarcs (Szabolcs, c.) 101
Andalusia (SP) 114 7 6 4
Andrassy, Gyula, elder, count, pr. min.
(1867-1871) 599,611 
Andrassy, Gyula, younger, count 628 
Andrew (AndrSs) I, k. of Hungary (1046- 
1060) 141,167 
Andrew (Andrds) II, k. of Hungary 
(1205-1235) 143,167,180-182, 189 
Andrew (Andr&s) III, k. of Hungary 
(1290-1301) 198-199, 202-204 
Andronikos, Byz. pretender 183 
Angelus Isaac II, Byz. emp. 174 
Anghel, Atanasie 373 
Anglo-Austrian Bank 568 
Anglo-French Orientation of Romania 
665
Angyalos (-; Anghelus; R) 173 
Anjou, French dyn. of Sicily, Royal dyn. 
of Hungary 204, 221, 223, 231, 235,
240
Anne (Stuart), queen of England 380 
Anne of Auschwitz (Piast prcess) 205 
Anonymus (P. dictus magister, master 
P.) 110-112, 114, 125, 127-128, 136, 
152,155,158-159,191, 201 
Antioch (Antiochia) 241 
Anti-Semitism 687, 689 
Antitrinitarians (Antitrinitarianism) 
289-291
Antiunionists (Romanian) 491, 610 
Antonescu, Ion 689 
Antoninus Pius, Rom. emp. 35-36, 42 
Antoninus Satuminus 29 
Antonios, b. of Turkia 12421 
Antony, Mark (Marcus Antonius) 21 
Antwerp (Antwerpen; B) 619 
Aoric, Visigothic k. 73 
Ap&czai Csere, J&nos 344,346, 351, 404, 
406
Apafi, Mihaly (Michael) I, pr. of Trans. 
(1661-1690) 359-367, 3672, 368-371, 
382, 384-385, 386-389, 391, 394-404, 
408
Apafi, Mihaly (Michael) II, pr. of Trans.
(1683-1691) 367, 372, 393 
Apahida (-; Apahida; R) 83, 85,101 
Apathy, Istv3n 591, 644, 648, 653-654 
Apati, Mikl6s 404 
Apollodorus, architect of Trajan 30 
Apor 122
Apor (Opour), Hung, chieftain 122 
Apor, Istv3n 373, 387, 390, 399 
Apor, Lazar 302
Apponyi, Albert, count 589, 628, 631,
637, 641, 659, 66028
Apponyi, Gyfirgy 484 
Approbatae Constitutiones 349 
Aprily, Lajos 679
Apulum 23, 28, 30, 34, 36, 38, 40, 42, 44, 
49-50,52-53,58,63,87,104,106,136 -► 
also Gyulafeherv^r 
Aquincum 42, 76 —► also Obuda, Buda­
pest 
Aquitany 114
Arad (Arad; Arad; R) 35,79,117,132,135, 
137-138,143-144,157,175, 288, 295 
Arad, c. 117,143,155,171, 217, 271 
Arad-Csalya -> Arad 
Aradvar 13 —> also 6-Aradvdr 
Aranas —► Aranyos 
Aranka, GyOrgy 449, 455 
Arany, Tam£s 289
Aranyos (Ariesch; Aries; R) 119-120, 
148,150-151 
AranyosbSnya (Offenbanya; Offenburg;
Baia of Aries; R) 232 
Aranyosgy6res (Gieres, Jerischmarkt;
Cimpia Turzii; R) 95 
Aranyosl6na (Lone; Luna; R) 503 
Aranyossz6k (Aranyos, seat) 182 
Arcadioupolis (Burgas; BG) 122 
Arcidava (Varadia; Varadia; R) 20 
Ardaric (Ardaricus, Ardarik), Gepid k.
77, 79-80, 85 
Argedava (Arcidava? 0) 20 
Ariaric, Visigothic k. 67, 73 
Aristotle 15, 292 
Arnulf I, German k. I l l ,  113 
Aron, Vasile 457
Arpdd, pr. of the Hungarians 110,115, 
120-121, 125, 138 
Arpad, Royal dyn. of Hungary 111, 115,
120, 125, 129, 135, 138-139, 141, 145,
161, 204
Arp^s (Arpasch; Arpasul; R) 150,191 
Artand (Bihar, c.) 83,137 
Arz, Arthur Albert 640 
Asen, tzar of Bulgar-Romanian Empire 
128,188
AsezamSntul Cultural Mihai Viteazul 
'682
Aspremont, Ferdinand Gobert 376 
Assembly
Baiazsfalva (Romanian) (1848) -  491- 
494, 497, 499, 504-505 
Hung. Constitutional -  of Pozsony 
(1848) 486
National -  of Frankfurt (1848) 494, 
501
Romanian National -  at Gyulafeher- 
\kr (1918) 650 
Saxon National -  287 
Saxon University -  531 
Szekely National -  508-509, 509 
Assimilation 178, 221, 281, 360,434, 446, 
453-454, 464, 481, 532, 534, 562, 564, 
575, 633
Asszonynepe (Frauenvolk; A^inip; R) 
120,143,145,157 
Asszonypataka -*■ Nagyb&nya 
ASTRA (Literary and Cultural Society of 
the Romanian People in Trans.) 585- 
586, 591, 593, 614, 627, 633 
Asztalos, Istv&n 679 
Athanaric, Visigothic k. 67, 71, 73-75 
Attila, Hunnish k. 78-80,178, 237, 282 
Augsburg (G) 120, 257 
Augusta, Augustae (Ogosta; Harlec; BG) 
187
Augustus (C. Julius Caesar Octavianus), 
Rom. emp. 21-24, 45, 55, 63, 73 
Aurelian, Rom. emp. 55, 63, 73, 81 
Aurelius Afer, T. 46 
Aurelius, Marcus, Rom. emp. 38-39,42, 
45
Aurignac (F) 3-4 
Auschwitz (Oswi^cim; P) 205 
Austrasia 85, 91
Austria 24,48,85,247-248,307,318,466,
492, 505, 539, 541, 547, 565, 569-570,
577,599,609,616,623-624,652 -> also 
Empire
Austria-Hungary ->• Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy 
Austrian Civil Code 530, 600 
Austrian Hereditary Lands and Prov­
inces 262,307,320,415,422,431,435,
441, 453, 464, 474, 496, 501 
Austrian National Railway Company 
(STEG) 579-580 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy 570, 608,
617, 624, 626, 637, 639 -> also 
Habsburg Empire 
Autonomy 402, 466, 498, 680
-  of Croatia 502
-  of the Banat 654
-  of the counties 461, 488, 550, 655
-  of the Saxons 199-201, 481, 490, 507
-  of the Szekelys 199-201, 397, 507, 
600
-  of Trans. 543, 616, 625
-  of Trans, principality 372, 375 
Constitutional -  of Hungary 487
Cultural -  611,624,673 
Cultural and linguistic -  601 
National -  611
Saxon -  180-181, 228, 231-232,466, 
478, 480, 507, 530-532, 600, 611 
Szekely -  397, 433, 507, 600 
Territorial -  of the Romanians 199-
201, 521
Aventinus, Bavarian historian 117 
Averescu, Alexandru 680 
Axente, loan 494, 504, 532 
Azo, Papal legate, b. of Ostia 147
Babes, Victor 586, 592 
Babes, Vincenjiu 615 
Babolna -> Alpar6t 
Bach, Alexander 528, 5326, 533, 540 
Bach, Eduard 529 
Bacon, Roger 400 
B&cstorok (n BAcs, Kolozs, c.) 5 
Baden (G) 369, 371 
Baden-Wurttemberg (G) 63 
Baduil (Budli/Buldi, Budlu), b. of Bihar
142
BSgyon (-; Badeni; R) 11 
Baia de Fier (R) 3 
Baian, Avar khagan 91-92 
Bakonyb61 (Veszpr6m, c.) 146,154 
Balasescu, Nicolae 506, 50628 
Balassa, Imre 252
Balassa, Menyhdrt 258-259, 267, 284 
Bal&zsfalva (Blasendorf; Blaj; R) 370, 
428-429, 439, 472, 474-477, 488-489, 
491-494, 497, 499-500, 504-506, 509,
513, 588, 592, 613-614, 632 
Balcescu, Nicolae 47412, 4916, 492, 521,
52142, 535 
Balgrad, Belgrad -*■ Gyulafeh6rv£r 
Balint, Simion 49414 
Balk, v. of Moldavia 216 
Balogh, Zsigmond 378 
Baltzata (R) 64
BSlvdnyos (0; Hdromsz6k, c., GOtzen- 
burg; Balvanos; R) 208, 231 
Banat 5, 7-8, 13, 20, 29, 31, 34, 59, 67,
421, 428, 448, 499, 514, 544, 560, 579- 
581, 583, 588, 593, 598, 639, 648, 652- 
654, 665, 681-682 
Banat of Sz0r6ny (SzOreny, Sz0r6nys6g) 
193, 195-197, 203, 217-218, 227 
B&ncsa, J^nos 231
BSnffy, D£nes 360, 363, 365, 372, 399 
Bdnffy, Dezs6 of Losonc 226 
B^nffy, Dezsfl, baron, pr. min. (1895- 
1899) 611, 623-625, 627, 629
Banffy, Gyorgy (16607-1708), count, gov.
of Trans. (1691-1708) 372 
Banffy, GyOrgy (1746-1822), count, gov. 
of Trans. (1787-1822) 435, 449, 452-
457
Banffy, Miklos, count 596, 679, 681, 690 
BSnffyhunyad (-; Huedin; R) 334, 680 
BAnffyhunyadi, Janos 345, 405 
Banyabiikk (-; Vtlcele; R) 10 
Barabds, Mikl6s 596 
Barac, loan 457 
Baran, b. 147 
Barancs (Branicevo; S) 192 
Baranya, c. 176, 556 
Baranyai Decsi, Janos 292 
Barathely (Parately, Breitau; Brateiu; R) 
64-65, 70-71, 79, 88, 95, 98, 100, 169, 
173
Barbaricum 32, 34-35, 59, 64-65 
Barbat, Romanian v. 203 
Barbiano, Giaccomo, conte di Belgioioso 
298
Barca (Borsod, c.) 151,182 
Barcarozsny6 (Roseanu; Risnov; R) 53 
BarcasSg (Burzenland) 71, 78, 99, 150, 
182, 189, 191-192,195, 203, 208, 226, 
384
Barcaszentpeter (Petersberg; Sinpetru; R)
240
Barcsai, Abraham, treasurer 378 
Barcsai, Akos, pr. of Trans. (1658-1660) 
338, 357, 359 
Barcsai, Mihaly 381 
Barcsay, Abraham, bodyguard officer in 
Vienne 438 
Bardolff, Carl von 635 
Bari J (Barifiu), George 466, 4667, 472", 
475, 477-478, 488,492,499-500, 50524, 
50628, 516, 532-533, 542,550-551, 553,
585, 592-593, 599, 600s 
Barlab^ssi, L6n£rt 239 
Bamujiu, Simion 475-477,484-489,492- 
494, 500, 520 
Baromlak (Nagybaromlak, Wurmloch;
Valea Viilor; R) 150 
Bar6t (-; Baraolt; R) 180 
BSrtfa (Bardejov; SL) 366 
Bartha, Mikl6s, count 596, 617 
Bartha, Mozes 454 
Bartok, Bela 177, 597 
Baruch, Jeremias 581 
Basarab, Longus, ken6z 215 
Basarab, (Ivanco, loan) v. of Wallachia 
214
Basel (SW) 233, 287, 292, 400
Basil II, Byz. emp. 125-128
Basta, Giorgio 296-299
Bathory, Andras (Andrew), cardinal, pr.
of Trans. (1598-1599) 262, 295-296 
Bathory, Andras, v. of Trans. (1552-1553)
257-258 
Bathory, Anna 288 
Bathory, Boldizsar 293-294 
Bathory, Gabor (Gabriel), pr. of Trans.
(1608-1613) 303-316, 324, 389 
Bathory, Gyorgy 279 
Bathory, Istvan (Stephen) of Somly6, pr. 
of Trans. (1571-1586), k. of Poland 
(1576-1586) 259-264, 266-267, 269- 
270, 273, 275, 280, 285, 287, 291-294,
309, 332, 344, 348, 376, 389, 395 
Bathory, Istvan of Ecsed, v. of Trans.
(1479-1493) 229 
Bathory, Istvan of Somly6, v. of Trans.
(1529-1534) 229,249 
Bathory, Krist6f 263, 291 
Bathory, Zsigmond (Sigismund) pr. of 
Trans. (1586-1599; 1601; 1601-1602)
263, 291-297, 314, 324, 348, 389 
Bathory, Zsdfia 355, 364, 376 
Batizi, Andras 288 
Bator Nyirbator
Batthyany, Lajos, count, pr. min. (1848)
486, 495, 497-498, 500 
Batthyany, Orban 267 
Batu, Mongol khan 195 
Baumgartner, Johann Christian 454 
Bausner, Bartholomeus 405 
Baussnern, Simon Friedrich 435 
Bavaria 114, 204
Beatrix of Luxemburg, queen of Hun­
gary 143 
Bebek, Ferenc 259 
Bees, comes 127 
Becse (Bacs, c.) 255,257 
Becskerek -*• Nagybecskerek 
Bedecs (-; Bedeciu; R) 582 
Bedeus von Scharberg, Joseph 478, 532 
Bek6s (Bek6s, c.) 254, 256, 276 
B6k6s, c. 276
Bekes, Gaspar 259-261, 285 
Bekesvar (B6k6s, c.) 127 
Beksics, Gusztav 602 
Bela I, k. of Hungary (1060-1063) 141- 
142,145,171 
Bela II (the Blind), k. of Hungary (1131- 
1141) 143,154-155, 157 
Bela (Alexios) III, k. of Hungary (1172- 
1196) 143,150,157,160,173
B61a IV, k. of Hungary (1235-1270) 192- 
198, 201, 203 
Belcredi, Richard, count 552 
B61di, P51 365-366, 390, 399 
Belenyes (-; Beius; R) 590 
Bel6nyesszentmikl6s (-; Sinnicolaul de 
Beiuj; R) 171 
Belgrade (NSndorfehervdr; Beograd; S) 
81, 111, 115, 192, 255, 312, 369, 371,
417, 547, 649-650, 653, 657 -+ also 
Sitigidunum 
Bels<5-Szolnok, c. 118,138,145,176,201-
202, 206, 216, 220 
B61tek (Krasznab§ltek; Bildegg; Beltiug; 
R) 279
Bern, J6zef 513-514,516,51632, 517,51737, 
521-522 
Bencz6di Szekely, Istvan 288 
Benedek, son of Korlat (1206; 1208-1209) 
189
Beneventum (Benevento; I) 114
Benke, J6zsef 455
Benkfi, Ferenc 437
Benk<5, J6zsef 436, 439
Bercsfenyi, Mikl6s 376
Berde, M6zes 517
Bereck (Bretz; Bre(cu; R) 62-63, 71
Bereg, c. 198, 216, 221, 231, 299
Beregsz^sz (Beregovo; U) 288
Berengar I, k. of Italy 113
Bereny (Hunyad, c.; Lammdorf; Beriu;
R) 117-119 
Berethalom (Birthalm; Biertan; R) 41,59, 
75
Beretty6monostor (Bihar, c.) 142 
Berlin (G) 436, 480, 597, 618, 619, 636,
638, 648, 684 
Bersobis (Bersovia?) 41 
Bersovia (Zsidovin) 30 
Berthelot, Henri 640, 643 
Berthold, duke of Bavaria 119 
Berve (Blutroth; Berghin; R) 100 
Berzenczey, Laszl6 508-509 
Berzeviczy, Albert 627, 629 
Berzeviczy, Mdrton 266-267 
Besenyfi (Beszterce-Nasz6d, c.; Heiden- 
dorf; Viisoara; R) 172 
Besenyfi - *  Obeseny<5 
Bessarabia 13, 641, 665, 689, 692 
Bessenyei, GyOrgy 438 
Beszterce (Bistritz; Bistrija; R) 79,88,100, 
148, 150, 181, 183, 195, 228, 232-233,
235, 242, 272, 274, 301, 341, 370, 390, 
432, 530-531, 571, 582, 611
Beszterce, c. 172, 556 
Beszterce, seat 183
BeszterceMnya (Banska Bystrica; BO)
321
Beszterce-Nasz6d, c. 607
Bethlen (Szolnok-Doboka, c.; Bethlen;
Beclean; R) 149, 406 
Bethlen, Farkas 286 
Bethlen, Farkas, chanc., historian 410 
Bethlen, Gabor (Gabriel), pr. of Trans.,
"rex electus Hungariae" (1619-1620)
298, 308-309, 311-325, 328-331, 335,
338, 340, 344, 346-347, 349, 354, 359,
361, 387, 395 
Bethlen, Gabor, count, commissioner of 
the Viennese Government 546, 607,
611
Bethlen, Gergely, chiefcaptain of Trans.
372
Bethlen, Istvan ( Stephen) the elder, pr.
of Trans. (1630) 325-326, 330 
Bethlen, Istvan, the younger 328, 330,
332
Bethlen, Istvan, count, pr. min. of Hun­
gary (1921-1931) 636,648 
Bethlen, Istvan, the elder 325-326 
Bethlen, Janos, chanc. of Trans. 360,362-
363, 387, 390, 399, 410
Bethlen, Janos, the elder 484, 48424, 4901 
Bethlen, Janos, the younger 545 
Bethlen, Kata, countess 399 
Bethlen, Mikl6s, chanc. of Trans. 362-
364, 371-372, 376, 378, 387, 399, 409 
Bethlen, P6ter 330 
Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobald 637 
Bethune, Marquis (Francois Gaston de
Selles) 365 




Bezded (-; Bezded; R) 136 
Biandrata, Giorgio 267, 290-291 
Bianu, loan 62124 
Bibarcfalva (-; Biborjeni; R) 241 
Bihar (Biharvar, - ; Biharea; R) 87, 94-95,
101, 112, 114, 117-118, 128, 131-132,
137-138, 141-144, 148-149, 158-161,
166-170
Bihar, c. 77,117-118,143,166,176,179,
201, 250, 259-260, 271-272, 383, 466,
472, 499, 518, 544, 556, 581, 583, 586,
593, 642, 645, 648, 672, 691 
Biharfelegyhaza (-; Rosiori; R) 134 768
Biharszentandras (-; Sintandrei; R) 171 
BiharvSr —> Bihar 
Bihor, comes 144 
Birlad(R) 70 
Bi'r6, J6zsef 597 
Bismarck, Otto von 612 
Bisterfeld, Johannes 346 
Bistritz -> Beszterce 
Bitolja (Bitola; CR) 185 
Black Saxon movement 613 
Blaga, Lucian 672 
Blenheim —► Hochstadt 
Blidaru (R) 17 
Bob, loan 456 
Boccaccio, Giovanni 292 
Bocskai, Istvdn (Stephen), pr. of Trans. 
(1604-1606) 293-300, 303-305, 307- 
308, 312, 345 
Bod, P6ter 425-426, 436, 438 
Bodon (Magyarbenye; Biin; R) 157 
Bogdan, loan 592
Bogdan, v. of Moldavia 214, 216-217,
219
Bogdan, v. of Moldavia 234 
BOgOz (-; Mugeni; R) 71, 241 
Bogsan -*■ Boksdnbdnya 
Bohafel, Alexandru (Boheczel, S&ndor)
477, 47716
Bohemia 204, 225, 233, 247-248, 262, 
318-319, 321-322, 529, 648 
BOhm, Kdroly 591 
Boja, son of Gyula 125-126,145 
Bokscinbcinya (Bogsan; Altwerk, Neu- 
werk; Bocsa, Vasiovei; R) 580 
Boleslaw I (Chrobry), k. of Poland 126 
Bolgirszeg (n Brass6; Obere Vorstadt;
!pchei; R) 474 
Botkdcs (Bulkesch; Balcaciu; R) 241 
Bolliac, Cezar 520 
Bologna (I) 213
Boloni Farkas, S&ndor 462, 4622, 4623, 
4624, 463, 465, 46S5, 473 
Bolyai, Farkas 454, 466 
Bolyai, Jdnos 466
Bonchida (Bruck; Bonjida; R) 202, 221 
Bonfini, Antonio, Italian historian 148,
160
B6nis, Ferenc 364
Bonyha (Szaszbonyha; Bachnen; Bahnea;
R) 287,406 
Bonyha, son of Gyula 125-126,145 
Borbeiy, GyOrgy 295 
Boril, tzar of Bulgaria 189 
7 6 9  Boris, Hung, pretender 143
Bornemissza, Anna 389, 401 
Borosjenfi (Jen6; - ; Ineu; R) 259,268,295, 
304, 311, 314-315, 357 
Borsod, c. 254 
Borsodvdr (Borsod, c.) 159 
Borsos, Tamds 347 
Borsova, c. 120,145 
Bosnia 217, 310
Botfalu (Brenndorf; Bod; R) 582 
Botosani (R) 98
Bourbon, French royal dyn. 375 
Boyars 191
Bozod (-; Bezid; R) 65, 71 
Brancovic (Brancovici), Sava 402 
Brancovici, Gheorghe 410 
Brandenburg 323, 372 
Brandsch, Rudolf 683 
Braniste, Valeriu 634 
Brankovic, George, Serbian despote, 
duke of Milan 227-228 
Braslaw (Brazlaw), chieftain of Eastern 
Franconia 111, 113-114 
Brassai, Sdmuel 466, 467®, 585, 591-592, 
596
Brass6 (Kronstadt; Brasov; R) 9, 71, 78, 
83,93, 99,151,182, 224, 232-235, 421, 
248-250, 272, 274-275, 277, 287-288,
291, 293, 297, 299, 301, 306, 310-312, 
337, 347, 370, 377-378, 381, 384, 388-
389, 391, 398, 403-404, 406-408, 421-
422, 426, 439, 457, 474-475, 477, 480,
489-490, 499, 506-507, 517, 520, 522,
540, 558-559, 565, 567-568, 571, 574,
580-582, 589-590, 593, 597, 624, 640, 
642, 669 
Brass6, c. 556-557, 574, 607, 611 
Bratianu, Dumitru 538 
Bratianu, loan I. C. 631, 637, 639, 658, 
6661
Bratianu, Vintila 666'
Bremen (G) 114 
Brennberg, Franz 550 
Brenner, Domokos 380 
Bresalauspurc - *  Pozsony 
Breslau (Wroclaw; P) 276 
Brigetio (SzSny; Esztergom-Komarom, 
c.) 42
Brincoveanu, Constantin —► Constantin, 
Brincoveanu 
Britain 538, 567, 582, 637 - *  also Eng­
land 
Britannia 45 
Brote, Eugen 62121 
Bruckenthal, Karl 437
Bruckenthal, Samuel, gov. of Trans.
(1777-1787) 420, 435, 438, 455, 584 
Bruckenthal Samuels' Library 438, 455, 
584
Brtinn (Brno; BO) 276, 331-332 
Bruto (Brutus), Gian Michele 292 
Buccow, Nicolaus Adolf 429, 431-433 
Bucharest (Bucuresti; R) 98, 106, 475, 
500-501, 534, 547, 570, 586, 592-594, 
615-621, 624-625, 631, 633-634, 637-
638, 640, 643, 647, 651-654, 658, 666, 
684-686, 689, 691
Bucoavna (first Romanian textbook) 403 
Bucov (R) 106
Buda (Budapest) 233, 247-250, 252-254,
256, 258-259, 266, 269, 274, 276-277, 
279, 299, 311-313, 321, 330, 357, 359-
360, 366, 368-369, 402, 429, 456-457,
474, 488, 495, 500, 504-505 
Budai Nagy, Antal 225-226, 238 
Budai-Deleanu, Ion 456-457 
Budapest 586, 590, 592, 594, 596-597, 
609, 613, 615, 618, 620-621, 623-624, 
638-639, 644-645, 647-649, 652-659, 
678, 683-687, 689-690 -> also Aqum- 
cum, Buda, Obuda, Pest, Pest-Buda 
Budjek, Mongol chieftain 195 
Bugat, Hung, chieftain 119 
Bukovina 98,513-514,517,539,570,637,
639, 643
Bulcs (Bultsch; Bulci; R) 35,171 
Bulgaria 7, 13,19, 23, 55,106,113,115, 
121 ,12320, 125-126,128,180,185,193, 
217, 570, 638 
Bultchu (Bolosudis), horka 121 
Bunea, Augustin 630 
Bureaucracy 440, 454, 670 
Burebista (Burebistas), k. of Dacia 16- 
24, 26 
Burgenland (A) 176 
Burgher 275-278,286,281,308,386,388, 
391, 461, 481, 531, 534, 538, 542 
Burgundy 114
BiirkOs (BUrgesch; Birghis; R) 150 
Burundai, Mongol khan 195 
Bus -*■ Buzd
Bussche-Haldenhauser, Freiherr von 
dem 63839 
Buteanu, loan 488, 494, 49414, 519 
Buzd (Bus; Buzd; R) 241, 490* 
Byzantium - *  Constantinople
Caesar, C. Julius 19-22 
Calan -*■ Shalan
Caligari, Giovanni Andrea 262, 264 
Calluc, Rom. magister militum 80 
Calugareni (R) 295 
Calvinism 288-289, 350-351 
Calvinists 290,384,399,427,463,560,587 
Cameratica Commissio 383 
Candia (Iraklion; GR) 360, 364 
Cannabaudes, Gothic k. 55 
Cantemir Dimitrie -*■ Dimitrie Cantemir 
Capestrano, Giovanni da 228 
Caracalla, Rom. emp. 41-42 
Caraffa, Antonio 370 
Carillo, Alfonso 293-294 
Carinthia (A) 111, 113 
Camuntum (Deutschaltenburg; A) 232,
40,48 
Carol ingians 112-113 
Carpaji, Society (1882) 617-618 
Cartesianism (Cartesians) 404, 408, 411 
Carthusian Anonymus 153 
Casim, pasha of Buda 256 
Cassander, k. of Macedonia 15 
Cassiodorus, Flavius Magnus Aurelius 
80
Castaldo, Giovanni Battista 257-258
Castra Martis (Kula, BG) 79
Castra Regina (Ratisbonne; Regensburg;
G) 84 
Catholicism
Greek -  426, 457, 465 
Roman -  219, 231, 290-291, 331, 423 
Catholics
Greek -  439, 457, 560, 671 
Roman -  243, 308, 384, 399, 423-424,
427, 560, 587 
Cavour, Camillo 539 
Cecilia Renata of Habsburg 323 
Central Asia 79, 91 
Central Powers 637-639, 641 
Cematon -> CsernSton 
Cemigrad -*■ Csongrdd 
Cesaria -» Ohrid 
Cesti, Marc Antonio 409 
Chancellery -*■ Court Chancellery 
Charles I (Charlemagne), k. of France,
Holy Rom. emp. 102 
Charles I (Charles-Robert of Anjou) (K6- 
roly R6bert), k. of Hungary (1308- 
1342) 204-205, 207, 214, 216, 223, 229 
Charles V , Holy Rom. emp. 247-248,
250-252, 254-257 
Charles II, k. of England 361 
Charles III k. of Hungary (1711-1740),
Holy Rom. emp. 415, 423 7 7 0
Charles X , k. of Sweden 355 
Charles (Habsburg), archduke, later 
Charles I, emp. of Austria, k. of Hun­
gary (1916-1918) 641 
Charles 1 ( or Carol I ) (Charles-Eitel- 
Frederic-Zephyrin of Hohenzollern- 
Sigmaringen), k. of Romania 605, 
60511, 616, 620, 635, 637, 639 
Charles II (or Carol II), k. of Romania 
641, 668, 688 
Charles, duke of Lorraine 367-368, 370 
Charlotte Amalia of Hessen-Rheinfeld 
369, 376
Charold, wife of the Hung, chieftain 
Doboka 12522 
Chemiakhov 67 
Childerich I, Frank k. 84 
Chosrau I (the Great), k. of Persia 93 
Christina, queen of Sweden 319, 330 
Chrysopolis - *  Colonia Aurelia Apulensis 
Church
Calvinist (Reformist) -  347, 373-374, 
411, 424-425,463,560 
Catholic (Roman) ~ 129,173,176,188,
197, 205, 212, 217, 243, 282, 291-929, 
320, 331, 372-373, 385, 403, 425-426, 
429, 441, 560, 677, 681 
Lutheran (Evangelist) -  287-288,384, 
424, 476, 479, 560, 611, 677, 682, 688 
Orthodox Greek -  350, 373, 383, 403, 
426,452, 671
Orthodox Greek (Romanian) -  193, 
224, 290, 292, 350, 373, 403, 406, 409,
426, 429, 439, 451-452, 457, 467, 469, 
497-498, 509, 520, 533, 560, 562, 589,
598, 624, 632, 641, 671 
Uniate (Romanian Greek Catholic) -  
373-374, 383, 426-429, 439, 457, 509, 
533, 624, 630, 677 
Unitarian -  291, 423, 560 
Cibin (Zibin, Klein-Zibin; Cibin; R) 166 
Cibinvar - *  Oriat 
CikSdor 143
Cipariu, Timotei 491, 506 
"Cives" -» Burgher 
Claudius Fronto, M. 38 
Claudius II (Gothicus), Rom. emp. 55 
Claudius Maximus, Tiberius, Rom. sol­
dier 38 
C16menceau, Georges B. 658 
Clement VII, pope 247 
Cloaca, loan Oargu 442-444 
Coalition
Anti-Habsburg -  323
Anti-Hitler -  691 
Cocceius, Johannes 400 
Codreanu, Comeliu Zelea 668 
C6falva (-; Tufalau; R) 11 
College
Calvinist -  of Kolozsvar 406, 425 
Calvinist ~s in Trans. 406, 425, 437, 
454
-  of Marosv^sirhely 454, 475
-  of Nagyenyed 378-379, 411, 425, 
454
-  of Sz6kelyudvarhely 403 
Protestant -  in Trans. 403, 455, 472 
Unitarian -  of Kolozsvar 404, 425, 
466
Coloman (Kalman), k. of Hungary 
1095-1116) 142-143, 147-149, 152, 
162,166, 175 
Colonia Aurelia Apulensis (Chrysopolis, 
Marosportus; - ;  Partof; R) 49 
Colonia Ulpia Traiana -*  Sarmizegethusa 
Colonica Dacica -*  Sarmizegethusa 
Colus, comes 144
Colusmonostora -> Kolozsmonostor 
Coluswar (Clus) -» Kolozsvar 
Comenius —► Komensky, Ian AmoS 
Comes (ispcin) 180, passim
~ (isp&n) Saxonum  (com es of the 
Saxons, comes of Szeben) 180, 189, 
204-205, 222, 490, 507, 528-529, 531, 
546, 552, 600, 610
~ (ispcin) Siculorum (comes of the 
Szekelys) 183, 202, 204-205, 214, 222, 
229-230, 236, 238, 507, 600
-  (ispdn) of Szeben -► comes Saxo­
num
-  (isp&n) of Temes 227, 229, 254 
Commissio Commercialis 431, 440 
Commissio Litteralia 441 
Commissio Oeconomica 440 
Committee
-  Romanian National (1848) 494,512- 
514
-  Romanian National (after 1848-
1849) 543, 548-549, 622, 631-632, 634
-  Romanian National (1918) 644, 649 
Commodus, Rom. emp. 39-40, 42 
Community (Communitas)
-  of the Romans (Vlachs) 198-199,208
-  of the Saxons 183, 192, 199, 208- 
209, 211, 213, 222, 234-235, 336, 468,
478, 480
-  of the Szekelys 179-180,199, 208- 
209, 213, 236-238, 282-283, 285
Comosicus, k. of Dacia 21 
Compania Graeca of Brass6 and Szeben
386-391
Compania Orientalis of Habsburgs 391 
Compromise (between Austria and Hun­
gary in 1867) 552, 554, 559, 562, 565-
567, 577, 585, 587, 589, 591-592, 595,
599-600, 605, 609, 613-616, 618, 620, 
623, 628, 633-635 
Concivilitas (Concivilitat) (egality of citi­
zens) (1781) 446-447 
Congregatio generalis 222-223 - *  also 
Diet 
Congress
-  of the Serbian, Slovakian and Ro­
manian Minorities (Budapest, 1895) 
623
Szekely National -  of TusnAd (1902) 
572, 625 
Conrad, Moritz 610 
Consciousness
National -  437-438
Romanian national -  439, 472, 474,
551
Szekely national -  437-438 
Consilium Aulicum (Trans. Council in 
Vienna) -*■ Council 
Conspiration (Anti-Habsburg) named 
Wessel6nyi (1672) 375 
Constans II, Byz. emp. 94 
Constantia (R) 106 
Constantin —► Constantin Movila 
Constantin Brincoveanu, v. of Wallachia 
371
Constantin Movila, v. of Moldavia 306 
Constantin ^erban, v. of Wallachia 353 
Constantine, the Great (Constantinus I), 
Rom. emp. 67 
Constantine II, Rom. emp. 67 
Constantine IV, Byz. emp. 94 
Constantine VII (Constantine Porphyro- 
gennetus), Byz. emp. 109,115,117- 
118,120-122,153, 178 
Constantinople (Byzantium) (Istanbul; 
T) 113-114, 117, 121-125, 127, 183, 
192-193, 220, 228, 248-250, 252-255, 
258, 261, 269, 272, 276, 296, 303-304, 
307, 309-315, 318, 323, 327, 329-330,
347, 356-357, 394, 402-403, 425 
Constitution 486, 509 
American -  463
-  of Austria 491, 501
-  of Hungary (1848) 491
-  of Romania (1923) 673
~ of the Saxon University 479
-  of Trans. 430, 461, 463 
Constitutionalism 464, 486, 507-508,
516, 551, 599, 605, 613 
Convent of Kolozsmonostor (1437) 225 
Copernic (Copernicus), Nicolaus 352, 
405, 425
Copyholder (telkes jobbSgy) 278,338 
also Peasants, serfs 
Cordon, Franz 51234 
Corlard of Talmacs, Walloon ger6b 193 
Cornelius Clemens 39 
Cornelius Fuscus 27 
Comides, DSniel 439 
Corpus Christi College in Oxford 409 
Coryllus (Scorilo), k. of Dacia 23-24, 26 
Cosbuc, George 594 
Cosma, Partenie 616 
Costin, Miron 175 
Cotiso, k. of Dacia 21-22 
Coulin, Arthur 596-597 
Council
- , (Consilium Aulicum) of R£k6czi, 
Ferenc II 378-379,381 
Grand (Romanian) National -  651 
Hung. National -  (1918) 644,646,648 
Prince's -  in Trans. 266, 355, 430 
Romanian Governing -  653-655, 657 
Romanian National -  (1918) 644,646- 
648, 650, 655 
Saxon National -  654 
Szekely National -  (1918) 653 
Trans. -  in Vienna 373 
Counter-Reform 383, 423 
Counter-revolution
-  in 1848-1849 501, 503, 507, 528 
- in  1919 659
Counties (Comitatus) 139, passim 
Court
-  Imperial (Habsburg) in Vienna 260,
292, 429, 430, 440, 447, 463, 484, 502
-  of Trans, prince in Gyulafeh6rv5r 
338-389
Court Chancellery 
Hung. -  484
Trans. -  in Cracow 266-267 
Trans. (Habsburg) -  in Vienna 416,
418, 440, 443, 457, 498, 541 
Unified Hung, and Trans. -  450, 476, 
541-542 
Courtjudge (udvarbir6) 348 
Cracow (Krak6w; P) 213, 261, 263, 266- 
267, 272-273, 276, 287, 292, 295 
Crainiceanu, George 586
Cravica (R) 590
Crenneville, Ludwig Folliot de 550 
Crete (GR) 360
Crimea (U) 356-357, 359, 369, 538 
Crisan, Gheorghe 443-444 
Cristea, Miron Elie 630 
Croatia 14,142,152, 359, 362-364, 375, 
487, 495, 502, 543-544, 547, 565, 600 
Csaki, Richard 682 
Cscik6 (-; Cicau; R) 95,169 
Csciky, Istvcin 296
Cs5ky, Istvan, treasurer of Trans. 325 
Cs^ky, L3szl6, v. of Trans. (1426-1437) 
223, 225
CsSky, Mih&ly, chanc. of Trans. 266-267 
CsSky, Mikl6s, v. of Trans. (1402-1403;
1415-1426) 223-224 
CsanSd (Chanad, Sunad), comes, Hung.
chieftain 127,144 
Csan&d (Csanddvar, N6met-, Nagy-, (3s-, 
R^ccsan&d, Marosvdr; Tschanad, Mie- 
resburg; Cenad; R) 127-128,138,141, 
144,160,167,174, 254, 257 
Csan&d, c. 128, 648 
Csanadvar -*■ Csandd 
Csanaki, M5t6 346
Cs&ngos, Hung, people in Moldavia 384, 
415
Csdnyi, L5szl6 516-517 
Csap (Cop; U) 656
Csap6szentgy0rgy (n Marosorb6; - ; Oar- 
ba de Mures; R) 86, 94,169-170 
CsSsz£r, P6ter 327-328 
Csatdr (HegykOzcsat^r; -; Cetariu; R) 
118,152 
Cseh, J&nos -*• R6di Cseh, JAnos 
Cseh, P6ter ->• R6di Cseh, P6ter 
Csehi (Somly6csehi; -; Ceheiu; R) 279 
Cs6piny (Tschepan; Cepani; R) 79 
Cserei, Mih&ly 409 
Cserhalom —► Kerl6s 
CsemSton (-; Cematu; R) 98 -> also Fel- 
stfcsem&ton 
Csics6, Csics6v£r (-; Cetatea Ciceului; R)
202, 205
Csics6keresztur (Nieder Kreutz; Critestii 
Ciceului; R) 170 
Csfk, c. 150, 241-242, 556, 604, 677 
Csik, seat 174,183, 290,432-433,512 
Csfkcsomort&ny (Csikcsomortan; - ;
^oirneni; R) 10 
Csfkkarcfalva (Karcfalva; Cir|a; R) 242 
Csikmadaras (-, Madaras; R) 387 
CsfkmenasSg (-; Armaseni; R) 241
Csi'kr^kos (-; Racul; R) 242 
Csiksomly6 (n Csi'kszereda, Vdrddtfalva;
- ; ^umuleu; R) 409 
Csikszentdomokos (-; Sfndominic; R) 
691
Csi'kszentkirSly (-; Sincraieni; R) 17,170, 
173
CsfkszentmSrton (-; Sinmartin; R) 409 
Csi'kszentmih^ly (-; Mihaileni; R) 241 
Cslkszereda (Szeklerburg; Miercurea 
Ciuc; R) 398 
Csi'kzsOgOd (-; Jigodinu; R) 135 
Csittfalva (n Malomfalva; - ; Citfalau; R)
161,169
Csoklovina (a  Lunk&ny; -; Cioclovina; 
R) 4
Csolnakos (-; Cinci?; R) 48 
Csomafcija (-; Ciumafaia; R) 101 
Csombord (Csombordvdr; - ; Ciumbrud;
R) 70,103-106,138 
Csombordvdr -> Csombord 
CsongrSd (Csongradvdr) 103, 106, 111, 
158
Csongradvdr -» Csongrdd
Csongva (n Marosujvdr; - ; Uioara de Jos;
R) 103 
Csomai, MihSly 231 
Csucsa (-; Ciucea; R) 654 
Cstiged (Maroscstlgedi; - ;  Ciugud; R) 
161
Csulai, Vlad 231 
Csupor, Mikl6s 229 
Cumania 188-189,192-197, 203, 214 
Cunimund, Gepid k. 87, 92 
Cuza, Alexandra loan 539, 541 
Czechoslovakia 658, 665, 683, 691 
Czeczey, Lenart 254 
Czibak, Imre 250
Czir&ky, Antal, count 458, 484-485, 496 
CzirSky census (1821) 485, 496
Dacia 3,16-17, 22, 28, 30-32, 34-42, 44, 
46-49, 51-53, 55-59, 61-67, 74, 76-77, 
81,99,102-103,117,160,187,410,627 
Dacia Apulensis 38 
Dacia Inferior 34, 42 
Dacia Malvensis 38 
Dacia Mediterranea 55 
Dacia Porolissensis 34, 38, 42 -*• also 
Porolissum, Mojgrad 
Dacia Ripensis 55 
Dacia Romana 62, 66, 76-77 
Dacia Superior 34, 36, 62 
Dacia Trajana -*■ Dacia
Dacoromanism -> Theory of the Daco- 
Roman continuity 
Dakia - *  Dacia 
Ddlya (Dalj; S) 14
Dalmatia 21,37,46-48,78,104,195,267, 
272
Danceny (R) 64 
Daniel, Constantin 597 
Danubian Confederation 500, 521, 547 
Danubian principalities 337, 354, 431, 
472, 474-475, 490, 492-493, 497, 500-
501, 505, 521, 538-539, 583 -> also 
Wallachia and Moldavia 
"Danubian United States" 535 
Danzig (Dancka; Gdansk; P) 233, 263 
Darabont, Ignatie 451 
Darabonts (guardsmen) 280, 284 
Darius I (the Great), k. of Persia 15 
Darufalva (Sopron, c.; Drafiburg; A) 171 
Datia - *  Dacia
D&vid, Ferenc (Hertel, Franz) 289-291 
De&k, Ferenc 503,534,544,547-548,552, 
601-602, 611, 613, 625, 632 
Debrecen (Hajdu-Bihar, c.) 242,254,265, 
272, 274-277, 288, 289, 347, 357, 377,
384, 404, 514, 516, 518-519, 639, 656, 
658
Debreceni, D6zsa 205 
Debren -» Pc*r6
Decaineus, k. of Dacia 20-22, 26 
Decebal, k. of Dacia 21, 24, 26-32, 41, 
44-47
Decius, Rom. emp. 62, 65 
Declaration of Fogaras (1688) 370 
Declaration of Hungary's Independence 
(14th April 1849) 516 
Decree of the serfs' emancipation (1783)
442, 445
D6cse -» Magyard6cse and Marosdecse 
Defoe, Daniel 380 
Dellfiapciti (-; Apatiu; R) 226 
Demsus (Demsdorf; Demsus; R) 220,230 




D6s (Desvar, Desch; Dej; R) 11,145,161- 
162,175, 201-202, 232, 238, 242, 273- 
275, 277, 328, 340, 398, 564, 582 
D6sakna (Salzdorf; Ocna Dejului; R) 
144-145
Descartes, Ren6 346, 363, 400, 404 
Desvar —► D6s 
D6sy, Zolt&n 636
Deszk (Toront&l, c.) 93 
Detta (-; Deta; R) 134,137 
Deutsche Bank 578
D6va (Schlossberg, Diemrich; Deva; R)
132, 135, 237, 160-161, 176, 205, 220,
238, 254, 266, 268, 369, 287, 291, 294,
443-444, 513-514, 564, 582, 589 
D6vai Bfr6, MatySs 288 
D6zsi, Merton 404 
Diana Hunting Society 452 
Dica 280 -> also Tax, taxation 
Dicomes, k. of Dacia 21 
DicsfiszentmSrton (St. M artin, Mar- 
tinskirch; TTmaveni; R) 93, 642 
Diegis, Dacian envoy 27 
Diema (Tiema; Orsova; Orschowa; Orso- 
va; R) 29 ,35 ,42-43,61 
Diet
-  in Hungary 221, 265, 366, 370, 378,
396, 398, 415, 449, 462-463, 471, 486- 
487, 494, 544, 547, 549, 554
-  in Trans. 256,258,260,264-265, 267,
282, 291, 293-294, 301-302, 304, 308,
312-313, 315-317, 320-322, 324, 326,
337-338, 356, 363, 367, 369-371, 378- 
379, 426, 429-431, 437, 446, 449-453,
455, 457, 461, 463-465, 470-471, 475- 
477, 47715, 481, 483-486, 493,495-496,
505, 536, 542-543, 545, 548-554, 599
-  of Union (1848) 493, 495-496 
Imperial Diet in Augsburg (1550) 257
Dimitrie Cantemir, pr. of Moldavia 175 
Dion Cassius Cocceianus 29 
Diotiysopolis (Balfik; BG) 19 
Diploma Andreanum (1224) 181, 479 
Diploma Leopoldinum (Leopoldian Dip- 
lom, I. 1690; II. 1701) 371-374, 415,
423, 426-427, 432 
Diruta, Girolamo 293 
Diurpaneus, k. of Dacia 26-27 




153, 159-162, 168, 170-171, 175-176,
191, 201-202 
Doboka (Dobuka), comes, Hung, chief­
tain 12522, 127, 144 
Doboka (Fogaras, c.; 0)
Doboka, c. 118,145-146,150,196, 200- 
201, 206, 209, 225-226, 301, 458, 546,
548, 623 
Dobokavar - *  Doboka
Dobokavaralja -> Doboka 7 7 4
Dobosi, Samuel 431 
Dobra, Petru 427, 519 
DObrentei, G&bor 455 
Dobrudja 7,38,52,66,106,170,576,641, 
665, 692 
Dobuka -> Doboka, comes 
Dolhay, GyOrgy 378 
Doliche 48
Domb6 (-; Dimbau; R) 152 
Dombr6 (Maros-Torda, c.; -; Dumbrava; 
R) 152
Dombus (Voldorf, Wallendorf; Valeni; 
R) 211
Domitian, Rom. emp. 26-27, 29 
DOmtfs (Abbey) (Komcirom-Esztergom, 
c.) 142,155,171 
Dorostolon -*  Silistra 
D6zsa, Daniel 595 
D6zsa, GyOrgy -+ Szekely, GyOrgy 
Dracula ->• Vlad Jepes 
Draculea ->■ Vlad Dracul 
Dr&g (-; Dragu; R) 488 
Drag, v. of Moldavia 216 
DrSgffy, Bertalan, v. of Trans. (1493- 
1498) 242 
Drigffy, GSspar 288 
Dragomir, Silviu 196 
Dragos, loan 518-520 
Dragun, ken6z 197 
Dristra -> Silistra
Drobeta 29-31, 35, 42 -> also SzOreny 
Dsida, Jen<5 679
Dualism  (Austro-Hungary) 568-569, 
599, 601-602, 604-605, 609-610, 616, 
630, 635 
Duc6 (Ducove; SL) 172 
Dukas, loannes, Byz. emp. 153 
Durostorum -» Silistra
East-Central Asia 456 
East Indies 273
Ecel (Hesseldorf; Ajel; R) 70, 241 
Ecsed -*  Nagyecsed 
Eder, Joseph Carl 437-438 
Eftimiu, Victor 679
Eger (Heves, c.) 141-142,147, 258, 299, 
327
Egerbegy (Arbegen; Agirbiciu; R) 150
Egeres (Erldorf; Aghiresu; R) 621
Egeresfalva (-; Aghiresul; R) 579




Elemund, Gepid k. 85, 89 
Elesd (-; Alesd;R) 649 
Eleusis (GR) 39 
Elisabeth (Stuart) 317 
Elisabeth I, queen of Russia 429 
Elisabeth, queen of Hungary 198 
Ellak, pr. of the Huns 80 
Emancipation
-  of the Jews (in Hungary) 465
~ of the Romanians in Trans. 491 
* of the serfs 464-465, 467, 470, 472, 
486-488, 493, 497, 503, 536-537, 566, 
572 
Emigration
Hung. -  (after 1711) 381, 416 
Hung. -  (after 1849) 534-535, 539-
541, 562
Polish -  in Paris 535 
Romanian -  491, 520-521
-  in USA from Trans. (19-20th cen­
tury) 558, 675
Eminescu, Mihai 593 
EMKE (Erd61yr6szi Magyar KOzmuvel6- 
d6si Egylet) 585, 607-608, 60814 
Empire
Asenid Bulgar-Romanian -  188,192- 
193
Austrian — ► Habsburg -
Avar -  90-91,94-95,97,101-102,129
Bulgarian -  102-104,128
Byz. -  125,127,188
Caroling -  102
Eastern Franconian -  103-104 
Eastern Rom. -  79-81, 83 
Habsburg -  247, 254, 256-257, 262,
274, 297, 317, 323-324, 354, 365, 368,
374, 376-377, 413, 415-417, 422, 428, 
440-441, 450, 464, 479, 483, 486, 489-
490, 494, 498, 501-502, 507, 532, 534, 
540-543, 552, 562, 567, 569, 576, 578,
599, 609, 628, 630, 643, 660 
Holy Rom. -  247, 256, 262, 274, 323- 
324, 376
Hunnish -  80, 83, 237
Khazar -  94
Meroving -  91, 99
Ottoman (Turkish) -  253, 264, 269,
272, 275, 299, 309, 314, 318, 323, 354,
356, 369, 363, 367, 369, 415, 422, 448,
538, 570 -> also Turkey
Rom. -  22-23, 26-32, 35, 38-41, 44,
47, 51-52, 54-63, 65, 71, 74-75, 77-81,
83 -» also Rome
Western Rom. -  80, 90
England 221,317,319,319,323,332,3454,
361, 365, 368, 372, 375, 377, 379-380, 
391, 399, 402-403, 405, 415, 617 
English Levant Trading Company 391 
Enlaka (-; Inlaceni; R) 53 
Enlightenment 402, 424-426, 435-438, 
453-454, 456, 462, 471, 530 
Ennsburg (A) 113
Entente 637, 639-640, 6432, 649, 654, 
654-660 
Entz, G6za 591 
Enyed —► Nagyenyed 
Enyedi, Samuel 404-405 
EOtvfls, J6zsef, baron 540, 544, 589, 599, 
601-602, 625 
Eperjes (Presov; SL) 366 
Eperjeske (Szabolcs, c.) 136 
Erasmus Rotterdamus 292 
Erdelyi GazdasSgi Egyestilet 534 
Erdelyi Gazdas&gi Egylet 469, 607, 689 
Erdelyi Helikon 679 
Erdelyi Kereskedelmi Egylet 570 
Erdelyi Magyar Nyelvmi'velfi TSrsasSg 
449-450 
Erdelyi Muzeum 455, 585 
Erdelyi Muzeum Egylet 534, 540, 584-
586, 588, 591, 679 
Erdfilyi PSrt 687 i
Erdelyi Sz6pmfves C6h 679 
Erdelyi Tudomdnyos Int6zet 687 
Erdelyi, loan 646
firdengeleg (Dindileag; Dindesti; R) 83 
Erd6benyei, J&nos 346 
Erd6d (Erdeed; Ardud; R) 278-279,288 
Erdfiftile (-; Filia; R) 241 
Erddihcit (Zala, c.) 179 
Eresztev6ny (-; Eresteghin; R) 135 
Ermanaric, Visigothic k. 75 
Ermih&lyfalva (-; Valea lui Mihai; R) 83, 
93
Erdsd (-; Ariusd; R) 8 
firsekujvdr (Nov6 ZAmky; SL) 360-361 
Erszakdcsi (-; Sacasinie; R) 101 
Erzberger, Mathias 638 
ErzsebetvSros (Ebesfalva; Eppeschdorf, Eli- 
sabethstadt; Dumbraveni; R) 93,287, 
422
Eskull<5 (-; Astileu; R) 201 
Estates
-  in Hungary 221, 265, 267, 299, 319- 
320, 370, 462
~ in Trans. 221-222,226,229,265-270, 
279, 291, 293-294, 303-304, 307, 312- 
313, 315-317, 319-320, 322, 324, 326,
337, 359, 370-372, 378, 381, 415, 428,
428-431,447,449-452,463,465, 47715,
496-497, 541 
Catholic -  373, 423 
Greek Orthodox -  374 
Moravian -  252 
Polish -  263 
Esterh&zy, J3nos, count 454 
EsterhAzy, Mikl6s, count 323, 326, 330,
354
EsterhSzy, Pal, pr., palatine of Hungary 
(1681-1713) 367, 36T-, 391 
Esz6k (Osijek; CR) 362 
Esztergom (Kom&rom-Esztergom, c.)
119, 125-126, 141,174, 180, 182, 193, 
197,212,282,361, 533 
Etienne, Andr6 437 
Etulia (R) 64 
Etzel —► Attila
Eugen (Eugfene-Frangois de Savoie-Ca- 
rignan), pr. of Savoy 377,380-381,416 
European Democratic Central Commit­
tee 535 
Eustatievici, Dimitrie 439 
Eutropius, Flavius 44, 46, 56-57 
Evlia, Chelebi 386
Extermination of the Jews (from Hun­
gary and Transylvania) (1944-1945)
689, 689s
Facs^d (Facset; Fatschet; Faget; R) 295,
646
Fadrusz, Jcinos 597
Fajsz (Falls, Falitschi), Hung. pr. 120,
124,127
Fajsz (Kukuliafajsz; Fiissen; Feisa; R) 120
Falkenhayn, Erich von 640
Farkas, ken6z 197
Famasi Veres,, Benedek 228
Fascism 668, 680-681, 688
Fastida, Gepid k. 66
February Patent (26th February 1861)
543, 550
February Petition (February 1849) 520 
Feh6r, c. 118,145, 207, 209, 230 
Feh6rv£r - *  Gyulafeh6rv£r and Sz6kes- 
fehervSr 
Fej6r, c. 176
Fej6regyh£za -+ Szdszfej6regyhSza 
FejervSry, G6za, baron 628 
Feketehalom (Zeiden; Codlea; R) 203 
Felenyed (-; Aiudul de Sus; R) 95 
Fels<5b£nya (Mittelstadt; Baia Sprie; R)
381 77 6
Felsficsematon (-; Cematu de Sus; R) 99 
—» also CsemAton 
Fels0-Feh6r, c. 446, 458, 546, 548 
Fels<51upk6 (Gomyalyubkova; Gomea; 
R) 138
Fels6marosujv£r (Marosujv^r; Uioara 
de Sus; R) 13 
FelsfivadSsz (Abaujvar, c.) 304 
Felventer (-; Vintere; R) 220 
Felvinc (Oberwinz; Vinful de Sus, Unirea;
R) 564 
Felvinczi, GyOrgy 405, 409 
Fenes (Hunyad, c.; 0) 197 
Ferdinand (Habsburg) I, Holy Rom. 
emp., k. of Hungary (1526-1564) 253-
254, 256-259, 270, 284, 292 
Ferdinand (Habsburg) II, Holy Rom. 
emp., k. of Hungary (1619-1637) 318, 
322-323, 325 
Ferdinand (Habsburg) III, Holy Rom. 
emp., k. of Hungary (1637-1657) 319, 
330-332
Ferdinand (Habsburg) V, emp. of Aus­
tria, k. of Hungary (1835-1848) 486-
487, 489, 493, 498, 502, 504 
Ferdinand (Habsburg), archduke 318 -> 
also Ferdinand (Habsburg) II 
Ferdinand, archduke of Este 463 
Ferdinand, k. of Romania 639, 650, 654- 
655
Ferenczi, S^ndor 90 
Ferenczy, Kdroly 596 
Fiatfalva (Fidthfalva; - ; Filia$; R) 98-99 
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb 454 
Ficsor, L3szl6 231 
Filtsch, Johann 437 
First World War 555,557,562,568,579- 
580, 582, 590-591, 593-594, 596, 608, 
613, 636, 665-666 
Flavius Aper 54 
Florence (Firenze; I) 240 
Fiorina (Flerin; Flarin; R) 185 
Foaie pentru minte 474 
Fogaras (Fogarasch; Fagara?; R) 157, 
166, 169, 173, 191-192, 221, 230, 238, 
248, 252, 268, 279, 281-282, 286-287,
293, 341, 344, 347, 365, 370, 372, 377,
385, 388, 401, 403, 406, 419, 432, 434, 
446, 531, 552, 577, 590, 597, 599 
Fogaras, c. 302-303, 384, 548, 556-557,
577
Fogarasi Pap, J6zsef 436 
FSispin - > Lord lieutenant 
F6kir£lybfr6 (Lord chief justice) 433 -+
7 7 7  also Kir&lybiro (chief justice)
Foktui, Mate 305 
Foldvdr (Arad, c.; Erdburg; 0) 168 
FOldv^r (Brass6, c.; Marienburg; Fel- 
dioara; R) 76, 99,166,191, 234, 249 
FOnlak (-; Felnac; R) 93,137 
ForgAch, Ferenc 266-267, 292 
Forgich, Simon, count 378 
Forgach, Zsigmond, palatine of Hun­
gary (1618-1621) 310-311, 320 
"Fourth Nation" -*• Natio Valachica (Ro­
manian Nation) in Transylvania 
France 261-262, 264, 317, 319, 323, 330,
365, 371-372, 375, 379, 382, 411, 465, 
521, 538, 546, 549, 637, 656 
Franchet d'Esperey, Louis-Felix 648 
Francis (Habsburg) I, Holy Rom. emp., 
emp. of Austria, k. of Hungary (1792- 
1835) 435,449,457 
Francis Ferdinand (Habsburg), archduke 
630-632, 634-635, 63S35, 636 
Francis I, k. of France 247, 255-256 
Francis Joseph (Habsburg) I, Emp. of 
Austria, k. of Hungary (1848-1916)
533, 541, 544-545, 548, 552, 554, 609, 
620
Franciscan Order 288 
Francke, August Hermann 405 
Francken, Christian 290 
Franckenstein, Valentin Franck von 410 
Franco, b. of Trans. 147 
Franconia 114,117 
Franeker (H) 403
Frangep^ n, Ferenc, archb. of Kalocsa and 
diplomat 252 
Frangepdn, Ferenc, count 364 
"Frangia" -> Franconia 
Frankfurt am Main (G) 480, 494, 501 
Frankfurt am Oder (G) 403 
Fr^ta -> Magyarfr&ta 
Frederick V, pr. elector, k. of Bohemia 
319
Freeholder (szabados) 278 -> also Peas­
ants, peasantry, serfs 
Freemasons (freemasonry) 435-436,455 
Friaul (Friuli; I) 113 
Fridericus Gotefridus Veronensis -> 
Bethlen, Mikl6s 
Frivaldszky, J&nos 436 
Fritigem, Arianic Gothic k. 75 
Front of National Revival 668 
Frontier guard regiments 432-434, 445,
458
Romanian -  432, 434, 448, 502-503, 
530, 533
Sz6kely -  432-434, 443,448,489, 494, 
530
Frontul Plugarilor 681, 692 
Fugger, family 273, 385 
Fulda (G) 114
Fillek (Fil'akovo; SL) 311, 366 
Fundus Regius (Fundus Saxonum) -*■ 
Kiraiyftfld 
Funk, Andreas 437
Gabriel, clergyman 117 
Gaina, Gothic chieftain 78 
Gal, Janos 5005 
Gal, Sandor 514
Galacfalva (Heresdorf; Galajii Bistrijei; 
R) 88
Galacs (-; GoleJ; R) 63 
Galad -> Glad 
Galerius, Rom. emp. 53 
Gaiffy, P§ter 378 
Gaifi, Janos 294 
Galg6c (Hlohovec; SL) 331 
Galicia 13, 484, 504, 571, 581, 637 
Gallarati, Giovanni 441 
Gallia 91
Gallienus, Rom. emp. 53-54, 58 
Gallus, comes of Fehervar 153 
Gaiospetri (-; Galospetreu; R) 135, \2>i 
Gaisz6csi, janos 288 
Galt —► Ugra 
Galtis (0) 67
Gambuc (Gombostelke; Gombutz; Gim- 
buf; R) 152 
Gandirea 673 
Garamond, Claude 404 
Garamszentbenedek (Hronsky Benadic;
SL) 147", 148,154, 240 
Garda de Fier (Iron Guard) 668,684,688 
Garibaldi, Giuseppe 540 
Gazeta de Transilvaniei 474-475, 533, 
546
Geberic, Visigothic k. 67, 73 
Ged6, J6zsef 4622 
Geertruidenberg (H) 380 
Geitzkoffler, Zacharias 281 
Geleji Katona, Istvan 350 
Gelence (Gelentz; Ghelin^a; R) 241 
Gel6nes (Bereg, c.) 77 
Gelu (Galou, Golou, Geula, Gyalu), Wal­
lachian chieftain in the Gesta Hunga- 
rorum of Anonymus 111-112, 114, 
152, 159, 191 
Genes (Szatmar, c.; Ghen(i; R) 83 
Gentile de Montefiore, cardinal 204
Geographus of Bavaria 103 
Geographus of Ravenna 92 
George (GyOrgy), Friar (Martinuzzi; Ju- 
raj UtieSenovic), archb. of Esztergom 
(1551) 250-258,265-269,272,283,285, 
290, 293 
Gepidia 80, 82, 87, 89, 92, 97 
Gerald (Gell6rt) (Saint), b. of Csanad 
127-128,141-142,154,160, 167-168 
Ger6b (Grave) 181, 196, 205-206, 209,
211, 215, 235 
Gerund (-; Grind; R) 152 
German principalities 365, 377,398-399 
Germania (Rom. province) 29-30, 55 
Germany 290, 325, 345, 360, 482, 490-
491, 495, 501, 570, 583, 590, 612, 617,
637, 639, 642-643, 665, 668, 683-684, 
687, 689, 691 
Geszty, Ferenc 287, 294 
G6za, Hung, grand pr., father of Stephen
I 117,119,124-127,161 
G6za (Geysa) I, k. of Hungary (1074- 
1077) 125 ,12523, 142,145,154,171 
G6za (Geysa) II, k. of Hungary (1141- 
1162) 142-143,157, 172-173,179 
Ghenadie, Orthodox b. 292 
Gheorghe £tefan, v. of Moldavia 353 
Ghica, Grigore 362 
Ghica, Ion 492, 52040 
Ghiczy, Andras 311-312 
Ghiczy, Janos, gov. of Trans. 293-294 
Ghirei, Tatar khan 313 
Gisella (Kesla), queen of Hungary, wife 
of Stephen I 145 
Giurgiu (R) 295
Glad (Galad, Gilad), Cumanian chieftain 
111-112,114,128,159 
Glad (Krass6-Sz0r6ny, c., 0) 111, 128 
Glatz, Theodor 596
Glirius, Mathias - *  V ehe-G lirius, 
Mathias 
Glogovdc -> 6-Aradvdr 
Glondys, Viktor 683 
Goddard, Jonathan 405 
Goethe, Johann Wolfgang 437, 462 
Goga, Octavian 594, 633, 668, 672, 679 
Goganvaralja (Goganujvar; Gogesch- 
burg; Gogan-Varolea; R) 242 
Golden Horde 195 
Goldis, Vasile 633,637 
Golescu, Alexandru G. 501 
Gombas Marosgombas 
GomOr, c. 145, 259
G8nc (Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen, c.) 327
GOnci, M&t6 288
Goos, Carl 495
Gordian III, Rom. emp. 52
Gorgeny - *  Gorgenyszentimre
G 0rg6nyszentimre (Gorgeny; GOrgen;
Gurghiu; R) 254, 268, 284, 388 
Gomya -»  Felsc51upk6 
Goroszl6 —► Magyargoroszl6 
Gosselin, chaplain of the Hung, k., And­
rew II 181 
Gotha (G) 578 
Gothia 67, 75, 77 
GOtt, Johann 475, 480, 50729 
Gottingen (G) 437 
Government
Central Viennese-of Trans. 419-421, 
428-429, 431, 434-435, 440-441, 443- 
444, 446-447, 449, 452, 454, 456, 458, 
460-461, 463, 467, 469, 477-479, 483- 
484, 489-490, 492, 495, 498, 502, 507, 
514, 521, 541, 550-551 
Hung. -  (1848-1849) 489-490, 492- 
493, 495, 498-503, 505-510, 516-519, 
521-522
Hung. ~s (between 1869 and 1919) 
571, 575, 580, 587-589, 599, 602, 605- 
607, 610-617, 619-629, 631-633, 635, 
638, 641, 645-649, 653-656 
Provisonial -  in Bucharest (1848) 499- 
500
Romanian -  586, 605, 616, 618, 639, 
648, 650 
Gozsdu, Foundation 590 
Grabarics, Jakab 379 
Granada (SP) 143 
Grand Austria 630 -*• also Austria 
Grand Romania 617, 652, 654 -+ also 
Romania 
Grand-Romanian state 617 
Grandjean, Wolfgang 404 
Gratian, Rom. emp. 76 
Greece 7
Green Saxon movement 613 
Gregory XIII, pope 262, 408 
Gresham College in London 345 
Gritti, Alvise (Lodovico), gov. of Hun­
gary 249-250,273 
Gritti, Andrea, doge of Venice 249 
Gr6dno (P) 262 
Groisz, Gusztiv 551 
Grotius, Hugo 380, 400 
Groza, Petru 681, 692 
Grozescu, Iulian 586, 594
Guard
Hung. National -  (1848) 503-504,508, 
510
Romanian National -  (1918) 647 
"Guard of Maniu" 691 
Gubemium of Trans. 372, 396, 401-415, 
424-427, 430, 432, 434, 440-441, 443- 
444, 449, 452, 456-457, 461, 466, 471,
484, 487, 489, 491, 494, 503, 50525, 542, 
546, 548, 551-552, 567, 599-600 
Romanian -  512 
Guilds 233,343,389 
Gunderic, Gepid k. 73 
Gunesch, Johann 405 
Guraszida (Gursaden; Gurasada; R)
171, 200
Gustavus, Adolphus, k. of Sweden 323- 
324
Guthi, Istv&n 378
Gyalu (Gyaluvar;Julmarkt; Gilau; R) 111, 
152-153, 158-159, 254, 268, 275, 281, 
302-303, 340 
Gyalui, Farkas 596 
Gialuuar —► Gyalu
Gy£n, son of A13rd, Saxon gereb 182 
Gy5rf5s, Elemer 689 
GySrf&s, JenS 596 
Gyarmathi, Samuel 456 
Gyergy6szek (Gyergy6, seat) 183, 432 
Gyergy6szentmi kl6s (Niklasmarkt; Ghe- 
orgheni; R) 174 
Gyergy6teker<5patak -> TekerSpatak 
Gyerfimonostor —► MagyargyerOmo- 
nostor
GyOr (Gyorvar) (Gy<5r-Sopron-Moson, 
c.) 147,159, 240, 367 
GyOrgyfalva (Kolozs, c.; Gergesdorf;
Gheorgheni; R) 169 
Gyorvar -*■ Gyfir
Gyula (B6k6s, c.; Gyulamonostora, Jula- 
monostora) 123, 254, 259, 264, 276, 
279, 315
Gyula (from the clan K&n), v. of Trans.
(1214) 200 
Gyula (Gtilasz) (Stephanos), Hung.
chieftain 121,123-124 
Gyula ("third") (Prokuj), Hung, chieftain 
125-126,161 
Gyula, Hung. pr. 124,126,137,145,153,
161
GyulafehervSr (Apulum; Belegrade, Belle- 
grate, Balgrad; Karlsburg, Weissen- 
burg; Alba Jule, Alba Iulia; R) 87, 
103-108, 111, 12320, 124,126,132,134-
138,144-145,147,14729, 153,158-161,
165, 168, 170, 172, 174-175, 182-183, 
195, 199-202, 205-206, 212-213, 217, 
226, 228, 232, 239, 242, 253, 256-257,
259-260, 266-268, 274-275, 279, 286-
287, 291, 293-294, 296, 309, 313-314, 
320, 327, 339-342, 344, 346, 349-350,
353, 357, 373, 377-378, 398, 401, 404,
443, 510, 514, 542-543, 564, 567, 595, 
650-653, 673, 682 
Gyulafeherv&r (Romanian) resolution 
(1918) 673,682 
Gyulaffy, L£szl6 294, 298 
Gyulai, P£1 536, 595 
Gyulamonostora (Julamonostora) -> 
Gyula
Gyulavars&nd (-; Varsand; R) 137-138 
Gyulay, P il (Abafdji) 267, 292, 294 
Gyule(a), dux Cunorum (Cumanian 
duke) 14729
Habsburg, dyn. (House of Habsburg) 
247-249, 251, 253-259, 263-264, 269,
274, 281, 284, 286, 299, 305-306, 308, 
312, 317, 319, 321-324, 327-328, 330- 
332, 354-355, 360-363, 365-368, 370- 
377, 379-381, 386, 395, 413, 420, 429- 
431, 435, 439, 449-450, 479, 486-487! 
489, 498, 516, 518-519, 539, 630 
Habsburg Empire -»• Empire 
Habsburg Monarchy -> Empire 
Hadad (Kriegsdorf; Hodod; R) 259, 284 
Hadik, AndrSs, count 421, 432 
Hadrian, Rom. emp. 29, 31-32, 34, 36, 
41-42, 55 
Hague (Den Haag) (H) 380 
Haiduks 298,300,305-307,311,313,315, 
325-326, 357 
Hamburg (G) 322 
Halici, Mihai 410-411 
Halle am Saale (G) 405 
Haller, Ferenc, count 552 
Haller, G&bor 360,399 
H aller, J^nos, count, gov. of Trans.
(1734-1755) 369, 372, 399, 410 
Haller, Pal 302,399 
Haller, P6ter 258,270 
Halm&gy (Halmaden; Halmeag; R) 150, 
191
Hamel-Bruynincx, Jacob-Jan 379 
Hampel, J6zsef (Szdraz, Antal) 8 1 ,10116 
Hann, Sebastian 409 
Hanska-Luterija (R) 64 
Hciporton (-; Hopirta; R) 157
Haramvar (Temes, c.; 0; Uj-Pal&nk; Neu- 
palank; Banatska Palanka; S) 143 
Hardewijk (H) 351 
Hargita, c. 582
Harina (MOnchsdorf, MUnzdorf; Herina; 
R) 212
"Harmincad" (tricesima) (tax) 272 -+ 
also Tax, taxation 
H£romsz6k (Three seats), c. 150, 171,
182, 208, 285, 290, 433, 489, 512, 514,
518, 556-557, 604 
Harteneck, Johann 377, 384 
Ha(eganu, Emil 686 
H&tszeg (Hacak; Hatzeg, Hotzing, Wal- 
lenthal; Hajeg; R) 3,83,197-198,215,
220, 230-231, 292, 403, 599 
Hatvani, Imre 519 
Havaselve -» Wallachia 
Haynald, Lajos, b. of Trans. 543 
Haynau, Julius von, baron 527, 5271'3 
Hecataeus of Milet, Greek historian 14- 
15
Hegyalja 376
Hegyeshalom (Gy<5r-Sopron-Moson, c.) 
157
Hegyktfzkov&csi (-; Cauaceu; R) 118, 
138
HegykOzszentimre (-; Sintimreu; R) 141 
Heinsius, Anton 380 
Helene (Ilona), queen of Hungary 143 
Hell, Miksa (Maximilian) 425 
Heltai, GSsp^r (Helth, Kaspar) 288-290, 
292
Henndorf (H6gen; Bradeni; R) 234 
Henning, ger6b of P6terfalva 205 
Henry III (Valois), k. of France 261 
Henry IV (Bourbon), k. of France 262, 
317
Henter, Benedek 378 
Henter, Mihily 378 
Heraclius I, Byz. emp. 94 
Herbom (G) 346
Herder, Johann Gottfried 464, 475-476 
Hereditary Lands -*• Austrian Heredi­
tary Lands and Provinces 
Hermann, pr. of Baden 369 
Hermannstadt -*• Nagyszeben 
Herodotus, Greek historian 14-15 
Hertel, Franz -> Ddvid, Ferenc 
Hessen-Rheinfeld (G) 376 
H6viz -» Olthfrviz 
Hevizugra (Ugravdr; 0) 166 
Hidasliget (Bruckenau; Pischia; R) 138 
Hidveg (Fogaras, c.; 0) 191
Hierotheus, b. of "Turkia" 121,123-124 
Hildesheim (G) 126,144 
Hiszmann, Michael 437 
Hitler, Adolf 665, 683-684, 687,690-691 
Hmelnitsky, Bogdan, Cossack hetman 
332
Hochmeister, Martin 455 
HOchstadt-Blenheim (G) 377 
H6dmez6vAsArhely (Csongrad, c.) 658 
Hodony (-; Hodoni; R) 126,135,137 
Hohenlohe, Julius W., count 362 
Holding (telek) 278, 434, 441, 445, 458, 
467, 469, 496, 528 
HoldvilSg (Abstdorf, Appesdorf; Japu;
R) 150,284 
Holland 323, 345-346,404 
Holocaust in Hungary and in Romania 
689-690 
Holl6sy, Simon 596 
Holy Land 182 
Holy Ligue 294, 367-371, 383 
Holy Seat 262, 424 
Homonnay Drugeth, Balint 303-305 
Homor6d (Hamruden; Homorod; R) 
150,179,193 
Homor6ddar6c (Draas; Drauseni; R) 172 
Homor6dszentm£rton (Sankt-Marten;
Martinis; R) 241 
Honterus, Johannes 270, 287, 292, 597 
Hontvdr (Hont; Hont, c.) 159 
Horea (Vasile Nicula) 442-444,447-448,
503, 518
Horthy, M ikl6s, regent of Hungary 
(1920-1944) 659 
Horvath, AndrSs 387 
Hospites ("guests") 181,199, 202 
Hossu, Iuliu 686
Hosszufalu (Langendorf; Satulung; R) 
558
H6stcit (H6sdcit; Hochstatten; Hasdat) 
574
Huet, Albert 288, 298 
Hundertmannschaft (hudred men) 234 
Hungarian Bodyguard in Vienna 438 
Hungarian National Defence Committee 
(1848-1849) 513,517 
Hungarian Philological Society 455 
Hungarianization -> Magyarization 
Hunod, comes 144 
Hunyad -*  O-Hunyadvdr 
Hunyad, c. 118,146, 200, 202, 220, 229-
231, 272, 281, 384, 389, 397, 432, 434, 
546, 548, 556-557, 582, 589, 604, 607, 
781 626, 669, 672, 681
Hunyadi, J&nos, v. of Trans. (1441-1446), 
regent of Hungary (1446-1453) 227-
228, 230, 236 
Hunyadi, L£szl6 228 
Hunyadi, M<tty£s -> Matthias I, k. of 
Hungary 
Hunyadvar —► O-Hunyadvdr 
Hunyady, IstvSn 381 
Hussey, Sir Wlilliam 372 
Hussites 225 
HuszSr, Geil 289
Huszt (Hust; U) 266, 268, 287, 377-378, 
386
Huszty, Andr&s 424
Iancu, Avram 488-489, 493-494, 518-
519, 51939, 522, 528, 532, 540, 627 
Iasi gassy) (R) 500, 52040, 691 
Ibn Hayan 118 
Ibrahim Ybn Yakub 122 
Ibrahim, grand vizier 249-250 
Ibrahim, pacha of Buda 366-367 
Ieremia Movila, v. of Moldavia 296, 306 
Ieremias, v. ~» Ieremia Movila 
Igalja (Igyalja; Szolnok-Doboka, c. ; 0) 
150
Ikt£r (-; Ictar; R) 334
Ikus (Krass6, c.) 214
Ilie, v. of Moldavia 256
Ill6sh£zy, IstvSn, baron 298
Illuminism 435
Illye - *  Marosillye
Illy6d (-; Ilidia; R) 169,172,197
Illyria 47, 54-55, 57
Illyricum 21, 56, 75
Immigration (Romanian in Trans.) 214- 
215, 281-282 
Imperial Patent of the emancipation of 
the serfs (1854) 536 -> also Emanci­
pation of the serfs 
Imperial Privy Council 362 
Imperium Romanum -> Empire 
Imre (Emericus, Heinricus) (Saint), pr.
of Hungary, son of Stephen I 141 
Imrefi, Jcinos 309
Industry, industrialization 423,440,535, 
565-566, 569, 571-572, 575-576, 578,
581-582, 666, 669-670 
Inner Asia 92 
Innocentius XI, pope 368 
Inquilinus - *  Zsell6r 
Intelligentsia (intellectuels) 345,348,401, 
460-461, 604, 609 
Hung. -  472, 545, 679-681, 687
Polish -  460
Romanian -  440, 472, 474-475, 492-
493, 499, 509, 512, 518, 520, 532, 542, 
545-546, 552, 576, 586, 604, 613-616,
618, 623, 627, 630, 672, 681, 685, 688 
Saxon -  472, 482, 517, 583, 607, 612, 
623
Ioannes II Cinnamus 143 
Ioannes Comnenus, Byz. emp. 143 
Iobagiones 146, 200, 215, 282 -» also 
Serfs
Iobagiones castri 147, 206 -+ also Serfs 
Iordanes, the Goth, historian 26,67, 79- 
80
Iorga, Nicolae I. 639 
Iosif, £tefan Octavian 594 
Ipp (-; Ip; R) 685 
Irinyi, Daniel 614
Isabella (Jagellon), queen of Hungary, 
prcess of Trans. (1541-1551), wife and 
widow of John I, k. of Hungary 252-
253, 255-260, 264, 266-267, 270, 275,
283, 293, 314 
Isac, Emil 594,679 
lskar -» Oescus 
Isp6n —► Comes 
Ispanlaka (-; £palnaca;R) 13, 93 
Israel 320
Israelits 560 —► also Jews 
Istria (Istra; CR) 188 
Istv&n - *  ^orban 
Italia -*■ Italy
Italy (Italia) 19, 22, 54, 78, 99,113-114, 
118, 240, 247, 272, 539, 541, 582, 596-
597, 665, 684 




Ivan IV (the Terrible), tzar of Russia 263
Ivcinyi-Grtinwald, B61a 596
Izvorul (R) 70
Jacobins of Hungary (1794) 453 
Jagellon, Royal dyn. of Poland and Hun­
gary 235 
Jajca (Jajce; S) 231 
Jakab, Elek 591






Jdszi, Oszk&r 629,636, 644, 646, 648-649 
Jazikapan (R) 121
Jellacic, Josip, ban of Croatia 487, 502,
504, 513
Jenaische Naturwissenschaftliche Gesell- 
schaft 437 
Jenfi -+ Borosjendi, Szamosjen<5 
Jephtach 320 
Jerusalem 142 
Jesuit Order 403, 437 
Jesuits 291, 293-294, 373, 423, 426 
Jews 560, 562, 689, 6896, 690 -» also 
Israelits 
Joachim, comes of Szeben 189 
Jobbcigy -> Serfs
John I (Szapolyai, J&nos), v. of Trans. 
(1510-1526), k. of Hungary (1526- 
1540) 247-255,258,264-269,273,277,
290
John II (Szapolyai, J^nos Zsigmond)
("rex electus Hungariae"), k. of Hun­
gary (1540-1558), as John Sigismund 
(J^nos Zsigmond), pr. of Trans. (1556- 
1571) 252,258-260,264,267,271, 283,
290, 293, 355 
John III (Sobieski, Jan), k. of Poland 365-
367, 371 
John Casimir, k. of Poland 353 
John Philip (Johann Philipp von SchOn- 
bom), count, archb. of Mainz, pr. elec­
tor 359 
John Sigismund -► John II 
Jolanta of Capet-Courtenay, queen of 
Hungary 143 
Joseph I (Habsburg), Holy Rom. emp., 
k. of Hungary (1705-1711) 370, 378- 
381
Joseph II (Habsburg), Holy Rom. emp., 
k. of Hungay (1780-1790) 435, 440- 
449, 453 
Josephine reforms 446-449 
Josephinism 439-440 
J6sika, Istv&n, chanc. of Trans. 295 
J6sika, Miklos, baron 595 
JOsika, Samuel, baron 483,485,487, 534,
584
J6sikafalva (-; Belis; R) 646
Juga, Romanian v. 198
Jula, comes palatinus 147s
Julamonostora -> Gyulamonostora
Julia Mammaea 41
Julius Severus, proconsul of Dacia 34
Junker, Johann 654
Justin I, Byz. emp. 89, 97 782
Justin II, Byz. emp. 91-93 
Justinian I (the Great), Byz. emp. 81,89, 
91 ,97
Jutotcha (Jutas), Hung, chieftain 120
Kack6 (-; Citcau; R) 4689
Kdcsik, Mihdly 201
KAcsik, Simon, Szekely comes 195
Kacs6, SSndor 679
Kadan, Mongol chieftain 195
Kaldn (-; Calan; R) 580
Kcilbor (Kaltbrunnen; Calbor; R) 47
K51(i), horka 121
Kdllay, Mikl6s, pr. min. (1942-1944) 688 
Kdll6 -*■ Nagykdll6 
Kdlmdncsehi Sdnta, Mdrton 288-289 
Kalmdr, Jdnos 238-239 
Kdlnoky, Antal 433 
Kalocsa (Bdcs-Kiskun, c.) 128,141, 217,
252
Kalotaszeg 176, 597 
Kameniec (Kamenica; Kameniec-Podol- 
skij; U) 371 
Kcin, L6szl6 (1297-1317), v. of Trans.
204-205, 223, 229 
Kanizsa -> Nagykanizsa 
Kdpolna (-; Capilna; R) 226 
Kapoltch, Cumanian chieftain 149,171 
Kaposi Juhdsz, Sdmuel 405 
Kara Mustafa, grand vizier 367 
Kardcsony, GyOrgy 289 
Karakash Mehmed, pasha of Buda 321 
Kardnsebes (Karansebesch; Caransebes; 
R) 147, 149, 197-198, 217, 258, 268, 
275, 295, 298, 362, 590-591 
Karatna (n Torja; -; Caratna; R) 173 
Karcsa 101
Kardosfalva (KolozsvSr; Cordos; R)
84
Karlowitz (Karl6ca; Karlovac; S) 374- 
375, 426, 429, 533 
Karlsburg - *  Gyulafehervar 
Kama -> Maroskama 
Kdrolyi, Gdspdr 349 
Kdrolyi, Mih^ly, pr. min. (1918-1919) 
644-645, 649, 654-657 
Kdrolyi, Sdndor, baron 379, 381 
Kdros (Szabolcs, c.) 101, 136 
Karpaten-Verein 584 
Kassa (KoSice; SL) 233, 239, 248, 251, 
253-254, 259, 272, 274-275, 277, 298, 
300, 310, 320, 328, 331, 366, 658 
Kastner, Viktor 595 
Kastoria (BG) 185
Kaszds, Pdl 378
K&szon (KSszony; -; Casin; R) 209 
K£thay, Mihdly 300 
Katherine of Brandenburg, prcess of 
Trans. (1629-1630), wife of pr. Gabor 
Bethlen, pr. of Trans. 323, 325-326 
Katzianer, Hans 251 
Kazinczy, Ferenc 540 
Kazinczy, Lajos 528 
Kecskemet (Bdcs-Kiskun, c.) 572 
Kecskem6ti, MihSly 346 
K6kes (Szolnok-Doboka, c.; Blaudorf;
Chioehis; R) 149 
Keleti, Kdroly 562
Kelnek (Kelling; Clinic; R) 10,138,172 
Kelneki, Mihdly (Michael) (from the clan 
of Kdcsik), v. of Trans. (1209-1212) 
205
Kemeny, Denes, baron 533 
Kemeny, Ferenc, baron 542, 545-546, 
548, 553 
Kemeny, Istvdn, baron 50525 
Kemeny, Janos 679
Kem6ny, J&nos (John), pr. of Trans.
(1661-1662) 331, 357, 359-360, 409 
Kemeny, Simon 378 
Kemeny, Zsigmond, baron 595 
Kempen, Johann, baron 540 
Kende, Mikl6s 231 
Kendeffi, Addm 458 
Kendi, Ferenc (1553-1556) 258-259 
Kendi, Ferenc 294 
Kendi, Gdbor 294 
Kendi, IstvSn 308-309 
Kendi, Jdnos 256 
Kendi, Sdndor 259, 294 
Kenez 195-199, 215-216, 220, 223, 230- 
231
Ken§ziatus 196-198, 215 
Ken6zl<5 136
Kentelke (Kendtelek; Kindeln; Chintelnic;
R) 149,205 
Keny6rmez(5 (-; Cimpul Piinii; R) 229 
Ker (Doboka, c.; 0) 118 
Kerc (Kerz; Cir{a; R) 157,181,189,191, 
213, 239
Kercsesora (Kiskerc; Kercisora; Kerz;
Cirjisoara; R) 368 
Kerekes, Izsdk 411
Kerelfiszentpdl (-; SInpaul; R) 261, 268, 
285
Keresd (Kreisch; Cri?; R) 287, 406 
Kereszt6nysziget (Szeben, c.; Grossau; 
Cristian; R) 371
Kereszt6nyfalva (Brass6, c.; Grossau;
Cristian; R) 579 
Keresztes —► MezOkeresztes 
Kereszturi, Benedek 287 
Kereszturi, Krist6f 294 
Kereszturi, Pal 346
Kerl6s (Cserhalom; Kirieleis; Chrirales; R) 
148,183 
Keszi —► MezSkeszii 
Ketzeli, Mihaly 4689 
K6zd -> Szaszk6zd 






K6zdivciscirhely (Szekler Neumarkt; Tir- 
gu Secuiesc; R) 135, 399, 570 
Khadim Ali, pasha of Buda 259 
Khuen-H6derv£ry, Karoly, pr. min.
(1903; 1910-1912) 631, 633 
Kide (-; Chidea; R) 168 
Kiev (U) 67,439
Kingdom of Dacia 17-18, 20-24, 26-27,
29 —► also Dacia 
Kingdom of Romania -*■ Romania 
Kinizsi, Pal 229 
Kinsky, Ulrich 373
KiraiybirO (iudex regius, Konigsrichter) 
(chief justice)
-  of Szeben (of the Saxons) 211, 222,
236, 254, 600
-  of the Sz6kelys 283-284 
Kiraiyfold (Fundus Regius, Terra Regia,
KOnigsboden) 149-150,174,181, 211, 
336-337, 383, 405, 420-421, 428, 432, 
446, 476-478, 485, 529-531, 546, 559,
606, 610-611 
KirSlyhelmec (KrSlovsky Chlmec; SL)
101
Kis-Ktiktill<5, c. 557, 607 
Kisakna (Grubendorf; Ocnisoara; R) 103 
Kiscsur (Klein Scheuern; Sura Mica; R) 
99
Kisdiszn6d (Michelsberg; Cisnadioara; 
R) 181
Kisenyed (Klein-Enyed; Singatin; R) 445, 
510
Kisgalambfalva (-; Porumbenii Mici; R) 
87
Kiskerc - *  Kercsesora 
Kisnyires -*■ SzilSgynyires 101 
Kisseliov, Pavel Dimitrievitch 474
Kisselyk (Kleinschelken; ^eica Mica; R)
81, 87, 89 
Klapka, GyOrgy 539-541, 547 
Klauzil, Gabor 49819 
Klein, Johan 242 
Klein, Karl Kurt 682 
Klingsor 679, 682 
Klobusiczky, A. 35515 
Kniezsa, Istvan 149-150 
Knights of St. John 196-197, 203, 212 
Koch, Robert 586 
Kodaly, Zoltdn 597 
Kodoch, ken6z 197 
Kodyn(R) 98 
Kogalniceanu, Mihai 541 
K6halom (Reps; Rupea; R) 180, 405 
K0les6ry, Samuel 402, 404-405, 425 
KOln(G) 191
Kolozs (Salzburg; Cojocna; R) 144, 232 
Kolozs, c. 118, 128, 176, 200-202, 206,
209, 212-213, 230, 242, 445, 458, 589,
604, 645 
Kolozsakna -> MezOakna 
Kolozsmonostor (Kolozsvar; Appesdorf; 
Cluj-Manastur; R) 139,148-149,159,
165, 212, 225-226, 268, 275, 279, 286 
Kolozspata -> Patavar 
Kolozstorda 577
Kolozsvar (Napoca, Cluj; Cvar; Klausen- 
burg; Cluj-Napoca; R) 5, 131-132,
135-138, 144-145, 160-161, 163, 165-
166, 176,195, 201-202, 226, 232, 234,
238-242, 257, 259, 272, 274-275, 286-
291, 293-294, 317, 329, 340, 344, 346,
348, 360, 363, 369, 377, 385, 398-399,
401, 403-404, 406, 408-410, 421-422,
424-426, 436-437, 440, 446, 454-456,
461,466,472,477,47715, 484,487,494- 
469, 499-500, 508, 510, 513-514, 522,
528-529, 534, 539-540, 542, 551-552,
556, 559, 564-565, 567-568, 580-581,
587-588, 590-591, 597, 599, 608, 614,
619, 621-622, 642, 644-646, 649, 653- 





K0lp6ny -*  Mez6k0lp6ny
Kolun (Kolun; Colun; R) 191
Komana (Kormospatak; - ;  Comana; R)
191, 303 —*• also Als6komana 
Komensky (Comenius), Jan AmoS 346,
349,355, 35515 784
KOnigliche Deutsche Gesellschaft in 
Gottingen 437 
KOnigsboden - *  KiraiyfOld 
KOnigsrichter -*• Kiraiybfr6 
Konop (-; Conop; R) 169 
KOpec (-; Chepe(; R) 133 
KOpecbanya (-; Capeni; R) 579 
KOpeczi, Janos 405
Koppany (Coppan), Hung, chieftain 
125-126, 128 
Koppany (Torda, c.; 0) 163 
KOprtilU, Ahmed, grand vizier 360-361, 
364, 367
Kopriilu, Mehmed, grand vizier 356-
357, 360
KoprtilU, Mustafa, grand vizier 371 
Korcak (BO) 98




Komis, Gaspar 294, 296
Komis, Zsigmond, count, gov. of Trans.
(1713-1731) 408 
Korond (-; Corund; R) 93 
KSrosi Csoma, Sandor 456 
KOrOstarjan (-; Tarian; R) 135,137 
KOrtv61yes -*• Szentmihalykortvelyes 
Korunk 679
K6s, Karoly 597, 679-680
Kosaly (Kusaly, Als6kosaly; - ; Coseiu;
R) 63 
Kosovo Polje (S) 228 
Kossuth, Ferenc 628 
Kossuth, Lajos 465, 4656, 470-471, 47110, 
486, 50626, 506, 508-509, 513, 516-517, 
51737, 518-519, 521, 52143, 522, 528, 
534-535, 537-539, 541, 545, 547, 628 
K<5szeg (Vas, c.) 249 
Koszta, Istv6n 440 
Kosztezsd (-; Costesti; R) 17 
Koteles, Samuel 454 
K6tsi Patk6, Jinos 455 
Kovachich, Mdrton GyOrgy 439 
KovAcs, Istvan 67, 81 
Kovacs, J6zsef 437 
Kovacsi HegykOzkovacsi 
Kovacsoczy, Farkas 266-267, 292-294 
K6v^r (a Berkeszpataka; -; Cetatea; R)
266, 268, 278-279, 294, 377-378, 499 
K<5v&ri, Lciszl6 591, 596 
KOvesd (Kabesch; Coves; R) 150 
Kozarv^r (-; Cuzdrioara; R) 166 
Koz6p-Szolnok, c. 145,176,217,220,271
Kozma 494lb
Krajnikfalva (-; Josani; R) 137 
Krasso (Krassofo, Krassovar; 0) 138, 174, 
197
Krass6, c. 128, 169, 172, 214, 217, 221, 
230
Krassofo - *  Krasso 
Krass6-Szoreny, c. 607 
Kraszna (Krasznavar; - ; Crasna; R) 138, 
144,166,176, 254, 277 
Kraszna, c. 102,147, 271 
Kraszna (a  Szitabodza; - ; Crasna; R) 75 
Krasznavar - *  Kraszna 
Kraynik 231 
Kreutz, Gaspar 370 
Krist6ffy, J6zsef 628 
Kristyor (Hunyad, c.; - ;  Criscior; R) 220 
Kriza, Janos 594 
Kronstadt -> Brass6 
Krueger, J. G. 437 
Krul, Cumanian chieftain 149 
Ku(r)san, kende 110,120 
Kucsuiata (-; Caciulata; Cuciulat; R) 10, 
191
Kudzsir (Kudsir; Cugir; R) 580 
Kliktilld -> KtikullSvar 
KUkUllO, c. 118,176, 200, 202, 209, 458, 
548, 611
Ktiklill<5var (Kokelburg; Cetatea de Bal- 
ta; R) 120,138,144-145,162,175-176, 
195, 201-202, 226 
KtilsO-Szolnok, c. 145 
Kun, Bela 656-658 
Kun, G6za 596 
Kun, Gotthard 250 
Kun, Kocsard 608 
Kun-Gyalu (Szolnok, c.) 152 
Kunagota (Csongrad, c.) 123 
Kuncz, Aladar 679 
Kuruc movement 366 
Kurz, Anton 480, 482, 48221, 517, 522 
Kutyfalva (-; Cuci; R) 86
Laborcy, Bulgarian warrior 111, 114 
Lackfi, Endre, comes of the Sz6kelys 214 
Ladislas (Laszl6) I (Saint), k. of Hungary 
(1077-1095) 112, 141-143, 146, 148- 
149,154,160,162-164,166-168, 171, 
175, 212, 240-241 
Ladislas (Laszl6) IV (the Cumanian), k. 
of Hungary (1278-1290) 141,198,202-
203
Ladislas (Laszl6) V (Posthumus) (Habs­
burg), k. of Hungary (1440-1457) 228
Lalla, Mohammed, grand vizier 298 
Umkerek (Langendorf; Lancram; R) 147 
Lampert, Hung. pr. 141 
Land Reform
-  in Hungary (1848) 575
-  in Romania (1921) 674 
Lands of the Hung. Crown 482 
Lang, Martin 437
Language decree of Joseph II (1784) 447 
Lansing, Robert 648 
Lapad (Olahlap^d; - ; Lopadea Veche; R) 
157
L5pos —> MagyarlSpos 
Larissa (GR) 185 
Laski, Hieronym 248, 252 
Lasko, Osvaldus de 128 
L&szl6 - *  K3n, LSszl6 
Latinus, Johannes of Voldorf 211 
Latour d'Auvergne, Henri de, vicomte 
362
Latour, Theodor Bailie de 509 
Laureo, Vincenzio 262 
Laurian, August Treboniu 492, 505, 
50524, 520, 592 
Lavoisier, Antoine Laurent 437 
Law
District -  (Art. XLIII, 1868) 600 
Education -  (1868,1879) 589,611,615
-  of place-names (Art. IV, 1898) 620 
(Laws) of 1848 486,490,499,536,543- 
545, 552, 615
Nationalities -  (Art. XLIV, 1868) 601- 
602, 612, 620, 627
Serfs' emancipation -  (Art. IV, 1848) 
486, 495, 536
Union -  (Union of Trans, with Hun­
gary) (Art. 1 ,1848) 487, 543, 620 
Lazar, Gheorghe 457 
L&z£ri (-; Lazuri; R) 101 
Lecinyvcir 166
League of Nations 673, 680-681
League of Rhine 359, 361-362
Lecca, Constantin 597
Lecfalva (-; Le{; R) 5
Lederata (Backa Palanka; S) 29, 35, 78
Legion
Hung. -  (after 1849) 539 
Romanian -  (1849) 521 
Romanian -  of Prague (1918) 618 
Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm 436-437 
Leipzig (G) 405, 462 
Lemberg (Lvov; U) 456-457 
Lemony, loan 476-477, 509 
Lemheny (-; Lemnia; R) 64
Lengyel, Peter 409 
Lentulus, Cornelius 22 
Leodvin, b. 142 
Leon I, Byz. emp. 83 
Leon VI (the Wise), Byz. emp. 110,120 
Leopold I, Holy Rom. emp., k. of Hun­
gary (1657-1705) 355,357,359,362, 
364-365, 368-373, 375-378, 394, 400, 
428
Leopold II, Holy Rom. emp., k. of Hun­
gary (1790-1792) 449-451 
Lepanto (GR) 262
Lepes, GyOrgy of V&raskesz, b. of Trans.
223, 225, 227 
L6pes, L6r3nd of V&raskesz 223 
Lesnyek (-; Lesnic; R) 95, 220 
Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim 437 
Letcani (R) 70 
Levantine trade 272, 387 
Levedi, Hung. pr. 109 
Levente (Liuntika), Hung, duke 110,113 
Lex Apponyi (Law Art. XXVII, 1907)
589, 629, 632, 634, 637 
Leyden (H) 403 
Libanius 72
Libera vox (freedom to elect the pr. of 
Trans.) 371 
Liberalism 460, 462-463, 475, 481, 499- 
500, 569, 583, 602-603 
Liberi (freemen) 146-147 -»■ also Serfs 
Libertatea 626 
Liberti 146 -» also Serfs 
Liberties
-  of the Saxons (of Szeben) 181, 531
-  of the Szekelys 209, 222, 236, 282-
285, 295, 335, 398 - *  also Privilegies 
of the Saxons and the Szekelys
Libertini 451 
Licinius Crassus, M. 22 
Licinius Sura 29 
Liga Culturala 619, 621 
Lig§za, Stanistaw 267 
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Limes Transalutanus 34, 40, 52-53 
Linnaeus, Carolus 436 
Linz (A) 331 
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"Little Turkia" 117 
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L6f6 -*■ Primipili, primores 
London 345, 369, 403, 425 
Longinus, Rom. military tribun 30, 45 
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371, 375-377 
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Machiavel (Machiavelli, Niccolo) 305, 
400
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227
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Magyard6cse (-; Ciresoaia; R) 125 
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Magyarfrata (-; Frata; R) 171 
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R) 296
Magyargyerfimonostor (Ung. Kloster- 
dorf; Manastireni; R) 212 
Magyarigen (Grabendorf; Ighiu; R) 48, 
63
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241
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137,146
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R) 100
Magyars^ros (Kleinfarken; Delenii; R) 
406
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Mainz (G) 359
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638, 647, 649-650, 654, 666, 671-672, 
680, 691 
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221, 230-231, 242, 254, 259, 273, 281, 
377-378, 498, 544, 578 
MSramaros, c. 198, 216-217, 220, 231, 
242, 271, 385, 556, 604, 607, 672, 685 
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Marmajiei; R) 169, 559, 653-654 
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Maria (M&ria), (Anjou dyn.) queen of 
Hungary (1382-1395) 143 
Maria-Christina (Habsburg) 294 
Maria Theresa (Habsburg), queen of 
Hungary (1740-1780) 405, 425, 435, 
438, 440
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Marienescu, Atanasie 593 
"Markgrafschaft Sachsen" 531 
M£rkhcizi, P31 261 
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Marlborough, John Churchill, duke of 
377, 380 
Marlin, Joseph 482
Maroboduus, k. of the Germans 23, 44 
Maros-Torda, c. 606-607 
Marosbogat (Torda-Aranyos, c.; - ;  Bo- 
gata de Mures; R) 119
Maroscsap6 (-; Cipau; R) 137 
Marosdecse (-; Decea; R) 7,125 
Marosfelfalu (Prenzdorf; Suseni; R) 13 
MarosgombSs (Gombis; - ; Gimbas; R) 
90, 94, 134,137,169 
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79,103-105,131-132,135,137 
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res; R) 50,70,169-170 
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R) 79,177 
Marosnagylak (-; Noslac; R) 88, 93, 95, 
98,100,137 
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Ormenis; R) 150 
Marosszek (Maros, seat) 128, 172, 176,
182, 335
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R) 65, 67, 70-71, 74, 240 
Marosszentkir&ly (-; Sincraiul de Mures; 
R) 169
MarosujvSr (Maros, Maroschujvar; Ocna 
Mures; R) 70,103,148, 568, 578, 581 
Marosvdr - *  CsanSd 
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resch; Tirgu Mures; R) 8, 161, 169, 
232, 253, 274-275, 277, 292-293, 347, 
379, 389, 398, 401, 405, 425, 454, 466, 
472, 488, 509, 512-513, 522, 556, 559,
567-568, 574, 581-582, 587, 595, 608, 
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R) 88,98
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BO) 111 
Marsigli, Luigi 167 
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^omartin; R) 241 
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282, 324, 597 
Mathias II (Habsburg), Holy Rom. emp., 
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307, 319-320 
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Mavrocordat, Alexandru Moruzi 435 
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gary (1564-1576) 259-261, 263 
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70, 100, 149-150, 172-173, 182, 232,
241, 250, 298, 480, 514, 582, 610, 654 
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Mezfiakna (Kolozsakna, Szdszakna; - ; Oc- 
niJa;R) 70-71,144 
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R) 87
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ud; R) 169 
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len, c.) 251,295 
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Mez6s6g 5, 8, 12-13, 65, 174, 176, 201, 
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R) 169
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396, 406, 418-419, 426, 433, 440, 456-
457, 498, 500, 522, 534, 538, 540-541, 
617, 640, 668, 689 
Moldovan, Grigore 590, 594, 619 
Moldoveanul, Filip 291 
MolnSr-Piuariu, loan -> Piuariu-Moln^r, 
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Mor6, FiilOp, b. of Pecs 213, 231 
M or6, GyOrgy, ban of Sztfr6ny and 
N£ndorfeherv£r 231 
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540-541
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Murad, pasha, grand vizier 304-305,311 
Murdny (Murctn; SL) 364 
Muresanu, Andrei 493, 593 
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Mustapha, agha 304 
Muszka (-; Misca; R) 131-132,137 
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Nadasdi Ungor, Janos 229, 231 
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552
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361, 363-364 
NSdasdy, Tam^s 257 
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305
Nagy-Ktiklillfl, c. 556, 577 
Nagy^g (Gross-Astdorf; Sacarimb; R)
578
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Neustadt; Baia Mare; R) 169,175,259, 
263, 274, 377, 381, 405, 513, 516, 579, 
596-597
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255, 257
Nagydiszn6d (Heltau; Cisnadie; R) 241 
Nagyecsed (Szabolcs-Szatm6r, c.) 305,
348, 356
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va; R) 100 
Nagyenyed (Gross-Enyed, Strassburg, 
Aiud; R) 93,176, 289, 293, 296, 378-
379, 390,404, 411,437,454,472, 50525,
564, 575, 587 
Nagyemye (Am; Emei; R) 161 
Nagyfalu -*■ SzilSgynagyfalu 
Nagyharsany (Baranya, c.) 369 
Nagyikl6d (Szolnok-Doboka, c.; - ; Iclod;
R) 87,101 
Nagyilonda (-; Ileanda; R) 645 
Nagykalld (Szabolcs-Szatmar, c.) 305 
Nagykanizsa (Kanizsa) (Zala, c.) 297, 
299, 312, 360, 362 
Nagyk^roly (Karol; Carei; R) 138, 657 
Nagykoml6s (Netnet-Komlos; Komlosch, 
Comlosul Mare; R) 137 
Nagylupsa (Wolfsdorf; Lupsa; R) 220 
Nagymedes6r (-; Medisorul Mare; R) 99, 
169
Nagydsz (Triebswetter; Tomnatic; R) 
137
Nagyosztr6 (Osztro; Gross-Rodendorf;
Ostrov; R) 220 
Nagysaj6 (Grossschogen; ??ieu; R) 205 
Nagysink (Gross-Schenk; Cincu; R) 13,
234, 241
Nagysinkszek (Nagysink, seat) 180 
Nagyszalonta (-; Salonta; R) 330 
Nagyszeben (Szeben, Hermannstadt; Si- 
biu; R) 11, 99-100,172,180-183,191, 
195, 212, 224, 226-227, 229, 232-235,
241, 249-251, 258, 270, 272, 274-275,
282, 287-288, 291, 296, 301, 309-310,
316, 337, 341, 348, 377-378, 384, 388, 
391, 396, 398-401, 404, 408-409, 421- 
422, 431, 435, 437-438, 446, 455-457,
480, 485, 488, 490-491,494, 504,50524, 
50628, 507,510,512-514,51635, 517,522, 
528-529, 531, 542, 548, 551, 558-559,
565, 567, 580-582, 585-586, 590, 594, 
596-597, 612, 614-615, 618-619, 627, 
632, 638, 640, 652-653, 656-657
Nagyszegi, GSbor 374, 377-378 
Nagyszentmikl6s (Grossanktnikolaus;
Sinnicolau Mare; R) 35, 128,137 
Nagysz61ds (Vinogradov; U) 360 
Nagyszombat (Tmava; SL) 277, 425 
Nagyteremia (Marienfeld; Teremia Ma­
re; R) 137 
NagyvSrad (Grosswardein, Oradea; R) 
81,83,87,138,142-143,148-149,167- 
168, 170, 174, 195, 201, 204, 215, 220, 
238, 240-241, 250-253, 259-260, 264, 
266-268, 272, 274-275, 279, 287, 289, 
293-295, 298, 305, 313, 324, 326, 340, 
791 346, 349, 357-360, 362, 368-369, 372,
377, 382-383, 404, 410-411, 451, 513,
533, 559-560, 565, 567-568, 581, 593,
598, 645, 657-658, 669 
Naissus (Nig, S) 39, 55,187 
Namur (BG) 142 
Nandorfehervar -> Belgrade 
Naple (Napoli; I) 248 
Napoca 42, 44, 50, 58, 63, 84-85,136,160,
165 - *  also Kolozsvar 
Napoleon III, emp. of France 539 
Napoleonic wars 421 
Narbonne (F) 114
Nasuh, pasha, grand vizier 311-313,318 
Nasuh Hussein 329-330 
Nasz6d (Nussdorf; Nasaud; R) 432-434,
504, 517, 546, 571-572, 589, 591, 599 
Nasz6d, c. 546, 548-549 
Nation (natio) (in feudal sense of the 
word) 216,221-22,224, 426,445,459, 
466, 476, 47715, 478, 486, 493 
Hung. -  (natio Hungarica) 222, 224, 
447- 449, 451, 457, 497, 506, 508 
Illyrian -  (natio Illyrica) 440, 450 
Romanian -  (natio Valachica) 377,
408, 427, 434, 449, 457, 465, 472-473,
475, 477, 488, 490-493, 497-500, 506,
514, 520, 548
Saxon-(natioSaxonica) 222,224, 226, 
2231, 277, 283, 336-337, 408, 446-448,
479, 481-482, 490, 495, 497, 514, 516 
Szekely -  (natio Siculica) 222,224,226,
283, 335-336, 432, 447-449, 451, 465, 
497, 508
- *  also Three Nations (tres nationes) 
of Trans, and Unio trium nationum 
Nation (after 1848)
Hung. -  607, 622
Romanian -  542-543, 548, 551, 562, 
616, 622, 632, 650 
Saxon -  532, 562 
National awakening 
Romanian -  459 
Saxon -  478 
National Bank of Austria 565 
National rights (Romanian) 441, 476,
481, 492
Nationalism 459,492, 562,583, 606, 668, 
672-673, 681 
German -  479, 483, 583 
Hung. -  446-447, 483, 607 
Hung, cultural ~ 476 
Linguistic -  482 
Romanian -  445, 451, 488 
Saxon ~ 478
Nationalities 433, 464,466,481-482,498, 
521, 542, 544-546, 554, 562, 583, 586-
587, 591, 599, 601-602, 605-606, 608,
615,623-624,668,670,673,685 - *  also 
Minorities 
Nationality question 501, 505, 541, 546,
600-601, 609, 625, 644,650, 667, 681 
Nation-state (Hungarian) 464, 600-601,
612
Navarre (F) 262 
Nazism 668 —♦ also Fascism 
N6metcsan&d -*• Csandd 
N6meth, L6szl6 679 
Nemetszentp6ter (Deutsch-St. Peter; Sin- 
petru German; R) 93-94,137 
Neoabsolutism 527, 529-533, 539-540, 
552, 568-569, 588, 600 —» also Abso­
lutism
Nerva, Cocceius, Rom. emp. 29 
Nesselrode, Karl Robert, count, Russian 
diplomat 500 
Netherlands 319,345,350,365,368,372, 
375, 377, 379-380, 399, 403-406, 448 
Neuhaus (Jindrichiiv Hradec; BO) 376 
Neusachsen (New Saxons) 610 
New jersey (USA) 558 
New York (USA) 558 
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Nicholas I, tzar of Russia 514, 538 
Nicodemia (Izmit; T) 378 
Nicopolis (Nikopol, BG) 224 
Niculescu, Alexandru 224 
Nietzsche, Friedrich 592 
Niezowski, StanisJaw 267 
Nijmegen (H) 366 
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Nikolsburg (G) 322 
Ninth (nona) (tax) 224, 279 -» also Tax, 
taxation 
NiS(S) 187-188
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146,199-201, 206-209, 215, 218, 221-
222, 228-231, 237-238, 247, 282, 285-
286, 295, 327, 333-334, 337, 363, 389-
390, 395, 397-400, 418, 420, 422-424, 
433-434, 443, 445, 449-450, 452-453, 
460-461, 463-465, 468, 470-471, 477,
481, 483-484, 487-488, 503, 534, 536, 
603
Nobles' judge (szolgabir6) 207, 209, 231 
N6gr&d, c. 297,299 
Nopcsa, L&szl6 489 
Norfolk 380
Noricum 22, 37, 46-47, 56, 60
Norma Regia (royal norms) 441 
Novakovici, Dionisie, Romanian Ortho­
dox b. 429 
Numerus valachicus 675 
Nuremberg (Ntirnberg; G) 341 
Nyirbator (B&tor) (Szabolcs-Szatm&r, c.)
242, 456-257, 264 
Nyirseg (Szabolcs-Szatm&r, c.) 117,128,
148
Nyulas, Ferenc 454
O-Aradvdr (Glogovac, Othalom; - ; Glo- 
gova{; Vladimirescu; R) 138-139,
158-159, 168-170, 174 
6-Hunyadvar (Vajdahunyad) 138-139,
148-149, 158, 160, 165, 169, 175-176,
201-202 -> also Vajdahunyad 
6-Kolozsvdr -» Kolozsmonostor 
0-Orsova —► Orsova 
O-Tordavar (V&rfalva; Burgdorf; Moldo- 
vene^ti; R) 138-139, 149, 158, 160,
162-163,170,175 
0beseny<5 (Besenyo; Altbeschenowa; Du- 
destii Vechi; R) 131 
Obon -» Abony 
Obr&zsa (-; Obreja; R) 54, 64 
Obuda (Budapest) 119 -> also Aquin- 
cum, Budapest 
Ocfalva (-; 0|eni; R) 99 
Octavian -» Augustus 
October Diplom (20th October 1860)
541-543
O'Donel, Karl, count of Tyrconnel, mili­
tary gov. of Trans. 432 
Oescus (Iskar; Gigen; BG) 23, 55,187 
Offenbanya - *  Aranyosb&nya 
Ohio (USA) 558 
Ohrid (Cesaria; BG) 128,188 
Ok0rsiit6s (ox-grilling) (tax) 237,283 -► 
also Tax, taxation 
Oiah, Mikl6s, archb. of Esztergom (1553- 
1568) 282,292 




Ol&htordos (Als6-Feh6r, c.; Torendorf;
Turdas; R) 100 
Old Romania -> Regat 
Olmutz (Olomouc; BO) 514, 516, 520 
Oltenia (Little Wallachia) -> Wallachia 
Oltheviz (Heviz, Hevizugra; Warmbach, 
Warmwasser; Hoghiz; R) 191 
Oltszakadat (Sakedaten: Sacadate; R) 191 7 92
Omer, pasha of Bosnia 310 
Omoldova (-; Moldova Veche; R) 138,
166
6 nod (N6grdd, c.) 327, 396
6 p&los (-; Paulis; R) 137
6 p6cska (-; Pecica; R) 87,132,134,138
Opitz, Martin 346




Oravica (Oravicabdnya; Orawitza; Ora- 
vifa; R) 94, 590 
Orba (Orb6, Urwegen) 180 
Orbaisz6k (Orba, seat) 180,182, 212 
Orbcin, Baldzs 591, 616 
Orbisz 50 
Orb6 -*• SzSszorb6
OrdOgkut (Teufelsbrunnem; Treznea; R) 
685
Orla (Orld, Orlaboldogfalva; - ;  Sinta- 
maria-Orlea; R) 578 
Orl5t (Cibinvar; Winsberg; Orlat; R) 166, 
434, 440, 504 
Orm&ns&g (Baranya, c.) 176 
Ormenyes -► Maros6rm6nyes 
Ormod (Breszt6, Brestov; U) 77 




Oroszldnos (Banatsko Arandelovo; S) 
127
(5rs6g ((3rvid6k) 176 
Orsova (Orsvar, Orschowa; Orsova; R)
94, 106, 117, 123, 133, 137, 168, 174,
640, 649 
Orsvar —> Orsova
Orthodox decree of toleration (1758) 429 
Orthodoxes 428
Orthodoxy (Greek) 290, 292, 428-429,
451
Oselivka (MO) 64
Osman II, Ottoman sultan 318, 321
Ostorog (P) 332
Osul, Petcheneg chieftain 147 ,14729 
Osztro - *  Nagyosztr6 
Othalom —► O-Aradvar 
Otranto (I) 114
Otto (Wittelsbach dyn. of Bavaria), k. of 
Hungary (1305-1308) 204 
Otto I, Holy Rom. emp., k. of Germany 
124
Otto of Freising 173
6v5r (Old Castle) -> Kolozsv&r 
Oxford 409 
Ozd -> Uzd 
dzd, c. 212
P. Master (P. dictus magister) -> Ano- 
nymus 
Pacatian, Teodor V. 592 
Pacta Conventa 263 
Padova (I) 213,345-346 
Paget, William 372, 403 
P41, royal notary, b. of Trans. 212 
Palatino-Transylvanica Societas 391 
Palatka —► Magyarpalatka 
Paleologus, Jacobus 290 
Palestrina, Giovanni Perluigi da 293 
PSlffy, JSnos, count, war lord 381 
Pdlffy, KAroly J6zsef, count, vice-chanc. 
442
PSlffy, P51, count 354 
Pallavicini, Sforza 257 
Palm, Jozefa 454 
Panaitescu, Petre P. 192 
Pannonia 22-23, 27, 31, 35, 37, 42, 46- 
48,51, 59-60, 64, 76, 92,109,111-115, 
117,144 
Pannonia Inferior 35 
Pannonia Secunda 91 
Pan-Slavism 494 
Papacy 262
P£pai P&riz, Ferenc 400, 404-405 
Papiu-Ilarian, Alexandru 488, 494, 592 
Parajd (-; Praid; R) 568 
Parately (Paratej) -> Bar&thely 
Paris (F) 213,366,411,425,494,500,520- 
521, 52143, 535, 539, 619, 650, 653, 659, 
665, 684, 692 
Paris Peace Conference 655-657, 665 —► 
also Peace-treaties 
Pdrkany (Sturovo; SL) 367 
Par6 (Parr6, Par6, Berau; Parau, Pirau;
R) 191 
Parties
Hung. National -  680, 683 
Hung. Social Democratic -  667 
Hung. Socialist-Liberal Party of K31- 
m3n Tisza 605
Liberal -  (in Romania) 619, 621, 623, 
625, 631
Liberal National Party of Bratianu 
666-667, 680
National Present -  of Maniu 667-668, 
672, 691
Romanian Communist- 667,681,683
Romanian National Party of Iuliu Ma- 
niu 666, 671
Romanian National Party in Trans.
590, 615-616, 618-619, 625-627, 630, 
632, 638, 644, 647, 651 
Sachsische Volkspartei 612 
Partium (Partium Regni Hungariae) 83,
121, 260-161, 265, 270-271, 274, 278-
279, 281, 286, 288-290, 333-334, 365, 
377-378, 385, 417, 47715, 529, 537, 555 
Partos (-; Partos; R) 103 
"Pasha of Doboka" -> Bdnffy, Dezs6, 
baron 
Pasteur, Louis 586 
Pdsztortuz 679 
Pataki, loan 427
Patavar (Kolozspata; -; Pata; R) 158 
Patent of toleration (1781) 441, 4541 
Pater, JAnos 387, 391, 399 
Pat6csy, Ferenc 250, 256 
Pavia (I) 118 
Pax Habsburgica 417 
Pdzmciny, P6ter, archb. of Esztergom 
(1616-1637 ) 323, 330, 365 
Peace-treaties
-  of Bucharest (1913,1918) 634, 636
-  of Constantinople (1547) 255-256
-  of Karlowitz (1699) 374-375 '
-  of Linz (1645) 331
-  of Nijmegen (1659) 366
-  of Nikolsburg (1622) 322-324
-  of Paris (1856,1919,1947) 539,655- 
657, 692
-  of Speyer (1570) 259-260, 263-264, 
271
-  of Szatmdr (1565, 1711) 259, 381, 
400, 415
-  of Trianon (1920) 659-660, 665, 669
-  of Utrecht (1712) 382 
- o f  Vcirad (1538) 252-254
-  of Vasvir (1664) 362-363
-  of Vienna (1606) 298-300, 304-305
-  of Westphalia (1648) 332, 354, 359
-  of Zsitvatorok (1606) 299-300, 306, 
311
Peasant wars (1437,1514) 223-225, 235, 
238-239
Peasants, peasantry 192, 200, 225-226,
232, 234, 236, 238, 285, 327, 333, 343, 
396, 418, 421-422, 427, 443-445, 453, 
458-459, 463-464, 467, 469-471, 480,
485, 487, 489, 502-504, 508, 510, 534, 
536-538, 541, 566, 573-575, 577-578,
607, 670-671 -> also Serfs
Peasants' movement (1934) in Trans. 667 
P6chi, Simon 321 
P6chy, Man6, count 599 
P6cs (Baranya, c.) 147, 231 
Pecska -► 6 p6cska 
Pekry, Lfirinc 379 
Pemflinger, Markus 249, 287 
Pennsylvania (USA) 558 
PerSnyi, P&er (1526-1529) 248-250,252-
253
Perjdmos (Perjamosch; Periam; R) 131, 
137
Persia 258,299,311 
Persinari (R) 11 
Pertev, pasha 259
Pest (Budapest) 274, 276, 436, 481-482, 
487,497-498, 506, 516,52142, 539-540,
542, 544-545, 547, 549, 554, 576, 586, 
593, 595, 621 —► also Budapest 
Pest-Buda 486, 593 -*• also Buda, Pest, 
Budapest 
Pestalozzi, Johann Heinrich 480 
Pestenyi, Mihdly 231 
Pestera (-; Pesterea; R) 3 
Petelei, Istvdn 596
Peter (Orseolo), k. of Hungary (1038- 
1041; 1044-1046) 125, 139,147,168 
Peter (the Great) I, tzar of Russia 375 
Peter, Romanian v. 188, 220 
Peter, Romanian v. 220 
Peterborough, Charles Mordaunt, Earl 
of 380-381 
P6terfalva (Szeben, c.; Petersdorf; Pet- 
resti; R) 205 
Petfifalva -► Sz6kelypet<5falva 
Petfifi, SSndor 522,592 
Petr6czi, Kata Szid6nia 411 
Petronas Spatarios 109 
Petrovics, P6ter 252, 254, 256-259, 288- 
290
PetrozsSny (Petroscheni; Petrosani; R)
559, 579, 582, 640, 649 
Petru Rares, v. of Moldavia 249-250 
Phanariot 474
Philip I (Philippus I Arabs) 62, 65
Philip II (Philippus II) 62
Philip II, k. of Macedonia 16
Philip II, k. of Spain 262
Piarists 423, 437
Piedmont 539, 541
Pietism, pietists 402, 408, 411, 424
Pietroasa (Petroza, R) 74
Pintea, Grigore 378, 411
Piski (Hunyad, c.; 6 piski; - ;  Simeria
Veche; R) 135,137,169, 514 
Piskitelep (Fischdorf; Simeria Noua; R) 
580
Piskolt (-; Pi^colt; R) 100
Piuariu-Molricir, loan 437, 440, 455-457





Poetovio (Pettau; Ptuj; SLO) 48, 54-55,60 
Poiret, Pierre 404 
Pok, Mikl6s 204
Poland 135,159, 216,227, 233, 2487, 258, 
261, 262-265, 276, 281, 290, 294-295, 
309-310, 318, 323, 332, 338, 346, 350, 
353-355, 359, 361-366, 368-369, 371,
376-377, 381, 406, 411, 460, 656 
Polyin (Flussan; Poiana Sibiului; R) 99 
Pomarius, Christian 292 
Pontigny (F) 143 
Pontus 17,19-20 
Pop, Gheorghe 645 
Pop, Misu 597 
Pop, Nicolae 429 
Popescu, Nicolae 429, 597 
Popovici, Aurel C. 544, 619, 630 
Popovici, Stan (Sofronie) 429 
Popp, Vasile 455
Porcia, Johannes Ferdinand, pr. 362 
Porolissum 34, 37, 48, 53, 160 -» also 
Mojgrad
Porta (household) 268, 277, 280, 283 
Porte (Ottoman) 224, 252-253, 255, 258, 
260, 263, 269, 272, 305, 309-316, 318,
326, 328-329, 335, 358-369, 371-372, 
377, 381, 385, 394, 402, 417 
Porumbcik (Bornbach, Warmbach; Po- 
rumbacul; R) 302, 388 
P6sa (Szeri), v. of Trans.(1227; 1235- 
1241) 193,195 
Possevino, Antonio 262 
P6sta, Bela 67
Potaissa 38, 42, 58, 63,160 -» also Torda 
Potcoava, loan 262
Pozsesna (PozsgAs; Poscheschna; Pojeje- 
na; R) 63
Pozsony (Bresalauspurc; Pressburg; Pres- 
bourg; Bratislava; SL) 111, 158, 176,
247, 257, 272, 312, 320, 3203, 364, 370, 
437, 462, 486-487, 499 
Pragmatica Sanctio (1723) 415, 424 
Prague (Praha; BO) 123, 213, 240, 294-
296, 319, 321, 332, 502, 648
Preslav (BG) 135
Primipili ("16f(5k") 237, 283-284, 398 
Primores ("16f6k") 237, 283-284, 398 
Priscos, rhetor 78, 80 
Priszlop (Hunyad, c.; Felsfiszilvds; -;Pris- 
lop; Silvasul de Sus; R) 220 
Privilegies
Saxon -  274, 288, 336-337, 507, 611, 
671
Sz6kely -  335-336, 432, 489, 600 
-*  also Liberties of the Saxons and 
Szekelys 
Probus, Rom. emp. 64 
Proclamation of serfs' emancipation 
(1781) 442 
Prokuj, gyula -+ Gyula 
Promontorium Waradiense (Promontor 
of Vcirad) (V&radhegyfok) (Nagyvci- 
rad) 143
Pronunciamentum of BalSzsfalva (1868) 
614
Protestantism 291, 424 
Protestants 
Dutch -  372 
Romanian -  339 
Trans. -  291, 424, 450 
Protonotarius (chanc.) 268-269 
Provisorium 548
Provostship (Provost) of Szeben 182,212 
Prussia 263, 448, 480, 538 
Przemysl (P) 135 
Pseudo-Movses of Khorenatzi 98 
Ptolemy, Greek geograph 28, 352 
Puchner, Anton 495, 504-505, 507, 509- 
510, 512, 51234, 513-514 
Pulszky, Ferenc 10116 
Pumnul, Aron 491 
Puritanism 345-346, 407, 411 
Puscariu, Sextil 188 
Pythagoras 25
Quadratus Bassus 31 
Quedlinburg (G) 124 
Quinquagesima (fiftieth) (tax) 197 -► 
also Tax, taxation
Rabutin de Bussy, Jean-Louis, count 372,
377-379, 400-402, 409 
R5cz, Samuel 437 
Radagaisus, Gothic chieftain 71 
Radna (Oradna; Rodna; Rudna; Alt- 
rodna; Rudna Veche) 152, 181, 183, 
195 -> also Mariaradna 
Radn6t (Radnuten; Iernut; R) 50
Radu (Radul) !perban, v. of Wallachia
297, 306, 309-310 
Radu Mihnea, v. of Wallachia and Mol­
davia 309-310,313 
Radvcinszky, J^nos 378 
Radziwill, Janusz, Polish pr. 332 
Raetia 30, 55, 60, 76 
Rajka, Peter 580
R ik6czi, Ferenc (Francis) I, pr. of Trans.
(1652-1660) 364,366,375 
R3k6czi, Ferenc (Francis) II, pr. of Trans. 
(1704-1711) 369, 374-383, 386, 394-
398, 400-403, 408-409, 411, 416-417, 
424, 438
R£k6czi, GyOrgy (George) I, pr. of Trans. 
(1630-1648) 319, 322, 324-332, 336, 
340, 344, 348-350, 352-353 
R£k6czi, GyOrgy (George) II, pr. of 
Trans. (1648-1660) 332,336-338,340,
349, 352-357, 359, 387 
R&k6czi, JOzsef, son of Ferenc RSk6czi II 
417
RSk6czi, Lciszl6, son of Ferenc R6k6czi
II 411
Rctk6czi, Zsigmond (Sigismund), pr. of 
Trans. (1607-1608) 298,304-306, 314, 
319
R£k6czi, Zsigmond, son of GyOrgy R&- 
k6czi I 326,331-332,349,353-357,364 
RSkos (Pest, c.) 237 
Rikosd (Hunyad, c.; - ; Racastia; R) 163 
Ramazzini, Bernardino 425 
Ramus, Petrus (Pierre de la Ram<5e) 292, 
346
Ratiaria (Arcar, BG) 55,187 
Ratibor (Racib6rz; P) 256, 295 
Ratisbonne (Regensburg; G) 233, 361 
Ratiu, loan 551, 619, 621-622 
Ravasz, L5szl6 596 
Ravenna (I) 92 
Rebreanu, Liviu 594, 673 
Recsey, Adim , Baron 4904 
Reformation 218,287-289,291-293,328, 
479
Regalists 265, 430, 642, 476, 484, 549- 
550, 553, 671-672, 677 
Regat 671-672, 675, 677 
Regen - *  Sz5szr6gen 
R6geni, Mihily 404 
Regino, A. I l l
Region of Temes -*■ TemeskOz 
Regius, Heinricus 404-405 
Reichenstein, Franz Mtiller von, baron
551
Reicherstorffer, Georg 248-249, 287
Reichsrat 543, 551
Religion
Calvinist -  288
Greek Catholic -  671
Greek Orthodox -  338, 373, 383, 426,
671
Lutheran -  288 
Protestant -  331 
Uniate -  451 
Unitarian -  587 
-> also Church 
Religiones receptae (received religions)
560
Religious tolerance 287, 382 
Rem6nyik, S&ndor 679 
Renaissance 275, 286-287, 293, 340-341,
408-409, 411 
Republic of Councils in Hungary (1919)
656-659, 667 
Resica, Resicab&nya (Reschitza; Resina;
R) 580,649,669 
Resinir (Stadterdorf; Rajinari; R) 558,
576
Restitutionsedict of Joseph II (1790) 448,
452
Reteganul, Ion Pop 594
Reti, IstvSn 596
Rety (-; Red; R) 71, 269,173
Revisionism (revisionist in Hungary)
665, 668 
Revolts
Peasants' -  in Trans. (1784) 442-445 
Szekely -  (1506, 1519, 1571, 1575,
1762) 237-238, 244, 286, 428 
Revolution
French -  (1789) 435
Hung. -  (1848, 1918) 486, 489, 501-
502, 527-528, 539, 542, 555, 559, 564,
583, 643, 647
Russian -  (February, October 1917)
642-643
Viennese -  (1848) 495 
Wallachian -  (1821, 1848) 474, 492,
499, 501, 520, 535 
Rheinbund 362 
Ribbentrop, Joachim von 684 
Ribice (-; Ribifa; R) 220 
Robot (corvee) 199, 277, 279, 285, 387- 
388, 418, 427, 430; 442-443, 445, 453,
458, 467, 469, 488, 503, 505, 518, 536- 
537, 582 
R6di Cseh, Jcinos 205,242 
ROdi Cseh, Peter 205 796
Rodna -» Radna 
Rodosto (Tekirdag; T) 411, 438 
Rogerius (Roger), chronist 195 
Roggendorf, Wilhelm von 253 
Roman, Alexandra 590 
Roman Empire -*• Empire 
Romania 117, 184, 521, 540-541, 558,
568-570, 572, 574, 580, 582, 585-586, 
592, 594, 608, 625-618, 621, 623-627, 
630, 634, 636-641, 644, 648, 650-652, 
654, 658, 660, 665-671, 673-674, 678, 
681-684, 688-692 
Romanian National Bank 675 
Romanian National Commonality 686 
Romanian principalities -*■ Danubian 
principalities 
Romanian voievodats 112,128,196,232-
233, 269, 272, 281, 306, 310, 337, 352-
354, 357, 362 -» also Moldavia, Wal­
lachia
Romanization in Dacia 187 
Romanianization in Trans. 482,675, 677 
Romanus (Lakapenos) I, Byz. emp. 122 
Romanus II, Byz. emp. 122 
Romashki (U) 67
Rome (Roma; I) 17,19-23, 26-32, 38-40, 
44-46,57,62,64,66,122,189,247,262, 
373,409,426,428,434,439,671 -> also 
Empire 
R6mer, F16ris 10116 
Romula (-; Resca; R) 42, 52, 58 
Rosetti, Constantin A. 520 
Roska, Merton 90 
Roth, Elias 507
Roth, Johannes, judge of Szeben 270 
Roth, Otto 654
Roth, Stephan Ludwig 480-481, 507, 
50729, 517 
Rothschild, family 567 
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 458 
Royal Society 405 
Rozsnyai, Dcivid 241, 410 
Rozsnyai, Jcinos (Johannes de Rosenau)
241
Ruda (n Brad; - ; Ruda; R) 578 
Rudna -*■ Oradna
Rudolph I (Habsburg), Holy Rom. emp. 
(as Rudolph II), k. of Hungary (1576- 
1608) 261,263-264,294-296,304,306-
307, 317 
Ruga, Hunnish grand pr. 78 
Rugonfalva (Rugendorf; Ruganesti; R)
797 70
Russia 159, 263, 361, 369, 375, 381, 429,
448, 460, 497-498, 538-539, 570, 581, 
637, 643, 652, 656 
Russo-Romanian Pact 637
Saba, Gothic martyr 73-75 
Sabac (S) 231
Sabbatarians (Sabbatarianism) 328-329, 
351-352, 424 
Sachsentag (17 June 1890) 612 
Saguna, Andrei 510, 514, 518, 520, 528, 
532-533, 543, 552-554, 585, 614-615 
Saint Petersburg (RU) 399, 425, 429 
Saj6s5rvSr (Schart; ^irioara; R) 149,158,
162, 166,169 
Sajt6ny (-; £eitin; R) 132,135,137 
Sajti (Csan^d, c.; Sajt6ny, Sahtu; 0) 155 
Salan (ZaUn), Bulgarian chieftain 111 
Salard, dux 118
Salg6 (Salgovdr) (Orl^t) 166, 205 
Salg6tarj£n (N6gr5d, c.) 579 
Salmen, Franz von 490,528-529,531,546 
Salom on (Salam on), k. of Hungary 
(1063-1074) 141-142, 148,163 
Saloniki (Thessaloniki; GR) 185 — also 
Thessaloniki 
Samum (0) 61 
Sanatescu, C. 691 
Sdndor, JSnos 378 
S&ndor, J6zsef 596
Sanislau (Szeneslaus, Seneslav), Roma­
nian v. 197 
Sappel, Andreas 378 
Saragossa (SP) 118
Sarai, Visarion, Serbian Orthodox monk 
428
Sarajevo (BH) 187, 636
SArk&ny (Schirkanyen; ^ercaia; R) 191
Sarmatia 67
Sarmizegethusa (Colonia Dacica; Colonia 
Ulpia Traiana; Gredistye, V^rhely; Bur- 
gort; Gradiste, Sarmizegetusa; R) 24, 
28-29, 39, 41, 43, 46, 48, 52, 76, 98 
Sarmizegethusa Regia (Ujvarhely; - ; - ;  R) 
17, 29-30, 41-42 
Sarold (Nagy-KUkUll6, c.; 0) 125 
Sarolt (Sharolt), wife of grand pr. G6za 
124-145
Saromberke (Scharnberg; Dumbravio- 
ara; R) 79,205 
S^ros, c. 376
S^rospatak (Borsod-Abauj-Zemplen, c.) 
172, 364
S&rpatak (Sarpotoc; Scharpendorf;£apar- 
toc; R) 150 
S&rpataki, Merton, protonotary 399 
Sarvar (Beszterce-Nasz6d, c.) -> Saj6- 
sarvar
Sasul, Iancu, v. of Moldavia 262 
Savaria (Szombathely) (Vas, c.) 60 
Saxon and Swabian national councils 
(1918) 649,654 
Saxon University (Universitas Saxonum)
235, 287, 315, 345, 347, 363, 384, 396,
449, 491, 507, 529-531, 546, 553, 588,
600, 610 
Saxony 114,181
Scarbantia (Sopron) (Gy6r-Sopron-Mo- 
son, c.) 60 
Schaeseus, Christian 270, 292 
Schiller, Friedrich Johann Christoph 462 
Schleiermacher, Friedrich Ernst Daniel 
454
Schmerling, Anton von 542, 545, 550-
552
Schmidt, Konrad 543, 552 
SchOnhals, Karl von 5271-2 
Schreiber, Simon 517 
Schuller, Rudolf 646 
Schullerus, Fritz 596 t
Schuster, Friedrich Wilhelm 595 
Schwarzenberg, Carl, pr. 529, 596 
Schwendi, Lazarus von 259 
Scorilo, k. of Dacia -*• Coryllus 
Scythia Minor -> Dobrudja 
Sebes -*■ Kar^nsebes 
Sebesany (Felvinc; Sebesdorf; ^ibiseni; 
R) 103
Sebesvar, Sebesvaralja (-; Bologa; R) 202,
230
Second World War 683 
SegesvSr (Schassburg; ̂ ighisoara; R) 12, 
50, 64, 71, 83, 87, 94, 99,125,169,171,
183, 232, 234, 239, 241, 249, 274, 284,
409, 480, 490, 495, 514, 556 
Sehabedin, beylerbey 227 
Seidi, Ahmed, pasha of Buda 357 
Seivert, Johann 437 
Selim II, Ottoman sultan 261 
Sellemberk -+ Sellenberg 
Sellenberg (Sellemberk; Schellenberg;
^elimbar; R) 296 
Senyfii, Pal 208 
Seps (Sebes) 182, 208 
Sepsibeseny<5 (-; Padurenii; R) 241 
Sepsikilly6n (-; Chilieni; R) 241 
Sepsiszek (Seps, seat) 180,182, 212
SepsiszentgyOrgy (St. Georgen; Sfintu 
Gheorghe; R) 65,71,99-100,132,135,
169,173, 232, 277 
Sep ter (Siebendorf; ^opteriu; R) 65 
Serban, Constantin-* Constantin ̂ erban 
^erban, Radu -*■ Radu £erban 
Serbia 19-20,188,196, 204,539,636-637 
Serbian Orthodox church in Hungary 
429, 498-499 
Serdica (Sofia; BG) 65,187 
Seres (Serre; GR) 185 
Serfdom 222, 236, 398, 433, 473 ->• also 
Serfs
Serfs 199-200, 205-206, 209, 211, 215, 
220-222, 224-225, 233, 235, 278-280, 
282, 285, 333, 335, 338-339, 341, 343,
387-388, 390, 396, 419, 428, 430, 432, 
434, 442-445, 447, 449-450, 453, 457-
458, 462, 467, 469, 472, 476, 481, 485-
488, 536 -*  also Peasants, peasantry 
Sermon (Macvanska Mitrovica; S) 12320 
Serra, Antonio 406
Servetus, Michaelus (Servet, Miguel) 289 
Seuler, Lucas 405
Severus, Alexander, Rom. emp. 43, 51- 
52
Severus, Iulianus 34 
Severus, Septimius, Rom. emp. 40, 42- 
43
Shalan (Calan, Chalan) 125 
Sharkel 109 
Sicily 204
Siebenbtirgischer Verein ftir Naturwis- 
senschaften 584 
Siena (I) 240
Sigebert I, k. of Austrasia 91-92 
Sigismund (Zsigmond) (Luxemburg 
dyn.), Holy Rom. emp., k. of Hun­
gary (1387-1437), k. of Bohemia 143, 
148, 223-227 
Sigismund I, k. of Poland 252 
Sigmond, Elek 581 
Sikl6 (-; Piclau; R) 132-133,135, 137 
Sik6, Janos 405 
Silasi, Grigore 590, 594 
Silesia 256, 267, 295, 359, 398, 430 
Silistra (Dorostolon, Durostorum; Dristra;
BG) 110,121,124,135 
Silvestru, priest 350 
Simand (-; !pimand; R) 276 
Sim6nfalva (-; ^imonesti; R) 100,169 
Simeon I, tzar of Bulgaria 110-111,113, 
184
Simion, Balint 494”
Simion, Stefan 350 
Simon, ban 201 
Simon, b. of Trans. 147 
Simon, comes of the Szekelys 205 
Simonffy, J6zsef 51939 
Sinan, pasha, grand vizier 295 
Ipincai, Gheorghe 439, 456, 592 
Singidunum 32, 42, 81,101 -> also Bel­
grade 
Sipos, P&l 454
Sirmia (Sirmium; Szivaszentdemeter; 
Sremska Mitrovica; S) 60,87,92,123, 
12320
Siscia (Sziszek; Sisak; S) 22, 60 
Siskovics, J6zsef, baron 433 
Sixtus V, pope 262 
Skender, pasha 312-315, 318 
Skoplje (Scupi; M) 184,187-188 
Skylitzes, Ioannes 121 
Slavici, loan 594, 618 
Slavonia 103, 267 
Sion (R) 135
Slon-Prahova (R) 106,135 
Slovakia 8, 20-21,135,176 
Smighelsch, Octavian 597 
Smuts, Jan Christian 657 
Sobieski, Jan —» John 111, k. of Poland 
Societas Agriculturae 436 
Societas Philohistorum 456 
Society of Jesus 293 -> also Jesuits 
Society of Noble Youths 403 
Sockl, Theodor B. 596 
Socol, Aurel 686
Sofia (Serdica; BG) 55,183-184,187-188 
Sofronie -» Popovici, Stan 
Sokollu Mehmed, grand vizier 257 
Solferino (I) 539 
Soltesz (Schultheiss) 196 
Solymos (Arad, c.; Lippa; -; ^oirnus; R) 
250
Sombori, Julianna 4689 
Somker6k (Sinteragen; 5?intereag; R) 149 
Sommer, Johannes 290 
Somogyvcir (Somogy, c.) 142 
Soppel, Andreas 378 
Sopron (Sopronvar) (Gy6r-Sopron-Mo- 
son, c.) 159, 298, 366 
Sopron, c. 120 
Sorban, (IstvSn) ken6z 217 
Sorost61y (Schoresten; Sorostin; R) 406 
Soterius, Michael 453 
S6vcirad (n SzovSta; Sarateni; R) 70 
Soviet Russia 641
Soviet Union 665, 684, 688, 691-692
Sozzino, Fausto (Socinus, Faustus) 291 
Spain 114, 262, 375 
Spantov (R) 70
Spargapeithes, Agathyrsian k. 15
Spener, Jakob 405
Speyer (G) 259-260, 263-264, 271
Srjedec -» Serdica
Staatsrat 432, 458
Stalin, Joseph Visiaronovitch 692
Staple right of the towns 233
Statius, Priscus 36
!ptefan cel Mare (the Grand), v. of Mol­
davia 229 
Stephen (Istvan) I (Saint), k. of Hungary 
(1001-1038) 108, 119, 124-128, 139, 
141-146, 153-154, 160-163, 167-169,
174, 204
Stephen (Istvan) II, k. of Hungary (1116- 
1131) 143,169 
Stephen (Istvan) III, k. of Hungary 
(1162-1172) 143,153, 169, 172-173 
Stephen (Istvan) IV, k. of Hungary 
(1163-1165) 203 
Stephen (Istvan) V, k. of Hungary (1270- 
1272) 203
Stephen, (Habsburg), archduke, palatine 
of Hungary (1847-1848) 495 
Stepney, George, Lord 379 
Sterca Sulutiu, Iosif 543, 548, 553 
Stere, Constantin 633 
Stibor Stiborici, v. of Trans. (1395-1401;
1409-1414) 223 
Strabon, Greek geograph 19 
Stranover, Tobias 403 
Stranoves, Jeremias 409 
Strattmann, Heinrich Johann 369 
Stroescu, Vasile 633 
Sturdza, Dimitrie A. 619, 621-622, 624 
Stuttgart (G) 575 
Suceava (R) 98 
Sucidava (Celei) 78
Suleiman I, Ottoman sultan 247-250,
252-253, 256, 258-259, 354 
Sulla, P. Cornelius 19 
Sulutiu -> Sterca Sulutiu, Iosif 
Sulyok, Imre 266
Supplex Libellus Valachorum 451, 453,
456, 476
Svatopluk I, pr. of Moravia 111-113 
Svatopluk II, pr. of Moravia 113 
Sweden 319,323,330,332,355,365,375,
377, 385, 576-577 
Switzerland 403, 408, 480, 482, 492
Synod
-  of BalAzsfalva (1744) 428 
Orthodox -  of Szeben (1860) 542 
Saxon Lutheran -  288 
Syrmia 86-87, 89,103 -> also Sirmium
Szabadhely (Szombathely; - ;  Simbateni;
R) 155,191 
Szabolcs (SzabolcsvSr) 158-159 
Szabolcs, c. 288, 299 
Sz&deczky-Kardoss, Gyula 591 
SzakadAt -> OltszakadAt 
Szakil, Ferenc 399
Szalacs (-; Salacea; R) 134-135,137,142, 
145
Szal&rd (-; Salard; R) 118 
Szalcirdi, J&nos 342, 410 
Szalonta -> Nagyszalonta 
Szamosfalva (n Kolozsvar; Someschdorf;
Someseni; R) 83-85, 101 
SzamosjenS (Jeno, Kisjeno; - ; Fundatura; 
R) 88
SzamoskOzy, Istvan 292, 410 
SzamosujvSr (NeuschloG; Gherla; R) 15, 
76, 259, 278, 286, 422 
Sz£nt6 (TusnAdszAnt6; Santau; R) 118 
SzapAry, Gyula, count, pr. min. (1890- 
1892) 605, 605", 612, 620 
Szapolyai dyn., Royal dyn. of Hungary
254, 258-259, 263-264, 269, 275, 292, 
307
Szapolyai, JAnos -» John I, k. of Hun­
gary
SzSraz, Antal -> Hampel, J6zsef 
SzArhegy (Csfk, c.; -; Lazarea; R) 409 
Szarvas (B6k6s, c.) 129 
Szcisz, JAnos 381 
SzAsz, Karoly 462, 497, 533, 596 
Szcisz, PA1 689
SzAszbogAcs (Bogeschdorf; Bagaciu; R)
241
SzAszfejeregyh&za (W eifikirchen, 
Deutschweifikirch; Viscri; R) 70,172,
241
SzSszfenes (Fenesch; Floreati; R) 357 
SzAszfOld (Terra Saxonum) (Land of the 
Saxons) 181,191, 211, 224, 232, 240-
241, 271, 419-420, 468, 479, 481-482,
490-491, 507-508, 517, 531, 549, 549,
574, 610 - *  also Kir&lyfflld (Kttnigs- 
boden)
SzdszhermAny (Brass6, c.; Honigberg; 
Harman; R) 5, 70-71, 99
SzAszk6zd (Kezd; Keisd; Saschiz; R) 150, 
172, 182-183 
SzAszmuzsna (Mechen; Mosna; R) 50729 
SzAszorb6 (Urwegen; Glrbova; R) 149,
172, 208
SzAszr6gen (Sachsisch-Reen; Reghin; R) 
181, 512, 564 
Szdszsebes (MOhlbach; Sebes; R) 78, 84, 
103,172, 180, 226, 232, 239, 241, 252, 
258, 482, 556 
SzAszvAros (Broos; Orastie; R) 180, 224,
232, 274, 403, 507, 530-531 
SzathmSry Pap, KAroly 596 
Szatmar - *  Szatmar-Nemeti 
SzatmSr, c. 102,147,176, 216, 220, 288,
299, 566, 582, 648, 677 
SzatmAr-Nemeti (Szatmar, Szatmdrvar; 
Sathmar; Satu-Mare; R) 112,144,158,




S) 12320-> also Sirmium 
Szeben -» Nagyszeben 
Szeben, c. 205
Szebensz6k (Szeben, seat) 180-181 
Szechenyi, IstvAn, count 540 
Sz6chy, GyOrgy 320 
Sz6cs6ny (N6grad, c.) 378 
Sz6csenyi, TamAs, v. of Trans. (1321- 
1342) 205
Szeged (CsongrSd, c.) 175, 242, 255, 277,
288, 521, 535, 582, 656 
Sz6k (seat) (judicial and administrative 
district of the Saxons and the Sz6kelys 
in Trans.)
Saxon -  181-182, 211, 235, 283, 377, 
446, 461, 466, 480, 507, 606 
Szekely -  180, 446, 507, 606, 641 
Sz6k (Szikakna-, Seek; Sic; R) 208, 232 
Szekely Action (Action for Sz6kely In­
dustry) 572, 633 
Szekely Division 657-658 
Szekely (D6zsa), GyOrgy 235, 238 
Szekely, Bertalan 597 
Szekely, Bertalan, the younger 596 
Szekely, LSszl6 387, 399 
Szekely, M6zes (Moses), pr. of Trans.
(1603) 297,314 
Szekely, M6zes, son of M6zes Szekely, 
pr. of Trans. 328 
Szikelybanja (n VArhegy) 268, 285 
Sz6kelydalya (-; Daia; R) 242 
Sz6kelyderzs (-; Dirjiu; R) 135 800
Szekelyfold (Terra Siculorum) (Land of 
the SzSkelys) 135,148,173, 176,189, 
191, 208-209, 213, 224, 235-236, 238, 
240-241, 249, 271, 283-285, 333-334, 
336, 359-360, 377, 385, 407, 419-421, 
432-433, 448, 462, 489, 513-514, 529,
534, 537, 540, 548-549, 551, 559, 564,
575, 577, 579, 604, 609, 625, 628, 639-
641, 649, 674-675, 677, 685-686 
Sz6kelyhld (-; Sacueni; R) 98, 362 
Szekelykeresztur (Kreutz; Cristuru Se- 
cuiesc; R) 71, 95, 98,100,169 
Sz6kelypetc5falva (Petersdorf; Peteni; R) 
173
Szekelyszallas (Szeklerzollesch; Salasuri; 
R) 99
Szekelyszenterzsebet (-; Eliseni; R) 99, 
169
Szekelytamad (n Szekelyudvarhely) 268, 
285
Szekelyudvarhely (Udvarhely; Odorhel- 
len, Hofmarkt; Odorhei Secuiesc; R) 
83, 169, 171, 180, 182, 212, 232, 237, 
284-285, 293, 386, 432, 436, 472 
Sz6kes (-; Colibi; R) 198-199 
Sz6kesfeh6rv3r (Fejer, c.) 119,135,141-
144,161,174, 247 
Szekudvar (-; Socodor; R) 95 
Szelindek (Stolzenburg; Slimnic; R) 83 
Szelistye (Olahnagyfalu; Grossdorf; Sa- 
liste; R) 558,576 
Sz£ll, Kalman, pr. min. (1899-1903) 625 
Szemere, Bertalan 522, 52245, 535 
Szenci Kert6sz, Abraham 349, 404 
Szent-AbrahSmi, Mih&ly 425 
SzentabrahSm (-; Avramesti; R) 169 
Szentagota (Agnetheln; Agnita; R) 234 
Szentbenedek (-; Minastirea; R) 287,408 
Szentdomokos ->• Csfkszentdomokos 
Szentendre (Pest, c.) 93 
Szentes (Csongrad, c.) 88 
Szentgotth&rd (Vas, c.) 362 
SzentgyOrgyi, Janos, v. of Trans. (1465- 
1467) 228
Szentgyorgyvalya (-; Valea Singeorgiu- 
lui; R) 95
Szentimre (Marosszentimre; - ; Sintim- 
bru; R) 227,386 
Szentjakab ->• Mezfiszentjakab 
Szentjobb (-; £iniob; R) 142 
Szentkeresztbanya (Karlshiitte; Vlahioa; 
R) 580
Szentlaszlovara (Krasso-Szoreny, c.; 0) 
87,166
Szentmihalyk0rtv61yes (Peri; U) 220, 
242-243 
Szentmiklos (Torda, c.; 0) 163 
Szepess6g (Zips) 259 
Szerdahely (Reussmarkt; Miercurea; R) 
180, 614 
Szeremi, GyOrgy 292 
Szer6ms6g 12320 -> also Sirmium 
Szerencs (N6grid, c.) 298 
Szigethi-Gyula, Istvan, Calvinist b. 424 
Szigetv&r (Baranya, c.) 259, 354 
Szildgy, c. 279, 288 -> also SzilSgys^g 
SzilAgyi, Mihaly, gov. of Hungary (1458- 
1459) 228 
Sziligyi, S^ndor 591 
Szilagynagyfalu (-; Nusfalau; R) 101-
102
Szilcigynyfres (Kisnyi'res; - ; Ciuta R) 101 
Szilcigyscig 150,175 -> also Szildgy, c. 
Szilagysomly6 (-; ^imleui Silvaniei; R) 
77,79
Szilagyujlak (-; Lfileacul Silvaniei; R) 77 
Szind (-; Sandulesti; R) 163 
Szinna (Snina; SL) 248 
Szitabodza (Magyarbodza; - ; Sita Buza- 
ului; R) 4 
Szkharosi Horv£t, Andres 288 
Sz6kefalva (-; Seuca; R) 513 
SzokmSnd -> Vadverem 
Szolgabir6 -> Nobles' judge 
Szolnok (J^sz-Nagykun-Szolnok, c.)
175, 257, 272, 315, 326 
Szolnok, c. 145,152, 200, 204 
Szolnok-Doboka, c. 556, 589, 606 
Szombathely (Arad, c.; 0) 155 
Szombathely (Fogaras, c.; 0) 191 
Szombathely (Vas, c.) 60 
Sz6nok (Szolnok), comes -> Zounuk 
SzOrcse (-; Surcea; R) 17 
Szor^ny (Szorenyvar, Szorenytomya; Dro- 
beta; Tumu Severin; R) 193,196,227, 
231, 684 -> also Drobeta 
SzOreny, c. 230
Szfirenys6g -► Banat of Sz0r6ny 
SztrigyszentgyOrgy (-; Streisingeorgiu; 
R) 169,220
Tabula Peutingeriana 35, 52 
Tacitus, Publius Cornelius 16, 24 
Taksony (Taxin, Taxun, Caxun), Hung.
pr. 120,124 
Taksony (Taxun, Caxun) (Als6-Feher, c.; 
0) 120,157
Talmdcs (Szeben, c.; Talmesch; Talma- 
ciu; R) 150,172,182,191,193 
Tam&s, b. 288 
TamSsi, Aron 679, 681 
Tapae (0) 27
Tcipi6gy6rgye (Pest, c.) 59 
Tara Romaneasca (Romanian land) 192 
-» also Wallachia 
Tarbus, Barbarian chieftain 39 
TSrkdny (KOrOstarkany; - ; Tarcacici; R)
117-118
Tarpa (Szabolcs-SzatmSr, c.) 101 
Tasnad (Trestendorf; Tasnad; R) 277,279 
Tattenbach, Erasmus 364 
Tax, taxation 154,180,197,199-200,207,
224, 228, 237, 268, 272, 276-277, 279-
280, 282-283, 301, 308, 316-317, 329, 
335-336, 382, 385, 394-396, 417-418, 
421, 423, 427, 431, 442, 447, 450, 460- 
461, 470, 483, 487, 489, 528, 530, 573 
Teke (Tekendorf; Teaca; R) 183, 201 
TekerSpatak (-; Valea Strimba; R) 70, 
74, 76 
Telegd -> Mezfitelegd 
Teleki, Domokos, count 545, 550 
Teleki, J6zsef, count, gov. of Trans., his­
torian 485,487,481,496 
Teleki, Liszl6 (1710-1778), count 431 
Teleki, U sz l6 (1811-1861), count 521,
52143, 535, 540 
Teleki, Mihaly, count, chanc. of Trans. 
360, 363-365, 368, 370-371, 390, 392,
399, 406
Teleki, Mihaly, count, son of Mihaly Te­
leki, captain-general of K6v£r 377-
378, 381
Teleki, Pal, count, pr. min. (1920-1921, 
1939-1941) 659,684-685 
Teleki, Samuel, count, chanc. of Trans. 
457
Temes, c. 117,143, 217, 221, 230 
Temeseli Desi, P6ter 231 
TemeskOz (Region of Temes) 32, 34-35, 
39,59,63,67,92-95,106,117,123,128, 
137-138,143, 149,153,160, 230, 256-
257, 269, 271, 288, 294 
Temesliget (-; Padureni; R) 138 
Temesvar (Temeschwar; Timisoara; R)
95, 121, 132, 134-135, 137, 168, 174, 
238, 257, 288, 295, 312, 315, 359, 368- 
369, 402, 559-560, 565, 597, 642, 645, 
654, 666, 669, 672, 681 
Tempea, Radu 457 
Tepes, Vlad -*■ Vlad 'J'epes
Terentius Scaurianus, D„ proconsul of 
Dacia 30 
Terra Blacorum -*• Barcasdg 
Terra Transalpina -*■ Wallachia 
Territory of M6c 574 
Tettius Iulianus 27 
Teuthonic knights 182,189,192,197 
Teutsch, Andreas 405 
Teutsch, Friedrich 611 
Teutsch, Georg Daniel 584, 597 
Teutsch, Traugott 595 
Tevel(i), son of pr. Arpad 118,121 
Thalmann, Gustav 612 
Theodosius II, Byz. emp. 78-79, 83 
Theophil, painter 220 
Theophilus, b. 373 
Theophilus, Byz. emp. 109 
Theophylactos, b. 12421 
Theophylactos, patriarch 121 
Theory of the Daco-Roman continuity 
427, 439, 451, 457, 474, 499-500, 673 
Thessaloniki (GR) 114,122 - *  also Salo- 
niki
Thessaly (GR) 187
Theudepert or Theodebert, k. of Aus- 
trasia 80 
Thietmar, b. of Merseburg 126 
ThOkoly, Imre (Emeric), pr. of Upper 
Hungary, later of Trans. (1690) 366- 
369, 371, 376-378 
Thorisinde, Gothic k. 89 
Thoroczkai Wigand, Ede 597 
Thracia (Thrace) 19, 55, 57, 62, 78, 86, 
122
Three Nations of Trans. (Tres nationes 
Transylvaniae) 221,226,228,238,251,
253-254, 259, 265, 267, 270, 274, 311,
317, 338, 371, 427, 430, 446-447, 449, 
451-452, 47715, 481 -> also Nation 
(natio)
Three seats —► Haromsz6k 
Thuringia (G) 86, 214 
Thurz6, Gydrgy, count, palatine of Hun­
gary (1609-1616) 310, 312, 319 
Thurz6, Imre, count 322 
Thurz6, Szaniszl6, count 322 
Tiberius, Romanian emp. 23-24, 26 
Tibiscum (Zsuppa; -; Jupa; R) 35, 42 
Tib6d (-; Tibodu; R) 38 
Tih6 (-; Tihau; R) 63 
Tilly, Johann Tserclaes, count 298 
Tin6di Lantos, Sebestyen 290 
Tirgoviste (R) 295, 309-310 
Tirgsor (R) 70
Tisza, Istvdn, count, pr. min. (1903-1905; 
1913-1917) 626-628, 633-635, 63535, 
636, 63638, 637-638 
Tisza, Kdlmdn, pr. min. (1875-1890) 
605-606, 612 
Tiszaalpdr (Castrum Olpar; Alpdr, Alpdr- 
vSr) 158
Tiszantul 176, 259, 275-276, 286, 289, 
298-299 
Titel (Titelvar, Titel; S) 158 
"Tized" (tenth) (tax) 224 —> also Tax, 
taxation
Tokaj (Borsod-Abauj-Zempl6n, c.) 123,
248, 273, 299 
Toldy, Ferenc 48221
Tolerance Edict of Joseph II (1781) 441, 
451
Tolnai, Lajos 595
Tolnai Dali, Jdnos 346
Tolnai F., Istvdn 400
Tomori, Istvdn 248
Tomori, F&l, archb. of Kalocsa 238
Tompa, K. 10116
Topdnfalva (Topesdorf; Deusara; Cim- 
peni; R) 442, 51939, 540 
Toppeltinus, Laurentius (TOppelt, Lo­
renz) 410 
TOrcsvdr (Torzburg; Bran; R) 268 
Torda (Potaissa, Thorenburg; Turda; R)
118-119, 125, 134, 138, 144-145, 148,
154, 157, 163,171, 182, 202, 223, 238,
242, 253-254, 256, 258, 265, 273-275, 
277, 290, 386, 398, 564, 568, 574, 581, 
615, 621 -*■ also Potaissa 
Torda, c. 118,143,200-202,206-207,209,
212, 445, 672 
Torda-Aranyos, c. 604 
Tordaakna (n Torda) 144,148,163 
Tordai, Demeter 288 
Tordos (Hunyad, c.; Tordosujvdr; Thom- 
dorf; Turdas; R) 157 
Torja (-; Turia; R) 173 
Tormds (Termatchu), Hung, chieftain 
121
Torockai, Jdnos 329 
Torock6 (Eisenmarkt; Rimetea; R) 132, 
238, 388, 558, 580 
Torock6szentgy0rgy (-; Coltesti; R) 445 
TOrok, Bdlint of Enying 249-250, 252 
TOrtik, Jdnos of Enying 254, 256 
Torontdl, c. 648 
Torony (Torontdl, c., 0) 288 
Tortensson, Leonhard, count 331 
T6tfalusi Kis, Mikl6s -> Miszt6tfalusi
8 0 3  Kis, Mikl6s
Toumai (F) 84
To vis (Dreikirchen; Teius; R) 95,296,568 
Traian (Traianus) Marcus Ulpius, Rom. 
emp. 29-31,41,44-45,55-56,61,175,
427, 476
Trajan (Traianus) Decius, Rom. emp. 52 
Transylvania Society 617 
Trau (Trogir; CR) 195 
Traun (A) 120 
Trauschenfels, Franz 550 
Treasury (Transylvanian) 268, 279, 286,
294, 304, 316, 329, 336, 389, 458, 578-
579
Trefort, Agoston 615 
Tres Daciae 39 -+ also Dacia 
Trianon (F) 659-660, 665, 669 
Tribuna 594, 618, 621, 631, 633 
Tribuna Ardealului 686 
Tribuna Popurului 626 
Tribunists 625-626
Tripartitum of Werbficzy (1517) 285,290 
Triple Alliance 617-618 
Troesmis (-; Igli|a; R) 38 
Troester, Johann 341, 410 
Tschimhaus, Walter Ehrenfried 405 
Turda, comes 144 
Ttiri, Ldszl6 452-453 
Turkey 264, 269, 311, 377, 438, 535 -> 
also Empire 
Turkia 109,117,121-122,12421, 14729 
Tumu Severin ->• Szoreny 
Turzol, Cuman chieftain 111 
Tusndd (Tuschnad; Tu^nad; R) 572,625 
Typographica Officina of Miszt6tfalusi 
404
Tyrol (A) 387 
Tzimisces, Ioannes 124 
Tzimlianskoe gorodishtche (White For­
tress) 109
Udvarhely -> Szekelyudvarhely 
Udvarhely, c. 556, 604 
Udvarhelyszek (Udvarhely, seat) 176,
183, 212
Ugocsa, c. 147, 216, 220, 288, 299, 648 
Ugra (Galt; Ungra; R) 191 
Ugra (Ungra; Galt; Ungra; R) 191 
Ugramonostor (Monastery of Ugra; Bihar, 
c . ;0) 166 
Ugravar -*• Hevizugra 
Ugron, Gdbor 617 
Uj-Torda 160 
Ujakna 148
Ujegyhcizasszek (Ujegyhazas, seat) 180
Ujlaki, Mikl6s 227 
Uj6s (Eisch; Fintinele; R) 70, 79 
Ujvdr (KUkUllS, c.; 0) 202 
Ujvar —► Marosujvar 
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The history o f Transylvania is a history of three nations who lived side by 
side for centuries. This region’s past is important for each o f them for a variety 
of reasons. There was a time when the principality was the last sanctuary of 
Hungarian political life and culture. The Romanians also see it as the cradle of 
their nation, where the first Romanian book was published, and Romanian 
national feeling was born. The Transylvanian Saxons lived here, as the eastern­
most outpost o f their people, a world totally different from their original one to 
which they contributed much, bringing a western life-style, and from which they 
learned much, shaping their own distinct culture.
The centuries-long coexistence resulted in both understanding and differen­
ces. These differences have in part been solved by time, yet have in part become 
stronger, even turning to haired. The most important corner stone of national 
consciousness is history: most of these differences are, whether real or imagined, 
of a historical context. Today, when the rights of individuals or communities, 
the securing o f a future, have become key issues for the civilized world, a 
centuries-long coexistence like this and the historical tensions which accompany 
it certainly have a strange fascination that goes beyond the general teachings of 
history.
This is why Akadcmiai Kiado has decided to publish an abridged version 
of the original three-volume set Erdely tortenele (History of Transylvania), 
which has also been previously published in French and German. We hope that 
the message of tolerance in this book will reach an even broader reading public.
